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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XLIV

JANUARY TO JUNE 1939

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XLIV.—JANUARY TO JUNE 1939.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 246/246/25]

No. 1.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 10, 1939.)

(No. 231.)

My Lord,

Jedda, December 13, 1938.

IN my despatch No. 224 dated the 5th December I had the honour to report to you on the changed attitude of Ibn Saud towards Koweit, and on the 6th December I addressed a letter to Mr. Baxter in which I mentioned Ibn Saud's reluctance, as reported by the manager of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, to allow a British firm to establish itself on the mainland of Hasa. At the risk of some repetition, I now furnish a brief report on Ibn Saud's general attitude towards the Arab rulers in the Persian Gulf. It is well known that he has always resented his dependence on Bahrein if not on Koweit as well, that he despises the smaller sheikhs, and that he considers that the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the Persian Gulf has the effect of hemming him in. During the last year or two various new factors have been introduced into the problem: the discovery of oil in various Arab territories; the increase in the influence of Iraq; movements in Arab territories which for convenience can be described as democratic; and the real or simulated belief in some Arab circles that His Majesty's Government are engaged in a "forward movement" in the Gulf; and it will be convenient to make a brief survey of the whole position in the light of these new factors.

2. The personal respect which Ibn Saud has for His Highness the Sheikh of Bahrein was shown when the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia visited Bahrein a year ago and on the occasion of the return visit of the sheikh to the Hejaz shortly afterwards. The King, when speaking to me about the visit, praised the sheikh as an excellent man, and, moreover, of the same tribal origin as himself, while the Amir Saud spoke of the difference between the sheikh and the other Arab rulers, whom he described as rather Boeotian. During my recent visit to Riyadh Ibn Saud spoke with concern about the sheikh, whose position he considered was endangered by the Persian intrigues, which, in his opinion, had caused the recent agitation. He became quite animated in his sympathy. There was the Zubara question, too, he said, that remained open. I said I thought this question had been settled (I did not say that the decision of His Majesty's Government was not to support the Bahrein claim), but the King said it was by no means settled. This was the first reference to the Zubara question since the conversation with Fuad Hamza which I reported in my despatch No. 18 of the 1st February, 1938, except that some months ago one of the Mecca newspapers printed an obscure paragraph, which did not mention Zubara by name but referred to what could only be the Zubara dispute, and alleged that it had been exacerbated by the discovery of oil at the place concerned.

3. If there was nothing novel in the King's praise of the Sheikh of Bahrein on this recent occasion, to hear him praise the Sheikh of Koweit was certainly quite new. Hitherto, we have always been given to understand that he regarded the sheikh as the leader of a gang of smugglers responsible for the loss of an immense annual revenue to Saudi Arabia. Now, however, I was told of the traditional bonds between Ibn Saud and Koweit, and assured of his desire for the maintenance of the sheikh's position and dignity; and was asked to expedite the conclusion of that Saudi-Koweit Agreement for which he had previously shown so little enthusiasm. A year or two years ago the *Saut-al-Hejaz* would not have published the article on Koweit which appears in the issue of the 6th December. This article begins: "Koweit is a pure Arab country, distinguished by its mildness and tranquillity. Its people are known for their Arab nobility of character, which they have inherited from their honourable ancestors." In my above-mentioned despatch I tried to provide some explanation for this change of attitude, and suggested as the principal causes a growing realisation that Ras Tanura may be less successful than was hoped; suspicion of Iraq; and apprehension at the movement in Koweit which has resulted in the establishment of a council to assist in the government of that territory. It is early to give a decided opinion about Ras Tanura, and it might perhaps be justifiable to draw the opposite conclusion, viz., that the possession of a port of his own made Ibn Saud believe that few, if any, imports would now come in through Koweit; but it is certain that the other two considerations have had some influence on Ibn Saud's mind. The course of events in Koweit has not been in accordance with his conception of constitutional procedure in an Arab and a Moslem State. Some time ago he told me that he listened to the advice of his people and then governed in accordance with the principles of Islam, and he assented to my suggestion that his country was under a religious constitution. There is no doubt that, although he takes his own decisions, he does listen to the opinions of the *ulema* and of the tribal sheikhs; but he thinks it wrong that the Sheikh of Koweit should have to listen to a "self-appointed" council containing elements which, in Ibn Saud's opinion, are far from having the necessary prestige or position. But, says Ibn Saud, it would have been quite proper for the sheikh to summon men of position to form a council and to ask their advice.

4. I must repeat that Ibn Saud apologised, when I made some deprecating remark, for speaking about the internal affairs of Bahrein and Koweit, and explained that he was thinking of his own position, which might be affected by that of his neighbours.

5. Ibn Saud was indignant at what he had heard of Iraqi designs on Koweit. The efforts made by the Iraqi Government this year to draw tighter the commercial, financial and military bonds with Saudi Arabia have not weakened his suspicions, and their desire to have a port at Koweit—perhaps as a prelude to absorption—is the last straw. He did not refer to Iraqi propaganda elsewhere, but it was no doubt present to his mind, for Arabic newspapers have referred more than once to the populations of the minor Arab States in the Gulf as looking towards Iraq. Ibn Saud's jealousy of Iraq has been exacerbated recently by the rather flamboyant statements made by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs about Palestine on his return from London, and just as he is trying to prove, by his negotiations in connexion with the forthcoming London discussions, that, as he has claimed in so many words, it is he and not "certain others" who is the leader of the Arab world, so he may be wishing to counteract Iraqi influence in the Gulf by concluding the Koweit Agreement, thereby enhancing the position of the sheikh and emphasising the importance of the relations between Koweit and Saudi Arabia.

6. Ibn Saud made no reference to the minor Arab rulers during my visit to Riyadh, but Fuad Hamza asked me, obviously on instructions and with much earnestness, about the possibility of a solution of the eastern frontier difficulty. Moreover, when the King was deprecating hostile action against the Yemeni forces in Shabwa, Fuad said that our action would inevitably be linked up in the public mind with what is regarded as our "forward policy" in the Persian Gulf. When called upon to define this policy he could only say that some Arabs attributed the establishment of the council in Koweit to the British, who had found the sheikh too independent and desired to have a more subservient instrument, and refer to a movement in the direction of councils in some of the minor sheikhdoms. Fuad did not pretend that he himself held any such belief, and admitted that he

had brought back from Koweit, where he stayed on his way from Bagdad, a more reasonable theory; but it is admitted that His Majesty's Government have thought it necessary to extend and strengthen their control in the Hadhramaut, and Arabs cannot be blamed if they look for signs of a similar process nearer home. Ibn Saud has no love for the minor sheikhs, least of all for the Sheikh of Qatar, but a general movement towards the reduction of the status of Arab rulers could not be pleasing to him. His low opinion of the young men in the Hejaz, who are supposed to desire the modernisation of Saudi Arabia, has been expressed more than once, and he would naturally regret the appearance at his door, in however rudimentary a form, of a system which he is resolved not to see established in his own country.

7. Finally, in spite of his general desire to work with His Majesty's Government, and of his assertion that, on grounds of security, he would rather have the British as his neighbours than the Amir Abdullah or the Iraqi Government, he would certainly not welcome an increase in British control in the territories of his Arab neighbours in the Gulf. He must be well aware of the tendency of European control in eastern countries to spread, and of the keenness of the competition for oil-bearing lands, and the unfortunate course of the Jabal Nakhsh affair seems to have caused him to believe that our policy in the Persian Gulf is influenced by oil interests. I do not doubt, therefore, that in conversation with Mr. Lenahan he did show some reluctance to allow a British firm to establish themselves at Ras Tanura, which is to be the port for the shipment of Hasa oil. In the end the unique position which Messrs. Gray Mackenzie already hold in the Gulf, and the facilities which they are consequently in a position to offer, should enable them to secure the permission they require, but they will have much suspicion to live down. It is to be expected that Ibn Saud's attitude towards them will be influenced not only by what happens in the Gulf, but by the result of the London discussions on Palestine, and even perhaps by the outcome of the Anglo-Yemeni dispute about Shabwa and Abr. Our position will be none the easier if, as is reported by His Majesty's Embassy at Bagdad, there is to be a German mission at Jedda, unless the Germans are so foolish as to overdo their propaganda—a great mistake where Ibn Saud is concerned. It is to be hoped that the Hansa Line, who are said to have been making strenuous efforts to establish themselves at Bahrein, will not succeed in their attempt to obtain permission to extend their activities to the mainland. It is certain that the California Arabian Standard Oil Company are well content with the services rendered by Messrs. Gray Mackenzie, and would like to be able to utilise them at Ras Tanura; nor is there any outward sign that the Saudi authorities are considering the Hansa Line application; but the Germans may be expected to offer favourable terms, and they have the great advantage that their country cannot be accused of hemming Ibn Saud in.

8. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, to the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire, to the Political Agents at Koweit and Bahrein, to his Excellency the Governor of Aden, and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

[E 369/56/91]

No. 2.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 13, 1939.

MY telegram No. 206 of 21st December.

According to Ibn Saud, the Imam informs him that in correspondence with the Aden Government he has stuck to his point about Abr and reminded them about the "mediation."

Ibn Saud wants to take immediate steps to reply. Unless it has been decided to give way about Abr, I suggest he be asked to tell the Imam that the words of the Aden Government are the words of His Majesty's Government.

[E 586/6/31]

No. 3.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord,

Jedda, January 2, 1939.

SOON after my arrival in Riyadh in November Mr. Philby informed me that he had sent off to a number of papers in Egypt and England, as well as to the *Oriente Moderno* and to some German newspaper (I think the *Berliner Tageblatt*), an account of an interview with Ibn Saud on the subject of Palestine. He claimed that he had at last induced the King to throw off his subservience to His Majesty's Government and to pronounce himself on two points, viz., that it was unjust to take land away from Arabs and give it to Jews; and that if a Jewish State were formed he would not recognise it. I took no action about this, partly because I reckoned that the interview must have appeared already in some Egyptian paper, if not elsewhere as well, and partly because the statement of policy which His Majesty's Government had just issued took the wind out of Mr. Philby's sails.

2. I had not seen the interview in any newspaper, or heard of its publication, until I received the November number of the *Oriente Moderno*: it gives to the interview, which is dated from Riyadh on the 12th August, 1938, the place of honour and a delightful footnote implying that no European country except Great Britain ever criticised the policy of "Germany and other countries" in driving out the Jews. In one respect, M. Philby's statement to me went further than the King's words warranted: what the King said about recognition of a Jewish State, if one should be set up, was that he would do what the other Arabs did. Moreover, the whole article shows what difficulty Mr. Philby had in screwing any critical remarks out of the King. On one point, however, Ibn Saud did in the end speak very strongly. He describes the Balfour Declaration as Great Britain's greatest injustice, speaks of the ancestral rights of the Arabs in Palestine, claims that the promises to the Arabs should take precedence of that given to the Jews, and asks a question to which later events have given a sharper point, viz., how can Europe criticise Germany and other countries for driving out Jews from territories where they are in a minority, and find nothing to criticise in an attempt to drive out the Arabs from their own country in order that the Jews may live there?

3. It will be remembered that early in 1937 (my telegram No. 29, dated the 31st March, 1937) Mr. Philby claimed to have secured from Ibn Saud for publication at his discretion a rather violent statement on the subject of Palestine. This statement never appeared: Ibn Saud may have withdrawn it, or attached to it some condition which Mr. Philby did not mention. But Ibn Saud burnt his boats by the interview now published. It is true that at the London discussions he will inevitably take up in the person of the Amir Faisal an attitude which will effectively prevent his relapsing into silence on the subject of Palestine, but the interview was given over two months before His Majesty's Government issued the report of the Technical Commission and their statement of policy, and may be taken as a proof of the pressure to which Ibn Saud must have been subjected, by Arab and other Moslem critics and by his own feelings, to give some outward sign of the direction in which his sympathies lay.

4. Having expressed so strong an opinion in August, it is not surprising that Ibn Saud should now allow the Mecca press to refer to the question of Palestine in less colourless language than before. I was about to report that the *Saut-al-Hijaz* had published two articles which were a little more definite than usual, when Fuad informed me that the King had decided, in view of the criticism which had been directed against the *Umm-al-Qura* for its silence on the Palestine question, to allow that paper greater latitude on the subject. A few days later there appeared an article which may be taken as Ibn Saud's own words. I have the honour to transmit a summary of this article herewith. It is mild in comparison with some of the articles which have appeared in the press in Egypt and Iraq, but, in its reference to the Jews as "vagrants . . . who have introduced into Palestine customs and manners repugnant to the feelings of the rightful inhabitants," and its description of the Balfour Declaration as cruel and unjust, it marks a long step from which Ibn Saud would find it very difficult to draw back.

5. In my telegram No. 180 of the 28th November last, and in my despatch No. 218 of the same date, I stated that it seemed to me that this was our last chance, so far as Ibn Saud was concerned. I did not know at that time that he had reached the limit of patience in August. Should the policy adopted by His Majesty's Government after the London discussions be substantially unsatisfactory to the Arabs, we cannot expect Ibn Saud to refrain from open criticism, and if he proceeds from criticism to action we shall have little ground for complaint. I venture to repeat a sentence from my above-mentioned despatch No. 218:—

"I have no doubt that (Ibn Saud) considers that our behaviour in Palestine is little, if at all, better than the German treatment of the Jews."

We now find that he had already uttered that very sentiment in the interview which he granted to Mr. Philby last August. Fortunately, Ibn Saud now has before him not only Lord Baldwin's moving appeal for the Jews in Germany, but also the speech on Palestine which Mr. Malcolm Macdonald made in the House of Commons on the 24th November, and it is to be hoped that the policy which will be adopted as the result of the London discussions will finally convince him that the British are not after all the canting hypocrites which he had begun to believe they must be.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Summary of a leading article from the Umm-al-Qura of December 23, 1938.

THE news has been announced by wireless broadcast that the Saudi Government, with other Arab Governments, has accepted the invitation of the British Government to participate in discussions which are to take place in London with a view to the settlement of the Palestine problem. This is news of the first importance, both as indicating a change of policy and as showing that the British Government have been convinced by the reasonable arguments addressed by the Arabs and their Governments.

It is not surprising that Palestine should constitute the foremost problem for the Arab countries, since it contains the earlier of the two *qiblas* and the third of the holy sanctuaries. This is the country that was to be made a home for strangers and vagrants who have been rejected by the countries in which they live and who have introduced into Palestine customs and manners repugnant to the feelings of the rightful inhabitants.

All Arabs and Moslems have from the first denounced the Balfour Declaration for its cruelty and injustice, and opposed it by all means in their power. The people of Palestine, seeing the danger increasing, began a movement for the defence of their existence, and to that end have borne pains and calamities which the very mountains could not have endured. They have received moral and material support from their brethren in other countries, while the Arab Governments have not failed to explain to the British Government the grave injustice of the Zionist policy and the harm it is doing to the friendly relations between the Arabs and Great Britain. The British Government appreciated the diplomatic endeavours which were made by the Arab Governments, sometimes jointly, sometimes singly and confidentially, until they finally discovered that there was something fundamentally wrong with their policy. The invitation to take part in the London discussions has been accepted by the Arab Governments in the desire to reach a settlement which will preserve the Holy Land for its people and protect the honour of the Arabs living in it. The Saudi Government consider that it is as much to the interest of Great Britain as of the Arabs that concord should prevail on this point. They decided to take part in the

conference [*sic*] after agreement on the following basis had been arrived at with the British Government:—

- (1) The Arabs are to negotiate with the British Government and not with the Jews.
- (2) The representation of the Palestine Arabs will be secured by the best possible means (one of the results of this was the release of the Seychelles deportees).
- (3) In their discussions with the British Government the Arabs are not bound except by what they consider the interests of the Arabs: they may make any demand they please.

On these bases our Government have accepted the invitation, and so, we understand, have the other Arab Governments.

We trust that the conference will meet soon, and that the Arabs will succeed in realising their just and rightful claims.

[E 728/728/91]

No. 4.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 29, 1939.

IN response to request from Ibn Saud, I met him at Shumaisi, on the Mecca road, 27th January. I found that the purpose was to discuss Yemen affairs.

2. The journey of the Amir Husein from Cairo to the Yemen in Italian aeroplane had strengthened the King's suspicions of Italian designs. At the same time, considerable number of Yemen notables who were on pilgrimage had asked him for advice. They feared Italian penetration and wanted to revolt against the Amir [group undecypherable], but Abdulla-al-Wazir had advised them to do nothing during the lifetime of the Imam. They had asked Ibn Saud (1) what was his policy, and (2) what was the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Yemen. He had said that, as for himself, he wanted to have nothing to do with Yemen affairs; and that as to His Majesty's Government, that was not a matter on which he could speak. He had thus put them off until after the pilgrimage day, 30th January. What was he to say then?

3. I gave the obvious reply by referring to Anglo-Italian Agreement. His Majesty's Government were most anxious to prevent Italian interference in Yemen affairs and had entered into agreement as the best guarantee. His Majesty might be right in saying that Italy was no respecter of treaties and Italian penetration was no doubt being effected in the Yemen in small underhand ways, but extension of influence on a serious scale would involve open intervention. That would mean very serious difference with His Majesty's Government in view of its effect on Empire communications, and except in the case of war between the Great Powers, Italy probably did not want to cause such difference.

4. Ibn Saud will as usual be glad to have a message from the Secretary of State, and I should be grateful if you could send one during the next few days. I judged from Ibn Saud's remarks that while he had hardly expected anything beyond a reference to Anglo-Italian Agreement, he would have been happy if I could have given him some additional assurance, *e.g.*, that we should regard armed Italian intervention in the Yemen as a *casus belli*—an assurance which I was careful not to give him.

(Repeated, Saving, to Aden, No. 2; Cairo, No. 4; and Bagdad, No. 3.)

[E 729/729/65]

No. 5.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 29, 1939.

MY telegram No. 16 of 29th January.

After talking about the Yemen, Ibn Saud spoke about the world situation. He was rather optimistic about Palestine. The main thing was to ensure that the Jews should never dominate that country. He repeated his conviction that

interest of His Majesty's Government and the Arabs were identical. If only the Palestine question could be got out of the way, all would be well. He had recently talked to men of importance from India, Egypt and Syria and other Moslem countries, and whatever their attitude towards His Majesty's Government, they were all entirely opposed to Italy and Germany. If His Majesty's Government ever abandoned their position in India, the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, he would know how to look after himself, but "so long as there was one Englishman in the Persian Gulf," our interests were his; and he hinted that in case of a world struggle we could count on his goodwill.

2. Ibn Saud mentioned as a good joke that Italian Minister, when reporting to him ratification of Anglo-Italian Agreement, said that if there was any trouble between Saudi Arabia and Great Britain at any time, Ibn Saud had only to tell him.

3. German Minister, who has not yet presented his letters of credence, seemed surprised and I thought somewhat put out on learning that the King had sent for me. On the other hand, the King did not see the new French Minister, who is also waiting to present his credentials. Only other person he received was Hamilton, London director of [group undecypherable] Arabian Standard Oil Company, whose departure was fixed for the following day.

(Repeated, Saving, to Cairo, No. 5; Jerusalem, No. 3; Bagdad, No. 4; Political Resident in Persian Gulf, No. 1; Government of India, No. 2; and Aden, No. 3.)

[E 669/56/91]

No. 6.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 1, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 12 [of the 13th January: Ibn Saud's mediation in dispute between Yemen and Aden regarding Shabwa and Abr].

Position is that the Government of Aden have only just received the King of the Yemen's reply to their letter of the 9th December. This reply ignores completely the proposal for the neutralisation of Shabwa and refers to the King's previous request for the evacuation of Abr. The King also mentions his acceptance of Ibn Saud's intervention, and states that he is awaiting the result. Governor of Aden has acknowledged receipt of the King's telegram, and informed him that it is being communicated to His Majesty's Government.

2. There is no need for you to raise the question with Ibn Saud, but if you have to discuss it, you may take the following line: Position will, of course, be considered fully by His Majesty's Government in the light of any arguments which may be contained in the King of the Yemen's latest communication, full translation of which has not yet been received in London. Subject to any further points arising from latest letter, His Majesty's Government are not disposed to agree to the proposal that police detachment should be withdrawn from Abr. This detachment has been found necessary to prevent raiding by Seiar tribes into Hadhramaut, and it is believed that, if post at Abr were withdrawn, this raiding would recommence. The only reason so far given by the King of the Yemen for wishing post to be withdrawn is that he has a claim to Abr: but Sultan of McKalla has strong claim to Abr, and it is clear that a settlement of these conflicting claims must form a part of a final boundary settlement in this area. His Majesty's Government are prepared to authorise Governor of Aden to enter into such boundary discussions, if the King of the Yemen so desires. If a new boundary is settled by agreement, well and good; but, in the meanwhile, His Majesty's Government have the undoubted right to maintain any necessary police posts at places like Abr which are situated to the south of the 1914 boundary. It is mainly as a sign of goodwill towards the King of the Yemen that they are prepared (if His Majesty gives the required written assurances) to withdraw the present police detachment from Shabwa and to agree to the neutralisation of that area. But the position as regards Seiar raiding seems to rule out the idea of leaving Abr unpoliced.

(Repeated to Aden, unnumbered.)

[E 728/728/91]

No. 7.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 3, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 16 [of 29th January: Suggested message for Ibn Saud from the Secretary of State regarding the Yemen].

It is, as you surmise, impossible for His Majesty's Government to give Ibn Saud any assurance to the effect that armed Italian intervention in the Yemen would be regarded as a *casus belli*. Although this might be the case, no decision as to the attitude which His Majesty's Government would adopt in the face of such intervention can be decided in advance.

2. You may, however, tell Ibn Saud that I have learnt with interest of your recent conversation with him on the subject of the Yemen; that if he is asked about the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Yemen, His Majesty's Government would be grateful if he were to say that he had been assured that His Majesty's Government intended scrupulously to respect the independence and integrity of the Yemen, in whose internal affairs they had no intention of interfering, and hoped that other Powers would do so, too.

3. You may also inform Ibn Saud of pleasure which it has given His Majesty's Government to receive the Emir Feisal in London, and their hope that with his assistance some solution of the Palestine problem acceptable to all concerned may be found. His Majesty's Government highly appreciate the assistance which they have received from Ibn Saud in the matter of the conference as in so many other ways.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 10, Saving, and Bagdad, No. 6, Saving.)

[E 1150/6/31]

No. 8.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 20. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 14, 1939.

ACTING on a secret message from Ibn Saud, I secured interview with him alone as though on my initiative. He told me this.

2. Dr. Ruwaiha, formerly employed in this country and now resident in Iraq, arrived here 11th February with greetings from Fawzi Qawakji, and request for help on the ground that no good can be expected from London discussions. According to the doctor, Iraqi supporters of the Palestine Arabs got help from the late Prime Minister, but have received arms and ammunition from Taha Hashimi and have 300 men ready to take them to Palestine to participate in revolt, but fear that Iraqi Government for the sake of propriety would prevent their going direct to Transjordan and want to pass through Saudi Arabian territory. Ibn Saud refused, and told the doctor that passage of expedition would be resisted by Saudi Arabian forces. The doctor leaves for Iraq 14th February. The King will cause him to be detained slightly on the way so that return may take about eight days.

3. The King says that object of scheme is not the good of Palestine or Islam, but to bring Palestine into Iraqi orbit and to discredit him. He suggests that His Majesty's Ambassador in Bagdad, unless he takes action earlier on information from his own sources, might inform Iraqi Government perhaps ten days hence that rumours have reached him of intention of Fawzi Qawakji to go to Palestine with an armed band: such a move by His Majesty's Ambassador would not compromise Ibn Saud as Saudi Arabian Minister in Bagdad has already heard of the scheme through his "spies," so there should be rumours afloat.

4. Ibn Saud said he believed that General Nuri, for all his megalomania, had no knowledge of this scheme.

5. Fawzi Qawakji apparently counts on help from Iraqi official named Umairi, who is in charge of a post which Ibn Saud thinks is Rutba.

6. Ibn Saud suggested that Major Glubb should agree upon simple plain language cypher with Saudi Arabian frontier inspector, who would telegraph, for instance, that "stolen camels had passed through such and such a place" if proposed expedition managed to assemble and make for Transjordan, and if this suggestion is accepted the King will instruct inspector accordingly.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 3; Jerusalem, No. 2; and Cairo, No. 6, Saving.)

[E 1255/6/31]

No. 9.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 18, 1939.

MY telegram No. 23.

When paying farewell visit, German Minister went out of his way to say that he had been surprised to see in Jedda doctor of German Legation in Bagdad, Dr. Ruwaiha, who was educated in Germany. This man, who had brought a letter from the minister's wife, had now disappeared. Minister wondered what he was doing here. I did not reveal knowledge of the man or of his business.

2. I mentioned this later to Ibn Saud, who said that, according to Dr. Ruwaiha, Germans promised to the supporters of Palestine in Iraq 2,000 rifles and had already sent 200, which were transmitted to Palestine, but the second consignment was seized in the customs. Asked how Iraq frontier posts could be evaded, Dr. Ruwaiha said that the Minister of the Interior arranged for police of a given post to be absent on an agreed date. Dr. Ruwaiha claims to have 250 rifles ready, and asked Ibn Saud for another 150, as 400 men were ready to leave for Palestine.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 6; Bagdad, No. 7; and Cairo, No. 7, Saving.)

[E 1251/735/25]

No. 10.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 19, 1939.

ACCORDING to Saudi Arabian Government, conversations with German Minister were to this effect:—

2. Minister declared that sole object of establishment of Legation to be good relations and commerce. They could supply goods, *e.g.*, arms. He was informed that, owing to geographical and other considerations, this country regarded friendship with Great Britain as essential and would do nothing contrary to that policy. Minister declared that Germany also desired friendship with Great Britain, though her good intentions were not always reciprocated, and did not wish Saudi Arabia to do anything to interfere with her friendship for His Majesty's Government. Moreover, he wished to assure the King that there was no arrangement of any kind between Germany and Italy except each would help the other if the other was in danger of being "crushed."

3. Minister was asked whether Germany could supply arms at low prices payable on easy instalments, and he promised to do his best to arrange this.

4. Preceding paragraphs were drafted after conversation with Yusuf Yasin. Later, I saw Ibn Saud alone and he said that the German Minister assured him that Germany wanted Saudi Arabia to be strong so as to be able to maintain her independence and resist the pressure of Great Britain. According to the King, it was this which led to his assertion that friendship with His Majesty's Government is essential to Saudi Arabia.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 8, and Cairo, No. 8, Saving.)

[E 1252/1252/25]

No. 11.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 19, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

According to Yusuf Yasin, Italian Minister recently gave them all kinds of assurances about desiring nothing but independence and prosperity of Saudi Arabia, and ended with renewed offers to supply arms. Government are inclined to buy more automatic rifles and ammunition of the type already supplied by Italy.

2. Saudi Arabian Government conclude that Italian *démarche* was intended to reinforce German representations.

(Repeated, Saving, to Cairo, No. 9, and Bagdad, No. 5.)

[E 1444/177/25]

No. 12.

Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman-al-Feisal-al-Saud to Mr. Neville Chamberlain.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 25, 1939.)

(In the Name of God the Compassionate the Merciful!)

THE visit of our second son, Feisal, to London for participation in the discussions, which we hope will lead to a favourable solution of the Palestine question—a very dear wish of the Arab people—affords us an opportunity to offer you our best respects, and to express to you our greatest appreciation of the noble efforts you have made to avert the catastrophe which was about to overtake the peace of the world and which you are still making to settle the difficult international disputes. These, if left unsolved, would fan the fires of hatred and envy between nations, prompt the strong to subject the weak, diminish the respect for right and law, and set up the principle of might in their place.

As we are absolutely confident that you are fully alive to the danger points in the Near East generally, and in the Arab countries more particularly, and are aware of the strong ties and traditional friendship between us and the British Government, we thought of taking the opportunity of the presence of our son Feisal in London to convey to your Excellency this important note, which we hope will receive all the consideration and attention which the present situation demands, and which the friendship of our two countries and their mutual interests require.

We do not wish to enumerate here evidence of the traditional friendship which we have shown towards our ally, Great Britain, nor the occasions on which we stood by her side in the worst hours of danger and anxiety, uninfluenced by the efforts of the enemies of Great Britain, who were trying to win us to their side and to create misunderstanding between us and Great Britain. If your Excellency were to review the events of the Great War and the years following it, and especially those of the last three years, when Italy was exerting every effort in order to influence us, you would realise the extent of the great sacrifices we made in order to keep Britain's friendship, and to maintain the truest and sincerest friendly ties with her.

Our traditional friendship with Great Britain is but a true picture of what we believe to be in the best interests of ourselves personally, the Arab countries as a whole, and the world of Islam generally. We need hardly point out that our interests run parallel to, and are strongly interlinked with, the vital interests of Great Britain in this important part of the world. This is the principal reason which prompts us to adhere to this friendship, and to strengthen and enhance it.

We honestly believe that the friendship we feel for Great Britain and that which she feels for us, and the confidence we have in each other, complement one another and should therefore never be looked upon as separate entities. Indeed, the course of events and the sequence of political and military eventualities make

it obligatory on us to do our utmost to strengthen them, on the basis of our mutual interests and our common good, for the following important reasons:—

1. The two seas between which our country is situated constitute two of the most important arteries of British Imperial communications.
2. The air routes most important to the British Empire, as well as the petrol pipe-line from Mosul, lie near to our northern frontiers.
3. Our country is the centre of the Arab race and of the Arabic-speaking nations, to whom Great Britain is bound by important interests.
4. Our country is the centre of Islam and contains the Moslem holy places, and Great Britain has a great number of Moslem subjects throughout the British Empire.
5. Our country is the important central point of a circular area of the world's surface, the course of events in which is likely to have the most important effect on the future of the Near East and on the future relations of Great Britain and the Arabs on the one side and the Italians, Turks, Iranians, &c., on the other.

It is our belief and conviction that it is to our mutual interest to speak freely and frankly on everything that may affect the position of both or either of us. We therefore address this note to your Excellency, in order to shed some light on certain points and clarify others, and we feel absolutely sure that your Excellency will spare no efforts to bring about the desired results.

There is a crucial point which we would like to explain, namely, that our relations with the British Government are founded on two bases. The first is our obligations in accordance with the existing treaties, and the second is our great friendship, based on the identity of our interests and the firm conviction of both sides that the position of one of them is the complement to the position of the other. We should also like to state that there is nothing in our treaty obligations to compel us to follow a certain line of procedure, but, nevertheless, we have actually followed, and do still follow, that particular line. However, we have often noticed that this is unilateral, a fact which, as you know, does not lead in most cases to the desired results, to say nothing of the possibility of its being wrongly interpreted or used as an excuse for aggressive action against us. At this moment, when Great Britain has taken a somewhat definite stand as a result of her undertakings in the Anglo-Italian Agreement, we think it imperative to approach the British Government on this matter, so as to come to a clear understanding.

We therefore address this note to you, in the hope that your reply will be such as to reassure us and definitely establish our exact position. The points on which we feel it necessary to come to an understanding may be summarised as follows:—

1. We confidently hope that the Palestine question will be settled at the London Conference in such a way as will conserve the rights of the Arabs in their own country. This is one of the most important questions which exercise a potent influence on the relations of the British Government with the Moslems generally, and the Arabs more particularly. We have on several occasions explained to the British Government the extent of the danger which would threaten the relations between the Arabs and Great Britain on account of the Palestine question, and we do not wish to add here any more to what we have already communicated to them on this point.
2. To ascertain the opinion of the British Government in the case of an act of aggression committed against us, whether as a result of imperialistic designs, or because of our negative attitude towards certain Powers, or for any other reason, unprovoked by us.
3. To ascertain the opinion of the British Government on the question of a mutual agreement to consult each other from time to time on all events affecting the Arab countries.
4. To agree not to introduce any change in the *status quo* of any Arabic-speaking country which may adversely affect our interests, without first affording us an adequate opportunity to express our views.
5. To agree on the definite stand which will be taken by both of us towards the effect which the policy of a third party may have on our common interests.

6. To come to an agreement defining the exact meaning and extent of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, so far as it affects the Arab countries and limits the British Government's freedom of action and the reaction which this may give rise to in the Arab countries generally—a question which is at the moment the subject of separate communications between our two Governments.

The above is what we thought of bringing to your Excellency's notice, and we trust that you will be so good as to give it your consideration.

In conclusion, we wish to express to you our sincere greetings and best respects.

Written in our camp on the 2nd Thul Qida of the year 1357 of the Hijra, corresponding to the 2nd January, 1939, a.d.

ABDUL AZIZ-AL-SAUD.

[E 1879/735/25]

No. 13.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord,

Jedda, February 18, 1939.

IN my telegram No. 209, dated the 27th December, I reported that, according to a statement made to me by Fuad Bey, the German Minister at Bagdad was coming to Jedda for the pilgrim season. I now have the honour to send some details about this visit.

2. Although the application of Dr. Grobba for permission to make a direct flight to Jedda was refused by the Saudi Government, he did, in fact, arrive in an aeroplane, on the 21st January. The machine was a three-engined Junker low-wing monoplane of the Luft-Hansa, and the chief pilot, according to Dr. Grobba, was one of the best German pilots, with a record of over 2 million miles. Dr. Grobba said that he had hoped to fly direct to Jedda, but had been obliged to abandon this plan because there was no place on the direct route where the machine could refuel, and he had therefore flown to Assouan, where they had taken on enough fuel for the flight to Jedda and back. The absence of any refuelling station on the way must have provided the Saudi Government with an easy pretext for rejecting a proposal which they would probably have been unwilling to accept in any case.

3. Two journalists arrived with Dr. Grobba, but they returned with the aeroplane three days later. Dr. Grobba told me that one of them had intended to stay for a fortnight, but finding no copy he returned to Cairo. He has since said that in spite of the shortness of their stay the journalists propose to write "all sorts of things."

4. The only secretary who accompanied Dr. Grobba was M. W. G. Steffen, who is his Arabic interpreter. M. Steffen talks Arabic very well, and also reads and writes it. I learned from Dr. Grobba that M. Steffen was a Seventh Day Adventist missionary for many years, in Egypt, Transjordan (? Mosul), and that having become dissatisfied with that life he joined the staff of the German Embassy in Bagdad. M. Steffen wears the Nazi badge; Dr. Grobba does not.

5. Dr. Grobba was at pains from the beginning to talk about the exclusively commercial object of his mission. He professed, however, to be much annoyed at a newspaper report that the German Government had sent him to offer assistance to the Saudi Government in the development of their oil and mineral resources, and described it as a Jewish invention. In his last talk with me Dr. Grobba spoke about the possibility of exporting German goods to Saudi Arabia either on payment or under a system of barter. He also said that he had collected (though with a considerable reduction) a sum of money due to a German firm which no longer exists in Jedda, for tyres and other goods supplied many years ago. I am dealing with these commercial matters in a separate despatch.

6. Although Dr. Grobba arrived on the 21st January, it was not until the 11th February that he was able to present his credentials. The Viceroy, the Amir Faisal, being absent when he arrived, it was decided that he, and the new French Minister, should wait until Ibn Saud came to Jedda after the pilgrimage.

This arrangement was sensible, but Dr. Grobba seemed surprised and slightly annoyed when I mentioned that the King had asked me to meet him at Shumaisi on the 27th January—an interview which I reported in my telegram No. 16 of the 29th January.

7. On the 16th February Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, acting, as he said, on instructions from the King, gave me an account of Dr. Grobba's interviews with him and with the King. I have given the gist of what was said, in my telegram No. 25, dated the 18th February. Dr. Grobba claimed to have no object except to establish friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and to increase German exports, among which he mentioned arms. When he was informed that on account of geographical and other considerations the Saudi Government regarded friendship with Great Britain as essential, he disclaimed any desire to make any arrangement with Saudi Arabia which would conflict with her friendship with His Majesty's Government, with whom the German Government also desired to be friends, though they found that their good intentions were not always reciprocated. Dr. Grobba went out of his way to make what appears to be an incorrect statement as to the relations between Germany and Italy. He said that there was no treaty or other arrangement between the two countries except that which bound each to come to the help of the other, if the other was in danger of being "crushed."

8. In a private interview, which I had with Ibn Saud the same day, he supplemented the information which had been given to me by Yusuf Yasin. He said that Dr. Grobba informed him that Germany wanted to see Saudi Arabia strong so that she might be able to maintain her independence and resist the pressure of His Majesty's Government. It was apparently this approach which impelled the King to say that friendship with His Majesty's Government was essential to his country.

9. At the same private interview I mentioned to Ibn Saud the curious fact that the Dr. Ruwaiha (my telegram No. 20, dated the 14th February) who had come to him as an emissary from Fauzi Qauqji was doctor to the German Legation in Bagdad. On the occasion of his farewell visit Dr. Grobba had said, just as he was leaving, that he had been surprised to see Dr. Ruwaiha in Jedda; the man had brought him a letter from Frau Grobba, from Bagdad, but had now disappeared. The Minister wondered what the man's business could be. He looked enquiringly at me, but I said with perfect truth that I did not know Ruwaiha. Dr. Grobba was evidently uneasy. He took unnecessary pains to explain that the legation employed Dr. Ruwaiha, in spite of the fact that he was a Syrian, because he had been trained in Germany and because the other Bagdad doctors were all Jews. I passed this information on to Ibn Saud, who then told me that, according to Dr. Ruwaiha, the Germans had promised 2,000 rifles to the Iraqi supporters of the Palestine revolt and had sent them 200, which had been duly transmitted to Palestine, but a second consignment had been seized in the customs by the Iraq Government on information laid by "a follower of the Agha Khan." I said that I believed that some cartridges had been seized in the custom-house in Bagdad, but I did not remember a seizure of rifles.

10. It is probable that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Germany will lead to the supply of German munitions of war to the Saudi Government. The German Minister was asked whether Germany could supply arms at low prices and easy instalments, and he promised to try to arrange this. According to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the conversation referred mainly to Mauser rifles and ammunition of the type already in use in this country.

11. Dr. Grobba left Jedda for Egypt on the 18th February by sea. The Luft-Hansa, he said, could not spare an aeroplane to come to Jedda for him, but he intended to fly to Bagdad from Egypt. He has always declared that he must be back in Bagdad in good time in order to be present when the Iranian Heir Apparent passes through Iraq on his way to Egypt for the Royal marriage.

12. There is no indication that there is to be a permanent representative of the German Government in Saudi Arabia. In the letter announcing his departure Dr. Grobba gives the German Legation, Bagdad, as the address of the German Minister to Saudi Arabia. Dr. Grobba talks as though he proposed to visit Saudi Arabia every year, though not necessarily Jedda. He said on one occasion that it would be convenient as well as interesting if he could go

to Riyadh sometimes instead of coming to Jedda, as Riyadh was nearer to Bagdad. It is true that Riyadh is only about eighteen hours by car from Koweit.

13. As Dr. Grobba is well known to His Majesty's Embassy at Bagdad there is no need to describe him. He has made himself very agreeable to his colleagues and to the Arab officials, but it seems to be generally concluded that the object of the German Government in appointing a representative to Saudi Arabia at this juncture is mainly anti-British. Dr. Grobba has seen a good deal of Muhammad Ali Riza, a young member of the well-known firm of Zainal Ali Riza. This young man, who is honorary consul for Czecho-Slovakia, was in Germany last year on business, and he is inclined to be pro-German and pro-Italian. But he is a wild talker, as his confidences about Hejaz hostility to Ibn Saud, which I have reported more than once, will have shown, and if he is to be the centre of German propaganda here it is not likely to be very useful to Germany.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1881/735/25]

No. 14.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 33 E.)

My Lord,

Jedda, February 22, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to submit a brief report on the commercial side of the activities of the new German Minister to Saudi Arabia on whose stay in Jedda I reported in my despatch No. 29 dated the 18th February.

2. But for its poverty, which compels it to turn to the cheapest market, viz., Japan, Saudi Arabia is the ideal country for the German exporter, since its exports are insignificant and it has free currency obtained from the pilgrimage and from royalties on oil. The revenue from oil is at present small, but within a short time it may be coming in at the rate of nearly a million sterling a year.

3. Saudi Arabia also suits Germany as a market in that the King is very anxious to establish a standing army, and that Germany is able to supply arms and ammunition. We know from confidential sources that the German Minister promised to do his best to ensure the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia at low prices and on easy terms of payment, and it may be assumed that his task will be facilitated by political considerations. So far, it seems, only Mauser rifles and ammunition have been in question, but as the oil revenues increase, orders for other munitions, such as guns and armoured cars, might well be placed in Germany.

4. In my despatch No. 206 E. dated the 30th October, 1938, I reported on a transaction by which Saudi lamb skins had been sold in Germany at a good price on condition that the sellers bought German goods to twice the amount which the skins realised. Muhammad Ali Riza, who effected this transaction, stated at the time that this arrangement suited Saudi Arabia at the moment, but might not always be convenient.

5. In his final visit to me just before his departure Dr. Grobba talked a good deal about trade prospects. He admitted that the creation of a regular army would give Germany an opportunity to tender for the supply of arms. He saw only restricted opportunities for the use of the barter system with Saudi Arabia, but hoped that Germany might take a larger share of Saudi exports of skins. He said that the Saudi authorities had also suggested as suitable articles for barter, millet from Jizan and dates from Hasa; but as Germany only wants millet for fodder and dates for the extraction of spirit the prices she is likely to be able to offer cannot be tempting unless politics is to take precedence of economics. I have no special knowledge of the Hasa date trade, but I believe that the Hasa dates, which ripen earlier than the dates in Basra, command a fair price as food in India and Persian Gulf ports. But I am inclined to believe that the Saudi suggestions about millet and dates were not very serious, and that such German goods as are sold here will usually be sold for cash.

6. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Department of Overseas Trade and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1985/56/91]

No. 15.

Sir B. Reilly to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald.—(Communicated by Colonial Office March 16.)

Sir,

Aden, February 21, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the recent telegraphic correspondence on the subject of the proposed restoration of Wadi Yumit to the Yemen, and to enclose copies of my letter to the King of the Yemen and of his reply.

I have, &c.
B. R. REILLY,
Governor.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

Sir B. Reilly to the King of the Yemen.

Your Majesty,

Aden, January 21, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Majesty's telegram of the 22nd Sha'ban, 1357, to Colonel Lake regarding Wadi Yumit. The matter was referred at that time to His Majesty's Government, who have agreed, as an exceptional measure and in virtue of the friendly relations existing between the two Governments, to accept this small rectification of the *status quo* and to regard the Wadi Yumit as being in your Majesty's territory, the future frontier to run in that locality in accordance with that in existence by the terms of the Anglo-Turkish boundary agreement.

I am, consequently, informing those concerned of the change.
(Usual greetings.)

B. R. REILLY,
Governor.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

The King of the Yemen to Sir B. Reilly (Aden).

(A.C.)

Dhul Hijja 16, 1357 (February 5, 1939).

WE have received your esteemed letter dated the 1st Dhul Hijja, 1357 (the 21st January, 1939), and thank you for the commendable interest which you have kindly taken in securing for us a solution for Wadi Yumit affair, and for its exclusion from the nine cantons owing to its being a dependency of Ta'iz.

Our good hopes have been doubled that by means of your kind attention and interest all questions which have arisen in the recent periods will also be suitably solved in a just and equitable manner as an act of regard for the maintenance of the firm friendship between the two Governments which was fortunately established by your Excellency.

In conclusion, we repeat our best and sincere respects.

[E 2093/177/25]

No. 16.

Mr. Neville Chamberlain to King Ibn Saud.

Your Majesty,

Downing Street, March 23, 1939.

I HAVE had the honour to receive from His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal the letter addressed to me by your Majesty and dated the 2nd January, 1939.

I have asked His Royal Highness to be good enough to convey to your Majesty my respectful thanks for this letter and my keen appreciation of your generous reference to my efforts in the cause of peace.

I am very grateful for the friendliness and frankness with which your Majesty is always ready to discuss all matters of mutual interest to our two countries. The Government of the United Kingdom greatly value the friendship of your Majesty and appreciate the assistance they have always received from you, more particularly over the difficult question of Palestine. They share your Majesty's view that their community of interests in the Middle East requires that there should be the closest co-operation between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia.

Your Majesty mentioned in your letter certain points on which you desired to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government.

The first of these points was the question of Palestine. The Government of the United Kingdom fully realise the importance of this question in its effect not only on that country, but also on relations between Great Britain and the whole Arab world. The Government of the United Kingdom are now considering the question of policy in the light of the conferences on Palestine, which have just been discussing the problem, and it is not possible at the moment to say more. But His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal, who has played so large a part in the conferences, will have realised, I hope, that it is the sincere and earnest desire of the Government of the United Kingdom to find a final solution which shall do justice to all parties and which shall conserve the rights of the Arabs in Palestine.

Secondly, your Majesty enquires what attitude this country would adopt if Saudi Arabia were to be the victim of aggression. As long as relations between Great Britain and the Arab countries remain as they are at present, it is difficult to envisage any aggression on Saudi Arabia by her neighbours. Nor can it be supposed that, leaving aside the possibility of a general war in which the position of Great Britain as a world Power was being challenged, any European Power would wantonly attack Saudi Arabia, especially as the Government of the United Kingdom have made it clear how deep is the interest that they take in the preservation by Saudi Arabia of her independence and integrity. The declarations of the Government on this subject correspond to one of the major interests of British imperial policy, and I personally think that these declarations are sufficient by themselves to deter potential aggressors (except, as I say, in the possible eventuality of a general challenge to Great Britain) since the nature of this policy and the grounds on which it is based must be apparent to the Governments of all other States.

With regard to the proposal for mutual consultation on all matters affecting Arab countries, your Majesty is aware that the Government of the United Kingdom desire at all times to obtain your views on such matters. They will welcome every opportunity to consult with your Majesty on all questions involving the common interests of the two countries.

In your fourth point, your Majesty asks that you may be given an opportunity of expressing your views before any change is introduced in the status of any Arabic-speaking country. So far as the Government of the United Kingdom can judge, there is no prospect (apart from Palestine—and Syria and the Lebanon—whose future status is now under discussion) of a change in the status of any Arabic-speaking country. But should the Arab countries at some future time desire closer union or some form of federation, Great Britain would consider this to be a question for negotiation and decision among the Arab States themselves. Certainly the Government have no intention of taking any initiative in this question, more especially as it will scarcely be practicable for Palestine or Syria to participate in a federation for a considerable time. It is possible, however, that your Majesty, in framing this question, was thinking less of federation than of the future status of Transjordan. The Government of the United Kingdom cannot tie their hands in regard to a question for which they are responsible to the League of Nations, by giving undertakings about this question to third parties. But should the possibility arise of changes in Transjordan, they will certainly remember that any changes in a neighbouring territory of this kind must always be of especial interest and concern to your Majesty and will take this factor into account in framing their policy.

With regard to the suggestion that the two countries should decide beforehand on the attitude to be adopted towards a third State whose policy may affect

our common interests, the Government of the United Kingdom, while they would welcome mutual consultation on such points as may arise, feel that in view of the impossibility of foreseeing what action a third State may take in the future, it would be unwise and dangerous for the two Governments to attempt now to lay down a common policy to meet all eventualities. I would, however, say this. Any action which tends to weaken the position of Great Britain in the Middle East must inevitably tend to expose the Middle Eastern Powers to greater danger than at present, for none of those Powers as yet possess the military and other resources necessary to make an effective stand against any Power which was able to usurp the place of Great Britain in the Middle East. No other Power is likely to fill the place of Great Britain without wishing to acquire extensive rights of interference in the political and, more especially, the economic affairs of the Middle Eastern countries, and the best service which those who have the interests of the Middle Eastern States at heart can render to those States is to persuade them to discourage firmly all activities, such as the dissemination of propaganda, which are likely to undermine the position either of Great Britain or of France. This is, however, a point upon which I may not have wholly grasped your Majesty's meaning, and if your Majesty would care to make further suggestions through Sheikh Hafiz Wahba or Sir Reader Bullard the Government of the United Kingdom will be most happy to consider them.

Finally, your Majesty requests a definition of the meaning and extent of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of the 16th April, 1938. This agreement is an agreement between Great Britain and Italy alone. No other Power is asked to recognise or to be bound by it. The relations between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia are therefore governed by their treaties and by their friendship alone, and the Anglo-Italian Agreement does not indicate the slightest pretension on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom to restrict the liberty of action of Saudi Arabia. I am prepared, if your Majesty thinks it desirable, to reply more fully on this point in answer to the *note verbale* handed to Sir Reader Bullard on the 13th November, 1938.

I would conclude by assuring your Majesty once again how highly the Government of the United Kingdom value the relations of confidence that so happily exist between your Majesty and Great Britain. I have little doubt that your Majesty will share my view, that this confidence and the clear community of interests that exist between our two countries are the best assurance for the maintenance of those good relations on which both countries so greatly depend.

I have asked His Royal Highness to convey to your Majesty, with my respectful compliments, my sincere good wishes for your long life and prosperity.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 2329/394/25]

No. 17.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, March 29, 1939.

MY telegrams Nos. 37 and 42.

Your despatch, Secret, to Kabul, No. 18 of 14th February, of which I have just received copy, gives good ground for hope that it may be possible to assist Ibn Saud under the new export credits scheme in [group undecypherable] cartridge factory and perhaps Hotchkiss gun and small arms ammunition also.

2. Ibn Saud has never wanted to take arms from Italians, and he has now ceased to use their air mission. Hopes that Germans would supply arms on easy terms seem to have been disappointed. Now is a particularly good moment to help if we can manage it in the midst of other preoccupations.

3. The King doubtless wants armaments on general grounds, but Koweit stratagem will have disturbed him and he may be fearful in case of a European war that Italians might instigate the Yemen to try to recover Najran. In any case, he is leaving me in no doubt as to the importance he attaches to the question and as to his desire for a speedy decision.

[E 2313/177/25]

No. 18.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 86.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 29, 1939.

THE Amir Faisal came to see me on the 24th March in order to say good-bye before leaving London on the conclusion of the conferences on Palestine. His Royal Highness was accompanied by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and by Fuad Bey Hamza, who interpreted.

2. His Royal Highness said that he had received from the Prime Minister the day before a letter which Mr. Chamberlain had asked him to convey to King Abdul Aziz in reply to the letter which he had brought to Mr. Chamberlain from his father on his arrival in this country. The Prime Minister had suggested that, if there were any points in this letter which he desired to discuss before his departure, he should do so when he saw me to-day. He was most grateful for the full reply which had been given to his father's enquiries, and for the frank and friendly tone of the letter as a whole. There were, however, certain points in the letter which were not entirely clear, and he wondered whether there were any additional explanations which I would care to give him.

3. I told His Royal Highness that I was glad of this opportunity to make certain comments upon the letter, as it dealt with one point of fundamental importance about which I would like to say something. This point was the possibility of aggression against Saudi Arabia. King Abdul Aziz had asked, if I remembered rightly, what would be the attitude of this country were Saudi Arabia to be the victim of aggression. The meaning of the Prime Minister's letter upon this point was, I hoped, entirely clear, but the language used was official and diplomatic. I therefore wished to fill in the picture in language which it would be difficult to put on paper.

4. I then went on to say that I could not imagine circumstances ever arising in which Saudi Arabia was the victim of aggression by a major Power without Great Britain being at war; and if Great Britain were at war, those who were attacked by her enemies would be her friends, and she would, I was convinced, shape her policy accordingly. Moreover, the facts of geography made it inevitable that Great Britain, with her manifold responsibilities in India, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, should always regard the eastern coast of the Red Sea as an area of vital consequence. I did not think, therefore, that King Abdul Aziz need have any doubt but that, if the case arose, the interests of Saudi Arabia would be found to be the interests of Great Britain. I was not trying to say anything new which was not already said in the letter. I only wished to give additional emphasis to certain points made in the letter.

5. The Amir Faisal said that King Abdul Aziz had never doubted the objects of British policy or supposed that they had changed. But he had felt that the times demanded that his relations with Great Britain should be set out more clearly than might have been necessary hitherto. Since, therefore, the opportunity had occurred he had thought it right to address this enquiry to His Majesty's Government in accordance with the frankness which characterised all his relations with Great Britain.

6. Both His Royal Highness and I had other appointments and the few remaining minutes had to be devoted to Palestine. It must therefore be a matter for speculation whether His Royal Highness would have asked for a guarantee of a more formal and binding character had there been more time for discussion. His Royal Highness did, however, ask Sir Lancelot Oliphant, whom he saw a little later, how the mechanical side of the community of interests between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia would work in a crisis: how soon, for instance, could help from Great Britain reach Saudi Arabia and what form would it take? His Royal Highness was told that the difficulty of answering hypothetical questions of this kind was as a rule insuperable. But the enquiry would nevertheless be examined with a view to seeing whether there was any answer which could be sent through you to the Saudi Arabian Government.

7. Our brief conversation about Palestine was confined to a reference by me to the two main questions which seemed still to be outstanding between the British delegates and the delegates of the neighbouring Arab States. The first question was how soon Palestinian Ministers could become heads of departments. Could this take place at once, or rather as soon as peaceful conditions had been

restored in Palestine, or must we wait until His Majesty's Government and the British authorities in Palestine were satisfied that conditions in Palestine were such as to enable this change to be effected? I wondered whether a solution of this problem might not be found by agreeing that Palestinian Ministers should be placed in charge of departments within a period of two years from the time when peaceful conditions had been restored. The second outstanding point was the difficulty which had arisen in regard to the end of the transition period. His Majesty's Government hoped that conditions in Palestine would enable that country to obtain her independence in ten years' time, but the question arose what should happen if, at the end of ten years, His Majesty's Government were to decide that the establishment of an independent State must be postponed. My own suggestion would be that in that event we might consult with the Governments of Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia before taking a final decision regarding the postponement of the end of the transition period.

8. A copy of the Prime Minister's reply to King Abdul Aziz is being sent to you separately.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 2770/177/93]

No. 19.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, April 12, 1939.

I AM informed by Yusuf Yasin that General Nuri is going to [group undecypherable] Hasa by air to meet Ibn Saud and that visit was probably prompted by a severe message which Ibn Saud sent him on 4th April. Message, which Yusuf Yasin read to me, is to the following effect:—

2. If Iraq takes action regarding other Arab States without the consultation with Ibn Saud provided for in treaty [group undecypherable] fears great difficulties may result. Ibn Saud hitherto silent, to conceal differences in Arab world. It was not weakness or lack of experience in war that prevented his taking similar action. This no moment for rivalry or individual ambition. The Arabs are on bad terms with Jews, French and British, and they have to fear the Turks and Persians. If present tension continues British and French in case of war might give Turkey a free hand in Syria and Palestine in order to be free to use their troops elsewhere (Ibn Saud wishes His Majesty's Government to realise that this was inserted to frighten General Nuri, not because the King thinks it possible). Saudi Arabia and Iraq must try to bring about arrangement between Arabs and French and Arabs and British to circumvent Turkish designs on Syria and perhaps secure arrangement between his Arabs and Turks. Violent propaganda in Iraq may make French and British more determined. Feisal saw French Foreign Minister in Paris and convinced him of necessity to ratify treaty with Syria and obtained promise of satisfactory settlement.

3. Yusuf Yasin added that Ibn Saud had sent to Arabs of Syria and Palestine messages of similar tenor urging moderation and conciliation.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 17; Cairo, No. 12; and Jerusalem, No. 9.)

[E 2827/177/25]

No. 20.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, April 15, 1939.

MY telegram No. 48 of 12th April.

I suggest you authorise me to inform Ibn Saud that you hope to send him your views before he meets General Nuri, 29th April.

Yusuf Yasin, who has now returned to Riyadh, spoke at great length about the position of Ibn Saud, who is anxious on three points:—

1. His position if attacked.
2. Iraqi designs on other Arab States.
3. Turkish designs.

I have sent Ibn Saud text of Prime Minister's reply to his letter and repeated to Yusif Yasin supplementary assurance made to Feisal by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. These had not reached the King.

On all three points I have talked as convincingly as possible, but Ibn Saud will expect to hear from you on the second and third.

[E 2939/2828/25]

No. 21.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 22.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 3. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Jedda, April 15, 1939.

MY telegram No. 49 of 13th April, fourth paragraph.

The terms proposed to the Japanese Minister for the two areas covered by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company option (not including the Kuwait Neutral Zone) were as follows:—

(All figures in gold pounds.)				£
Payment down	200,000
Rent for first year	100,000
Rent for second year	125,000
Rent for third year	150,000
Rent for fourth year	175,000
Rent for fifth year and each subsequent year until discovery of oil in commercial quantities	200,000

2. If oil is discovered in commercial quantities the rent ceases to be paid, but the revenue payable to the Saudi-Arabian Government is not to fall below £200,000 per annum.

3. When oil is discovered in commercial quantities, the Saudi-Arabian Government would receive:—

- (1) A royalty of 4s. gold per ton calculated in the usual way.
- (2) One-fifth of the gross production ("oil at mouth of well").
- (3) An annual payment per million tons which would be £15,000 for the first 4 million and £20,000 for each subsequent million.

4. I understand that these terms are taken from the Iraq concession to the Board of Trade (? 1932), with the exception of the initial payment of £200,000 gold, which has been added by the Saudi-Arabian Government.

5. The Saudi Government seem to have told the California Arabian Standard Oil Company of this proposal which they have made to the Japanese Minister. The Minister is stated to have approved it "personally" and to have said that he would submit it to his Government.

6. I have given the figures to the Jedda representative of Petroleum Development (Western Arabia), Limited.

7. See my immediately following telegram, Saving.

[E 3041/177/25]

No. 22.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 69. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 27, 1939.

MY telegram No. 64 [of 24th April: Ibn Saud's expected meeting with General Nuri].

You may inform Ibn Saud, in confidence, that His Majesty's Government have learned with interest of his views, as recorded by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, and that the following are their views upon the points which he has raised:—

2. As His Majesty's Government have already explained, they do not think it in the least likely that Saudi Arabia will be wantonly attacked. Even if general hostilities should begin, it is unlikely that Italy would attempt to occupy positions on the Saudi Arabian coast, since they already possess bases in Eritrea

which are in a more favourable strategical position from which to threaten British communications in the Red Sea. Nor is it likely that Italy will wish to add Saudi Arabia to her enemies. But in the unlikely event of Italy taking such action, His Majesty's Government, in their own interests, if for no other reason, would take steps to restore the position.

3. His Majesty's Government have no reason to suppose that Iraq has any hostile designs against any other State, even including Koweit. The recent Iraqi propaganda about conditions in Koweit has certainly been troublesome, but His Majesty's Government have repeatedly made it clear to the Iraqi Government that they will not tolerate any modification of its status, and this being so, they find it difficult to take this propaganda seriously in the sense of supposing it will lead to any deliberate attempt to secure such a modification by force. His Majesty's Government would, however, welcome any further action which Ibn Saud might feel disposed to take to impress upon General Nuri the folly of the agitation and propaganda directed against Koweit.

4. Apart from Koweit question, Iraqi Government may possibly look forward to the day when Iraq will, they hope, play a leading part in a federation with other Arab States. But here again His Majesty's Government have no reason to suppose that Iraqi Government expect to create this federation by any but peaceful means. Certainly no such federation could be created except after prolonged discussion, in which Ibn Saud would be able to make his views fully known.

5. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the Turkish Government have no intention, apart from the Hatay, of attempting to recover any portion of former Ottoman Empire. Continued unrest in Syria, especially in parts adjoining Turkey, may, however, make the Turkish Government feel that some action similar to that which has already resulted in the virtual cession of the Hatay is necessary in Turkish interests. In the interests of Syria, two things are important if this is to be avoided. One is an agreement between France and the Syrians. The other is that the politicians of Damascus, who have hitherto dominated the Governments of Syria and have successfully managed while in office to antagonise most of the minorities and many of the Arabs (*e.g.*, of Aleppo), should in future adopt methods which will win the confidence and goodwill of all sections of the population.

[E 3035/394/25]

No. 23.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 3, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 43 [of 29th March: Credits for Saudi Arabia].

You may inform Saudi Arabian Government that His Majesty's Government agree in principle to assist them to acquire on credit—

- (a) Cartridge factory.
- (b) Some raw material for this factory.
- (c) Up to 3,500,000 rounds of war-time .303-inch ammunition.
- (d) Rifles or machine guns from this country.

2. Price of (a) c.i.f. Jedda is nearly £28,000. This includes machinery shipped from here and cost of sending out experts to erect it, but not the building (nothing elaborate is needed) to house the machinery or local labour.

3. Price of (b) is at present (when prices are high) rather over £4,000 per 1 million rounds. His Majesty's Government have in mind quantity sufficient for about 6 million rounds (say, £25,000). But for reasons given in letter from Mr. Baggallay to Export Credits Guarantee Department enclosed in my despatch No. 106 [of 15th April] it is not contemplated that this would all be acquired straight away.

4. Price of (c) is 16s. for 1,000 rounds, £2,800 in all (without freight, &c.). This quantity is all War Office have to offer. As it is unlikely that anything can be done to ensure delivery of (a) at earlier date than Greenwood and Batley have mentioned, Saudi Arabian Government may think it desirable to take full quantity.

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5. Sum His Majesty's Government propose for (d) is £10,000. War Office have no second-hand rifles for disposal, but orders for both rifles and machine guns can be placed with the trade. There may be some delay owing to army expansion in this country. But if given particulars of types and quantities required, War Office will be glad to help with advice generally.

6. Terms His Majesty's Government have in mind are that Saudi Arabian Government should undertake to repay all the credits (including that for factory, for which they have suggested paying firm in annual instalments) at end of five years and in the meanwhile pay only interest. Export Credits Guarantee Department propose to arrange, if practicable, a global guarantee arrangement, so that a number of separate contracts can be avoided.

7. It is, however, important that if Saudi Arabian Government decide to accept this offer, or any part of it, no further steps should be taken to place orders until Saudi Arabian Legation have discussed financial details with Export Credits Guarantee Department, who will be able to indicate the lines on which a global agreement could be prepared.

8. Please telegraph as soon as practicable whether these suggestions are agreeable to Saudi Arabian Government. This applies especially to (c), for which there are other would-be purchasers.

[E 3750/2670/91]

No. 24.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 23.)

Sir,

India Office, May 19, 1939.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 8th May, 1939, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter from the Political Agent, Bahrein, dated the 7th May, 1939, on the subject of Ibn Saud's visit.

I am, &c.

S. F. STEWARD.

Enclosure in No. 24.

Political Agent, Bahrein, to Political Resident, Bushire.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bahrein, May 7, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the visit of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud to Bahrein from the 2nd to the 7th May, 1939. It will be appreciated that this report has been written on the day of the King's departure and that there has been insufficient time to collect much gossip from the palace or the bazaar. The report is therefore based almost solely on my personal observations.

2. On the 1st May, 1939, the Amir Saud arrived in Bahrein from Al Khobar by launch, and on the same day the Amir Feisal arrived from Cairo by air. The latter had chartered an Imperial Airways aeroplane from Egypt and brought with him Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and Sheikh Jemal Husseini, who had been summoned by Ibn Saud for a discussion on Palestine. I paid an informal call on the Amirs the same evening, and the following morning they crossed to Al Khobar by launch, in company with the brothers of his Highness the Sheikh of Bahrein and his eldest son, Sheikh Salman, in order to escort the King to Bahrein. The King arrived in the late afternoon with a huge party of relatives, Ministers, Amirs, political *détenués* and retainers, and was met on the customs pier by his Highness the Sheikh of Bahrein, Mr. Belgrave, myself and the assistant political agent. The arrival was admirably staged, and an excellent guard of honour provided by the Bahrein police was inspected before Ibn Saud and his Highness entered an open car to drive to the palace in Manama, where the remainder of the Al Khalifah family and the notables of Bahrein had assembled to greet him. At this point the King performed the first of many acts of cordiality towards myself by insisting on my accompanying him in his car,

although I had intended to take leave of him at the pier. After a brief stay at the palace in Manama, the King and his Highness the Sheikh motored to Rafa'a, where a palace recently constructed by his Highness's son, Sheikh Salman, had been placed at Ibn Saud's disposal.

3. On the following morning the Bahrein police gave a short display before Ibn Saud, followed by Arab dancing; in the afternoon the King, the Amir Saud, the Amir Feisal and several other sons and members of the entourage, together with Sheikh Hamad and the leading members of the Al Khalifah, came to a garden-party at the agency. The whole party was in excellent spirits, and the King cracked several Rabelaisian jokes, while at intervals he made extremely offensive remarks about the German Chancellor and Signor Mussolini. He reminded me that the ex-Kaiser Wilhelm had in 1914 claimed to be the Sword and Protector of Islam—and had come to a bad end; and he added, it was interesting to observe, that Signor Mussolini is now using very much the same language and will probably go very much the same way! He said that he was thankful that he had been able to put an end to the Italian connexion with his "Air Force" by making the excuse that he felt he ought to send his young men to Egypt for training.

4. On the following morning I was enabled to pay a formal call at Rafa'a on His Majesty, who had with him only the Amir Saud and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba. The interview lasted half an hour, and I found an opportunity to tell the King something about the abortive agitation which occurred in Bahrein last autumn. His Majesty said that he knew well that it had been entirely foreign in origin, and he proceeded to blame Iraq for the trouble it causes in neighbouring States by its press and wireless propaganda. The disturbances in Dubai were also mentioned, and the King made it very clear that his sympathies were entirely with Sheikh Said-bin-Maktum. He then said that he wished to give me some friendly advice: never to believe any news from the coast unless I had verified it myself. He thought that much of our difficulty with the coastal sheikhs in the past had been due to inaccurate information from our previous agent there, and he added that he himself had much the same trouble with some of his outlying districts. He wished to assure me that on more than one occasion he had advised Trucial Coast sheikhs to place their trust in the British and to cease making stupid difficulties in regard to air facilities and so on. His Majesty was politely enthusiastic about Bahrein and the admirable relations which exist between the Al Khalifah and ourselves; and at this point he said that there was one matter which he wished to mention as the friend of all parties concerned. He had intended to raise it with Sir Reader Bullard if the latter had been able to come to Bahrein, but he thought it would be proper to speak to me about it. He had been much criticised for not attempting to make peace between Bahrein and Qatar; it was a stupid and unnecessary quarrel and ought to be ended. In the subsequent pause I remarked that I also was greatly concerned at this quarrel and was constantly on the watch for an opportunity to initiate a settlement. I thought that both sides were still a little too hot, but I should be immensely grateful for any advice which His Majesty could, in his wisdom, give me. The King then closed this part of the discussion by saying that he hoped to hear before long that a settlement had been reached. I expected the next subject to be Jebel Naksh and Khor-el-Odeid, but he then turned to a discussion on oil, making it evident that, in his view, the California Arabian Standard Oil Company did not have *his* interests at heart. He was thankful that at last some progress had been made by them, but, after all, he needed oil royalties very badly and they were only just beginning to come in in very minor sums. Fortunately, he still had other large areas in his country uncovered by existing concessions, and these would not go for nothing. I might add here that I gather the impression that the whole Damman visit has been somewhat unsatisfactory; the King would not follow the programme which had been arranged; he arrived at a banquet organised by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company and left inside three minutes; he complained to Sheikh Hamad in my hearing that on one occasion he had been compelled to chase food unsuccessfully all around the table with a spoon and fork; and altogether he appears to have reacted somewhat violently to the American passion for schedule.

5. To revert now to the course of events in Bahrein. On the afternoon of the 4th May a formal entertainment was given by the Manama and Muharrag Municipalities in the Manama Municipal Garden. The proceedings, once they

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began, were comparatively brief, being confined to short speeches of welcome read on behalf of his Highness the Sheikh and the presidents of the two municipalities and a reply read on behalf of the King by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. The sentiments expressed were in all respects admirable, the King's speech referring to "this Arab island under its Arab ruler." Though it would be foolish to imagine that the King had any particular motive, this part of the speech was a potent reply to those who talk of British domination and colonisation in Bahrein or the dictatorship of the British Adviser.

6. On the following day, Friday, the King joined in the prayers at the mosque in Manama. In the afternoon he paid a visit to the oil-field and refinery, during which Mr. Belgrave and I accompanied him in his car and were compelled to assume the rôle of oil experts. During much of the drive, however, His Majesty held forth on politics; after a brief reference to M. Litvinov's departure from the scene in Russia and a remark that he wished he knew what this meant, the King embarked on a long statement of his dislike for Germany and Italy and their hectoring methods. He said that Herr Grobba had told him recently that Germany and Italy were stronger than the rest of Europe put together, that the democracies were afraid of them, and that he (Ibn Saud) would be well advised to link his fate with the Axis. He himself, however, had not the least doubt that, if war broke out in Europe, there would be revolution in Germany and Italy, whose people must, he said, be sick of "having their tongues held." He then went on to deprecate modern tendencies in Iraq. Iraq, he said, seemed to be composed of three quite irreconcilable elements: the Government, the army and the people. Everyone was in far too much of a hurry, and Iraqi foreign policy was deplorable. He himself thought that they would all do well to remember how much Arab nations owed to England. But for England the Iraq State would never have come into existence, and Egypt would have been at the mercy of any odd minor Power, such as Greece. How happy was Bahrein under its Arab sheikh, enjoying the protection of England—and at this stage point was given to his remarks by the sight of the battery of tanks at the Oil Company's refinery. From there on his interest was mainly in statistics of tons of oil, tanks and wells. He stopped at the power house at the refinery and was obviously impressed, but worried by the noise. Later on, at tea, he whispered to me that he heard that the Bahrein Petroleum Company were to get a concession for the unallotted area of Bahrein, and said he would be very grateful if I would let him know in due course what the terms were, as these would help him a great deal in his own concessional negotiations! I thought it well to make it clear that we did not settle the terms and were concerned only to see that Sheikh Hamad received fair treatment from the company.

7. It struck me on this, as on other occasions, that he seemed extremely anxious to show publicly the goodwill which he entertained for the British. He made me sit by him on all public occasions and would not tolerate any attempt on my part to retire into the background. He was equally cordial to Mr. Belgrave, and made a particular point of thanking him personally for all the arrangements which had been made for his entertainment.

8. On the earlier nights the banquets given by his Highness the Sheikh and his brothers (for which the State pays) had been restricted solely to Arab guests. On Friday and Saturday nights, however, a few European guests were also invited and received most kindly attention from the King.

9. On Saturday morning the King visited a few of the more important Nejdi traders in Manama and also had his eyes tested. (Dr. Kennedy tells me that it is merely a matter of giving him slightly stronger lenses.) After dinner the King attended a torch-light tattoo, in which the Bahrein police, some of the town watchmen and a number of school-children took part. It was an admirable production, for which great credit is due to Mr. Belgrave, who was solely responsible for its organisation. Meanwhile, I had arranged through Sheikh Hafiz Wahba that the King would give me a private audience after the tattoo, and at this I solicited Sheikh Hafiz's assistance in reading to him two messages and a memorandum from His Majesty's Government in regard to Palestine. There had been insufficient time after the arrival of the telegrams (in very corrupt form) from the Foreign Office to do more than make a rough translation, but the English and Arabic versions were faired during the night and handed to His Majesty when he left Bahrein this morning. As I have reported separately, Ibn Saud said that he was unable to make any comment immediately,

but that he would study these papers in detail on arrival at Al Khobar and, if he wished to send any message or require further elucidation from His Majesty's Government, he would write to me at once. Explaining the presence of Sheikh Jemal Hussein, he said that he had received many kindnesses from the British Government, and that, now that they were in difficulties, he wished to do what he could to help them. He had sent messages to the Palestine Arab leaders to prepare for a settlement, and had asked that Jemal Hussein be sent to him for a discussion, since he regarded him as probably the most intelligent amongst them. It was probably an unusual experience for Ibn Saud to sit with only two companions in a large and empty palace late at night, and with no more than two policemen and two of his own fidawis outside.

10. The King and his entourage left Bahrein this morning after the most affectionate farewells and pressing invitations to visit him at Riyadh. I have not yet received full information of the presents which have been given by Sheikh Hamad, but they include twenty-one motor cars, fifty camels and twenty horses. Other gifts include 30,000 Rs. for the King's servants, though as a cheque for this amount was presented to Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman the ultimate disposal of the money remains in doubt. The Manama bazaar is half denuded by the immense purchases made by the Saudi entourage, and a fleet of boats is at present carrying these purchases across to Al Khobar. I shall report more fully on the financial aspect of the visit at a later date.

11. According to information received so far, no political questions affecting Saudi-Bahrein relations were discussed with the sheikh or his family. The King did, it is true, enquire from Mr. Belgrave whether it would be possible to release from jail one of the prisoners convicted of complicity in last October's disturbances, but this enquiry seems to have been prompted by the fact that the man had at one time been a nakhuda in Ibn Saud's own employment. A roundabout request also reached me to release a Nejdi whom I had imprisoned for rash and negligent driving, but I declined to do anything unless the King himself mentioned the matter. Bazaar rumours heard so far relate mainly to the Amir Feisal—one of them referring to his impending elevation to the Throne of Palestine.

12. The effect of this visit has been wholly admirable locally and will, I am convinced, have excellent results in a much wider sphere. The King has seen for himself the relations which exist between the Al Khalifah family, the agency and the adviser; he has spoken publicly of his great pleasure in all that he has seen in Bahrein; he has exhibited equally publicly (and at a time when there are many visitors from other Moslem States in Bahrein) the most marked cordiality towards British officials here; and further proof has been given of the personal affection which exists between the King and Sheikh Hamad of Bahrein. I am sure that he has enjoyed his visit, and certainly Sheikh Hamad, his brothers and sons are delighted beyond measure. Indeed, it is difficult to realise, after the events of the past few days, that only nine years ago the Political Agent in Bahrein reported after Ibn Saud's last visit to the island that "the whole effect of this visit has been deplorable. A more successful impetus to pan-Arab feeling could not have been given and the tenuity of our hold on Bahrein could not have been more clearly demonstrated The futility of the Al Khalifah sheikhs in their own dominions has been amply demonstrated" This present report might end with a quotation from Ibn Saud's own words to Sheikh Hafiz Wahba: "In my own country I lose my temper not less than once in three days; here in Bahrein I cannot imagine how I could ever lose it." Fortunately the weather was cool.

I have, &c.

H. WEIGHTMAN.

P.S.—I have just heard through Sheikh Mohammad-bin-'Isa, brother of Sheikh Sir Hamad, that Ibn Saud talked constantly to Sheikh Hamad and his relatives about world politics, and that time after time he impressed upon them the strength of his pro-British sentiments. He said he might have his minor differences with us, but these matters were matters of no account and that he was solid with the British.

H. W.

[E 3882/394/25]

No. 25.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, May 26, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 75 of 3rd May.

Saudi Arabian Government are still considering the question of a cartridge factory, but they have decided to take advantage of credits offered by His Majesty's Government for purchase of the following:—

- (a) 200 Hotchkiss machine guns at £12, plus cost of reconditioning.
- (b) 3,500,000 rounds of .303 ammunition for £2,800.
- (c) English rifles to the value of £10,000.
- (d) Ammunition for rifles—at least 1,000 per rifle.

2. They realise that this involves an increase in credits offered owing to exclusion of (c) and (d) from the £10,000, but hope that His Majesty's Government will not object to that. They would be grateful for the advice of His Majesty's Government as to the make and price of rifles, and do not wish to approach the factories. I judge that they hope for favourable terms in price as well as in credits, having in mind the very low price at which rifles were offered by the Italians.

[E 4229/1809/25]

No. 26.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 73. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, June 6, 1939.

PRIME Minister called on me on 5th June and spoke to me of deterioration of Iraq's relations with Saudi Arabia.

He intimated that Ibn Saud was jealous of dominant influence which Iraq was gaining in Arabian affairs, and disturbed by rumours in circulation that a Hashimite Prince would soon become King of Syria. He was also annoyed that agreements concluded in May 1938 (see Bagdad telegram No. 37, Saving) had not been ratified. (Prime Minister admitted that his Government regarded agreement concerning nationality of border tribes as being unfair to Iraq and wanted a modification.) Finally, Ibn Saud was showing great obstinacy about the demarcation of frontier in neighbourhood of Muqur (see letter to Mr. Baxter of 16th March). He might think recent events had weakened Iraqi Government and that moment was therefore favourable to press unreasonable demands, perhaps under threat of tribal trouble.

A few days ago he had withdrawn Saudi commission, which had been making a triangulation of frontier with an Iraqi commission, and had demanded that an Iraqi representative should be sent to discuss matter with him or that a Saudi Arabian representative should be received in Bagdad for the same purpose.

Prime Minister was considering possibility of sending Minister for Foreign Affairs to Riyadh soon, but opening of Parliament in a few days' time made this difficult.

Meanwhile, he intended to offer arbitration under provisions of protocol of arbitration to "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty of April 1931, and would like to suggest that His Majesty's Government should be invited to provide president of board of arbitration. Before making this proposal, he wished to know whether His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would accept such an invitation. He felt strongly that, as inspirers of Treaty of Mohammerah and its protocols, His Majesty's Government were clearly the best authority to arbitrate on this matter, though he doubted whether Ibn Saud would welcome proposal. I undertook to ascertain your views and should be glad to receive early instructions by telegraph.

During our conversation Prime Minister told me that Saudi Arabian Minister here had informed him that the Amir Saud had recently left Riyadh for an

unknown destination with a large body of men. Prime Minister was somewhat anxious lest this move should be the prelude to despatch of raiders into Iraq. I should welcome any information which His Majesty's Minister at Jedda may have about this move.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 28.)

[E 4246/1809/25]

No. 27.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 23, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 75 [of 12th June: Ibn Saud's letter to Sir R. Bullard objecting strongly to Iraqi policy and propaganda, especially regarding Syria].

I have no further information regarding intentions of French Government. Sir E. Phipps's despatch No. 648 [of 16th May] shows that French Minister for Foreign Affairs, when asked about the rumoured French intention to establish a monarchy in Syria, replied that all this was very vague at present, and would not admit that French Government had any particular candidate in view to occupy the throne. I doubt whether French Government have yet come to definite decision to have a monarchy at all, still less to adopt a Shereefian candidate.

2. Question is, in any case, primarily one for decision by the mandatory Power and the people of Syria. If, however, the Iraqi Government were to make it known that they favoured some particular candidate, it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to take exception to their action on the ground that it amounted to improper interference with Syrian affairs, and still less to improper interference with Saudi Arabian affairs, seeing that such action by itself would seem to constitute no threat to any part of Saudi Arabia.

3. I presume that Ibn Saud's real fear is the formation of a comparatively strong and influential bloc of the northern Arab States, which might rapidly overshadow Saudi Arabia in political importance, and dispose, once and for all, of Ibn Saud's claim to be regarded as the political leader of the Arab world. It would, from Ibn Saud's point of view, be worse still if Iraq, Transjordan and Syria were all ruled by members of the Shereefian family, who might possibly even attempt to stir up revolt in the Hejaz or other parts of present Saudi territories. But remote apprehensions of this kind would not entitle Ibn Saud to regard Iraq's present policy as directly aimed against Saudi Arabia. There can presumably be no fear on his part of Iraqi attempts openly to seize his territory.

4. His Majesty's Government have themselves recently taken strong exception to Iraqi propaganda, especially regarding Koweit; but it is obvious that no activities in which the Iraqi Government have been engaging could possibly be regarded as justifying any violent action by Ibn Saud, such as tribal raids into Iraq, and any such action might obviously lead to most serious consequences.

5. I think that, subject to your observations, your reply might be on the following lines:—

6. I have learnt with regret that anything said or done by the Iraqi Government should have led Ibn Saud to think that the Iraqi Government are pursuing a policy contrary to his interests.

7. His Majesty's Government have themselves found it necessary recently to take exception to certain aspects of Iraqi propaganda, especially propaganda directed against Koweit. His Majesty's Government have made their views regarding the objectionable nature of this propaganda clear to the Iraqi Government. There is no reason why Ibn Saud, if he shares the views of His Majesty's Government on this point, should not also point out to the Iraqi Government that such propaganda is open to strong objection.

8. At the same time, it does not appear likely to His Majesty's Government that Iraq has aggressive intentions towards Saudi Arabia or the Persian Gulf States. Even if such ambitions were entertained in certain quarters in Iraq, it would still be doubtful whether they would constitute a real threat to Iraq's neighbours. No one can foresee the distant future, but so long as Ibn Saud and his successors rule what is now Saudi Arabia, and so long as His Majesty's

Government maintain their position on the shores of the Persian Gulf, as they have every intention of doing, it is clearly beyond the power of Iraq to achieve any territorial expansion in that direction.

9. As regards Syria, I understand that the Iraqi Government hope that eventually there may be some form of closer union between some of the Arab States. But so far as Syria is concerned this must depend upon the end of the French Mandate. These Iraqi hopes, therefore, are not likely to be realised in the near future, and need surely not affect Iraq's present relations with other States.

10. As for the question of the Syrian Throne, His Majesty's Government think that this is primarily a question to be decided by the people of Syria and the mandatory Power. They do not believe that any decision has yet been reached, even whether there is to be a king at all. His Majesty's Government had not heard that the Iraqi Government wished to support some particular candidate for the Syrian Throne, and they are not aware who this candidate may be, but if Ibn Saud holds different views on the suitability of certain possible candidates, it would seem desirable that a friendly discussion should take place between the Saudi Arabian and Iraqi Governments with a view to reconcile any difference of outlook.

11. In general, His Majesty's Government believe that there is no question affecting the interests of the two neighbouring Arab monarchies, which cannot be solved by the normal methods of friendly and confidential consultation. I hope that Ibn Saud will find, in the course of such conversations, that the Iraqi Government have every desire to take full account of his position and to treat outstanding problems in a spirit of goodwill. It would, meanwhile, be best to refrain from any action or public statement which might merely embitter Saudi-Iraqi relations. Hasty action of this kind by Ibn Saud would certainly not be the best means of inducing Iraq to modify her policy towards Syria in such a way as to take more favourable account of his interests. Perhaps, in order to initiate conversations, Ibn Saud might be prepared to repeat his invitation to General Nuri, or some other leading Iraqi statesman, to visit him in Saudi Arabia, or alternatively he might send one of his own sons to Bagdad. A full and frank exchange of views upon Saudi-Iraqi relations could not fail to be of mutual advantage.

12. Foregoing was drafted before receipt of Bagdad telegram No. 225 [of 18th June], but will, I hope, provide you with general lines on which you can base a suitable reply to Ibn Saud.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 225; Cairo, No. 49, Saving (by post); Damascus, No. 3, Saving (by post); Jerusalem, No. 452A (by post); and Paris, No. 273, Saving (by bag).)

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 75/75/34]

No. 28.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 4, 1939.)

(No. 620.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, December 22, 1938.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 480 of the 30th September, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of an agreement dated the 8th December last, concluded at Bagdad between the Iraqi and Iranian Governments on the subject of the formation of a commission to re-erect the frontier pillars on the Iraqi-Iranian frontier in accordance with article 3 of the Frontier Treaty, signed on the 4th July, 1937.

2. I have obtained this document privately from Mr. McDougall, the legal adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who informs me that although it is dated the 8th December the actual date of its signature by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Iranian Minister in Bagdad was the 10th December.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

Enclosure in No. 28.

Accord.

EN vue d'appliquer les dispositions de l'article 3 du Traité de Frontière, conclu le 4 juillet 1937, entre et de l'article 1 du protocole annexé audit traité et signé à la même date, les soussignés représentants des Gouvernements des deux États contractants, dûment autorisés, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1.

1. Une commission de bornage sera constituée comprenant un premier représentant et un second représentant nommés par chaque Gouvernement. Le second représentant remplacera le premier représentant en son absence et se chargera de ses fonctions. Il jouira des mêmes droits et privilèges que le premier représentant.

2. Au cas où il y aurait un désaccord entre les représentants et qu'ils n'arriveraient pas à résoudre la question en litige ils la soumettront à leurs Gouvernements afin d'y trouver une solution par la voie diplomatique.

3. Les premiers représentants présideront alternativement les séances de la commission.

4. Les procès-verbaux seront rédigés en iranien, en arabe et en français et au cas de litige le texte français fera foi.

5. Chaque premier représentant désignera les auxiliaires qui doivent l'assister dans chacune des séances de la commission.

ARTICLE 2.

Les travaux de la commission seront :

(a) De borner la frontière irano-irakienne conformément au Traité de Frontière conclu le 4 juillet 1937, en érigeant des bornes sur les emplacements fixés par la Commission de Délimitation de 1914 mentionnée dans l'article 1 (b) dudit traité, en érigeant des bornes supplémentaires comme il est prévu ci-dessous et en fixant les coordonnées géographiques exactes des anciennes et nouvelles bornes.

(b) De fixer définitivement, comme il est prévu ci-après, les coordonnées géographiques désignées d'une manière approximative dans l'article 2 dudit traité.

(c) De préparer comme il est prévu dans l'article 9 de cet accord une nouvelle carte de toute la frontière et d'y mettre en évidence la ligne frontière tracée par la commission de 1914 ainsi que l'emplacement de toutes les bornes et piliers à ériger par la commission.

ARTICLE 3.

Chaque Gouvernement désignera des secrétaires et des spécialistes pour assister les représentants parmi lesquels il y aura au moins deux spécialistes triangulateurs.

ARTICLE 4.

La commission se réunira quand il sera jugé nécessaire et au moins une fois par semaine afin de rédiger en un procès-verbal le résultat des travaux exécutés et de fixer le programme à suivre. Les procès-verbaux seront signés par les représentants des deux parties contractantes.

ARTICLE 5.

1. La commission prendra comme base de ses travaux :

(a) Les procès-verbaux des séances de la Commission de Délimitation de la Frontière de 1914 contenant le tableau descriptif de la ligne frontière et de l'emplacement des bornes; les cartes identiques et les cartes supplémentaires utilisées et signées par ladite commission.

(b) L'article 2 du Traité de Frontière conclu le 4 juillet 1937.

2. Chacun des Gouvernements fournira à son premier représentant les copies des documents susmentionnés qui seront comparées et vérifiées avant de commencer les travaux de la commission.

ARTICLE 6.

La date et le lieu de la première séance de la commission seront fixés d'un commun accord par les deux Gouvernements.

ARTICLE 7.

1. La commission doit désigner avec précision les emplacements fixés par la commission de 1914 et y ériger les nouvelles bornes.

2. La commission érigera entre les bornes dont l'emplacement a été fixé par la commission de 1914, des bornes supplémentaires sur la ligne frontière, à des distances telles que chaque borne soit visible de l'autre à l'œil nu. Cependant, si la frontière suit une ligne naturelle clairement définie ou si la nature du terrain rend difficile l'érection des bornes, ou dans les circonstances exceptionnelles, l'érection des bornes n'est pas obligatoire. Dans ces cas la commission doit s'efforcer d'ériger les bornes à des distances aussi proches l'une de l'autre qu'exige une démarcation de la frontière. En outre, dans les cas exceptionnels où les bornes ne peuvent pas être érigées sur la ligne frontière même et où une démarcation claire et permanente est indispensable, la commission érigera des bornes additionnelles à proximité de la ligne frontière de sorte qu'elle puisse être déterminée en se référant à ces bornes.

3. La commission entreprendra l'exécution des travaux de la commission d'experts prévue par l'article 1 du protocole de signature annexé au Traité de Frontière du 4 juillet 1937. Les coordonnées géographiques en question seront définitivement déterminées par les méthodes prescrites à l'article 9 de cet accord pour la détermination des bornes-frontières.

ARTICLE 8.

1. Les bornes seront d'une des deux formes suivantes :

Forme (1). Un poteau en fer de 5" x 3" et de 11' de longueur rayé noir et blanc. A l'extrémité supérieure de la borne sera fixé perpendiculairement à la ligne frontière un disque circulaire de fer de 1' de diamètre portant le numéro de la borne en relief. Le disque sera noir et le numéro en relief blanc.

Forme (2). Des pierres (taillées si possible) bâties avec de la chaux ou du ciment sur une fondation convenable dans laquelle sera enfoncée verticalement une barre de fer. Les dimensions de la borne seront au moins de 1.50 mètre

de hauteur et de 1 mètre de diamètre à la base. Sur le côté de la borne à angle droit de la ligne frontière le numéro de la borne sera marqué sur une plaque en ciment de 1' de diamètre.

2. Les bornes de forme (1) devront être employées de préférence aux bornes de forme (2).

3. Les bornes seront numérotées consécutivement en commençant par la première borne érigée par la commission.

4. Si la nature du terrain ou autres circonstances empêchent l'érection des bornes des formes (1) et (2), la commission choisira d'autres formes de bornes convenant aux endroits en question.

ARTICLE 9.

1. La nouvelle carte de la frontière mentionnée dans l'article 2 (c) ci-dessus sera d'une échelle de 1 : 50,000 et contiendra le levé topographique d'une région de 5 kilom. au moins de chaque côté de la frontière. La commission établira, si elle le juge nécessaire, pour certaines parties de la frontière des cartes plus détaillées et d'une échelle plus grande qui seront annexées en marge des cartes ci-dessus mentionnées.

2. Étant donné qu'il existe une triangulation le long de la frontière irakienne basée sur l'ellipsoïde de Clarke 1880, la triangulation du levé topographique ci-dessus mentionné sera basée là-dessus.

3. Les deux Gouvernements mettront à la disposition de la commission, aussitôt que possible, un nombre suffisant d'experts topographes.

4. Les coordonnées géographiques des bornes-frontières seront déterminées par la triangulation du levé ci-dessus mentionné.

5. Les feuilles originales du levé ci-dessus mentionné seront signées par chacun des représentants.

6. Par un commun accord entre les deux Gouvernements la nouvelle carte sera publiée en français. Les représentants signeront deux de ces copies dont chaque Gouvernement recevra une et pourra la publier en sa langue nationale.

ARTICLE 10.

La commission préparera un carnet de repérage contenant les coordonnées géographiques de chaque borne, sa direction, sa distance de la borne précédente ainsi que l'azimut des points de repère visibles.

ARTICLE 11.

La commission nommera une sous-commission qui sera chargée de surveiller l'érection des bornes sur les emplacements désignés par la commission. Cette sous-commission sera composée soit des seconds représentants soit des membres techniques. Un rapport des travaux effectués par la sous-commission doit être soumis le plus tôt possible à la commission afin d'être inséré aux procès-verbaux de la commission.

ARTICLE 12.

Les frais de l'érection des bornes ainsi que tous autres frais communs seront à la charge des deux Gouvernements à parts égales et les comptes définitifs en seront préparés en double exemplaire et signés par les représentants des deux parties. Chaque Gouvernement en recevra un exemplaire.

ARTICLE 13.

Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent à faciliter les travaux de la commission, spécialement en ce qui concerne le logement, la main d'œuvre et les matériaux nécessaires. Chaque représentant et sa suite peuvent franchir librement le territoire des deux Gouvernements et y circuler pendant l'exécution des travaux.

ARTICLE 14.

1. Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent à protéger et entretenir les bornes érigées par la commission.

2. Les deux parties contractantes sont d'accord qu'après l'achèvement des travaux de délimitation, et au moins une fois tous les deux ans, leurs autorités

locales près de la frontière coopéreront ensemble à contrôler toutes les bornes érigées par la commission et au besoin faire les réparations nécessaires. Les deux Gouvernements laisseront à la disposition de ces autorités un nombre suffisant de cartes relevées par la commission.

ARTICLE 15.

Les procès-verbaux de la commission, le carnet de repérage prévu à l'article 10 de cet accord, les cartes et tous autres documents préparés par la commission seront en double exemplaire et signés par les représentants, qui en donneront un exemplaire à leur Gouvernement respectif.

ARTICLE 16.

Le présent accord, fait en double exemplaire en français, entrera en vigueur immédiatement après la signature.

Fait à Bagdad, le 8 décembre 1938.

Pour le Gouvernement
royal de l'Irak :

Pour le Gouvernement
impérial de l'Iran :

[E 72/72/93]

No. 29.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 4, 1939.)

(No. 631.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, December 27, 1938.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 215 of the 25th December, I have the honour to submit the following report on the events, so far as I have been able to ascertain them, which led to the resignation of Jamil Madfai's Cabinet:—

2. About 7 o'clock on the evening of the 24th December a strong detachment of armoured cars and cavalry was moved from the military cantonment on the right bank of the Tigris at Washash and concentrated at Hinaidi, where it came under the direct control of the Chief of the General Staff. Shortly afterwards small parties of these troops were sent to the houses of Nuri Said and Taha-al-Hashimi to protect them, and at the same time a deputation of officers, headed by the Chief of the General Staff, sought and obtained an audience with King Ghazi, to whom they represented the dissatisfaction of the army with Jamil Madfai's Administration. They begged His Majesty to call upon the Cabinet to resign and to replace it by another, which should include men who had faithfully served his father, such as Nuri Said and Taha-al-Hashimi. King Ghazi thereupon sent for the Prime Minister and his principal colleagues. I do not know precisely what passed between the Prime Minister and the King, but, according to the story told to me by the late Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I paid a farewell visit on the 26th December, His Majesty gave his Government no support and was, indeed, in no condition even to discuss the situation. Taken as they were completely by surprise, the Government were left with no alternative but to resign.

3. It is said in many quarters that, after obtaining the resignation of Jamil Madfai, King Ghazi at first summoned Hikmat Sulaiman, and that it was only after Hikmat had declared his inability to form a Government that the premiership was offered to Nuri. The latter at once set about gathering his colleagues, and a Royal irada appointing the following Cabinet was read out with the customary ceremony in the Serai at 2 o'clock the following afternoon (the 25th December):—

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Nuri Said ("Personalities," 66).

Finance: Rustam Haidar ("Personalities," 72).

Defence and Acting Minister of the Interior: Taha-al-Hashimi ("Personalities," 81).

Justice: Mahmud Subhi-al-Daftari ("Personalities," 46).

Education: Salih Jabr ("Personalities," 78).

Economics and Communications: Umar Nazmi.

At the same time a unanimous invitation from the entire Cabinet was despatched to Naji Shawkat ("Personalities," 62), the Iraqi Minister at Angora, to join them as Minister for the Interior. To-day I learn that he has accepted this invitation and is hastening to Bagdad.

4. With the exception of Umar Nazmi, all the colleagues chosen by Nuri Said are well known in public life. Umar Nazmi is a senior official who has an excellent reputation and whom the late Prime Minister several times endeavoured, without success, to persuade to accept the portfolio of the Interior.

5. Judging from their past record, the new ministers appear as competent and reasonable as can be expected in this country, but I confess to misgivings concerning Taha-al-Hashimi. He has for some time taken a leading part in the work of the Palestine Defence League, about whose objectionable activities I have had on several occasions to make strong representations to the Iraqi Government. It is to be feared, therefore, that he may endeavour to influence the new Government to adopt towards the Palestinian question an attitude less conciliatory than that of their predecessors. As reported in my telegram No. 218 of to-day's date, I have already given Nuri a strong hint on this subject.

6. As regards the Prime Minister himself, I have already reported in paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 563 of the 16th November that, according to the impression I have formed, he is no longer the man he was. It is possible that the lack of balance and instability of temperament which he has shown since his last term of office are largely attributable to chagrin at his humiliation at the time of the *coup d'Etat* of October 1936, and that a return to power will bring out again some of the valuable qualities which he has shown in the past. I hope that this may be so, but his readiness to participate in yet another military *coup* (although this time a bloodless one) to overthrow a well-intentioned and successful Administration which had given him no personal or public justification for such a course does not inspire confidence. As your Lordship will be aware from my despatch No. 563, and as Nuri himself reminded me to-day, he gave me warning of the intended *coup*, and I, on my part, while frankly disbelieving its imminence, took such action as lay within my power to dissuade him from the course which he has now adopted.

7. The immediate reasons for this military revolt are seemingly trivial, but its root causes lie deep in the graver events of recent history. Superficially, it was the result of the irritation caused to the General Staff by the tactless and over-forceful behaviour of the recently-appointed Minister of Defence, Sabih Najib, whose service in the army as a junior officer was too recent for such behaviour to be acceptable. Fundamentally, it was the breaking into flame of the smouldering resentment of the officers who had been displaced and humiliated by those who had won preferment and influence as the friends of Bakr Sidqi. Of these, Taha-al-Hashimi, the Chief of the General Staff, whom Bakr deposed and whose brother Yasin he drove from office, was the natural leader, and it is to him that the chief part in the movement must be attributed. Nuri's share was probably much the same as Hikmat Sulaiman's in the military revolt led by Bakr Sidqi, but it is doubtful whether any of the other members of the new Cabinet were in the plot. They were gathered together later just as Hikmat Sulaiman gathered his colleagues after Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet had been driven out by the army in October 1936.

8. It is as yet too soon to determine what general policy the new Government may be expected to adopt. From the point of view of His Majesty's Government, their attitude towards the question of Palestine is perhaps the most important consideration, and I have telegraphed to your Lordship separately (my telegram No. 217 of the 27th December) reporting the conversation which I have to-day had with Nuri Said on this subject. I may add that Nuri told me he was not worrying about world affairs, serious as they were, since "our course is already set by the side of Great Britain."

9. As regards internal affairs, Nuri has, I am credibly informed, declared his determination to eschew all idea of avenging either the murder of Jafar Pasha Al Askari or his own expulsion in October 1936, and he has already written to Hikmat Sulaiman assuring him that he has nothing to fear. He may, indeed, endeavour to hold to this principle, but he has also to reward those who regard themselves as having been his friends in need, and he will find it difficult to do this without displacing many who owe their present positions to his enemies. Already a number of army officers have been transferred from their commands and others have been given leave while their future is considered.

10. In matters of internal administration, the line taken by the new ministers is not likely to differ widely from the general policy of their predecessors. There is, however, one important matter concerning which the policy of the Prime Minister will need particularly to be watched: I refer to the position of King Ghazi.

11. Although Nuri Said in our talk to-day employed conventional phrases about the King's youth and inexperience, it is doubtful whether he has ever forgiven him for what he regards as His Majesty's base and cowardly abandonment of a loyal and faithful servant when Bakr Sidqi marched on Bagdad. Quite recently, as I reported in my despatch No. 563 of the 16th November, he was freely speaking of His Majesty in the most contemptuous terms. I have reported in my telegram No. 218 of to-day's date the plan which Nuri outlined to me to install the Emir Zeid in the palace, and this arrangement, admirable in so far as it may lead to a purge of the palace entourage, may well betray an underlying intention eventually to place the Emir Zeid on the throne instead of King Ghazi. His Majesty is already acutely jealous of any attention shown to either the Emir Zeid or to the Emir Abdul Illah, and, if the new Prime Minister acts on his plan, His Majesty's suspicions will certainly be aroused. He will probably react by plotting against the new Government and will naturally look for conspirators in the army. The prospect is disturbing, and little imagination is needed to foresee to what calamities for the country such developments might lead.

12. I happened to visit the King on the morning of the 24th December, when Nuri's return to Bagdad came, among other subjects, under discussion. I do not think that His Majesty had any more idea of what the day held in store than I had myself. Since the *coup*, I am told, on reliable authority, that His Majesty is taking credit for having "once again saved the country."

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Governor-General of India.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 374/374/93]

No. 30.

Sir M. Peterson to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 11, 1939.

MY telegram No. 3, Saving.

King Ghazi sent for me this morning and appealed in the presence of the Prime Minister for financial assistance for Iraq in the form of credit facilities. Government anticipate that there will be a deficit of £800,000 in this year's estimate owing to unforeseen commitments on railway construction.

I undertook to convey the request to His Majesty's Government, but reminded the King and Prime Minister that grant of export credit presupposed some degree of confidence in the stability of the régime in the country receiving them. I also reminded them of oil company's offer of a loan.

Nuri Pasha said they did not want to negotiate with oil company under constraint imposed by present financial stringency.

Minister of Finance is to visit me shortly in order to explain the programme in greater detail. But I should be glad to know as soon as possible whether I may encourage Iraqis to believe that assistance will be afforded in principle and subject to assurances of reasonable programme being submitted.

[E 376/374/93]

No. 31.

Sir M. Peterson to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 14, 1939.

(R.) MY telegram No. 12.

Nuri Pasha and Minister of Finance came to see me on 13th January. (End of R.)

They confirmed that the deficit which had arisen largely owing to uncontrolled expenditure by the railways would reach £800,000, and possibly more, unless

certain possible economies were effected. Scheme proposed by Mr. Hogg has been modified, and the Government now urgently require credit facilities for £5 million comprising £3 million for armaments and £2 million primarily for railway materials, otherwise they will be obliged to suspend public works. Minister of Finance proposed that the credit should be for maximum period of fifteen years. Approximately £1½ million of the annual oil revenues would remain for other public works, execution of which could, he suggested, be undertaken by United Kingdom firms with United Kingdom materials and the assistance of the Export Credits Guarantee Department as need arose after a mission of United Kingdom experts had visited Iraq and advised on the preparation of a general scheme of development.

I informed the Prime Minister [?] that a decision regarding armaments credits could not be taken pending the approval by Parliament of the amended export credits legislation, and that I had already recommended that His Majesty's Government should give sympathetic consideration to his appeal for assistance.

I suggest that if desired facilities are accorded they might be made conditional on preference being extended to United Kingdom contractors and materials in the construction of public works which might be included in any scheme of development prepared by the proposed mission. Though I consider it desirable to help the Iraqi Government in every possible way, it would be a pity to miss the opportunity of cornering future major contracts, for which there is increasingly keen foreign competition.

I realise that the nature of the present difficulties may arouse misgivings regarding recurrence, but the Minister of Finance intends to go to the root of the problem, which is over-spending by the railways, and ensure that they keep within reasonable bounds.

He indicated that payment to Air Ministry in respect of Hinaidi could not be made before 1940; as regards the request for armament credits, I understand Anglo-Iraqi discussions on the question of military transport have been begun, but there has so far been no discussion on the defence plan.

[E 377/374/93]

No. 32.

Sir M. Peterson to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 14, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Deficit of £800,000 includes £691,000 carried forward from 1937-38.

[E 756/72/93]

No. 33.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, January 16, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 631 of the 27th December last, I have the honour to report that recent conversations, which I have had with Nuri Said, have given me some further insight into the political ideas which are uppermost in his mind—a mind which is undoubtedly quick, while I am not yet convinced of its stability of purpose.

2. Nuri has explained that all public men in Iraq are concerned about the manner in which, during the past four years, Governments have been overthrown one after the other by secretly contrived unconstitutional action, and that he is determined to make an effort to put an end to this state of affairs, even though conscious that he himself owes to it his accession to office.

3. His appreciation of the elements of the situation is not new, and I need only summarise it in the briefest terms. While King Faisal was alive he kept his finger on the pulse of public opinion and changed Cabinets as soon as their popularity had waned or their unpopularity had reached a dangerous point.

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4. Since his death there has been no constitutional instrument responsive to public feeling and capable of acting in this manner. King Ghazi, through his youth, inexperience, and hitherto unstable temperament has been unable to employ his father's methods, and Parliament, packed as it has always been with the nominees of each successive Cabinet, has in no way reflected the changes of public feeling. In consequence, Governments, once established, have endeavoured to remain in office regardless of public feeling and have sought to repress, instead of to satisfy, criticism and opposition. In so doing they have often indulged in abuses of their special powers such as those derived from the Malicious Propaganda Law. Public resentment has thereupon rapidly increased and has found expression in the disturbing tribal or military demonstrations against the Government of the day which have become an almost annual event in recent years.

5. The remedy, Nuri Said concludes, is to restore to the Constitution, in working order, this necessary instrument which, reacting to public opinion, will dismiss Cabinets when they have outlived their utility. In his speech to the Muthannah Club, a copy of which I communicated to your Lordship with my despatch No. 3 of the 7th January, the Prime Minister indicated his wish so to reform the Electoral Law that the Chamber would become the natural instrument for changes of Government, and a committee, actually set up by Jamil Madfai's Cabinet, is at present drafting proposals with this end in view.

6. Nuri has, however, made it clear to me that he has little hope that constitutional or electoral reforms can give the desired results. He feels that the people are politically too backward to be able to work a free Constitution effectively, and that, whereas a quick remedy is evidently needed, the education of the country in the art of democratic government will take many years. His personal inclination, therefore, is to seek somehow to restore to the Palace the influence which it enjoyed when King Faisal was on the throne. This *exposé* of his views supplies, I think, the answer to the question contained in the first paragraph of your telegram No. 14 of the 13th January, which reached me after this despatch had been drafted.

7. The hope that King Ghazi himself, as he grew into maturity, would be able to take his father's place must now, Nuri feels, be deferred even if not finally set aside and he is evidently searching for a plan whereby the Emir Zeid can be used to replace the King, in fact if not in name. It is by this process of thought that he has come to evolve the idea of making Zeid a kind of Royal Counsellor in the Palace. Or, alternatively, of making him Prime Minister in a Government pledged to eliminate the army from politics and to restore constitutional checks and balances (please see my telegrams No. 9 of the 10th and No. 5, Saving, of the 11th January, 1939).

8. Both plans offer considerable difficulties, and this probably explains Nuri's vacillation between the two. In my last talk with him he seemed disposed to abandon altogether the idea of making Zeid Prime Minister and to be concentrating instead on devising means to introduce the Emir into the Palace. He is clearly puzzled, however, to know how to overcome King Ghazi's suspicions, and as I reported in my telegram No. 5, Saving, of the 11th January, he has asked me to help him to explain the position to His Majesty.

9. For the reasons given in my despatch No. 631 of the 27th December last there are grounds for believing that Nuri's plans for the better government of the kingdom may not be altogether free from personal hostility to King Ghazi, and that was why I asked him to tell me frankly whether or not he was aiming at placing the Emir Zeid on the throne instead of King Ghazi. He assured me that this was not so, and that his sole purpose was to find a remedy for the deplorable political situation which he had already discussed with me.

10. As I see it the defects which the constitutional machinery of the country have revealed since the death of King Faisal are very real, and though, having regard to the manner in which he himself has come into office, it may be hypocritical of Nuri to shed tears over the wickedness of military plots to overthrow Cabinets, it is I think clearly his duty as Prime Minister to try to prevent a repetition of such plots and in our interests to help him to do so. I also see force in his argument that much time is likely to be required to develop in Parliament the power effectively to direct the government of the country. As your Lordship knows, several plans for strengthening the influence of the Palace by means of a Privy Council have been discussed by Nuri's predecessors, but to form

such a council would be to give power to a number of men without responsibility and to diminish the authority of the responsible Ministers to a degree which might make it impossible for them to govern.

11. Nuri's plan has the merit of offering the possibility of a speedy remedy for the country's constitutional ills without the defects inherent in the creation of a Privy Council. At the same time there is the evident risk that his assurances that he is not aiming at getting rid of King Ghazi may not be altogether honest, and if this plan is adopted it will be necessary to be constantly on the watch for any attempt to allow the appointment of the Emir Zeid to the Palace as a counsellor to King Ghazi to develop into a movement to place him on his nephew's throne.

12. The stability of Iraq would, I am convinced, be impaired by any change of this nature which would enable all discontented elements to rally round a legitimist cause. Since Zeid has no children, the succession would also be brought into question.

13. In the meanwhile Nuri has wisely decided to break with the practice of his predecessors and not to dissolve Parliament, which is due to reassemble on the 1st February. On this point also he has changed his mind since I spoke to him on the 27th December (please see my telegram No. 218 of that date).

14. Outside the constitutional problem with which they are endeavouring to deal the new Government's chief preoccupation is finance, and in my telegrams No. 3, Saving, of the 7th January, No. 12 of the 11th January and No. 15 of the 14th January, I have reported to your Lordship the form of the problem with which they are confronted and the appeal which they are making to His Majesty's Government for help to deal with it.

15. Publication of the Government's general administrative programme has been delayed to enable consultation to take place with Naji Shaukat, the Minister of the Interior, who arrived from Angora on the 10th January. There has been some shuffling of officials, and it is expected that more will occur when Naji Shaukat has had time to take control of his department. The Prime Minister is doing his best to win popularity among the Euphrates sheikhs and has sent his son Saba as a peacemaker to Hikmat Sulaiman. The visit was returned when Saba was in hospital after an accident, and I am told that Nuri and Hikmat have since then themselves met.

16. Nuri tells me that Naji Shaukat reports that the change of Government has made an excellent impression in Angora, and that he has received the most cordial messages from the President Ismet Inönü. He proposes to return from the London Conference on Palestine via Angora where he will have some discussions with the Turkish Government.

17. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora, to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 938/72/93]

No. 34.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, January 25, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 16 of the 16th January, I have the honour to state that the situation with regard to the Palace seems to me to have been modified by the action of the Government in appointing Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to be Rais of the Diwan and private secretary to His Majesty.

2. Rashid-al-Khoja, the previous occupant of the post, has been appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a position for which he is quite unsuited but which, I am informed, he may occupy only temporarily. As I reported in my despatch No. 288 of the 28th June last, I have always regarded Rashid-al-Khoja as the least harmful element in the Palace entourage: but it is undoubtedly a matter for satisfaction that the new appointment should have caused Doctor Damluji, the Chamberlain, who is an old enemy of Rashid Ali's to accept protracted leave of absence from his duties, to which he is not expected to return.

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3. Rashid Ali's career is summed up in the Personalities Report. He has been Prime Minister and was Minister of the Interior, and therefore a colleague of Nuri Pasha, in Yasin's Government which was upset by the Bakr Sidqi' coup of 1936. Your Lordship will recollect that it was the action of Jamil-al-Madfai's Government in banishing Rashid Ali from the capital which led to the military movement of Christmas Eve last. He passes for being unscrupulous without being actually corrupt, an arch-intriguer and in politics a "wild man." Taufiq-as-Suwaïdi, who could not perhaps be expected to record a favourable verdict, told me recently that he regarded Rashid Ali "as a *déséquilibré*." From the same source I learn that when Rashid Ali's banishment was ordered King Ghazi sent for Taufiq-as-Suwaïdi and enquired: "Why have you sent him to Anah? It is far too good a place for him." It might therefore be supposed that the new appointment was unwelcome to His Majesty and I had some hopes of ascertaining his point of view when I went to see him this morning. However, with the perversity which characterises him and which makes His Majesty so difficult a man to help, the King brought Rashid Ali in with him to present to me and insisted on his remaining throughout our conversation.

4. Welcome as is the disappearance of Doctor Damluji my own feeling is that Pasha has committed a grave blunder in introducing into the Palace a man who, judging by his previous record, can be relied upon to pursue the customary oriental tactics and to secure control of His Majesty in the controller's own interests. My second conclusion is that in placing, as he has done and without consulting me in any way, an ex-Prime Minister in the Palace *entourage*, Nuri Said has relieved me of any responsibility which I might otherwise have been disposed to undertake in the matter of persuading the King to accept the Emir Zeid, or anyone else, as Palace Counsellor. Rashid Ali is an undoubted personality, although a not very reassuring one; and there can hardly be room in the Palace for another.

5. I must add that, according to Taufiq-as-Suwaïdi, it was only after he had tried unsuccessfully to induce his colleagues of Justice, Finance and Interior successively to resign in Rashid Ali's favour that Nuri decided to appoint the latter to his present post. The ex-Foreign Minister adds that Nuri's insistence on creating a post for Rashid Ali is due, not only to the Prime Minister's well-known inability to resist helping anyone who has formerly been his friend, but to the ominous demands of a certain clique in the army which describes itself as "Rashid Ali's Camp (Washash)."

6. I take this opportunity to correct an error in paragraph 12 of my despatch under reference, in which I stated that the Emir Zeid had no children. He has a son of about 2 years old.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 1319/1079/93]

No. 35.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 49 E.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, February 2, 1939.

WITH reference to the Eastern Department's letter of the 13th December last, regarding the convention concluded between the Iraqi Government and the Basra Petroleum Company (Limited) on the 29th July, 1938, I have the honour to enclose copies extracted from the *Official Gazette* of the English text of Law No. 68, ratifying the convention which is annexed thereto, together with letters exchanged between the Iraqi Government, on the one hand, and the Basra Petroleum Company and the Iraq Petroleum Company on the other.

2. The law entered into force on the 30th November, 1938, the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette* (Arabic version).

3. The convention, which closely follows the lines of the British Oil Development Company agreement, is for a period of seventy-five years (article 2). Exports of oil are to commence seven and a half years from the date of the

agreement at a minimum rate of 1 million tons per year (article 6). If the oil deposits in the concessionary area, which is defined as all territory not comprised in previous concessions (article 3), prove to be comparable in extent and specification with the deposits now being exploited by the Iraq Petroleum Company, the annual minimum oil exports must be increased to 2 million tons (article 12).

4. The company will pay the Iraqi Government by way of dead rent (article 10) the sum of £200,000 (gold) on the 1st January each year, starting in January 1939 until the commencement of regular exports, when the dead rent will cease as such and be replaced by minimum annual payments of £200,000 (gold) based on a royalty of 4s. per ton (article 11 (3) (a)).

5. The royalty and production liabilities are conditional on the petroleum found being of merchantable quality (article 12). This provision was not specifically included in the British Oil Development Convention, but formed the subject of an exchange of letters. The new convention also differs from that made with the British Oil Development Company, in that the dead rent is fixed at £200,000 (gold) from the first payment, whereas under the British Oil Development Company's agreement it rose from £100,000 (gold) in the first year to the £200,000 (gold) maximum in the fifth. The Basra Petroleum Company, though they must start drilling operations within three years of the date of the convention and drill a specified minimum footage each year (article 5), are not under an obligation to keep a minimum of nine rigs working, a commitment which the British Oil Development Company are finding embarrassing. A further difference is found in the Basra Petroleum Company's undertaking to pay £3,000 annually for the education and training of Iraqis in England (article 31).

6. In letters exchanged between the Acting Minister of Economics and Communications and Mr. John Skliros, on behalf of the Iraq Petroleum Company, the site of the Government refinery, which under article 14 (2) of the agreement of the 24th March, 1931, that company have to build if so requested, is defined as "any place within a radius of 3 miles of K. 2 pumping station near Baiji." It is also established in the letters that the Government may, if they wish, construct the refinery themselves. I understand that they intend to adopt this course, and that the Minister of Economics and Communications is on the point of writing to four United Kingdom firms and one Czecho-Slovakian firm specialising in such work, inviting them to submit proposals for building and equipping a refinery. The minimum cost is likely to be in the neighbourhood of £500,000.

7. According to Mr. Skliros the concession is in the nature of a gamble as far as oil probabilities are concerned. There are no obvious indications of oil-structures in the concessionary area, which covers 95,000 square miles, but it is unlikely that there should be a gap between the Iranian and the Saudi Arabian structures.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

Enclosure in No. 35.

NOTIFICATIONS, &c., BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

Law Ratifying the Convention concluded on July 29, 1938, between the Iraq Government and the Basra Petroleum Company (Limited) No. 68 of 1938.

WE, King of Iraq,

With the approval of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, do hereby order the enactment of the following law:—

Article 1.—The convention concluded on the 29th July, 1938, between the Iraq Government and the Basra Petroleum Company (Limited) is hereby ratified.

Article 2.—This law shall come into force from the date of its publication in the *Government Gazette*.

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Article 3.—The Minister of Economics and Communications is charged with the execution of this law.
Made at Bagdad this 28th day of Ramadan, 1357, and the 21st day of November, 1938.

GHAZI.

JAMIL-AL-MADFA'I,
Prime Minister.

ABBAS MAHDI,
Minister of Economics and
Communications.

(Published in the *Waqayi' al 'Iraqiya* No. 1671 of November 30, 1938.)

N.B.—Letters exchanged between the Iraq Government and the Basra Petroleum Company (Limited), Annexure I.

Convention made with the Government of Iraq; Annexure II.

Annexure I.

LETTERS EXCHANGED.

*Ministry of Economics and Communications to Mr. John Skliros
(Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), Bagdad).*

Sir,

Bagdad, July 29, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to invite your acceptance on behalf of the company that—

- (1) Any place within a radius of 3 miles of K. 2 pumping station near Baiji is accepted as being "adjacent to a railway and in the vicinity of Kirkuk" for the purposes of article 14 (2) of the convention dated the 14th March, 1925, as amended by agreements dated the 24th March, 1931.
- (2) The Government are at liberty to construct the refinery if they do not wish the company to construct it for their account.
- (3) In the application of the price formula in the said article the cost of transporting crude petroleum from well-head to the refinery shall be estimated as nil.
- (4) The crude petroleum to be supplied shall be such as is received at K. 2 pumping station for export, whether stabilised or unstabilised, according to the exigencies of the company's operations.
- (5) Accounts will be provisionally settled monthly on the basis of excluding royalty and shall be finally adjusted at the end of the year.
- (6) Deliveries will be regulated so as to maintain, as near as may be, the proper proportion between the percentage to be taken from day to day and the total of Government's annual purchase of crude petroleum.
- (7) The above undertakings shall not be operative unless and until the convention in course of negotiation between the Government and Basra Petroleum Company (Limited) shall have been signed by both parties and ratified by the Iraqi Parliament.

Ag. Minister of Economics and Communications.

*Iraq Petroleum Company to the Minister of Economics and
Communications, Bagdad.*

Excellency,

Bagdad, July 29, 1938.

IN reply to your letter No. G. 1 of to-day's date, I have the honour to accept on behalf of the company the terms and conditions therein contained.

For and on behalf of Iraq Petroleum
Company (Limited).

*Ministry of Economics and Communications to Mr. John Skliros
(Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), Bagdad).*

Sir,

Bagdad, July 29, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to enquire whether your company is disposed to purchase from the Government refinery at Baiji such quantities of petrol as may be surplus to Iraq's requirements.

Ag. Minister of Economics and Communications.

*Iraq Petroleum Company to the Minister of Economics and
Communications, Bagdad.*

Excellency,

Bagdad, July 29, 1938.

IN reply to your letter of even date (G. 2), I agree in principle to the company purchasing from the Government refinery at Baiji such quantities of petrol produced therefrom as may be surplus to Iraq's requirements, subject to acceptable terms and conditions being agreed between the Government and the company from time to time, having regard to the specifications of the petrol and to the then prevailing market demands, and subject to deliveries being regulated, so as to maintain, as near as may be, the proper proportion between the percentage to be purchased from day to day and the total of the annual tonnage contracted to be taken from the refinery.

My conditional acceptance of this arrangement is also subject to examination of the customs tariffs of the countries into which Iraq crude petroleum is imported, and to the company not being penalised thereunder by the admixture of refined products to the virgin crude petroleum.

The above undertakings shall not be operative unless and until the convention between the Government and Basra Petroleum Company (Limited) shall have been ratified by the Iraqi Parliament.

I have, &c.

For and on behalf of Iraq Petroleum
Company (Limited),

Managing Director.

*Basra Petroleum Company to the Minister of Economics and
Communications, Bagdad.*

Excellency,

Bagdad, July 29, 1938.

WITH reference to the company's contribution of £3,000 per annum under article 31 of the convention signed this day between the Government and the company, I propose the following arrangement:—

"The company's contribution shall be paid to the funds of a committee to which the company shall have the right to nominate one member.

"The committee administering this scheme will be appointed by the Government and will sit in London.

"The company shall have the option to recruit such students and trainees graduating under this scheme as have acquired suitable qualifications for employment in the company's service and who are willing so to serve.

"The company shall have the use of the machinery created under this scheme for the training of such of its Iraqi personnel as it may require to be trained in England, but, if the committee finds itself unable to defray the cost of their training, the company will defray separately the cost of training its nominees.

"The engagement of students graduating under this scheme is left to the company's discretion, having regard to the company's capacity for absorption consistent with the paramount consideration of maintenance of maximum efficiency of the company's service. The company shall not be relieved hereby from its contracted obligation under article 31 in respect of the employment of Iraqis."

I shall be glad to hear whether you agree to this arrangement.

For Basra Petroleum Company (Limited).

Ministry of Economics and Communications to Mr. John Skliros
(Basra Petroleum Company (Limited), Bagdad).

Sir,

Bagdad, July 29, 1938.

IN reply to your letter of even date, No. B. 3, I confirm my agreement to the proposed arrangement.

Yours faithfully,
Ag. Minister of Economics and Communications.

Annexure II.

CONVENTION.

THIS convention, made the 29th day of July, 1938, between his Excellency Sayed Ibrahim Kamal, Acting Minister of Economics and Communications, on behalf of the Government of Iraq (hereinafter called "the Government") of the one part and John Skliros on behalf of Basra Petroleum Company (Limited), of City Gate House, Finsbury Square, in the City of London (hereinafter called "the company"), of the other part.

It is hereby agreed between the Government and the company in the manner following:—

ARTICLE 1.

The Government hereby grant to the company on the terms hereinafter mentioned the exclusive right within the defined area as described in article 3 hereof to explore, prospect, drill for, extract and render suitable for trade petroleum, naphtha, natural gases, ozokerite, and the right to carry away and sell the same and the derivatives thereof.

ARTICLE 2.

The period of this convention shall be seventy-five years from the date hereof. At the expiration of the said period the rights given to the company by article 1 hereof shall determine, and all the company's land, buildings, wells, wharves, roads, pipe and railway lines, machinery, plant and fixtures of every sort in Iraq used for the company's operations hereunder shall become the property of the Government free of charge.

ARTICLE 3.

The area to which this convention relates (hereinafter called "the defined area") shall comprise all the lands, islands, shoals, reefs, territorial waters and submerged lands of Iraq and Iraq's interest in the neutral zone as at the date of the signature hereof that are not comprised in the oil conventions made between the Government and—

- (1) Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) under agreement dated the 30th August, 1925.
- (2) Turkish Petroleum Company (Limited) under convention dated the 14th March, 1925, as amended by Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited) agreements dated the 24th March, 1931.
- (3) B.O.D. Company (Limited) convention dated the 20th April, 1932. Provided that within cemeteries, buildings used for religious worship, and antiquities as defined in the Antiquities Law No. 59 of 1936, neither the company nor any other person shall have the right to carry on any of the operations named in article 1 hereof.

ARTICLE 4.

The company shall, within eight months after the date of this convention, commence a detailed geological survey in at least three different districts of the defined area, and, in the event of this provision not being complied with, the Government may notify the company that this convention is terminated, and, upon delivery of such notice to the company, this convention shall become entirely null and void. For the purpose of the said survey the company's servants and agents shall have power to enter upon any part of the defined area free of charge.

ARTICLE 5.

Within three years after the date of this convention the company shall start drilling operations. As from three years after the date of this convention the company shall drill a minimum of 12,000 feet per annum, and within one year after oil being struck the footage to be drilled shall be not less than 20,000 feet per annum until the commencement of regular export of oil, provided that any excess of drilling over the amounts named herein shall be credited to the amount required subsequently to such drilling. The company may work with any number of rigs that it considers can be profitably operated, provided, however, that at least two rigs capable of drilling to a depth of 10,000 feet shall be used, and any other rigs used shall each be capable of drilling to a depth of not less than 3,000 feet. If the provisions of this paragraph are not complied with this convention shall become entirely null and void.

All drilling shall be efficient and workmanlike and shall have for its object the location and delimitation of structures containing oil of merchantable quality and in quantities permitting exploitation as envisaged by this convention.

ARTICLE 6.

The company shall make arrangements sufficient for the transport of at least 1 million tons of oil per annum from the defined area to a seaboard terminal either by constructing and completing a pipe-line of that minimum capacity or by making arrangements for the transport of that minimum quantity, and within seven and a half years after the date of this convention shall commence regular export of oil. Except in the year in which export commences the amount exported shall not be less than 1 millions tons in every year, provided that the said quantity can with reasonable diligence on the part of the company be made available from the oil resources of the defined area and delivered at a seaboard terminal. The company shall have the right to fix the points of departure and terminal of the pipe-line and the alignment thereof.

The company shall, before commencing the construction of the pipe-line, submit to the Government preliminary plans showing approximate alignments of the trunk pipe-lines that are to be laid in Iraq territory and plans of a character that will enable the Government to ascertain the ownership of the lands traversed.

The company may form a company for the construction, operation and maintenance of the pipe-line system, and such company shall enjoy all the rights and privileges granted to the company under this convention and assume all the engagements and responsibilities therein expressed in so far as the same may be applicable to its operations.

ARTICLE 7.

Subject to the due fulfilment of article 32 hereof, the company shall maintain in good working order all borings and wells so long as they are economically productive, and shall limit the damage done to the surface of the lands in or upon which the said borings and wells are situated to that which is necessary for the purpose of its operations.

ARTICLE 8.

The company shall at its own cost furnish to the Government before the first day of July in each year a report on its operations, and such reports shall be treated as confidential by the Government. A duly authorised Government official shall have access at all reasonable times to the geological plans and records of the company.

The Government shall permit the company at all times to have access to such geological information in respect to the defined area as the Government may possess and shall permit the company to take copies thereof.

ARTICLE 9.

The company shall take all reasonable measures to prevent the injurious access of water to the oil-bearing formations and of noxious waste products into the waters of Iraq, and if any well be abandoned shall plug it immediately upon the casing being withdrawn. The company undertakes to take every reasonable

precaution against the pollution of the elements in the vicinity of its installations. But the Government recognises that in certain circumstances a pollution of the elements is inevitable by reason of the nature of the operations of the oil industry, and will not, for the purpose of preventing this inconvenience, ask the company to undertake any measures which it could not be reasonably asked to undertake.

ARTICLE 10.

The company shall pay to the Government by way of dead rent until the commencement of regular exports of the substances comprised in article 1 the sum of £200,000 (gold) on the first day of January, 1939, and a similar sum on the first day of January of each succeeding year.

The last payment of dead rent shall be made on the first day of January immediately preceding the date of the commencement of regular exports.

After the date on which regular exports commence a proportionate part of the dead rent paid or due to be paid on the first day of January immediately preceding the date of such commencement, being the proportion which the period between the date of such commencement and the next following first day of January bears to 365 days, shall be recoverable by the company without interest by way of deductions from royalty out of any excess over £200,000 (gold) of royalty which may be due to the Government in any subsequent year or years of the convention, but shall not be otherwise recoverable.

ARTICLE 11.

(1) In consideration of the privileges herein conceded the company shall pay to the Government a royalty per ton of the substances (other than natural gas) comprised in article 1 hereof won and saved by the company, but for the purpose of this provision the company shall be entitled to deduct from the gross quantity so won and saved—

- (a) All water and foreign substances.
- (b) All petroleum distributed under article 19 hereof.
- (c) All substances used within Iraq by the company for its operations hereunder.
- (d) The 20 per centum referred to in article 14 hereof.

(2) The royalties shall be calculated for each calendar year, and the amount thereof or any sum remaining due in respect thereof shall be paid on or before the 31st March in the succeeding year. If notice of abandonment be given under article 39 hereof the royalties due up to the date of such notice shall be paid before its expiration.

(3) (a) Until a date twenty years after the commencement of regular exports the royalty shall be 4s. (gold), and the company undertakes that for a period of twenty years as from the first day of January next following the date of the commencement of regular exports mentioned in article 6 the annual payment to the Government by way of royalty shall not be less than £200,000 (gold), which sum shall be paid on the said first day of January and thereafter on the first day of January in each year:

Provided that—

- (i) The oil resources of the defined area permit of the production of a minimum amount of 1 million tons during the year in respect of which royalties are payable, and that such quantity can with reasonable diligence on the part of the company be delivered at a seaboard terminal, but this proviso shall not apply to the year in which regular exports commence.
- (ii) If in any calendar year the total of the royalty due by the company under this sub-section (3) of this article is less than £200,000 (gold), then the difference between the said total of royalty due by the company and the sum of £200,000 (gold) shall be recoverable by the company without interest by way of deductions from royalties out of excess over £200,000 (gold) of royalty which may be due to the Government in any subsequent year or years of the convention, but shall not be otherwise recoverable.

(b) For each period of ten years after the expiration of the twenty years referred to in sub-section (3) (a) of this article the rate of 4s. (gold) shall be increased or reduced by the percentage by which the profit or loss shall be greater or less during the five years immediately preceding such period than during the fifteen years immediately preceding the said five years, provided that (i) "profit or loss" shall mean the difference between the average "market value" (as hereinbelow defined) per ton f.o.b. seaboard terminal of crude oil produced within the defined area, and the average "cost" (as hereinbelow defined) per ton of producing, treating and transporting such crude oil; (ii) "market value" in any given year shall be determined by an independent expert appointed by agreement between the parties, or as hereinafter provided, and shall be the fair and reasonable price represented by the mean between the world's market value of such crude oil f.o.b. seaboard terminal as between a willing buyer and a willing seller prevailing during the first week in January in each such year for which the calculation is made and the world's market value calculated in an identical manner prevailing in the first week in July in the same year, and in either case in ascertaining such world's market value there shall be taken into account, in so far as the expert may deem reasonable and relevant, all conditions (which term shall include prices of products if he deems them relevant) prevailing in the principal markets of the world during the two weeks aforesaid, or as closely thereto as possible; provided that in the event of the parties failing to agree upon an independent expert, the independent expert shall be nominated by the president of the Court of International Justice at The Hague for the time being; the expert's fee and charges shall be borne equally by the two parties; (iii) "cost" in any given year shall be the cost of all producing, treating, transporting and ancillary operations, including an allowance for reasonable depreciation and repayment of capital, having regard to the probable life of the fields, plant and other installations as certified by the company's auditor, who shall be a chartered accountant, provided that the company shall permit the figures relating to cost to be examined in London on the Government's behalf by a chartered accountant appointed by the Government; (iv) the minimum rate shall be 2s. (gold) and the maximum rate 6s. (gold).

Example.

	£	s.	d.
Average market value per ton during the fifteen years	10	0	0
Average cost per ton during the same period	9	0	0
Profit	1	0	0
Average market value per ton during the five years	9	10	0
Average cost per ton during the same period	8	5	0
Profit	1	5	0

Profit has increased by 25 per cent. Therefore royalty is increased by 25 per cent., i.e., from 4s. to 5s.

The accounts submitted to the Government for the purposes of this sub-section shall be treated as confidential by the Government.

(4) The company shall also pay a royalty of two pence per thousand cubic feet of all natural gas it sells, calculated at an absolute pressure of one atmosphere and at a temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit.

ARTICLE 12.

The liability of the company under article 6 to export not less than 1 million tons of oil in each year and the liability of the company under article 11 (3) to pay annually to the Government the sum of £200,000 (gold) as minimum royalty are conditional upon the petroleum found being of a merchantable quality. The said liabilities in terms of article 6 and article 11 (3) shall be increased to 2 million tons of oil, which shall be exported through a separate pipe-line, and to £400,000 (gold) respectively, in the event of the company proving in the Defined Area oil deposits comparable in extent and in specification with the deposits under commercial exploitation by Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited).

at the date of this convention, but if the specification of the company's oil is not comparable therewith then the applicable criterion shall be that the profit yielded by the company's oil f.o.b. seaboard terminal shall not fall more than 10 per centum below the profit yielded to Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited) by any oil which that company may be then exporting from its own defined area. In applying this provision, the profit of the company and that of Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited) shall both be ascertained by the method prescribed in article 11 (3) (b) of this convention in the calculation of fluctuations of royalty.

ARTICLE 13.

Any sum of money payable under this convention and expressed to be gold shall be calculated at the London price of fine gold on the day on which the payment is due to be made, one gold pound being regarded as the equivalent of 7.322382 grammes of fine gold (123.27447 grains standard).

ARTICLE 14.

(1) The Government shall be entitled free of cost at well-head to 20 per centum of all petroleum won and saved by the company, and in respect of such 20 per centum no royalty shall be payable.

The Government shall be entitled to take the whole or any part of the said 20 per centum in kind, subject to the provisions of sub-section 2 of this article, and any part of the said 20 per centum not so taken in kind shall be sold by the Government to the company and purchased by the company at a fair free market price, to be governed by the fair free market price of petroleum of a similar quality prevailing at the time at well-head in Roumania. If, in fact, free market does not exist in Roumania the fair free market price shall be ascertained by agreement between the Government and the company, or, failing agreement, by arbitration in accordance with article 41 of this convention.

(2) The Government may at any time notify the company that it will take the whole or a specified part of the said 20 per centum in kind. After the expiration of twelve months from the receipt of the notice the company shall deliver the required amount at well-head, and shall continue such delivery until the Government, by twelve months' previous notice in writing, shall cancel or vary the arrangement, provided that no such arrangement made may be cancelled or varied until it shall have subsisted for at least three years.

Delivery of the amount taken in kind shall be regulated so as to maintain as near as may be the proper proportion between the percentage to be taken and the total production.

The Government shall not export, or sell for export, in crude or refined form any part of the petroleum taken in kind.

(3) The company shall deliver to the Government free of cost at well-head if and when available, so much petroleum as the Government may require until the commencement of regular exports referred to in article 6, provided that the amount so taken shall not exceed in any year 3,000 tons of petroleum, or of such products thereof as are suitable for road making purposes.

ARTICLE 15.

The company shall measure in a method approved from time to time by the Government all substances comprised in article 1 hereof and won and saved, and the duly authorised representative of the Government shall have the right (1) to examine such measuring (2) to examine and test the appliances used for such measuring. If, upon such examination or testing any such appliance shall be found to be out of order the Government may require that the same be put in order by and at the expense of the company, and if such requisition be not complied with in a reasonable time the Government may cause the said appliance to be put in order and may recover the expense of so doing from the company, and if upon such examination as aforesaid any error shall be discovered in any such appliance such error shall, if the Government so decide after hearing the company's explanation, be considered to have existed for three calendar months previous to the discovery thereof, or from the last occasion of examining the same in case such occasion shall be within such period of three calendar months,

and the royalty shall be adjusted accordingly. If the company desire to alter any measuring appliance it shall give reasonable notice to the Government to enable a representative of the Government to be present during such alteration.

ARTICLE 16.

The company shall keep full and correct accounts of all substances measured as aforesaid and of all quantities exempted from royalty under article 11 hereof, and the duly authorised representative of the Government shall have access at all reasonable times to the books of the company containing such accounts and shall be at liberty to make extracts therefrom, and the company shall, at its own expense, within three calendar months after the end of each calendar year deliver to the Government an abstract of such accounts for such year and a statement of the amount due to the Government for such year under articles 11 and 14 hereof. Such accounts shall be treated as confidential by the Government, with the exception of such figures as they think it necessary to publish.

ARTICLE 17.

(1) If any sum due to the Government under article 10 hereof or any part thereof remain unpaid after the expiration of three calendar months after the date on which it becomes due, the Government shall have the right to terminate this convention and take without payment all the property of the company in Iraq, including the oil collected in storage tanks and elsewhere.

(2) If any sums due to the Government under articles 11, 14 and 29 hereof, or any part thereof, remain unpaid after the 31st March in any year, the Government shall have the right to prohibit the export of petroleum and other products until the sum in question be paid.

If payment be not made on or before the 30th June of the same year, the Government shall have the right to terminate this convention and take, without payment, all the property of the company within Iraq, including the oil collected in the storage tanks and elsewhere.

(3) Interest shall be payable at the rate of 6 per centum per annum on any amount due under article 10 hereof and not paid on the date on which it becomes due and on any amount due under articles 11, 14 and 29 hereof and not paid on or before the 31st March in any year.

ARTICLE 18.

Any duly authorised representative of the Government shall have the right, to any reasonable extent and at all reasonable times, to inspect all operations carried on by the company within Iraq.

The company shall, on request, place at the disposal of such representative a proper person to explain such operations and to afford such information as such representative may reasonably require. The company shall pay the Government quarterly, in advance, the sum of £1,400 per annum on account of the expenses of such inspection, the first quarterly payment to be made on the 1st January, 1939.

ARTICLE 19.

If the company, by virtue of the exclusive right given to it under article 1 hereof, forbids or obstructs the taking of petroleum by any inhabitant of the defined area from a locality from which such inhabitant has been accustomed to take petroleum free of cost or free except for Government tax it shall monthly or quarterly furnish to him from its tanks free of cost for local consumption an amount of petroleum equivalent to the average monthly or quarterly amount he has been accustomed so to take previous to such forbidding or obstructing. Any dispute as to such amount shall be settled by agreement between the Government and the company.

ARTICLE 20.

On the occasion of a state of emergency (of which the Government shall be sole judge) the company shall use its utmost endeavours to increase the supply of petroleum and products thereof for the Government's own consumption to the extent the Government shall require, and the Government shall afford to the

company all reasonable assistance, provided that nothing herein shall oblige the company to supply free of cost to the Government any petroleum or products other than the 20 per centum referred to in article 14.

ARTICLE 21.

(1) Subject to article 24 hereof the company may erect and use telegraphic and telephonic apparatus within Iraq for the purpose of this convention, but except as hereinafter mentioned no such apparatus shall be erected without the previous licence of the Government which shall not be withheld if they decline to provide the facilities required by the company, nor shall their decision be unreasonably delayed. The Government shall have the right at any time if the interests of the public so require to purchase at a price to be agreed or failing agreement fixed under article 41 hereof, any apparatus erected by the company under the provisions of this sub-section of this article, and in that event the Government shall provide and maintain a service sufficient to provide the facilities theretofore provided by the company.

The charges, if any, imposed upon the company by the Government for a licence to erect such apparatus, or to use the same, or for any telegraphic, telephonic or radio facilities provided by the Government within Iraq shall not be unreasonable or higher than those ordinarily imposed upon other industrial undertakings. Telegraphic and telephonic apparatus may be erected without licence for internal service within the company's premises, provided that no such apparatus shall be carried without licence across public right of way. In the erection and use of any apparatus erected or used under the provisions of this article, the company will observe the general requirements of the Government in accordance with the laws for the time being in force governing telegraphic, telephonic and radio communications.

(2) In the event of a pipe-line being constructed under the terms of article 6 of this convention, and in the event of a separate pipe-line being constructed under article 12 of this convention the company shall have, for the exclusive purpose of pipe-line construction, maintenance and operation and communication between the various pumping, valve, storage and other stations or works ancillary to pipe-line operation along the whole length of the pipe-line or pipe-lines, the right to set up, maintain and operate telegraph and telephone systems (whether overhead or underground) and radio installations on payment of an inclusive licence fee of £1 (gold) per annum. The Government undertakes not to exercise the right to acquire any such systems or installations.

ARTICLE 22.

(a) The company may construct and operate within the company's refineries power houses, workshops, tank depots and stores in Iraq and, for the purpose of communication between any points on the same oil structure, such railways as may be necessary for its operations hereunder.

(b) The company may construct and operate elsewhere within the defined area such railways as may be necessary for connecting oil structures and the premises aforesaid to the railway systems in Iraq or sources of supply of materials provided that the plans of any such railways shall be submitted to the Government for approval which shall not be unreasonably withheld nor shall their decision be delayed more than sixty days. And provided that no railway exceeding 2 ft. 6 in. in gauge shall be constructed under this sub-section unless the Government or a person holding a concession from the Government in that behalf do not within three months after receipt of a written request from the company to construct the same agree to do so or do not within six months after such receipt proceed with such construction, or do not complete the same within a reasonable time.

(c) The Government shall have the right at any time, if the interests of the public so require, to purchase, at a price to be agreed, or failing agreement to be fixed under article 41 hereof, any railway of a gauge exceeding 2 ft. 6 in. constructed by the company otherwise than railways constructed under sub-section (a) above, but on any railway so purchased the Government shall provide at reasonable rates all reasonable traffic requirements of the company. The company's rail vehicles shall not be sent over Government railways without the approval of the Government and Government rail vehicles shall not be sent over the company's railways without the approval of the company.

(d) Nothing in this article shall limit the right of the company to use portable decauville type service lines of a gauge not exceeding 2 ft. for the purpose of and during the construction of pipe-lines or works ancillary thereto, provided that the railway system within Iraq cannot give facilities for such construction purposes.

(e) The company may, within the defined area, dig, sink, drive, build, construct, erect, lay and operate such pits, shafts, wells, trenches, excavations, dams, drains, watercourses, factories, plants, tanks, reservoirs, refineries, pipe-lines (subject to article 24 hereof), pumping-stations, offices, houses, buildings, wharves and other terminal facilities, vessels, conveyances, ferries, bridges and other works whether of the nature hereinbefore mentioned or not as may be necessary for its operations hereunder, provided that before constructing any dam, drain, reservoir, watercourse, ferry, bridge or wharf otherwise than within its own premises the company shall submit plans of the same to the Government for their approval which shall not be unreasonably withheld nor shall their decision be unreasonably delayed more than sixty days or in the case of a ferry or bridge delayed more than thirty days. In granting their approval for the construction of any ferry or bridge which is suitable for public use the Government may require that the same shall be available for public use subject to payment of fair compensation to the company. Before erecting any refinery or factory outside the defined area the company shall obtain the Government's approval of the site.

The company shall have the right to place contracts for drilling, pipe-laying, building and other works within Iraq.

ARTICLE 23.

The company may occupy such lands within the defined area and outside municipal boundaries as may be necessary for the purposes of its business upon the following terms:—

(a) Lands belonging to the Government which from their nature or position are unsuitable for cultivation will be leased to the company for the period of this convention at a rent of 10 fils per hectare per annum. The company may relinquish any such land at any time and the Government may require the relinquishment of any such land which is not used within a reasonable time or which is no longer required to be used by the company. Lands so relinquished, which subsequently become necessary for the company's business, will again be leased to the company subject to the conditions aforesaid.

(b) Subject to the approval of the Government, cultivable lands belonging to the Government will be leased to the company for the period of this convention at a fair rent on the basis of the surface value of the lands, which rent shall be agreed between the Government and the company or failing agreement fixed under article 41 hereof.

The company may relinquish any such land at any time and the Government may require the relinquishment of any such land which is not used within a reasonable time, provided that the company shall pay fair compensation if any land so relinquished has been rendered by the company unfit for cultivation. Lands so relinquished, which subsequently become necessary for the company's business, will again be leased to the company, subject to the conditions aforesaid.

If the said lands are in the occupation of some other person the company shall, in addition to the rent, pay such sums as may be reasonable to such person to compensate him for the termination of his occupation of the land.

(c) Privately-owned land and legal rights in land shall be acquired by agreement between the company and the person concerned or failing agreement the Government will regard such lands or rights as being required for a work of public utility and will acquire them according to the law for the time being in force and at the expense in all things of the company, provided that in fixing the value of such lands no regard shall be had to the purpose for which they may be used by the company; and provided also that the lands so acquired by the Government be registered in the name of the Government, but placed free of charge at the disposal of the company during the period of this convention.

- (d) The Government undertakes that in expropriation proceedings the Government will, so far as the law permits, act in accordance with the requirements of the company as if the Government were the agent of the company.
- (e) Privately-owned land acquired by agreement between the company and persons concerned under paragraph (c) above may be registered in the company's name, and shall not be disposed of without in the first instance the Government being offered the option of acquiring such land (including all buildings and materials abandoned therein or thereon by the company) at the price which the company paid for the land. The decision of the Government to exercise or forgo the option shall not be delayed more than thirty days. The disposal of such land shall be governed by the exigencies of the company's operations, and shall not be effected for the express purpose of depriving the Government of the benefit of its right of succeeding thereto under article 2 of this convention.

ARTICLE 24.

The company shall be entitled within Iraq to place and maintain over, under and along land belonging to the Government free of any charge for such land any pipe-lines required for its operations hereunder and any telegraphic or telephonic apparatus erected with the licence of the Government under the provisions of article 21 hereof, but it shall repair or pay compensation for any damage done by such pipe-lines or apparatus or by their placing or maintenance. The Government also undertake to empower the company to place and maintain such telegraphic and telephonic apparatus within Iraq over, under and along land not belonging to the Government free of any charge for such land on condition that it does as little damage as possible, and shall be liable to pay compensation for damage done by such apparatus or by its placing or maintenance. The Government shall prohibit anchorage near the company's pipe-lines submerged at river crossings.

ARTICLE 25.

Nothing in this convention shall limit the right of the Government to make or maintain upon, under or along or in the vicinity of land in the possession of the company within Iraq such roads, railways, aerodromes, canals, protective bunds, flood protection works, police posts, military works, pipe, telegraph and telephone lines, or other works of public utility as shall be expedient, and to pass at all times over and along such works, provided always that such right shall be exercised in such manner as not to endanger the operations or interfere with the rights of the company under this convention, and provided also that the company shall receive fair compensation for the occupation by such works of lands in its possession other than land belonging to the Government, and that any rent payable to the Government for Government land in the company's possession occupied by such works other than pipe, telegraph and telephone lines shall be remitted.

ARTICLE 26.

Nothing in this convention shall limit the right of the Government or of any person authorised by them in that behalf to search for and get any substances other than those comprised in article 1 hereof in, upon or under the lands within the defined area except lands occupied by wells of the company, provided always that such right shall be exercised in such a manner as not to endanger the operations or interfere with the rights of the company under article 1 hereof (including the right to drill through such substances). Fair compensation shall be paid by the Government for all damage which the company may sustain through the exercise of the said reserved rights by the Government, and the Government undertake that in any concession which they may hereafter grant for such reserved rights the Government shall bind the concessionaire to pay such compensation to the company.

ARTICLE 27.

The company may take away subject to the usual regulations and upon payment of the usual charges, if any, such surface, soil, timber, clay, ballast, lime, gypsum, stone and similar substances belonging to the Government and within Iraq as may be necessary for the company's operations hereunder. The company may also, upon payment of the usual charges, if any, and subject to the approval of the Government, which shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed, take away or use any water belonging to the Government and within Iraq that may be necessary for the company's operations hereunder, but so as not to prejudice irrigation or existing navigation or to deprive any lands, houses or watering places for cattle of a reasonable supply of water from time to time.

ARTICLE 28.

The company shall be entitled to use for its operations hereunder any railway, tramway, road, canal, river, waterway or port in Iraq on payment of the charges, if any, ordinarily imposed upon other industrial undertakings for the like use of such railway, tramway, road, canal, river, waterway or port. The company shall be entitled to use for its operations hereunder any form of transport, whether by land, water or air, for the movement of its employees or materials subject to the due observance of the laws and regulations governing the use of such transport.

ARTICLE 29.

(1) The company will pay on the 1st January, 1939, and on each subsequent 1st January, the last payment being made on the 1st January immediately preceding the commencement of regular exports, the sum of £1,000 (gold).

Thereafter the company will pay in addition to and within the period allowed for payment of royalty, the first payment being made in respect of the year in which regular exports commence, a sum based on the oil admissible for royalty in the preceding year, calculated as follows:—

	£ (gold).
For each million tons up to 4 million tons, and <i>pro rata</i> ...	15,000
For each subsequent million tons, and <i>pro rata</i> ...	20,000

In consideration of such payments, the company shall be exempt from all taxation falling due on or after the first day of April, 1938, of whatever nature, whether State or municipal, on their capital borings and wells, plant, machinery, buildings (other than houses and offices within municipal limits), and profits (other than those accruing from the transport of oil not produced from the defined area) and on the substances comprised in article 1 of the convention before or after their removal from the ground and upon the technical processes utilised in connexion with the said substances, provided that:—

- (a) The company shall not be relieved from paying excise or other duty on the products of the said substances which are refined in Iraq and not used by the company for the purposes of its operations, subject to the right of the company to claim refund of the duty on such of the said products as are exported by the company.
- (b) To the extent to which the company shall provide at its own cost adequate services within the areas occupied by its camps, tank farms, pumping stations, residences and other buildings in connexion with and for the purpose of education, protection, sanitation, water, light and other services ordinarily provided by a local authority, the company shall be exempt from rates or taxes in respect of services so provided, but nothing shall impose on the company any obligation whatever to provide any such service.

(2) The taxes, impositions, duties, fees or charges, whether Government or municipal or port, from which the company is not exempt under the foregoing conditions shall not be other or higher than those ordinarily imposed from time to time upon other industrial undertakings or upon their property or privileges or employees.

ARTICLE 30.

The company shall be entitled to import into Iraq free of customs duties (1) all materials, machinery, plant and stores which are necessary for the finding, winning, refining, storing and transporting of the substances comprised in article 1 hereof and for the storing and transporting of the said materials, machinery, plant and stores or of materials produced in Iraq; (2) all materials, including electric fittings for the construction of offices and houses (a) within the defined area imported within ten years after the commencement of drilling therein; (b) adjacent to and required for any refinery or pipe-line within Iraq imported within ten years after the commencement of its construction.

Goods imported free of duty shall not be sold by the company for use in Iraq otherwise than to a company formed under articles 6 or 35 hereof or to any person or company holding a concession from Government exempting such goods from customs or other duties unless they are damaged or depreciated, in which case they shall incur import duty on their assessed value at the time of sale.

The company shall be entitled to export free of customs duties (a) all substances comprised in article 1 hereof; (b) goods imported free of duty.

The ordinary duties shall be leviable on goods not hereby exempted from duty.

The Government shall permit the passage of materials for the construction, maintenance and operation of the pipe-lines across the frontiers of Iraq and the customs examination thereof at points selected by the company, provided that reasonable notice is given of such selections to the Government. The said materials shall cross the frontiers at no other than such points or by recognised trade routes. The Government shall, so long as requested by the company, keep open the customs posts at any such points by night and day and on public holidays. The company shall erect and maintain any special buildings that may be necessary for this purpose, and in agreement with the Government shall pay to the Government the salaries of such additional customs officials and such other expenses as may be incurred by the Government in carrying out its obligations under this article.

ARTICLE 31.

The employees of the company within Iraq shall, so far as possible, be subjects of the Government, but managers, engineers, chemists, drillers, foremen, mechanics, other skilled workmen and clerks may be brought from outside Iraq if qualified persons of these descriptions cannot be found in Iraq and provided that the company will, as far as reasonably practicable and as early as possible, train Iraqis in these capacities. The entry of all foreign personnel into Iraq shall be subject to the immigration laws for the time being in force, provided that such laws shall not prejudice the rights of the company above mentioned. The company shall have the right so to arrange its labour shifts that construction, maintenance and operation under this convention may proceed by day and night and during public holidays.

During special construction or repair work when large quantities of labour may be required as a temporary measure, the Government shall grant special facilities for the free movement of the company's employees, vehicles and materials whether by day or by night over certain frontier points to be agreed.

The Government at all times will grant such facilities for the movement of the company's staff, employees or materials at the agreed frontier points, and will look favourably upon and if at all possible will adopt any measures of reciprocity in this respect which the company may arrange with the Governments of the adjoining territories.

Any additional expenses incurred by the Government in facilitating such movements at the agreed frontier points shall be agreed between the Government and the company, and shall be paid by the company.

The company shall pay to the Government on the first day of January, 1939, and on the first day of January of each succeeding year during the currency of this convention a sum of £3,000 for the education and training of Iraqis in England in accordance with the provisions of this article and under a scheme to be agreed upon between the Government and the company.

ARTICLE 32.

The company shall take all reasonable measures to carry out the objects of this convention, and shall make and pay reasonable satisfaction and compensation for all injury which it or its employees or agents in exercise of the liberties and powers granted hereunder may do to the property or rights of other parties and shall at all times save harmless and keep indemnified the Government from and against all actions, suits, claims and demands by such parties in respect of such injury.

The Government shall likewise take all reasonable measures to facilitate the carrying out of the objects of this convention, and to protect the property of the company and its employees and agents within Iraq, provided that the company shall not be entitled to claim any damages from the Government for any failure to comply with this obligation. When entering into granting or confirming any agreement, licence or concession other than this convention, the Government shall protect the rights of the company hereunder.

Nothing in this convention shall prevent the Government from exercising the right to prohibit in the interests of public security the entry into or remaining in any area of any person or persons employed by the company.

During construction periods the company may take in agreement with the Government and with the Government's co-operation such special protection measures as may appear to it to be necessary.

The Government shall prohibit the erection of buildings, tents or any other erections for human occupation in areas which the company may declare to be dangerous by reason of its operations under article 1 hereof.

ARTICLE 33.

While at war with another nation the Government shall have the right to use the company's railways, other means of transport, bridges, wharves, telegraphs and telephones within Iraq on payment of fair compensation and in times of national emergency the company shall give all facilities to the Government to send its vehicles over the company's railways.

ARTICLE 34.

The company shall be and remain a British company registered in Great Britain and having its principal place of business within His Britannic Majesty's Dominions and the chairman shall at all times be a British subject. The memorandum and articles of association of the company shall be deposited with the Government. The articles shall embody such provisions of this convention as the Government may require.

ARTICLE 35.

The company shall be at liberty to form one or more subsidiary companies under its own control for the working of this convention should it consider this to be necessary. Any such subsidiary company shall enjoy all the rights and privileges granted to the company hereunder and assume all the engagements and responsibilities herein expressed so far as the same are applicable to its operations.

ARTICLE 36.

Whenever an issue of shares is offered by the company to the general public subscription lists shall be opened in Iraq simultaneously with and on the same terms and conditions as lists opened elsewhere, and Iraqis in Iraq shall be given a preference to the extent of at least 20 per cent. of such issue.

ARTICLE 37.

The company shall not without the previous consent in writing of the Government assign to any other person or company this convention or except to a company formed under the provisions of articles 6 or 35 hereof any part of the undertaking under this convention, but such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. In the event of breach of this condition the Government may notify the company that this convention is terminated, and upon the delivery of such

notice to the company this convention shall become entirely null and void and the Government shall have the right to take without payment all the property of the company in Iraq, including the oil collected in storage tanks and elsewhere.

ARTICLE 38.

Except as otherwise provided in articles 4, 5, 17, and 37 hereof the penalty for any breach of this convention shall be damages which shall be fixed by agreement or under article 41 hereof.

ARTICLE 39.

(1) The company shall have the right during the first thirty years after the date of this convention to abandon the undertaking upon giving three months' previous notice in writing of its intention so to do such notice being delivered to the Government not later than the last day of such period of thirty years and upon the expiration of such notice this convention shall absolutely determine. Upon such determination all buildings of a permanent nature shall become the property of the Government without payment but subject to sub-section 2 of this article the company shall have the right to remove all other property of the company in Iraq and to export the same free of export duty provided that the Government upon so notifying the company at any time during the currency of the said notice may purchase the said property of any part thereof at a price equal to the replacement value thereof at that date less depreciation which price shall be fixed by agreement or by arbitration under article 41 hereof and provided that the company shall have no right to remove any of the said property or to receive any sum by way of price thereof until all amounts due to the Government up to the date of such determination have been paid or fully set off by the said price.

(2) The provisions of sub-section 1 of this article shall not prejudice the right of the Government to take the property of the company without payment if such right shall have accrued to the Government under the provisions of article 17 and 37 of this convention before the expiration of the said notice of abandonment.

(3) If the company abandon the undertaking otherwise than within the period and in the manner set out in sub-section 1 of this article, the Government shall have the right to take without payment all the property of the company in Iraq, including the oil collected in storage tanks and elsewhere.

ARTICLE 40.

No failure or omission on the part of the company to carry out or perform any of the stipulations, covenants or conditions of this convention, shall give the Government any claim against the company or be deemed a breach of this convention in so far as the same arises from *force majeure* and if through *force majeure* the fulfilment by the company of any of the conditions of this convention be delayed the period of such delay together with such period as may be necessary for the restoration of any damage done during such delay shall be added to the periods fixed by this convention provided always that no addition shall be made to the period fixed in article 2 hereof unless the production or export of petroleum by the company shall be totally suspended for not less than sixty consecutive days through *force majeure* occurring within Iraq.

ARTICLE 41.

If at any time during or after the currency of this convention any doubt, difference or dispute shall arise between the Government and the company concerning the interpretation or execution hereof or anything herein contained or in connection herewith or the rights and liabilities of either party hereunder the same shall failing an agreement to settle it in another way be referred to two arbitrators, one of whom shall be chosen by each party and a referee who shall be chosen by the arbitrators before proceeding to arbitration. Each party shall nominate its arbitrator within thirty days of being requested in writing by the other party to do so. In the event of the arbitrators failing to agree upon a referee the Government and the company shall in agreement appoint a referee, and in the event of their failing to agree they shall request the president of the Permanent Court of International Justice to appoint a referee. The decision of

the arbitrators or in the case of a difference of opinion between them the decision of the referee shall be final. The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed by the parties and in default of agreement shall be Bagdad.

ARTICLE 42.

The company shall within eight months after the date of this convention open an office in Iraq in charge of a person empowered to transact business with the Government. All plans, notices and other communications required hereunder to be sent to the Government, shall be sent to such Minister or other person as the Council of Ministers may from time to time nominate in that behalf, and all communications required hereunder to be sent to the company shall be sent to the head office of the company in Iraq. Any such plan, notice or communication shall be deemed to be delivered if the sender obtains from the addressee a receipt for the same or if it is delivered through a notary public.

ARTICLE 43.

Wherever in this convention it is mentioned that any matter is subject to the approval of either party, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld, and the decision shall not, in the absence of any provision in this convention to the contrary, be delayed more than thirty days.

ARTICLE 44.

The Government shall have the right to appoint a director to the board of the company who shall enjoy the same rights and privileges and receive the same emoluments from the company as the other directors.

ARTICLE 45.

Any action to be taken hereunder by the Government shall be taken by such Minister or other person as the Council of Ministers may from time to time nominate for the purpose of such action.

ARTICLE 46.

This convention has been drawn up in the Arabic and English languages, both texts being regarded as authoritative, but in the event of any discrepancy between the meanings of the English and Arabic texts hereof the English text shall prevail.

ARTICLE 47.

Nothing in this agreement or in the convention shall be read restricting in any way the right of the Government to grant to any person or party whatsoever licences or concessions outside the defined area for the substances mentioned in article 1, or as granting the company any such licences or concessions outside the said area.

ARTICLE 48.

This convention shall not be operative until and unless it has been confirmed by special law to be promulgated not later than the 15th December, 1938, and any reference to the date of this convention shall be the date upon which the special law shall come into force.

In the presence of—
E. G. HOGG,
Financial Adviser.

On behalf of the Government:
IBRAHIM KAMAL,
*Acting Minister of
Economics and
Communications.*

In the presence of—
P. G. ALLEN,
*Iraq Petroleum Company
(Limited).*

On behalf of the company:
J. SKLIROS,
Managing Director.

In accordance with the powers granted to me under article 54 of the Iraq Stamp Law, 1922, and its amendments, I certify that I have accepted in cash the sum of 2 I.D. 250 fils being the stamp duty payable on the signature of this agreement.

IBRAHIM KAMAL,
Minister of Finance.

[E 1399/72/93]

No. 36.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, February 22, 1939.

I DO not know how useful General Nuri is proving in London. But I think he should be given hint that things are not going well here, and that his Government is riding for a fall. Great discontent is being caused—

(a) By enforcement of 10 per cent. cut in official salaries. Amount to be saved is only £30,000, and this could be done more suitably by suppressing a few sinecure posts.

(b) By a more than usually drastic purge of mutessarifs, which is being carried through under pretext of submitting them to an examination.

Reports about the army are conflicting, but it is clear that there is a tug-of-war between so-called Taha and Rashid Ali. Former is said to be on bad terms with chief of General Staff, whose action last December brought this Government into power. Minor member of the Cabinet admits that they are being bullied by Taha over: (1) Palestine [? collections]; (2) pet scheme of Taha's, for converting country police into gendarmerie and placing them under Minister of Defence. This will spoil one of the few efficient services in Iraq.

Government position is said to have been weakened by recent debate in the Chamber when a private member's attempt to impeach former Government was unanimously rejected.

Most ominous of all is extent to which the King has fallen under the influence of Rashid Ali. His Majesty told me this morning that Rashid Ali had convinced him that His Majesty must henceforward be the dominant factor.

Rustam Haidar, whom I regard as the only good man in Government, is ill.

I have no objection to General Nuri being told as much of the above as you think fit.

I told His Majesty this morning that I did not share his opinion as to present state of the country, and must beg him to consult me if he found himself again in difficulties. He promised to do so, but I have not confidence that he will.

[E 1023/474/93]

No. 37.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Peterson (Bagdad).

(No. 107.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 24, 1939.

THE Prime Minister of Iraq called on the 21st February to see me before leaving London to return to Bagdad.

2. After some general observations regarding the Palestine Conference and the evils of political Zionism, General Nuri-al-Said turned to the position in Syria. He had been asked some weeks ago to convey a message from the Turkish President to the Syrian Government, but he had not hitherto passed on this message. It was to the effect that the Syrian Government should accept the present position as regards the Hatay and cease from making anti-Turkish propaganda in this connexion; the Turkish Government further desired to make it clear that, apart from the Hatay, Turkey had no wish to change her existing frontier with Syria; the message proceeded to affirm that Turkey entertained friendly feelings towards the Syrian Government, and sympathised with them in their present difficulties. It appeared that General Nuri did not now intend to take any action with regard to this Turkish message, since the Syrian Government had resigned in the course of the last few days. The general declared, however, that he was very anxious regarding the position in Syria, and thought that

the refusal of the French Government to ratify the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 would have very serious consequences. He believed that the anti-French feeling in Syria was incited by foreign Powers, and he wondered whether, if complete confusion were to prevail in Syria as a result of trouble between the Syrians and the French, the Turks might not seek to take advantage of the situation. The French were, in his opinion, pursuing a very dangerous policy in Syria, and it was partly due to the French that the Damascus Government had so little influence in various outlying districts, such as the Jezireh.

3. I suggested to his Excellency that the Syrian Government would do well in their own interests to keep on the best possible terms with both the French and the Turks, and I understood him to express his general agreement with this view.

4. I then referred to the Iraqi Government's recent request for credit facilities, and said that I understood that he had in the course of the last few days had a full discussion with Mr. Nixon, the general manager of the Export Credits Guarantee Department, and that as a result he was arranging for Mr. Hogg, the British financial adviser to the Iraqi Government, to pay a flying visit to London to engage in further financial discussions. General Nuri confirmed this and stated that he had also discussed the situation with a representative of Messrs. Baring. The position briefly was that there were three courses which might be open to the Iraqi Government in this matter: if, as they hoped, they could obtain financial credits from His Majesty's Government, the resulting contracts would, of course, be placed with British firms; failing such credits they might decide on a loan, in which case the contracts would be placed with whatever firm offered to supply their requirements on the most advantageous terms, and the orders might well go to other than British manufacturers; lastly, the Iraqi Government might decide simply to cancel their public works programme, in which case also the contracts would be lost to British industry.

5. General Nuri then said that he had received telegrams from Bagdad, including one from King Ghazi, referring to a dispute which had arisen in Koweit between the Sheikh of Koweit and his council, and expressing the hope that the sheikh would not take drastic action against that body.

6. In conclusion, General Nuri asked for my views on his Government's idea of negotiating a Treaty of Alliance with Egypt. I informed him that there would be no objection whatever, so far as His Majesty's Government were concerned, to his undertaking such negotiations, but I would ask to be kept informed of their progress, and to be given an opportunity to study the draft text of any new treaty, if the negotiations reached that stage, in order to have an opportunity of offering comments. General Nuri agreed to this, and explained that his intention was to suggest that the new treaty should be on rather different lines from the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, for he thought it should provide that each country should send troops to the other to assist in case of need. The Iraqi Government would be prepared in certain circumstances to send troops to help Egypt if attacked. He hoped that an undertaking from Egypt similarly to assist Iraq would have a steadying and very beneficial effect upon Iraq's relations with Persia.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[E 1494/72/93]

No. 38.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 70.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, February 14, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Iraqi Parliament reassembled on the 6th February, after the adjournment, which began on the 1st December last.

2. The Government have several important laws under preparation which, it is expected, will soon be submitted to the Chamber. Among these are:—

- (1) A law to amend the Organic Law of March 1925.
- (2) A law to amend the Electoral Law of October 1924.
- (3) A law to amend the Liwa Administration Law of April 1927.

- (4) A law concerning the efficiency of administrative officials (mutessarifs, kaimakams and mudirs).
 (5) A law providing for the division into two ministries of the present Ministry of Economics and Communications.

3. Numbers (1), (2), (3) and (5) are being prepared in the light of the recommendations made by a special committee set up by Jamil Madfai's Government last December. The president of the committee was Naji Pasha Suwaidi and the members Mr. Drower, the adviser to the Ministry of Justice, Mr. Edmonds, the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, and Abdul Aziz Qassah, the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

4. The main purpose of the proposed amendments to the Organic Law and the Electoral Law was outlined in the public speech made by Nuri Pasha on the 4th January, the text of which was given in the enclosure to my despatch No. 3 of the 7th January, and some details of the recommendations made by the Naji Suwaidi Committee have now reached me.

5. It does not appear that any far-reaching change in the principles of the Constitution have been suggested or will be attempted. The amendments recommended deal rather with points of detail and aim at eliminating the defects which experience has revealed in the original law. There is, however, I understand, a recommendation concerning the dissolution of Parliament which, if adopted, may have important results. Paragraph 2 of article 26 of the Organic Law provides that the King dissolves Parliament. The committee has advised that this should be amended in such a way as to make a dissolution dependent on a resolution passed by three-fifths of the Senate. At the same time, it is recommended that article 31 should be amended to define more precisely the past services to the State which are a necessary qualification for nomination to membership of the Senate.

6. The effect of the first of these two amendments would be to curtail very considerably the power of Cabinets to bring about a dissolution of Parliament at will and it would thereby strengthen the control of Parliament over the Cabinet. The second amendment is clearly intended to increase the fitness of the Senate to discharge the new function with which it will be entrusted by the first.

7. Other amendments to the Organic Law which, I understand, have been recommended by the Naji Suwaidi Committee are:—

That the last sentence of article 18 concerning foreigners who must be employed in accordance with treaties and agreements shall be deleted as no longer necessary; that Senators and Deputies shall be paid a monthly salary throughout the year, and not a fixed salary for each session; that ordinary sessions shall begin on the 1st January, instead of the 1st November; that the High Court provided for in articles 81 and 82 shall be appointed each year, and not *ad hoc* by Royal Irade; that articles 114, 115, 116 and 117 shall be deleted from the Organic Law; and that arrangements should be made in some other legal manner to give effect to their provisions.

8. I have not yet received much information concerning the committee's report on the amendment of the Electoral Law, but I understand that one of its most interesting features is a recommendation that all candidates for election to the Chamber should obtain a public nomination and make a cash deposit, which would be forfeited by those who fail to obtain a specified number of votes. The idea is to modify the existing practice whereby all candidates are secret Government nominees by compelling all who seek election openly to present themselves to their constituencies. The committee have also recommended that the constituencies should be redistributed and that trades and crafts should have direct representation equal to one-fifth of the total number of Deputies.

9. The third task of the Naji Suwaidi Committee was to make proposals for the improvement of the provincial administration, by amending the existing Liwa Administration Law. This law (in article 23) lays on the mutessarif of each liwa a wide diversity of administrative responsibilities without, at the same time, providing him with powers to enable him to discharge these obligations. For example, he is required to spread education, without having control of any funds for this purpose; to protect public health, without exercising authority over the medical institution set up in his liwa, and so on. The amendments proposed by the committee aim at giving powers to mutessarifs to direct the spending of certain grants made for public service in the State budget and

provide that they shall be assisted in this work by an elected council. This council will be separate from the existing Majlis Idara, or Administrative Council, whose functions are restricted. It is hoped by these means to stimulate local interest in public welfare and progress and to check the dangerous tendency which has been noticeable in recent years to devote to Bagdad too great a proportion of the budgets of the public services.

10. The proposal to make two Ministries of the Ministry of Economics and Communications was, as your Lordship is aware, already under consideration by Jamil Madfai's Government before their resignation on the 25th December. The division of the departments concerned has not yet been finally settled and I understand that the views of Mr. Loggin (the new adviser) are being carefully considered.

11. The fourth of the laws listed in paragraph 2 above was devised originally about six years ago by Naji Shaukat, then Minister of the Interior, and has now been recovered from the archives of the ministry. Naji Shaukat's plan is that all mutessarifs and kaimakams and mudirs should be obliged to undergo an examination and that those who fail to obtain the necessary number of marks should be dismissed. Marks in the examination would be given partly for personality and record, and partly for answers to questions set in papers on geography, history and general knowledge. To pass, it would be necessary to obtain a fixed minimum in each subject. It may well come to pass, therefore, that an excellent official may be dismissed because he is unable to give a list of the principal rivers of China, or to explain the origins of the Reformation. The whole idea is typical of Naji Shaukat's rigid and doctrinaire approach to administrative problems; nor does it appear that Naji Shaukat has any idea how he will obtain better men to replace those who fail to pass his egregious examination.

12. In the meanwhile, a general post of senior officials has left Sulaimani, Mosul and Kirkuk without a mutessarif, and the rumour that a superannuated staff officer whom the army have long wished to be rid of is to be made mutessarif of Sulaimani does not suggest that the Government have any good men in mind to fill these vacancies.

13. The administration and public order of the Sulaimani liwa at present both leave much to be desired, and it is unfortunate that no mutessarif of character and experience can be found to be sent there.

14. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 1794/66/91]

No. 39.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, March 8, 1939.

MY telegram No. 58.

As I anticipated, King Ghazi this morning entirely collapsed as soon as I mentioned Koweit. His Majesty's rather incoherent explanations were to the effect that he had no intention of attacking Koweit, but wished only to egg on its ruler to concede liberal institutions. I asked whether His Majesty really imagined that Iraq could offer herself as an example at present time; I had repeatedly warned him of impropriety of using his private transmitter set for propaganda of any kind, and abuse was aggravated when, as in this question, propaganda was of nature to cause us annoyance, if not embarrassment. I went on to insist that His Majesty should disclose his real reason for sponsoring these attacks.

King Ghazi said that foreign influence[? s], to which his broadcast had referred, were Persia, and that he and his Government were seriously concerned over influx of Persians into Koweit, which they regarded as endangering Iraq's communications with us in the event of war. I replied that we could be trusted to look after that ourselves; I added that while his last Government had shown some interest in this question and while I had obtained some information on the

subject to communicate to them (your telegram No. 3, Saving), present Government had shown no interest in subject whatever and I had not, therefore, communicated the information.

His Majesty must surely realise that matters of this kind were better handled through diplomatic channels than in unfortunate manner which he had chosen.

King professed great regret and made fullest promises of amendment. Needless to say, none of these is of any value whatsoever.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 12, and Bushire, No. 14.)

[E 1819/72/93]

No. 40.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 85.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, February 23, 1939.

WITH reference to the fifth paragraph of my telegram No. 41 of the 22nd February, I have the honour to report that a Deputy for Kut, Daud-al-Saadi, moved a resolution in the Chamber on the 20th February charging the late Prime Minister and his colleagues with having violated the Constitution by their banishment of himself and several other persons from the capital last December (see my despatch No. 606 of 14th December last) and demanding their trial for this offence under article 81 of the Organic Law.

2. The resolution and the debate which followed its introduction aroused much public interest. A summary of some of the principal speeches is contained in the enclosed cutting from the *Iraq Times*.⁽¹⁾ It will be seen that Daud-al-Saadi received no support for his resolution and that many of the speakers maintained that the action which had been taken by Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet under the Harmful Propaganda Law had been fully justified.

3. Before the debate took place the present Cabinet had decided that, as they were not directly concerned, they would not themselves take part and that the fate of the resolution should be left to the free vote of the Chamber. During the debate several speakers (whose speeches are not fully reported by the *Iraq Times*) passed from a defence of Jamil Madfai's use of the Harmful Propaganda Law against those who had encouraged bomb-throwing in public places to praise of his past services to the country and, when the voting took place, the result had the character, not so much of a defeat of Daud-al-Saadi's resolution, as of a unanimous declaration of the Chamber's approval of the work of Jamil Madfai and his colleagues. The present Cabinet had not foreseen such a development and have been made to feel very uneasy by this demonstration of the Chamber's loyalty to the late Government.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tebran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 2013/873/93]

No. 41.

Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 91 E.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, February 28, 1939.

WITH reference to the Eastern Department's letter of the 7th April, 1938, to the Chancery, regarding the Administration Report of the Port of Basra and the Fao Bar Dredging Scheme, I have the honour to enclose three copies of the report for the year ending the 31st March, 1938.⁽¹⁾

2. In his introductory survey, Sir John Ward points out that the length of the dredged channels has been increased from 4½ miles in 1925 to 17 miles in 1938, but that the ultimate aim of a two-way channel carrying 30 ft. at low water

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

cannot be achieved without further additions to the dredging fleet, especially in view of the recurrence of floods. Authority is being sought to purchase a fifth dredger this year, and a sixth will eventually be required.

3. The port again experienced a successful year. As against an estimated revenue of I.D. 337,995, the actual earnings attained I.D. 425,940, as compared with I.D. 347,804 in 1936-37. The Traffic and Marine Departments accounted, in the proportion of I.D. 48,000 and I.D. 33,000 respectively, for the whole of this increase. The total sanctioned expenditure, including a supplementary allotment of I.D. 21,500 granted during the year, was I.D. 357,440. The actual expenditure amounted to I.D. 350,198, as against I.D. 291,462 in the preceding year. There was a saving of I.D. 7,241 on the budget estimate, and an actual surplus of I.D. 75,752 was obtained. Of the latter sum I.D. 73,424 was transferred to the surplus revenue reserve account, which thus rose to I.D. 278,991. The fifteenth instalment (I.D. 18,029) in respect of capital debt redemption was paid to His Majesty's Government, reducing the amount outstanding to I.D. 270,437. The sum of I.D. 14,423 was also paid by way of interest.

4. During the year under review 1,295 vessels of a total gross tonnage of 7,735,414 entered the Port of Basra and Abadan, representing an increase over the preceding year of 255 vessels and 1,708,041 tons. Basra's share of the 1937-38 totals was 269 vessels with a gross tonnage of 1,390,982. In order to cope with the increased tonnage handled at the wharves the Government have been asked to sanction the provision of additional cranes.

5. In 1937-38 the record traffic movement of the preceding year was surpassed, as will be seen by the following figures for the import and export trade through the Port of Basra and for the transit trade:—

	1935-36.	1936-37.	1937-38.
	Tons.		
Imports	351,616	358,730	403,863
Exports	349,006	603,055	584,505
Transit trade	549,776	839,068	983,845

6. The year 1938-39 will not show such satisfactory results. Owing mainly to a sharp fall in grain shipments, due to lack of demand, exports from Basra during the period the 1st April to the 31st December, 1938, declined nearly 30 per cent., viz., from 480,173 tons to 339,565 tons. Though well maintained up to the end of September, imports subsequently began to sag and the total for the year ending the 31st March next will probably be appreciably less than that for the preceding twelve months.

7. At the beginning of the year 1937-38 only eight air liners used the Basra airport weekly, six of them stopping overnight. By the end of the year the regular weekly services had risen to eighteen and all of them used the port for a night stop. Day and night landing facilities were improved, mainly by the resurfacing and extension of some of the existing runways and by the installation of a new remote control desk and illuminated panel. Despite exceptionally heavy rains, the aerodrome was serviceable throughout the year. Progress was made with the construction of the slipway for flying boats and this has since been completed. During the year 4,139 passengers passed through the airport and 862 landings were made.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

MAURICE PETERSON.

[E 2216/66/91]

No. 42.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 91.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, March 25, 1939.

(R.) AS it happened, just after Bushire telegram No. 149 to the India Office reached me on 23rd March I was summoned to the palace and was received by King Ghazi in the presence of the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance. (End of R.)

After discussing other matters, the King and the Prime Minister stressed His Majesty's friendly feelings for the Sheikh of Koweit, and pressed me to expedite the acceptance of the friendly overtures mentioned in the ambassador's telegram No. 66. Having heard them out, I said I thought sheikh would need a lot of convincing of the friendly sentiments which His Majesty had told me that he entertained towards him, and proceeded to protest with as much force as I could command against [? improper] behaviour of the Iraqi police, who, I said, had evidently been encouraged to commit these outrages by unrestrained and harmful propaganda which had [group undecipherable] been conducted in this country.

The King and his Ministers expressed astonishment and denied knowledge of these events. His Majesty said that he would cause the offenders to be punished. I [group omitted] that was least he could do. Prime Minister observed that these incidents only showed how necessary it was that no time, therefore, be lost in despatching an envoy from here to Koweit, and that the individual whom they had in mind was well equipped in every way to undertake such a mission. He would be able to advise the sheikh on how to administer his country and to convince His Highness that the King of Iraq's sole idea was to render assistance in bringing that backward territory up to date. The King then alleged that the sheikh employed Persian police and encouraged Persian immigrants in order to enable him to control his own people. I denied this, and when the Prime Minister went on to say how pleased His Majesty would be to send the Iraqi police at any time to help the sheikh to keep order, I [group undecipherable] rather have thought Koweit's recent experience of Iraqi police would have been enough.

[? Group omitted] I could say would shake the King and Prime Minister from their idea of sending envoy and later on of inviting sheikh to Bagdad to be flattered and decorated. They again begged me to seek your approval for the project. But I hope the sheikh will be discouraged from responding, at any rate until he has received apology for these three latest violations of his territory. If and when apology has been received and the Iraqi Government have given proof of good faith by genuine cessation of propaganda, it will be for consideration whether it might not be impolitic to discourage despatch of the King's messenger of friendship. Possibly, if, as one hopes, his relations with Ibn Saud are shortly to be put on a more regular footing, the sheikh would be in a stronger position than he would seem to be [group undecipherable] to [group undecipherable] Iraqi blandishments.

Impression left on me by the proceedings at the palace was that Iraqis are aiming effectively to take over protection of Koweit while nominally leaving sheikh and His Majesty's Government in their present position.

Protests from this embassy regarding propaganda have hitherto had little effect. I spoke to Prime Minister on 22nd March about broadcasting referred to in your telegram No. 87. I also expressed disappointment that the King, in a broadcast to the nation on His Majesty's birthday in sending greetings to other Arabs in whose future and welfare he was interested, had seen fit to mention those of Koweit together with those of Palestine and Syria. Prime Minister pointed out that he had deleted the three names from original draft and from account issued to the press. I said that nevertheless oriental secretary had heard the broadcast. (There was nothing offensive in broadcast, but I thought it well to mention it.)

I have to-day reinforced my oral representations about Jahrah with a note requesting an apology (copy of which is being sent to you by air mail), but I do not expect any concrete result.

(Repeated to Bushire, No. 24. Copy by bag to Koweit.)

[E 2238/474/93]

No. 43.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).

(No. 163.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 25, 1939.

THE Iraqi Minister called on me at my request on the 25th March, when I gave him, for the information of his Government, a general review of the European situation. I told him in some detail of the action which was being taken

by His Majesty's Government consequent on Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia, of the position with regard to Poland and Soviet Russia, the situation in the Balkans, and the attitude of Italy.

2. I proceeded to refer to the discussions which had recently been taking place in London regarding Palestine. I had hoped that, even though it had proved impracticable to obtain agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Palestine Arab delegation, it might nevertheless have been possible for us to secure a close understanding with the delegates of Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia during their stay in London. It seemed to me, from what the Egyptian Ambassador had told me on the preceding day, that the differences between us had been considerably reduced. I had not yet heard the result of the final discussions which had taken place on the preceding day at the Colonial Office, but I believed that the main difficulty now outstanding, that is to say, the difficulty regarding the end of the transition period, might be solved if we could agree that, though it would be for His Majesty's Government to decide whether in ten years' time conditions in Palestine were such that an independent State could be set up, they would consult the Governments of Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in advance if they thought it necessary to postpone the establishment of such an independent State.

3. The Minister replied that he also had not yet heard the outcome of the final discussions which Taufiq Suwaidi and the other delegates from the neighbouring States had held at the Colonial Office, but that he shared my belief that the problem of terminating the transition period was the main difficulty now outstanding.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 2216/66/91]

No. 44.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 30, 1939.

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 91 [of 25th March: Koweit-Iraqi relations]. I entirely approve your language.

2. It is deplorable that, in spite of friendly sentiments expressed by King Ghazi and his Ministers, propaganda against Koweit and violations of Koweit territory continue. Latest incursions of Iraqi police are indefensible, and it would, in any case, be impossible for His Majesty's Government to advise sheikh to receive King Ghazi's messenger until adequate amends for these incursions had been received.

3. It now appears, moreover, that the messenger would be sent on an official mission, and that it is even contemplated that he should give advice to the sheikh about administration of his country.

4. The sheikh is precluded by his treaty engagements from receiving the agent or representative of a foreign Power except with the consent of His Majesty's Government, and it must be clear to the Iraqi Government that His Majesty's Government could in no circumstances permit any interference in the internal affairs of Koweit. If, therefore, the Iraqi Government wish to make to the sheikh any communication other than a message of mere courtesy, this should be made in the normal way through you.

5. Provided you see no objection, you should speak to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of the foregoing paragraphs.

6. You should also urge him strongly to agree to Iraqi co-operation in the early demarcation of the frontier in order that the risk of incidents may be lessened (see Political Resident's telegram No. 150 [of 22nd March]). (End of R.)

7. I do not wish to hold up credits negotiations on account of Iraqi attitude towards Koweit or to use threats at this stage. But assuming negotiations lead to an agreement, it may be difficult to put that agreement into effect unless Iraqi attitude has meanwhile improved.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 98. Repeated to Bushire, No. 7, and Koweit, No. 2.)

[E 2616/77/93]

No. 45.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 9.)(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.)*Bagdad, April 8, 1939.*

PRIME Minister told me to-day that he proposed to instruct Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to read to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs a communication in the following sense:—

"For some time past Iraqi Government have been dissatisfied with activities of German Legation here, and, generally speaking, conduct of German Minister has been beyond all limits of diplomatic usage. German Minister has on at least two occasions been warned by Minister for Foreign Affairs in a friendly manner that his intense activity is not approved of. He has, nevertheless, failed to moderate his behaviour, and Iraqi Government have particular cause to make complaint against German Minister and Legation in respect of their activities and intrigues of the last few days. Iraqi Government hope that German Government will take steps to curb zeal of their representatives, whose activities already tend to impair atmosphere of cordiality, which it is the desire of Iraqi Government to maintain with all Governments, including the German Government, with which they are in relation."

Prime Minister, who has told me repeatedly how anxious he is about effects of German intrigues, went on to say that he was contemplating dismissal of all German school-teachers. He also hoped to be able to take steps against employees of contractors engaged on construction of Mosul Railway.

I am myself very much impressed by obvious effects of German agitation, though it is difficult for me to track it down.

As Prime Minister, who enjoys thinking aloud, does not always find himself able to give effect to his words, it would, I submit, be a good thing if, after lapse of a short period, His Majesty's Embassy, Berlin, could ascertain whether or not Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires receives above instructions.

[E 2628/72/93]

No. 46.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 10.)(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.)*Bagdad, April 10, 1939.*

I FEEL that the time has come to invite your most serious attention to the situation regarding British interests in Iraq, both as they are affected by internal politics and general world affairs. It is not a reassuring one.

To give a true picture a certain background is necessary. On a purely nationalist people, to whom we have granted independence, impinged the Palestine problem. For better or worse we admitted their interests in this problem. Yet our special position as adviser and ally precluded our Palestinian policy being judged on its merit here. Iraq has always felt aggrieved that a nation so closely associated with her has not definitely favoured the Arab case. This attitude may be illogical, but it is a fact, and we have to deal with it as such.

This difference of opinion has for some years still fully been exploited by anti-British elements, first by Italy and then to much greater effect by Germany. And the task of those elements has been much lightened by the policy of France in Syria, with which Iraq feels even closer sympathy than she does with the Arabs of Palestine.

(It is true that Iraq recognises that in recent months Great Britain has to some extent come round to the Arab view of Palestine.)

Meanwhile, Iraqi attention had been directed also to Koweit, and King Ghazi's propaganda was all the more difficult to deal with, as he made it his own personal hobby and, as the Monarch, resisted ministerial control. Moreover, here, too, German influences and the effect of the success achieved by German methods in Central Europe did all in their power to make mischief.

Finally, Syria came on the scene, and the combination of agitation on this subject with that about Palestine and Koweit worked Iraqi press and wireless into a symphony of extreme nationalist anti-British and anti-French complications. To press and wireless were added street demonstrations passively and sometimes actively encouraged by official quarters and in which khaki-clad school cadets were wont to take part. German Minister has also been inclined to exploit to his advantage Iraqi disappointment over the difficulties which they have experienced in obtaining arms from His Majesty's Government. He has, for example, been able to contrast his own offer of credit of £4 million with apparent unwillingness of His Majesty's Government to help.

In such circumstances the effect of the King's death can well be imagined. It was easy for German and other interested circles to spread rumours that this tragedy had been caused by the English, for whom his disappearance seemed to come at such a convenient moment. I have had many indications of this suggestion and of the reactions to it; suffice it to say that, apart from the Mosul crime, an attempt on the life of the legal adviser was, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on good authority informs me, narrowly frustrated some days ago (this may admittedly be due to mistaken identity), and I myself have been provided with a personal detective.

It is true that immediate tension of Royal funeral has passed, and that the Mosul murder has impressed the Government most forcibly with the necessity of taking more stringent measures to maintain public order. But one can never be sure what effect German money and propaganda will have at any given moment on a people who, like Iraqis, are credulous, highly impressionable and highly nationalist.

Another disquieting feature of the situation is the lack of homogeneity in the Cabinet. The members of the present Government, so hurriedly brought together when their predecessors were driven from office last December, have little in common, and for this reason are not well adapted to deal firmly with the critical situation. The Prime Minister must, therefore, watch his step most carefully if he is not to trip over the forest of obstacles which [group undecipherable] nationalists or German propaganda have placed in the way of Anglo-Iraqian friendship, and he knows it. He is clearly alarmed, and now asks for our help both in enabling him to trace and counter pro-German and anti-British machinations in Iraq, and, through an agreement with the Arabs about Palestine, to prevent his own position being undermined by the extreme nationalists (it has been put about that even he had a hand in the King's death).

Your telegram No. 274 to Cairo seems to show that a solution acceptable to the Arabs in general is not impossible; but, so far as Iraq is concerned, it is important that this should be brought about quickly. Situation in this country would look grave were European war to break out with Palestine still unsolved in a manner acceptable to the Arabs. At the best, we could expect but half-hearted co-operation from Iraq; at the worst (and it is by no means to be discounted), we might be faced with popular opposition to the declared determination of the present Iraqi Government to implement alliance.

Prime Minister is, I know, full of genuine admiration for the patience and resource with which the Secretary of State for the Colonies has conducted these difficult and prolonged negotiations. It would, I feel, be a thousand pities if the present negotiations were to be so protracted that the effect of the ultimate solution would be lost owing to the atmosphere having in the meanwhile been vitiated by the forces described above.

I am doing my best to strengthen the Prime Minister's hand, and on 8th April I told him that in my opinion [group undecipherable] Arab opposition to the policy of His Majesty's Government would, if it continued, make all settlement impossible. I recalled that in Iraq both treaty of 1922 and that of 1930 were declared to be unacceptable and were the subject of hostile demonstrations of most savage kind. Yet they had been worked out well and served as a model envied by other countries. The moral was obvious and the Prime Minister was quick to take it, reminding the oriental secretary, who was present, of how fighting ceased here as soon as a provisional Government was installed. I will, when I communicate to him to-day or on 11th April substance of your telegram No. 274 to Cairo, urge him, in the light of Iraq's own experience, to take the lead in supporting His Majesty's Government's policy.

[20188]

I apologise for inflicting on you this long telegram at a moment of grave preoccupation, but it is my duty to make plain not only the delicacy of the position here, but the importance of an early agreed Palestine solution as a means of stabilising at vital point of our Imperial communications a situation which is far from secure.

French Minister is similarly anxious and is impressing on his Government the urgency of giving satisfaction in Syria.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 18 (please copy by bag to Jedda); Damascus, No. 2; and Tehran, No. 9, Saving.)

[E 2678/474/93]

No. 47.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 143. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, April 4, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 86 of the 23rd March, I have the honour to report that, during a visit which I paid to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 28th March, General Nuri-al-Said informed me that he had received a telegram from the Iraqi Minister in London reporting a conversation with your Lordship. Rauf Chadirji had stated that you had discussed with him recent events in Europe and had enquired about the attitude of the Iraqi Government towards their obligations under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. Nuri-al-Said added that when Rauf Beg's report was received he had decided to refer the whole matter to the Cabinet so that, with the agreement of his colleagues, instructions might be sent to the Iraqi Minister indicating in what manner he should reply to the oral communication which you had made to him. He had accordingly prepared a memorandum for the Cabinet, to which he had attached the Minister's report, and he handed me a copy of this memorandum, together with a copy of the instructions which the Cabinet, after a special meeting, had decided to send to Rauf Beg. I enclose a translation of each of these documents.

2. The first part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs' memorandum sets out the considerations which led King Ghazi to hold the meeting at the palace on the 23rd March, which I reported in my telegram under reference. The memorandum then refers to the report from the Iraqi Minister in London on his conversation with your Lordship, and proposes that the Minister should be instructed to speak to you in the same manner in which King Ghazi and his Ministers had spoken to me concerning the attitude of Iraq towards the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance.

3. The text of the instructions actually drawn up by the Cabinet is, I consider, not unsatisfactory. Nuri Pasha was at pains to impress on me that it was intended that the statement with which they commence should be absolutely unequivocal, and he did not wish it to be thought that the determination of the Iraqi Government to fulfil their treaty obligations was in any way conditional upon the further observations which Rauf Beg had been instructed to make. The anxiety of the Iraqi Government regarding the situation in Syria and Palestine arose not only from their deep fellow-feeling for the Arabs in those two countries, but also from their sure knowledge that until tranquillity had been restored in Syria and Palestine it would be impossible for any Government in Iraq to bring the country wholeheartedly into line with Great Britain in an international crisis.

4. I had not at that time received the instructions contained in your telegram No. 92 of the 29th March (with which I have since complied). I did not, therefore, discuss the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Syrian situation, but confined my remarks to an expression of my satisfaction that the Iraqi Government had once more so readily and so clearly declared their fidelity to the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then turned to the second and third paragraphs of his memorandum to the Cabinet. He said that in the last reports received from Taufiq Suwaidi the latter had seemed most hopeful that His Majesty's Government would satisfy the Arab desires in the few outstanding matters regarding Palestine, and Nuri Pasha said that he felt happier than he had done for some time about the situation in that country.

6. As regards the third paragraph of the memorandum, the Minister for Foreign Affairs quite frankly told me that he and his colleagues had come to the conclusion that they could not advise their Syrian friends (who were constantly asking them for guidance) how to act until they had found out whether Turkey was nursing ambitions in regard to Syria. What they feared was that if the Syrians boldly resisted French efforts to scrap the treaty of 1936, the Turks might well find an opportunity to take another Syrian province for themselves. It had therefore been decided to depute a member of the Government to go to Angora in order to sound the Turkish Government on this subject. He said that he himself had much wanted to go, but he recalled that some days earlier, when he had spoken of going on a mission to Turkey, I had urged him not to leave Iraq at the present juncture, and he paid me the compliment of claiming that it was in deference to my advice that he had decided to send Naji Shaukat, the Minister of the Interior, instead. He was finding it most difficult to deal with the Shaukat family and their extreme pan-Arab and pro-German views and would be quite pleased to be rid of Naji Shaukat for a while; he might even send him to Tehran for the royal wedding as well. The Prime Minister, however, does not feel that he will be able to place much reliance on Naji Shaukat as an observer in Turkey as, for all his pan-arabism, he is such an admirer of the Turks that the latter might well throw dust in his eyes as they did when he was Minister at Angora.

7. It was interesting to me, in view of the conversation recorded in your despatch No. 107 of the 24th February, to know that the Iraqi Government were still so apprehensive about Turkish designs on Syria, but I left Nuri Pasha in no doubt that, whatever reactions there might be to Naji Shaukat's mission to Angora, it would be the gravest mistake for the Iraqi Government to encourage the Syrians to embark on a bitter struggle with the French. I have no hope, however, of having made any impression on his mind. The conviction that the failure of the Syrian Government to make good is due entirely to French trickery is so deeply rooted in the Iraqi mind that it is useless to attempt to dislodge it with any argument. The delay of the French Government in ratifying the treaty signed in 1936 is regarded here as a final proof of French bad faith, and I fear that, if the Iraqi Government obtain in Angora the desired assurance that Turkey will not exploit disturbances in Syria for her own purposes, no advice will dissuade the leaders of the Arab movement in Iraq from encouraging the Syrians to fight for their liberty.

8. During the last ten days I have had a good many informal visits from Nuri Pasha, in the course of which he has indulged in a great deal of thinking aloud about the internal situation. I do not propose to trouble your Lordship at present with all that the Prime Minister has said in the course of these long conversations, but it may be of interest to record that he is very far from satisfied with the present Minister of the Interior. He recalled that at one time, a good many years ago, he had had to work hard to kindle even a dim flame of enthusiasm for the Arab cause in Naji Shaukat's Turkish-trained mind. Now he had become positively rabid, and carried his narrow fanatical views into every branch of his official work. "He is far more of a Nationalist now even than I am," said the Prime Minister. Nuri claimed that, nevertheless, in his heart Naji Shaukat knew he was wrong in maintaining, for example, that all British officials could be dispensed with, but that he felt this excessive nationalism was an easy path to cheap popularity and ignored what he did not wish to see; his characteristic method of dealing with all serious difficulties was to refuse to admit their existence. The Prime Minister said that he would be happy to be rid of him from the Cabinet, but he could not at present risk a quarrel with the Shaukat family.

9. I shall be grateful if Nuri Pasha's reference to the internal situation may be treated as strictly confidential.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Angora, and to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, and also to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

Memorandum by Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers.

(Strictly Secret.)

IT is requested that the following facts may be laid before the Council of Ministers for a decision thereon:—

The increasingly disturbed general international situation in Europe tends to weaken the hope that the crises which have been succeeding one another would end without a world catastrophe involving all Powers. It is true that the clash may be put off for a few months or even for a couple of years, but signs exist which indicate with certainty that it is bound ultimately to occur.

As Iraq is bound up with Great Britain by means of an alliance imposing upon her, should Britain become engaged in war, certain obligations laid down in paragraph 4 of the annexure to the Treaty of Alliance, and, as at the same time Iraq also has obligations, of a nature not less important than those devolving upon her under the said treaty, towards neighbouring Arab countries who are still awaiting the attainment of the independence promised them long ago by mandatory Powers, by which we mean the promises of France and Great Britain with reference, respectively, to Syria and Palestine (in which two countries it is to be deeply regretted conditions have so considerably worsened as to arouse deep public anxiety in Iraq), His Majesty the King felt compelled to hold a special meeting with his ministers on the 23rd March, 1939, at which it was decided to invite the attention of the allied Government of Britain to the following questions:—

- (a) The necessity of mediation on the part of the British Government with the French Government to secure the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, and the necessity of an understanding with the leaders of the National Block party.
- (b) The necessity of expediting the settlement of the remaining outstanding matters concerning the Palestine question, and of exerting efforts for the restoration of stable conditions and peace in Palestine, the removal of causes of complaint and estrangement and the cessation of the continuous acts of destruction which arise from the ambiguous policy at present pursued in that country.
- (c) The establishment of a friendly atmosphere to replace the misunderstanding in regard to Koweit, and the removal of the influence of Iranian immigrants, as suggested by His Majesty the King to the British Ambassador before the latter's departure from Bagdad.

Following on the above decision, the Chargé d'Affaires at the British Embassy was summoned to the Royal Court, where, in my presence and that of the Ministers of Defence and Finance, His Majesty brought up before the chargé d'affaires the above three questions with a view to a satisfactory agreement being reached regarding them before the crisis in Europe had assumed a more serious phase such as might involve the British Government in a war, whereupon Iraq would be bound to fulfil her obligations towards her ally as provided for in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance alluded to above. The chargé d'affaires promised immediately to communicate these representations to His Britannic Majesty and his Government.

In view of the nature of the contents of a telegram received from the Iraqi Minister in London, of which a copy is attached, it is suggested that our minister in London should reply to the observations of the British Foreign Minister in accordance with the principles enumerated above, and that he should also make further endeavours in London to achieve the acceptance of these principles, emphasising at the same time the harmful results which are bound to ensue from delay in the settlement of the above-mentioned questions.

2. As regards the Palestine question, we got in touch with the Government of Saudi Arabia, informing them of the efforts exerted by us and asking them to exert similar efforts and inform us of the results. We have also received from the representatives of Iraq at the Palestine Conference a telegram communicating the text of certain proposals which have been agreed to by the Arab delegations, including, of course, the Palestine delegation, as it has been the policy of the

delegations of the Arab Governments not to accept any proposal to which the Palestinian delegation are unable to agree. Until recently all the delegations maintained touch one with the other. It would appear to us, if reports recently received from London prove true, that the Palestine problem is on the way to a solution, to be reached within the next few days, satisfactory to the inhabitants of Palestine as well as to Arab Governments.

3. As to the Syrian question, there are two issues to this question. The first issue is that relating to Alexandretta. The Syrians are now willing not to raise any question in regard to that territory and to leave the matter as one for settlement between the Turkish Government and the French Republic. The second issue relates to the ratification of the treaty of 1936, and in this connexion we consider it highly necessary that the rights of the Syrians as laid down in that treaty, which ensures the unity of Syria, should be upheld, and that the partition, which is advocated by the new French policy, should be rejected.

Having regard to the critical nature of the situation and to the need for the expeditious determination of a sound line of action, we suggest that his Excellency the Minister of the Interior should be sent out on deputation to Turkey, at the earliest possible opportunity, there to interview the President of the Turkish Republic and get in touch with members of the Turkish Government with a view to ascertaining the exact nature of the intentions and attitude of the Turkish Republic in regard to the present situation in Syria. It is our opinion that the Syrians should not be encouraged to embark upon any definite action before the views of the Turks have been ascertained. If after studying the situation his Excellency the Minister of the Interior is fully satisfied that the Turks share our own views on this question, the Iraqi Government would then be able openly to support the Syrian cause in a more effective manner, whether before the British Government or before the French Government. We are also of opinion that Iraq should not plunge headlong in a policy the precipitate adoption of which might have for consequence the dismemberment of Syria.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Annex to Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

Telegram from Iraqi Minister in London.

March 25, 1939.

LORD HALIFAX, the Foreign Minister, called for me to-day to discuss the international situation in Central Europe and the attitude of Russia and that of Roumania, and the circumstances under which the latter was impelled to declare her policy towards that situation. He told me that Great Britain's policy in those circumstances was determined; he did not, however, state its nature. Great Britain had prepared the way for the settlement of Franco-Italian differences and the matter was mainly dependent on the speech to be made by Mussolini. He had interviewed the ambassadors of Turkey and Bulgaria and was satisfied with the position maintained by the Balkan Powers in connexion with the present crisis. Endeavours were being exerted for the settlement of the differences between Hungary and Roumania. He had devoted himself last week to an exploration of the situation in Central Europe and of the position of States directly affected by that situation. He now wished to be informed of the views of Arab Governments in treaty relations with Great Britain. Taking up the question of Palestine, he told me that the Egyptian Ambassador had informed him yesterday that it was possible to achieve peace in Palestine through the mediation of Arab States, provided the trifling points remaining unsettled at the conference negotiations were settled. I replied that I shared the Egyptian Ambassador's opinion that it would be unfortunate to allow these points to remain unsettled, and that I would communicate to my Government his statements at the interview. Lord Halifax professed ignorance of the results of yesterday's talks which were communicated to you by Al Suwaidi. I request your instructions.

IRAQIYAH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

Instructions sent to Rauf Beg.

THE Iraqi Government desire that there should be no doubt left as to their determination to carry out their obligations in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance of 1930 between them and Great Britain. They consider, however, that, having regard to the disturbed international situation, the utmost endeavours should be exerted for the consolidation of peace and the tranquillisation of public opinion in neighbouring Arab countries, with the greatest possible expedition. They also consider it to be their unavoidable duty to invite the attention of their ally to the following questions which have been discussed already by His Majesty the King with the chargé d'affaires of the British Embassy, Bagdad, in the presence of the Foreign Minister, and concerning which His Majesty has asked the chargé d'affaires to communicate with his Government. The Iraqi Government further consider it essential (a) that the British Government should at once use their good offices with the Government of the French Republic with a view to expediting the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 and bringing about an understanding with leaders of the (Syrian) National Block Party; (b) that the remaining outstanding matters relating to the Palestine question should be rapidly settled; and (c) that the present misunderstandings in regard to the question of Koweit should be removed and that the influence of Iranian immigrants should be restricted. Please emphasise harmful consequences of delay.

[E 2648/77/93]

No. 48.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 147.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, April 6, 1939.

IN his despatch No. 626 of the 22nd December, 1938, Sir Maurice Peterson reported the conclusions which Taufiq-al-Suwaïdi (then the Minister for Foreign Affairs) had reached concerning the activities of the German Legation in Bagdad.

2. His successor, Nuri-al-Said, has soon formed a similar opinion. Before Sir Maurice Peterson's departure, Nuri-al-Said mentioned more than once his suspicions that it was encouragement from the German Legation that had made the late King Ghazi so obstinately determined to meddle in the affairs of Koweit, and during the last ten days he has several times discussed with me what he regards as being the accumulating indications of the existence of a widespread network of German political intrigue. He has spoken in particular of the activities of a man named Hans (or Hugo) Steffan, who arrived in Iraq early in January as the agent of Krupps and certain other German arms manufacturers. Herr Steffan was warmly sponsored by the German Legation and quickly established personal contact with a number of officers in the Ministry of Defence. Nuri-al-Said now tells me that, when martial law was declared in the Rashid cantonment on the 5th March, the censor intercepted telegrams handed in by Steffan which indicated that he was in close relations with some of the officers implicated in the plot reported in my despatch No. 130 dated the 30th March. The Prime Minister says that thereupon he told the German Minister that Herr Steffan's presence was no longer desirable in the country, and I am told, though I have not yet confirmed this information, that he left Iraq a few days ago.

3. The revelations made concerning Steffan appear to have caused the Prime Minister some anxiety, and just before King Ghazi's death he personally appealed to Mr. Edmonds, the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, and to Major Wilkins, a senior British police officer in the Criminal Investigation Department, to make arrangements for the close supervision of the German Legation and of all Germans whose activities give rise to the least suspicion. He also asked me to support his appeal on the ground that it was a common British and Iraqi interest to check German intrigues. He also suggested that "I" Branch of Air Headquarters should collaborate, and I have informed them accordingly.

4. Mr. Edmonds and Major Wilkins are both, of course, willing to do their best, but they have pointed out to me that for some time all executive authority in the Criminal Investigation Department has been taken out of Major Wilkins's hands and that it will be difficult for him at a moment's notice to organise an efficient branch of the department to assist him in carrying out the work which the Prime Minister now wishes him to undertake. I have mentioned these and similar points to the Prime Minister, who, I hope, will see that Major Wilkins is given the support he needs.

5. It is, in my opinion, most desirable that German activities should be watched and checked, and I shall do my best to see that the most is made of the opportunity which is afforded by the Prime Minister's present attitude towards the German Legation.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 2749/72/93]

No. 49.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 130.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, March 30, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 32, Saving, of the 22nd March, I think it may be well for me to give your Lordship the following connected account of the army plot which General Nuri recently discovered and suppressed in typically energetic fashion.

2. It was at the beginning of March that he informed Sir Maurice Peterson that an army plot had been discovered to dethrone King Ghazi and replace him by His Majesty's cousin, the Amir Abdul Illah. The latter, according to General Nuri's account, had immediately revealed the conspiracy to the King's uncle, the Amir Zeid, who had in turn informed Taha-al-Hashimi, the Minister of Defence. Some dozen arrests were made, including that of Hikmat Sulaiman, who, as your Lordship is aware, participated in Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* in 1936 and was Prime Minister in the Government which came into power as a result of it. Apart from Hikmat, the accused men consisted mainly of active or retired army officers who had in one way or another been associated with Bakr Sidqi's many acts of violence. A special military court, on which two of the five judges were civilians, was established at the Hinaidi (Al Rashid) Camp on the 6th March; the press was placed under a military censorship; and the trials of the accused men commenced forthwith.

3. From the first it was evident that General Nuri was, in all these proceedings, concerned quite as much, if not more, with the past as with the present, and that he was seizing the opportunity of the plot to repay Hikmat (against whom he admitted that only the slightest evidence of complicity in the plot existed) for the latter's part in the *coup d'Etat* of 1936, in which Nuri Pasha's brother-in-law, Ja'far Pasha, had lost his life and Nuri himself had been obliged to flee the country. This fact lent a disturbing feature to the Government's action with regard to the plot, since it was understood that General Nuri, on taking office at the end of last year, had assured Hikmat that the latter was in no danger, and it was therefore legitimate to hope that a term might be put at any rate to this aspect of the personal feuds and vendettas which have so long made for instability and weakness in the internal political structure of Iraq. Sir Maurice Peterson accordingly took this aspect of the matter up with General Nuri and pressed him strongly with a view to ensuring that there should be no victimisation of Hikmat or any other politicians; and the general's assurances to Sir Maurice seemed to indicate that Hikmat (whose offence, according to the Prime Minister, seemed to be no greater than that of having maintained contact with disaffected officers and other suspect individuals) would, in fact, be treated leniently.

4. It was therefore with some perturbation that the Ambassador learnt, on the 17th March, that the trials had been concluded, and that, of eight men found guilty, seven, including Hikmat, had been sentenced to death. Your Lordship had already authorised the Ambassador in such an event to inform General Nuri

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F 4

that Sir Maurice's advice that he should show forbearance in the case of Hikmat was offered with your full knowledge and consent, and to add that the help which His Majesty's Government were able and happy to give General Nuri personally in 1936 (when the general was afforded shelter in the Embassy immediately after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat*) entitled your Lordship to say that he should show forbearance now. Sir Maurice accordingly conveyed this message to General Nuri, who replied that he was advising King Ghazi to commute Hikmat's sentence to one of five years' imprisonment, and that even this reduced sentence might later be curtailed.

5. The sentences, as originally passed and subsequently commuted, which show that Nuri was as good as his word, were as follows:—

	Original Sentence.	Commuted to—
Hikmat Sulaiman.	Death.	Five years' imprisonment.
Hilmi Abdul Karim.	Death.	Penal servitude for life.
Ismail Abbawi.	Death.	Penal servitude for life.
Yunis Abbawi.	Death.	Penal servitude for life.
Jawad Hussain.	Death.	Fifteen years' hard labour.
Abdul Hadi Kamil.	Seven years' hard labour.	
Ali Ghalib.	Eight years' hard labour and two years' police surveillance	

6. It was subsequently reported that two further retired officers, namely, Zaim Ismail Haqqi-al-Agha and Aqid Shakir-al-Wadi, had been acquitted by the court.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 2750/72/93]

No. 50.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 131.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, March 30, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a cutting⁽¹⁾ from the *Iraq Times* of the 28th March, containing a translation of the programme of the Cabinet of General Nuri-al-Said. The prefatory statement confirms the Government's intention to amend the Constitution in a manner which will take into consideration the lessons of the unhappy events which have disturbed the tranquillity of the country during recent years. The remainder of the programme follows, in the main, conventional lines, but several noteworthy features are included.

2. In internal affairs, the undertaking to encourage marriage in order to secure a higher birth-rate is a novelty, and it is significant that the idea of converting part of the police force into a gendarmerie is revived. In finance, attention is promised to the establishment of equilibrium in trade with individual countries, and a drive to increase exports of dates, grain and tobacco is foreshadowed.

3. As regards foreign policy, the reaffirmation of the Government's desire to foster friendly relations with Great Britain is satisfactory, but it is clear that this desire is to be subordinated to continued vigorous endeavours to achieve closer political, economic and cultural unity between all Arab countries.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 2616/77/93]

No. 51.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).

(No. 142.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 14, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 120 and 130 [of 6th and 8th April: Iraqi-German relations].

While I welcome resolution which Prime Minister is showing in regard to German propaganda and intrigue, I doubt whether proposed action is best way of dealing with problem.

2. German Government are particularly sensitive to anything in the nature of moral lecture. Even if chapter and verse can be given, communication on lines proposed will cause violent resentment on part of German Government, particularly as coming from minor Power, and it seems essential that Iraqi Government should not embark on such a course unless they are prepared to see it through, even to rupture of diplomatic relations between Iraq and Germany. In fact, unless Iraqi Government are clear at outset how far they are prepared to go, communication may merely lead to rebuff.

3. If Iraqi Government are, in fact, prepared to go to extremes, it would be better to ask at once for Dr. Grobba's removal as *persona non grata*. They cannot expect that German Government will relish such a request, but if Iraqi Government are sure of their ground this is a step which they are fully entitled to take, and there is good precedent in Brazilian demand for recall of German Ambassador after "Integralista" rising about a year ago. I am not advocating that General Nuri should take this step. I do not know full strength of the case against German Minister, and I mention possibility only because if extreme measures are required this is probably the best.

4. I entirely approve in principle the proposed removal of Dr. Jordan, although if he is still "Archæological Attaché" to the German Legation, I do not see how Iraqi Government can deport him. It is certainly open to them to ask formally for his removal, but on the whole it would seem advisable merely to ask the German Government to arrange for his transfer to some post outside Iraq as soon as this can conveniently be arranged, and so avoid publicity and the necessity of the Iraqi Government insisting upon his recall. I have recently had to take similar action in respect of a member of German Embassy here. In asking the German Chargé d'Affaires to arrange for this, I refused to give any reason beyond stating that I had satisfied myself that it was a genuine case of anti-British activities which I could not ignore.

5. I suggest that the Iraqi Government would be well advised, in future, to refuse to accept German diplomatic or consular officials who are also active officials in the Nazi party (as opposed to party members). This is line taken by His Majesty's Government on the ground that they disapprove of such a confusion of functions.

6. In my view it would probably be better if Iraqi Government were to concentrate for the present on removal of Dr. Jordan, and if communication to German Government were to remain piece of "thinking aloud" by Prime Minister. But if in your opinion this would be too discouraging, I should be content if you would draw attention of Iraqi Government to considerations in paragraphs 2 to 5 above. Even in regard to these paragraphs, I am prepared to leave it to your entire discretion how best to make any communication, for I have no wish to give Prime Minister impression that His Majesty's Government do not genuinely appreciate his attitude towards German problem.

[E 2817/77/93]

No. 52.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 150. Secret.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, April 11, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 147 of the 6th April, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship with the following further information which I have gathered concerning the activities of the German Legation at Bagdad.

2. On the afternoon of the 4th April, when the Prime Minister called at the embassy to express the deep regret of the Iraqi Government for the murder

that morning of His Majesty's Consul at Mosul, his Excellency told me that he had reason to believe that the mob which had stormed the consulate had been excited by agitators, who had gone among them declaring that the English had killed King Ghazi. He also said that the police had arrested several young men that morning in Bagdad who had been distributing typewritten handbills which contained similar allegations, and that it was believed that these men had relations with the German Legation or with Dr. Jordan, a German archaeologist, who was for a number of years employed in the Bagdad Museum and who now resides here ostensibly as the representative of a German society (said to be non-existent), but who is actually the local agent of the Nazi party. He promised to keep me informed of developments.

3. Later I learned from Mr. Edmonds that the police had discovered the existence of a society formed within the local Young Muslims' Association to foster Nazi principles among the Iraqi youth. The records of the society, including the minutes of its meetings and a list of members, had been seized, together with a quantity of propaganda literature from Germany, and some ten men had been placed under arrest. These papers are now being translated and will be studied by the examining magistrate in conjunction with the statements made by those who have been arrested.

4. Mr. Edmonds tells me that the Minister of the Interior, Naji Shaukat, whose family are known for their pro-German sympathies, has been much shocked by these revelations, and it seems true that the Iraqi Ministers and high officials are indignant that the German Legation should have so deliberately sought to embroil them in grave complications with His Majesty's Government.

5. The Prime Minister has been most outspoken in his condemnation of Dr. Grobba's conduct and declares that he will take drastic measures to put a stop to his activities. He has actually gone to the length of saying to me how much he would like to withdraw the Iraqi Legation from Berlin and tell the German Government to withdraw their representatives from Iraq. However, he may not revert to that idea just yet, for in the heat of the moment he is all too inclined to undertake a good deal more than he is able to carry out. The immediate measures which he proposes to take were reported in my telegram No. 130 of the 8th April, and I shall report in due course what in fact is done. I am afraid that he may find it much more difficult to be drastic than he imagines. But in order that I may be in a position to advise him, should the removal of Dr. Grobba from Iraq (which I personally would welcome, as Dr. Grobba has been here far too long and has, I understand, now taken charge of all German propaganda, &c., in the Near East) become necessary, I shall be grateful for the benefit of your views and to have your Lordship's instructions in the matter generally.

6. Everywhere people I meet are amazed at the extent to which the Germans have succeeded in poisoning the public mind, especially that of the student class, with anti-British sentiments, and their success must be attributed in the main to the skill with which they have exploited the hostile feelings which have been aroused by the long struggle in Palestine and latterly by the deterioration of the situation in Syria.

7. The Amir Zeid has spoken to me most seriously about the state of public feeling, and his views have been echoed by many others, including the well-disposed and experienced Sabih Najib, who was so helpful as Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs under the last Madfai Cabinet, in which he later became Minister of Defence. Both said that the Prime Minister in conversation with them had shown himself fully alive to the dangers of the situation, and I believe that he is. But I am less certain whether he has the strength or continuity of purpose to deal with these dangers effectively.

8. The arrangements mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of my despatch under reference are developing satisfactorily. Mr. Edmonds is at present confident that his Minister is taking up the matter in the right spirit, and Major Wilkins tells me that Saiyid Alwan, the commandant in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department, is collaborating closely and actively: both officers are keenly determined to round up the German Minister's agents and propagandists.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 2820/72/93]

No. 53.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 153.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, April 11, 1939.

WITH reference to my unnumbered telegram of the 4th April despatched by wireless through the courtesy of the Air Officer Commanding, I have the honour to submit the following report on the death of the late King Ghazi I and the events which followed it.

2. The news of the accident which caused King Ghazi's death first reached me through Dr. Sinderson, the late King's physician, with whom I was talking in my house on the evening of the 3rd April when he was summoned urgently to the Palace.

3. Some hours later he returned and told me that while King Ghazi was himself driving from his private radio station to the Qasr-al-Zahur his car had collided with an electric light standard and that His Majesty had sustained in the collision injuries so serious that he had died about an hour afterwards.

4. The next morning the Government issued three communiqués (of which I enclose copies taken from the *Iraq Times* of the 4th April). The first announced the death of King Ghazi, and the second contained a medical report on His Majesty's death. The third proclaimed the accession to the throne of the young Crown Prince as Faisal II, the appointment of His Royal Highness the Amir Abdul Illah as Regent and the summoning of the recently-dissolved Parliament to reach a final decision upon the question of the Regency in accordance with article 22 of the Constitution.

5. King Ghazi's body was removed to the Royal Court during the early hours of the morning of the 4th April, and throughout the afternoon and evening crowds of mourners marched slowly past the coffin. From early morning until late at night the main thoroughfares and squares of the town were crowded with mourners, wailing, beating their breasts and tearing their hair in the intensity of their grief. There were as many women and children as men among the crowds, and hundreds lay sobbing in the streets.

6. Malicious persons at once began to exploit the public emotion for their own ends, and tendentious rumours of all kinds were soon in circulation. One that was persistently repeated was the story that the English had killed the King. During the morning several young men were arrested while they were distributing typewritten handbills to this effect or making excited speeches to groups of mourners in which they wildly accused the British of the murder of the "Arabs' hero King."

7. I am reporting separately the tragic results to which this criminal agitation led in Mosul, and in another despatch I am acquainting your Lordship with the information which I have gathered concerning the sources from which this agitation was inspired.

8. Another story sedulously fostered by unscrupulous mischief-makers was that Nuri-al-Said had murdered King Ghazi, and several groups of mourners were heard chanting the slogan: "Thou shalt answer for the blood of Ghazi, O Nuri."

9. The Royal funeral took place on the morning of the 5th April. The procession, admirably marshalled by Saiyid Tahsin-al-Qadri, the head of the Protocol Department, who with the help of a small inter-departmental committee had made all arrangements within only twenty-four hours, left the Royal Court punctually at 8 o'clock in the morning and proceeded slowly along the 2-mile route to the mausoleum near Adhamiyah, where King Ghazi was interred by the side of King Faisal I and King Ali of the Hejaz. I was accompanied by Captain Holt, and the Air Officer Commanding, attended by two staff officers, was also present.

10. The route was lined by thousands of people. Some stood and watched silently with tears streaming down their faces; others, mostly women, abandoned themselves to hysterical grief, rending their garments and covering their heads and breasts with mud from the gutters. It was strange to see and hear soldiers and even policemen sobbing like children. At several points there was a danger that the pressure of the surging crowds would break down the police and military cordon, but reinforcements in motor cars were always at hand to save the situation, and the commandant of police and his officers worked indefatigably to

maintain order. I was particularly impressed by the efficiency of the police on motor cycles, who handled their vehicles with the greatest skill and were far more effective than their horse-mounted colleagues.

11. After the short burial service the Diplomatic Corps and other privileged mourners were escorted in their cars along a specially cleared route back to the town, the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department personally escorting my car and that of Air Vice-Marshal Tyssen as far as the gates of the embassy.

12. I had not before seen an Arab crowd in such a fever of hysteria. The scenes which I witnessed as I walked in the procession gave me a vivid impression of how the tragedy of Mosul must have been enacted the day before. What I saw also made me more than ever determined to impress upon the Prime Minister how dangerous this frenzied mourning would become unless it was checked and controlled. I accordingly sent that evening a short letter to his house urging him to hasten to restore calm and to suppress the false rumours which were still everywhere in circulation, and which had begun to be echoed even in Beirut and Damascus. (I have heard since that they were repeated in German broadcasts.) Reports from Basra and other provincial centres indicated that public excitement was dangerously high and was being worked up to an artificial pitch by official or semi-official encouragement. The following morning I sent the oriental secretary to give the Prime Minister a similar message orally and to enquire what measures were in fact being taken to calm public excitement. The results of the oriental secretary's interview with the Prime Minister were reported to your Lordship in my telegram No. 120.

13. On the 6th April the Senate and the dissolved Chamber of Deputies held a joint meeting to appoint a Regent in accordance with article 22 of the Constitution. The meeting took place at 3 o'clock in the afternoon and the proceedings were broadcast. The voting on the proposal that the Amir Abdul Illah should be appointed Regent during the young King Faisal's minority was public, each Senator and Deputy standing up to declare himself for or against it. The result was an unanimous approval of the Amir's appointment. His Royal Highness thereupon took the oath in the prescribed form, and the meeting was adjourned. I enclose a copy of the official communiqué (No. 7) issued on the proceedings.

14. Immediately after the meeting of Parliament the Prime Minister submitted the resignation of his Cabinet to the Regent and was requested to remain in office and to form a new Government. Nuri-al-Said thereupon reformed the same Cabinet and the necessary Irada was signed by the Regent. This was the last of the constitutional acts necessitated by King Ghazi's death.

15. Article 22 of the Constitution provides that in the event of the throne passing to a minor the King's prerogatives shall be exercised by a Regent chosen by the former King and approved by Parliament. King Ghazi himself, though he lived for over an hour after the fatal accident, never recovered consciousness and was therefore unable to express his wishes. After his death the Queen, who had at that time not recovered from the shock, was asked whether His Majesty had ever made a will. She affirmed that he had frequently declared his wish that if he should die before his son became of age the Amir Abdul Illah should become Regent, and she said that she thought that His Majesty might possibly have left something in writing to this effect. A few hours later the Queen Mother and the Princess Rajiha, the late King's sister, repeated this statement on oath before the whole Cabinet, the Rais of the Royal Diwan and the Chief of the General Staff. The Amir Abdul Illah was thereupon declared Regent. A translation of the statement of the Queen Mother and the Princess is enclosed herein. I have heard nothing more of the document which the Queen Mother thought she might be able to find. As your telegram No. 112 did not reach me until the 5th April, the day after the appointment of the Amir Abdul Illah had been notified to me by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and published in the press, it would have been too late for me to have spoken to the Prime Minister on the lines of your instructions, even if it had been possible to find an opportunity to do so in the midst of his overwhelming preoccupation with the highly dangerous situation created by the death of King Ghazi and the murder of His Majesty's Consul at Mosul.

16. Moreover, I had reason to believe that he and the Government had, in fact, considered the matter on its merits. He was aware that the Queen Mother

had a special reason for preferring that her brother, the Amir Abdul Illah, should become Regent rather than the Amir Zeid, and he was quick to see that, for this reason, she might be tempted to be more positive in her assertions about the late King's wishes than may have been justified by anything which His Majesty had in fact said. His personal inclination was, I suspect, towards the Amir Zeid, but he could foresee the dangers of a dispute and knew that a quick decision was vital.

17. Apart from these considerations, the factor which finally told against the Amir Zeid was, as I reported in my telegram No. 122, his wife. On analysis everyone seemed convinced that her defects (including her somewhat disreputable past) more than outweighed the advantages of age, experience and personality which the Amir Zeid may perhaps be said to have over the Amir Abdul Illah. At the meeting of former Prime Ministers and the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber, which the Prime Minister summoned to deliberate on the Regency question, only Jamil-al-Madfai urged the Amir Zeid's claim with any ardour, but in the end he yielded to the opinion of the majority and the next day cast his own vote in Parliament for the Amir Abdul Illah.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 53.

Extract from the Iraq Times dated April 4, 1939.

(Official Communiqué No. 1.)

THE Council of Ministers announces to the Iraqi nation, with the deepest regret, the death of His Majesty King Ghazi I, as a result of a collision of his car, which His Majesty was driving, with an electric standard near Harthiyah Palace at 11.30 last night.

The Council of Ministers expresses its heartfelt condolences to the Royal Family on this tragic event, appealing to Almighty God to preserve for the country King Ghazi's only son—His Majesty King Faisal II.

Enclosure 2 in No. 53.

Extract from the Iraq Times dated April 4, 1939.

(Official Communiqué No. 2.)

(Medical Report.)

HIS Majesty King Ghazi died at 12.40 A.M. this morning from a severe fracture of his skull, which caused extreme laceration of the brain.

His injuries were sustained as a result of a motor-car accident which occurred at 11.30 last night while His Majesty was driving his car near Qasr-al-Zihour.

His Majesty was rendered unconscious at once and consciousness was not regained.

SAIB SHOWKAT.
H. C. SINDERSON.
NOEL BRAHAM.
SABIH-AL-WAHBI.
JALAL HAMD.

April 4, 1939.

Enclosure 3 in No. 53.

Extract from the Iraq Times dated April 4, 1939.

(Official Communiqué No. 3.)

THE Council of Ministers met at Qasr-al-Zihour after the tragic event which has befallen the country through the death of His Majesty King Ghazi.

The council, having taken over the constitutional powers of the King until the appointment of a Regent, in accordance with article 22 of the Constitution, has passed the following resolutions:—

1. To proclaim the Crown Prince, His Royal Highness Amir Faisal, King of Iraq under the name of His Majesty King Faisal II, *vide* article 20 of the Constitution.

2. To appoint his Highness Amir Abdul Illah Regent, as the King is not of legal age. This is in accordance with the wish expressed by His late Majesty King Ghazi, as testified by the statements of Her Majesty the Queen, and Her Royal Highness Princess Rajiha, to the Council of Ministers.

3. To convoke the recently dissolved Chamber of Deputies (preliminary to the meeting of Parliament) to decide finally the question of the Regency, *vide* paragraph 2, article 22, of the Constitution.

4. To declare general mourning throughout the country.

NOTE.—Article 22 of the Constitutional Law states:—

"The King shall attain his majority on the completion of his 18th year. In the event of the throne passing to a person below that age, the King's prerogative shall be exercised by a Regent, chosen by the former King, until such time as the King attains his majority. . . .

"Whenever the necessity for the appointment of a Regent arises, Parliament shall be convoked immediately. Should the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved, and the election of the new Chamber be not yet completed, the former Chamber shall be convoked for this purpose."

Enclosure 4 in No. 53.

Extract from the Iraq Times dated April 7, 1939.

(Official Communiqué No. 7.)

THE Iraqi Parliament held a combined meeting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, under the presidency of Sayid Muhammad-al-Sadr, President of the Senate.

His Excellency the Prime Minister and the President of the Senate delivered commemorative speeches, after which the sitting was suspended for ten minutes as a mark of respect for His late Majesty King Ghazi.

When the sitting was resumed a communication from the Prime Minister was read, containing the proclamation of the Crown Prince, His Royal Highness Amir Faisal, as King of Iraq, under the name of His Majesty King Faisal the Second, in accordance with article 20 of the Constitution.

The articles of the Constitution connected with the question of a Regency were then read, and Parliament was asked to vote on the appointment of his Highness Amir Abdul Illah as Regent.

This resulted in Parliament's unanimously approving the appointment of his Highness Amir Abdul Illah as Regent, whereupon the meeting of Parliament came to an end.

In accordance with constitutional procedure, his Excellency Sayid Nuri-as-Said submitted the resignation of his Cabinet to his Highness Amir Abdul Illah, who, after accepting it, requested him to form a new Cabinet. His Excellency Sayid Nuri then formed his new Government, which is the same in all respects as the previous Cabinet.

The new ministry will continue the policy already announced in the previous Cabinet's programme.

In view of the official mourning throughout the country, it was decided to dispense with the customary ceremonies on the formation of a new Cabinet, and also to refrain from accepting congratulations.

Enclosure 5 in No. 53.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty King Ghazi had on various occasions mentioned before us that, in the event of anything happening to him, Amir Abdul Illah should be guardian over his son.

Tuesday, the 4th April, 1939, at 2 A.M.

ALIYAH (Her Majesty the Queen).

RAJIHA (Her Royal Highness).

The solemn statement, of which the text is given above, was made by Her Majesty the Queen and Her Royal Highness the Princess, sister of His Majesty the late King, before us on the 4th April, 1939.

Signatories—

NURI-AL-SAID, Prime Minister.

NAJI SHAUKAT, Minister of Interior.

RUSTAM HAIDAR, Minister of Finance.

SUBHI-AL-DAFTARI, Minister of Justice.

TAHA-AL-HASHIMI, Minister of Defence.

OMAR NADHMI, Minister of Economics and Communications.

SALIH JABR, Minister of Education.

RASHID ALI, Rais of the Royal Diwan.

HASAN FAUZI, Chief of the General Staff.

[E 2800/72/93]

No. 54.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 157.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, April 13, 1939.

IN my telegram No. 113 I reported that the Iraqi Prime Minister had given me an undertaking that a resolution, expressing the regret of the Iraqi Government for the murder of His Majesty's Consul at Mosul, would be submitted to Parliament on the 6th April last.

2. But, as I subsequently had the honour to report in my telegram No. 119, his Excellency found that it would be out of order for him to refer to this matter on the 6th April, since he was advised that a dissolved Parliament, convoked solely for the purpose of appointing a Regent, was debarred from dealing with any other business. It may well be, however, that the Prime Minister in fact, owing to the circumstances in which the last Parliament had been dissolved after his Government had assumed office, felt that the chances, already existing, of a dissension in the Chamber (over the question of the Regency) would be increased by a reference to the Mosul murder.

3. It was accordingly arranged, as recorded in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 119, that the Prime Minister should address to me a letter of regret, the text of which would be broadcast and published in the press. This letter was sent to me by Nuri-al-Said on the 5th April, and I have the honour to enclose a copy of it herein.

4. This letter has not yet been published or broadcast in Iraq. I consider, however, that the understanding which I reached with Nuri-al-Said authorises the publication of the letter. Therefore, while it may (owing to Nuri's difficulties with his own Cabinet) prove hard, or even inadvisable, to press for publication to be given to the letter in this country, I can see no objection, and, indeed, every advantage, in the letter being given such publicity in the United Kingdom as your Lordship may consider appropriate, and broadcast in the Arabic news transmission.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 54.

Iraqi Prime Minister to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall.

My dear Chargé d'Affaires,

April 5, 1939.

I WISH to confirm to you for transmission to the British Government, the profound regret of the Iraqi Government and people at the outrage committed in Mosul and their deep sympathy with the victim's family. I wish also to emphasise the bitter resentment felt by all sections of the people against those immediately and ultimately responsible for this unforgivable act.

The Government have already issued, through wireless broadcast and through the press, a statement of their abhorrence of this dastardly crime and also of their determination to prevent all, whoever they may be, from disturbing the good relations existing between Iraq and her ally Great Britain. I enclose a copy of this statement.

The Government are further ensuring the fullest publicity by wireless and the press to the innumerable telegrams continually being received from the authorities, and public and private institutions, and all sections of the people in Mosul, unanimously expressing their detestation of this crime. By all these means the Government are convinced that the fullest opportunity is being given to all persons in Iraq and elsewhere of understanding the true feelings of the Iraqi Government and people in this matter.

Unfortunately, the elections for the new Chamber have not been completed. Had they been completed, Parliament could to-day have received statements on matters other than the Regency and thus have joined at once in an expression of condemnation and sympathy.

With renewed expressions of my profound personal regret and sympathy in this distressing affair, which I beg you to transmit not only to your Government, but also to the bereaved family.

I remain, &c.
NOURY SAID.

Enclosure 2 in No. 54.

Statement by Iraqi Government.

WHILE the population of Mosul were stunned by the terrible tragedy of His Majesty's death, some agitators took the opportunity to incite the crowds to murder the British Consul at Mosul.

The murderer and the responsible agitators were at once arrested, and they will be severely dealt with for their dastardly crime.

The Government, while announcing their detestation of this crime, are confident that the whole Iraqi nation, and more especially the people of Mosul, agree with them on the necessity of taking all measures required to clear the good name of Iraq of such an act.

In this connexion the Government reaffirm the declaration made by the Prime Minister a few days ago, that no opportunity shall be afforded to anybody to disturb the good relations existing between Iraq and her ally Great Britain.

[E 2801/72/93]

No. 55.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 162.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, April 13, 1939.

IT was shortly before 1 P.M. on the 4th April that, in my absence at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps at the Turkish Legation, Mr. Edmonds, Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, informed His Majesty's Embassy by telephone, as reported in my telegram No. 110 of that date, that a crowd of mourners for the late King Ghazi had attacked and burnt His Majesty's Consulate at Mosul and murdered His Majesty's Consul. It appeared that a crowd of persons, who had gathered together to express their grief at the King's death, had been worked into a passion by agitators, who had spread the rumour that he had been killed by the English; and that they had stormed the consulate before the police could

prevent them from doing so. The embassy immediately communicated with the Air Officer Commanding, having meantime received a corroborative report by telephone from Mr. Campbell, the British judge at Mosul.

2. I at once sought to get into touch with the Prime Minister, but his Excellency, who had doubtless simultaneously been informed of the tragedy, called upon me at the embassy early in the afternoon. He expressed the deep sorrow of the Iraqi Government at the tragedy, which he said had been a terrible shock to himself and his colleagues. I impressed upon him the very serious view which His Majesty's Government would take of the matter. We then discussed the reparation which the Iraqi Government should make and the manner in which they should mark their disapprobation of the crime, and Nuri-al-Said gave the following undertakings:—

- (1) A public expression of regret and an appropriate resolution in Parliament, which was to assemble on the 6th April to appoint a Regent.
- (2) A public funeral with full honours at Mosul on the 7th April.
- (3) The strictest investigation to fix responsibility for the crime.
- (4) Full reparation for the damage done to the property of His Majesty's Government.
- (5) Discussion with his colleagues of the payment of a suitable grant to Mr. Monck-Mason's dependents.

The Prime Minister also stated that he had taken special precautions for the safety of British subjects and their property.

3. The situation in Mosul naturally required immediate attention, although any further danger to British lives and property was averted by the declaration of martial law, the calling out of troops and police, and the posting of guards round the houses of all British subjects. I appointed as Acting-Consul Mr. P. W. Wilson, the local manager of the Eastern Bank, who had acted in that capacity last year, and who I had reason to believe was well qualified to take charge of the consulate in an emergency. I also despatched to Mosul on the 5th April Mr. J. S. Somers-Cocks, second secretary at this embassy, in order that he might assist Mr. Wilson in any way possible and also make a full report on the circumstances attending the riot, and safeguard, so far as possible, the confidential documents at the consulate and other property of His Majesty's Government. A copy of the report prepared by Mr. Somers-Cocks upon his return forms the enclosure⁽¹⁾ to this despatch; and it shows, I think, clearly the development of events on the 4th April. I find myself in general agreement with the conclusions reached in Mr. Somers-Cocks' report, particularly in so far as they affect future measures for the protection of the British community at Mosul, and I trust your Lordship will give them favourable consideration. I propose especially to press for the establishment of a police post in the area in which the consulate is situated. For the rest, I think your Lordship will agree that great credit is due to Mr. Somers-Cocks for the very efficient way in which he discharged the task entrusted to him, and in particular for his thorough assembling and sifting of the mass of evidence relating to the crime. I am reporting in another despatch the measures which he took for the safeguarding of the codes and cyphers and certain other office property of His Majesty's Government.

4. The Iraqi Government lost no time in implementing certain of the undertakings which Nuri-al-Said had given me on the 4th April. In an official communiqué issued on the 6th April, the text of which I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 118, they expressed their abhorrence of the crime and their realisation of the necessity of taking all requisite measures to clear the good name of Iraq. They also, in view of the rumours alleging British complicity in the death of King Ghazi, inserted into the communiqué at my suggestion a statement reaffirming the declaration made by the Prime Minister on the 30th March (in which connexion I would refer to my telegram No. 101) to the effect that no opportunity should be afforded to anybody to disturb the good relations existing between Iraq and her ally Great Britain. Steps were also taken to arrange a public funeral with full honours at Mosul on the 7th April; and a commission of enquiry (to which the Director-General of the Interior, the British Deputy Inspector-General of Police and a senior official of the Ministry of Education were appointed) was set up in that town to examine the circumstances of the crime and fix responsibility for it. With regard, however, to the proposed

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

resolution in Parliament on the 6th April, Nuri-al-Said appears to have encountered unexpected difficulties, but he sent me instead on the 5th April a letter, a copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship under cover of my despatch No. 157 of to-day's date.

5. With regard to the question of reparation for the damage done to the property of His Majesty's Government, Mr. Somers-Cocks' memorandum and my despatch No. 157 of to-day's date will show you that investigations on this subject are not yet complete. I propose, however, to go into this matter on the 15th April, when I shall be passing through Mosul on my way to meet Her Royal Highness Princess Alice and the Earl of Athlone at Tel Kotehek. At present I have in mind to ask the landlord of the consulate building to obtain an estimate of how much it would cost to repair the damaged fabric of the building and any landlord's fixtures that may have suffered, and thereafter to arrange, if necessary, for Lloyds' agent to arrive, with an Iraqi assessor, at a comprehensive estimate of the total damage done.

6. The Iraqi Government have not of their own accord suggested any figure which might be payable to the dependents of Mr. Monck-Mason in compensation for his death, but your Lordship, in your telegram No. 126 of the 27th April, instructed me to remind the Iraqi Government of the case of the murder of Mr. Imrie, the United States Consul at Tehran, when the Persian Government granted 110,000 dollars to his widow; and you informed me that a sum of not less than £12,000 would be suitable compensation for Mrs. Monck-Mason and her children. In view, however, of the present financial difficulties of the Iraqi Government and the necessity, particularly in an Eastern country, of having some margin with which to bargain, I thought it well to suggest to Nuri-al-Said in the presence of the Minister of Finance, on the 11th April, the figure of £20,000. I shall inform your Lordship in due course of the Iraqi Government's reaction to this suggestion. In the meantime, I shall be grateful if public mention of any sum can be avoided, until I have had an opportunity to discuss the matter again here.

7. The shocking circumstances of Mr. Monck-Mason's murder have, I think, been a salutary lesson to the Iraqi Government in that they have brought home to them, in the internal field, the necessity of taking far more stringent measures than hitherto to maintain public order and to control instead of encouraging political demonstrations; and, in the external field, the degree to which Iraqi public opinion has been influenced, and deceived, by German anti-British propaganda. So far as internal order is concerned, they are, I think, making a genuine effort, although control will never be really effective if they continue, despite Nuri-al-Said's frequent assurances to me, to permit large scale public demonstrations in the streets, and this is a fact to which I shall not cease to draw their attention. So far as the external factor is concerned, Germany's recent action in Czecho-Slovakia, and that of Italy in Albania, has, if I have read the situation right, cured Iraqi opinion of any predilection for the totalitarian States; but here again, although the Iraqi Government are, I think, at last taking radical measures to curb German activities in this country, more radical measures still will be necessary if German influence, with all its menace to British lives and interests, is to be eradicated from Iraq, and I trust that I shall have your Lordship's support in any encouragement which I may see fit to give the Iraqi Government with this object.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 3014/72/93]

No. 56.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 176.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, April 19, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 131 of the 30th March, with which I transmitted to your Lordship a copy of the programme of the present Iraqi Cabinet, I have the honour to submit the following report on certain administrative measures recently adopted by the Government.

2. In the Ministry of the Interior the plan of subjecting senior officials to an examination in general knowledge, which was mentioned in Sir Maurice Peterson's despatch No. 70 of the 14th February, has apparently been dropped and another scheme for weeding out inefficient and unwanted officials has been substituted.

3. By an ordinance issued on the 28th March, amending the State Officials Discipline Law of 1936, the Government have taken powers to suspend officials for any period up to five years by resolution of the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the minister concerned. Committees have been set up in each ministry to examine the service records of senior officials and to make recommendations for action under this ordinance.

4. Instructions have also been issued to all ministries carefully to prepare lists of officials who have reached the age limit with a view to their being placed on pension.

5. In the Ministry of Education, Saiyid Sami Shaukat (a brother of the Minister of the Interior) has been appointed Director-General (he previously held the post of Director-General of Health). He is fostering in the schools, with Nazi methods, an enthusiasm for pan-Arab ideals. The number of hours devoted to military drill in the secondary schools has been increased, and the boys are being encouraged to wear uniform as often as possible. The teachers are also being brought into the school cadet movement and uniforms and rank have been provided for them. As an additional stimulus to militant patriotism, Saiyid Sami Shaukat has himself delivered a number of impassioned speeches to gatherings of school-boys in which he has exhorted them to be ready to give their lives in the Arab cause.

6. He aims also at attracting scholars to Iraq from other Arab countries. With this end in view, the regulations of the medical college have been amended to permit the admission of non-Iraqi Arab students up to a total of one-sixth of the number of new students admitted each year.

7. The new director-general has also encouraged all students and school-boys to take an organised part in public demonstrations. Columns of school-boys in uniform, marching through the streets with banners bearing political slogans, have been a prominent feature in recent demonstrations, and school-boys were the leaders of the attack on the Mosul Consulate on the 4th April.

8. I have pointed out to the Prime Minister the dangerous absurdity of encouraging school-boys to believe that their military training has a political object just at the time when responsible Iraqi statesmen are doing their utmost to keep the army out of politics. He agreed with me, but as good as admitted that the Shaukats (Naji Shaukat, Minister of the Interior, Sami Shaukat, Director-General of Education, and Saib Shaukat, Director of the Bagdad Hospital and leader of the Muthanna Club) were too strong for him.

9. In the army the purge begun with the arrests made under martial law in March (see Sir Maurice Peterson's telegram No. 81 of the 17th March) has been completed by the enforced retirement on pension of twenty-seven officers of the army and air force. These officers include Akram Mushtaq, the Officer Commanding the Iraqi Air Force, who is still Director of Civil Aviation, and two army colonels.

10. The Iraqi air force was reorganised early in April on lines approved by the British Military Mission.

11. A recent order that officers below field rank should wear uniform when off duty is a sign of the influence of "Shaukatism" in the army.

12. The Bagdad wireless station has been taken over from the Ministry of Education by the Ministry of the Interior and placed under the control of the Director of Public Press Publicity. This is a medium-wave station with a very limited range. The powerful short-wave station at Qasar-al-Zuhur has been presented to the Government by the Regent, but it is not yet being operated.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 178.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, April 20, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 103 of the 31st March, I have the honour to submit the following report on the developments which have taken place in the relations of Iraq with Koweit since Sir Maurice Peterson's departure.

2. It will be remembered that the ambassador had begun in February of this year to press the Iraqi Government to put a stop to the press and wireless campaign which was being carried on in this country against Koweit. King Ghazi, the Prime Minister, and the Rais of the Royal Diwan all promised that this would be done but, though once or twice it seemed that effect would be given to their assurances, the agitation was always resumed a day or two later. Meanwhile, with King Ghazi's approval and probably at His Majesty's suggestion, the Prime Minister put forward a proposal that he should send a private and personal messenger to the Ruler of Koweit to express regret for the attacks made on him in Iraq and generally to smooth the Ruler's ruffled feelings. While this proposal was being examined, the disturbances which occurred in Koweit on the 10th March excited King Ghazi's close interest and the Palace (Qasr-al-Zuhur) radio station began at once to attack Koweit. At the same time the Prime Minister renewed pressure on the ambassador to obtain an early agreement to his plan to send a special messenger to the Ruler.

3. Sir Maurice Peterson's telegrams Nos. 70 and 78 reported the attitude which he adopted towards this situation and the manner in which he renewed his protests against the continued attacks on Koweit, broadcast from the Qasr-al-Zuhur station. I should mention that the press in the meanwhile had shown a considerable improvement and objectionable articles about Koweit had become rare.

4. Shortly after the ambassador's departure, I received from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf news of the several serious incursions of Iraqi police into Koweit territory which took place in March, and of the attachment of some of the Sheikh of Koweit's properties in Iraq. I reported in my telegram No. 91 of the 26th March the immediate representations which I made concerning these events to King Ghazi and his principal ministers.

5. During the next week I repeatedly discussed the whole question with the Prime Minister, who appeared to be at a loss to know how to deal with the situation. He told me privately that he found King Ghazi unmanageable where Koweit was concerned. It seemed that a few discontented young Koweitis had gained access to His Majesty and had cajoled him into "taking up their cause." King Ghazi, without reference to his ministers, had thereupon organised his broadcast propaganda and had given private encouragement to the press to write up the alleged grievances of the Koweitis and to elaborate articles advocating the absorption of Koweit by Iraq. The Prime Minister told me that, when he returned at the end of February, he had been astonished to find that the Government appeared to be allowing this anti-Koweit campaign to develop without remonstrating in any way with His Majesty. I have reported in another connexion the difficulty the Prime Minister experiences in controlling the Minister of the Interior: I should add that he is not satisfied either with Rashid Ali, Rais of the Royal Diwan, for whom another post will probably be found if and when Nuri-al-Said feels himself strong enough to bring this about.

6. He had at once set about trying to put matters right, but had found it an exceedingly difficult task. When he went to the palace in the morning the King would promise to be good, but in the evening His Majesty was apt all too easily to be persuaded by the young men, including his wireless operators, with whom he associated at that time of day (the Prime Minister strongly suspected that some of these were in the pay of the German Legation) to defy the advice of his ministers and to believe that he was serving the best interests of the Arabs and the cause of Arab unity by broadcasting extremist nonsense about Koweit, Palestine, Syria and, on occasions, Transjordan. Almost daily, and often in the middle of the night, King Ghazi was sending for or telephoning to the Prime Minister and pressing him to take steps to deal with Koweit. What His Majesty wished should be done was never clear but, since the suppression of the abortive

rising against the Sabah family, he had been flattered by constant pressure which was being put upon him to help the Koweitis who had been banished or who had fled into Iraq. The problem was, in fact, mainly how to save the King's face. The Prime Minister therefore thought that it would have a good effect on King Ghazi if it could be arranged that the proposed messenger should be received by the sheikh without delay.

7. I used all the obvious arguments. I said that it seemed to be quite uncertain what message the messenger was to take. The first idea had been that it would consist of apologies for the palace broadcasts. Later it had been suggested that the messenger would advise the Ruler on the administration of his State, and even offer the services of Iraqi police to keep order for him. Now it seemed that the message would also embrace an appeal from His Majesty for clemency for those who were responsible for the recent attempt to organise a revolt in Koweit against the ruling family. I enlarged on the absurdity of sending an apology to the sheikh while the King's wireless was still abusing him, his territory was being violated by Iraqi police and his properties were sequestered in the most offensive and inexcusable manner by the local representatives of the Iraqi Government in Basra. The second idea, I said, paid no heed to the special treaty relations of Koweit with Great Britain, and was, moreover, quite gratuitously impertinent. The social conditions of Koweit were, in fact, a good deal better than the average obtaining in Iraq, and it would be wiser for Iraq to put her own affairs in order than to presume to give advice to Koweit. As regards clemency, I had no doubt that the exiles could easily make their own peace with their Ruler if they asked for pardon decently and gave promises for their future good behaviour. Nuri-al-Said admitted the force of all these arguments, but pressed me persistently to do something to help him to calm His Majesty, whose unreasoned and unreasonable importunities about Koweit were, the Prime Minister said, leaving him no peace to look after the many other pressing problems with which he ought to be dealing.

8. I saw King Ghazi again (and, as it transpired, for the last time) on the 3rd April. The Prime Minister was present, together with the Rais of the Royal Diwan, Rashid Ali. The discussions were inconclusive and often irrelevant. King Ghazi, having made much of the importance he attached to an early pardon being granted to Koweit malcontents who had been arrested, the backward state of Koweit, &c., sought to ascribe all these evils to smuggling. His Majesty was strongly supported in this by his Prime Minister, who, incidentally, did most of the talking on this well-worn theme. Protesting vainly against the irrelevancy of this subject, I took my stand on the hope of the early conclusion of the Saudi-Koweit agreement for the control of trade between the two countries and the Ruler of Koweit's undertaking to stop all smuggling into Iraq so soon as this agreement was brought into force. I shall report the counter-arguments which were then adduced and discuss the wider aspects of the smuggling question in a separate despatch, which I hope to be able soon to address to your Lordship. From smuggling I managed with difficulty to bring the discussions back to propaganda against Koweit, to the police incursions and the attachment of the Sheikh of Koweit's properties. The ministers airily assured me that the properties had been restored to the sheikh, that the police incidents would be investigated, and that, therefore, there was no need to discuss these matters; in fact, the sooner they were forgotten, the better. They brushed aside my observation that the impression which these incidents had made could not easily be dispelled, maintaining that any annoyance which had been caused to the sheikh would be quickly erased by King Ghazi's gracious message and the charm and tact with which it would be delivered. I refused to be a party to this easy optimism and insisted that satisfactory replies must first be given to my protests about the attachment of the sheikh's properties and the misconduct of the police, and I argued that time must be allowed to heal wounded pride before the right atmosphere could be created for the success of the messenger's visit. The meeting ended, after an hour or longer, with the exhaustion of all concerned, and with nothing more achieved than mutual undertakings to think the whole matter over and see if something could be done. (Nevertheless, I did get the King to admit the inconsistency of protesting to me by daylight the personal regard in which he held the sheikh, and in the evening insulting His Highness from the Royal Broadcasting Station). The Prime Minister had already told me privately that he had discovered that the attachment of the Sheikh of Koweit's properties in Fao had

been due to direct orders sent by King Ghazi to the mutessarif, but he was positive in his assurances that he had taken the necessary steps to have the mutessarif's action cancelled and the revenue demand withdrawn.

9. The fatal accident on the night of the 3rd April, which cost King Ghazi his life, has relieved the situation a good deal. The Qasr-al-Zuhur wireless broadcasting station has been handed over to the Government, and Royal patronage of rebellious elements in Koweit has ceased. Palace pressure on the Prime Minister to arrange for the visit to Koweit of a special messenger has also disappeared, though I foresee that the Prime Minister may raise the matter again before long. If he does so, I shall speak to him on the lines of your telegram No. 98 of the 30th March.

10. Nevertheless, even now the position is far from satisfactory. Nationalist agitation for the union of Koweit with Iraq has, with the late King's encouragement, been taken up eagerly by the pan-Arab clubs, and may be renewed again at any moment under the leadership of the fanatical Shaukat family. There has been a serious hitch in the fulfilment of the Prime Minister's promise that the attachment of the sheikh's properties would be cancelled (see my telegram No. 137 of the 12th April), and the reply which has been made to my protest about police incursions into Koweit is altogether inadequate. This reply consisted of a statement that the enquiries made by the competent authorities showed that the alleged incursions into Koweit territory had not, in fact, taken place, and went on to raise irrelevant objections to the movements of the political agent in Koweit. When I visited the Prime Minister on the 11th April, I informed his Excellency that I could not transmit such a reply to my Government, and I have since written him an official letter urging that an independent and authoritative enquiry should be carried out at once and that a full report of the result should be communicated to me. Privately, the Prime Minister promised me to do his best to persuade the Ministry of the Interior to nominate a special official for this task and to associate with him the British Inspecting Officer of Police at Basra. He admitted, however, that it would not be easy for him to move the Minister of the Interior to do this. It was Naji Shaukat, he said, who, on account of his dislike of the sheikh, had obstructed the prompt transmission of an order to the mutessarif of Basra (a politician who had been appointed by the Minister of the Interior in Nuri-al-Said's absence in London, with the express object of creating trouble with Koweit) to cancel the attachment of the sheikh's properties, and the Prime Minister foresaw that, for similar reasons, the Minister of the Interior would find a variety of excuses for not taking strong action properly to investigate the alleged misconduct of the Basra police.

11. The Prime Minister, of course, again raised the question of smuggling, a not unfounded grievance which always seems to crop up whenever a protest is made concerning some action touching the sheikh's interests. A vicious circle seems, in fact, to have been established. When a protest is made to the Iraqi Government about police incursions into Koweit, they counter with complaints about smuggling, and whenever an attempt is made to deal with smuggling the sheikh protests that no satisfaction has ever been given to his numerous complaints of incursions by Iraqi police into his territory.

12. I shall continue, nevertheless, to press for a satisfactory response to my representations concerning the attached properties and the recent misbehaviour of the police.

13. In accordance with the instructions contained in paragraph 6 of your telegram No. 98 of the 30th March, I have strongly advised the Prime Minister to consider the possibility of making early arrangements for the demarcation of the Koweit-Iraqi frontier. He received the suggestion without enthusiasm, saying it would not stop smuggling. I observed, however, that a line of beacons would, in my opinion, serve as a useful reminder of a pact, both to the Iraqi police and to intending smugglers. I propose to discuss this matter with him again and more fully, so soon as the police incursions at Jahrah and the attachment of the sheikh's properties have been disposed of.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and to the Political Agent at Koweit.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 3331/72/93]

No. 58.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 207.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, May 1, 1939.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 166 of the 28th April, a Royal Iradah was issued on the 26th April appointing Saiyid Ali Jaudat-al-Aiyubi (Personality, No. 17) to be Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. It has always been a strain on Nuri-al-Said to combine the duties of Foreign Minister with those of Prime Minister, and his recent assumption of the additional burden of the Ministry of the Interior, during the absence of Naji Shaukat at Angora, has no doubt compelled him to hasten the appointment of another Minister.

3. I do not know Ali Jaudat well, and the accounts of him given to me by those who do are conflicting. I shall therefore reserve judgment on the Prime Minister's choice of a successor in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs until I have had time to see him at work.

4. From several sources I learn that Naji Shaukat, who was until recently Minister to Turkey, will probably be persuaded to remain in Angora as Iraqi Minister, and that Umar Nazmi, the present Minister of Economics and Communications, may be given the portfolio of the Interior instead. I shall not be sorry if the Prime Minister sees fit to find permanent employment outside Iraq for the present Minister of the Interior—a conveniently deaf and obstinate man.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

P.S.—I am happy to report that since this despatch was written the resignation of Naji Shaukat has been officially announced.

W. E. H-B.

May 3, 1939.

[E 3782/72/93]

No. 59.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 243.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, May 18, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 153 of the 11th April, I have the honour to submit the following report on the ceremonies organised in Bagdad on the occasion of the fortieth and final day of mourning for the late King Ghazi, which fell on Sunday, the 14th May.

2. Delegations representing Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt and Transjordan began to arrive on the 12th May, and by the appointed day about 150 men, of whom many were well-known public figures, had gathered in Bagdad. They included Abdul Rahman Bey Azzam (the Egyptian Minister here, who has just resumed his duties after a year's absence), Hamad Pasha-al-Basil, and Ali Bey-al-Jarim from Egypt; Lutfi Haffar, Fakhri Barudi, Sa'dullah Jabari, Sulaiman Ahmad (the poet Badawi-al-Jabal) and Maruf Arhanti from Syria; Shibli Mallat and Yusuf Khazan from the Lebanon; Abdullah-al-Saqqaf and Mithqal Pasha-al-Faiz from Transjordan; and Jemal Hussaini, Husain Khalidi, Alfred Rock and Akram Zuaitar from Palestine. All the delegates were treated as guests of the Government and comfortably accommodated in the best hotels in Bagdad.

3. The principal gathering, that of the *Ta'bin* (or lamentation and praising of the dead) was held in the Town Hall at 3.30 o'clock in the afternoon of the 14th May. Certain members of the Diplomatic Corps were invited and I attended, together with the oriental secretary and the acting consul. The proceedings consisted of an opening speech by the Prime Minister, followed by fourteen alternated speeches and poems delivered by members of the foreign delegations. The Prime Minister's speech was proper and pertinent to the occasion, but most of the other speakers and poets soon changed their paeans of

praise of the late King Ghazi for strident chords in the pan-Arab key. Some went further and indulged in dramatic grief for the sufferings of Palestine. Akram Zuaitar, the well-known Palestinian Arab agitator (who has recently been given an appointment under the Iraqi Ministry of Education), was the worst offender, and I enclose herein a translation of his oration,⁽¹⁾ which the audience had the good taste to receive in silence. I was given the gist of it by Captain Holt, and so was in a position to tell the Prime Minister in the evening, when we met at a party, in unmistakable language precisely what I thought of these proceedings "in honour of the late King," to whose memory only a bare half-hour had been devoted out of a solid two and a half hours of oratorical effort; and when he talked of "safety-valves" and Hyde Park, reminded him that it was not my Government's habit to invite foreign diplomats to go there on Sunday afternoon.

4. The following morning, when I handed to him a copy of the main points of the white paper on Palestine, I used the opportunity officially to express my surprise that he should have allowed such a speech to have been delivered at a gathering to which the Diplomatic Corps had been invited to honour the memory of the late King Ghazi. I reminded him, moreover, that, before accepting the invitation to attend, I had asked for and obtained from the Director of Ceremonies in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs an assurance that no political or nationalist speeches would be delivered. The Prime Minister looked sheepish and mingled mumbled apologies with remarks to the effect that he did not think that Zuaitar's speech was so objectionable as I had evidently been told it was. Nevertheless, he had, he said, reprimanded the convening committee; that Nuri Pasha had been shocked by what had been said was confirmed to me by the Regent.

5. The *Ta'bin* speeches, &c., were broadcast and listened to eagerly by large crowds in the coffee shops, where a radio receiving set has now become an indispensable equipment. Akram Zuaitar's speech, I am told, was followed with tense interest and stirred listeners to loud expressions of enthusiastic approval.

6. In the evening the delegates were entertained by the Prime Minister and the next afternoon they attended a garden-party given in their honour by His Highness the Regent. On the 16th May the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave another garden-party for the delegates, to which the Diplomatic Corps were again invited.

7. Throughout the stay of the delegates in Bagdad everything was clearly done to make the most of the occasion to foster among those present the ideal of Arab unity and to develop the prestige of Iraq and the Hashimite House in the Arab world. Speaker after speaker at the various gatherings glorified the achievements of Kings Hussain, Faisal and Ghazi, and declared that Arab hopes for the future were centred on the infant King Faisal II. No mention was at any time made of King Abdul Aziz, and I wonder what my Saudi Arabian colleague must be thinking of these panegyrics of the Royal House which His Majesty had so summarily ejected from their kingdom.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Jedda and Tehran, to the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, to His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut and to His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 3728/374/93]

No. 60.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 207.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 23, 1939.

MR. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL'S telegram No. 41, Saving, [of 28th April: Credits for Iraq].

1. It has been decided that credits will be available for Iraq to the extent of £3,250,000 for the defence requirements set forth in enclosure to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall's despatch No. 158 [of 13th April]. This is, of course, on assumption

that the military material in question will in fact be available in the United Kingdom for release to Iraqi Government. Export Credits Guarantee Department are now prepared to open detailed negotiations with Mr. Hogg.

2. Export Credits Guarantee Department are discussing with Mr. Hogg and Crown Agents arrangements for taking care of payments falling due in near future for railway material ordered through Crown Agents.

3. Interest rate on credits for defence requirements will be 5 per cent.

4. Please inform Iraqi Government accordingly.

[E 3871/374/93]

No. 61.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 212.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, May 25, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 207 arrived most opportunely, as I was able to communicate its contents to Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs when they returned my first official call on 24th May.

Prime Minister was gratified and assumed that most of military supplies would be available for early shipment. He, however, expressed surprise and disappointment at proposed rate of interest for armament credits. He stated that, as Iraq had better security to offer and would also repay in sterling rather than in goods, he expected terms at least as favourable as had been given to Turkey. He understood that our loan to Turkey gave long-term facilities for purchase of defence requirements with interest at 3 per cent. By this he presumably had in mind article 2 of Turkish Armaments Agreement, which prescribes interest at the rate of 1 per cent. above Bank of England discount rate or at the rate of 3 per cent., whichever is greater, on advances up to 1934. He added that Mr. Hogg had already reported that interest would probably be charged on this basis, i.e., making 3 per cent. for time being.

[E 3959/3959/93]

No. 62.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 246.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, May 20, 1939.

WITH reference to the comments on the growth of the school cadet movement which I have made in several recent despatches, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that new School Cadet Regulations were published in the Iraqi *Gazette* on the 15th May.

2. The first article declares that the object of the cadet organisation is to accustom the boys to hardship and hard work and to develop among them manly and martial ideals through military training in all its branches.

3. The regulations then go on to stipulate that all intermediate and secondary schools shall be included in the cadet organisation, and that all primary schools shall be covered by regulations for scouts which will be published later.

4. The style of the Minister of Education is in translation "The Prince of Chivalry" and that of the Director-General is Protector of Chivalry! All school teachers are to be incorporated in the cadets as officers. Those receiving salaries of £42 a month and upwards will be called superintendents and, according to seniority, will wear one, two or three gold braids with a crossed sword and pen on their shoulder-straps. Teachers receiving from £18 to £36 a month will be called knights (1st, 2nd and 3rd class) and their badge of rank will be one, two or three gold braids without the crossed sword and pen. Teachers earning £15 and less a month will be called helpers, and will have as badges of rank gold braids narrower in width than those worn by the knights.

5. The number of hours to be devoted weekly to military training and the uniforms to be worn by masters and cadets are left to the decision of the Ministry

of Education, but the regulations provide that the Ministry shall arrange for all cadets to attend a summer training camp for not more than one month each year.

6. It is also stipulated that no boy shall be considered to have passed the annual school training examination if he fails to satisfy the examiners in the prescribed military subjects.

I have, &c.

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 4085/1079/93]

No. 63.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 257 E.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, May 31, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a copy of the agreement signed between the Iraqi Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company on the 25th May, which formed the subject of my telegram No. 213 of the 26th May.

2. In addition to the provisions summarised in that telegram, the agreement (article 3) relieves the Iraq Petroleum Company of their obligation, under article 6 of their convention, to carry at least 50 per cent. of the capacity of the whole pipe-line system to the Haifa terminal. I understand that Mr. Skliros insisted on this amendment so that more oil could, when deemed expedient, be carried along the pipe-line to Tripoli as the cost of pumping it by this route is cheaper than by the Haifa route.

3. The agreement does not become operative until it has been confirmed by a special law to be promulgated not later than the 1st July next.

4. I am informed that, in letters exchanged at the time of signature, the Iraq Petroleum Company agree to advance to the Iraqi Government £250,000 (not £200,000 as stated in the telegram referred to above) on the 1st June from the first £500,000 instalment of the loan of £3 million.

5. Mr. Skliros contends that the maximum saving to the British Oil Development Company by the reduction in the number of drilling rigs in operation from nine to three would be in the region of £175,000, which is half the cost of the present operations of the company and would represent nearly 6 per cent. interest on £3 million. The economy would, however, be operative for only seven years, at the end of which there would be no return on the loan. As the maximum capacity of the pipe-line system only slightly surpasses 4 million tons (the total movement in 1938 was 4,138,216 tons, on which royalties to the value of £825,200 gold were paid), there is no hope of recovering an appreciable part of the advance from royalties in excess of the stipulated figure of £800,000 (gold). In order to secure repayment the Iraq Petroleum Company will, therefore, be obliged in due course to build another pipe-line. They will, however, be able to take this step at their own convenience, whereas if they had concluded an agreement—as they were on the point of doing—with the last Government just before they were ejected last December, they would have been committed to duplicate the existing pipe-line system within two years. This would have proved an embarrassing obligation in the light of the tension that has since developed in the international political situation.

6. As far as the Iraqi Government are concerned, the negotiations seem to have been concluded in the nick of time. The shortage of funds had become so desperately acute that the Minister of Finance had, I understand, been forced to draw on the revenues of the Municipalities of Bagdad, Basra and Mosul, and was actually contemplating paying civil servants only 50 per cent. of their salaries for May in cash and giving them six months' promissory notes for the remaining 50 per cent. There appear, therefore, to be some grounds for Mr. Skliros's conviction that the Ministers of Defence (Taha Hashimi) and of Economics and Communications (Omar Nazmi) and the Rais of the Royal Diwan (Rashid Ali) refused to associate themselves with the loan agreement because they hoped that the negotiations would fail and that the Government would, in consequence, be forced to resign owing to their failure to solve their financial difficulties: a new Government would have had to be formed, probably under the leadership of Taha Hashimi, which would immediately have endeavoured to come to terms with

the oil companies. I am informed by Mr. Skliros that, in order that the agreement should be strictly legal, the Minister of Economics and Communications should have signed it on behalf of the Iraqi Government. As he would not do so, the Prime Minister signed instead in the presence of the entire Cabinet, the "competent Minister" witnessing his signature. Any legal deficiency will, however, be rectified by parliamentary approval.

7. The agreement, which has been well received in the local press, will provide the Government with the cash it so urgently needs to meet the overdue accounts of local railway contractors and to proceed with the construction of the Baiji-Mosul railway extension. Expenses in connexion with railway development will, it is believed, absorb nearly all, if not all, the advance of £1 million payable this year.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Agreement between the Government of Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), B.O.D. Company (Limited), Basra Petroleum Company (Limited) on May 25, 1939.

THIS agreement, made the 25th May, 1939, between his Excellency Sayed Nuri Said, Prime Minister of the Government of Iraq, on behalf of the said Government (hereinafter called "the Government"), of the first part, Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), of City-Gate House, Finsbury Square, in the City of London, of the second part, and B.O.D. Company (Limited), of City-Gate House, Finsbury Square, in the City of London, of the third part, and Basra Petroleum Company (Limited), of City-Gate House, Finsbury Square, in the City of London, of the fourth part (the parties of the second, third and fourth parts being hereinafter called "the companies" and represented by their attorney, Mr. John Skliros).

Whereas the parties hereto have agreed to add to, supersede and partially amend the conventions hereinafter defined in the manner hereinafter appearing:

Now it is hereby agreed between the Government and the companies in the manner following:—

ARTICLE 1.

In this agreement the following expressions have the following meanings:—

The relevant convention means, in the case of Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), the convention made between the Government and that company, dated the 14th March, 1925, as amended by certain agreements and letters, dated the 24th March, 1931 (hereinafter together called "I.P.C. Convention"); in the case of B.O.D. Company (Limited), the convention made, and certain letters exchanged, between the Government and B.O.D. Company (Limited), dated the 20th April, 1932 (hereinafter called the "B.O.D. Convention"); and in the case of Basra Petroleum Company (Limited), the convention made between the Government and Basra Petroleum Company (Limited), dated the 29th July, 1938 (hereinafter called the "B.P.C. Convention").

ARTICLE 2.

(1) From the date of this agreement article 5 of the B.O.D. Convention shall cease to be operative, and the following obligation shall be fulfilled by the B.O.D. Company (Limited), that is to say: With effect from the date of this agreement the company shall drill not less than 12,000 feet per annum until the commencement of regular export of oil, provided that any excess of drilling over the amount named herein shall be credited to the amount required subsequently to such drilling. If this obligation is not complied with, the B.O.D. Convention shall become entirely null and void. All drilling shall be efficient and workmanlike.

(2) The period of seven and a half years mentioned in article 6 of the B.O.D. Convention shall be extended by seven years.

ARTICLE 3.

The following sentence shall be deleted from article 6 of I.P.C. Convention :—

“ In any event at least 50 per cent. of the capacity of the whole pipe-line system shall be carried to a terminal in the Bay of Acre until the throughput capacity at such terminal shall reach a total of at least 4 million tons per annum.”

ARTICLE 4.

(1) In consideration of the foregoing amendments to the relevant conventions the companies shall advance to the Government the sum of £3 million sterling in six equal instalments of £500,000 sterling, the first instalment to be payable within three days immediately following the date of this agreement and subsequent instalments to be paid on the following dates :—

September 1, 1939.
June 1, 1940.
September 1, 1940.
June 1, 1941.
September 1, 1941.

These payments shall be made in London to the order of the Government.

The total advance shall be recovered by the companies without interest by annual instalments on the 1st day of January of each year at a rate not exceeding 20 per cent. of the said total advance, but only by deductions from the aggregate of the payments due by way of royalty under the relevant conventions as and when and in so far as such payments exceed £800,000 (gold) in any year, and shall not be otherwise recoverable.

(2) With effect as from the date of this agreement, up to and including the royalties accruing during the year 1946, the royalties payable by Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited) on the 1st day of January under the I.P.C. Convention shall be paid quarterly on the basis of tonnage accrued for royalty during the previous quarter, not exceeding an aggregate of £800,000 (gold) per annum.

ARTICLE 5.

Where not specifically amended or superseded by the provisions of this agreement all the rights, privileges and obligations of the Government and the companies remain in force during the periods fixed by the relevant conventions and on the terms and conditions therein contained.

ARTICLE 6.

Any action to be taken hereunder by the Government shall be taken by such minister or other person as the Council of Ministers may from time to time nominate for the purpose of such action.

ARTICLE 7.

This agreement has been drawn up in the Arabic and English languages, both texts being regarded as authoritative, but, in the event of any discrepancy between the meanings of the English and Arabic texts hereof, the English text shall prevail.

ARTICLE 8.

This agreement shall not be operative until and unless it has been confirmed by special law to be promulgated not later than the 1st day of July, 1939, and any

reference to the date of this agreement shall be the date upon which the special law shall come into force.

In the presence of :
OMAR NADHMI.

On behalf of the Government :
NOURY SAID.

In the presence of :
P. G. ALLEN.

On behalf of Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited):
J. SKLIROS,
Managing Director.

In the presence of :
P. G. ALLEN.

On behalf of B.O.D. Company (Limited):
J. SKLIROS,
Director.

In the presence of :
P. G. ALLEN.

On behalf of Basra Petroleum Company (Limited):
J. SKLIROS,
Managing Director.

In accordance with the powers granted me under article 54 of the Iraq Stamp Law, 1922, I certify that I have accepted in cash the sum of 2 Iraq dinars and 250 fils, being the stamp duty payable on the signature of this agreement.

RUSTAM HAIDAR,
Minister of Finance.

[E 4122/374/93]

No. 64.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 218.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, June 6, 1939.

MY telegram No. 212.

Minister of Finance has taken up proposed rate of interest in separate conversations with counsellor, commercial secretary and myself, making the same complaint as Prime Minister. While less outspoken with me, he gave counsellor and commercial secretary to understand that 5 per cent. would be definitely unacceptable.

If only for reasons of prestige, its acceptance is, in fact, likely to be difficult, unless arguments can be provided which are both convincing in themselves and such as can be readily appreciated by public opinion.

Reluctance to pay 5 per cent. and difficulty of understanding why this rate is reasonable will have been increased by conclusion of Iraq Petroleum Company loan of £3 million, which is repayable without interest and only out of oil royalties when earned in excess of present figure.

Difficult as it may be to persuade Iraqi Government and people, I, of course, realise that they cannot always be granted most-favoured-nation treatment [? in any] loans, and that His Majesty's Government must be free to adjust rates to conditions of [group undecypherable] and also political situation. Politically, however, we do not want it said that we are treating our older Arab allies worse than our newer Turkish friends, while economically Iraqi Government would seem to be entitled to better rather than worse treatment. For the Turks, if I understand the position correctly, are receiving a loan and credits and, in addition, special facilities to repay both in kind, but Iraqi Government get only credits with no special facilities for sale of their goods in British markets and for credits; incidentally, they offer better security with their oil royalties and low national debt. For the same reasons Iraqi Government would be disappointed if they were charged as high an interest rate as Roumania.

[E 4476/72/93]

No. 65.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 299.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, June 16, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 75. Saving, of the 9th June, I have the honour to inform you that the new Parliament was opened by the Regent on the 12th June.

2. A translation of the Speech from the Throne is given in the enclosed cutting from the *Iraq Times*.⁽¹⁾ Apart from the friendly reference to the friendship and alliance between our two countries, it contained two interesting points. The first was the statement that the recently concluded Anglo-Turkish Agreement had increased stability in the Near East, and had furthered co-operation against any aggression which might endanger peace in this part of the world. The second concerned Palestine. This was of considerable importance and, as the translation given in the *Iraq Times* is not altogether adequate, I quote the full text of this part of the speech below:—

“Our Government continue to give their closest and most sympathetic consideration to the questions which are engaging the attention of our neighbours. The work of our delegation, and that of other Arab delegations, at London resulted, as you know, in the publication of the white paper about Palestine. In our opinion, if that paper had contained a clear and positive statement which would have helped to an understanding of the intentions of the British Government concerning the creation of national government in Palestine and the suppression of the political aspirations of Zionism, those doubts and fears would have been diminished which, to our regret, continue to create unrest and to cause the most regrettable incidents in that dear land which is the centre of the hopes of all Arabs and Moslems!”

3. These words confirm the line taken by the Prime Minister and others, including the Regent, with whom I have spoken, that the cool reception given to the policy of the white paper is, in the main, due to the fact that the Arabs fear that it will not be carried out. In other words, if it had been possible for the white paper in some way to have dispelled Arab fears that the Jews will find a means to defeat its provisions, it would have been far more acceptable to the Arab world. The rest of the speech was devoted to somewhat colourless observations on home affairs and calls for no comment.

4. On the day of the opening of Parliament, the local press published a statement by the Prime Minister on the recent general election. He said that as the Electoral Law had not yet been amended, there had been no alternative but to conduct the election in the usual manner. He hoped, however, that this would be the last time that such elections would be held. The present Parliament would amend the Electoral Law to meet the desire of the people for free elections. Having done this, Parliament would again be dissolved and elections would be held under the new law.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

[E 16/6/31]

No. 66.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, January 1, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Saudi delegation to London will consist of Faisal, Fuad and a secretary.

2. King also proposes to send as a private person, not as a delegate, his fourth son Amin Khalid, for medical treatment and as company for his brother. He begs that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will not regard Amin as a guest included in the offer of official hospitality.

3. See my immediately following telegram.

(Repeated, Saving, to Cairo, No. 1; Bagdad, No. 1; and Jerusalem, No. 1.)

[E 115/6/31]

No. 67.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, January 4, 1939.

MY telegram No. 196, Saving.

Saudi Arabian Government have informed the Prime Minister that they welcome his proposal for a meeting in Cairo. Their delegation sails on 9th January and expects to reach Cairo on 12th January. The Prime Minister anticipates that about a week in Cairo would be helpful, and the Saudi Arabian Government have suggested to him that it would thus fit in better if the conference met in London towards the end of January rather than on 18th January.

2. His Excellency would be grateful for your reactions to his suggestion.

(Repeated to Jedda, Jerusalem and Bagdad.)

[E 114/6/31]

No. 68.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, January 4, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 335, Saving, of 29th December.

French Government state that as visit of these personages to Beirut will certainly be accompanied by great demonstrations on the part of Moslem population and risk of causing incidents, they are disposed to accede to wish expressed by His Majesty's Government on condition that those concerned only stay five days at the most in the Lebanon and are provided with a return visa to Egypt; that they stay in the buildings which will be allotted to them; and, finally, that they undertake only to enter into contact with Amin Hussein and to abstain from any public declaration, including local press.

(Repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem and Beirut.)

[E 114/6/31]

No. 69.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 5, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 3 [of 4th January: Arrangements for Palestine discussions].

You should thank French Government for their readiness to accede to our wishes. You may explain that His Majesty's Government, for their part, entirely appreciate the desirability of conditions suggested by the French

Government in connexion with the proposed visit. They agree that five days in the Lebanon will be ample for the conversations with the Mufti, and that it is very desirable to ensure, during the visit of these persons to Beirut, that there shall be as little publicity as possible and that suitable restrictions should be placed on their freedom of movement and their contacts.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo is being instructed to make all arrangements in consultation with his French colleague and Egyptian Government.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 8; Jerusalem, No. 10; and Beirut, No. 1.)

[E 114/6/31]

No. 70.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 5, 1939.

MY telegram No. 171 [of 29th December: Arrangements for Palestine discussions].

Though apprehensive of risks of incidents if deportees are admitted to Lebanon, French Government are disposed to agree to visit of not more than five days provided they stay in buildings which will be allotted to them and give undertakings to enter into contact only with the Mufti and to abstain from making declarations in public or to the press.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo is being instructed to make all arrangements in consultation with his French colleague and Egyptian Government.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 3.)

[E 164/6/31]

No. 71.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 6, 1939.)

(No. 230.)

My Lord,

Jedda, December 13, 1938.

IN my telegram No. 198, dated the 11th December, I had the honour to request your instructions as to the replies to be given to certain questions which Ibn Saud had asked in a long memorandum about the proposed London discussions on Palestine. A translation of this document is sent herewith. The questions are at the end. I found it difficult to deal with the questions at all. The document is believed to have been sent from Riyadh in manuscript and typed in Mecca, but no date is given, and it is difficult to relate the memorandum to the telegrams which have been exchanged, since neither refers to the other. Moreover, the first two questions, which I have turned into one, refer to the "position" of the Mufti, without stating exactly what his position was at the time of writing. In the end I took the situation to be as expressed in my above-mentioned telegram, believing that in transmitting to Ibn Saud the reply of His Majesty's Government I could give him an opportunity to clear up any ambiguity. It is to be hoped that these points will have ceased to have any practical importance by the time this despatch is received in London. The sole value of the memorandum will then be as a record by Ibn Saud of the efforts which he has made to reconcile the points of view of His Majesty's Government and the Arabs with regard to the London discussions. It will be seen that in paragraph 16 he claims to have persuaded His Majesty's Government to agree to make certain concessions which they had, in fact, decided upon spontaneously, and I propose to clear up this misunderstanding as tactfully as possible. A copy of the letter which I propose to send to the Amir Faisal will be transmitted to you shortly.

2. It may be admitted that Ibn Saud would in any case do his best to help bring about a solution of the Palestine problem, but he seems to be particularly desirous that His Majesty's Government should know how great are the efforts he has made to that end, and should understand that when it comes to deeds it is he, and not the Nuris and Taufiq Suaidis, that really counts. Pride alone might induce him to bring this fact to the notice of His Majesty's Government,

but we also have to keep in mind the vague statement to which I referred in my telegram No. 164 from Riyadh (16th November) and in paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 216, dated the 28th November. It may be that Ibn Saud desires to establish a claim to provide from his family any Arab ruler (or rulers) that the new policy in Palestine may eventually be found to require.

3. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 71.

(Translation.)

Memorandum regarding the Endeavours exerted (to ensure) the holding of the London Conference.

WE wish to set forth below the endeavours which we have exerted since the departure from Riyadh of Sir Reader Bullard until now with the Government of Iraq and the people of Palestine in order to secure agreement as to participation in the discussions at the London Conference in the light of the statements of the British Secretary of State for the Colonies and the communications which his Excellency the Minister has made to us.

2. It is known that we began our efforts with the people of Palestine through two channels: the first being the Mufti, Haj Amin-el-Husaini, and the second, certain others of those who have close relations with many leaders and thoughtful people of Palestine. We have urged on all of them the necessity of agreement to accept the invitation, seizing the opportunity which the British Government have announced, and benefiting by the participation of representatives of the Arab Governments in direct negotiations with His Majesty's Government. We have borne in mind the following facts:—

(1) To convince those concerned of the immediate and the remote advantages of participation in the conference.

(2) To prove the good intention of Great Britain in inviting the representatives of the Palestine Arabs and of the neighbouring Arab Governments.

(3) The fact that the coming discussions are to be made with the British Government and not with the Jews, which constitutes a guarantee of the non-recognition of the position of the Jews as a party with whom we deal.

(4) The conviction that the people of Palestine will be properly represented and that they will be left free to select their representatives from amongst persons who have been interned or deported.

(5) The conviction that the presence of the Mufti in person in the discussions, even if the prohibition laid down by the British Government was withdrawn, would be of no advantage, and that it is better not to insist on this.

(6) To attempt to arrive at an agreement on certain bases, for the initiation of the discussions, and, if this could not be achieved, that there should be at least no restriction on the freedom of any party to express its views quite frankly regarding the solution it believes to be suitable, without restraint or compulsion.

(7) To try to stop immigration during the discussions pending the adoption of a final decision for the settlement of the Palestine problem either by the conference or by the Government direct if the conference should fail.

3. On the 28th Ramadan (20th November, 1938) the Iraqi Legation addressed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Mecca, in a confidential note, enquiring whether the Government of His Majesty the King had accepted the invitation and about the points on which they considered agreement with Iraq essential before entering into a discussion on this question. A reply to the following effect was sent to the Iraqi Government through the Saudi Legation in Bagdad on the 29th Ramadan (21st November, 1938). As no conditions were attached to the invitation, and as the British Government have informed us that the discussions are not to be in the form of a round table (conference) with the Jews, but with them direct, the Saudi Government have accepted the invitation and decided to nominate His Highness the Amir Faisal to represent them.

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As to agreement on the points between us, we informed the Iraqi Government of our suggestion to the effect that a preliminary meeting should be held in the British Foreign Office with a view to studying certain matters as a preliminary step, viz.: to secure an amnesty for the deportees; to enable the people of Palestine to elect really representative persons and to select trusted Nationalists for the purpose; to try to induce the Mufti to fall in with our conviction that he should not go to London.

4. On the 1st Shawwal (23rd November, 1938) we informed the Iraqi Government of the reply of the British Government about their attitude and the manner in which the Arabs of Palestine are to be represented. With the exception of the Mufti, they raise no objection: on the contrary, they are anxious that the Nationalists should be properly represented. The discussions will be conducted with them direct. As to the question of immigration, there is no practical advantage to be expected from pressing it now; the important thing is that the representatives of Palestine should be nominated. It is in this that we beg the Iraqi Government to co-operate with us with a view to inducing the Arabs to expedite the election. We enquired of the Iraqi Government regarding their information as to the view of the Arab Higher Committee concerning the coming discussions, and its insistence that the British Government should agree beforehand upon the basis of the Arabs' previous demands.

5. On the 30th Ramadan (22nd November, 1938) we received, through our agent in Damascus, the decision of the Arab Higher Committee, transmitted by hand of the Mufti, to the effect that (1) it is impossible that the Arabs and the Jews should sit together at a round table (conference); (2) negotiations should be conducted on the basis that Palestine should be granted its independence, a treaty like that of Iraq and Syria should be concluded, the interests of the British and of the Jewish minority should be preserved, and the discussions should not be conducted on basis of mandate, partition or the establishment of a Jewish State; (3) the British Government should withdraw the stipulation regarding the Mufti and the members of the Arab Committee. The Mufti stated that, if His Majesty the King thought it advantageous that he (the Mufti) should not insist on going to London in person, he was prepared to comply with the desire of His Majesty, but he requested that a guarantee should be given to the effect that the Arab Higher Committee should be the sole representatives of the people of Palestine.

6. On receipt of this reply we telegraphed to our agent to meet the Mufti again and to tell him the following:—

(1) We have succeeded in securing that the meeting will not be a round table (conference) between the Arabs and the Jews, since the negotiations of the Arabs will be with the British Government and not with the Jews.

(2) We have succeeded in securing that the representation of the Arabs of Palestine shall be free from any restriction or condition, and, as regards the Mufti himself, we have informed the British Government that our view originally was that he should not attend in person, and that his Honour was of the same opinion; and the British Government were, therefore, prepared to accept any of the persons interned or deported, even those in the Seychelles.

(3) It is desirable that trustworthy people should be selected and we will exert our endeavours with Great Britain to accept them without any modification, and, in case they insist on one or two changes, it will be possible to arrange that matter.

(4) As to the suspension of immigration we explained that there is no practical advantage in raising this question, because the latest permits issued are until the month of March next, and we shall have arrived, please God, before that time at a final solution of the problem.

(5) As to a general amnesty for the persons interned or deported, we think that Britain will not object to this after the suspension of fighting; and, as this would require a considerable time, we have contented ourselves with the promise of a pardon for those who may be selected to represent the Arabs of Palestine.

(6) As to the stipulation that the discussions should be conducted on the basis mentioned by the committee, we think it would be difficult to persuade the British Government to accept it, since, if they were to accept it, there would be no need for the London Conference to be held: it would be a question of the dictation of terms by a conqueror to the conquered, and be regarded as a restriction on the freedom of discussion. As long as there is no restriction on the freedom of discussion or obligation to narrow its scope, it would be better not to insist on

the condition (proposed by) the committee. They can declare that they are electing their representatives on the basis which they have laid down; but to impose (on others) is not wise.

7. We communicated with the Egyptian and the Iraqi Governments on the 1st Shawwal (23rd November), and received their replies to the effect that they had not come to a final decision because they were communicating with Great Britain on certain points, that the Council of Ministers would meet and give a decision in this respect; and that they would inform us of their views in due course; but so far we have received nothing fresh from them.

8. On the 2nd Shawwal (24th November) we directed our agent (*i.e.*, consul) in Damascus to resort for help to some persons who have influence over the Mufti (we gave him the names of those persons), so that they might consider the matter carefully and urge the Mufti and the members of the Arab Higher Committee to accept the above views, as we believe that an opportunity is now offered to the Arabs assembled before the world to refute the arguments of the Jews. We added that we believed the London Conference to be a brilliant success in the matter of the Arabs of Palestine, as the Arab Governments used, in fact, to discuss the question with the British Government, but such discussions had no official character, but were merely a matter of friendship and mutual interest. Now the Arab Governments have been officially invited to take part in an official conference for the settlement of the question. We therefore think it better that the opportunity should not be lost, and press for the acceptance of the invitation and the selection of trustworthy representatives.

9. On the 1st Shawwal (23rd November, 1938) the Government of Iraq informed us that they had forwarded a memorandum to the British Ambassador in which they asked for:—

(a) The temporary suspension of immigration.

(b) A declaration of general amnesty to the mujahidin (champions, or persons engaged in a holy war), and the grant of freedom of representation to them.

(c) Approval of the Arab project for the settlement of the Palestine question.

(d) Acceptance of the attendance of the Mufti, or, if this is difficult, persons upon whom he relies, such as Hilmi Pasha, Auni Abdul Hadi, Izzat Darwa'za and Jemal-al-Husaini.

(e) Syria to take part in the discussions and to receive an invitation through France.

(f) Approval of the condition that negotiations should be conducted between the Arabs and Great Britain only, and that the Governments of Egypt and the Yemen, and the Mufti also, should be consulted.

10. On the 3rd Shawwal (25th November, 1938) we received a communication from our Minister in Bagdad saying that the Iraqi Government had informed him that they were still waiting for a reply from the British Ambassador on certain points, but would probably accept the invitation; and that they had directed their consul in Syria to discuss with the Mufti matters relating to the conference, and to come to Bagdad to present a detailed report in this respect. The Iraqi Government added that they had understood from the British Ambassador that an invitation would not be sent to Syria through France, but that the British Government did not object to the Iraqi representative's representing Syria too, but that they had not yet accepted the invitation.

11. On the 3rd Shawwal (25th November, 1938) we received also a communication from the Arab Higher Committee and the Mufti, saying that his Honour was very pleased with the conclusions we had arrived at and that all of them were just what was required with the exception of some points on which he would consult his people, and of the personal question. He says that he will not go (he had said that he would not go) and, this being so, why does the Secretary of State for the Colonies declare in Parliament that the restriction imposed by the British Government regarding the Mufti still holds good, though they have decided to accept representatives chosen even from the persons interned and deported? The Mufti promised to send a written reply in a day or two.

12. The Iraqi Government telegraphed to us at the same time (3rd Shawwal, 1357) to say that they had noticed that, although the Mufti admitted that the general interest necessitated his not going to London, he thought that to exclude him in person did not agree with the

good intention necessary, and therefore wished to insist that Britain should remove that special restriction. We think that this is a matter of form and that time should not be wasted on it especially as an opportunity is offered which we ought not to lose. We believe that we ought not to sacrifice the main point for an unimportant matter of form, and we requested the Iraqi Government to exert their endeavours with us to induce the Mufti not to insist on this, and to secure the announcement of the names of the representatives. We telegraphed to our agent to make the following communication to the Mufti:—

Our belief in the sincerity and zeal of his Honour causes us to believe that he is prepared to ransom Palestine with his blood, his children and his property; and we believe that for a matter of form of no practical value he will not insist upon something which will do untold harm to Palestine and will be used against him before the Arab and Moslem world and the people of Palestine. Had his presence been in the general interest and indispensable, there would have been reason to insist. But, as we have already agreed with him, it is advantageous that he should not attend, and it is better that other persons of sincerity should undertake the mission in his place. We do not see that his insistence after that is of any advantage to him or in the interest of Palestine. We see that the British have opened a door of negotiation and we hope that a settlement of the question may be arrived at in the presence of all the Arabs. To refuse and to raise obstacles means refusal to embark on the settlement of the question. We beg all to think of the general interest and to be sure that our advice has no other object than to be of service to Palestine and to the Arabs; because we do not think it advantageous to lose an opportunity. If, then, the Mufti thinks fit to be conciliatory and to smooth the way, we are doing our best in working for the general interest; if, however, he insists on his opinion it means that he desires to monopolise the question and to place his friends in an awkward position. The important and practical question is that he should communicate to us the names of the persons who should represent the Arabs of Palestine.

13. On the 5th Shawwal (27th November, 1938) we learnt from our agent that he had seen all the people whom we had directed him to approach, and had asked them to act in accordance with our instructions to him. They unanimously agreed that to accept our idea was the right and wise thing to do. They also informed our agent that they had had a meeting with the members of the Arab Higher Committee, including the Mufti, and insisted that it was essential to accept without hesitation; whereupon it was decided that five persons should be selected on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine: four for the Moslems and one for the Christians and that the final reply should be sent in a day or two, in writing.

14. On the 6th Shawwal (28th November, 1938) the Iraqi Government informed us that they had accepted the invitation to the London Conference in the following form:—

In view of the assurances given by Great Britain to the effect that the Arabs of Palestine will be enabled to be represented in a manner reassuring to them, and of their desire that the question of Palestine should be settled in association with the Arab Governments, the Iraqi (Government) accept the invitation. They added that they were exerting their efforts on two points: (1) to induce the Mufti and the people of Palestine to elect their representatives; (2) to persuade Great Britain not to exclude the Mufti. They shared our opinion that this matter ought not to be allowed to raise an obstacle. They had informed the Government of the Yemen of their acceptance of the invitation and requested them to accept it with the reservations which Iraq had attached to her acceptance; and they asked us to agree to be bound by the policy defined in the Arab Covenant for the settlement of the Palestine question.

15. On the 8th Shawwal (30th November, 1938) we received the expected reply from the Mufti, and in view of its importance we reproduce it in full:—

(After prayers for the King's health, and thanks.)

I assure your Majesty that I do not mind about myself and that I ask for nothing whatsoever for myself, and I do not want to go to London. But I do care about the discharge of the trust which the people of Palestine have placed upon my shoulders and the shoulders of my brothers by the general authority, in which took part all the committees and municipalities and personalities and towns and villages and even the leading men of the Defence party, whom the

British call Moderates (blank—presumably corrupt groups), for the solution of the problem. No doubt you have received news of this consultation, which took place during the last two weeks. Now this trust cannot be discharged in sincerity and peace unless the delegates who are to represent the Palestine Arabs are sincere and trusted persons chosen by the Arab Higher Committee exclusively, without admixture of any person from any other group or party in Palestine whatsoever. The reason which obliges us to assure you of this limitation is that the British Government have announced that they have asked the High Commissioner for Palestine to select representatives of the Palestine Arabs from the various parties and classes, and we fear that he may nominate persons whom the people have rejected and in whom they have no confidence because of their hostility to our interests. The right of the Arab Higher Committee in this matter is evident, for it is they who represent the Arabs of Palestine and who have been given full authority by them, and it is not right that they should be limited in their right while that right is given to the Jewish Agency unconditionally. I beg your Majesty to be so good as to obtain from His Majesty's Government an undertaking to that effect so that we may put forward the names of those in whom we and our brothers the members of the committee have confidence.

As to the bases of the discussions, the reason why we want to make sure about that is that the British Government make the solution of the Palestine question dependent upon agreement between the Arabs and the Jews. Now it is highly improbable that the Jews will agree to the cessation of immigration or the formation of an independent Government, and the Arabs will accept nothing less, and in that case the efforts and hopes will have been in vain, and the prestige of the Arabs and of their Governments will be exposed to contempt when the conference breaks down. The British Government will then inform the Arab delegates of the reason why agreement between the Arabs and the Jews is impossible and they alone will adopt the solution which appears right to them, although it may not be really in accordance with Arab demands. In particular, the declarations of the Minister for the Colonies and the recent debates in the House of Commons do not inspire us with optimism, for they still refer to the rights of the Jews in Palestine and the determination of His Majesty's Government to carry out their obligations towards them. I and my brothers therefore believe that interest and honour alike require that your Majesty should approach the British Government with a view to their announcing their intention to solve the question on the basis of the final cessation of Jewish immigration and the replacement of the mandate by a treaty like that of Iraq and Egypt. I and my brothers are confident that your Majesty is keener than any one on the interests of the Arabs and of Islam and best informed of the eternal breaking of promises and shilly-shallying which is a mark of British policy. God preserve your Majesty!

16. We immediately instructed our representative that he should see the persons whom we had charged him to see before, and that they should all go to see the Mufti and try to persuade him that this policy of his is not in accordance with the general interest, and tell him that our view is as follows:—

The insistence of the Mufti that the Arab Committee represents Palestine is question of form, since the freedom of election of delegates is guaranteed and the British Government have accepted it and given undertakings about it.

The discussion in London is for the solution of the difficulties, and, if the British Government accepted the bases of the Arab demands before the conference, there would be no need for a conference or for any discussion between the Arab Governments and the British Government. It is strange that representatives of the Arabs and of their Governments have for some time been going, and are still going, to London to set forth the views and demands of the Arabs at the insistence of the people of Palestine themselves, and the British Government have had with them private discussions about Palestine having no official value, and now when the British Government officially ask all the Arabs to discuss the Palestine question the Arabs come along and stipulate that their demands should be accepted before the meeting. This is unreasonable.

What we have been able to persuade the British Government to do is this:—

(1) That the discussions of the Arabs should be with the British Government and not with the Jews;

(2) That His Majesty's Government should accept as delegates of the Arabs even persons chosen from among those who have been imprisoned or interned, and should pardon them;

(3) That the discussions should be free and that the Arabs should not be limited by any condition, but should set forth whatever they like, and, if the British Government had announced their views on any matter, the Arabs also had announced *their* demands before the conference; and since the British Government do not require the Arabs to be limited by the British point of view or by bases laid down by the British Government, but have said that they are ready to discuss whatever the Arabs set forth, it is useless for us to bind ourselves to compel the British Government to declare their acceptance of the Arab demands before the conference. As to the question of representation, the important thing, as we have said, is to elect trustworthy persons to sit at the conference and we will endeavour to induce the British Government to accept them. Moreover, the representatives of the Arab Governments will defend the interests of Palestine like the people of Palestine themselves, or even more strongly. It is therefore necessary that all should reconsider the question, and if they are able to increase the pressure upon the British Government with a view to inducing them to accept their demands before the conference meets, that is their business; and, if they see that this opportunity is open for the Arabs, the reasonable thing to do is to accept it. As we have said before, we have no personal advantage in this matter except in our feelings of affection and our desire to save Palestine from the present state of hardship. Here is a way opened to that end, and if the Mufti wants to close it and to persist in his policy, it is he who will bear the responsibility before the people of Palestine and the world and the generations to come. Moreover, the meeting of the conference is in the interests of the Arabs and the Moslems. Either the Arabs will obtain all or most of what they aim at, or else the aims of Great Britain will be revealed in their true light, and in that case the Arabs will have a new course to take with the British.

17. At the same time we informed the Iraqi Government of what had happened, and asked them to tell us what they learned after the arrival of their consul from Syria. At the same time we gave them our opinion of the Mufti's demands, which is as follows:—

We do not believe it is possible for the British Government to recognise the Arab Higher Committee as the sole representative of Palestine for the following reasons:—

- (a) Because they dissolved the committee and declared it illegal, and it is therefore difficult for them to go back on their decision.
- (b) Because the moderate parties split off from the committee some time ago, and the statement that the committee still represents them is not supported by the facts.
- (c) Because there is wide divergence between the position of the Arab Committee and the Jewish Agency.
- (d) Because the British Government have agreed to the freedom of representation of the people of Palestine without condition except for the person of the Mufti.

We therefore do not think it possible to grant the Mufti's request, particularly because it is a matter of form rather than of practical importance. In our opinion the important thing is who the representatives are to be. If they are selected by him, whether they are called representatives of the Arab Committee or representatives of Palestine does not matter, so long as the object is service to the cause and so long as the representatives of the Arab Governments are to participate in the discussions. We believe that there is nothing to be feared from the moderates, since they cannot depart from the view of the majority. We, however, suggest that we should adopt a common policy towards the Mufti with a view to inducing him to change his opinion on the question of form and to nominate the representatives, whereupon we and Iraq would endeavour to induce the British Government to accept them in the name of the whole of Palestine, and to persuade them to that end. As to claiming approval of the Arab demands as a basis for the negotiations, we think that this is also impossible. We and Iraq have endeavoured to obtain a promise to this effect, but could not succeed. We believe that had the English agreed to this there would have been no need

for the London Conference, and it is unreasonable to insist on a thing of which we know the result beforehand. We think that it would be difficult for them to give any promise that might limit freedom of discussion, and we see no harm in conducting negotiations without having a promise as to the desired basis. We therefore suggest a joint approach to the Mufti with a view to his renouncing his opinion on the point of form and (to suggesting) that it would be better that he nominate and select the representatives; we would then endeavour, in conjunction with the Iraqi Government, to have them accepted in the name of the whole of Palestine and would attempt to persuade Great Britain to that end.

18. This is the summary of the work which we have done to ensure the meeting of the conference which it is proposed to hold in London. It appeared to us that the insistence of the Mufti might be due to one of the following reasons:—

(1) The Mufti may be afraid lest, if he is neglected in this connexion, the British Government may continue in their measures against him and in keeping him away from Palestine and from its leadership.

(2) There may be some extremist groups round him, urging him to insist on this matter.

(3) There may be some other parties who may be afraid lest we should succeed in influencing the Mufti, and may wish to obstruct the matter, and endeavour to frustrate the accomplishment of the aim and do not wish it to be accomplished at our hands. But whatever may be the cause, from among the above-mentioned possibilities, that has induced the Mufti to take up this attitude of his, we have done all we could in this respect and will continue our endeavours until the end. But we should like to know the views of the British Government on the following points:—

(1) If the Mufti persists in his attitude, what will be the opinion of Great Britain in this respect?

(2) Will the British Government change their opinion as regards the attitude they have adopted towards the Mufti and towards (acceptance of) the demands of the Arabs before the conference is held?

(3) Is it possible that some other Arab authority might get from the British Government with regard to the grant of the demands of the Mufti anything beyond what has already been (granted); and could this happen through anybody other than us?

What we beg of the British Government is (to realise that) in any of the above cases we are anxious to learn of any decision the British Government may take in this respect in order that we may be aware of the matter. And although we hope that the Mufti will give up his insistence on his present attitude, yet if he persists in his view and the cause is one of the three we mentioned above, we hope that the British Government will tell us whether they think of modifying their attitude, and in that case we should wish that our position should be taken into consideration and that such demands may not be granted except through us; and, if they do not want to change their attitude, it is for them to do what they like.

[E 115/6/31]

No. 72.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 6, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 7 [of 4th January: Arrangements for Palestine discussions].

As Saudi delegation only leaves Jedda on 9th January and intends to spend some days in Egypt, I realise that it may no longer be possible to start London discussions on 18th January. Nevertheless, I trust it will be possible for Arab delegates to reach London well before the end of January. In the first place, His Majesty's Government are anxious that there shall be no avoidable delay in opening discussions for a Palestine settlement. Secondly, Parliament reassembles on 29th January, and it had been our hope that discussions could have been well under way by that date, after which Prime Minister, Secretary of State for the Colonies and I will all have our parliamentary duties to consider. Egyptian

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Government should be asked to consider these points in consultation with Ibn Saud and the Government of Iraq and to let me know as soon as they can the earliest date (which I hope will be somewhere near 18th January) when all the Arab delegates, including the Palestine delegates, can reach London, so that a definite date may be fixed for the opening of the discussions.

2. I wonder, moreover, whether it is really necessary for preliminary discussions in Cairo to last for so long as a week. Object of such discussions was understood to be confined to making final arrangements regarding selection of Palestine Arab delegation. Perhaps it is now the intention to discuss policy as well. If so, I would earnestly beg Egyptian Prime Minister not to allow these preliminary discussions in Cairo to result in Arab delegates binding themselves in advance to some cut-and-dried scheme. The Prime Minister, with his great political experience, will appreciate that a certain liberty of manoeuvre is often necessary to success of negotiations, and that if one party takes up a fixed position at the start and refuses to deviate therefrom, it becomes all the more difficult to reach agreement. His Majesty's Government, for their part, intend to keep, so far as possible, an open mind with regard to the best solution of the problems for discussion, and they will be prepared to take full account of the arguments which the Egyptian delegate or any other delegate may wish to put forward. It is equally desirable that the attitude of the Egyptian and other delegations should not be rigidly determined in advance.

(Addressed to Cairo, No. 11. Repeated to Jedda, No. 7; Jerusalem, No. 3; and Bagdad, No. 4.)

[E 259/6/31]

No. 73.

Sir John Simon to Consul-General Hazard (Beirut).

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 10, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 4 [of 9th January: Arrangements for Palestine discussions].

I see no reason why Mufti should be allowed to go to Cairo. It may be reasonable that the Seychelles deportees, who are naturally rather out of touch with Palestine leaders in Syria and the Lebanon, should be allowed to visit Beirut to confer with Mufti before Palestine delegates are finally selected. French Government have agreed to facilitate this under conditions which appear to be quite reasonable. The fact that deportees now hesitate to take advantage of these arrangements does not seem sufficient reason to allow Mufti to meet them in Egypt, where his presence would, from many points of view, be open to strong objection.

(Addressed to Beirut, No. 3. Repeated to Cairo, No. 16, and Jerusalem, No. 16.)

[E 304/6/31]

No. 74.

Sir M. Lampson to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 10, 1939.

PALESTINE.

Difficulties having now been removed, Prime Minister tells me that he is sending Palestinian leaders to Beirut by aeroplane early Wednesday morning, and has insisted on their return to Cairo on Friday.

(Confidential.)

2. Regarding Egyptian representation, his Excellency said that King Farouk was now taking strong line against his [? group omitted], mainly on the ground that he would not be without his Prime Minister during the present time of international tension. The Prime Minister would still like to go and will speak to the King again. He feels that even if the conference were a failure, he might help His Majesty's Government in making it less obviously so.

3. I repeated my personal opinion that it would be unfortunate if he did not go, as with his prestige he could exercise special influence upon the Arab delegates. The matter was so important that it justified a special effort. But I

did not feel justified in pressing him if he felt his duty lay here. Nor did we wish to see him associated with any failure, though I myself believed the conference would achieve success, especially if he attended it. He replied that all the Arabs were urging him to go; they trusted him, but did not trust Nuri Pasha.

4. If he does not go he may send Minister for Foreign Affairs, though admitting his defects of extreme touchiness, lack of intelligence and ignorance of English. He could send no other Cabinet Minister, but he would let me know further when he had seen King Farouk again.

(Repeated to Beirut, Bagdad and Jerusalem.)

[E 422/6/31]

No. 75.

Sir M. Lampson to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 16, 1939.

(R.) FUAD HAMZA BEY states that the Palestine leaders, who have returned from Beirut, are about to announce the following composition of Palestinian delegation at London Conference:—

- (1) Auni Abdul Hadi.
- (2) Jemal Hussein.
- (3) Hussein Khalidi.
- (4) Alfred Rock.
- (5) Amin Tamimi.
- (6) Musa-el-Alami.
- (7) George Antonius (to be Secretary-General).

2. Delegation will be accompanied by three "counsellors," namely: Fuad Saaba, Yacoub Ghoussein, Abdul Latif Salah.

3. It had previously been pointed out to Auni Abdul Hadi and Fuad Bey Hamza that omission of any representative of the Defence party would be unfortunate for the Palestinian cause itself. Both had admitted the wisdom of this argument. Fuad was very apologetic in giving above news, but said that nothing could now be done to alter the delegation. (End of R.)

4. Presumably this delegation will be entirely subservient to the Mufti. But I am assuming from your telegram No. 159 to Jedda that His Majesty's Government will nevertheless acquiesce in this composition of the delegation.

(Repeated to Jerusalem and Jedda.)

[E 422/6/31]

No. 76.

Sir John Simon to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 16, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 24: [Palestine discussions].

The personnel of Palestinian delegation for London discussion is good so far as they represent the adherents of Mufti. But I feel that there will be very strong criticism both in Palestine and here of the omission to include a representative of the Defence party. You will appreciate from Lord Halifax's telegram No. 159 of 9th December to Sir R. Bullard that he pressed this point upon Ibn Saud. We received no comment on this from him, and in the absence of comment assumed from Sir R. Bullard's telegram No. 207 of 25th December that this point had been put to Mufti and that delegation was likely to include a representative of Defence party if we obtained permission from French Government for deportees from Seychelles to enter Lebanon and confer with Mufti regarding selection of delegates. Our belief that this would be so was strengthened by Sir M. Peterson's telegram No. 217 of 27th December, in which he reported that Nuri Pasha proposed to meet the Mufti and arrange for addition of two or three further delegates, amongst whom he wished to include Ragheb Nashashibi.

2. Nevertheless, we, of course, anticipated that the Mufti and his friends might create difficulties on this score, and in Lord Halifax's telegram No. 159 to Jedda he said that we would be prepared to receive, as representatives of the Palestine Arabs, such persons as he (Ibn Saud) might name after careful

consideration and consultation of Arab opinion. Later in the telegram we emphasised the importance which we attached to His Majesty's Government being free to say that they themselves had not selected the delegation, but that they understood Ibn Saud, on his own initiative, had been in consultation with neighbouring Arab Governments and with leaders of the Palestine Arabs, and that, as a result of these consultations, Ibn Saud had furnished a list of delegates. You will appreciate obvious reason why we were anxious that Ibn Saud and/or other neighbouring Arab Governments should take the responsibility with Palestinian Arabs of selecting the list of delegates. Receiving no reply on this point, we assumed that Ibn Saud was agreeable. Again, this impression was confirmed when we heard that conference between representatives of three neighbouring Governments was to be held in Cairo partly for the purpose of selecting or helping to select Palestinian delegation.

3. In your telegram No. 24 you now say that the Palestine leaders who have returned from Beirut are about to announce the names of Palestinian delegation. This is a different situation, and means that responsibility is thrown on us for saying yes or no to list of delegates who have been appointed solely as result of meeting confined to Mufti and his friends. If we accept a list so nominated and presented, we shall be open to severe criticism that we have let down completely "moderates" in Palestine, who are just beginning courageously to assert their influence again.

4. Despite what Fuad told you to the effect that nothing could now be done to alter the delegation, I hope it is not too late to get Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Iraqi representatives to influence Palestinians in direction of including a prominent member of Defence party. Incidentally, it seems to us extraordinary that conference which has been called in Cairo for purpose of helping to select delegation should be presented with a *fait accompli* by one section, even though it is admittedly the most important section, of Palestinian opinion. In any case, if they cannot succeed in so extending Palestinian delegation, we attach great importance to Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Iraqi representatives joining with Palestinian in asking us to accept the list named in your telegram. If they were to do this, we should naturally defer to so authoritative a request. As suggested in Lord Halifax's telegram No. 159 to Jedda, we should wish to be able to say in public that we had accepted list proposed by this authoritative body in consultation with Palestinian Arab opinion.

5. Please represent this strongly, though informally, to Mahmoud, Fuad and Nuri Pasha, and telegraph as soon as possible their reactions.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 11, and Jerusalem, No. 26.)

[E 459/6/31]

No. 77.

Sir M. Lampson to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 17, 1939.

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 30.

I to-day spoke to Nuri Pasha in the sense of your telegram No. 11. He was on his way to attend a conference with all other Arab delegations, and promised to bear your point in mind.

2. He spoke of necessity of some fundamental change of our Palestine policy. Something on lines of Egypt or Syria. It was far more than a policy in regard to Jewish immigration that was required if there was ever to be a solution. Time was short and I thought it better not to follow him on to these lines, but it bears out our belief that something like independence of Palestine in alliance with us is likely to be broached in London.

3. I impressed on Nuri Pasha, just as I had on Emir Faisal, the need for speed in getting to London. He says that shipping accommodation is not available until 22nd January. (End of R.)

4. His Excellency fears Egyptian Prime Minister will not after all attend conference, which he regards as unfortunate. He hinted that I should put in a word with King Farouk.

[E 546/6/31]

No. 78.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 20, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 42, 47 and 48 raise matters of great importance and delicacy. Levy's statement from Ragheb Nashashibi is not the only evidence of strong criticism there will be from Palestinian and other quarters if Egyptian, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Governments recommend that delegation, which excludes representation of Defence party, should come to London, and if we accept this proposal. We do not seek to minimise importance of Mufti's adherents and will gladly accept those Palestinian representatives who have been proposed. But evidence increases that there should be added to them additional member or members. We are giving this matter careful and immediate consideration, but cannot telegraph our definite conclusions and proposals on the point until we have communicated with High Commissioner in Jerusalem, which we are now doing. I will telegraph further to you to-morrow.

Matter is so important that we think it would be a mistake for delegates in Cairo to sail on 22nd January if it is still unsettled then. It would be better for them to postpone sailing for two or three days. We appreciate that this further delay may be nuisance to delegates, especially to Nuri Pasha, and we regret it. But we hope that it would not mean any alterations in his plan to come to London, where we look forward to seeing him and others. From our point of view postponement for few days makes no difference, as in any case departure of delegates from Cairo has now been delayed so long that they would not have arrived in time for effective discussions before Parliament reassembles on 31st January. We shall be prepared to give a great deal of time to discussions as soon as delegates arrive.

It is important that, if possible, you should prevent Egyptian Prime Minister from sending you at present written communication referred to in your telegram No. 48. We may be able to suggest some way out of present difficulty, which would be impossible if that letter had been sent and received.

Solely for your own information, our general view at present is as follows: We think Mufti's insistence on delegation composed exclusively of his friends is unreasonable and improper, and we could not regard delegation so confined as properly representative of Palestinian Arabs. It is true that hitherto we have expressed our readiness in last resort, if delegation confined to Mufti's adherents were definitely recommended by Egyptian and other Governments, to accept such delegation. Fact that we have become more insistent recently on inclusion of member or members of Defence party is due to developments in Palestine, which now clearly indicate that there is strong minority of Arab opinion opposed to Mufti. Unless arrangements can be reached for representatives of Defence party to come to London in same delegation, we should probably find it necessary to arrange for them to come to London as separate, smaller delegation, to whom we should accord full status as representatives of important section of Palestinian Arab opinion.

My telegram to-morrow will contain further elaboration of these views.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 35; Jedda, No. 14; and Bagdad, No. 19.)

[J 236/1/16]

No. 79.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 20, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 41 [of 18th January: Palestine discussions].

Please inform Egyptian Prime Minister, if you see no objection, that I trust that we need not give up all hope of his taking part in the London discussions. Perhaps, as he himself suggests, he may be able to come at a later stage.

[E 558/6/31]

No. 80.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 21, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 48.

I communicated your message to the Prime Minister, who was visibly gratified and asked me to thank you.

2. He expatiated at length on his difficulties with King Farouk, and said he intends to have another strong talk with him. He would not go on with present perpetual Palace interference. He agreed that it would be a great relief to get Ali Maher out of the country.

3. Ali [? Maher] has now asked for British visa.

[E 559/6/31]

No. 81.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 21, 1939.

THERE has been half-hearted effort to-day to revive the suggestion of bringing the Mufti here to arrange the selection of a Palestinian delegation acceptable to us. I have stamped heavily on this and hope I have scotched it.

2. The Prime Minister needed little persuading, but Nuri Pasha was more inclined to press it. In the presence of the Prime Minister, I told Nuri Pasha that I would not hear of it.

3. The Prime Minister's present idea is that Nuri Pasha should now fly to Beirut to-morrow, 22nd January, to try and secure the Mufti's consent to the inclusion of a representative of the Defence party. I have told both him and the Prime Minister that unless the Mufti agrees, (1) they will probably find themselves faced with a fully accredited and accepted opposition Palestinian delegation in London, and (2) the Mufti will be playing completely into the hands of the Jews, who are wisely waiting for the Arab side to split on such petty matters as this.

[E 546/6/31]

No. 82.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 21, 1939.

MY telegram No. 47 [of 20th January: Palestine].

Following comment received from High Commissioner, Jerusalem:—

"I agree with the Foreign Office telegram under reference *in toto*. I would only add that acceptance of the position which the Mufti and the proscribed Arab Higher Committee have arrogated to themselves must have had effect of throwing all those who are inclined to moderation into the arms of the extremists, since they will feel they are being left in the lurch and have no other future than under banner of the Mufti."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 23, and Jedda, No. 18.)

[E 546/6/31]

No. 83.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 21, 1939.

MY telegram No. 47 [of 20th January: Palestine].

We have given further consideration to the position and ascertained views of High Commissioner in Jerusalem, repeated to you in my telegram No. 50. Our conclusion is that it is impossible to regard delegation as proposed from Beirut

as adequately representative of Palestinian Arabs. No doubt it does represent a considerable majority of them, and therefore we are fully prepared to accept representatives proposed and shall welcome them in London. But one important Palestinian party, *i.e.*, the National Defence party, has been deliberately left off delegation, for reasons which are obvious and which no fair-minded person will approve. Quite apart from rights and wrongs of the issue, there would be very strong criticism if we accepted Beirut list as fully representative, and ignored claim expressed by Ragheb Nashashibi in his press statement published this morning.

It seems to us of great importance, therefore, that Palestinian Arab representatives in London should definitely include prominent members of Defence party. This could be achieved in one of three ways:—

- (1) By the addition to the proposed Palestinian delegation of, say, two prominent Defence party members, with appropriate staff of assistants. We greatly appreciate efforts which have been made by Egyptian, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian representatives to achieve this solution, and presume that their failure must be taken as final.
- (2) By the Egyptian and other Governments mentioned above recommending to us that we accept the delegation already proposed and also recommending that we should accept a second, smaller delegation, representative of Defence party. Under this proposal it would not be necessary for the Mufti's adherents, if they persist in their objection, to meet in London at same table with their political rivals. We should be willing, generally, to hold separate meetings with the two delegations, according to each the full status of representatives of important sections of Palestinian Arabs. But we anticipate that Egyptian and other Governments might see objection to recommending the Defence party delegation as well as the delegation of Mufti's adherents, and we can appreciate their difficulties. We shall quite understand, therefore, if this proposal is not practical politics.
- (3) In that case, we would favour solution by His Majesty's Government taking full responsibility, without any recommendation from Egyptian and other Governments, for inviting the delegation of Mufti's adherents, and also for inviting a separate delegation, smaller in numbers, but equal in status, from Defence party. We are anxious to avoid position in which one of the delegations would have the blessing of the Egyptian and other Governments, whilst the other had not, for this would give one delegation undue advantage over the other. Under this proposal, therefore, we would withdraw our suggestion that neighbouring Governments should make a recommendation to us. Probably best procedure would be for us to make statement to the effect that a list of representatives of the Palestinian Arabs had been handed to you by members of the Cairo Conference, and that we had at once expressed our readiness to receive these representatives, but that we had noticed absence from the list of any representatives of one of the important Palestinian parties, *i.e.*, the Defence party, and that we had therefore got in touch with the leader of that party and invited him and his associates to send representatives to London. This approach to Ragheb Nashashibi would perhaps be made best through you, since we understand he is at present in Cairo, but this is a detail which we can consider with you later. We would not propose that Defence party delegation should be as large as the other Palestinian Arab delegation. Perhaps three full delegates with secretarial assistance would be appropriate.

In discussing position with Egyptian Prime Minister and other representatives of neighbouring countries, you should point out that we are not endeavouring to play off the "moderates" in Palestine against the "extremists," with a view to getting better terms out of the Arabs than we might otherwise do. We fully appreciate that with regard to the Jewish question in Palestine there is probably no distinction between so-called moderates and so-called extremists, and that Defence party delegation is likely to be as firm in its views on this as other delegation. Our object is to secure Palestinian Arab delegates who are acknowledged as fully representative and who will not collectively be open to charge of sectionalism.

We appreciate that Egyptian and other representatives may be in a difficulty about the attitude which they are to adopt to these two separate delegations. Their contacts hitherto have been with the Mufti's adherents, and it may be difficult for them now to have dealings with a minority faction. On the other hand, I am sure these representatives of other countries will recognise the essential justice and wisdom of our general purpose, and indeed they themselves have been doing their best to impress this upon Palestinian Arabs. We hope, therefore, that there will be no difficulty about Egyptian and other representatives making contacts with both Palestinian delegations during London discussions. This is a matter which we could discuss privately with them on their arrival in London if they wish.

In making this proposal we have been influenced by your remark in your telegram No. 42 that Mufti's adherents themselves suggest that, though they could not sit at same table with representatives of Defence party, Nashashibi might proceed to London in order to be present at the time of discussions. Presumably, they meant him to come in a private capacity, but that, of course, would not give him and his friends proper status.

Please discuss this with Egyptian, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian representatives and let us know their reactions. It may be that in to-day's discussions they have already adopted some line which creates difficulties about alternative courses proposed above.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 38; Bagdad, No. 24; and Jedda, No. 19.)

[E 560/6/31]

No. 84.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 21, 1939.

MY argument seems to have had some effect, for Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires has just informed oriental secretary that meeting took place this afternoon between delegates of all Arab countries and the Prime Minister, and it was decided that an effort should be made to persuade the Mufti to agree to the inclusion of two members of Defence party other than Raghieb Nashashibi in Palestine delegation. Alternative scheme suggested at meeting was that Raghieb Nashashibi and others of his party should go to London separately from Palestine delegation, which would not recognise them or sit down with them in discussions.

2. Exclusion of Raghieb Nashashibi under the first alternative was justified on the grounds that it was only fair that the head of Opposition should be excluded if the Mufti was.

3. Nuri enquired which alternative I preferred. I have replied that the first seemed to me the best.

4. Nuri is proposing to fly to Beirut to bring necessary pressure on the Mufti, but Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires thought that Jemal-al-Husseini would meanwhile get in touch with the Mufti by telegraph or telephone.

5. Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires said that Nuri, after the meeting at which the Mufti's representatives were present, seemed to hope that the Mufti would agree to include two representatives of the Opposition in Palestine delegation, but he may be too optimistic.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 21.)

[E 618/6/31]

No. 85.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 23, 1939.

MY telegram No. 56.

Nuri Pasha, who was accompanied to Beirut by Fuad Hamza and Jemal-al-Husseini, returned to Cairo this afternoon.

2. Mufti, under great pressure, agreed to include one Defence party delegate, and finally told Nuri Pasha privately that he would also agree to a second if this was absolutely necessary to clinch matters. But he begged Nuri

Pasha to endeavour to avoid inclusion of second delegate, as this created bitterness and difficulties. Mufti and Nuri Pasha both urged that, as only one of each other party and three independents had been selected so far, it was unreasonable that more than one Defence party should be appointed.

3. It was pointed out to Nuri Pasha that, though theoretically this composition of the delegation so far as selected might be correct, the fact remained that, as all ten were subservient to the Mufti, it was unreasonable that two members of Defence party should be objected to.

4. Prime Minister, under pressure from me, agreed that two members of Defence party should be selected. Oriental Secretary was subsequently summoned to meeting of Prime Minister, Emir Feisal and Nuri Pasha and leading members of delegation, including two Palestinians, at which they confirmed acceptance of two Defence party delegates.

5. Palestine delegates selected are Yacoub Farrag, vice-president of Defence party, and Hati Nimr Naboulsi. Former is in Beirut, the latter in Palestine.

6. Raghieb Nashashibi, who presumably, through indiscretions of some delegates, had heard of this selection, telephoned to Fuad Hamza objecting to appointment of Nimr, and said that Yacoub was not well enough to go.

7. Meeting of Arab delegates has summoned Nashashibi at once, and hoped to convince him to accept their choice.

8. If the Palestine delegates selected refuse to go, Arab and Egyptian delegations have said they will select others. They point out that His Majesty's Government asked them to select Palestine delegates, and did not wish themselves to select delegates; and that later His Majesty's Government insisted on inclusion of members of Defence party. They have done what we asked, and maintain that it is not for Nashashibi to make the selections. They also point out that Raghieb Nashashibi being excluded on the ground of exclusion of Mufti, they have done the next best thing in selecting vice-president of Defence party. Moreover, they are prepared to acquiesce in Raghieb Nashashibi's going separately to London, but not as part of official delegation.

9. In your telegram No. 33 I was instructed that, while His Majesty's Government hoped that a prominent member of Defence party would be included, they attached importance to Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Iraqi representatives joining in asking us to accept list of names in my telegram No. 24. On this I took action as reported in my telegram No. 42. In your telegrams Nos. 47 and 51 it was later laid down that delegation must include prominent members of Defence party, failing which arrangements would be made for separate delegation of Defence party. I accordingly spoke strongly to the Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha and Feisal, with the result that they took action indicated in my telegram No. 55, and we have now succeeded in getting two Defence party representatives. The circumstances have not been easy, and I trust that my actions have your approval.

10. I felt I was not justified in refusing delegation with two Defence party representatives, put forward by Egyptian, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian delegations in agreement with Palestine. Moreover, Prime Minister is leaving to-night with the King on Royal tour in Upper Egypt, and will probably not be back before 28th or 29th January, and without him further negotiations would be extremely difficult. I have therefore agreed to communication to me of list on above lines, and delegates will endeavour to sail from Port Said to-morrow (Tuesday).

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 631/6/31]

No. 86.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 23, 1939.

MY telegram No. 62.

Fuad Hamza has just informed me that, after argument of an hour and a half, Nashashibi refused to regard the two delegates in question as representative of his party, and said that he would publish statement in the press to the effect that he did not regard himself as represented or something to that effect.

Fuad said it was [?] arranged that the Prime Minister, who has left for Upper Egypt, would send us in the name of the three delegations the list of Palestinian delegates as indicated in my telegram No. 62, but he (Fuad) enquired what was our reaction.

I replied that all the delegates had better postpone their departure while I telegraphed London for instructions. He said Nuri had already left, that Prince Feisal's baggage had gone, and that the Prince himself was just leaving the hotel. It was, therefore, impossible to postpone the departure. He asked that we would communicate to him at Port Said any further news we might have regarding His Majesty's Government's views.

Palestinian delegates have obtained their visas and cannot now be stopped from proceeding.

I suggest only possible course is to let the delegations proceed and to arrange for separate Nashashibi delegation if His Majesty's Government are not satisfied with the present Palestinian delegation.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 618/6/31]

No. 87.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 24, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 62 and 64 [of 24th January: Palestine discussions].

I approve action which you have taken in this matter. Nevertheless, position as regards representation of Defence party on Palestine Arab delegation appears to be most unsatisfactory. The two members selected by Egyptian, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian delegates seems to be regarded by Ragheb Nashashibi as entirely unsuitable. He is reported in to-day's press to have stated that one of these people is ill and unfit to travel, while the other ceased to be a member of the Defence party some time ago and is now an avowed adherent of the Mufti. If this is true, Nashashibi's refusal of this particular proposal is not unreasonable.

2. It appears that, with departure of Egyptian Prime Minister and the various delegates, there is now no one in Cairo with sufficient authority to pursue the matter further in consultation with your Excellency. I realise, moreover, that we can hardly ask Nuri Pasha and Fuad to return from Port Said to Cairo to settle the matter satisfactorily.

3. In these circumstances, I think the only course is for you to get into direct touch at once with Ragheb Nashashibi and ascertain his views. On what grounds does he object to two individuals recommended by Egyptian, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian delegates? Is he prepared to nominate two members of his party to sit on the delegation with suitable secretarial assistance, and, if so, what are their names? If he nominates two other members of his party, you are authorised (unless you see strong objection to any name or names suggested) to make arrangements to send these persons with secretarial assistants to London as soon as possible, if necessary by air. The question of their inclusion as official members of the Palestine Arab delegation will be taken up with Nuri Pasha and his colleagues on their arrival in London. You should make it clear that for reasons which have been given, Ragheb Nashashibi himself will not be acceptable to other Arab and Egyptian delegates as an official member of the delegation. This is their affair. We have no objection, and, indeed, see some advantage, if he chooses to visit London in a private capacity to keep in close touch with his party representatives and with situation during discussions.

4. If, on the other hand, he maintains attitude of stiff opposition to present proposal, report to us his reasons for this and any indication that you can get of possibility of his agreeing to a separate delegation of, say, three Defence party members. We should then consider whether best line would be to fall back on this alternative proposal, or to drop altogether idea of representation of Defence party. I should be glad to have at same time any views that you may hold on this question in the light of your discussions during last few days.

5. We are repeating to you telegram No. 73 from High Commissioner in Jerusalem for your information before you get in touch with Ragheb Nashashibi.

6. Please report as soon as possible after action taken, and in meantime send appropriate message to Fuad at Port Said.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 44.)

[E 662/6/31]

No. 88.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 26, 1939.

FOLLOWING is draft referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

Your telegram No. 70 [of 25th January: Palestine discussions].

In spite of Ragheb Nashashibi's attitude, I think that you should approach him again on the following lines (High Commissioner at Jerusalem is being instructed to approach Fakhri Nashashibi in the same sense):—

2. You should explain that, when His Majesty's Government suggest that he should himself select two members of his party to be members of the Palestine Arab delegation, they have in mind the fact that the other Palestine parties are represented on a very similar scale. Thus the Istikhlal party has one member on the delegation, the Arab Palestine party two members, the Reform party one member, the Young Men's Congress one adviser, the National Bloc, Nablus, one adviser. The three other members and one other adviser are non-party. On this basis, it has appeared to us that Defence party would be fairly represented by two members, especially as on the old Arab Higher Committee they were represented by two members only out of ten. (If it would help Nashashibi, we would be prepared, in announcing names of Palestine delegation here, to draw attention to this division of delegates between Palestine parties, so emphasising the relative representation of Defence party and other individual parties.)

3. You should now put to Ragheb Nashashibi the following proposal: That he should nominate two members of his party (one of whom might be himself, if he wishes), together with one adviser (or what you have called counsellor in your telegram No. 24) and a secretary or, if desired, two secretaries. This party would proceed immediately to London at expense of His Majesty's Government, like other Palestinian delegates. In the meantime, we would do our best to secure their acceptance as part of the Palestine Arab delegation, and should hope to succeed. If we fail in this, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to treat them as a separate Defence party delegation, composed as above. This delegation would be accorded exactly the same treatment by His Majesty's Government as the other Palestine Arab delegation. They would, if necessary, be interviewed at separate meetings, and would have an equal opportunity of stating their views and discussing future policy. This course would meet the objection, which I understand from your telegram under reply Ragheb Nashashibi has raised, to defence party delegates being subordinated to the head of a single Palestinian delegation.

4. You should explain that, whether the offer is accepted or not, publicity will be given to it, and that if it is refused, Nashashibi must take responsibility for that.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 49.)

[E 662/6/31]

No. 89.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 25, 1939.

I COMMUNICATED to Ragheb substance of paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 59.

2. He states that, apart from the unsuitability of the two delegates selected, he does not admit the right of Arab and Egyptian delegations to select the representatives of his party. He insists, moreover, that, in fact, the present delegates were selected by the Mufti: therefore, he (Ragheb) should have the right to select representatives of his own party. He refuses to select himself only two members for the delegation, because he claims the right of a 50 per cent. representation therein, and that there should be no head of the delegation. He bases this 50 per cent. representation on the claim that his party represents 80 per cent. of the population of Palestine. He refuses to be moved from this claim.

3. He was then sounded as to agreeing to a separate delegation of the Defence party. He rejected the idea altogether. From remarks he let drop, it

seems that his refusal is based on the idea that his position in Palestine would be weakened thereby, because people would say that the present delegation was appointed by the whole Arab world (though he maintains it was only appointed by the Mufti), while a separate delegation of the Defence party would not have the prestige of such backing.

4. It seems evident that Ragheb has been encouraged from Palestine to adopt his present unresponsive attitude. Only a short time ago he was in a more humble frame of mind.

5. Finally, Nashashibi said he would not accept responsibility for the decisions taken by the conference in the absence of representation of his party.

6. I submit that it would be easier for the High Commissioner, Palestine, to exercise influence with a view to reducing the claims of Nashashibi. I see no prospect here of getting Ragheb to a more amenable frame of mind.

7. There seems, in fact, little chance in any case that the Defence party will agree to participate in the conference, except on a basis unacceptable to the other Palestinian delegates and to the neighbouring Arab delegations, who certainly regard the Defence party as very much of a minority.

8. If the High Commissioner, Jerusalem, cannot persuade Nashashibi to adopt a more moderate attitude, there thus seems no alternative to holding the conference without them. Incidentally, Nuri claims to have in his pocket a statement signed by Nashashibi and given to him a few days ago regarding the policy of his party on Palestinian question. It is similar to that of the Mufti and that, as we know from secret sources, of Arab delegations, namely, stoppage of immigration of Jews and the conclusion of a treaty with Great Britain on the lines of the Iraq Treaty to establish independence of Palestine, with provision for protection of Jews already in the country. It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that it is not so much a question of principle as of a feud between the Nashashibi and Husseini families.

9. Above statement of Ragheb, which he confirmed in conversation with the oriental secretary, hardly tallies with that of the Defence party deputation reported in Jerusalem telegram No. 78 to Colonial Office.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 589/6/31]

No. 90.

Viscount Halifax to Consul-General Havard (Beirut).

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 27, 1939.

YOUR despatch No. 10 [of 18th January: French restrictions on the Mufti].

Your replies to French High Commissioner and to Dr. Tannous are approved. So long as Mufti takes no steps to call off the Arab campaign in Palestine and to stop political assassinations by his partisans, it is to be hoped that French authorities will maintain the strictest control over his political activities.

2. The position as regards the Mufti's future place of residence is that French Government asked that, since important negotiations were proceeding between themselves and Syrian Government, His Majesty's Government should not press for his transfer to Latakia or the Northern Lebanon until the end of last year. We do not, however, wish to press the matter at the present moment when London discussions are about to begin.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 28, Saving.)

[E 708/6/31]

No. 91.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 27, 1939.

SUBSTANCE of your telegram No. 69 was suitably communicated to Ragheb Nashashibi this afternoon.

2. He refused to admit Defence party would be fairly represented by two members, because he maintained that other parties were now only nominally

separate and had really constituted one party under the Mufti. He therefore maintained his demand for 50 per cent. representation of Defence party in Palestine delegation.

3. He also rejected [group undecipherable] of a separate delegation which he declared would create embarrassments both for Palestine and Great Britain.

4. Finally, on being pressed hard to show a spirit of co-operation and modification of his attitude, he said that he would consult his adherents and let us have an answer in a day or two.

5. It seems evident that decision will be especially affected by Fakhri Nashashibi's attitude and that acceptance or refusal of your proposals will depend mainly on extent to which High Commissioner in Jerusalem can influence the latter.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 709/6/31]

No. 92.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 88.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 29, 1939.

RAGHEB, after conversations with Fakhri Nashashibi (in Jerusalem) on the telephone, states that he will agree to representation of Defence party at the conference by three delegates, one of whom he would like to be a Christian and by one counsellor and one secretary. He desires these representatives should be included in a single Palestinian delegation, which, however, should be without a president, unless the president is a member of Defence party. If such inclusion should prove impracticable, he would acquiesce in a separate delegation of Defence party composed as above, but he repeats his objection to two delegations.

2. He says Fakhri Nashashibi is in agreement with above.

3. It was pointed out to him that the increase from two to three delegates would render more difficult the inclusion of his representatives in a single delegation, even if His Majesty's Government were prepared to support his demand, which conflicted with the views of His Majesty's Government as expressed in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 69. The inconvenience of delay involving further reference to London was also impressed on him. However, he seemed to think that he had made a great concession in receding from his previous demand of a 50 per cent. representation, and that his present demand would be acceptable to His Majesty's Government.

4. As indicated in my telegram under reference, it seems to me that it is now for the High Commissioner at Jerusalem to convince Fakhri Nashashibi if His Majesty's Government wish their original proposals accepted.

[E 709/6/31]

No. 93.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 30, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 88 and Jerusalem telegrams Nos. 99 and 100 [of 29th January: Palestine discussions].

Position has been discussed with representatives from Egyptian, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian delegations. They would agree to a separate Defence party delegation if this is considered essential. They would prefer not to accept, at any rate, at present, responsibility for recommending members of a separate Defence party delegation, and would wish to reserve their position in this respect, in the hope that they may find it possible later to reconcile the two Palestine Arab delegations to the extent of inducing them to coalesce into a single delegation. They point out that their task of bringing about such a reconciliation will be much facilitated if Ragheb Nashashibi could be induced to forgo his demand for three delegates. It was only with great difficulty that they secured agreement in principle to inclusion of as many as two delegates from Defence party. If two Defence party delegates, including Ragheb himself, now come to London, they have some hope of inducing other Palestine delegates to agree to work with them

on same delegation, but difficulty is very greatly increased if there are three Defence party members as full delegates. Representatives of neighbouring States therefore urge strongly that one of the three persons whom the Defence party had thought of sending to London as a delegate should come as an additional "adviser." This could make no practical difference to Defence party since exactly the same people would come to London to represent their views, but it would make the position here very much easier from point of view of getting one Palestine Arab delegation. They argue that a great concession, as against original proposal made by Nuri and his colleagues, has already been made to the Defence party by definite proposal that Ragheb Nashashibi should come to London in person, and if the vice-president of the party, Yakub Farraj, also comes, it is clear that their delegation will be a very strong one. Suleiman would then come as adviser. They attach great importance to Yakub Farraj being one of Defence party representatives, as he is apparently acceptable to both sides and could act as liaison between them. His presence might greatly ease position. They again point out that Defence party only had two representatives on Arab Higher Committee in 1936.

2. The above arguments seem to have some force. You should, therefore, now approach Ragheb Nashashibi and urge him to agree to send to London the people whom he has in mind, and to come himself if he wishes, but not to maintain his view about the third delegate. For the reason given at end of paragraph 1, you should also urge strongly the desirability of his appointing Yakub Farraj rather than Isa-el-Isa (see High Commissioner's telegram No. 99) as one of the two Defence party delegates. We attach real importance to this.

3. If you think it will help, you may point out to Ragheb that we all desire one Palestinian Arab delegation, and that it is in best interests of Arabs that they do not appear to present divided front.

4. If, however, your Excellency is unable to induce Ragheb to budge from his demand for third delegate, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to accept three delegates instead of two, with one adviser and one secretary, and to treat these as a separate delegation for the purposes of full discussion of future policy in Palestine.

5. In either case, Defence party representatives should now leave for London at earliest possible moment, and come by quickest route, if possible by air.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 58.)

[E 792/6/31]

No. 94.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 91.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 31, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 79.

Arguments in first three paragraphs were forcibly put to Ragheb, who refused to recede from his demand for three delegates. He was finally told that His Majesty's Government were prepared to accept three delegates, with one adviser and one secretary, and to treat them as a separate delegation. He said that Fakhri had telephoned him yesterday that Yakub Farraj and Isa-el-Isa had informed him that they were not prepared to go, as they were afraid of terrorism against their families in Palestine. I pointed out that this conflicted with Yakub Farraj's telegram of acceptance to Nuri (see your telegram No. 78). Ragheb could furnish no explanation of this contradiction.

Ragheb left the embassy to arrange telephonic conversation with Fakhri in order to decide final composition of delegation, &c. He seemed, however, troubled at the idea of two separate delegations, and remarked as he was leaving that he would have to discuss that aspect of the question with Fakhri. Need of haste was impressed on Ragheb, who said that he would try to collect party here in a couple of days to leave by air. He added, however, that some might not like air travel, and in that event would go by first boat.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 839/6/31]

No. 95.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 97.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, February 1, 1939.

MY telegram No. 91.

Raghib states that his party will be represented by a separate delegation composed of himself, Suleiman Toukan and Dr. Fuad-al-Dajjani or Abdul Rauf-al-Bitar as delegates, and also of Fakhri Nashashibi as counsellor and of Mahommed Younis Effendi as secretary. First and last of the above are in Cairo; others are in Palestine and propose to fly here 3rd February. The whole party proposes to leave 5th February by Imperial Airways for England.

2. Desirability of earlier departure was strongly urged on him, but he expressed doubt whether members in Palestine could arrive earlier or would be ready to start for Alexandria the same day if they come here 3rd February, in order to catch Imperial Airways liner early morning of 4th February. He said High Commissioner, Jerusalem, would know better the possibilities as regards members coming from Palestine.

3. There is only one Imperial Airways plane on 4th February, and it may be difficult to get five places in it at the last moment. There are two planes 6th February.

4. Anyhow, in view of difficulty of reserving places, I shall be grateful for earliest possible advice from High Commissioner as to the day on which passages should be booked.

5. In view of language used by Raghib indicating his disinclination to sit in the council at all with the other Palestinian delegates, it seems inadvisable for the present, at any rate, to acquaint him with substance of your telegram No. 89, which might have provoked further hesitations in his irresolute mind and led to more delay. Once he and his friends are in the atmosphere of London, they may be induced to see things with a less jaundiced eye.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 887/6/31]

No. 96.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, February 3, 1939.

SUBSTANCE of your telegram No. 94 suitably communicated to Ragheb, who remains impervious to all arguments and appeals. He seemed to view with equanimity the prospects detailed in your telegram.

I am accordingly arranging four passages (see Jerusalem telegram No. 52 to me) by Imperial Airways leaving Alexandria on Sunday, 5th February. Ragheb confirms that delegates will be himself, Suleiman Toukan and Adel-el-Shawa, and that Fakhri will go with them as counsellor. Younis is falling out and will not be replaced.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 903/6/31]

No. 97.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, February 3, 1939.

(R.) I SENT for Ragheb this evening and made a final earnest appeal to him to agree to inclusion of the only two members of his party, i.e., himself and Suleiman Toukan in a single Palestine delegation. I used parts of your telegram No. 98 in my argument.

He refused to recede from his previous position, and added that it was impossible to change his attitude which was now publicly known.

[20188]

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He finally said that if he could be convinced that it was in the interests of a settlement that he should accept above proposal he would be prepared to do so. But he was not convinced. Indeed, he himself felt that any discussion with Palestinians would lead to no result owing to inevitable *sur-enchère* amongst them. (End of R.)

The only hope was for His Majesty's Government and neighbouring Arab States to come to an agreement regarding Palestine without participation of Palestinians who would then have to accept it.

(R.) I said that his attitude being what it was the only thing was for him to go to London with his delegation and discuss the question with His Majesty's Government. Then either His Majesty's Government would convince him that it was to the general advantage that he should agree to above proposal or he would be able to convince them to the contrary and have his separate delegation. (End of R.)

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 783/6/31]

No. 98.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 278.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 3, 1939.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that in the course of a conversation with Sir Alexander Cadogan on the 30th January the French Ambassador referred to recent articles in *The Times* concerning a possible settlement of the Palestine problem which would affect the status of Syria and the Lebanon. By this his Excellency doubtless meant such articles as the leading article of the 23rd January, advocating a federation between Palestine, including a Jewish autonomous area, Syria and the Lebanon.

2. M. Corbin said that he had been instructed by his Government to make it clear that they would have to oppose any solution on these lines. They deprecated any such project, amongst other reasons owing to the fact that it would involve them in difficulties with Turkey.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 839/6/31]

No. 99.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 3, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 97 [of 1st February: Palestine discussions].

Colonial Secretary had discussion with Palestine Arabs this afternoon, and afterwards with General Nuri, Ali Maher and Fuad Bey.

2. It was clear from his talk with Palestine representatives that they are extremely upset at prospect of Defence party delegation coming, which possibly includes Abdul Rauf-al-Bitar as delegate and certainly includes Fakhri Nashashibi as counsellor. This had such effect on them that not only would it exclude any possibility of them agreeing to work on one delegation with these particular Defence party representatives, but it also involves serious possibility that Palestine delegates already here would refuse to take part at all in series of discussions in which His Majesty's Government were also discussing, even if separately, with this other delegation.

3. We do not think that proposal which we have made to Ragheb Nashashibi, and which he has accepted, that Defence party should have separate delegation of three delegates, one adviser and one secretary, is in fact unfair to the other Palestine Arabs, and in last resort this offer stands. On the other hand, we are anxious to avoid a complete breakdown of discussions with Palestinian Arab representatives, and to find some means by which they can in practice take place. In addition, delegations of neighbouring States attach

special importance to Arab case being presented by united Palestine Arab delegation, and this is obviously in best interests of Arab cause. In light of above, we should like you to make strong appeal to Ragheb Nashashibi to accept modified proposal.

4. Proposal is result of discussion with General Nuri, Ali Maher and Fuad Bey, and has their firm support. You should tell Ragheb that this is so, not mentioning Colonial Secretary's talk with Palestine Arabs here. Proposal is that Defence party should appoint two delegates to sit as full members of single Palestine Arab delegation, these two representatives to be Ragheb Nashashibi and Suliman Touqan. Mahommed Yannis Effendi could be attached to them as secretary. All these members would have full support of delegates of neighbouring Arab States, as in case of Palestine delegates now in London. The other individuals mentioned in your telegram No. 97, including Fakhri Nashashibi, could come to London if they wished as private individuals, and could be in touch with Ragheb throughout the discussions in London, though not members of the conference.

5. When urging this proposal you should make following point if you think it would help. Originally one of the most powerful arguments put forward by Ragheb in favour of a third Defence party delegate was that he should be enabled to appoint a Christian. This argument weighed heavily with us, and until we received your telegram No. 97 we were under impression that third member would definitely be a Christian. But neither Fuad-al-Dajjani nor Abdul Rauf-al-Bitar are Christians, and principal reason for our agreeing to third member has therefore disappeared.

6. But main purposes of above proposal are (a) to avoid possibility of no discussions with Palestine Arabs taking place, and (b) to secure that Palestine Arabs are represented by one delegation instead of two. You should urge these points strongly. With regard to (a), as I have already said, there is serious possibility of Arab delegation at present in London refusing to take part in discussions if personnel of separate Defence party delegation is as proposed in your telegram No. 97. In that case, we understand from press reports that Ragheb Nashashibi himself would offer to withdraw from discussions and to leave neighbouring Arab Governments to negotiate with His Majesty's Government, and in any case it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to hold discussions with Palestine Defence party delegation alone. But if no negotiations take place with Palestine Arabs because (as result of quarrel amongst themselves) they withdraw from discussions, prestige of Arabs must suffer seriously and their cause be gravely damaged.

7. With regard to (b) above, it really is in interests of Arabs themselves that they should present united front in London discussions. If His Majesty's Government have to negotiate with two separate delegations, public opinion here and elsewhere will regard Arabs of Palestine as being divided, and again their cause will be seriously prejudiced. Jewish delegation is united. We understand that, in fact, there is no difference of opinion between Defence party and other Arab parties on policy. General Nuri, Ali Maher and Fuad Bey urge strongly that it is of greatest possible importance to Arab cause that there should be one instead of two delegations. Surely if Ragheb were to announce that he had accepted above proposal in interests of securing united Arab front on policy, his position in eyes of Palestine public would not be weakened, but if anything strengthened.

8. General Nuri and Fuad Bey tell us that, in fact, Ragheb was ready to agree, on the night that they left Cairo, to only two members of Defence party being added to Palestine Arab delegation, those members being Ragheb himself and Suliman Touqan. In appealing to Ragheb you should remind him of this. They also urge that representation of Defence party on Arab Higher Committee in 1936 was two members, and that this is reasonable argument in favour of two now. General Nuri, Ali Maher and Fuad Bey are telegraphing separate personal appeal to Ragheb in favour of above proposal. They assure us that if it had been possible for the two delegates to be Ragheb and Yakoub Farraj, they had been possible for the two delegates to be Ragheb and Yakoub Farraj they could guarantee Mufti's agreement. But we presume it would be difficult for Ragheb now to turn down Suliman. If Ragheb will accept proposal regarding himself and Suliman, they will do their very best to persuade Mufti, and are hopeful that they will succeed.

9. In last resort we cannot, of course, withdraw the offer of separate Defence party delegation consisting of three delegates, one adviser and one secretary which we have already made, and if Ragheb refuses above suggestion, then that offer stands. But we understand that delegations from neighbouring States would not then be able to give this separate Defence party delegation official support, and that they would feel compelled to issue a public statement to this effect. You should emphasise this point to Ragheb.

10. In event of separate delegation, as is suggested in paragraph 2 above, Palestine Arabs now in London might refuse to enter discussions with us. If they did this, we could not have discussions with Defence party delegation alone. We would then have discussions with representatives of neighbouring States, as well as with Jewish delegation. We would hope that Palestine Arabs now in London would not leave London, but would stay in order to be in informal touch with delegates of these neighbouring States. If Ragheb and his friends proceeded to London, these delegates of neighbouring States would also have informal contacts with them. Therefore you should not prevent these Defence party representatives from proceeding to London on condition that they understand that His Majesty's Government might not be able to enter into discussions with them.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 72.)

[E 839/6/31]

No. 100.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 3, 1939.

MY telegram No. 94 [of 2nd February: Palestine discussions].

Following is for your own information and for use in discussions with Ragheb if it is in time and you feel it would be helpful.

2. Discussion with General Nuri, Ali Maher and Fuad Bey late last night indicated possibility that, if separate Defence party delegation, as proposed in your telegram No. 97, does come to London, Palestine Arab delegation now in London might in the end agree to enter into discussions with His Majesty's Government rather than withdraw completely. But this would be only if delegations of neighbouring countries agreed to make public statement that they were not in any way responsible for the Defence party delegation. In their statement delegations of these countries would say something to effect that they had done their best to secure inclusion of some Defence party representatives in Palestine delegation, but that owing to difficulties about personnel they had failed, and they would go on to say that in the circumstances His Majesty's Government had invited the separate Defence party delegation.

3. The position would then be that delegations of surrounding countries would maintain their official support for Arab delegation now in London, but withhold it from Defence party delegation. They would be present at and take part in discussions between His Majesty's Government and Palestine Arab delegation now in London. But they would not attend discussions between His Majesty's Government and Defence party delegation. Therefore, although we should accord Defence party delegation position of a delegation enjoying equal status with other Palestine Arab delegation, neighbouring Arab States would not accord it this support. General Nuri and his colleagues assure us that they would maintain informal contact with Ragheb Nashashibi, but they would not feel able to go beyond that.

4. Quite apart from the serious prejudice which this division would cause to Arab case generally, it would, of course, be particularly damaging to position of Defence party delegation. It is all the more reason why Ragheb should accept proposal made in my telegram No. 94.

5. It is still possible that, if separate Defence party delegation, including Fakhri and Bitar, came to London, Palestine Arabs now here would withdraw wholly from discussions. But position described above is now more likely.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 74.)

[E 887/6/31]

No. 101.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 4, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 99 [of 3rd February: Palestine discussions].

I am grateful for your efforts. If there is no change in Ragheb's attitude before Saturday morning, the best thing is to let him and his colleagues leave for London. On their arrival here on Monday, General Nuri, Ali Maher and Fuad Bey would then make further personal effort to persuade him to agree to proposal contained in my telegram No. 94, and we should also be prepared to support their appeal if that seemed helpful. Best chance of getting agreement now appears to be to get Defence party representatives to London and face them with General Nuri and his colleagues.

2. But the task would be simplified if by any chance Fakhri's arrival in London were postponed until later, for his presence in delegation is now the main fly in the ointment. General Nuri is more confident that he could persuade Ragheb in Fakhri's absence. We do not know whether Fakhri is still in Jerusalem or whether he is now in Cairo. If the former is the case, High Commissioner should do anything that he discreetly and properly can to get him to postpone departure. If latter is the case, then your Excellency should consider whether you can do anything to this end. Of course, in neither case should we positively make the suggestion that Fakhri's arrival in London should be postponed. Only if some convenient opportunity presents itself for arranging this should High Commissioner or you tactfully seize it. Perhaps it is impossible to get four seats on Imperial Airways plane on 5th February, or perhaps Fakhri would prefer to come by sea.

3. It may well be that efforts to persuade Ragheb in London will fail, in which case procedure will almost certainly be as outlined in my telegram No. 96. In any case, best thing is for Ragheb to proceed to London with his colleagues, excluding Fakhri if possible, by Imperial Airways leaving Alexandria on Sunday, 5th February.

4. Above is for your own information only.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 80.)

[E 978/6/31]

No. 102.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, February 6, 1939.

FROM conversations with the different Arab delegates here and definite proof from secret sources which you have also received, it is clear that while Arab delegations acceded to our urgent request and did not actually formulate a common policy before leaving for London Conference, they have, in fact, more or less agreed amongst themselves to support Palestine claim for complete stoppage of Jewish immigration and for independence under a treaty similar to Anglo-Iraq Treaty, with special provisions for protection of Jews already in Palestine.

2. It seems unlikely that an agreed settlement on these lines is practicable, more especially as regards independence. It may thus become necessary for His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declaration, to impose a policy of their own. What that policy should be is outside my competence, but from point of view of defence, which so closely affects our position in Egypt, I venture to urge extreme importance of its being somehow or other acceptable to Arab rulers and to Egypt. If our solution does not carry them with us, then, in the event of hostilities, we risk having to deal simultaneously with Arab rising in Palestine and Arab hostility in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In Egypt, western desert Arabs now being organised and armed might turn against us. In any case, adherence to Sidki's thesis regarding treaty of alliance would be multiplied a thousandfold, and Egyptian support of our cause might even be in doubt or at best lukewarm. With Mediterranean and perhaps even Red Sea virtually closed at outbreak of war, our position in Egypt would be very difficult.

3. On other hand, a Palestine solution acceptable to Arabs means freeing of troops from Palestine, support of neighbouring Arab countries (with all that that means to our communications) and very possibly or indeed probably trouble for Italians from Arabs in Libya.

4. In short, there is great potential strength to be gained or lost, and, as seen from Egypt, our whole military position in the Near East is greatly affected by success or failure of Palestine Conference or by decisions which may follow.

5. This telegram is sent in agreement with general officer commanding and has been shown to Chief of Imperial General Staff.

[E 1041/6/31]

No. 103.

Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Damascus, February 8, 1939.

REFERENCE to my printed despatch No. 9 enclosing copy of letter of 25th January addressed to French delegate.

I learn that National Arab Bureau, at the instigation of the Mufti, is circulating to Arab delegates in London its tendentious bulletins about Palestine, with obvious intention of stiffening Arab attitude to compromise. Yesterday, bureau sent telegrams to heads of Arab delegations in London, over the signature of Nabih-al-Azmeh, pointing out that Zionism menaces all Arab countries, and telling them that England is aware that Arab Governments will go on helping Palestinian Arabs in the event of the conference breaking down.

I drew the attention of French delegate to these further attempts of National Arab Bureau to pollute the conciliatory atmosphere His Majesty's Government was endeavouring to create. I asked particularly that the delegation should exercise against National Arab Bureau the same censorship it applied to foreign newspaper correspondents and refuse to allow Nabih's political telegrams to go. Delegate informed me regretfully that he had no power to do so.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 17; Beirut, No. 4, Saving; and Paris, unnumbered, Saving.)

[E 1028/6/31]

No. 104.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 34.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 9, 1939.

THE Emir Feisal called on me on the 31st January, accompanied by the Emir Khalid, the Saudi Arabian Minister and Fuad Bey Hamza, who interpreted.

2. His Royal Highness said that he had been charged to deliver a message to His Majesty's Government from King Abdul Aziz. His Majesty attached the greatest importance to his friendship with Great Britain, and it was his desire that this friendship should be something more than that between two countries in normal treaty relations. It was distressing to him to see this traditional friendship clouded by the Palestine question. There were many outstanding questions which he hoped would be discussed during the visit of the delegation to London, but the Palestine question was the most important. He thought it essential that a solution which would satisfy the Arabs' legitimate aspirations should be found. He believed in the justice of His Majesty's Government, and he hoped that now at last they would be able to devise such a solution. In view of this long-standing friendship, he hoped that if any difficulties occurred during the conferences with the Arab delegations, His Majesty's Government would make use of the Saudi delegation as mediators.

3. I thanked the Emir Feisal for this message and said that His Majesty's Government greatly appreciated the friendship of King Abdul Aziz and that it had always been their policy to keep this friendship as close as possible. They were most grateful to His Majesty for the steps he had taken to ensure the

attendance of the Arab delegations at the conferences and for sending his son as his delegate to London. His Majesty's Government were fully alive to the importance of the Palestine question both in regard to the situation in that country and in regard to its effect on their relations with other Arab States. I hoped that His Royal Highness would realise the difficulties which confronted His Majesty's Government not only on the Arab side but on the Jewish side as well. I added that it was the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government to find now a final solution which would do full justice to both sides and they counted on the co-operation of the Saudi delegation to assist them in realising this aim.

4. Finally, the Emir Feisal said that it would be disastrous if the Arab delegations, who had come to London convinced of the justice of the Arab cause and of the fairness of His Majesty's Government, should have to return to their respective countries empty-handed. They believed that the Arab case was well-founded. Nevertheless, in order to reach a solution it might be possible for them to abate some of their just claims, but they also looked to His Majesty's Government to make their contribution to this solution.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 1145/6/31]

No. 105.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 13, 1939.

I HAVE given Ibn Saud explanation based on letter from High Commissioner of Palestine to His Majesty's Consul at Damascus about police post in the Mosque area at Jerusalem (High Commissioner's despatch to the Colonial Office, 20th January, No. S.F.-39-39), as Mufti had telegraphed to him making various unfounded accusations against us in this respect. Ibn Saud says that he does not believe the accusations, and does not suppose Mufti believes them, but His Majesty's Government will be open to such charges as long as Palestine question remains unsettled.

2. He seems cheerful about the prospects of the settlement and highly appreciative of reception of Faisal by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He says frankly that Arabs can hardly expect to secure their maximum demands, but does not indicate clearly in what respect they could make concessions except in admitting that Arabs could not be left to do as they liked with the Jews. He believes that if His Majesty's Government can satisfy Arab rulers, the rulers can bring over Palestine Arab delegation whatever the Mufti makes out.

[E 1253/6/31]

No. 106.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 18, 1939.

IBN SAUD summoned me to private interview 17th February, and read out long telegram from Faisal giving summary of written demands put forward by Nuri at London discussions. The King is greatly worried by this move. He wants His Majesty's Government to have his views direct and begs that they may remain secret from Faisal, who might be embarrassed in his negotiations if they were sent through him or communicated to him.

2. The King's views are set forth in my immediately following telegram. He says that if His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept Nuri's programme, he would be grateful for secret intimation so that he may adjust his policy accordingly. Indeed, if His Majesty's Government have decided on any policy, he begs to be informed. I said that I believed that His Majesty's

Government had not take a decision, but were still examining views of various interests concerned, and that personally I did not think that Nuri's programme could be accepted, especially if opposed by other important Arab interests.

3. The King repeated request that Faisal should remain in ignorance of this communication.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 5; Cairo, No. 6; and Jerusalem, No. 4.)

[E 1254/6/31]

No. 107.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 18, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

These are the views of Ibn Saud on Nuri's proposals:—

2. Nuri's object is to wreck the conference unless his demands are accepted, and, in either case, to appear as the only friend of Palestine and Syria and to draw them into Iraqi orbit. The King has begun to believe that Nuri must have knowledge of proposed raid into Palestine (my telegram No. 20 of 14th February), which could be represented as another proof that Iraq is the only friend.

3. Ibn Saud's picture of Arab world as it eventually ought to be is a group of independent States united by some such alliance as at present unites Iraq and Saudi Arabia. What Nuri wants is to add other territories to Iraq so as to attain preponderance over other Arab States. This would disturb the balance and be unwelcome to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and presumably to His Majesty's Government.

4. The King would like to see Palestine independent, but not independent of His Majesty's Government. (He did not define his views exactly, but I think he envisages some such arrangement as we had in Iraq after 1920.)

5. From Arab point of view it was highly undesirable to make demands which would completely alienate the sympathies of the Jews of the world. The Jews in Palestine could not be left at the mercy of the Arabs.

6. Saudi Arabia and Egypt could agree upon a common policy and the King could persuade the Yemen to join them. When I asked whether they could also win over Palestine Arab delegates, the King said he hoped they could, though he admitted the attraction of Nuri's extremist policy.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 7; Jerusalem, No. 5; and Bagdad, No. 6.)

[E 886/6/31]

No. 108.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Peterson (Bagdad).

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 18, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 28 [of 2nd February: Collection in Iraq of contributions for Palestine Defence Society].

General Nuri has been informed of situation and reminded that money collected by Palestine Defence Society in Iraq has, on previous occasions, been sent to Damascus Committee of Relief and distributed to people actively engaged in committing acts of violence in Palestine. Syrian Prime Minister has in the past complained to His Majesty's Consul that, while he was doing his best to control the Syrian press and prevent anti-British demonstrations, his position was being made very awkward by this continuous flow of money from an ally of the United Kingdom to a terrorist organisation. As a result of your representations, steps have in the past been taken by the Iraqi Government to discourage public collections and to curtail the activities of the Palestine Defence Society. On the whole, the Iraqi Government have, as His Majesty's Government gladly recognise, showed a readiness to restrain agitation in Iraq.

2. General Nuri was informed that we realise the difficulties of the Iraqi Government and appreciate what they have already done to check agitation on behalf of Palestine. It is therefore the more unfortunate that, at a moment when

all parties assembled in London are attempting to find a solution of the Palestine problem, a Minister in the Iraqi Government should officially encourage the collection of funds on behalf of the Palestine insurgents. The Iraqi Government can be under no illusion as to the use to which the money collected by the Palestine Defence Society is put. His Majesty's Government are gravely concerned at this action by the Minister of the Interior, which is bound to encourage further agitation in Iraq. They earnestly hope, therefore, that the Iraqi Minister of the Interior will immediately cancel his circular and take every possible step to control the activities of the Palestine Defence Society.

3. General Nuri promised in reply that he would telegraph to his Government and arrange for steps to be taken to ensure that funds from Iraq were not being used for other than purely humanitarian purposes in Palestine. If money was actually being sent to quarters which were using it for objectionable purposes, this would be stopped.

4. You should take the matter up on similar lines with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 1253/6/31]

No. 109.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 21, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 22 and 23 [of 18th February: Ibn Saud's communication regarding demands alleged to have been put forward by Iraqi Prime Minister at London discussions].

General Nuri has not hitherto put forward any written demands at London discussions, and it was not at first apparent what document could have aroused Ibn Saud's misgivings. Saudi Arabian delegates have now, however, approached me on their own initiative, and I understand from them that their report to Ibn Saud was based upon a draft letter which General Nuri was thinking of sending to me about 12th February but which was never actually sent.

2. Amir Feisal asked me on 20th February, in connexion with General Nuri's draft letter, whether there was any likelihood of His Majesty's Government wishing to bring in the establishment of an Arab federation as part of a bargain for a Palestine settlement. I replied that His Majesty's Government had never entertained such an idea, if only for the reason that they regarded the settlement of the Palestine problem as urgent and any future establishment of an Arab federation as a matter for a distant and unforeseeable future, which must depend on the development of feeling among the Arab States themselves. If and when these were strongly in favour of some such plan, and agreed upon the method of its practical execution, I had no doubt that His Majesty's Government would be very willing to consider it, but it did not at present appear to them to be in the field of practical politics.

3. Amir Feisal expressed himself as reassured by my reply.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 37; Cairo, No. 132; and Jerusalem, No. 122.)

[E 1505/6/31]

No. 110.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo (No. 143), Bagdad (No. 41), Jedda (No. 28) and Washington (No. 94).

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 25, 1939.

PALESTINE Conferences.

Following is a summary of recent developments and present position:—

2. Conferences began with a series of general statements. This stage was prolonged, in the case of the Arab Conference, by insistence of Iraqi Prime Minister on making a long statement in support of Palestinian case, and this

forced delegates from other Arab States also to make statements. All statements made by Arabs strongly pressed question of pledges given by His Majesty's Government to the Arabs during the war, and it was eventually decided to set up a committee to study and report on McMahon-Hussein correspondence. This enabled conference itself to proceed to more practical matters.

3. Conferences then discussed future Constitution of Palestine and questions of Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews. Arabs put their case for immediate establishment of an independent Arab State, and for complete stoppage of immigration and land sales. Their arguments were fully considered and discussed. Jews maintained attitude that they could never accept permanent minority status or stoppage of immigration.

4. In addition to formal conferences, many informal meetings have been held with representatives of neighbouring States. It has now at last proved possible to induce representatives of neighbouring States to sit at the same table with Jewish representatives for informal discussions. Personal relations with all the Jewish and Arab delegates have so far been most cordial, and representatives of neighbouring States have throughout acted as if they had every desire to help, although in practice they generally seem inclined to support the extreme Arab case.

5. Stage has now been reached of putting forward definite proposals, and the British delegates put forward on 24th February suggestions on the constitutional aspect of the problem under the three following heads:—

(a) His Majesty's Government would, as a result of the present conferences, make a formal declaration that they wish in due course to see the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in treaty relations with Great Britain. The fact that Palestine has made no progress towards independence in the past twenty years is not the fault of His Majesty's Government, for the changes which they have at times proposed have invariably been rejected either by the Arabs or the Jews. But in order to bring about a settlement of our present difficulties, some move in that direction now seems necessary. There must be a transition period; and steps must be taken to work out the Constitution of the new State. These details cannot be worked out by the present conferences. They would require much preparation, and a body containing not only political representatives, but also experts such as constitutional lawyers.

(b) A Round-Table Conference should therefore meet, probably later this year, to consider such matters as the arrangements during the transition period, the Constitution of the new State, and the future treaty between Great Britain and Palestine. The British representatives would include members of all political parties. The Arab and Jewish representatives would be nominated, and not elected, since elections are not practicable in the present disturbed state of Palestine.

(c) Pending the meeting of this conference and its report, there would be certain temporary arrangements in Palestine to enable the people of that country to take part in the Government and to gain experience of administration. Representatives of both Arabs and Jews would be added to existing bodies in Palestine. The Advisory Council, which could be renamed the Council of State, would be enlarged by addition of Arabs and Jews nominated by the High Commissioner, and the High Commissioner would be bound to consult it on all questions of legislation. The Executive Council, which could be renamed the Council of Ministers, would be enlarged by addition of Arab and Jew "Ministers without portfolio," and the High Commissioner would be bound to seek their advice on executive questions.

6. His Majesty's Government have not yet formulated in detail their immigration proposals, but they are at present thinking of suggesting a global figure to be absorbed over a five-year programme. The Round-Table Conference, or some body to be set up under the new Constitution, might decide what was to happen after 1944.

[E 1684/6/31]

No. 111.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo (No. 165), Bagdad (No. 45), Jedda (No. 31) and Washington (No. 101).

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 3, 1939.

MY telegram No. 143 (41) (28) (94) [of 25th February: Palestine Conferences].

Tentative suggestions put forward by British delegation as basis for discussion have been very badly received by Jewish delegates. There have been no formal meetings with Jewish delegation since 27th February, when Jews presented a formal statement explaining their reasons for being unable to find in these suggestions a basis for further discussions. Informal meetings with leading Jewish delegates are nevertheless still taking place. Jewish objections were originally based partly on misunderstandings. They inferred, for example, that it was intended to set up at an early date an independent Arab State in Palestine; that it was intended to subject Jewish National Home to the control of this Arab Government; and that British suggestions were, in fact, rigid decisions, which it was useless to attempt to modify. But their main criticism is that British suggestions condemn Jews to permanent minority status, since there can be no certainty that Jewish immigration will continue after the five-year period. In point of fact, British suggestions do not close the door, but leave the question of immigration after the first five-year period to the Round-Table Conference. But it is doubtful whether Arabs will agree to this; they, of course, are pressing that there shall be no more uncertainty regarding future Jewish immigration, and that the limits of the Jewish National Home shall be settled once and for all.

2. Arab delegates also have stated that they regard British suggestions as unacceptable. They urge that main decisions should be taken by present conference, and not be postponed for further discussion by proposed Round-Table Conference some months hence. To allow uncertainty on the main issues to continue for several months would inevitably, they argue, have an unsettling effect in Palestine. In any case, they take the line that the appropriate body to draw up a Constitution for Palestine would be an elected assembly representative of the people of Palestine, and not a Round-Table Conference.

3. Arab Conference has set up a Committee of Policy to consider all these questions, and it is to be hoped that in this smaller body more rapid progress may be made.

4. McMahon Committee (see paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference) has held several meetings, but has not yet reported.

5. Foregoing is for your information only.

[E 1834/6/31]

No. 112.

Sir R. Lindsay to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Washington, March 10, 1939.

MY telegram No. 87.

You will have noticed from telegrams sent by the British Library of Information that there has been, on the whole, a good deal less comment on Palestine Conference than might have been expected. This Embassy has only received very few letters of protest from rather unimportant Jewish societies. To-day's press announces that public officials from fourteen States, including ten Governors, five Senators, six representatives and several mayors, have appealed to the President to intervene with His Majesty's Government not to abrogate the mandate. This is probably a formality to satisfy their numerous Jewish constituents.

It seems clear, however, that the only people seriously interested in Palestine are numerous Jews mainly centred in New York and a few Left-wing intellectuals who sympathise with them. These people are usually more vocal than numerous, and just now [group omitted] ever they are making less noise than they would in normal times. This may be due to fear of stimulating anti-Semitic feeling.

which is, as the United States Ambassador recently remarked to you, on the increase. It may also be due to realisation that His Majesty's Government are the only Government likely to be able to contribute seriously towards a solution of German refugee problem.

Any modification of the mandate will be unpalatable to such critics, but I should feel no serious alarm as to the attitude of the United States of America if a reasonable attitude can be maintained towards the main question—that of outlets for the Jews.

[E 1979/6/31]

No. 113.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo (No. 185), Bagdad (No. 56), Jeddah (No. 35) and Washington (No. 120).

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 15, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram: [Palestine Conferences].

Following is substance of British proposals:—

(A)—Constitution.

1. His Majesty's Government's ultimate objective is the termination of the mandate and the establishment of an independent Palestine State, possibly of a federal nature, in such treaty relations with Great Britain as would provide satisfactorily for her commercial and strategic interests.

2. His Majesty's Government have no intention that Palestine should become a Jewish State or an Arab State; nor do they regard their pledges to either Jews or Arabs as requiring them to promote either of these alternatives. It should be a State in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each are safeguarded.

3. The Constitution of the independent State would be drafted in due course by a National Assembly of the people of Palestine, either elected or nominated as may be agreed; His Majesty's Government to be represented on the Assembly and to be satisfied as to the provisions of the Constitution, and, in particular, as regards—

- (a) The security of and access to the Holy Places.
- (b) The protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews, and as regards securing the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.

His Majesty's Government would also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which His Majesty's Government are at present responsible, were adequately safeguarded.

4. The establishment of an independent State to be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government, as the mandatory Power, would retain responsibility for the government of the country.

5. As soon as peace and order are sufficiently restored, first steps to be taken towards giving the people of Palestine, during the transitional period, an increasing part of the government of the country—

- (a) The first stage of this process would be as follows:—

In the *legislative* sphere—the addition of a certain number of Palestinians (Arabs and Jews), by nomination, to the Advisory Council; the numbers of Arab and Jewish representatives being fixed approximately in proportion to population and so as to give a majority of Palestinian members.

In the *executive* sphere—the selection of Palestinian members of the Advisory Council to sit on the Executive Council; the numbers of Arab and Jewish representatives being fixed approximately in proportion to population and so that half the members of the Council would be Palestinians.

- (b) The next stage would be:—

In the *legislative* sphere—the conversion of the Advisory Council into a Legislative Council with an elected Palestinian element. Certain powers would be reserved to the High Commissioner.

In the *executive* sphere—certain Departments would be placed in charge of Palestinian members of the Executive Council.

- (c) Further advances towards self-government in the transitional period might be in the direction of increasing the powers of the Legislative Council and placing more Departments under the charge of Palestinian members of the Executive Council.

6. His Majesty's Government would be prepared, if conditions in Palestine permit, to hold elections for a Legislative Council (the composition and powers of which would be a matter for consultation between the different parties) within two years. Beyond this, no time-limit can be fixed now for the advance from stage to stage of constitutional development in the transitional period; nor can a date be fixed for the end of the transitional period and the establishment of the independent State. His Majesty's Government would hope that the whole process could be completed in ten years, but this must depend upon the situation in Palestine and upon the success of the various constitutional changes during the transitional period, and the likelihood of effective co-operation in government by the people of Palestine. They could not contemplate relinquishing all responsibility for the government of Palestine unless they were assured that the measure of agreement between the communities in Palestine was such as to make good government possible.

(B)—Immigration.

1. Immigration during the next five years would be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, would bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the population. This would mean an addition to the present official figures of Jewish population of 115,000. From this must be deducted a figure of 40,000 representing the estimated number of illegal immigrants now in Palestine. Immigration over the next five years would therefore attain, if economic absorptive capacity permits, a figure of 75,000, to be admitted as follows:—

Ten thousand per year, plus 25,000 Jewish refugees, special consideration being given to children and dependants. The refugees to be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision is secured for them.

2. The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity would be retained, and the High Commissioner would have the ultimate responsibility for deciding what the economic capacity allowed. Before a decision was reached, appropriate Jewish and Arab representatives would be consulted.

3. After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration would be permitted without the acquiescence of all parties, to be obtained through the medium of the appropriate constitutional organs functioning during the transitional period or by means of a conference representative of Arabs, Jews and His Majesty's Government.

4. His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted and will be strictly enforced. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported would be deducted from the yearly quotas.

(C)—Land.

The High Commissioner would be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. The High Commissioner would be instructed to fix areas in which transfer was to be permitted freely, regulated or prohibited, in the light of the findings of the Peel and Woodhead Reports. He would retain this power throughout the transitional period.

[E 1979/6/31]

No. 114.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington).

(No. 121.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 15, 1939.

MY telegram No. 120 [of 14th March: Palestine Conferences].

You should communicate to State Department, for their confidential information, substance of British proposals, and should add an explanation on following lines:—

2. The constitutional changes proposed by His Majesty's Government are designed to give effect to that part of article 2 of Palestine Mandate which refers to necessity for securing development of self-governing institutions. Hitherto, through no fault of His Majesty's Government, but solely on account of non-co-operation on part of Arabs or Jews, it has not proved possible to make much progress in this direction. The Palestine Arabs, during the present conference, have demanded the establishment of an independent Arab State in Palestine. His Majesty's Government have, of course, not been able to accept this demand. Nor have His Majesty's Government finally committed themselves as regards the nature of the future independent Palestine State. They have, however, maintained that a transitional period of indeterminate length will be necessary before Palestine can achieve her independence, and that full independence cannot be granted until there is a sufficient measure of co-operation between Arabs and Jews in Palestine to make good government possible. This means that the Arabs will not be able to obtain their share of independence until they have succeeded in winning the confidence and co-operation of the Jews, and this should give the Jews every opportunity of safeguarding their own interests.

3. As regards immigration, the time has obviously now come for His Majesty's Government to put an end to the state of uncertainty which has been the main cause of the present disturbed conditions in Palestine. His Majesty's Government have already facilitated the arrival in Palestine of approximately 400,000 Jews, in pursuance of their obligation, as laid down in the mandate, to secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home. It will be remembered that the Arabs were never consulted regarding the mandate and have refused to agree or to recognise either the mandate or the Balfour Declaration. The Arabs have hitherto had no assurance where this process of admitting Jews to their country without their consent will end; they are insisting that all further Jewish immigration should at once be stopped. His Majesty's Government have not agreed to this, but they have decided that it is reasonable that, after a period of five years, during which immigration will on the average slightly exceed its present level, Jews should have to obtain Arab consent to any further Jewish immigration.

4. If Jews are required to obtain Arab consent to what they regard as the vital question of further immigration, and the Arabs have to obtain Jewish consent before they can secure an independent Palestine, it would seem that the elements of a compromise are present. His Majesty's Government feel that the most important consideration regarding Palestine is that Arab and Jew should learn to work together, and they think that present scheme offers the best prospect of favouring the growth of such co-operation.

5. It is unlikely that present proposals, though they involve a change of policy, would require an amendment of the mandate.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 57; Jedda, No. 36; and Cairo, No. 186.)

[E 2051/6/31]

No. 115.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 199.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 18, 1939.

PRIME Minister sent me a message this morning to the effect that he was much distressed by the breakdown of Palestine Conference. If Palestinians had refused our terms, with the tacit implication that they would submit to our solution and cease disorders, he would not be worried. If not, and if the present campaign of lawlessness is to continue in Palestine, he viewed the situation with gravest concern and would like, in agreement with His Majesty's

Government and acting through me here to try his hand at getting Palestinians to accept solution which they have refused, or, failing that, some modification of that solution acceptable to His Majesty's Government. If neither solution proved practicable, he would like to be acquainted with the policy that His Majesty's Government proposed to adopt in order that he might endeavour to secure Arab acquiescence in it and a cessation of campaign of lawlessness.

2. He realised that this proposal would involve some delay in publication of His Majesty's Government's policy, so as to give him time to get to work with Palestinians.

3. I thanked the Prime Minister for his message and said that I appreciated the spirit which prompted it, but I made it clear that I hardly thought His Majesty's Government would want to reopen here discussions which had failed in London. I added that naturally I would transmit his message to your Lordship, and I was sure that you would appreciate his motive in making it.

[E 1979/6/31]

No. 116.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo (No. 198), Bagdad (No. 66) and Jedda (No. 39).

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 20, 1939.

MY telegram No. 195 (63) (37) [of 19th March: Palestine Conferences].

Now that British proposals have been rejected by Arabs as well as by Jews, I think that it will be useful to your Excellency (your Excellency) (you) to have some more material for use in explaining and defending them. You should, however, proceed until White Paper is published on assumption that, since proposals have been rejected, His Majesty's Government may decide to modify them very materially, or even to adopt a quite different line of policy.

2. It has for some time been evident that by far the most important points in the Palestine Arab case were that there has hitherto been no certainty on two fundamental issues. In the first place, the eventual result of British policy might be the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. Secondly, no final limit had been set to imposed Jewish immigration, and there was no assurance that Jewish immigrants might not be sent to Palestine in ever-increasing numbers. Both these main grievances are completely met by British proposals. You should emphasise this as much as possible, as it is really the main point of our general plan.

3. The main reason given by the Arabs for rejecting British proposals was the absence of a time limit for the transition period. They wished His Majesty's Government to promise that they would have their independence on some fixed date. It is, however, obviously impossible for any British Government to agree that, on some fixed date, they will hand over their responsibilities in Palestine, whatever the world conditions prevailing at that time, and even if racial feelings were so strained that British departure would inevitably be followed by a kind of civil war between Arabs and Jews. Arab representatives, however, strongly objected to the idea that their achievement of independence should be dependent upon Jewish co-operation and goodwill. In reply to this, His Majesty's Government have made it perfectly clear that during the transition period they would not allow unreasonable obstruction and non-co-operation on the part of the Jewish community to hinder in any way the acquisition of self-government by the people of Palestine. All the stages up to and including self-government, under a British High Commissioner with certain reserved powers, would proceed whether the Jews co-operated or not. It was only the last stage of all which would require Jewish co-operation, to the extent which would be necessary in order to make future good government possible in an independent Palestine State. This is, after all, a not unreasonable prerequisite.

4. Although the foregoing difference was the point which was most stressed by the Arab representatives as a reason for rejecting British proposals, the fact is that there is a fundamental difference of opinion regarding the future position of the Jewish national home. The Arabs insist that the Jews must in future be content to be subject to the rule of the Arab majority, who would be prepared to give them privileges amounting to something like ordinary minority safeguards. His Majesty's Government maintain, on the other hand, that the Jewish national home in Palestine is entitled to a special position, and that ordinary minority safeguards are inadequate. It is probable that some aspect of this major problem

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would have prevented agreement, even if the difficulty regarding the length of the transition period could have been overcome.

5. As regards immigration, the fact that the Jews will have to obtain Arab consent for further immigration after five years goes very far indeed towards meeting the Arab case. Presumably, however, a good deal of criticism may be expected of the figure of 75,000 Jewish immigrants during the next five years. The overwhelming counter-argument is that this figure only brings the Jewish population of Palestine to approximately one-third of the total population; thus, even after the five-year period, there will still be roughly two Arabs to every one Jew in Palestine, and this cannot reasonably be regarded as a legitimate cause for Arab apprehension. It should also be noted that this figure is a maximum figure, subject to economic absorptive capacity, so that if economic situation in any single year does not permit, the total will not be attained. The whole matter was discussed very amicably with representatives of neighbouring States before British proposals were drawn up, and it was at their suggestion that the basic figure of 10,000 a year (instead of the present 12,000 a year) was adopted, together with an extra number as Palestine's contribution to the refugee problem. The total figure of 75,000 was first mentioned by Fuad Bey Hamza as a counter-proposal to a somewhat higher figure suggested by the Secretary of State for the Colonies at one of these informal conversations, and Ali Maher and Taufiq Suwaidi also agreed to put that figure to the Palestine Arabs.

6. Cordial personal relations have been maintained with representatives of neighbouring Arab States, and they are to be renewed informally during next few days, although insistence of these delegates on making formal speeches associating themselves on the whole with Palestine Arab attitude has been disappointing. They appear to regard proposals as inadequate, and there seems to be little prospect of securing an agreement with them. But they probably realise that, even although His Majesty's Government are not willing to give Palestine Arabs all they want, latter are, in fact, receiving very fair treatment and their main grievances are being met.

7. Foregoing observations are for your general guidance only, and are not suitable for textual communication to the press.

(Repeated to Damascus, No. 8, and Washington, No. 133.)

[E 2051/6/31]

No. 117.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 210.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 199 [of 18th March: Palestine].

You should thank Egyptian Prime Minister for his message, and say that I much appreciate his offer to try and help us to reach a solution of the Palestine problem. You should now communicate to his Excellency His Majesty's Government's final proposals (see my telegram No. 185), which were rejected by the Jews and the Palestine Arabs. You should discuss these proposals orally with him, making full use of the material contained in my telegram No. 198 [of 20th March], and obtain his general reactions. You may add that Ali Maher told us before his departure that the only point which had prevented agreement was the inability of His Majesty's Government to set a definite limit to the transition period.

2. You may explain that informal discussions are still taking place in London with Egyptian, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian delegates to ascertain whether there is any way, short of fixing a definite date, for the end of the transition period, which would render proposals as a whole more acceptable to Arab opinion. You should suggest to Egyptian Prime Minister that he should send immediate instructions to Egyptian Ambassador in London to do his utmost to promote such an agreement, so that the views of our respective Governments regarding the future of Palestine may be in line henceforward.

3. You should further point out that His Majesty's Government fully realise that Palestine Arabs have not got all they want, but they consider the present proposals as representing the outline of a just and reasonable settlement. Egyptian Prime Minister, with his great political experience, will appreciate the importance, in the interests of both our countries, of doing nothing which

could rightly be represented in the United States and elsewhere as a grave injustice to the Jewish national home. We must be particularly careful, in view of the present international situation, not to alienate American opinion. Our policy must be such that it can be publicly defended as being a just policy and one which carries out our obligations under the mandate. This is a point which the Palestine Arabs, perhaps naturally enough, do not sufficiently realise.

4. Again, Egyptian Prime Minister can be reminded that the continuance of disturbed conditions in Palestine is contrary to Egyptian interests as well as ours. His Majesty's Government believe that their proposals will in the long run bring about that peace in Palestine which we both desire, because our proposals remove the major Arab fears and do justice to the Arab case. But there is no doubt that the restoration of peace can be hastened, if the Egyptian Government are willing whole-heartedly to co-operate in urging the Palestine Arabs to settle down and help to work out the future constitutional developments foreshadowed in the proposals. But first we should like an assurance that the Egyptian Prime Minister himself will be prepared to regard British proposals as a suitable basis for such co-operation.

(Confidential.)

5. We should, however, find it impossible to agree to a procedure (if this is what Egyptian Prime Minister contemplates) whereby he would simply put our proposals to the Mufti, obtain the latter's terms, and then attempt to work out some compromise. We have no wish to get drawn into negotiations with the Mufti in this way, and you should strongly discourage any idea of this sort, if it is put forward.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 76, and Jedda, No. 43.)

[E 2178/6/31]

No. 118.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 22, 1939.

MY telegram No. 210 to Cairo [of 21st March: Palestine].

I think that, in spite of the Amir Feisal's presence in London, it would be very desirable if you could explain British proposals to Ibn Saud, making use of the material contained in my telegram No. 39 [of 20th March]. I should like Ibn Saud to recognise in particular the very full extent to which British proposals meet Arab case. The assurance that it was not the intention of His Majesty's Government that Palestine should become a Jewish State, and the further assurance that after five years Jewish immigration would cease unless the Palestine Arabs were to acquiesce in its continuance, together with the fact that Jewish immigration in the meanwhile would be so restricted as to bring the Jewish population up to only approximately one-third of the total population, should at least convince him that it was the desire of His Majesty's Government to remove the main Arab grievances. As compared with these major points, the question of the length of the transition period, before a completely independent Palestine Government can be established, seems a matter of minor importance to the Arab world. It seems a pity that Arab delegations thought it necessary to reject proposals because Palestine Arabs could not get all they wanted on this point.

2. You could point out that informal discussions are still taking place with the Amir Feisal, and the representatives of Iraq and Egypt, on this question of the transition period. His Majesty's Government still hope that it will be found possible to reach an understanding with delegates from neighbouring States before they leave London in the course of the next few days.

(Confidential.)

3. It is most important to do what is possible to ensure that Ibn Saud really appreciates our attitude. We shall need his assistance and goodwill when we attempt to induce Palestine Arabs to end disturbances and to co-operate in putting into force our constitutional scheme. Do you think it desirable for you to go to Riyadh, when His Majesty's Government have taken their final decision, and explain whole position to Ibn Saud orally? Please telegraph your views on this point.

[E 2202/444/93]

No. 119.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).

(No. 103.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 31, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 86 [of 23rd March: Palestine], paragraph 2.

I am glad to see that Iraqi Prime Minister seems prepared to accept all the British proposals if an acceptable amendment can be introduced regarding the arrangements for terminating the transition period. The position on this point is that the result of the latest discussions with Taufiq Suwaidi and Egyptian and Saudi Arabian delegates will be fully considered by His Majesty's Government as soon as Secretary of State for the Colonies, who has been indisposed, returns to work next week.

2. General Nuri is mistaken in believing that British delegates ever accepted idea that a definite term of five years could be fixed for transition period. I shall be interested to learn to what document King Ghazi and he are referring when they say they have seen a draft fixing a five-year period. Perhaps they are thinking of the proposed five-year period before further Jewish immigration is to be made dependent upon Arab consent. In any case, there must be some misunderstanding. On the constitutional side, British delegates certainly never intended to put forward any proposal on the lines suggested, and there is thus no question of His Majesty's Government having changed their mind.

3. When referring to the discussions with Taufiq Suwaidi and other delegates, as suggested in paragraph 1 above, you should be careful to emphasise to Iraqi Prime Minister the fact that the results of these talks were very tentative and inconclusive. Their main advantage was to give the British delegates an idea of the general direction in which Iraqi and other delegates would like to see British proposals altered. British delegates at the last meeting made it clear that, in the absence of Secretary of State for the Colonies, there could be no question of attempting to reach any kind of agreement. All that could be done was to go over the ground and try to get a clear idea of the points which the Iraqi and other delegates wished His Majesty's Government to reconsider.

4. I am really anxious, in view of General Nuri's apparent misunderstanding regarding transition period, that his Excellency should not on this occasion again believe that British delegates have accepted something which they had no intention of accepting, thus leading to further reproaches later that His Majesty's Government have changed their mind.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 255, and Jedda, No. 52.)

[E 2444/6/31]

No. 120.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 234.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 1, 1939.

I DULY communicated to the Prime Minister our Palestine proposals, together with suitable parts of your telegrams Nos. 198, 210 and 237, and suggested a meeting to discuss them.

2. Prime Minister's reply (through Amin, and considerably delayed by discussions with Ali Maher, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and certain Palestine delegates) was that British proposals were unacceptable as they stood, and he wished to suggest certain modifications. He also wished to get into touch with the Mufti. He said that the Mufti had appealed to King Farouk for permission to come to Egypt. The Palace was pressing the Prime Minister to agree. The Mufti was feeling uncomfortable since the French had begun to deal high-handedly with Syrians.

3. I retorted emphatically in the sense of last paragraph of your telegram No. 210, and strongly opposed any idea of the Mufti's coming here. I explained that I was only instructed to pass on the Prime Minister's reactions, and that I had no authority whatever to negotiate.

4. I had arranged for formal discussions this morning with the Prime Minister, but he has gone down once more with a temperature and meeting has had to be postponed. The Prime Minister has just telephoned through Amin that if my instructions precluded me from discussing possible ways out of the

difficulty, he can only say that his suggested modifications represent his final views. They are—

- (1) That certain minor Ministries should be entrusted to Palestine Ministers as soon as peace is re-established.
- (2) That a definite date (say twelve years) should be fixed for the end of transitional period in exchange for acceptance by Arabs of His Majesty's Government's immigration proposals of 75,000, spread over five years.

I observed as regards (2), that time and again during discussions in London the Secretary of State for Colonies had made clear the reason why Parliament would not accept any fixed time limit; twelve years was no easier than ten.

5. Prime Minister considers present Syrian and Palestinian situations, coupled with the recent anti-war co-operation movement of the Wafd (see my telegram No. 233), as serious and liable to result in trouble in Egypt.

6. In this connexion Shahbandar, who has just arrived here, told the oriental secretary that many Syrians are even turning to the Turks to escape from the French, and that others are lending a willing ear to Italian and German agents (see in this connexion Bagdad telegram No. 86 to you).

7. The notorious Italian-German agent, Shekib Arslan, who was on his way to Damascus, has stopped here. So now we are saddled with him; with some of the returned Palestine delegates who have already been priming Egyptian Ministers with stories of our alleged brutalities; and temporarily with Saudi and Iraqi delegates.

8. Ministry of the Interior report that Moslem Brothers' Society is gaining influence among both students and the people. It provides the most strenuous agitators against policy in Palestine.

9. Local outlook is thus not pleasant, and, meantime, the European situation has become more tense over Poland.

10. I estimate Prime Minister's motives are two-fold:—

- (1) Genuine desire to settle Palestine question with kudos to himself in Arab eyes.
- (2) Extreme anxiety for us to be in a position to bring all our troops from Palestine to Egypt to meet possible emergencies—he keeps on referring to this.

11. I have thought it better to report Prime Minister's reaction to our proposals as given to me by Amin (see above); but as soon as he is well enough I will have postponed meeting with him. But meantime, Arab and Palestine leaders will have arrived here with almost certainly increased public activity over Palestine, and this will not make situation any easier.

(Repeated to Bagdad and Jedda.)

[E 2541/6/31]

No. 121.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 342.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 6, 1939.

AT Mr. Butler's request the Egyptian Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 31st March in order to keep in touch with the attitude of His Majesty's Government in connexion with their Palestine policy. The Ambassador said that he had been wondering why there had been so much delay in this matter since the departure of the delegates from the neighbouring States, and he presumed that the reason was that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had been away. Mr. Butler replied that the Ambassador was quite right, and added that Mr. MacDonald hoped to return on or about Monday, the 3rd April, and would, no doubt, wish to see his Excellency as soon as possible after that date. Nashat Pasha said he was glad of this, since the Saudi Arabian and Iraqi delegates were both looking to him to maintain contact with His Majesty's Government. In fact, the Saudi Arabian delegation had telephoned to him from Paris to obtain information regarding any developments in the situation. The Saudi delegation would remain in Cairo till about the 8th April, and Nashat Pasha thought it most important that the final proposals should, if possible, be

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communicated to him and to the various Arab States before they were published in the form of a white paper. He himself would like the neighbouring States to signify their agreement so that His Majesty's Government could indicate this before publishing their statement of policy.

2. Mr. Butler said that he hoped the Ambassador clearly understood the position, which was that the Secretary of State for the Colonies must reserve the right to decide upon what proposals he thought best. Nashat Pasha replied that the British views were already so close to those of the neighbouring States that he hoped that His Majesty's Government would come to decisions which the neighbouring States could accept. He ran over the three points:—

- (1) That responsible Ministers should be appointed as soon as possible.
- (2) That if the transition period did not end on the expiry of ten years His Majesty's Government should call the neighbouring States into consultation.
- (3) That it should be possible to reduce immigration to, say, 50,000, or at any rate something which would not make the proportion of the two communities less than two Arabs to one Jew.

On the third point, Mr. Butler said that it had been the object of the British proposals to achieve the ratio mentioned.

3. Mr. Butler asked whether there was much impatience in Egypt. Nashat Pasha replied that he thought there was no undue anxiety, although it was important to proceed. The Mufti could do nothing if the Prime Minister of Egypt backed the British programme. He had communicated the latest developments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ali Maher Pasha.

4. Mr. Butler asked Nashat Pasha, with reference to the last meeting on the 24th March, whether he thought that all the representatives of the neighbouring States had understood that, although everyone was anxious to come to an agreement if possible, no final agreement had yet been reached. He said that every one of the delegates understood this perfectly, but that they had all left in great hope.

5. Talking of the international situation, the Ambassador said that the Egyptians were always nervous of and jealous of the Italians. They did not dislike the Germans except as friends of the Italians. He did not contemplate that Dr. Goebbels would have much of a reception in Egypt, and the Egyptian police were already alarmed at the work they would have to protect him during his visit.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[E 2866/6/31]

No. 122.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 150.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, April 17, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Prime Minister and others have made it clear that the one desire of the Arabs is from the beginning to obtain safeguards in some form that the declared policy of His Majesty's Government (which in itself is acceptable) will not be subverted by Jews, whose intrigues and influence they feel powerless to resist.

Prime Minister thinks that the proposal mentioned in my telegram under reference would be one way of doing this.

I venture to submit that His Majesty's Government should not be deterred from considering this proposal on the ground that it opens up possibility of association of Palestine with Iraq. If it secures lasting peace in Palestine and thereby safeguards British interests in the Near East, advantage of this proposal will far outweigh any possible disadvantages.

Moreover, if His Majesty's Government conceal their readiness to acquiesce in the development of Arab unity they will lose ground to the Germans, who are giving out in this part of the world that they definitely support federation of Arab States.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 21, and Jedda, No. 19.)

[E 2956/6/31]

No. 123.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 279.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 23, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 320 and 321.

I saw the Prime Minister and informed him of contents of your telegram No. 320 and handed him copy of new formula in your telegram No. 321.

2. The Prime Minister's first reaction was one of disappointment that His Majesty's Government had not been able to go further, and he clearly did not like inevitability of some reference in Parliament to the phrase "possibility of a federal nature." But he did not press his point of view. I pointed out to him that His Majesty's Government had gone a long way now to meet Arab point of view, and that such difference as remained was one of theory rather than of substance; I urged him to use his best endeavour to get Arab representatives to accept the new formula. The Prime Minister finally agreed to do so, but stressed the fact that he was doing so entirely because of the strain of international situation, and that under other circumstances he would have washed his hands of the whole business. He is calling a meeting of Arab representatives to-night.

3. As regards Mufti, he said there was now no intention or reason to invite him to Cairo. He observed, however, and he wished me so to inform your Lordship, that in his view it would be a great mistake to exclude Mufti from Palestine indefinitely, and that if His Majesty's Government wished their plan to work successfully, he should be allowed to return at some time to co-operate during the transitional period. I warned his Excellency that whilst reporting this expression of view to your Lordship, I could hold out no hopes in regard to it.

4. He mentioned incidentally that he had recently met Ragheb Nashashibi, by whom he was singularly unimpressed, and believed him to be without any real influence whatever.

5. The contents of paragraphs 5 and 7 of your telegram No. 320 have been conveyed to Sheikh Hafez Wahba for the information of Emir Feisal.

(Repeated nowhere.)

[E 3029/6/31]

No. 124.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 282.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 24, 1939.

MY No. 279.

Prime Minister had a meeting with the Arab delegates last night and informs me that they agree in principle to the new draft formula regarding the period of transition, but they wish to have first before them the final text of the proposals as a whole in order that they may know exactly to what they are to commit themselves.

2. As the revised draft of the proposals will probably be submitted to the Cabinet (see your telegram No. 320) before the end of the month, the Prime Minister would be grateful if they could now be telegraphed to me urgently for communication to him. Or can I communicate to him, as our final proposals, those given in your telegram No. 185, as revised by your telegrams Nos. 320 and 321?

3. The Prime Minister desires to bring here urgently, in order to clinch the matter, four Palestinian leaders now in Beirut, namely, Izzet Darwaza, Muin-al-Madi, Musca-al-Alami and Jamal-al-Husseini (Mufti being excluded), on the understanding that they will return to Beirut after completion of this specific business. In view of the urgency of getting settlement while the Arab delegates are still here, I have taken it on myself to agree forthwith.

4. Arab delegates expressed the urgent hope that there will be no executions pending the amnesty contemplated in paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 320.

[E 3084/6/31]

No. 125.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 289.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 26, 1939.

I COMMUNICATED orally to the Prime Minister this afternoon substance of your telegram No. 340.

He replied that he appreciated your point of view, and that our proposals had not and would not be communicated to the Palestine Arabs. What was intended was that the Egyptian Government and Arab States, on their own responsibility and initiative, should discuss matters with certain influential Palestine Arabs, with a view to getting them to acquiesce in a solution on the lines of His Majesty's Government's proposed unilateral declaration. His Majesty's Government's proposals would not be communicated to these Palestine Arabs, but suggestions as from the Egyptian Government and Arab States would be made to them for a settlement on the lines of our proposals. It was necessary, however, for him and his Arab colleagues to know exactly what were our proposals as a whole before they could talk effectively to the Arabs with a view to overcoming their objections and to restore peace in Palestine. He urged, therefore, that he might be acquainted as soon as possible with our final proposals as a whole.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jedda and Jerusalem.)

[E 2866/6/31]

No. 126.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).

(No. 163.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 27, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 149 and 150 [of 17th April: General Nuri's proposal regarding Palestine].

You will have seen from my telegram No. 320 [of 21st April] to Cairo that His Majesty's Government are not in favour of the Mufti or the Palestine Arabs being given a further opportunity to negotiate. We believe that our present proposals go so far to meet the main Arab grievances that they should suffice to bring an early end to the rebellion in Palestine, especially if the Iraqi Government and the Governments of the other neighbouring States are willing to support them.

2. I think that you should explain the situation on these lines to the Iraqi Prime Minister in due course. You should also thank him for putting forward a new proposal which might, in his opinion, induce Palestine Arabs to come to terms. It is not clear, however, whether Egyptian and Saudi Arabian Governments would agree to General Nuri's new suggestion, or whether they share his view with regard to its effect on Palestine Arabs. Moreover, proposal on its own merits seems to be open to some objections, and His Majesty's Government would certainly be very strongly criticised if they adopted it at the present moment. The British proposals in their present form not only do not rule out any form of Constitution for the coming independent Palestine State, but, in fact, every care has been taken to leave form of the new State a completely open question. The words "possibly of a federal nature," which have now been omitted at the Egyptian Prime Minister's request, were inserted only to make it clear that a federal solution is not ruled out. Nor clearly is a monarchy ruled out. Nor is a scheme ruled out by which the independent Palestine State shall join a federation with some neighbouring State or States. These points will all have to be considered in due course, but it is not necessary to deal with them at the present stage. In fact, it would be a mistake for His Majesty's Government to mention these matters in the present white paper in such a way as to give an impression that they were likely to encourage this or any other particular form of ultimate solution. The only result would be to arouse opposition to the particular proposals themselves. The French Government, for example, would object very strongly to the mention of a federation. In any case, it is not for His Majesty's Government now to take the initiative in advocating the desirability of a monarchy, or of the federation of Palestine with a neighbouring State. It

will be for the inhabitants of Palestine themselves to put forward, when the time comes, their wishes on such matters, and General Nuri can rest assured that the wishes of the inhabitants of Palestine will be taken into full account when the Constitution of the independent Palestine State is discussed and settled in the future.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 350, and Jedda, No. 68.)

[E 3160/6/31]

No. 127.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 302.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 30, 1939.

MY telegram No. 299.

Prime Minister handed me this morning memorandum containing final conclusions of discussions he has had with representatives of Arab countries. Text is contained in my immediately following telegram. Prime Minister assured me that, subject to acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the three points outlined therein, (? Arab) States agree publicly to declare, after issue of white paper, their approval of British proposals and to use all their influence in putting them into effect in Palestine.

2. Prime Minister also stated that we could take it Palestine leaders now here accept on the basis proposed in memorandum.

3. Prime Minister laid particular stress on importance of some statement being made in white paper to the effect that His Majesty's Government are determined vigorously to deal with illegal immigration (point 2 in memorandum).

4. He further stressed importance of consultation with Arabian High Commissioner and Palestine Ministers regarding sales of land (point 3 in memorandum).

5. Prime Minister once more expressed opinion that so-called Palestine leaders were a worthless lot, and that the Mufti was the only man among them. He had telegraphed gist of memorandum to Mufti to-day. We should end by finding Mufti the best man of the lot to work with.

6. Prime Minister once more emphasised that one of his reasons for wanting Palestine question settled was his desire to get British troops from Palestine down into Egypt.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Bagdad and Jedda.)

[E 3161/6/31]

No. 128.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 303.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 30, 1939.

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"The British proposals concerning Palestine have been examined by the delegates of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdoms of Iraq and Egypt. The delegates are of opinion that they can advise the Palestinians to co-operate in establishment of an independent Palestinian State on basis of negotiations which took place in London this year, and of the last two despatches addressed by the British Government to his Excellency the President of the Council of the Ministers of Egypt.

"Nevertheless, in order to avoid all ambiguity and to expose the practical side of the scheme, the delegates have deemed it essential to draw attention to the following:—

"(1) Immediately after the restoration of peace and security, a Ministry should be formed of Palestinians with British advisers to co-operate in the administration of the country.

"(2) Number of Jewish immigrants within the next five years should not exceed 75,000, and proportion of the Jewish population in Palestine should in no way exceed one-third of the whole population.

"(3) The question of sale of lands should be settled by mutual understanding between the High Commissioner and the Palestinian Ministers.

"The Arab State hope that within the next three years after peace and order had been established a Constituent Assembly will be formed for the purpose of drawing up Constitution."

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Bagdad and Jedda.)

[E 3161/6/31]

No. 129.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 365.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 4, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram: [Palestine policy].

Following is text of memorandum on points made in message contained in your telegram No. 303 [of 30th April], which you should communicate informally to Egyptian Prime Minister. You should explain to his Excellency that, as Iraqi and Saudi Arabian delegates are understood now to have left Cairo, and as message in your telegram under reply came from them as well as Egyptian Prime Minister, steps are being taken by His Majesty's representatives to communicate this memorandum similarly to competent Iraqi and Saudi Arabian authorities. But since Iraqi Prime Minister and Ibn Saud may not be fully informed of course of discussions in Cairo, or of previous correspondence referred to, it might be well if the Egyptian Prime Minister felt able to send to Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Governments a telegram containing such further explanations as he may consider desirable.

2. You should further remind Egyptian Prime Minister that memorandum must for the present be regarded as most secret, and it is very important that there should be no leakage.

3. Memorandum begins:—

"His Majesty's Government are glad to note that, after representatives of Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia had examined the proposals concerning Palestine contained in the last two communications handed by the British Ambassador in Cairo to his Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers of Egypt, they were of opinion that they could advise the Palestinians to co-operate in the establishment of an independent Palestine State on the basis of the negotiations which took place in London and the contents of the two communications referred to.

"With reference, however, to the three points to which attention is called in the message from these representatives, His Majesty's Government wish to state their understanding of the position as left by the negotiations which took place in London and by the two communications referred to, as follows:—

"(1) The position regarding the appointment of Palestinians to the charge of departments of the Administration in Palestine was made clear in the relevant paragraph of the memorandum which was communicated by the British Ambassador to his Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers of Egypt on 7th April, and to which the representatives of Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia informed His Majesty's Ambassador that they agreed on 9th April. As explained in the memorandum, it is proposed that as soon as peace and security have been sufficiently restored in Palestine, a certain number of Departments would be placed in charge of Palestinians, with British advisers, and that this process should be extended during the transition period until all heads of departments were Palestinians. The Palestinian heads of departments would exercise the administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British officials, and they would sit on the Executive Council which advises the High Commissioner. When Palestinians were in charge of all the departments, consideration would be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers, with consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of departments. It is not proposed, therefore, that there should be a Ministry of Palestinians immediately after

the restoration of peace and security, but His Majesty's Government will make as rapid progress as circumstances permit with the progressive appointment of Palestinians to the charge of departments.

"(2) With regard to immigration, the figure of 75,000 Jewish immigrants within the next five years was arrived at on the basis of the best local statistics available as being a figure required to bring the total Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population at the end of the period. It has sometimes been suggested that there should be a special census for determining the exact population figures. His Majesty's Government have already considered this suggestion, and they would have been inclined to accept it if they had felt it to be practicable; but they have been forced to the conclusion that practical difficulties must rule it out. Such a census would probably lose much of its value owing to the natural incentive of both Jews and Arabs to secure an underestimate of their numbers. In any case, regular decennial census is due in 1941, but even if it were to show that present estimates are to some extent inaccurate, with result that Jewish population would, in five years' time, be rather more or rather less than one third of the total population, His Majesty's Government feel that it would be very unwise to allow it to be supposed in Palestine that there would be a chance of the figure of 75,000 being altered on that account. Apart from the fact that the first result of allowing Palestine Arabs and Jews to believe that it might be so altered would be to destroy the accuracy of 1941 census, there is advantage in leaving no uncertainty as to what maximum figure of immigrants will be. It will be appreciated that 75,000 is a maximum figure, in the sense that if, during the five-year period, economic absorptive capacity is inadequate, that total may not be reached. His Majesty's Government appreciate Palestinian Arab anxiety about possibility of future Jewish illegal immigration, and in their declaration of policy His Majesty's Government intend to reaffirm their determination to do everything in their power to check this immigration, and their intention to deduct the number of such illegal immigrants as may, despite the firm measures to be taken, succeed in settling in Palestine from the numbers of legal immigrants to be admitted. In this connexion I am communicating to Egyptian, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Governments copies of the announcements which were made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the House of Commons last week.

"(3) With regard to the sale of lands, it is intended that the High Commissioner shall consult the Palestinian representatives on Executive Council on questions concerning the sale of lands before decisions are reached."

Memorandum ends.

(Addressed to Cairo, No. 365. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 174, and Bahrein, unnumbered (who should await further telegram before taking action); Jedda, No. 77; and Jerusalem, No. 289.)

[E 3161/6/31]

No. 130.

Viscount Halifax to Political Agent (Bahrein).

(Unnumbered.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 5, 1939.

MY telegram No. 365 to Cairo [of 4th May: Palestine policy].

You may communicate memorandum informally to Ibn Saud with a covering communication on the following lines, explaining that both documents should be regarded as most secret at the present stage, since His Majesty's Government are very anxious that there should be no leakage in the press before they have published the forthcoming White Paper stating their future policy in Palestine:—

"The Egyptian Prime Minister handed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo on the 30th April a memorandum regarding Palestine showing the conclusions reached as the result of discussions in Cairo between representatives of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt. His Majesty's Government have now considered the terms of this document, of which His Royal Highness the

Emir Feisal no doubt possesses a copy. They understand, in fact, that it represented a message from the Saudi Arabian and Iraqi delegates as well as from the Egyptian Prime Minister. His Majesty's Government wish to transmit to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz the accompanying reply to the points raised in that memorandum. They would explain that the reply is also being communicated to the Prime Ministers of Egypt and Iraq.

"His Majesty's Government desire to take this opportunity to express to His Majesty their appreciation of the assistance which His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal rendered to them during the Palestine Conferences in London. The friendliness, courtesy and marked ability displayed by His Royal Highness greatly eased the difficulties which inevitably arose in the course of the discussions, and of, as all who participated in the conferences must hope, the way now lies open towards the re-establishment of peace and order in Palestine, a considerable part of the credit will be due to the Saudi Arabian delegation.

"His Majesty's Government hope to publish shortly their final and complete decisions regarding Palestine in the form of a document to be laid before Parliament. They are not yet able to state the exact date when this document will be published, but they expect the full text to be ready in about a week's time. They would like, if His Majesty's movements permit, to arrange that he should have, for his own confidential information, the more important passages in this document in advance of publication. It is their hope and belief that this document will form the basis for the re-establishment of peace in Palestine, especially if His Majesty King Abdul Aziz and the Governments of Egypt and Iraq feel themselves able to use their great influence with the Palestine Arabs in the interests of peace. His Majesty's Government recognise that, under their new decisions, the Palestine Arabs will not obtain everything which they demanded at the London Conferences. His Majesty will, however, appreciate that the British proposals will entirely remove the most important grievances of the Palestine Arabs. They remove the fear of political domination by the Jews by declaring categorically that it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government that Palestine shall become a Jewish State. They remove the fear of Jewish immigration continuing indefinitely regardless of Arab feelings, by imposing severe limitations on Jewish immigration during the next five years, and by providing that, after five years, there shall be no further Jewish immigration without the acquiescence of the Arabs. And they contain important constitutional provisions by which the people of Palestine will be able in due course to achieve their independence.

"On the specific points mentioned in the annexed reply to the Cairo memorandum of 30th April, His Majesty will no doubt be able to obtain any necessary explanations from His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, and His Majesty's Government need therefore only offer the following brief comments:—

"1. The British Ambassador in Cairo was informed on 9th April that the representatives of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt agreed to the suggestions which His Majesty's Government had made regarding the appointment of Palestinians to the charge of Departments of the Administration in Palestine. His Majesty's Government intend to embody these suggestions in the White Paper declaring their policy.

"2. His Majesty's Government think it best to fix now a final immigration figure of 75,000 (subject to economic absorptive capacity) during the next five years. This figure has been worked out on the basis of existing estimates of population and clearly it may not bring the Jewish population up to exactly one-third of the total population. It is only possible to work for approximate proportions. The actual proportion in five years' time may be rather more or rather less than one-third. The census held for the purpose of securing a more exact calculation would probably fail to establish the facts. His Majesty's Government feel that it would be wrong to allow the population of Palestine to believe that the immigration figure might be changed, for they are convinced that this would only lead to further uncertainty and much bitter and unprofitable controversy.

"(3) It is intended that there should in future be full consultation between the High Commissioner and the Palestinian heads of Departments

on the Executive Council before decisions are taken on the question of the sale of lands. One of the purposes of putting Palestinians on the Executive Council is that they may be consulted on such matters as this. But the ultimate decision in such matters will lie with the High Commissioner.

"The Cairo memorandum of 30th April proceeds to express the hope of the Arab States that, within the next three years after peace and order have been established, a constituent assembly will be formed for the purpose of drawing up a Constitution. His Majesty's Government's proposals on this point are that, at the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body, representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government, will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transition period, and consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestine State. It may eventually be thought best that the first draft of the new Constitution should be drawn up by a special body including experts (as was done in the case of Egypt), and that the document drawn up by them should then be laid before a constituent assembly. The British delegates gained the impression, during their conversations with the delegates of the neighbouring States following the London conferences, that the latter regarded this time-table and procedure as offering a possible solution.

"His Majesty's Government trust that the annexed reply, together with the foregoing explanations, will give His Majesty King Abdul Aziz a sufficient explanation of their views. If, however, there is any point upon which further information is required, they will be happy to provide it to the best of their ability. They wish to keep His Majesty fully informed of the position and of their views regarding the Palestine problem, and they continue, as always, to attach the greatest importance to the friendly interest and help of His Majesty in this matter."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 177; Cairo, No. 371; Jedda, No. 78; and Jerusalem, No. 295.)

[E 3293/6/31]

No. 131.

Viscount Halifax to Political Agent (Bahrein).

(Unnumbered.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 5, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram [Palestine policy].

You should send a further message to Ibn Saud on the following lines:—

"His Majesty's Government have just received by telegraph through Sir R. Bullard a message from His Majesty King Abdul Aziz stating that His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal and Jemal Hussein are with him now in order to discuss the question of Palestine, but that no progress can be made before His Majesty's Government's reply to the Egyptian Prime Minister is received.

"The reply of His Majesty's Government to the Egyptian Prime Minister's memorandum of 30th April is being communicated to His Majesty separately. His Majesty's Government are anxious that this reply should be regarded by His Majesty as a secret document, which may, of course, be shown to His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal, but not to other parties.

"His Majesty's Government note that His Majesty intends to discuss the Palestine problem with Jemal Hussein. They think it well, therefore, to explain their own position, which they have maintained throughout the informal discussions which have taken place with representatives of the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt in London and Cairo since the London Conference came to an end. Before summoning the conference His Majesty's Government had undertaken to Parliament that, if the attempt to reach agreement at the conferences failed, they would, on their own responsibility, announce their future policy regarding Palestine. Prior to reaching decisions on the details of that policy, His Majesty's Government

have, however, welcomed the opportunity of informal discussions with representatives of the three States named with a view to considering certain suggestions which those representatives wished to make. But these discussions have not involved any renewal of negotiations, which came to an end when conference closed. As a result of informal discussions, His Majesty's Government are prepared to modify their proposed policy in certain respects, and they believe that the proposals which they now contemplate (beyond which they cannot go) are reasonable and just. They go a long way to meet the Arab case, and should, in the view of His Majesty's Government, form a basis on which peace can be restored in Palestine.

"As His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal will appreciate, this position was fully explained to the Egyptian Prime Minister and the representatives of the other States in Cairo. His Majesty's Government were not parties to the invitation to the Palestinian leaders to come to Cairo for further discussions. They, of course, welcome any initiative which His Majesty or any of the neighbouring States may wish to take on their own responsibility with a view to helping in the restoration of peace in Palestine. But they feel sure that, in any discussions that he may have with Jemal Hussein, His Majesty will keep in mind the position of His Majesty's Government as described above."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 179; Cairo, No. 373; Jedda, No. 79; and Jerusalem, No. 299.)

[E 3349/6/31]

No. 132.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, May 6, 1939.

YOUR No. 364 to Cairo.

Prime Minister called on me this morning and told me that Mufti had telegraphed suggesting that he and three others should visit Prime Minister to discuss Palestine. I stressed obvious objections, but after prolonged discussion I consented, at Prime Minister's urgent request, to submit following proposals to you:—

That if after seeing final text of white paper Prime Minister felt that he had a fair chance of persuading Mufti that it was in the best interests of Palestine Arabs to try and make British plan a success, he should agree to the visit.

Prime Minister undertook:—

- (1) That Mufti and party would be accommodated outside Bagdad (he mentioned the King's aerodrome 10 miles away).
- (2) There would be no demonstration or excitement in Iraq.
- (3) Mufti would only stay two or three days, and that before he left assurance must be obtained from French that they would permit him to return.

I impressed on the Prime Minister that in the view of His Majesty's Government the important point was that the Arab States should, if possible, bless the white paper regardless of Mufti, but Prime Minister insisted that it would be almost impossible for them to do this unless they knew beforehand that Mufti would not curse it.

Your telegram No. 175 was being decyphered when Prime Minister called, and I am reporting separately on action taken on paragraph 1 thereof.

Please instruct me by telegraph what reply I should make to the above proposals.

French Minister now informs me that Mufti has made personal application to High Commissioner for permission to visit Iraq. Permission will not be given unless you signify approval either through His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris or me.

(Repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem and Jedda.)

[E 3456/6/31]

No. 133.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo (No. 380), Bagdad (No. 186), Jedda (No. 80), Bahrein (Unnumbered), Damascus (No. 20) and Washington (No. 207).

(Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 10, 1939.

FOLLOWING is text of important extracts from forthcoming Palestine White Paper (instructions are being telegraphed to you separately):—

"I.—Constitution.

"1. The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. This proposal for the establishment of the independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the mandate.

"2. The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

"3. The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country. During the transitional period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the machinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

"4. As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine, steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain departments with British advisers. The Palestinian heads of departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of departments approximately in proportion to their respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British officials. When that stage is reached, consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers, with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of departments.

"5. His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless, they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

"6. At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the Constitution of the independent Palestine State.

"7. His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph 1 or in the Constitution contemplated by sub-paragraph 6 adequate provision had been made for—

"(a) The security of and freedom of access to the Holy Places, and the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.

- "(b) The protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.
- "(c) Such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing.

His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

"8. His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within ten years. If, at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

"During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils.

"II.—Immigration.

"1. Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:—

- "(a) For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.
- "(b) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependants.

"2. The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

"3. After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

"4. His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

"III.—Land.

"The High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

"The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the 'rights and position' of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land."

[E 3431/6/31]

No. 134.

Viscount Halifax to Political Agent (Bahrein).

(Unnumbered.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 11, 1939.

YOUR telegrams of 7th and 10th May: Palestine.

Promised extracts from white paper are being telegraphed to you separately. You should arrange for them to reach Ibn Saud on Monday, 15th May, or if, owing to Ibn Saud's movements, it is impossible to reach him on that day, you should arrange for message to reach him as late as possible before that date. Text of these extracts from white paper should, of course, be regarded as most secret until it is published. Date of publication is also confidential for the present.

2. You should send to Ibn Saud a covering communication on the following lines:—

"His Majesty's Government have received the message from His Majesty King Abdul Aziz regarding their future policy in Palestine. They would explain that they quite realise that their decisions do not meet all the demands of the Palestine Arabs. They have for some time recognised with regret that the members of the Palestine Arab delegation who took part in the London Conference would not regard their present decisions as entirely satisfactory. His Majesty will appreciate that in political matters of this kind no party is ever likely to obtain the full satisfaction of its demands. Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government have, largely as a result of discussions with the representatives of the neighbouring States during the conference and after, made concessions which they believe to be of a very substantial nature to the Arab point of view. They had hoped that when the representatives of the neighbouring States in Cairo expressed agreement in principle with His Majesty's Government's latest proposals, their Governments would also be prepared to regard this solution as reasonable and just.

"His Majesty's Government intend to issue their white paper regarding Palestine in the evening of Wednesday, 17th May, for broadcasting that evening and publication in the morning newspapers of 18th May. The decisions which they have reached regarding their future policy in Palestine are contained in the accompanying extracts from the forthcoming declaration. The white paper will also contain a lengthy statement of the reasons which have led His Majesty's Government to reach these decisions.

"His Majesty's Government are glad to note that His Majesty King Abdul Aziz, with his customary goodwill and wise statesmanship, is anxious in principle to advise the leaders of Palestine in the direction of moderation, and they appreciate His Majesty's hope that he may be given some further material which would enable him to approach the Palestinian leaders with greater prospects of success. It may, perhaps, be of assistance to His Majesty to know, although this should not be divulged until the white paper is published on 18th May, that the explanatory paragraphs of that document will, in fact, contain some material which may be helpful to him. For example, one passage contains a statement that His Majesty's Government declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. The document proceeds to explain that His Majesty's Government would regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.

"Another passage in the white paper contains a very important declaration by His Majesty's Government on the immigration question, and on their obligations towards the Jewish National Home. It declares that His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five

years, which is now contemplated, has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the establishment of the Jewish National Home by further immigration, regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

"If His Majesty, after studying the information now communicated to him in advance regarding the contents of the forthcoming white paper, should feel able to use his great influence with the Arab world to ensure favourable reception of these new decisions, it is certain that the population of Palestine will benefit all the sooner from the restoration of normal conditions."

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 82; Cairo, No. 387; Bagdad, No. 190; and Jerusalem, No. 320.)

[E 3456/6/31]

No. 135.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington).

(No. 212.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 12, 1939.

MY telegram No. 137 [of 21st March: Palestine].

You may now give State Department, in strictest confidence, the final decisions of His Majesty's Government regarding their Palestine policy, as contained in the fairly extensive extracts from draft white paper which are being telegraphed to you in my telegrams Nos. 207 and 213. You should explain, though this is also confidential for the present, that His Majesty's Government intend to issue white paper in the evening of Wednesday, 17th May, for broadcasting that evening and publication in the morning newspapers of 18th May.

2. It is, of course, very important that there should be no leakage.

3. You may also give a copy to the President for his confidential information if you think it advisable. I hope that he and his advisers will appreciate the peculiar difficulties which His Majesty's Government have to contend with in Palestine, and that the policy upon which they have decided—which unfortunately will be disappointing to both Jews and Arabs—represents a sincere effort to fulfil the obligations which we have undertaken to the two peoples and to act justly between their interests.

4. You might explain that the constitutional provisions in the policy do not preclude an ultimate settlement of the Palestine problem on the lines most favoured by the Jewish leaders, i.e., on a federal basis. This possibility is not specifically mentioned in the white paper, but the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the debate in the House of Commons, will make it clear that such a solution is not excluded and will be for consideration in due course. Whilst it is too early to envisage what may be the ultimate constitutional evolution in Palestine, His Majesty's Government believe that a federal solution, if it be practicable, may well be the best.

5. With regard to immigration, His Majesty's Government have resisted very strong pressure from many quarters in favour of immediate and complete stoppage of Jewish immigration.

6. The President has always shown an interest in the possibility of some development and settlement, either of Arabs from Palestine or else of Jews, in Transjordan. We share his desire for such a development, though expert investigations have indicated that the possibilities are somewhat limited. While the situation in Palestine has been tense, and the Arab fear of domination by a Jewish majority continued, it was politically impossible for the Transjordan authorities, however willing they might be, to consent at any rate to any such Jewish settlement. We hope that His Majesty's Government's policy in Palestine will enable peace and confidence to be restored there in the near future, and that in due course, therefore, it may be possible, if the Jews play their cards well, for them to induce the Arabs to agree to development in Transjordan on the lines which the President has advocated.

7. As regards the regulation of land sales, the High Commissioner will do his utmost to follow as closely as possible the recommendations of the recent commissions of enquiry.

8. United States Ambassador in London has been fully informed of the position.

[E 3349/6/31]

No. 136.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).

(No. 192.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 12, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 173 [of 6th May: Iraqi Prime Minister's wish that Mufti of Jerusalem should visit Iraq to discuss Palestine].

I will send you instructions later as regards reply to be returned to Iraqi Prime Minister. Meanwhile, you need say nothing to him on the point. If he complains of delay in reply, you might point out that his suggestion was that he should see the final text of the white paper before he himself even considered the question. So that it is obviously not a matter of immediate urgency.

2. At the same time, you should know the position for your own information. His Majesty's Government intend to make a statement in Parliament on the same day as the appearance of white paper, declaring that they have decided to exclude the Mufti from Palestine indefinitely. This decision has been taken at the urgent insistence of the British authorities in Palestine, who claim that such an announcement, making it clear that the Mufti is not going to be allowed to return in the near future, is essential. He is responsible for the campaign of organised murder which has been ruthlessly waged in Palestine, even against the Arabs who are his political opponents. His methods of violence and intimidation have rendered it impossible for His Majesty's Government and the British Administration in Palestine to feel any confidence in the possibility of co-operating with him. Moreover, his return to Palestine would in itself intimidate all the best Arab elements in that country who were not prepared to submit to his designs and personal ambitions.

3. You will appreciate that in these circumstances it would not be understood if His Majesty's Government, at the very time of making this declaration regarding the Mufti's continued exclusion from Palestine, were to facilitate his journey to Bagdad to discuss Palestinian affairs with the Iraqi Prime Minister. Objections to Mufti's visit to Iraq would be very great from the point of view of our relations with Egypt (see Sir M. Lampson's telegram No. 322 [of 9th May]), and they would be far greater from point of view of British Administration in Palestine. But it is difficult to explain matters to General Nuri until we can tell him about our forthcoming announcement in Parliament. Further telegram follows on this point.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 391; Jedda, No. 85; and Jerusalem, No. 328.)

[E 3560/6/31]

No. 137.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 333.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 15, 1939.

I COMMUNICATED this morning to the Prime Minister text of extracts from Palestine white paper contained in your telegram No. 380, and made oral statement on lines of your telegram No. 381. After concluding words based on last sentence of your telegram No. 381, Prime Minister said that he was already acting in that sense, and had made a communication to the Mufti urging him to acquiesce in His Majesty's Government's statement of policy.

2. As Prime Minister himself had thus brought the Mufti into the picture, I gave him the hint about the exclusion of the Mufti as instructed in last paragraph of your telegram No. 392. I have seldom seen the Prime Minister more upset. He said such a declaration would ruin the prospects of settlement. He asked me to telegraph urgently through your Lordship a personal appeal from himself to the Prime Minister to exclude any reference to the Mufti's exclusion in connexion with the white paper. Why not, he said, do things without saying them as in the English way? The Mufti, he said, might continue to be excluded for the present without any declaration, which would most certainly involve continuation of the conflict and terrorism in Palestine.

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3. As I was leaving I begged him again to support His Majesty's Government's declaration of policy. He replied: "I must wait reply about the Mufti." This would seem to indicate that the proposed declaration about the Mufti may not only involve continuation of conflict in Palestine, but may also deprive us of the support of Arab States (see Bagdad telegram No. 189 to you).

4. I do not disguise from your Lordship that the proposed declaration about the Mufti seems to me a great mistake.

[E 3592/6/31]

No. 138.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 192.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, May 16, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 187.

I have complied with instructions.

Prime Minister received extracts without enthusiasm. He said that he felt sure that policy of His Majesty's Government would fail. What was lacking was a provision which would set the seal of certainty to limitations to Zionism envisaged in white paper.

He insisted that Jews would employ every possible device to modify or evade these limitations and to obstruct creation of an independent Palestine State until they had done so.

I said that it was not the policy of His Majesty's Government to permit creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. He retorted: "Nor do they want an Arab State." I recalled to him message in last sentence of your telegram No. 163 but he would not be comforted.

Prime Minister said that if His Majesty's Government for practical reasons found themselves unable to give unconditional undertaking to set up an independent Palestine State within a definite period, Arab fear of Jewish machinations would be diminished if Arab head of State and Palestine Cabinet could be set up at once.

Prime Minister said that Iraqi delegate had reported that when Arab delegations left London Conference they had been under the impression that His Majesty's Government had accepted their request for immediate formation of a Palestine Cabinet.

I need not worry you with details of counter-arguments which I employed based on mass of material which has accumulated on this subject.

Conclusion was that the Prime Minister undertook to study good points of extracts and to see whether he could not find justification for an appeal to Palestine Arabs to give His Majesty's Government's proposals a chance.

He did not mention the Mufti.

He showed me telegram received to-day from Ibn Saud to the effect that unless white paper embodied three recommendations in Cairo telegram No. 303 to you he would not feel able to ask Palestine Arabs to accept it.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 27; Jedda, No. 23; and Jerusalem, No. 17.)

[E 3605/6/31]

No. 139.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 195.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, May 16, 1939.

MY telegram No. 192.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that before leaving Bagdad for Beirut on 16th May Jemal Hussein had a private discussion with him and Prime Minister on published forecasts of the white paper. Jemal Hussein was very gloomy and went off in a pessimistic frame of mind, seeing no possibility of acceptance by Palestinian Arabs. The Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs did their best to persuade him to see the advantages of giving the policy a trial, but met with no apparent success.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 28; Jedda, No. 24; and Jerusalem, No. 18.)

[E 3618/6/31]

No. 140.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 337.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 17, 1939.

OWING to my enforced absence at Alexandria, I instructed oriental secretary to communicate orally to the Prime Minister substance of your telegram No. 401.

The Prime Minister made no observation at first, but looked upset. He handed Mr. Smart English translations of telegrams to him from Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Governments, texts of which are given in my immediately following telegram. Reference in those telegrams is to memorandum, text of which was transmitted to you in my telegram No. 303.

The Prime Minister said that Egyptian Government could not do otherwise than take up the same attitude as Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Governments. His Excellency added that this was all the more inevitable in view of His Majesty's Government's decision about the Mufti, which he deplored. He doubted, moreover, whether we should be able to maintain it.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 57; Bagdad, No. 28; and Jedda, No. 22.)

[E 3619/6/31]

No. 141.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 338.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, May 17, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of Saudi Arabian Government telegram:—

"Saudi Arabian Government is of opinion to resume exerting efforts with both Palestine Arabs and British Government with the object of bringing closer together the two view-points and of arriving at an equitable and satisfactory solution.

"Saudi Arabian Government is of the opinion, too, that the reply to British Government should be to the effect that it is not possible to convince Palestinians of the advisability of accepting British project unless it is modified by interpretations suggested in Cairo."

Following is text of Iraqi Government telegram:—

"We (i.e., Iraqi Government) are of the opinion that efforts should be exerted to bring closer the point of view of people of Palestine and British Government in order to arrive at a just and satisfactory solution. A reply should be sent to British Government to the effect that we cannot advise people of Palestine to accept British proposals unless they embody the interpretations communicated to the British Government with Cairo proposals."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 29; Jedda, No. 23; and Jerusalem, No. 58.)

[E 3513/6/31]

No. 142.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 208. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Foreign Office, May 17, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 289, Saving [of 13th May: Desire of Jewish organisations in France to send delegation to embassy].

It may be expected that after the publication of the white paper on Palestine, Zionist organisations in many countries will wish to send delegations to His Majesty's representatives to protest against the decisions of His Majesty's Government. If His Majesty's representatives refuse to receive such delegations, this may tend to confirm the false impression that His Majesty's Government have disregarded their obligations to the Jews and are concerned only to placate Arab opinion.

2. Provided, therefore, that you see no objection, I shall be glad if your Excellency will agree to receive the suggested delegation.

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3. You may, however, remind delegation that the Jewish Agency for Palestine are in direct touch with His Majesty's Government and have constant opportunities of making the views of the various Jewish organisations known to the competent British authorities both in London and in Palestine.

If the members of the delegation should in future feel impelled to put forward to His Majesty's Government some particular point of view, the appropriate channel would be through the Jewish Agency in London rather than through the British Embassies and Legations abroad.

[E 3560/6/31]

No. 143.

Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 401.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 17, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 333 [of 15th May: Forthcoming declaration that Mufti will be excluded indefinitely from Palestine].

You should at once explain confidentially to the Egyptian Prime Minister that His Majesty's Government fully understand his concern on this matter, but that it is not practicable for them to act as he suggests, viz., while keeping the Mufti out of Palestine, to refrain from making any public statement of their intention to exclude him indefinitely. His Majesty's Government are bound to be pressed in Parliament to make their intentions clear. There is, in fact, a question down for 17th May asking whether it is the intention to allow the Mufti to return to Palestine; His Majesty's Government could not refuse indefinitely to answer such questions.

2. You should explain that, in these circumstances, His Majesty's Government feels that no useful purpose would be served by trying to evade or postpone their reply. They must explain fully and publicly what their intentions are, and they intend to reply to parliamentary question on 17th May accordingly.

3. Reply to question on 17th May will be as follows:—

"His Majesty's Government cannot lose sight of the facts, not only that the present Mufti of Jerusalem was the head of an organisation which they held responsible for the campaign of terrorism and violence against British forces and civil officials and against Jews, but also that he is the head of a faction which has for many months past pursued persistently a similar campaign against Arabs of other shades of political opinion. They have decided, therefore, to exclude him indefinitely from Palestine."

4. You should further explain, if you think it desirable, that the British authorities in Palestine do not agree with Egyptian Prime Minister's view that such a declaration would have a bad effect on the internal situation in Palestine. In the view of the British civil and military authorities, it is most important to make it clear that the Mufti will not be allowed to return for an indefinite period. It is only by such a declaration that the large body of Palestine Arabs, who are tired of rebellion and violent methods, can feel free to co-operate in efforts to restore law and order. If, on the other hand, no such announcement is made, it will be generally felt that methods of terrorism have been successful, and the establishment of normal conditions and of confidence between the various communities in Palestine will become impossible.

5. His Majesty's Government very much regret that their views on this point should differ from those of the Egyptian Prime Minister.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 199; Jedda, No. 87; and Jerusalem, unnumbered.)

[E 3514/6/31]

No. 144.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).

(No. 200.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 17, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 189 [of 14th May: Forthcoming declaration regarding the intention to exclude the Mufti indefinitely from Palestine].

You should immediately explain position in great confidence to Iraqi Prime Minister on lines of my telegram No. 401 to Cairo.

2. You should add, in reply to Iraqi Prime Minister's enquiry recorded in your telegram No. 173 [of 6th May], that General Nuri will understand from parliamentary statement which is being made on 17th May the future attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Mufti, and their reasons for that attitude. General Nuri will appreciate from this statement that His Majesty's Government would not welcome any discussions between the Mufti and the Iraqi Government regarding the future of Palestine. General Nuri will remember that His Majesty's Government have themselves refused to receive the Mufti as a delegate during the recent conferences in London, owing to his record as the leader of a faction which has been guilty of organising a campaign of terrorism against its political opponents in Palestine. His Majesty's Government would therefore hope that the Iraqi Prime Minister will discourage any suggestion on the Mufti's part that he may be allowed to come to Iraq.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 402; Jedda, No. 88; and Jerusalem, unnumbered.)

[E 3801/6/31]

No. 145.

United Kingdom Delegation to Foreign Office.—(Received May 23.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 20. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Geneva, May 22, 1939.*

FOLLOWING from the Secretary of State:—

"In the Council this evening I made the statement on Palestine, the text of which is available in the Foreign Office.

"2. M. Bonnet (France) said that he was grateful for the statement, which he had noted with interest. The only other speaker was the *rapporteur* (M. Munters, Latvia), who said that he noted that the white paper would shortly be distributed to members of the League, and that the Permanent Mandates Commission would have an opportunity of considering it at its forthcoming ordinary session. The discussion of this item of the agenda was thus concluded."

[E 3823/6/31]

No. 146.

Sir R. Lindsay to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 235.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Washington, May 23, 1939.

MY telegram No. 229.

Jewish community in this country are bitterly attacking the white paper and are declaring that His Majesty's Government's policy constitutes a betrayal of the Jews and a denial of the Balfour Declaration. Zionist organisation of America under Rabbi Wise state that "Jewish people could not accept in principle or in practice," and that American Jews "will give every support to Jews of Palestine in rebuilding of Jewish homeland in Palestine, regarding new white paper as no more permanent than the white paper which preceded it."

National Emergency Committee for Palestine and four other Jewish bodies have all issued protests in varying terms, and white paper was severely criticised in synagogues over the week-end.

Senator Wagner, at large protest meeting in New York on 21st May, referred to "the black paper of 1939," but the Mayor of New York was much more temperate, reminding his hearers of the critical international situation, expressing his faith in "the fair play, generosity and understanding the British people," and warning his audience "never to get mad when you are in danger."

Senator King attacked His Majesty's Government in Senate on 12th May for succumbing to Arab pressure and failing to carry out terms of mandate. I understand Jews are lobbying Congressmen very actively.

On 22nd May a delegation headed by Rabbi Wise called on Secretary of State to deliver a resolution protesting against white paper. According to press, this resolution asked that United States Government should (a) request His Majesty's Government to take no action to implement the policy of the white paper until United States Government had had an opportunity of examining its bearing on

American rights, and (b) intimate that "the United States Government, on basis of its convention with Great Britain, cannot recognise action taken under white paper in view of jeopardy created for American interests."

Secretary of State is reported to have confined his reply to explaining that State Department was still studying the white paper.

[E 3715/6/31]

No. 147.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington).

(No. 240.)

(Telegraphic). R.

Foreign Office, May 24, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 228 [of 19th May: Palestine white paper].

You may inform State Department that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the policy laid down in the white paper does not conflict with the terms of the mandate and will not render it necessary to amend the mandate.

2. As regards procedure at Geneva, you may reply that United Kingdom delegate has made a brief statement on Palestine at the present session of the League Council, but that the white paper will not be seriously discussed at Geneva this month. Permanent Mandates Commission will have an opportunity of considering the matter at its forthcoming ordinary session in June. League Council will presumably, therefore, have the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission before it at its next session in September.

[E 3875/6/31]

No. 148.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington).

(No. 503.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1939.

THE United States Ambassador called to see me yesterday in order to convey to me a message appended as an annex to this paper on behalf of his Government concerning English policy in Palestine. The Ambassador was concerned to point out how restrained was the reaction of his Government to the policy declared by His Majesty's Government, and expressed the view that we could be very well satisfied with the situation. It was very much more favourable in regard to this matter than he could have hoped.

2. In the course of some general discussion of the present situation I told the Ambassador of the general policy that we were pursuing towards Russia, and Mr. Kennedy expressed his strong view that we had been completely right to go as far as we had in order to avoid a break-down of the negotiations. In his view this would have been disastrous.

3. The Ambassador referred before leaving to the discussions on which he had been engaged with the appropriate Departments with regard to the barter arrangements with the United States. He urged in the strongest terms that although he had never thought much of the idea when it was first initiated, it was essential now that we should move quickly and generously. He made no secret of the fact that the President's personal policy was involved in this question, and that for the sake of larger issues we should be making a great mistake if we failed to clinch matters quickly on broad lines. I told the Ambassador that I would transmit what he had said to my colleagues who were more closely concerned.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

Annex.

Mr. Hull appreciates very much the advance information furnished by His Majesty's Embassy in Washington regarding the Palestine White Paper. Mr. Kennedy believes that Lord Halifax would wish to know informally that there is rather widespread disappointment in the United States, particularly in Zionist circles, at some of the provisions of the white paper, and especially those which envisage a marked reduction of Jewish immigration into Palestine.

[E 3886/6/31]

No. 149.

Political Secretary, Bahrein, to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bahrein, May 27, 1939.

MY telegram No. 74 of 22nd May.

Following is translation of letter from Ibn Saud:—

"I thank the British Government for their interest in sending their message to me and for their expressions of sincerity. The most interesting aspect to me in this matter is to know the views of the people of Palestine. I did not reveal the contents of your previous communication to Jemal Husseini as the British Government desired that they should remain secret. My conversation with Jemal Husseini was of a general nature about convincing the people of all Palestine to be compliant in coming to an agreement with the British Government and stopping hostilities.

"I believe that the British Government do not harbour any ill intentions towards the Arabs, and I realise the difficulties with which they are faced in the present circumstances in coming to a solution of the Palestinian problem. I hope peace will prevail in that country, and that an agreement may be reached between the British Government and the Arabs in a manner which will safeguard the interests of both. I still do not know exactly how the people of Palestine view the white paper, but believe if there are guarantees of their interests, then it will be possible to come to an understanding. However, I will not weaken the efforts to find an [? opportunity] of bringing peace to Palestine and trust that God may do so."

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 4050/6/31]

No. 150.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 3, 1939.

MY telegram No. 70 of 31st May.

Amir Faisal has at last returned to the Hejaz. I think he would like to see me and visit might be useful. I therefore propose to go to Taif after King's Birthday for two or three days.

2. There are no fresh arguments to be advanced in support of Palestine proposals of His Majesty's Government, and I suppose all I can do is to repeat that they represent great advance from Arab point of view, to remind the Amir that His Majesty's Opposition and Government supporters think they go too far, and to express hope that, in any case, Ibn Saud will use his influence in favour of maintenance of order in Palestine. I should, of course, use world situation as background to these arguments.

3. If you have any other instructions, I should be glad to have them by 8th June at latest.

[E 4077/6/31]

No. 151.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 5.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 164. Saving. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Cairo, June 3, 1939.

YACOUB-AL-GHOSSEIN, head of the Youth party and member of the Supreme Arab Committee, confidentially told reliable intermediary here that he and others of the Supreme Arab Committee were prepared to acquiesce in

co-operation on lines of white book and to urge Mufti to acquiesce or, if he refused, to break with him. In order to do this, Yacoub said that they must have something in the nature of an apparent concession to show the Arabs.

2. Intermediary replied that the white book was now the definite policy of His Majesty's Government and could not be modified. Yacoub suggested that certain interpretations of the white book might be given which would help him and his friends to bring about Arab co-operation. Following are the points which he raised:—

- (1) What are the departments which would at first be given to Palestinians? He himself suggested Education, Health, Aukaf, Public Works and Justice. Intermediary pointed out that this was asking too much, and Yacoub more or less admitted that he would be satisfied with less.
- (2) Approximately when would the Palestinians be given all the departments?
- (3) Would it be possible to give an assurance that the opinions of parties of Supreme Arab Committee agreeing to co-operate would be taken regarding the persons to be appointed as heads of departments?
- (4) Could a date be fixed for the constitution of the Legislative Assembly?
- (5) Would it be possible to appoint a representative having the confidence of the Supreme Arab Committee parties co-operating to the Census Board or whatever body organised the next census?
- (6) Would it be possible to appoint an Arab approved by these elements to an authoritative post in the Department of Immigration and in the department handling land sales?
- (7) Could the Palestine Government pay compensation to those persons who had not taken part in the conflict, but who had suffered material losses therefrom?
- (8) Could an Economic Commission, with suitable Arab representatives thereon, be appointed to consider remedies for the disastrous economic situation created by the events of recent years? Yacoub apparently had in mind, among other things, the organisation of agricultural credits, &c.
- (9) The British Government had stated that the ten years' transition period might be prolonged if the situation at the end of that time was not satisfactory. If the situation became satisfactory sooner, could the transition period be shortened?

3. Yacoub added that he was in indirect touch with the British authorities in Palestine.

4. In view of the words "as circumstances permit" in section 10 (4) of the white book, I take it we are not prepared to give any assurance as to when all the heads of the departments will be Palestinian.

5. Similarly the words "provided that local conditions permit" in section 10 (5) presumably rule out giving any date for the constitution of the Legislative Assembly.

6. Section 10 (8) states that His Majesty's Government will strive to create an independent Palestine State to come into being *within* ten years. The word "within" might perhaps enable us to make a favourable response to (9) of Yacoub's points.

7. While Yacoub was most anxious that his approach should be kept secret for the present, he said that, if we were prepared to discuss matters, he was prepared to get into direct touch with us.

8. It is evident from contacts with Arabs in Cairo that there is a desire among some members of the Supreme Arab Committee to acquiesce in our policy provided they can be assured that method of its execution will not be to exclude them from the participation contemplated by the white book or to rely only on the co-operation of the minority Nashashibi elements. Latter policy must consolidate the majority parties in Opposition under the leadership of the Mufti, with whom some of the committee would like to break.

(Repeated to Jerusalem [No. 5, Saving].)

[E 4050/6/31]

No. 152.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 92.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 7, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 72 [of 3rd June: Sir R. Bullard's proposed visit to Amir Feisal at Taif].

I approve arguments which you propose to use regarding Palestine. When drawing attention to Jewish reactions, and to criticisms advanced in certain quarters in London, and emphasising value to Arabs of policy laid down in white paper, you may add that His Majesty's Government are firmly determined to adhere to their policy, and that there is no reason to fear its modification as a result of pressure from its opponents.

2. Otherwise I have no observations.

[E 4408/6/31]

No. 153.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 17, 1939.

PALESTINE.

Amir Faisal does not deny that white paper represents tremendous advance from Arab point of view, but says that while he and the King and Arabs like them and have confidence in the good intentions of His Majesty's Government, ordinary Arabs will ask what the Jewish national home means and what is to happen after ten years, and will even think provisions regarding the Jewish immigration conceals sinister intention to continue it after five years with the consent of packed body of unrepresentative Arabs. The sort of argument he used will have been heard repeatedly at London discussion.

2. Faisal showed me in confidence what purported to be minutes of talks between Ibn Saud and Jamal Hussaini before the issue of the white paper. It represented Ibn Saud as expressing complete confidence in the good faith of His Majesty's Government and the conviction that the friendship of Great Britain is essential to the Arabs. At the same time, it is evident from the circumstances reported in my telegram No. 75 of 14th June that Ibn Saud is much more interested in his position with regard to Iraq than in Palestine, and that he would hardly adopt a Palestinian policy which would give General Nuri fresh opportunity to represent him anti-Arab.

3. In talking with Faisal I felt that the white paper policy had effected great improvement in Saudi relations with His Majesty's Government, and that Ibn Saud's doubt and anxiety about our intentions had been removed. But in trying to persuade Faisal in London of the necessity for compromise because of Jewish influence in America and elsewhere we seemed to have been so successful that even Faisal asks himself whether His Majesty's Government will be sufficiently free from Jewish pressure to act on their good intentions. On this subject I asserted that resolve of His Majesty's Government, as conveyed in your telegram No. 92 of 7th June, not to allow any opposition to divert them from the policy laid down in white paper.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 20. Will Cairo please post figures to Jerusalem, Bagdad and Damascus.)

[E 4377/6/31]

No. 154.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 18, 1939.

AMIR FAISAL, who paid a sudden visit to Jedda, sent for me to-day. Ibn Saud has had an idea on which he asks for the opinion of His Majesty's Government. How would it be, he asks, if he sent people secretly to try to induce the

Palestinian Arabs to make a truce of a year, during which they could put their views before His Majesty's Government? Emissaries would speak in his name and deny the suggestion [group omitted] known to His Majesty's Government.

2. I am obliged to transmit this suggestion to you, but I was not encouraging in my reply to the Amir. I said that I saw two great objections, the first that the white paper was the last word of His Majesty's Government, and the second that His Majesty's Government had long been opposed to an armistice as likely to encourage extremists. It would be impossible, I urged, to suggest an armistice to the Arabs without raising hopes which would almost certainly be disappointed.

3. Although this proposal will, I imagine, be rejected by His Majesty's Government, it would not be of much use to suggest that Ibn Saud should urge unconditional acceptance of the white paper at a moment when enemies are representing him as siding with us against the Arabs, though we might express the hope that he will continue to use his influence for peace in all possible ways.

4. Ibn Saud also asks whether it would be useful if his emissaries made soundings as to the possibility of bringing about a reconciliation between the French and Syrians. I said that in a matter which concerned Syria His Majesty's Government would be reluctant to offer an opinion, even on a project designed to assist their French allies.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 12.)

(Will Jerusalem please send figures by post to Cairo, No. 15, Saving; Damascus, No. 1, Saving; and Bagdad, No. 8, Saving.)

[P 2538/120/150]

No. 155.

THE BRITISH POLICY FOR PALESTINE.

A Statement by the Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 1939.

I WELCOME this opportunity of giving an account of the policy which His Majesty's Government, with the approval of Parliament, have decided to pursue in Palestine. The main burden of responsibility for carrying out the mandate naturally rests upon His Majesty's Government. They have not regarded their work in Palestine primarily as a load which it was troublesome to support, but as the fulfilling of a great trust which they, as the original authors of the Balfour Declaration, viewed with sympathy even before the many other nations who subsequently approved it. But undoubtedly the administration of the mandate has brought in its train difficulties, the consequences of which other nations have watched with anxiety, but which Great Britain alone has actually had to face in the practical sphere. Only Great Britain has spent her treasure—to the extent of many millions of pounds—in the execution of the mandate; and only Great Britain has had large numbers of her civilian officers and soldiers killed in defence of it. It is proper that the nation which is entrusted with the duty of fulfilling this international promise to the Jews and the Arabs, and which gains such benefits as may accrue to the Power which administers Palestine, should bear the hardship and loss associated with the work. But that nation is also entitled to receive from the others who have supported the objectives of the mandate, but who have no direct responsibility in attaining them, a ready understanding, and a willingness to give full weight to the practical difficulties which have arisen in the execution of this peculiarly difficult task.

After the enquiries following the serious disturbances of 1929, His Majesty's Government proposed to make another move in the direction of giving a measure of self-government to the people of Palestine, and they announced their intention to set up a Legislative Council generally on the lines indicated in the white paper of 1922. It was then hoped that the participation of representatives of both sections of the community in a Legislative Council would begin to introduce a spirit of co-operation between the Jews and the Arabs. In 1935, after a reformed system of municipal government had been given a trial, a detailed scheme for a Legislative Council was produced. The plan was laid before Parliament early in 1936, and, after severe criticism in the House of Commons, withdrawn. The Arabs interpreted this withdrawal as due to powerful pressure from the Jews,

who had bitterly opposed the proposal for a Legislative Council; and the incident was one of the causes that precipitated the general strikes and disorders which broke out again in the spring of 1936.

A Royal Commission was appointed to enquire into the underlying causes of the disturbances; to ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews had any legitimate grievances as to the manner in which the mandate was being implemented; and to make such recommendations as they might think necessary for the removal of grievances and the prevention of their recurrence. The report of the Royal Commission made it clear that the main cause of the trouble was Arab fear of Jewish domination, due to uncertainty about the extent of future Jewish immigration; and as a remedy for the situation which had arisen the commission unanimously recommended a scheme of partition which would have divided Palestine into two sovereign independent Arab and Jewish States, whilst other areas of the country were to be retained under mandatory administration. This proposal was approved in principle by His Majesty's Government, subject to the working out of a practical scheme. But it involved the abrogation of the existing mandate, and therefore required the approval of the League of Nations. And so, following parliamentary debates in London, the partition proposal was discussed at meetings of the Permanent Mandates Commission and of the Council and Assembly of the League two years ago, when His Majesty's Government received authority to explore the practical application of the principle. Last year a commission under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead was appointed for the purpose of ascertaining whether a practicable scheme of partition could be devised; but after a careful examination of the economic, financial and other implications of the proposal they came to the conclusion that if they were to adhere strictly to their terms of reference they had no alternative but to report that they were unable to recommend boundaries for the proposed division of the country which would give a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States. After considering the report His Majesty's Government announced their conclusion that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine were so great that this solution was impracticable. Therefore they would have to devise some alternative means of meeting the requirements of the Palestine situation. They at the same time announced their intention to invite Jewish and Arab representatives to confer with them in London, in an effort to secure some kind of agreement between the two peoples in Palestine which would be the best of all bases for conducting future policy; but they made it clear that if the London discussions did not produce agreement within a reasonable period of time they would take their own decision and announce early the policy which they proposed to pursue.

You are aware that no agreement was reached in the London Conferences. The policy which has now been published has been framed in the light of the reports of the Royal Commission and the Partition Commission, and also of the London discussions. Whilst conforming to their obligations to the Jews and the Arabs under the mandate, His Majesty's Government have been concerned to remove as far as is possible at the present time that uncertainty about future developments which is one of the causes of the tragedy now being enacted in Palestine.

The mandate is closely related to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which was itself afterwards enshrined in the preamble to the mandate. The Balfour Declaration made a promise to the Jewish people, and also contained an assurance to the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. From the very beginning, therefore, policy in Palestine has been erected on a foundation of obligations to the Jews on the one hand and to the Arab and other non-Jewish communities in Palestine on the other. The Permanent Mandates Commission in 1930 endorsed the view that "the obligations laid down by the mandate in regard to the two sections of the population are of equal weight"; and His Majesty's Government hold firmly to that important opinion. There can be no just solution to the problem which belittles either of these two sets of obligations. Many people who have engaged in this Palestine controversy start from what may be called either a pro-Jewish or a pro-Arab standpoint, and each partisan group tends to place special emphasis on the undertakings to their own friends, and to underestimate—or in some cases even to ignore—the claims of the other party. That

way lies injustice and a breach of the mandate. Also, at each stage of the controversy, documents have been presented by the Jewish Agency and by bodies representing the Palestine Arabs, respectively. Often these rival cases are ably argued. But they are necessarily *ex parte* statements; however conscientiously the Jewish leaders may argue the Jewish case and the Arab leaders argue the Arab case, they must each tend to place special emphasis on those factors in the history of documentation of the matter which support their own particular claims. The arguments so presented are often logical and impressive, but they leave out a part of the picture.

The British Government and people as a whole are impartial as between the claims of the Palestine Arabs and the Jews. They are sympathetic and friendly to both the Arab and the Jewish peoples. British friendship for the Arabs has been abundantly shown in the decisive help which we have given them, in war and peace, in attaining their prized object of freedom over a large part of Arabia. Our friendship for the Jewish people has been expressed in the absolute equality of treatment with other British citizens invariably accorded to large Jewish populations in many parts of the British Empire, and latterly in our conspicuous support both in word and deed of the cause of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. In Palestine we are sympathetic to the position of both peoples. The Arabs and the Jews have different characteristics and gifts; they each have distinct contributions to make to the well-being of their common lands; our paramount desire is to deal fairly by both peoples and to help them to live in peace and concord together.

The authors of the Balfour Declaration and of the mandate who envisaged duties towards the Jews and duties towards the Arabs, each of equal weight, cannot have supposed that those duties would be in conflict, but that they would be mutually reconcilable. They cannot have intended that these two sets of obligations should contradict each other, and meet only in a violent clash. What then are these obligations? On the one hand was the promise of "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people"; and on the other was the assurance that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." These general undertakings of the Balfour Declaration were afterwards enlarged upon and given more practical interpretation in the articles of the mandate.

The term "National Home," which is used throughout the declaration and the mandate, is somewhat ambiguous and has been open to various interpretations. It has been claimed that it meant that Palestine should ultimately become a Jewish State. There can be no doubt that the possibility of a Jewish State was not excluded; it was regarded as a definite possibility by some of the leading statesmen who were familiar with the intentions of those who drew up the Balfour Declaration. Thus President Wilson spoke early in 1919 of laying in Palestine "the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth," and General Smuts towards the end of the same year foretold an increasing stream of Jewish immigration into the country and "in generations to come a great Jewish State rising there once more." His Majesty's Government accept that the possibility of Palestine becoming a Jewish State was not precluded.

Yet in the Balfour Declaration and the mandate the terms Jewish State and Jewish Commonwealth are not employed. Instead, a term which was without precedent in constitutional charters, a term which lacked clear definition, the term "Jewish National Home" was used. It was deliberately used. For clearly statesmen engaged in waging war, still uncertainly situated in the middle of Armageddon—and even the statesmen gathered later in peace at Versailles and Geneva, attempting to create a new world—could not foretell with any confidence the result which would flow from the Balfour Declaration and the mandate. That must depend on others; it must depend in the first place on the response made by the Jews themselves to the historic opportunity offered to them. The Jewish effort might be small or it might be great. It might meet with unforeseeable difficulties. Those responsible for the Balfour Declaration and the mandate were aware of these uncertainties hidden in the future, and so they chose deliberately to describe this part of their objective in Palestine a phrase—"a Jewish National Home"—which might mean either a Jewish State or else something very much less.

If the extent of the effort which the Jews would make in re-establishing a National Home was one of the main factors which would determine ultimate

developments in Palestine, the attitude of the existing Arab population was the other. When the mandate was framed there were only some 80,000 Jews settled in the country; but there were already more than 600,000 Arabs, whose forefathers had been in occupation of the land for many centuries. From the beginning the Balfour Declaration recognised certain duties to the non-Jewish population. While promising the Jewish people a National Home it declared that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. This principle is reflected in the operative clauses of the mandate, where, for example, in article 2 it is laid down that "the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants" are to be safeguarded, and in article 6 that "the rights and position" of the non-Jewish sections of the population are not to be prejudiced.

There has sometimes been controversy as to what these phrases were intended to mean. Some exponents have sought to minimise the significance of the words and to suggest, for instance, that "civil rights" meant little more than civic rights. That is an untenable position. The provisions in the mandate must be regarded as giving effect not only to the Balfour Declaration, but to the spirit of article 22 of the Covenant. The Arabs were a people whose well-being and development was to form a sacred trust of civilisation, and they were a people who had been settled in a country for many centuries, but in whose land there was to be created a home for another people. There can be no doubt that their rights which were to be safeguarded included all those political and social rights which a free people in such circumstances were entitled to retain. Should any doubt still remain upon the point, there exists contemporary evidence contained in the message communicated to King Hussein, which indicates authoritatively what the British Government in 1917 had in mind when they spoke of protecting the civil rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. This message was delivered only a few weeks after the publication of the Balfour Declaration itself. That pronouncement, with its promise to the Jewish people, came as something of a shock to the Arab world. British advisers in the Near East were even fearful lest it should cripple the great Arab revolt itself. And so the British Government sent a representative, one Commander Hogarth, to explain to King Hussein the significance of the Balfour Declaration. It was a frank explanation. It did not seek to minimise the extent of British sympathy with Jewish aspirations in Palestine, nor Britain's determination to do whatever she properly could to help in the achievement of those aspirations. It was an honest and balanced description of what was intended regarding both the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine. Commander Hogarth stated that Jewish opinion in the world favoured a return of Jews to Palestine, that the British Government viewed with favour the realisation of this aspiration, and that the Government was determined that no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal. But he stated categorically that this was only to be done "in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political," and he added that the British Government were determined that so far as Palestine was concerned "no people shall be subject to another."

I would point out that it was not a new Government which gave this explanation of the Balfour Declaration. It was the same Government, with Mr. Lloyd George in 10 Downing Street, and Mr. Balfour at the Foreign Office. There can have been no misunderstanding; there can have been no confusion of thought. The Hogarth message does not add anything to the substance of the Balfour Declaration; it is an authoritative explanation of its content. It does not purport to be additional to anything which was afterwards put into the mandate. It is merely evidence that the words "civil and religious rights" and "rights and position" in the Balfour Declaration and the mandate were intended by those primarily responsible to include the normal political rights of a people.

That assurance to the Arabs must surely mean that Palestine could not one day become a Jewish State against the will of the Arabs in the country.

So if either the Jews did not respond sufficiently to the opportunity afforded to them, or the Arabs objected to their country becoming a Jewish State, the conception of a Jewish National Home in Palestine was to be interpreted as something less than a Jewish National State. And, indeed, already in the white paper of 1922, which was drawn up concurrently with the framing of

the mandate itself, the nature of this less ambitious Jewish community was described. I quote the whole passage:—

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have re-created in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has, in fact, 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connexions."

That was written in 1922. Since then Jewish development in Palestine has proceeded apace. The Jews have responded magnificently to their opportunity. They have achieved a creative work which can only be accounted for by the fact that for many of them the mandate was an inspired summons back to their historic homeland. I need not describe their performance; it is well known. The mandatory Power has been carrying out its duty. The Jews have been able to acquire a very large portion of the best cultivable land in the country. The Administration has facilitated immigration so that over 300,000 new settlers have entered the country since the white paper of 1922 was written. The Jewish community is no longer a small and weak minority. It counts some 450,000 souls, and amounts to almost a third of the population. Its strength is out of all proportion to its numbers. It is skilful and self-confident; it is well disciplined; it has an economic power which makes its position in the country decisive. It has achieved to a degree which renders them a permanent part of the life of Palestine all those characteristics which the 1922 white paper described as essential to the Jewish National Home. The Jewish National Home is established, and given reasonably peaceful conditions, it is secure and will grow as the years go by.

But in the intervening years the Arabs' attitude to this change has been more and more sharply defined. It has become evident beyond a shadow of doubt that they would resent most bitterly the extension of this Jewish National Home into a Jewish National State. There is nothing inconsistent with the mandate in His Majesty's Government's declaration that it is no part of their policy that Palestine, against the will of the Arab population, should become a Jewish State.

I will return later to the constitutional problem in Palestine. First, I would say something regarding His Majesty's Government's policy on immigration. It has been said in some quarters that our new proposals constitute a breach of the mandate. That is a matter to which His Majesty's Government gave most careful consideration before reaching a conclusion, for they were aware of the view held by some people that a breach of the mandate might be involved. It is urged that the mandate is broken when the mandatory Power changes the time-honoured practice of settling the number of immigrants to be admitted to Palestine according to the country's economic capacity to absorb them.

But I would point out in the first place that "economic absorptive capacity" is never mentioned in the mandate. The mandate instructs that Jewish immigration is to be facilitated "under suitable conditions," and so long as "the rights

and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced." Those are the important conditions regarding immigration laid down in the mandate, and they are the sole conditions.

It is true that the British Government at the time of the framing of the mandate themselves laid down that "immigration should not exceed the economic capacity of the country to absorb them." That was in order to give the Palestine Administration more precise guidance as to the method by which, in the circumstances of the time, immigration should in practice be determined. I may remark in passing that the author of that phrase in the 1922 white paper, Mr. Winston Churchill, has himself more than once repudiated the suggestion that it meant that immigration should always be permitted right up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country to absorb them." That was in order to give the Palestine other relevant considerations to be taken into account. Nevertheless, it is true that, from 1922 until 1936, the flow of immigration was in practice regulated strictly by the Administration's view of the country's economic absorptive capacity; and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, in his letter to Dr. Weizmann in 1931, stated that this principle should be the sole criterion in considering the admission of immigrants. That principle received the approval of the Council of the League of Nations.

But His Majesty's Government do not regard any of these past statements as meaning that for all time and in all circumstances Palestine's economic absorptive capacity should be the sole factor taken into account in determining immigration policy. They do not regard the mandate as requiring any such rigid practice. Indeed, in certain circumstances—such as those which have arisen recently—they would regard strict adherence to that practice as contrary to the mandate.

It is reasonable that in one set of circumstances the unqualified adoption of the economic absorptive capacity principle might be appropriate, whilst in totally different circumstances it would be inappropriate. In the early stages of the mandatory régime, and especially so long as conditions in Palestine were comparatively peaceful, it was proper that as many Jewish immigrants should be admitted as the economic progress of the country would permit. There was no reason for any other limitation. The task of building up the Jewish National Home was being undertaken. The immigrants were harming no one; indeed, they were helping to develop the country, which was, incidentally, in the interests of the population severally. And if peaceful conditions had always persisted in Palestine there would have been no reason to alter this practice.

But there was always some Arab hostility to the Jewish immigrants; occasionally it broke out in acts of violence; and throughout the last decade the situation has been tense, until during the last three years a stubbornly sustained movement of greater violence than ever has received widespread support.

In our view, this steady growth of genuine Arab hostility is relevant in considering immigration policy. It may be argued that always, even in the early years, the Arabs have in some form or other protested against immigration. If we felt justified in ignoring their opinions then, why should we pay such special heed to them now? I would make three points in answer to that question. First, whilst the Jewish population in Palestine was comparatively small and powerless, the rights of the Arab population were not seriously prejudiced if fresh Jewish immigrants were permitted, even in the face of Arab protests. Secondly, it was our positive duty under the mandate to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish National Home which would have the strength in Palestine to maintain for ever those national characteristics described in the 1922 white paper. The Jewish community in the early years had not that strength; but to-day, with its vigorous population of close on half a million citizens, it has. Thirdly, we always hoped that—although at first Arab hostility to the introduction of large numbers of Jews into their country was natural and inevitable—the Arab population generally would in time learn to appreciate the material benefits which Jewish development brought in its wake for the whole population. The industrial expansion, the swollen revenues of the Administration, and the consequent extension of social services, have had a beneficial effect upon the Arab inhabitants as well as the Jews. We felt justified, therefore, in the interests of the Arabs themselves, in persevering with Jewish immigration on a large scale, in the hope that the other section of the population would become reconciled to it.

But that hope has been disappointed. As the proportion of the Jewish population in the country grew, Arab hostility grew also, and became harder and

more bitter, until it has now expressed itself in the movement of revolt which has been maintained for three years. Immigrants who could be economically absorbed cannot be politically absorbed. Who will say that, if an immigrant cannot be economically absorbed, that is a relevant consideration, and he should be kept out; but that if he cannot be politically absorbed that is a matter of no importance, and he should be let in? In the former case some other individual may lose his life. In His Majesty's Government's view, this consideration is a matter of great relevance.

What is the reason for this intense Arab opposition? It is not that the Arabs are incapable of enjoying the material advantages which the development of their country will bring to them. They are human, and in other circumstances they would appreciate this. But they are not thinking of material things. They are thinking of something more precious to them than any material advantage. They are thinking of their freedom. They recognise the industry and the skill and the wealth of the Jews, which are superior to those of most peoples, and they fear that the time is soon coming when the Jewish population will dominate them in their native country not only economically, but socially, politically and in every way.

So their protest has swelled until large numbers of Arabs have shown themselves prepared to lay down their lives in defence of their people. Sooner or later the time must come when the mandatory Power, which is charged to safeguard "the rights and position" of the Arabs, is in duty bound to take serious note of this passionate protest. Sooner or later the time must come when to continue ignoring it would be to infringe the specific instruction of the mandate. If the protest had merely been the disreputable action of terrorists and bandits, then it could pass unheeded, except by our soldiers and policemen. But although the movement of revolt has been disgraced by many acts of murder by bandits of the worst type, it has also borne the undeniable stamp of a wide, patriotic, national protest.

The words of the Balfour Declaration on the matter are strong. "*Nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities.*" The mandate says that the Administration, "while ensuring that the rights and position of the other section of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate immigration under suitable conditions." The rights referred to are the normal political rights of a people. And normally those rights would include the power to have their voice heard against a flow of immigration which threatened to relegate them to a position of virtual inferiority in their own country. It seems to His Majesty's Government that the rights guaranteed to the Arabs in the mandate would be definitely prejudiced if, now that immigration has made the Jewish population a vast proportion of the whole population, and given it a position already of economic dominance, the mandatory Power were to continue to permit indefinitely a flow of further immigration against a strong national protest which is supported by every articulate section of Arab opinion.

Of course, the point at which it is decided that there shall be no more immigration without Arab acquiescence must to some extent be fixed arbitrarily. The mandatory Power, who is responsible for administration and the restoration of law and order in Palestine, is the proper and best judge of when that time has come. The Arab representatives have urged upon us that immigration should be completely stopped forthwith. But we cannot accept that proposal. There are Jewish settlements in which more immigrants are required to develop the land. There are Jewish industrial enterprises which have been established in the expectation of a further immigration of money and men. It would be unfair on the Jewish National Home to allow no time for a gradual adjustment to new circumstances. An abrupt stoppage of immigration now would cause an upset in Jewish industry and produce economic and financial results which would affect adversely the well-being of the population generally. But, above, all, His Majesty's Government are concerned to help in any way that they properly can the settlement in new homelands of Jewish refugees from Europe. They would not consider it right that the doors of the National Home in Palestine should now be closed to these refugees. Although the authors of the mandate can never have contemplated that this extraordinary pressure would be added to the urge of Jews to return to Palestine, and although it is generally agreed that even in the best circumstances Palestine could not provide a home for more than a proportion of

Jewish people who wish to fly from Europe, His Majesty's Government believe that room should be found in Palestine for a further substantial number of refugees.

In view of all these considerations, they have decided that, if the economic absorptive capacity of the country permits, another 75,000 immigrants should be admitted during the next five years. This means that this tiny, rather poor, country, which already supports a population of 1½ million people, is to make a bigger contribution to the solution of the refugee problem during the next five years than any other country with the exception of the United States of America. But after the next five years further Jewish immigration will take place only if the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

I would draw attention to some other considerations. Under article 2 of the mandate His Majesty's Government is made responsible for "placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home." That is one of the major obligations of the mandate. What is the effect on it of the events of recent years? Arab hostility towards the Jews in Palestine has been whipped up to a passionate heat; there is no security of life or limb for the citizens of the Jewish National Home; their orange groves have been destroyed; countless acts of sabotage have disturbed and hampered the economic life of the community, which is only being maintained at its present level by an extraordinary expenditure of money and lives; the material losses resulting from the troubles which have already taken place have not yet been fully felt; and the hostility towards the Jewish National Home is spreading steadily in the countries beyond the Palestine border. These circumstances do not add to the economic or the political security of the Jewish National Home; they detract from it. And if this evil situation were to be indefinitely prolonged and the deep and bitter feeling which it arouses were to become intensified, then, indeed, would the threat to the Jewish National Home be constant. These are the hard facts which we have to face. We are not dealing simply with an argument on paper, but with a practical political problem. If the Arabs of Palestine feel that immigration into their country is to be continued indefinitely, then their desperation will grow sharper, and the sympathy of their fellow-Arabs in surrounding countries will become more active. To allow such a situation to develop is hardly in the best interests of the National Home itself. It certainly would not provide such political and economic conditions as will make the establishment of the Jewish National Home secure.

Nor would the danger be confined to Palestine itself. The hostilities there threaten to become a cause of permanent unrest and friction throughout the Near and Middle East. In some ways it is remarkable that Trans-Jordan has not before now been directly involved in the disturbances. In countries even further afield there might be evil consequences. Who can tell what the end might be if the bitterness of Arab nationalists against the Jews in Palestine were turned against the Jews in Iraq, or elsewhere? His Majesty's Government are compelled to take a most sober view of the consequences which policy in Palestine may bring in countries beyond its own borders.

Moreover, what is the alternative to the policy of seeking and requiring Arab acquiescence to further immigration after five years. It is the policy of continuing to facilitate Jewish immigration despite Arab hostility. That means ruling Palestine without the consent of a large proportion of the governed. It means altering steadily and to an important degree the position of the Arab population in their native country, against their own strongly expressed will. It means making this vital change in Palestine by force. I cannot bring myself to believe that the mandate intended that. Certainly it seems to me to be contrary to the spirit of the League of Nations. The League was brought into being precisely so that political and territorial changes might *not* be accomplished by force, but to provide a means by which necessary changes could be achieved by consultation, negotiation and consent between peoples. That is the civilised method, and it is the method that we are proposing in the future in Palestine.

His Majesty's Government have not said that after another five years there shall be no more Jewish immigration into Palestine. They have said that after that period such immigration will require Arab acquiescence. Perhaps that assurance will gradually accomplish a psychological change in the attitude of many Arabs towards the immigration of Jewish capital and citizens. So far they have not been free to recognise the many benefits which have followed from

the remarkable economic, financial and cultural development of the country under Jewish initiative. Their capacity for appreciating that has been overlaid by their fear that further unlimited Jewish expansion would spell for them the loss of their freedom as a people. But once that fear of their being forced under Jewish domination is removed, once they know that their wishes in important matters are going to be taken into account, they will be able to judge the issue coolly and more strictly on its merits. Then influential individuals amongst them, and whole Arab communities, may well begin to wish to share the advantages of further Jewish development. Even through the worst of the trouble some Arab villages have lived side by side in comparative friendship with their Jewish neighbours. If the Jews bestir themselves, they will not lack friends. The Jews themselves will have bargaining counters in their hands in the political as well as in the economic sphere. Constitutional advance in Palestine cannot reach any very distant goal without Jewish consent and co-operation. As I say, His Majesty's Government have not said that there shall not be no further Jewish immigration after another five years.

His Majesty's Government are charged by article 6 of the mandate to encourage close settlement of Jews on the land, provided that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced. Since 1921 land sales in Palestine have been uncontrolled, and a considerable part of the best agricultural land in the country has come into Jewish hands. So long as this process did not threaten the position of the Arab population, which is dependent on agriculture, the Administration did not contemplate any restrictive legislation.

But during recent years we have received repeated warnings from Commissions of Enquiry that the position of some small Arab landowners already required special protection. The members of successive commissions have held this view unanimously. They have reported that in some parts of the country the Arab population were so congested that, with their present methods of cultivation, there was no room for further land alienation without a loss of livelihood to Arab cultivators; and they recommended that in those places there should be a statutory prohibition of land sales. In other areas they reported that the situation was such that land sales should be restricted if the risk of Arab land shortage on a serious scale was to be avoided. We have to keep in mind the natural increase which will take place in the Arab population.

His Majesty's Government are anxious that the development of the Jewish National Home should be as unhampered as possible by barriers placed in the way of further agricultural settlements. But their duty under the Mandate was clear. They have to safeguard adequately the rights and position of the Arab population, which is primarily dependent on agriculture; and so they have decided to give the High Commissioner powers to prohibit or restrict land sales in any part of Palestine.

There will be areas where prohibition is enforced; there will be other areas where land sales will be permitted subject to the authority of Government being obtained; and there will be other areas where land sales continue to be uncontrolled. But this does not necessarily mean that a region which once becomes a prohibited area will always remain a prohibited area. As far as conditions permit the Government's policy will be one of dynamic agricultural development. The Government will encourage the improvement of methods of cultivation, so that congested areas may become less congested; and it is not impossible that as the situation develops an area which was at first a prohibited area may become one in which only restriction applies, and a restricted area may become free.

I return then to the constitutional proposals in our policy. It is asserted that by them we hand over a Jewish minority in Palestine to the rule of an Arab majority. Were we to do this I agree that we should be committing a breach of the mandate. But I am encouraged to believe that our white paper does not propose anything of the sort by the knowledge that the Arab representatives at the recent London Conference rejected these proposals precisely because they did not give an Arab majority control.

We are charged by article 2 of the mandate with "placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home." To place unqualified power in the hands of an Arab majority would defeat that purpose. Let me give one example of the way in which, easily and swiftly, an Arab majority in a Legislature might, if it

were so minded, destroy the National Home. It is an example which I used to the Arab delegates in London, to show them the impossibility of their demand for unrestricted rule by an Arab majority. Much of the Jewish economy is dependent on secondary industries; these industries are almost entirely Jewish concerns; and the Arabs are not directly interested in them but much Jewish capital is sunk in them; and large numbers of Jews are dependent upon them for their livelihood. So they would be a good target for non-Jewish attack. These industries depend on protected tariffs. It would be possible for an Arab majority in a single legislative act to reduce or abolish these tariffs, and so to render destitute large numbers of the citizens of the National Home.

Critics are apt to report that to withhold from an Arab majority the right to enjoy the normal privileges of a majority is a negation of democratic principles. But there are many democratic States in which special provision is made to protect the interests of racial and other minorities. And though the Jews may be a numerical minority in Palestine, they are not an ordinary minority. They are an extraordinary minority. One of the purposes of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate was to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish community in one country in the world where it would not suffer the insecurity and disabilities of a minority. Whatever the number of its citizens, the Jewish National Home has a special status in Palestine. As long ago as January 1918 Commander Hogarth, in his message to King Hussein delivered on behalf of the British Government, laid down the principle that "so far as Palestine is concerned no people shall be subject to another." That principle seemed to be acceptable to the Arab leader then. It is a principle which must be carefully maintained in any constitutional arrangements in Palestine.

His Majesty's Government are bent on preserving it in the developments which they propose. One of our instructions under the mandate is to create "such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure . . . the development of self-governing institutions." We have endeavoured from time to time to make a start with these institutions; but our efforts have been frustrated. For twenty years the animosities produced by our steady achievement of the obligation to establish the Jewish National Home have barred all progress with the fulfilment of this other obligation, which is so characteristic and essential a part of the whole mandate system. Whenever we have made a proposal it has been rejected either by the Arabs because they thought it too favourable to the Jews, or else by the Jews because they thought it too favourable to the Arabs.

We think the time has come to make another effort. We propose that as soon as peace and order have been restored, Arabs and Jews should begin to be officially associated with the work of central government. We contemplate a transitional period, and at the end of it the creation of an independent Palestine State. I need not trouble the members of the commission in this statement with a recital of the safeguards for Jewish interests which will characterise the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period. These are indicated in the white paper.

But I must refer to the proposal for the creation eventually of an independent State. Its constitution is not set down in the white paper. The body which is to be set up to consider the constitution of an independent Palestine will not even meet until some five years from now, when it may be hoped that conditions in Palestine, and relations between the Jews and Arabs, will be happier than they are to-day. Time is needed for hatred and suspicion to be removed, for the Jews and Arabs to accustom themselves to the fact that they have to live side by side in Palestine, and for tolerance and co-operation to grow between them. It is too early to speak with any confidence of the form of constitution which will be appropriate when the peoples of Palestine become self-governing.

But the white paper declares what must be the fundamental principle of the independent State. It must be one "in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured." Thus the principle of non-subjection of one people to the other is written firmly into His Majesty's Government's statement of policy. Again, His Majesty's Government, who will be represented in the work of constitution making, have declared in the white paper that before

they withdraw from responsibility for government in the country they must be satisfied that "adequate provision has been made for . . . the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home."

As I say, it would be premature now to attempt even to sketch the constitutional provisions which would be most appropriate to secure "the essential interests" of the Arabs and the Jews. It may be that the State should be formed on a military basis; it may be that it should be a federal State. It may be that the best arrangement would be to establish a predominantly Arab province, and a predominantly Jewish province or provinces, and to give to these political units a large measure of local autonomy under a central government dealing with matters of common concern between them. What is essential is that each people, both the Arabs and the Jews, should be free to live its own life according to its own traditions and beliefs and genius. Only by means of that freedom to each people can peace, friendship and prosperity be restored and placed upon permanent foundations in Palestine. His Majesty's Government do not claim that the policy which they have announced will achieve its ends in the near future. The animosities of the past few years have gone too deep for that. But they have decided on this policy because they believe it is the best calculated to turn events towards the great objectives which all who are concerned for Palestine must have in their minds.

[E 4494/1809/25]

No. 156.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 22, 1939.

MY telegram No. 81 of 20th June.

According to message from Ibn Saud, Iraqi Government promised, on receipt of Egyptian newspaper concerned—*Ahram*—to take steps to contradict the story that Nuri Pasha showed certain people the letter in which Ibn Saud tried by threats to prevent Iraq from helping Syria and Palestine. The King says no action has been taken, and he wishes to publish a communiqué whose text is given in my immediately following telegram (not repeated to Bagdad). Message asked whether I thought the communiqué could be broadcast from London. I replied that I would telegraph to you and Bagdad and hoped some good would come of it, and explained to the bearer of the message that, in any case, we could not publish a message affecting the Prime Minister of Iraq without at least consulting him first.

2. It is some days ago since this serious allegation against Ibn Saud appeared, and his desire to defend himself is understandable.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 27.)

[E 4495/1809/25]

No. 157.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 85.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 22, 1939.

THE following is the text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"The Saudi Arabian Government are concerned at the publication in *Ahram* of the statement that the Iraqi Prime Minister showed certain Syrians and officers of Iraqi army a letter sent to him by King Ibn Saud containing threats and warnings designed to prevent Iraq from helping Syria and Palestine. We understand that the Saudi Arabian Government have requested the Iraqi Government to deny this report about threats and warnings."

[E 4377/6/31]

No. 158.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 23, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 80 [of 18th June: Ibn Saud's enquiry whether he should send secret emissaries to induce Palestine Arabs to make a truce of one year].

I think that you should reply to Ibn Saud's enquiry to the effect that His Majesty's Government are grateful for his offer to use his influence with the Palestine Arabs with a view to the restoration of peace and order. They fear, however, that an attempt to induce the Palestine Arabs to make a truce of one year would not be likely to lead to the satisfactory result which Ibn Saud and His Majesty's Government hope to achieve. It might arouse the false impression that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to enter into fresh negotiations with the Palestine Arabs, and even that the policy laid down in the recent white paper might be changed.

2. If, however, Ibn Saud would be prepared to offer advice as from himself to the Palestine Arabs in rather a different sense, it might be very helpful. Ibn Saud could say that he realises that the white paper does not fulfil all the hopes of the Palestine Arabs, but it is clearly not going to be changed, and the Palestine Arabs would do well to make the best of it. In point of fact, the white paper does go a very long way to meet their main grievances. There is no need for the Palestine Arabs to express formal acceptance of the white paper, or to commit themselves in any way to agreement with the statements or decisions which it contains. But the point is that there is now not the faintest excuse for attempting to secure political objectives by violent methods. The time has undoubtedly come for ordinary constitutional methods to take the place of violence.

3. Ibn Saud can, I trust, add that he is convinced that His Majesty's Government mean to play fair by the Palestine Arabs, and that if the latter will co-operate they will find that every effort will be made to ensure that they shall benefit by the advantages offered to them in the recent declaration of policy. It is not reasonable for the Palestine Arabs to say that they do not trust His Majesty's Government, or that they fear that Jewish pressure will wreck the whole scheme. The least that the Palestine Arabs can do is to give the new system a trial. Finally, Ibn Saud can say, with regard to the appointment of Palestinians to be in charge of certain departments of Government, that His Majesty's Government and the British authorities in Palestine are ready and willing to bring the new scheme into operation as soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored. There is no need to wait until the Palestine problem has been discussed at Geneva in September. His Majesty's Government are willing to bring the new system into force before September if peace and order are sufficiently restored before then.

4. As regards Ibn Saud's further suggestion that he might make soundings as to the possibility of bringing about a reconciliation between the French and the Syrians, I approve your reply to the Amir Feisal. His Majesty's Government do not feel able to express a definite opinion on this point, though they are inclined to anticipate that the French Government would take the line that their relations with the Syrian political parties are to be regarded as a matter of internal concern, and that they consequently do not need outside assistance in this matter. On the whole His Majesty's Government doubt whether it would be worth while for Ibn Saud to put this suggestion to the French Government.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 456; Cairo, No. 462; and Bagdad, No. 226.)

[E 4542/1809/25]

No. 159.

Sir B. Newton (No. 30) to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received June 25.)

(No. 229.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, June 25, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 84 to Foreign Office.

Following official communiqué from Press Bureau is published in press here this morning:—

"*Al Ahram*, of Egypt, in its issue of 17th June, published a telegram from its special correspondent in Damascus under the heading: 'Syria and Palestine and Attitude of Arabs Towards Them: Strange Story about an Alleged Message from Ibn Saud.' The contents of this telegram are not true. Relations of affection and friendship existing between the King of Iraq and Saudi Arabia are established on a common policy in all matters, and particularly in regard to all that concerns the Arab cause."

[E 4603/1809/25]

No. 160.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 230. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, June 26, 1939.

JEDDA telegram No. 84 to Foreign Office.

Information from a special source available to you in London indicates that report in *Ahram* was deliberately inspired by Ibn Saud himself. His object presumably was to obtain ground for demanding public denial of the stories which, so he alleges, General Nuri has circulated privately.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 31.)

[E 4582/1809/25]

No. 161.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 89.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 25, 1939.

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"A telegram published in Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram* from its Damascus correspondent on 17th June stated that rumours were being circulated locally to the effect that General Nuri had shown to some representatives of Arab countries a note which he had received from Ibn Saud; the note was said to contain warnings and threats to Iraq Government in connexion with their efforts to assist Palestine and Syria. According to correspondent, this has created a bad [group omitted] in all Iraqi circles—particularly in the army—and in Moslem and Arab circles generally; and is rumoured to be cause of Iraq's withholding certain assistance which it was hoped to obtain from her in connexion with Palestine and Syrian problems.

"Iraqi Government has broadcast an official communiqué declaring that message published by *Al Ahram* does not correspond with facts, but in view of the very serious nature of the charge made in the message published in *Al Ahram* it is possible that the impression may be produced in the people's minds that there was after all something in it, and that Iraqi Government merely published its denial out of courtesy to the Saudi Arabian Government for the sake of friendly relations existing between the two countries. The Saudi Arabian Government, therefore, holding as they have always held, that their efforts to reach agreement with the Iraq and Arab countries and to achieve the unification of Arab nation in general should take precedence over any other consideration, and desiring to acquaint the Arab public opinion with the true facts of the announcement, know that the note referred to by the

Damascus correspondent of the *Al Ahram* was, in fact, sent to the Iraqi Government and a similar note was sent to the people of Syria and Palestine. The notes were designed to acquaint the people with the facts of the present position, and to urge the necessity of co-operation. They contain no sort of threat whatever directed against the Iraqi Government's efforts to assist Palestine. On the contrary, they called for co-operation and mutual understanding.

"Naturally, Iraqi Government have not informed the Saudi Arabian Government that they have offered any unlawful assistance to either Syria or Palestine in the present troubles, nor has the Saudi Arabian Government ever heard that the Iraqi Government had done so; there could, therefore, be no point in making threats.

"It follows then that the Iraqi Government denied that the message published by *Al Ahram* was properly made.

"The Saudi Arabian Government, desiring that all men of influence in the Arab world may be acquainted with the notes addressed by the Saudi Arabian Government to the Iraqi Government and the people of Syria and Palestine, had authorised the legations in Bagdad, Cairo, London and the consulates in Damascus to make these notes accessible to any Arab who wishes to see them. In this way the Arab world generally and Iraqi nation particularly—especially Iraqi army, which was said by *Al Ahram* correspondent to have taken particular offence at the rumours about threats—may realise what the true facts are, and may appreciate that the efforts of the Saudi Arabian Government are constantly directed to furthering the interests of the Arabs and Arab nation."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 29, and Cairo, No. 20, Saving.)

CHAPTER IV.—SYRIA.

[E 235/5/89]

No. 162.

Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord,

Damascus, January 4, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 48 of the 30th December, 1938, regarding the refusal of the French Senate to recommend the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936, I have the honour to report that the Syrian Parliament debated on the 31st December the situation created by this action of the French Senate.

2. At the end of a six hours' session the Syrian Chamber passed, with a large majority, a motion of confidence in the Government and of condemnation of the French attitude. This moderate outcome was very largely a result of the previous deliberations of the Nationalist *bloc* which, under the astute guidance of Jamil Bey Mardam, decided that there was nothing to be gained by forcing the pace of opposition to the change in French policy believed to be implied by the action of the Senate Committee. I enclose a translation in French of the motion adopted by the Syrian Parliament.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives in Aleppo, Beirut, Jerusalem and Paris.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 162.

*Extract from La Chronique of January 3, 1939.**Ordre du Jour voté par la Chambre syrienne à la Séance du 31 Décembre 1938.*

LA Chambre, poussée par son désir d'amitié avec la France, demeure attachée au traité ratifié par elle le 26 décembre 1936 et considère que les droits de la Syrie, prévus par cet acte, doivent être reconnus.

Si le Parlement français ne désire pas l'amitié de la Syrie, il ne peut refuser de lui reconnaître son droit naturel à l'indépendance consacré dans le Pacte même de la Société des Nations.

2. Aucun autre accord ne lui ayant été soumis, la Chambre ne prend en considération que le traité de 1936 et ne reconnaît aucun accord ou annexe non connu par elle.

3. La Chambre regrette que le Gouvernement français ne respecte pas les engagements pris sans qu'il ait le moindre motif à cet effet, et regrette les atermoiements mis à la ratification du traité et le retard mis à exécuter les accords intervenus; en même temps, elle demande au Gouvernement syrien de sauvegarder tous les droits inhérents à l'indépendance de la Syrie et à son unité et de décider les mesures immédiates pour prendre en mains les pouvoirs dont il n'a pas encore pris possession, et ce sans aucun retard.

4. Le Parlement enregistre la déclaration du Président Mardam qu'il se considère délié de tous les engagements pris, lesquels sont devenus nuls et de nul effet.

5. Le Parlement, seul représentant légal de la nation, dénonce tout procédé qu'emploiera le Gouvernement français pour connaître l'opinion du pays. Le Parlement, seul qualifié pour parler au nom de la nation, est prêt à faire connaître son opinion à qui veut la lui demander. Il adresse un pressant appel au peuple syrien, groupes et individus, pour refuser de répondre à tout organisme et à toute personne dont le but est de diviser les rangs en vue de faire perdre au pays son unité et son indépendance.

6. La Chambre regrette les actes de rébellion contre la loi et la république dans le Djebel Druze et à Lattaquié, venant après la Djézireh, et encore plus que des fonctionnaires français soient à la base de ces actes.

Elle demande au Gouvernement syrien de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour y mettre fin au plus tôt.

7. La Chambre prend acte que le Gouvernement syrien est en plein accord avec elle sur tout ce qui est mentionné dans cet ordre du jour

[E 473/5/89]

No. 163.

Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord,

Beirut, January 11, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that his Excellency M. Gabriel Puaux, the new French High Commissioner in the Levant States under French mandate, arrived by air at Beirut from Alexandria on the afternoon of the 7th January.

2. Immediately after his arrival at Beirut's new aerodrome, where he was welcomed by the Secretary-General, the General Commanding the French Army of the Levant, the Admiral Commanding the French Naval Division and the Air Officer Commanding, the new High Commissioner, accompanied by these officials and escorted by a squadron of spahis, went in procession to the Grand Serail—his official headquarters—where he inspected the guard of honour. After a short interval he drove to the Residency, where he received M. Eddé, the President of the Lebanese Republic.

3. On the following day, the 8th January, M. Puaux returned the official visit of the President of the Lebanese Republic and laid wreaths on the monument erected in memory of the Lebanese who were put to death by the Turks in 1916 on account of their pro-French sympathies, as well as at the Cenotaph commemorating French soldiers who died during the Great War.

4. On the 9th January the High Commissioner received all the civil, military and ecclesiastical authorities, including the consular corps, at the Residency. To His Majesty's Consul-General, who as doyen of the corps was received first, the High Commissioner was particularly friendly. In reply to an expression of welcome and wishes for the success of his mission, M. Puaux stated that he was a good friend of Great Britain and had always had the most cordial relations with his British colleagues, adding that he would always endeavour to further the cordial relations existing between France and Great Britain.

5. A notable absentee from the reception was the Iranian Consul-General, who, doubtless on instructions from his Government, had refrained from attendance, as he had also done at the official reception held on New Year's Day by the Acting High Commissioner.

6. Although M. Puaux has only been here a few days, he appears to have created already a feeling of sympathy for himself amongst the Lebanese. The press had already informed the public of the details of his career, and how, when French Minister at Vienna at the time of the Dollfuss murder, he had protected the murdered Chancellor's family, and M. Puaux himself made use of the radio station at Beirut to broadcast a most friendly message to the Lebanese people on the evening of his arrival. His dignified demeanour and his courteous and friendly nature make a favourable contrast with the character of M. de Martel, and, in so far as externals count, France has certainly gained by the change of High Commissioner.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and His Majesty's Consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

[E 470/284/65]

No. 164.

Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 5.)

My Lord,

Damascus, January 13, 1939.

I AM happy to be able to report, with reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 228 of the 20th December, that my relations with the French authorities in Syria are more than friendly: they are cordial.

2. It may, however, be regretted that the close and cordial contact between this consulate and the French delegation when translated into results has left much to be desired in the matter of obtaining that effective collaboration which the troublous state of Palestine would appear to demand from a particularly friendly Power responsible for the exercise of the mandate over a neighbouring country. I have had occasion during the past fourteen months frequently to draw your Lordship's attention to the liberty allowed in Syria to the activities of Palestinian agitators. Even since last September, when the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Government of France became especially intimate, there has been a ceaseless flow of the vilest anti-British propaganda emanating from Palestinian and pan-Arab organisations in Syria and the Lebanon. This propaganda has, I have little doubt, penetrated deep into the souls of many Arabs and has done much harm to Anglo-Arab relations. It has certainly tended to retard the re-establishment of peaceful conditions in Palestine, if only on account of the effect it has had in drawing money from abroad for the continuance of disorders in that unhappy country. Ever since last October I have used all the powers of persuasion at my command to urge the French authorities to take steps to stop such propaganda. That they have not done so has not been due to any lack of willingness or friendliness on their part. It has been due, as I have reason to be able to assure your Lordship, to the overriding decision from the French authorities in Paris to their subordinates in Syria to take no action that might disturb the delicate relations existing between the French and the Syrians. But from a very friendly Power I believe we are entitled to ask for more than this. Entirely without French assistance I was able, during part of 1938, to get the Syrian Prime Minister to employ his authority and astuteness to keep the Palestinian agitators in check, which he managed to do by his own methods in a fairly satisfactory manner. After he left for Paris in August the Syrian situation in respect of Palestine came again under the complete domination of the Palestine Defence Committee and the National Arab Propaganda Bureau. Admittedly the position seems to be little better in the friendly States of Egypt and Iraq where the general freedom of expression and action allowed anti-British elements is equally distressing, but that provides no excuse for what might almost be described as French apathy. Looked at from this end I find it difficult to escape the conclusion that hitherto the authorities in Paris have been unwilling to go beyond giving your Lordship's department warm promises of co-operation which in the event they have been unduly reluctant to implement. So far as I am aware, the local French officials have acted with promptitude and energy immediately they have obtained authority to do so from the Quai d'Orsay.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris and His Majesty's Consul-General in Beirut.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MacKERETH.

[E 614/63/89]

No. 165.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 24, 1939.)

(No. 61.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, December 23, 1938.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 58 of the 13th December, 1938, regarding the situation in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, I have the honour to report that as from the 15th December last the Government of the Hatay has been

collecting customs duties on goods of Syrian and Lebanese origin entering the sanjak on the same basis as foreign goods, that is to say, at the rate of 15 per cent. *ad valorem*.

2. On the occasion of my last visit to the sanjak on the 20th December last, I was impressed by the almost complete cessation of traffic on the Aleppo-Alexandretta road, formerly the busiest in Syria. Where some 300 vehicles per day used to pass through the control post at Ain Delfi, it is now rare for more than twenty vehicles a day to pass through, and these mainly passenger cars and buses. Motor lorries transporting goods between Syria and the sanjak are now rarely seen. This diminution of traffic is undoubtedly due to the customs barrier, coupled with the restrictions on the use in the sanjak of motor vehicles registered in Syria and *vice versa*, and with the passport and *laissez-passer* requirements now in force.

3. The almost complete severance of commercial traffic between Aleppo and Alexandretta has so far had little effect in Aleppo, whose merchants have taken to sending and receiving their goods via Lattakia, Tripoli or Beirut; but in Alexandretta its effect is already severely felt. Ships calling at the port are bringing and finding almost no cargo at all, and customs revenues have sunk to a point which seriously embarrasses the finances of the sanjak. I am informed that the Minister of Finance, Cemal Baki, tendered his resignation to the President of the Hatay on the 16th December on finding that the reserve funds were exhausted, and no serious thought had been given by his colleagues to the problem of replenishing the State account which had only £7,000 Syrian (approximately £800 sterling) to its credit. His resignation was, however, not accepted. It remains to be seen how the salaries of State employees for the current month are to be paid when they fall due.

4. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Angora and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 622/284/65]

No. 166.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 98.)

My Lord,

Paris, January 23, 1939.

I HAVE received from His Majesty's consul at Damascus a copy of his despatch No. 5 of the 13th January, on the subject of Anglo-French collaboration in Syria.

2. In his interesting analysis of the attitude of the French authorities in regard to the activities of Palestinian agitators, Colonel MacKereth expresses the opinion that the failure of the former to take steps to stop this propaganda has been due to the overriding decision of the French authorities in Paris, who have instructed their subordinates in Syria to take no action that might disturb the delicate relations existing between the French and the Syrians. And he goes on to say that he finds it difficult to escape the conclusion that hitherto the authorities in Paris have been unwilling to go beyond giving your Lordship's department warm promises of co-operation which, in the event, they have been unduly reluctant to implement.

3. This embassy is in close and constant personal contact with the head of the appropriate department in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who has frequently expressed the view that His Majesty's Government and the French Government are more or less in the same position and are confronted by similar difficulties in the Near East, and that, consequently, it was in the interests of both to collaborate as closely as possible. At the same time, M. Lagarde has always explained very frankly that the French authorities found the greatest difficulty in doing anything to disturb Arab feeling in Syria at a time when (i) overriding considerations concerning the general international situation, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean, led them to conclude with Turkey an agreement in regard to the Sanjak of Alexandretta, which was highly distasteful to Arab opinion in Syria—they conceived, incidentally, that an improvement of French relations with Turkey was in harmony with the wishes and interests of His

Majesty's Government—and (ii) the French Parliament was opposing ratification of the treaties with Syria, and thus further irritating Arab opinion. The promises made by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were nearly always made subject to the need not unduly to annoy Arab feeling, a consideration which they suggested was in the interest of His Majesty's Government also.

4. It is possible that the local French authorities have blamed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Paris, while the latter have blamed the local authorities for reluctance to act. But I have hitherto understood that it was regarded on our side that it was M. de Martel, the late High Commissioner in Syria, who made difficulties about implementing the promises made by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to this embassy.

5. As an indication that the desire for close Anglo-French co-operation overseas is not confined to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I would add that the French Minister for the Colonies and the officials of his department were particularly pleased at the visit which Sir Henry Moore, Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, recently paid to them. M. Mandel sent me a personal message to say that the closer the co-operation between his Ministry and His Majesty's Government, the better pleased he would be, and I understand that, in the conversations which Sir Henry Moore had, special emphasis was laid, not only by M. Mandel but also by the officials of his department, on the value of such co-operation. On the military aspect I would invite your Lordship's attention to the report by the military attaché which was enclosed in my despatch No. 73 of the 17th January.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut and His Majesty's Consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 751/5/89]

No. 167.

Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

Beirut, January 24, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 71 of the 2nd November last, I have the honour to report that the Cabinet presided over by Maitre Abdallah Yafi resigned on the 21st January.

2. For some time past there had been rumours of dissensions amongst the Ministers, notably over the question of the suspension of a prominent Arabic newspaper for publishing an article "derogatory to the dignity of the Government," to use the words of the decree of suspension. The Ministers, however, had agreed to remain in office until the new French High Commissioner should have arrived and taken over his duties. This, in fact, they did, and since M. Puaux' arrival mutual relations between the several Ministers appeared to have improved. Last week, however, another Beirut newspaper violently attacked the Government and this paper happened to be the official organ of the Constitutional party which had supplied Maitre Yafi with two Ministers so that he might form his Ministry of Union. The Government issued a decree of suspension against the offending paper and this action immediately revived the old dissensions and led to Maitre Yafi placing his resignation in the hands of the President of the Republic.

3. After the usual consultations, President Eddé again turned to Maitre Yafi to form a second Cabinet, this time, however, on party lines since it was evident that a Cabinet composed of different parties had proved a failure.

4. Within twenty-four hours Maitre Yafi had formed a Cabinet of seven Ministers, which, it is said, will dispose of at least forty out of sixty-three votes in the Chamber. The new Cabinet is composed as follows:—

President and Minister of Justice: Maitre Abdallah Yafi.
Interior and Defence: Habib Abi Chahla.
Finance: Musa Nammour.
Public Works and National Economy: Gabriel Kabbaz.
Agriculture: Ibrahim Haider.
Posts and Telegraphs: Hikmat Joumblat.
Education and Public Health: Maitre Roukos Abou Nader.

5. All of these Ministers with the exception of Gabriel Kabbaz have held office before in one or more of the many Ministries which have come and gone with monotonous regularity since the reinstitution of the Lebanese Constitution in January 1937. Gabriel Kabbaz figures as No. 32 in Lebanese Personalities for 1938.

6. The failure of Lebanese Cabinets to remain in office more than a few months is becoming somewhat proverbial. It seems gradually to be dawning on the public that a Cabinet of seven Ministers, a Chamber of sixty-three Deputies and some 4,000 Government officials employed to run the administration of a diminutive country, the population of which is less than that of the city of Manchester, is becoming a weight too staggering to bear. The new French High Commissioner is said to be studying the general situation and will be reporting in due course to his Government. The result may well be another revision of the Lebanese constitution, this time with a reduction of the administrative and legislative paraphernalia to an extent more in keeping with the country's real needs and capacity to maintain.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and His Majesty's consuls in Aleppo and Damascus.

I have, &c.
G. T. HAVARD.

[E 1535/5/89]

No. 168.

Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 23, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 14th February, I have the honour to inform you that consequent upon the French delegate's pointing out to the Syrian Government that it had not competence to annul or suspend the execution of the High Commissioner's rescripts, Jamil Bey Mardam and his Cabinet, pretexting an affront, resigned on the 18th February.

2. After some jockeying for position among the politicians, the President of the Republic found Lutfi Bey Haffar willing and able to form a Government with himself as Prime Minister. Mazhar Pasha Reslan takes the office of Minister of Interior; Faiz Bey Al Khoury, Minister of Finance; Nassib Bey Al Bakri, Minister of Justice; Salim Bey Jambart, Minister of Economics. The way of Jamil Bey's successor will probably be hard.

3. During the past two years the Syrian Parliament has modified the terms of *arrêts* issued by the French High Commissioner without evoking any rebuke from the mandatory authorities. In the present instance, the susceptibilities of the Moslems were closely affected and, public opinion having already been aroused by the refusal of the Senate Committee in Paris to recommend the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936, the Government were emboldened to instruct, without awaiting parliamentary backing, the civil departments to consider the decrees of the High Commissioner concerning the privileges of the religious communities as having no effect in Syria. The French delegate at once challenged this attitude; the Government accepted the challenge by resigning.

4. The French authorities may have decided that the growing unpopularity of the Nationalist Government and increasing sectarian suspicion provided a favourable atmosphere in which to test the political power of the Nationalist *bloc* on a matter of the freedom of personal conscience, which, whilst cutting at the roots of Islamic dogma, could not but make a favourable appeal to the Liberal sentiments of the French left wing politicians; hitherto the principal animators of France's 1936 policy of disinterestedness and possible opponents of more conservative doctrines regarding Syria.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Paris, Jerusalem, Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
GILBERT MAC KERETH.

[20188]

N

[E 1894/5/89]

No. 169.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, March 6, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to report that, on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th March, his Excellency M. Puaux, the new High Commissioner of the French Republic in the States of the Levant under French mandate, paid his first official visit to the provinces of the Jezireh and the Euphrates forming the eastern part of this consular district.

2. In preparation for the visit of M. Puaux a consignment of 1,000 Syrian flags was sent by the Nationalist *bloc* from Aleppo to Kamechlié a fortnight ago for use in decorating the town. The consignment was, however, seized on arrival by certain militant Separatists, who publicly burned the Syrian flags under the eyes of the unprotesting French officials charged with the maintenance of public order.

3. M. Puaux flew to Hassetché on the 2nd March, but owing to bad weather was forced to land at Palmyra and did not reach his destination till 3.45 p.m. He was enthusiastically welcomed, and found the town splendidly decorated with French and Jeziriot flags. Only two Syrian flags were to be seen, one at the Serail and the other at the gendarmerie headquarters, where they were protected from assault by French troops. The High Commissioner went on foot through the cheering populace to the Serail, where he received the officials, notables, religious chiefs, Separatist and Unionist leaders, and the representatives of the Kurds and Assyrians, to all of whom he gave assurances of the friendship and sympathy of France.

4. After passing the night at Hassetché the High Commissioner proceeded on the morning of the 3rd March to Kamechlié, where he arrived at 8.50 a.m. and was given a tremendous welcome. He announced that France was pledged to ensure security, justice and progress throughout the Jezireh, that after two years of hesitation the moment had come to decide on a definite and durable policy, and that he was pleased to observe from his meetings with all the responsible leaders of the region that on at least three main points they were all agreed: the dependence on the continuing friendship and protection of France, the demand for the maintenance of French armed forces and the necessity for some form of decentralisation or local autonomy in the region. He promised them all that he would lay their case before his Government, and told them they could rest assured of the active sympathy of France.

5. His Excellency left Kamechlié at 2 p.m. and proceeded by air to Deir-ez-Zor, where he arrived at 5.15 p.m. He found the town completely closed and himself systematically boycotted by the Arab population. After staying the night at Deir-ez-Zor, he returned on the 4th March by air to Palmyra and Damascus.

6. The Jezireh flag, the first recorded public appearance of which is alluded to in the third paragraph of this despatch, is understood to consist of two small French tricolours, a cross, a crescent, and two ears of wheat on a white ground.

7. A copy of this despatch has been sent direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut, Damascus and Mosul.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 1932/5/89]

No. 170.

Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 6, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the High Commissioner's Arrêté No. 22/LR of the 18th February, 1939, transferring to himself the powers of government formerly exercised by the Syrian Government in the Mohafaza of Lattakia.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 170.

Arrêté No. 22/LR du 18 Février 1939 relatif au Maintien de l'Ordre dans le Mohafazat de Lattaquié.

LE Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu le décret du Président de la République française en date du 23 novembre 1920;

Vu le décret du Président de la République française en date du 5 décembre 1925;

Vu l'Arrêté No. 34/LR du 8 février 1936 relatif au maintien de l'ordre;

Arrête :

Article 1^{er}. Les pouvoirs appartenant au Gouvernement syrien pour le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publiques dans le Mohafazat de Lattaquié seront exercés par le Haut-Commissaire à partir du 18 février 1939 à 12 heures.

Art. 2. Conformément aux dispositions de l'article 2 de l'Arrêté No. 34/LR du 8 février 1936, le Haut-Commissaire délègue ces pouvoirs à son délégué à Lattaquié.

Art. 3. Les forces de police et de gendarmerie du Mohafazat seront placées à compter des jour et heure indiqués ci-dessus sous les ordres du délégué du Haut-Commissaire à Lattaquié.

Art. 4. Le Secrétaire général du Haut-Commissariat est chargé de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

Art. 5. Vu l'urgence et conformément à l'article 3 de l'Arrêté No. 96/LR du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

Le Haut-Commissaire,

G. PUAUX.

Beyrouth, le 18 février 1939.

[E 1892/284/65]

No. 171.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 635. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 17, 1939.

WITH reference to despatch No. 10 of the 27th January from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, of which a copy was sent to your Excellency direct, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram⁽¹⁾ which has now been received from Colonel MacKereth regarding the policy of the French Government in Syria.

2. You will see that Colonel MacKereth points out that the policy which the French Government are apparently following conflicts with the policy which His Majesty's Government may adopt in Palestine, and that he suggests that it would be desirable that British and French policy should be further co-ordinated.

3. I am conscious at all times of the advantages of close co-operation between His Majesty's Government and the French Government, as well in the Near East as elsewhere. The difficulties with which His Majesty's Government are faced in Palestine are, however, so great already that it is hardly feasible to add to them by assuming an obligation to keep strictly in line with the policy of the French Government in Syria.

4. This consideration has particular force if the policy of the French Government in Syria is, in fact, mistaken—a question which must inevitably be a matter of opinion. The reassertion of French control in Syria would unquestionably have many practical advantages from the point of view of the day to day requirements of His Majesty's Government. On the other hand, it is far from certain that it will be possible for the French authorities, without creating serious opposition, to reverse the measure of independence which they have granted to Syria in recent years, or that such a policy is not more likely to lead to the growth of pro-German, pro-Italian, and even pro-Turkish influence in Syria, than to the suppression of such influences. Moreover, such a policy is in

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

conflict with the line followed by His Majesty's Government in Egypt and Iraq, and, as Colonel MacKereth has observed, in conflict also with the efforts which they are now making to reach some settlement regarding Palestine which will not be altogether unacceptable to the Arabs. It is also likely to cause a certain amount of mistrust and resentment among other Arab States, to whose friendship His Majesty's Government attach great importance.

5. For all these reasons I view recent developments in Syria with some misgiving. At the same time, I realise that, just as it would not be feasible for His Majesty's Government to alter their policy in Palestine in order to bring it into line with French policy in Syria, so it would hardly be reasonable to expect that the French Government should deviate from what they consider to be the most practicable policy in Syria in deference to any considerations based on the policy of His Majesty's Government regarding Palestine, or any other part of the Middle East. Furthermore, it appears that suspicion has been aroused in certain French quarters by a number of newspaper articles which have recently appeared, to the effect that His Majesty's Government are aiming at a federation of certain of the Arab States, including Syria, in which British influence would be predominant. These articles do not, in fact, reflect the policy of His Majesty's Government (which is, in brief, that while they think it would be both useless and unwise to oppose the trend of Arab nationalism towards federation, federation is a matter for the Arabs themselves, in regard to which His Majesty's Government have no intention of taking any initiative). Still less is it the case that His Majesty's Government are aiming at the weakening or elimination of French influence in the Levant. Nevertheless, the existence of such suspicions makes it particularly difficult at present for His Majesty's Government to express to the French Government any criticism of French policy in the Near East.

6. I doubt, therefore, whether it would be advisable to volunteer to the French Government any expression of my misgivings regarding French policy in Syria. I consider, however, that the French Government might well be asked in confidence if there is any indication which they would be prepared to supply regarding the line which they are, in fact, intending to follow in Syria, and the degree of success which they think is likely to attend their plans for reassuming more direct control over the mandated territories, if this is indeed their intention. If an opening were then offered you of expressing any opinion on the matter, you might express, but as your personal and preliminary observations, such of the considerations advanced in the preceding paragraphs of this despatch as you consider desirable. You should at the same time make it clear that you do not question the right of the French Government to decide for themselves what policy they should follow in Syria, or doubt that His Majesty's Government will, whatever happens, co-operate with them as far as possible.

7. Your Excellency should add that the French Government will be kept informed of the intentions of His Majesty's Government about Palestine as soon as these are decided. In pursuance of this policy an opportunity is being taken to inform the French Ambassador here of the final proposals which are to be laid before the Arab and Jewish delegations at the Palestine conferences.

8. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Bagdad and Jedda and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[E 2144/5/89]

No. 172.

Consul MacKereth to Mr. Baxter.—(Received March 22.)

(Confidential.)

My dear Baxter,

Damascus, February 24, 1939.

YOU will already have gathered from my reports that the political scene in Syria is shifting. Lagarde, in the rôle of Eiron, described to Campbell (see E390/5/89 of the 13th January from the Paris Embassy) with uneasy obliquity the state of Franco-Syrian treaty relations in a way that does not agree with the slant we get on them here. In Syria the French are pretty obviously trying to get back into the saddle. It may be an elegant trick to stop the Palais du Luxembourg clock and so enjoy the fiction that the 2nd January is only the end of a

long last day of the year before for the purposes of financial acts, but the political clock cannot be stopped so painlessly. We shall follow the French experiment in Syria with interest, and may offer up a prayer that M. Puaux will have more luck than Lord Lloyd had in Egypt.

2. That the French are determined to take over the reins may be judged from the following bare recital of facts:—

- (1) M. Puaux' declaration to the *Temps* before he embarked for Syria and Lebanon, when he said: "... c'est à Damas que brille l'un des foyers de la civilisation arabe, à l'action duquel la France du Maghreb ne peut rester indifférente. Tout nous commande donc de rester au Levant."
- (2) M. Puaux' broadcast address to the Syrians from Beirut broadcasting station on the 11th January, when he said: "Je parlerai toujours aux Syriens le langage de la vérité... je les jugerai sur leurs actes. Qu'ils ne doutent ni de la force, ni de la générosité de la France." This is perhaps the language of truth, but it is scarcely the language to address a country, which one has recently signed a treaty of alliance and friendship with and repeatedly assured that one has every intention of keeping one's bond.
- (3) The viceregal pomp of M. Puaux' arrival in Damascus, inflated with all the panoply the French army and air force could muster, and it was considerable.
- (4) M. Puaux' speech in the Jebel Druse, when he encouraged the revival of separatism, which M. de Martel had helped the Syrian Government to extinguish.
- (5) M. Puaux in Latakia formally received Suleiman Murshed, the Alawite rebel against the Syrian Government, who, during the previous two months (with more than suspected connivance of the French political officers), had held the Alawite territory to ransom and committed many acts of highway robbery, and who, to everybody's amazement, presented some 5,000 armed ruffians as his followers at the military review before the High Commissioner. This sounds incredible, but I have the account from the delegate himself. I had hitherto not believed the tale.
- (6) The publication at the present stage of the Franco-Syrian treaty relations of decree No. 146/LR, making it lawful for Moslems to change their religion and for Moslem women to marry non-Moslems. These liberal ideas touch Moslems on the raw; although in the past Moslem men and women have violated the laws of their faith in such matters when it has suited them without being called to book in the courts. The time when Syrians were getting over the shock of the recantation of the 1936 treaty by the French seems ill-chosen for the stirring up of religious fanaticism. It looks uncomfortably like an attempt to pick a quarrel.

3. The French appear fully confident of being able to deal with any disturbances and of carrying off their change in policy. But I feel uneasy of the eventual outcome, for the present is scarcely indicated as the best occasion for the gratuitous cultivation of Arab hostility, when so many enemies must be longing for chances to create trouble. Trouble in Syria may draw off some of the Arab hatred of us over Palestine, yet I can visualise Transjordan and Palestine again becoming a background of revolt in Syria. That would bring forth a test of the cordiality of Anglo-French relations, and if in such circumstances we can produce no better results of co-operation than the French have been able to do in respect of the Palestine disturbances, I cannot picture the French Government imitating us in the attitude of patience personified.

4. Both M. Puaux and M. de Hauteclocque give the first impression of combining inexperience with dynamism; a dangerous combination. M. Puaux' acts can only be satisfactorily explained if he has received instructions to engineer a break with the Syrians and so clear the way for direct or puppet administration of the country.

Yours ever,

GILBERT MAC KERETH.

[E 2156/5/89]

No. 173.

Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 18, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 15 of the 15th March reporting the resignation of the Syrian Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith newspaper extracts⁽¹⁾ from the *Echos de Syrie* giving (1) the text of the ministerial declaration of the 14th March, setting forth the reasons the Prime Minister gave for resigning, and (2) the text of the High Commissioner's broadcast address to the "Syrian Nation" following the resignation.

2. Lutfi Bey Al-Haffar, although subservient to the Nationalist bloc, took the step that the Mardam Cabinet could not, of withdrawing the instructions to Government departments to ignore the High Commissioner's *arrêts* respecting the religious communities. M. Puaux met this gesture by appointing a commission to discuss the opportuneness and modification of the *arrêts* in question. Following this *détente* the mandatory authorities maintained their pressure to recover the administrative authority they had hastily relinquished on the signature of the 1936 treaty. Moreover, it became obvious that the High Commissioner was lending a ready ear to the separatists in the Jebel Druze, Jezirah and Lattakia districts, and was unwilling to use French forces to maintain the rapidly dwindling authority of the Syrian Government, child of the Nationalist bloc. The Syrian Nationalists, aware of international rumblings, and encouraged by Iraqi politicians and, it is rumoured, by Turkish agents, decided that the present was a suitable moment for a show-down and resigned.

3. The political situation is at present chaotic, with considerable division, personal, racial and religious, growing on all sides.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Paris, Jerusalem, Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 2322/284/65]

No. 174.

Mr. R. I. Campbell to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 367.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 25, 1939.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 635, Very Confidential, of the 17th March regarding the policy of the French Government in Syria, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that a member of my staff enquired to-day, in confidence, of the head of the African Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether there was any indication which the French Government would be prepared to supply regarding the line of policy which they are intending to follow in Syria.

2. M. Lagarde said that he would speak very frankly. In November last an agreement had been reached between the French and Syrian Governments. Opposition had, however, developed both in the French Parliament and also in Syria among the minorities. The French Government had, therefore, decided to postpone further consideration of the policy to be pursued in Syria until the new High Commissioner had been able to examine conditions on the spot and prepare a report. When M. Puaux's report had been received and examined the French Government would take a decision as to their future policy in Syria. That was the position at the present moment.

3. In view of the above explanation, it did not seem desirable to develop to M. Lagarde any of the considerations in regard to a possible change in French policy involving more direct control over the mandated territories, which were advanced in your Lordship's despatch under reference.

4. M. Lagarde was, however, informed that the French Government would be kept informed of the intentions of His Majesty's Government about Palestine as soon as these were decided. He expressed his gratitude. He remarked that there was a curious difference between the British position in Palestine and the

French position in Syria, owing to the fact that in Palestine the administrators were excellent, while the military forces did not know the country well, whereas in Syria the administrators were much inferior to those in Palestine, but the military forces had the advantage of having spent a long time in the country and knowing it well. It was due to the latter factor that order could be kept in Syria.

I have, &c.

R. I. CAMPBELL.

[E 2235/63/89]

No. 175.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 785.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 3, 1939.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency the accompanying copy of a telegram addressed by His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora regarding the Hatay.

2. I request that your Excellency will enquire unofficially of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether their information coincides with that given to Mr. Davis by the General Officer Commanding the French Forces in North Syria regarding the immediate likelihood of the Hatay Assembly passing a resolution in favour of union with Turkey. If so, you should ask how, in the event of such a resolution being passed, the French Government anticipate that the situation would then develop.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

Enclosure in No. 175.

Consul, Aleppo, to His Majesty's Ambassador, Angora.—(Received March 23.)

(Unnumbered.)

Aleppo, March 23, 1939.

YOUR telegram, unnumbered, of the 18th March.

General Officer Commanding French Forces in North Syria, whom I saw this morning, told me that formal demand for union of sanjak with Turkey is expected at any moment and that in present circumstances he cannot foresee any alternative to complete abandonment by France of major portion if not the whole of sanjak if such demand materialises.

(Repeated to Foreign Office, No. 13, and Saving to Paris, Beirut and Damascus.)

[E 2578/63/89]

No. 176.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 416. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, April 6, 1939.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 785 of the 3rd April, His Majesty's Minister enquired unofficially of the Director of the Africa-Levant Department on the 5th April whether the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had information similar to that given to His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo by the General Officer Commanding the French troops in North Syria to the effect that the Hatay Assembly was expected in the immediate future to pass a resolution in favour of union with Turkey.

2. M. Lagarde stated that the Head of the State and the President of the Council of the Hatay had become members of the Turkish Parliament. The first had been a refugee from Syria in Turkey, and, while there, had carried on pro-Turkish activities in respect of the Sanjak of Alexandretta before returning there on the establishment of the present régime. The second had remained in the sanjak and had acted on behalf of Turkey on the spot. They both exerted a certain influence, and there was undoubtedly a pretty strong movement in Turkey in favour of the union of the Hatay with that country. Rumours had recently been current to the effect that the Hatay would, under Turkish instigation, declare its union with Turkey. The French Ambassador had enquired of the Turkish

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Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the rumours were true, and had been told in reply that they were not. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs had received the Turkish Ambassador in Paris on the 3rd April, and had raised this question with him; M. Bonnet had said that the French Government would have the strongest objections to any such development. M. Davaz said that no action of the kind was imminent, and that if it could be stated that negotiations with regard to the Hatay were in progress between the Turkish and French Governments, nothing more would be heard of the matter. M. Bonnet had replied that he saw no objection to this. In the circumstances the Ministry hoped that the question had now been postponed until a later date. It caused them, however, considerable preoccupation, and it was being studied closely. M. Lagarde was not able to tell Mr. Campbell what action it was likely that the French Government would take if the union of Hatay with Turkey were in fact to be declared. M. Lagarde said that what he had told Mr. Campbell was for the strictly confidential information of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 2630/63/89]

No. 177.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 22.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, March 18, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 12 of the 15th March, 1939, regarding the situation in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, I have the honour to report that the process of assimilation of the Hatay to Turkey has now proceeded so far that the Hatay may now be regarded for all practical purposes as Turkish in all but name.

2. A measure enacting the adoption of the laws of Turkey in the Hatay was approved by the Hatay Chamber of Deputies at Antioch on the 17th February last. All previous legislation, including the Shari law, the Ottoman codes, and the decrees of the French High Commissioner, were declared to be henceforth inoperative in the Hatay. The power of determining the date of enforcement of the Turkish laws was, however, reserved to the Hatay Council of Ministers, as it was thought that some measures, for example those relating to military service, international agreements, and the position of women, might, on examination, be found not immediately applicable in the Hatay.

3. It has also now been announced that Turkish nationals are henceforth authorised to enter and leave the Hatay freely, without passport or visa, on simple production of their Turkish identity certificates. Large numbers of Turks, especially officials and members of the learned professions, have already appeared in the sanjak, particularly in the towns of Antioch and Alexandretta, and fresh contingents are continually arriving.

4. On the 13th March last the Hatay Chamber of Deputies adopted a further measure, making the Turkish currency legal tender in the Hatay, and stipulating that all payments received or made by Government departments must henceforth be in Turkish, not in Syrian, currency. This was followed by an announcement that as from mid-day on the 16th March the Turkish system of exchange control would be put in force in the Hatay. This announcement was followed by a run on the banks, depositors being anxious to withdraw their money in Syrian currency rather than have it forcibly converted at the official rate of 67 Turkish piastres to the Syrian pound, which compares unfavourably with the free market rate of 105 Turkish piastres to the Syrian pound. Hatay business circles were also greatly perturbed at the announcement, the ultimate effects of which on British and other foreign firms in the Hatay it is as yet too early to forecast. It is anticipated that the Turkish clearing system will also be inaugurated shortly in the Hatay, and that customs duties and other taxes will also be assimilated to the Turkish model.

5. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Angora, and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.
A. W. DAVIS.

[E 2322/284/65]

No. 178.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 907. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 15, 1939.

I HAVE received Mr. Campbell's despatch No. 367 of the 25th March, in which he stated that, according to M. Lagarde, the French Government had decided to postpone further consideration of the policy to be pursued in Syria until the new High Commissioner had been able to examine conditions on the spot and prepare a report.

2. I welcome the information that no final decision has yet been taken by the French Government, since this means that an exchange of views between His Majesty's Government and the French Government may still not be too late to affect the issue. At the same time I am bound to note that, since the arrival of M. Puaux in Syria, various steps have been taken which indicate that it is not proposed to proceed with the 1936 treaty, even as amended by the supplementary agreement signed in November last. For instance, control of the police in Syria has been resumed by the French authorities, French officials have taken over the offices of Governor in the Jebel Druse and Latakia, and M. Puaux has made a tour through the Jezireh, on which he appears to have given open encouragement to autonomist aspirations.

3. His Majesty's Government have never felt entirely happy about the decision of the French Government not to proceed with the ratification of the 1936 treaty, even after the negotiations for its amendment in certain admittedly necessary ways had reached an apparently successful conclusion. They have hitherto hesitated to give expression to their misgivings for various reasons, including reluctance to interfere in what the French Government may well regard as a question for themselves alone, fear of reviving the old misapprehension that this country distrusts and resents the position of France in the Levant, and consciousness of the fact that their own experiences in Palestine do not add to their qualifications for playing the rôle of adviser.

4. More recently, however, the situation has been affected by two new factors, namely, the fresh deterioration in the international situation since the middle of March and the attitude of this country's allies.

5. In Iraq in particular recent developments in Syria are regarded with strong feelings. The Iraqi Government have on various occasions in the past asked His Majesty's Government to press the French Government to expedite the entry into force of the 1936 treaty, but His Majesty's Government have never given the Iraqi Government any ground for thinking that they would do so. Recently the Iraqi requests have become more insistent, and on the 23rd March the late King Ghazi asked Mr. Houstoun-Boswall to convey a message to The King (see Mr. Houstoun-Boswall's telegram No. 86 of the 23rd March). King Ghazi pointed out that if war broke out the Iraqi Government would find themselves in the unenviable position of supporting the British Empire, whose allies would very likely be engaged in repressive measures against the Arabs in Syria. Ibn Saud, also, has told His Majesty's Minister at Jedda that, if King Ghazi were to send a message to The King on the subject, he himself would have to do so, too. Since then Mr. Houstoun-Boswall has reported (see his telegram No. 99 of the 31st March) that public interest in the situation in Syria is likely soon to develop into serious agitation, and he fears that, if disturbances break out in Syria, men and arms will be despatched surreptitiously from Iraq, and persistent pressure be put upon His Majesty's Government by the Iraqi Government to persuade the French Government to ratify the 1936 treaty. He further fears that a bitter campaign of propaganda will also be waged against France in which Great Britain, as France's close associate, will certainly become involved.

6. I recognise that this question does not directly concern any neighbouring country, and that the French Government have already on two occasions made it clear that they do not welcome the interest shown in it by the Iraqi Government. But His Majesty's Government cannot so easily ignore the views of their ally. They are satisfied that the Iraqi Government are genuinely and justifiably apprehensive of the ultimate effects on the alliance of the present policy in Syria, and they are bound to take these apprehensions into account. Moreover, should

war break out, the fate of France would depend quite as much as the fate of this country upon the loyal co-operation of Egypt, Iraq and other Arab countries.

7. His Majesty's Government therefore feel that a point has been reached where they are entitled, on grounds of high policy and in view of the close friendship between the two Governments, to make their position clear to the French Government.

8. I request therefore that your Excellency will, unless you see strong objection, seek an interview with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and speak to him on the following lines:—

9. You should begin by saying that you have been instructed to raise with him a question closely affecting the interests of the two countries, that is to say, their joint position in the Middle East. In raising this question His Majesty's Government desire to make it clear at the outset that, whatever policy the French Government may hereafter pursue in the Middle East, and particularly in the Republic of Syria, His Majesty's Government will loyally support them to the best of their ability, even though it may not be the policy which they think that they themselves would be likely to pursue in similar circumstances. His Majesty's Government say this because they recognise that the fates of the two countries are bound up together, and their co-operation in any part of the world cannot, and must not, be affected by divergencies of view on even important issues. They hope that this unreserved assurance of co-operation will be taken as proof, were proof needed, that, in making the suggestions which follow, His Majesty's Government are concerned for French interests quite as much as for their own.

10. You should then say that His Majesty's Government understand that, pending the receipt of a report from M. Puaux, the French Government have not reached a decision as to what their future policy in Syria will be. At the same time certain administrative measures have been taken in Syria which imply that the French Government do not now intend to adhere to the 1936 treaty settlement, even as amended in 1938. His Majesty's Government would not be frank if they pretended that this apparent change in policy has not from the start filled them with misgiving. They are as desirous as the French Government that conditions should not be created in any territory under French control in the Levant in which the growth of German or Italian influence would be encouraged. But the question is whether the growth of this influence is likely to be encouraged or discouraged by a retreat from the 1936-38 settlement.

11. So far as the immediate needs of public order and good government are concerned, His Majesty's Government do not presume to question the present policy, as this policy is doubtless based upon considerations of which His Majesty's Government are necessarily ignorant. Moreover, they recognise that it will enable the French Government to take a stronger line with any agitators from Palestine than has been possible while the Syrian Government were in direct control. But upon a longer view His Majesty's Government cannot help feeling that the day has passed when the clock can be put back in a country like Syria, which was, moreover, the first home of Arab nationalism. It seems to them inevitable that, unless the people of Syria can soon be assured that they are not after all to be denied within a reasonably near future the degree of independence already achieved by Egypt and Iraq, and now virtually promised to Palestine, they are likely to afford a far more profitable field than otherwise for the propaganda and intrigues of Germany and Italy, with consequences which may eventually prove disastrous to both France and Great Britain.

12. Moreover, Great Britain is the ally of two countries, Iraq and Egypt, in which sympathy for Syria is widespread. His Majesty's Government are well aware that the French Government do not regard the Iraqi Government as having any status in regard to Syria, and consider that their attitude falls little short of one of interference in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country. But this does not alter the fact that the loyalty of Iraq, as well as Egypt, to the alliance with Great Britain is quite as vital to the interests of France as to those of Great Britain.

13. In this connexion you should say that His Majesty's Government have repeatedly pointed out to the Iraqi Government that it is in the best interests of Syria to reach some mutually satisfactory arrangement with France, which is the only well-disposed Power able and willing to afford her that measure of protection which she unquestionably requires at the present time. They have warned the Iraqi Government not to encourage extremist claims on the part

of the Syrians, but to exercise their influence in Syria on the side of moderation. His Majesty's Government believe that the more sensible Iraqi statesmen recognise the soundness of this advice. Nevertheless, agitation in Iraq is already developing, and it is to be feared that, if disturbances break out in Syria, the Iraqi Government may be compelled by public opinion to take certain steps which might embarrass their relations, not only with the French Government, but also eventually with His Majesty's Government.

14. In normal times, such a situation might be viewed without undue disquiet, particularly in view of the large and efficient forces which the French Government retain in Syria. In the present world conditions, however, His Majesty's Government regard it as essential for both France and Great Britain to remain on terms of close friendship with the various Arab States, and the Iraqi Government have already expressed to His Majesty's Government their apprehensions regarding the difficulty which they might have in keeping the people of Iraq loyal to the alliance in a war in which His Majesty's Government were also the allies of a Power which would very likely be engaged in repressive measures against the Arabs in Syria.

15. So far as concerns Palestine, which has been hitherto, and for the moment no doubt remains, a far more serious cause for dissatisfaction in the Arab world than Syria, His Majesty's Government are now risking unfavourable Jewish reactions in America and elsewhere, which might in themselves have an appreciable effect upon the international situation in an emergency, by making a determined effort to reach a settlement of the Palestine problem. They trust that this settlement, while safeguarding the position which the Jews have created for themselves in Palestine, will be acceptable, if not to the Arabs in Palestine, then at least to the general mass of opinion in the neighbouring Arab States. The French Government may think this a somewhat belated move, and His Majesty's Government would not for a moment wish to minimise the seriousness of the situation which has prevailed in Palestine during the last two years. But however this may be, His Majesty's Government cannot conceal the anxiety which they feel as to the possible effects of the present position in Syria were war to break out in the near future.

16. His Majesty's Government are aware that, in view of the lack of natural unity in Syria, a settlement precisely on the lines of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty may not be advisable, and they are certainly not anxious that the French Government should do anything which would lead to political instability in any part of their mandated territories, since this might also, in present circumstances, have dangerous repercussions in the Middle East. They trust, however, that, when the French Government come to decide what their policy in Syria shall be, the French Government will give due weight to the importance of Arab friendship, both to themselves and to His Majesty's Government, particularly in time of war.

17. You should conclude by asking the Minister for Foreign Affairs to bring these considerations to the notice of his colleagues as the considered views of His Majesty's Government, and to express the hope that they will, in due course, authorise him to inform you fully of the policy which they decide to pursue.

18. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Bagdad, Cairo and Jedda, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[E 2792/5/89]

No. 179.

Sir M. Lamson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 381.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 5, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that there is no foundation whatever for the press reports recorded in Colonel MacKereth's telegram No. 19 of the 31st March, to the effect that Dr. Shahbandar had been invited to Egypt to take part in discussions regarding a settlement of the Palestine problem through the union of Palestine and Syria.

2. On the 30th March the oriental secretary met Dr. Shahbandar at dinner at the Iraq Legation, and, although Dr. Shahbandar aired his views about Syria at considerable length, he never once referred to any scheme for uniting Palestine and Syria.

3. Dr. Shahbandar told Mr. Smart that he had intended to come and see him in order to explain the danger which French policy in Syria entailed for England. He said that he himself, who had been thrice condemned to death by the Turks and had had his property confiscated by them, was now unable to prevent Turkish propaganda going on in his own house. The disgust of the Syrians with French policy was so great that they were turning to Turkey in desperation. The Turks, he maintained, definitely intended to get hold of Syria, not by annexation, but by treaty arrangements with Syria similar, on paper, to those of England with Iraq. It was certain that Turkey, once she had Syria, would not stop at the Palestinian border, and we should find ourselves with a powerful military State menacing the British position in the Near East.

4. German and Italian propaganda, he said, was now extremely active in Syria, and the attitude of the French was making the Syrians ready to turn to anyone who held out hopes, however fallacious, of independence.

5. Dr. Shahbandar said that the French confidence in being able to overcome all opposition in Syria was ill-founded. At the present moment certain elements were playing the French game because of their difficulties with the Central Government. Once, however, the French again became the responsible central authority, these elements, which previously had been at odds with the Damascus Government, would soon have reason to complain of its French successors. In a few months all the discontent against the Syrian Government would be diverted against the French.

6. Mr. Smart gave Dr. Shahbandar no hope that His Majesty's Government would be likely to interfere with French policy in Syria—a course which Dr. Shahbandar obviously had in mind. His opinions must be taken with reserve in view of his Nationalist and anti-French sentiments, but I share the misgivings expressed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your Lordship's despatch No. 635, Very Confidential, of the 17th March to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, regarding the dubious expediency of the new French policy in Syria. This policy must, it would seem, have the same results as British policy in Palestine, namely, to drive the inhabitants into the arms of the enemies of France and England. It is true, as your Lordship points out, that the immediate requirements of His Majesty's Government in Palestine may be served by French suppression of Syrian liberties. A number of the anti-French Syrian Nationalists were also actively engaged in supporting the rebels in Palestine: two at least of the leaders of the Palestine revolt have been arrested in Damascus, and perhaps now that the French have taken over the administration, there may be a stricter control over the activities of organisations in Syria promoting the revolt in Palestine. But in the long run neither England nor France can afford to make Syria and Palestine hostile and ready to welcome our enemies at the first opportunity, however dangerous the latter may ultimately be to the Syrians and Palestinians themselves. In view, however, of our policy in Palestine, representations to the French Government regarding their policy in Syria might be answered by "Tu quoque" arguments not easy to rebut.

7. The idea of solving the Palestine problem by the union of Palestine and Syria may not, at present, be practical politics, in view of the long and resolute opposition of the French to any union of Arab countries, which, they have always considered, would involve an abandonment of French positions in the Near East in favour of the British. But a federation including Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan may eventually provide a natural solution of the political and economic difficulties which now beset these countries.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and at Bagdad, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut, and His Majesty's Consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

(for the Ambassador),
C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 2916/284/65]

No. 180.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 488. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, April 20, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I to-day carried out the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 907, Very Confidential, of the 15th April in regard to Syria.

2. I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as directed, and, in order to make sure that there should be no possible misunderstanding, I left with his Excellency a copy of paragraphs 9 to 17 inclusive of your despatch under reference, making it clear that this must be considered as a very confidential verbal communication.

3. M. Bonnet promised that the French Government would take into the most earnest consideration the views of His Majesty's Government. He hopes to be able to reply thereto fully some time next week, after the necessary consultations with M. Puaux, who is now here, have taken place.

4. His Excellency remarked, however, that the French military view was that the Syrians were far too weak and impractical at present to be able to govern themselves. Their weakness would be a constant incentive to the Turks to invade Syria, and this, of course, would cause a highly dangerous situation to develop.

5. As for German and Italian propaganda, that, M. Bonnet feels, would always be altered to suit an altered situation. Now it consisted in telling the Arabs that France was not keeping her word and would not grant Syria her promised independence. If that independence were granted the propagandists would stir up discontent amongst the Christian minorities. M. Bonnet agreed, however, that the disadvantages of both systems must be carefully weighed.

I have, &c.

ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 3091/284/65]

No. 181.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 530. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, April 26, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 488, Very Confidential, of the 20th April respecting Syria, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the French High Commissioner at Beirut called on me this morning.

2. I asked M. Puaux whether M. Bonnet had informed him of the verbal communication that I had made to his Excellency on the 20th April. M. Puaux replied that he had done so.

3. I found M. Puaux in a somewhat depressed state. He remarked that the Syrian problem seemed to be "insoluble," and that in any case the bringing into force of the 1936 treaty, even with the amendments of November last, would certainly not be the way to solve it.

4. M. Puaux spoke bitterly about the "Damascus politicians" and the folly that it would be to sacrifice to so effete a crew the interests of the fine, fighting Christian minorities, who were, moreover, very well disposed to the French. They would consider that they had been betrayed by the French if the treaty were brought into force without several further drastic amendments. Nothing I said could shake him on this point. He clearly does not think that Syria is as ripe for independence as Iraq.

5. M. Puaux leaves Paris on the 3rd May for Beirut, where he will arrive on the 10th May, and I gathered that nothing could possibly be decided until some time after his return.

6. The High Commissioner said that he greatly hoped that we had not told the Iraqi Government that we were approaching the French Government in this matter, as that would have a very bad effect in Iraq. I reassured him on this point.

7. I mentioned in the course of our talk the question of the incursion of armed bands from Syria into Transjordan, referred to in your Lordship's despatch No. 949 of the 19th April, and expressed the hope that the High

Commissioner would use all his authority to prevent the recurrence of such raids. M. Puaux promised that he would do so, but he affected to make light of this danger.

8. I propose to mention this to M. Bonnet next time I see him, as well as the larger question of the treaty.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 3199/5/89]

No. 182.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, March 31, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 14 of the 28th March, 1939, on the subject of the situation in Aleppo, I have the honour to report that on Thursday, the 23rd March, the Nationalist *bloc* at Aleppo decided that all shops and offices in the town should be closed until further notice as a general protest against the policy pursued by the French Government in Syria and a special protest against the arrest of certain prominent Nationalists in Damascus.

2. Owing to the relative loss of prestige and popularity by the Nationalists during their two years of office, this decision was by no means generally observed, especially by Christian merchants and shopkeepers. The Nationalists therefore called up their stalwarts from the Moslem quarters, armed with sticks and daggers, and ordered them to force the recalcitrants to close down, using threats or actual violence if necessary. This they proceeded to do under the benevolent eyes of the Syrian police, who in some cases even joined in the good work of intimidating the obdurate. Until Sunday, the 26th March, there was not much actual disturbance, but on that night a bomb exploded about 9.30 P.M. in the Azizieh quarter of Aleppo, and the following day bands of Moslem youths and children circulated in the streets throwing stones at tramcars, breaking the windows of any shops found open, and obliterating with black paint the French signs on banks, shops and offices. The French delegate and general warned the Muhafiz of Aleppo that he must keep order or they would intervene. He objected that he was not accustomed to being spoken to in that tone, to which the French replied that he would have to get used to it from now on. Thereupon the Muhafiz left for Damascus, handing over his duties to the Syrian chief of police, Nuzhat Bey El Mamlouk. On Tuesday at midday another bomb exploded near the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, whereupon the patience of the French was exhausted and the delegate called upon the military authorities to restore order in the town. This was done quietly and without incident, but despite the insistence of the French authorities only a few shopkeepers ventured to open up their premises. They point out that as in 1936 the French promised protection to those that opened and then turned round and made a treaty with the Nationalists, leaving them to the mercy of the *bloc's* supporters, so in 1939 they have no assurance that the French policy will remain stable.

3. On Tuesday, the 28th March, a further bomb exploded at 9.30 P.M. in the Jemilieh quarter of Aleppo, and on Wednesday, the 29th March, another one went off near the French general's house. Although no particular damage was done, a curfew has been imposed in that quarter of the town from 7 P.M. to 6 A.M., and the duties of the Syrian chief of police, who has been granted one month's leave of absence, but remains here for the time being as Acting Muhafiz, have now been taken over by Colonel Bringuier, the French officer in command of the Mission for the Reorganisation of the Syrian Gendarmerie.

4. Very few shops and offices in the town have yet reopened, and it is a question whether some shortage of supplies such as bread, meat and vegetables may not make itself felt shortly if the French cannot succeed in inducing them to change their attitude. In the meantime all kinds of rumours are circulating, including a circumstantial one to the effect that the French have already negotiated an agreement at Angora to hand over Aleppo together with the sanjak and the Jezireh to the Turks in return for Turkish friendship.

5. A copy of this despatch is being sent direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.
A. W. DAVIS.

[E 3243/284/65]

No. 183.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 558. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 1, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 530, Very Confidential, of the 26th April last, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that, as I happened to be lunching next to M. Bonnet on the 29th April, I took the opportunity of asking him whether he could give me a reply to the communication which I had made to him on the 20th April, as reported in my despatch No. 488, Very Confidential, of that date, regarding Syria.

2. M. Bonnet replied that the considered opinion of the French Government, after consultation with the General Staff, was that it would be quite out of the question to bring into force the treaty of 1936, even as modified at the end of 1938. General Gamelin felt strongly that in present circumstances it would be folly to grant complete independence to the Syrians, who were, apart from some of the Christian minorities, a soft race, incapable of defending themselves. If the French troops (numbering about 30,000) were to be withdrawn in the near future, either the Turks, the Italians or the Germans would march into Syria, which would be incapable of putting up any serious defence.

3. I asked M. Bonnet what, in these circumstances, the French Government proposed to do in the matter. His Excellency replied that, as reported in my despatch under reference, the French High Commissioner would be returning to Beirut, where he would arrive on the 10th May, and he would soon afterwards propose to the Syrians further indispensable modifications in the 1936 Treaty. The principal modifications in question will be:—

- (i) The further safeguarding of the rights of minorities in Syria; and
- (ii) The right for France to retain, for a certain number of years, her troops in Syria.

4. M. Bonnet did not seem to anticipate any very violent resistance on the part of the Syrians. The French Government, he said, would, once the treaty thus modified had been brought into force, appoint an ambassador at Beirut instead of a High Commissioner. They would also, in all probability, set up a Senate in addition to the single Chamber now existing, and the Syrians would be given the right to appoint their own diplomatic representatives abroad.

5. M. Bonnet indicated that, in the present disturbed state of the world, it was to the advantage of Great Britain, as much as of France herself, that a fairly strong French force should remain in Syria.

6. My impression is that the French Government have definitely decided to take the course outlined above, and that further representations would be useless and would even be resented.

7. I shall take an early opportunity of speaking to M. Bonnet in the same sense as I have already done to M. Puaux regarding the incursion of armed bands from Syria into Transjordan.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 3357/5/89]

No. 184.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 34.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, April 15, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 29 of the 31st March, 1939, on the subject of the situation at Aleppo, I have the honour to report that the formation on the 6th April last of the new Syrian Cabinet, under the premiership of Nassouh el Boukhari, has so far not brought about any perceptible change in the state of affairs here. While the Syrian Nationalists are still pressing merchants and shopkeepers to continue the strike by keeping their shops and offices closed, the French, for their part, have succeeded in keeping an important part of

the town open and in ensuring an almost normal supply of the necessities of life. Disorders have almost ceased, except for occasional stone throwing and window breaking, and there is some evidence that the balance is now turning in favour of the French. There is even some talk by the Nationalists of calling off the strike, which has obviously not influenced the French Government at all, and which has, on the contrary, undermined the influence and popularity of the Nationalist *bloc*, the first by evidencing to all who have eyes to see that the population is no longer solidly behind the *bloc*, and the second by inflicting pecuniary losses on the *bloc*'s supporters who have observed the strike, while its opponents, going about their business as usual, have suffered no losses.

2. The two representatives of Aleppo in the new Syrian Cabinet, Mohamed Khalil Mudarres, in the Ministry of Finance, and Salim Djambart, in the Ministry of National Economy, are both prominent industrialists and men of substance, whose nationalism is definitely of the more moderate and reasonable variety. Their presence in the Cabinet is taken as an omen that the new Government, if it does decide to intervene in affairs here, will follow counsels of prudence; but up to the present it has not given a sign of life so far as North Syria is concerned.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent direct to His Majesty's representative at Paris and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 3358/5/89]

No. 185.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 37.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, April 29, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 34 of the 15th April, 1939, on the subject of the situation at Aleppo, I have the honour to report that the Nationalist strike came to an end here on the 25th April, when all shops and offices were reopened and the life of the town returned to normal.

2. The decision to end the strike was taken by the Nationalist *bloc* ostensibly to permit the population to make necessary purchases in view of the strained situation in Europe. The real reason was, however, that the Nationalists, conscious that they were fast losing their influence and popularity by attempting to prolong the strike against the wishes of the population, decided to call it off before its gradual and automatic collapse had completely ruined their prestige.

3. Though the strike has lasted one month and has at times caused some embarrassment to merchants and traders whose business has been more or less seriously interfered with, its general effect has been nil.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent direct to His Majesty's representative at Paris and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 3243/284/65]

No. 186.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 1153. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 10, 1939.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 558, Very Confidential, of the 1st May, and I request that you will take an opportunity of expressing to M. Bonnet my appreciation of his courtesy in supplying me with the information contained therein as to French policy in Syria.

2. I welcome M. Bonnet's statement that the French Government are proposing to enter into negotiations with the Syrian Government regarding the modifications in the 1936 Treaty which they regard as indispensable. I agree

that the withdrawal of the French troops in Syria might in present circumstances be dangerous, notwithstanding the fact that their withdrawal from Syria would not mean their withdrawal from the Lebanon where, even if the Franco-Lebanese Treaty were brought into force, France would apparently be able in effect to keep an unlimited number of troops for an indefinite period. Indeed, I had assumed that the "further arrangement regulating the relations between the French army and the Syrian army," which was negotiated with Jamil Mardam last autumn (see your despatch No. 1380 of the 24th November last), already provided for the retention of French troops.

3. I note that while M. Bonnet stated that once the desired modifications have been negotiated and the treaty brought into force, an ambassador would be appointed at Beirut instead of a High Commissioner, he did not give any indication that the French Government are considering the establishment of a kingdom in Syria. You will, however, see from the enclosed copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Jedda that M. Puaux appears to have approached King Abdul Aziz with enquiries as to his willingness, in certain circumstances, to allow one of his sons to be appointed King of Syria. Such a development would be of considerable interest to His Majesty's Government, particularly in view of the effect which it might be expected to have in neighbouring Arab countries. I request therefore that you will, if you see no objection, and without mentioning M. Puaux by name, enquire whether there is any information on this subject which the French Government are able to communicate to His Majesty's Government.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Bagdad, Cairo and Jedda, and His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

Enclosure in No. 186.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, April 15, 1939.

ACCORDING to Ibn Saud, French High Commissioner of Syria asked him through Fuad Bey whether he would agree to the appointment of one of his sons as King of Syria on the basis of independence and of protection of minorities. Enquiry was personal, but High Commissioner thought French Government would not be against it. Ibn Saud said: "Yes, provided Syria were not less free than Iraq is now."

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 14; Bagdad, No. 20; Jerusalem, No. 10; and Damascus.)

[E 3599/284/65]

No. 187.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 648. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 16, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that, in the course of conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, I took the opportunity of speaking to him as directed by your despatch No. 1155 of the 10th May, marked "Very Confidential," regarding French policy in Syria.

2. M. Bonnet explained that under the 1936 Treaty, even as modified in 1938, the French troops in Syria would have been at the disposal of the Syrian Government, whereas it is the present intention of the French Government that they shall be at the disposal of the French Ambassador at Beirut, once the modified treaty comes into force.

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3. I threw a fly over his Excellency respecting the report that had, I said, reached His Majesty's Government as to the possible intention of the French Government to establish a monarchy in Syria. M. Bonnet did not deny that this might eventually be done, but he was *boutonné* on the subject, declaring that all this was very vague at present. Nor would he admit that the French Government had any particular candidate in view to occupy the future throne. Meanwhile, as he remarked rather sadly, the Syrian Government had resigned, and some time must elapse before Franco-Syrian affairs were satisfactorily settled.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 4246/1809/25]

No. 188.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 12, 1939.

AMIR FAISUL has given me letter from Ibn Saud declaring that he can no longer ignore Iraqi policy and propaganda which have for object either to effect union with Syria or to place a Shereef on the Syrian Throne. He considers the second the most dangerous in view of hostility of Shereefian family to him, and that if either is obtained [? more] will follow, and next goal will be the Hejaz and perhaps even Persian [? Gulf] and Nejd. Hitherto silent out of friendship for His Majesty's Government, he is now compelled to ask them either to declare their policy towards him in such a manner as to reassure him or else counter the efforts of Iraq wherever he finds them being used. His influence, he asserts, is quite as powerful as theirs.

Faisul says that King is very angry with Nuri, whom he accuses of having shown many important persons in Iraq garbled version of personal letter which the King sent him in April about Arab attitude to Great Britain and France, in order to convince them that the King is working with Great Britain against Arab cause (you have copy of the letter, but I have no reference here). Faisul asserted that it would be easy for the King to raise revolt in Iraq immediately. Neither Faisul nor the King referred to recent extension of powers to Amir Abdullah, but this is doubtless one of the causes of their anxiety.

I thought it well not to begin by saying that the King must not take any action which might cause trouble in Arab world, since he would in any case await your reply before taking a decision. Obviously, he would like an assurance that the Throne of Syria will not be given to a Shereef. I told Faisul that it seemed to me unlikely that the French would wish to encourage Iraqi influence in Syria, but that they would not consult us if they wished to give the throne to a Shereef any more than we consulted them about King Faisul. The Amir agreed, but said that the French would surely inform us beforehand, and the King relied on us to warn him.

Recent telegram from Bagdad shows that the King is right about Nuri's wish to have a Shereefian King in Syria, but whether the French have done more than sound him as they sounded the King I do not know. If his fear of addition of third Shereefian ruler to the existing two could be dissipated, the risk of quarrel with Iraq would be postponed, if not entirely removed. Perhaps you have some indication from Paris about French intentions.

Nuri had learned that the Amir Saud had left the capital with armed force for unknown destination. General belief here is that Amir Saud is in the capital, but in any case there is no need for anxiety on Iraqi side so long as the King is consulting His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 25.)

(Addressed to Foreign Office (1) (Taif). Repeated to Bagdad and Saving to Cairo, Damascus and Jerusalem, all unnumbered.)

[E 4391/63/89]

No. 189.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, May 18, 1939.

WITH reference to despatch No. 231 of 2nd May, 1939, from His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora to you on the subject of the situation in the Hatay, I have the honour to report that the declarations made in such glowing terms to the Turkish press by the President and Prime Minister of the Hatay State appear grossly to exaggerate the unanimity and joy with which the introduction of the new régime based on Kemalist principles has been received by the population of the Hatay. As a matter of fact, certain aspects of the new régime have provoked considerable discontent not only among Arabs and Christians but among the Turks of the Hatay also. The introduction of Turkish currency and exchange control in place of the Syrian currency based on the franc with free buying and selling has thrown the commercial community into confusion and has embarrassed the many persons who were accustomed to make payments abroad for life assurance, holidays, medical cures, education of children, &c. The introduction of the Turkish customs tariff has made imported goods much dearer, and in order to prevent the competition of merchandise imported under the former Hatay tariff (the Syrian tariff, less 40 per cent.) a very heavy consumption tax has been imposed on all such goods. The rates are given in the list enclosed herewith.⁽¹⁾ As a result the cost of living has gone up enormously. Imported goods have tripled in price, local products, such as fruit, vegetables, &c., have doubled in price, and many commodities have become absolutely unobtainable. This last feature may possibly pass, as supplies hitherto received from Syrian and Lebanese sources are gradually replaced by goods from Turkish sources, but the other features are likely to prove permanent; and as there is no sign that salaries and wages will be increased, the result is likely to be a serious decline in purchasing power and in the general standard of living of the population of the Hatay. This aspect of things is already beginning to make itself felt.

2. Opposition to the Government appeared openly in a recent session of the Chamber of Deputies at Antioch, when a Turkish member, Hamdi Saluç, president of the Halkevi at Alexandretta, protested that the Hatay Government, without consulting the Chamber, had introduced many measures which the Deputies did not like. After an angry scene between members of the Hatay Cabinet and Turkish Deputies, the Chamber voted against the procedure of urgency demanded by the Government.

3. Another cause of discontent is the number of Turkish officials who have invaded the Hatay to the exclusion of local candidates for Government employment. The prospect of impending union with Turkey adds to this discontent, for it is felt that, when that event takes place, the whole top-heavy superstructure of the autonomous Hatay, with its President, its Prime Minister and Cabinet, its forty Deputies and innumerable officials, will disappear overnight to give place to the very reduced organisation of a Turkish vilayet or kaimakamlık, in which but few local people will find a place. This and the prospect of conscription in the Turkish army is leading many even of the pure Turks of Antioch, not to mention the other elements of the population, to wonder whether the days of the French mandate were after all so bad for them as they were led to believe.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent direct to His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Angora, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 4393/5/89]

No. 190.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 45.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, June 10, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 18 of the 6th March, 1939, on the subject of the situation in the Jezireh, I have the honour to report that some disturbances of a political nature occurred at Kamechlie, the chief town of that district, on the 7th June last.

2. From the information available here it appears that the Separatist leaders, disappointed at the continued postponement of the measure of decentralisation which they had been led to expect, called upon their followers to demonstrate in force on the morning of that day. The demonstrators proceeded to the Serai, where they pulled down the Syrian flag and hoisted the Jezireh flag, while the crowd shouted: "Long live France!" and "Long live the Jezireh!" They then repaired to the house of the kaïmakam, where a meeting of officials was in progress, and demanded that all Syrian Government officials who are not natives of the Jezireh should quit the province immediately, without even waiting to take their families with them. Obligated to comply with this request, they left accordingly for Ras-el-Ain, where they are now awaiting instructions. The Separatist leaders then sent a telegram to the French High Commissioner at Beirut declaring their inability to submit any longer to union with Damascus, and asking for immediate application of the régime of decentralisation.

3. Later the same day a force of gendarmerie occupied the Serai and rehoisted the Syrian flag. This infuriated the populace, who attacked the building but were repulsed by the gendarmerie, who fired on the crowd, wounding seven persons. The town was thereupon closed and a general strike proclaimed.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Beirut, Damascus and Mosul.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 4446/1809/25]

No. 191.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 20, 1939.

MY telegram No. 75 of 13th June.

On receipt of Bagdad telegram No. 225 of 16th June, I informed Amir Faisal that the impression gained by His Majesty's Ambassador from French Minister was that conversion of Syrian Republic into a monarchy was not a very live question. If Faisal received this news without enthusiasm, that might be because, while it should calm his fears, it also damps his hopes.

2. According to a telegram received by Faisal from Egypt, newspapers in Damascus and Egypt state that General Nuri showed Arab Nationalist letter in which Ibn Saud threatened him for assisting Syrians and Palestinians. This letter was summarised in my telegram No. 48 of 8th April. Faisal is confident that the version shown by General Nuri was falsified, since actual text, if published, could do Ibn Saud no harm.

3. Is there any reason why Ibn Saud's supporters in other Arab countries should not engage in propaganda on his behalf? I suppose that the first two alternatives in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 75 mean that Ibn Saud would like His Majesty's Government, if not to help him to secure Throne of Syria for his family, at least to try to exclude any Shereefian candidate. This being impossible, I suggest he be told that His Majesty's Government are confident that he would do nothing which might cause strife between Arab States or create internal trouble in any of them, but that, subject to that proviso, they consider he is the best judge of his interests and of those of his country. We might add that we hope that visit of Iraqi Prime Minister will dissipate the misunderstandings, though Faisal seems pessimistic on that point.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 26, Saving; Cairo, No. 16; Jerusalem, No. 4; and Damascus, No. 2.)

[E 4246/1809/25]

No. 192.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 23, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 75 [of 12th June: Ibn Saud's letter to Sir R. Bullard objecting strongly to Iraqi policy and propaganda, especially regarding Syria].

I have no further information regarding intentions of French Government. Sir E. Phipps's despatch No. 648 [of 16th May] shows that French Minister for Foreign Affairs, when asked about the rumoured French intention to establish a monarchy in Syria, replied that all this was very vague at present, and would not admit that French Government had any particular candidate in view to occupy the throne. I doubt whether French Government have yet come to definite decision to have a monarchy at all, still less to adopt a Shereefian candidate.

2. Question is, in any case, primarily one for decision by the mandatory Power and the people of Syria. If, however, the Iraqi Government were to make it known that they favoured some particular candidate, it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to take exception to their action on the ground that it amounted to improper interference with Syrian affairs, and still less to improper interference with Saudi Arabian affairs, seeing that such action by itself would seem to constitute no threat to any part of Saudi Arabia.

3. I presume that Ibn Saud's real fear is the formation of a comparatively strong and influential bloc of the northern Arab States, which might rapidly overshadow Saudi Arabia in political importance, and dispose, once and for all, of Ibn Saud's claim to be regarded as the political leader of the Arab world. It would, from Ibn Saud's point of view, be worse still if Iraq, Transjordan and Syria were all ruled by members of the Shereefian family, who might possibly even attempt to stir up revolt in the Hejaz or other parts of present Saudi territories. But remote apprehensions of this kind would not entitle Ibn Saud to regard Iraq's present policy as directly aimed against Saudi Arabia. There can presumably be no fear on his part of Iraqi attempts openly to seize his territory.

4. His Majesty's Government have themselves recently taken strong exception to Iraqi propaganda, especially regarding Koweit; but it is obvious that no activities in which the Iraqi Government have been engaging could possibly be regarded as justifying any violent action by Ibn Saud, such as tribal raids in Iraq, and any such action might obviously lead to most serious consequences.

5. I think that, subject to your observations, your reply might be on the following lines:—

6. I have learnt with regret that anything said or done by the Iraqi Government should have led Ibn Saud to think that the Iraqi Government are pursuing a policy contrary to his interests.

7. His Majesty's Government have themselves found it necessary recently to take exception to certain aspects of Iraqi propaganda, especially propaganda directed against Koweit. His Majesty's Government have made their views regarding the objectionable nature of this propaganda clear to the Iraqi Government. There is no reason why Ibn Saud, if he shares the views of His Majesty's Government on this point, should not also point out to the Iraqi Government that such propaganda is open to strong objection.

8. At the same time, it does not appear likely to His Majesty's Government that Iraq has aggressive intentions towards Saudi Arabia or the Persian Gulf States. Even if such ambitions were entertained in certain quarters in Iraq, it would still be doubtful whether they would constitute a real threat to Iraq's neighbours. No one can foresee the distant future, but so long as Ibn Saud and his successors rule what is now Saudi Arabia, and so long as His Majesty's Government maintain their position on the shores of the Persian Gulf, as they have every intention of doing, it is clearly beyond the power of Iraq to achieve any territorial expansion in that direction.

9. As regards Syria, I understand that the Iraqi Government hope that eventually there may be some form of closer union between some of the Arab States. But so far as Syria is concerned this must depend upon the end of the

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o 3

French Mandate. These Iraqi hopes, therefore, are not likely to be realised in the near future, and need surely not affect Iraq's present relations with other States.

10. As for the question of the Syrian Throne, His Majesty's Government think that this is primarily a question to be decided by the people of Syria and the mandatory Power. They do not believe that any decision has yet been reached, even whether there is to be a king at all. His Majesty's Government had not heard that the Iraqi Government wished to support some particular candidate for the Syrian Throne, and they are not aware who this candidate may be, but if Ibn Saud holds different views on the suitability of certain possible candidates, it would seem desirable that a friendly discussion should take place between the Saudi Arabian and Iraqi Governments with a view to reconcile any difference of outlook.

11. In general, His Majesty's Government believe that there is no question affecting the interests of the two neighbouring Arab monarchies which cannot be solved by the normal methods of friendly and confidential consultation. I hope that Ibn Saud will find, in the course of such conversations, that the Iraqi Government have every desire to take full account of his position and to treat outstanding problems in a spirit of goodwill. It would, meanwhile, be best to refrain from any action or public statement which might merely embitter Saudi-Iraqi relations. Hasty action of this kind by Ibn Saud would certainly not be the best means of inducing Iraq to modify her policy towards Syria in such a way as to take more favourable account of his interests. Perhaps, in order to initiate conversations, Ibn Saud might be prepared to repeat his invitation to General Nuri, or some other leading Iraqi statesman, to visit him in Saudi Arabia, or alternatively he might send one of his own sons to Bagdad. A full and frank exchange of views upon Saudi-Iraqi relations could not fail to be of mutual advantage.

12. Foregoing was drafted before receipt of Bagdad telegram No. 225 [of 18th June], but will, I hope, provide you with general lines on which you can base a suitable reply to Ibn Saud.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 99. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 225; Cairo, No. 49, Saving (by post); Damascus, No. 3, Saving (by post); Jerusalem, No. 452A (by post); and Paris, No. 273, Saving (by bag).)

[E 4553/1142/44]

No. 193.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 814.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 24, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 392, Saving, of to-day, reporting the signature simultaneously in Paris and in Angora of agreements between France and Turkey, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of the texts, as printed in the *Temps* (semi-official), dated the 25th June, of the following documents:—

- (1) A Franco-Turkish declaration of mutual assistance.
- (2) A unilateral declaration by the French Government concerning Syria and the Lebanon.
- (3) The speeches exchanged by M. Bonnet and the Turkish Ambassador.
- (4) An explanatory memorandum issued to the press by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- (5) Reports from Angora of the signature of the Franco-Turkish agreements there.⁽¹⁾

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 193.

Extract from the Temps of June 25, 1939.

LA SIGNATURE DU PACTE FRANCO-TURC D'ASSISTANCE MUTUELLE.

Le Pacte d'Assistance mutuelle.

LA déclaration commune assurant l'assistance mutuelle de la France et de la Turquie, au cas d'un acte d'agression dans la région méditerranéenne ou dans les Balkans, est ainsi conçue :

Déclaration.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement turc sont entrés en étroite consultation et les discussions dans lesquelles ils se sont engagés et qui sont encore en cours ont révélé leur identité de vue habituelle.

2. Il est convenu que les deux États concluront un accord définitif de longue durée comportant des engagements réciproques dans l'intérêt de leur sécurité nationale.

3. En attendant la conclusion de l'accord définitif, le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement turc déclarent que, dans le cas d'un acte d'agression qui conduirait à une guerre dans la région méditerranéenne, ils seraient prêts à coopérer effectivement et à s'accorder mutuellement toute l'aide et l'assistance en leur pouvoir.

4. Cette déclaration, ainsi que l'accord envisagé, n'est dirigée contre aucun pays, mais a pour but d'assurer à la France et à la Turquie une aide et une assistance réciproques dans le cas où celles-ci s'avéreraient nécessaires.

5. Il est reconnu par les deux Gouvernements que certaines questions, y compris la définition plus précise des diverses conditions dans lesquelles se déclencherait le jeu des engagements réciproques, demanderont un examen plus approfondi avant que l'accord définitif ne puisse être conclu. Cet examen est actuellement en cours.

6. Les deux Gouvernements reconnaissent qu'il est également nécessaire d'assurer l'établissement de la sécurité dans les Balkans et sont en consultation afin d'atteindre ce but le plus rapidement possible.

7. Il est entendu que les dispositions ci-dessus énoncées n'empêchent ni l'un ni l'autre Gouvernement de conclure, dans l'intérêt général de la consolidation de la paix, des accords avec d'autres pays.

BONNET. SUAD DAVAZ.

Paris, le 23 juin 1939.

Voici la déclaration française relative "à la pérennité de la mission assumée par la France en Syrie et au Liban" :

Le Gouvernement de la République déclare qu'il n'entre aucunement dans les intentions de la France de renoncer, en faveur d'un tiers, à la mission qu'elle assume en Syrie et au Liban.

Paris, le 23 juin 1939.

BONNET.

Les signatures échangées, M. Georges Bonnet a prononcé devant le micro les paroles suivantes :

Allocution de M. Georges Bonnet.

La déclaration d'assistance mutuelle franco-turque reprend exactement les termes de la déclaration anglo-turque du 12 mai.

Elle est destinée à rendre strictement parallèles les obligations qui lient la France et la Grande-Bretagne et celles qui lient déjà la Grande-Bretagne et la Turquie.

Elle prévoit, en effet :

"(1) Que les deux Gouvernements, français et turc, s'accorderont mutuellement toute l'aide et l'assistance en leur pouvoir, dans le cas d'un acte d'agression qui conduirait à une guerre dans la région méditerranéenne;

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" Et (2) que cet engagement sera précisé dans un accord définitif qui aura également pour but d'assurer l'établissement de la sécurité dans les Balkans."

"Tels sont les deux points essentiels de cette déclaration. Il convient, d'ailleurs, de souligner, à ce propos, que, comme elle l'indique expressément, elle n'est dirigée contre aucun pays."

"Réplique exacte de la déclaration anglo-turque, la déclaration franco-turque a été élaborée en même temps que celle-ci, au cours d'une négociation qui a associé Paris, Londres et Ankara et dont le succès marque une solidarité essentielle au maintien de la paix."

"Je suis tout particulièrement heureux de voir ainsi resserrés les liens qui unissent la France et la Turquie, dont l'étroite entente se manifeste ainsi à la fois sur les problèmes particuliers et sur le plan plus élevé de la politique générale."

Réponse de M. Suad Davaz.

L'Ambassadeur de Turquie à Paris a pris ensuite la parole, et s'est exprimé ainsi :

Votre Ministre des Affaires étrangères, mon ami Georges Bonnet, vous a donné à l'instant même les renseignements nécessaires sur ce que nous faisons actuellement.

Je ne puis ajouter que ceci : je voudrais dire combien je ressens une grande joie de voir scellée aujourd'hui l'union franco-turque.

Les deux pays, en signant les accords d'aujourd'hui, l'ont fait pour consolider la paix. Ces accords ne sont dirigés contre personne; ils ont été conçus dans le but le plus pacifique. Notre idéal est la paix et c'est de cette manière que nous collaborons à son maintien. Ce faisant la France, la Turquie et l'Angleterre feront tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour maintenir cette paix qui est chère à l'humanité tout entière.

La Rétrocession à la Turquie du Sandjak d'Alexandrette.

LES documents signés hier, à Ankara, savoir : un arrangement, un protocole et deux lettres annexes, sont analysés et commentés dans la note suivante qui a été remise à la presse après la cérémonie du Quai d'Orsay :

La France est guidée par le souci d'affranchir les relations mutuelles de la Turquie et de la Syrie de la lourde équivoque dont les grevait la persistance, sous des formes plus ou moins nettes, de prétentions turques. Les rapports des deux pays seront désormais fondés sur la confiance réciproque. La Turquie reconnaît le caractère immuable de sa frontière avec sa voisine. Elle s'engage à ne rien entreprendre qui soit de nature à compromettre l'intégrité territoriale ou la tranquillité intérieure de cette dernière. C'est pour la première fois qu'elle contracte, dans ce domaine, une obligation unilatérale en vertu de laquelle elle s'interdit de s'ingérer, de quelque manière que ce soit, dans les affaires de la Syrie et, même simplement, de chercher à y exercer la moindre influence.

Tant par leur portée que par leur solennité, ces engagements libèrent la Syrie d'une menace morale et matérielle qui pesait sur sa vie politique. A Damas, et plus encore en Djézireh et à Alep, l'opinion mesure, à sa juste valeur, l'intérêt que présente pour le pays un assainissement qui, s'il est payé d'un prix incontestablement élevé, n'en affranchit pas moins la Syrie d'une lourde préoccupation et lui ouvre, sur son patrimoine définitivement consolidé, la perspective d'une existence paisible.

La France a saisi cette occasion de dégager de toute incertitude et de tout doute sa propre politique au Levant. C'est à cette fin que tend la déclaration par laquelle elle affirme qu'il n'entre aucunement dans ses intentions de renoncer, en faveur d'un tiers, à la mission qu'elle assume en Syrie et au Liban. Spontané et unilatéral, cet acte a une valeur *erga omnes*. Il vaut à l'égard des tiers, ce terme étant pris dans son acception la plus large. En même temps, donc, que la Syrie assure son avenir, la France proclame la pérennité de ses objectifs au Levant.

La rétrocession du sandjak ne pouvait être grevée de conditions qui eussent tendu à retourner contre la Turquie, au profit de la Syrie, l'hypothèque dont la négociation avait pour objet de préparer la mainlevée. La Turquie, plus que toute autre Puissance, est jalouse de ses prérogatives. Tout ce qui peut paraître limiter sa souveraineté lui est suspect. Faisant désormais partie intégrante de la

Turquie, le sandjak perd sa personnalité propre ainsi que, par voie de conséquence, l'autonomie dont il jouissait à l'intérieur des frontières syriennes. C'est ce principe qui forme l'assise du système.

Les relations contractuelles des Puissances avec la Turquie s'étendent automatiquement au territoire réintégré. Il n'en pouvait être autrement. Quant aux groupes ethniques de sang autre que turc, il n'était pas moins clair qu'Ankara écarterait résolument toute tentative de leur assurer une protection externe. Il a fallu ainsi éliminer des textes toutes les dispositions par lesquelles eussent été conférées aux éléments en cause certaines franchises ou garanties.

Il n'en reste pas moins que les individus qui désireront ne pas acquérir la nationalité turque auront, pendant un délai de six mois à dater de l'entrée en vigueur des accords, la faculté d'opter pour la nationalité syrienne ou pour la nationalité libanaise. Ceux qui agiront de la sorte devront, dans les dix-huit mois suivants, transporter leur domicile hors du territoire, après avoir liquidé leur avoir immobilier. Ils seront libres d'aliéner ou d'emporter leurs effets mobiliers de toute nature, ainsi que leur cheptel. Le produit de cette liquidation sera bloqué à un compte spécial de la banque centrale de la République turque à Alexandrette. Les modalités de transfert seront réglées par voie d'arrangement entre les parties contractantes. Quant aux étrangers, ceux qui le demanderont auront la latitude d'être admis au bénéfice du même régime.

Les accords règlent les conditions dans lesquelles les intérêts moraux et matériels de la France sont dédommagés. Les biens fonciers et les droits incorporels de nos nationaux sont cédés contre le versement d'une indemnité globale et forfaitaire dont il incombera au Gouvernement de la République de répartir le montant entre les œuvres ou entreprises dépossédées ou évincées. De même, en ce qui concerne les dépendances du domaine privé de la France dans le sandjak.

Le cimetière militaire dans lequel nous avons regroupé, en 1935, les cendres de nos soldats morts au cours de la campagne de Cilicie continuera d'être propriété française. Nous en assurerons le gardiennage. Il ne sera pas interdit, aux fêtes d'usage, d'y célébrer des cérémonies commémoratives selon les rites que la décence et la piété ont consacrés. Quant aux édifices culturels : églises et paroisses latines, ainsi que leurs dépendances, tous ceux qui relèvent de congrégations françaises resteront affectés à leur destination actuelle.

Telle est l'économie des accords qui fixent désormais le statut des relations franco-turques au Levant. Depuis 1936 ces rapports étaient tendus. Le retour du sandjak à la Turquie doit avoir pour effet de dissiper l'atmosphère irritante qu'entretenait la question d'Alexandrette.

Encore est-il que, de la province en cause, une portion non négligeable reste à la Syrie : la région de Kessab, sur les pentes méridionales du Djebel-Akra. Cette rectification laisse à la Syrie une contrée dont la population autochtone est de race arménienne et assure au pays une frontière orographiquement mieux assise.

Aucun obstacle ne s'oppose donc plus à l'établissement de rapports confiants entre la France et la Turquie. Telle est la raison essentielle pour laquelle les deux Puissances ont tenu à faire coïncider la signature des actes relatifs à la Syrie avec celle de la déclaration par laquelle elles s'engagent mutuellement à se prêter assistance en cas de conflit.

[E 4552/1142/44]

No. 194.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 392. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Paris, June 24, 1939.

MY telegram No. 378, Saving, [of the 22nd June: Franco-Turkish negotiations].

A Franco-Turkish declaration of mutual assistance was signed in Paris by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Ambassador on 23rd June. Copies of the text, which is identical with the Anglo-Turkish Declaration of 12th May, are being sent by despatch.

2. A unilateral declaration was also signed by M. Bonnet in the following terms:—

"The Government of the republic declares that it does not enter into the intentions of France to renounce in favour of any third Power the responsibilities which it has assumed in Syria and the Lebanon.

3. An agreement, a protocol, two annexes, a *procès-verbal* and two letters, establishing a new régime of confidence and appeasement on the Franco-Turkish frontier, and providing for the return to Turkey of the sanjak, were signed simultaneously at Angora, and are to be published shortly. According to semi-official statements, they lay down the compensation which France is to receive for her moral and material interests in the sanjak. An indemnity of about 30 million francs is to be paid by Turkey for the French interests ceded, and is to be distributed by the French Government. The military cemetery is to remain French, and the status of the French religious edifices to be unchanged. Kassab is to remain Syrian. Turkey, it is stated, undertakes not to interfere in any manner in the affairs of Syria.

4. Although the cession of the sanjak has given rise to certain criticisms from Right Deputies, such as M. Marin, who dislike any alienation of French territory both in itself and as a precedent, the conclusion of the Franco-Turkish Agreement as a whole is generally welcomed by the Right, Centre and Left alike. Newspapers regard it as further evidence of the value of the co-operation of France and Great Britain, and as a success for their diplomacy for the policy of the peace front. There are numerous tributes to Turkey and to the value of her friendship.

(Copy sent to Angora.)

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 729/729/65]

No. 195.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 29, 1939.

MY telegram No. 16 of 29th January.

After talking about the Yemen, Ibn Saud spoke about the world situation. He was rather optimistic about Palestine. The main thing was to ensure that the Jews should never dominate that country. He repeated his conviction that interest of His Majesty's Government and the Arabs were identical. If only the Palestine question could be got out of the way, all would be well. He had recently talked to men of importance from India, Egypt and Syria and other Moslem countries, and whatever their attitude towards His Majesty's Government, they were all entirely opposed to Italy and Germany. If His Majesty's Government ever abandoned their position in India, the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, he would know how to look after himself, but "so long as there was one Englishman in the Persian Gulf," our interests were his; and he hinted that in case of a world struggle we could count on his goodwill.

2. Ibn Saud mentioned as a good joke that Italian Minister, when reporting to him ratification of Anglo-Italian Agreement, said that if there was any trouble between Saudi Arabia and Great Britain at any time, Ibn Saud had only to tell him.

3. German Minister, who has not yet presented his letters of credence, seemed surprised and I thought somewhat put out on learning that the King had sent for me. On the other hand, the King did not see the new French Minister, who is also waiting to present his credentials. Only other person he received was Hamilton, London director of [group undecypherable] Arabian Standard Oil Company, whose departure was fixed for the following day.

(Repeated, Saving, to Cairo, No. 5; Jerusalem, No. 3; Bagdad, No. 4; Political Resident in Persian Gulf, No. 1; Government of India, No. 2; and Aden, No. 3.)

[E 748/61/91]

No. 196.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord,

Jedda, January 9, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in translation, the Saudi note on the Anglo-Italian Agreement whose receipt I reported in my telegram No. 7, dated the 9th January. I regret that I was not able to induce the Saudi Government to abandon their intention to make a communication to the British and Italian Governments or, at least, to limit their communication to the brief formula which was suggested in the sixth paragraph of your despatch No. 253, dated the 29th June, 1938; but in spite of a long talk with Fuad Bey, in the course of which I used as convincingly as I could most of the arguments set forth in the above-mentioned despatch, the Saudi Government have found it necessary to send identic notes to my Italian colleague and myself, and to embroider the proposed formula. But it will, I hope, afford partial satisfaction that they have at least avoided criticisms of detail and have not asked any questions such as those indicated in the enclosure to my despatch No. 220 of the 4th December last.

2. My Italian colleague regards the note he has received as a rather absurd statement of the obvious. I have, however, not discussed the matter with him and shall not do so without instructions.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome, Cairo and Bagdad, and to His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut, and also to His Majesty's Consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 196.

Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Minister (Jedda).

Your Excellency,

Mecca, January 5, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, since learning of the terms of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of the 16th April, 1938, have been studying its terms with the greatest care and attention because it contains some points affecting them and their Arab neighbour, the Yemen. They have been very careful in studying it and in considering what the agreement may imply and, after this continued and careful study, they have come to the conclusion that they are obliged to forward this present note to their two friends, the British and Italian Governments, in order to express their opinion and define their attitude towards the said agreement.

His Majesty's Government do not consider themselves bound by any agreement to which they are not parties. Therefore they do not consent and cannot consent to any condition or term which may limit their freedom or to any stipulation, whether in the Anglo-Italian Agreement of the 16th April, 1938, or in any other agreement, which may affect them, and they make all reserves in regard thereto.

Further, His Majesty's Government cannot be bound except by the treaties concluded between them and Great Britain and Italy respectively. They do not admit that their relations with them can be governed by anything except the provisions of International Law as recognised by independent States or (the terms) of the treaties concluded between them.

Greetings!

FAISAL, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 1109/1108/25]

No. 197.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord,

Jedda, January 19, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, according to information given to me by my Egyptian colleague, Abdul Rahman Bey Azzam, the agreement for the construction of the Mecca-Jedda-Medina roads and the provision of water and electric light for Mecca, which I reported in my despatch No. 18 dated the 19th January, was finally concluded by his being able to convince Ibn Saud that the object of the Egyptian Government in promoting this scheme was purely humanitarian and without any political motive whatsoever.

2. As you are aware, Ibn Saud is extremely jealous of anything that savours of interference in the internal affairs of his country, not merely by Europeans, but also by Moslem countries. Indeed, perhaps he is more suspicious of Moslems, who have a right of entry which is denied to Europeans. His suspicions are directed in particular against Iraq and Egypt—a point on which I reported in my despatch No. 55, dated the 22nd March, 1938. But it was to be expected that his deepest suspicions would attach to the ambition attributed to Egypt of becoming the seat of a caliphate—a subject to which I referred in my despatch No. 43 of the 9th March last; and I have no doubt that Azzam Bey acted wisely in making a bold attack on this suspicion instead of pretending that it did not exist.

3. According to Azzam Bey, he followed this line of argument. He had not come to "negotiate" about the roads, as Fuad Bey had invited him to do on his arrival. The Egyptian Government offered a handsome present, and it was for the Saudi Government to say whether they wished to accept it. To have any suspicion of the motives behind this offer was entirely unjustified. The Egyptian Government, as a one-eyed person in the kingdom of the blind, had offered and afforded assistance, often at considerable cost to themselves, to several Moslem countries which happened to be less advanced in material development. To Afghanistan, for instance, Egypt had offered to accept in Egyptian schools and

colleges a considerable number of Afghan students at the expense of the Government of Egypt, and the help given to Iraq in the matter of education was well known. As to the suspicion that Egypt wished to set up a caliphate, it was fantastic. To attempt such a project would defeat the object of the Egyptian Government, which was to draw Moslem countries, and particularly neighbouring Arab countries, together by moral and cultural bonds. It had been suggested that the Royal marriage between the Iranian Heir Apparent and an Egyptian princess had been arranged with one eye on the caliphate; but did anyone with any knowledge of Islam believe that a Shi'ah State would accept such a caliphate? Not a soul in Egypt was in favour of such a scheme—no statesman, or politician, nor the Sheikh-al-Maraghi; and when the young King showed some inclination that way, the people were firmly opposed to it. Egypt wanted nothing in return for such help as she proposed to give in the matter of the Hejaz roads, and in humanitarian and cultural projects in other countries, except the satisfaction of having accomplished work of public utility and the knowledge that in time of war, if war should come, she would have neighbours who were well-disposed towards her: the help of those neighbours she did not expect to secure.

4. Azzam Bey says that his arguments eventually convinced the King, who withdrew all the objections which had been raised hitherto, and even accepted without difficulty the clause which provides that when the cost of the improvements now contemplated has been paid off they shall never be the subject of any charge to the users beyond those necessary for their maintenance.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, and to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1334/6/31]

No. 198.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 43.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 20, 1939.

THE Emir Feisal called to see me this afternoon, accompanied by Fuad Bey and the Saudi Arabian Minister. The Emir began by saying that he had come in the spirit of full willingness to help over the Palestine problem, but he was rather concerned at the possibility of the introduction of other and wider matters into the discussions, which might possibly have reactions on Saudi Arabia and the other Arab States. What he had principally in mind was the various suggestions that had been unofficially made in the press as to the possibility of some form of Arab federation. Such a development, it was suggested, might take one of several forms, which might comprise—

Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon, or
Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, or
Palestine and Transjordan.

His Royal Highness had not been disposed to pay much attention to newspaper reports because he knew that these did not emanate from His Majesty's Government, but he and his delegation had been rather more concerned with the suggestion put forward by Nuri Pasha that he should write a letter to me sponsoring the general idea. This letter in draft the Emir Feisal proceeded to show me, emphasising its confidential character, and I read it through. In the letter, which I said I had not received, and which the Emir Feisal told me that he had persuaded Nuri to suspend, Nuri Pasha argued for the independence of Palestine, subject to suitable guarantees for minorities and also, so far as I remember, for the early establishment of some system of confederation, adherence to which Iraq would be willing to consider. The point that the Emir Feisal wished particularly to put to me was whether there was any likelihood of His Majesty's Government desiring to bring in the establishment of an Arab federation as part of a bargain for a Palestine settlement.

2. In reply to this I said that His Majesty's Government had never entertained any such idea, if only for the reason that they regarded the settlement of

the Palestine problem as urgent and any future establishment of an Arab federation as a matter for a distant and unforeseeable future, which must depend upon the development of feeling among the Arab States themselves. If and when these were strongly in favour of some such plan and agreed upon the method of its practical execution, I had no doubt that His Majesty's Government would be very willing to consider it, but it did not at present appear to them in the field of practical politics.

3. The Emir expressed himself as reassured by my reply and concluded by saying that he had a communication from Ibn Saud that he was anxious to present personally to the Prime Minister. I told him that, subject to the Emir Feisal's engagements, I would arrange with the Prime Minister what time would be convenient for him to receive His Royal Highness for this purpose.

4. The Emir Feisal did not raise any question concerning a possible future monarch of Palestine.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[E 1304/1304/65]

No. 199.

Sir M. Lampson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 124.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 8, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Eleventh Annual Congress of the Egyptian Medical Association and the Second Pan-Arab Medical Congress, which opened in Cairo on the 29th January, has now concluded its session. Some 300 delegates from Syria, Iraq, Tunis and other countries of the Near and Middle East attended, besides some 200 Egyptian doctors.

2. The chair was taken by Dr. Ali Ibrahim Pasha, the eminent Egyptian surgeon. The discussions naturally dealt largely with purely technical matters, such as the international organisation of hygiene, the standard of living in Eastern countries and the special diseases prevalent in those areas. The congress further considered the question of a universal medical terminology in all Arab countries.

3. The congress has afforded another opportunity for delegates of Near and Middle Eastern countries to meet together in Cairo, which is becoming more and more the political and cultural centre of the Near East. It is not surprising, therefore, that the delegates' thoughts were not confined solely to matters of purely technical interest. At a reception given by the Iraqi students of the Egyptian University and high schools in Cairo, Dr. Sami Shawkat, who was the president of the Iraqi delegation to the congress, enlarged, according to a press report, on a project for a greater unified Arab State. With this end in view he advocated a strict control over all schools, universities and the press in the Arab countries, and intimated that an Egypto-Iraqi committee would be constituted to promote this idea. According to the press the speaker envisaged a Greater Arabia on the lines of Hitler's Greater Germany.

4. This proposal of a unified, as opposed to a federated, Arab State is a new one, and shows little appreciation of political realities obtaining in Arab countries. But it is of interest in that it indicates the influence which the technique of the totalitarian States of Europe is now having on the Near East. A shrewd observer recently remarked *à propos* of the various meetings of Arab delegates which have recently taken place in Cairo that they would lead, not so much to a measure of co-operation, but to a rapid spread of advanced and novel ideas amongst the young men of the Near East.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

[E 1675/687/91]

No. 200.

Sir R. Craigie to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

Tokyo, January 16, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 586 of the 8th August, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Prince Seif-al-Islam Hasein of Yemen and his party left the Tokyo Imperial Hotel on the 6th January after a stay in Japan of more than seven months. The Japanese military authorities arranged for them to fly to Shanghai, but it is unlikely that they will remain in China for long, their aim being to return to Arabia, making short stays at ports of call on the way.

2. The Prince seemed to be as reluctant to leave Tokyo as he had been to leave London, one rumour current locally being that in view of "recent events in the Yemen" (of which, however, I have no details) he had no desire to return home in a hurry. There was consequently a considerable amount of packing, unpacking and repacking of trunks. The undue prolongation of the Prince's visit was a source of embarrassment not only to M. Choukry, his Egyptian secretary (who dared not press the Prince to go and ultimately left in advance himself), but also to the Japanese authorities, under whose auspices he originally came to Japan. He began to run short of funds, but these fortunately arrived and, as far as is known, he left no debts behind him.

3. I may add that Mr. Berlas, teacher of Hindustani at the Tokyo Foreign School of Languages, told a member of my staff the other day, in the course of conversation, that at a farewell dinner given to the Prince early in December by the Dai Nippon Islam Association (mentioned in a Chancery letter of the 9th September last) the Prince had in the course of a speech spoken very frankly of the impressions he had obtained during his stay in Japan. He had said that during his stay in this country he had been making enquiries as to the Japanese attitude towards Islam, but that he was puzzled to know what he would tell his co-religionists on his return home. He felt that the Japanese were merely paying lip service to the Mahometans and that they would accomplish nothing unless they were prepared to back up their words by action.

4. The dinner, it seems, was attended by about 200 persons, the chair being taken by General Hayashi, formerly Prime Minister, who is now, it appears, president of the association. There were, according to Mr. Berlas, a number of generals and admirals present at the dinner, including a Lieutenant-General Sosa, a well-known reactionary. No report of the proceedings had appeared in the press.

5. Mr. Berlas added that both the Prince Hasein and the Saudi Arabian Minister in London had been very disappointed to find how little there was behind Japanese protestations of friendship for Mahometans, and expressed the opinion that by inviting these distinguished personages to Japan the Japanese had not only failed to achieve their object but had disclosed to the Mahometan world the insincerity behind their professed friendship. He attributed this result mainly to the bad advice given to the leaders of the Islam Association by Kurban Gali, whom he described as being politically rather than religiously minded. It would have been much better had they not invited such distinguished persons to the opening of the mosque in Tokyo.

I have, &c.

R. L. CRAIGIE.

[E 2946/61/91]

No. 201.

Sir R. Bullard to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mecca).—(Enclosure in Jeddah Despatch No. 53 to Foreign Office, dated March 22; Received April 24.)

(No. 58.)

Your Excellency,

Jeddah, March 22, 1939.

UNDER instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the note which His Royal Highness the Minister for Foreign Affairs was so good as to address

to me on the 5th January, 1939, on the subject of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of the 16th April, 1938, respecting certain areas in the Middle East, and to make the following reply:—

"The agreement signed on the 16th April, 1938, is an agreement between the United Kingdom and Italy alone. In consequence, it imposes obligations upon the United Kingdom and Italy alone, and imposes no obligations whatever on third Powers, such as Saudi Arabia.

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom furthermore agree that their relations with the Saudi Arabian Government are governed solely by the provisions of international law and practice and the treaties and agreements in force between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia."

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

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PART XLV.—JULY TO DECEMBER 1939.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 4585/4585/25]

No. 1.

Personalities in Sa'ûdi Arabia.—(Enclosure in Jedda Despatch No. 98 of June 10; Received in Foreign Office, July 1.)

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Note on Titles, &c.

1. *Sherif*.—Said to apply strictly in Arabia to persons recognised as being in the direct male descent from Hasan, the son of the Caliph 'Alī. There is, however, much confusion as to the exact meaning of this and the following term.
2. *Seyyid*.—Said to apply in Arabia, though much abused in some other countries, only to persons recognised as being in the male descent from Huseyn, the son of 'Alī.
3. *Amir*.—Given as a title to all princes of the blood and describes the office of practically all provincial governors.
4. *Sheykh*.—Applied very widely, but not indiscriminately, not only to tribal personages, but to townsmen of consequence, especially, perhaps, though not exclusively, to those in official positions, *e.g.*, Sheykh Yusuf Yasin.
5. *Bey*.—Still used, sometimes in preference to Sheykh, by persons who would have been so called by right or courtesy in the Turkish system and who may dislike the association of "Sheykh" with age or desert life, *e.g.*, Fuad Bey Hamza.
6. *Hajji*.—Convenient, in a country where every Hejazi adult has made the pilgrimage, for certain persons not otherwise easy to give a title to, *e.g.*, Hajji Yusuf Zeinal.
7. *Effendi*.—Still applied to persons hardly entitled to be called Sheykh or anything equally honorific, *e.g.*, Muhammad Effendi 'Alī Ridha.
8. *Ibn, &c.*—Means, like its variant, Bin, "son of," or by extension, "descendant of." Replaced sometimes by the article "al," which it is not always easy to distinguish from "âl," meaning "of the house of." All four forms are illustrated by the name of the King, "'Abdul-'Aziz ibn (son of) 'Abdurrahmân al (son of) Faysal âl (of the house of) Sa'ûd," and the abbreviated names ibn Sa'ûd or bin Sa'ûd. The use of the patronymic "Ibn So-and-So" is so common as often to make a man's personal name difficult to trace.
9. *Abû*.—Means "father." Used in combination with the name of an actual son or the name of an object to form a familiar name or nickname, which sometimes becomes an accredited surname. Thus, Captain Glubb is known in the desert as "Abû Hunaik," or the father of the Little Jaw. Similar names are sometimes formed from other terms of relationship.
10. *Composition of Names*.—The most normal formation is to build from a person's own name by adding that of his father and sometimes names of remoter ancestors and/or a family name. It is not uncommon to omit at least the

first Ibn and place the father's name immediately after that of the person described, e.g., 'Abdullah Ibrahim al-Fadhil. It cannot be assumed, however, that the second of two unseparated names is that of the father, especially if the first be Muhammad, which is often little more than a prefix.

11. The following index gives, except in two cases, the first name of all living Arabs mentioned otherwise than incidentally in the report, but where Muhammad appears to be no more than a prefix it is reduced to M. and ignored for purposes of alphabetical order. Secondary entries have been made in many, but not in all, cases, where a patronymic or a family name seems likely to help to trace particular individuals:—

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1. Royal Family.

(1) *'Abdul-'Azîz ibn 'Abdur-Rahmân al-Faysal al Sa'ûd*.—King of Sa'ûdi Arabia, commonly known as Ibn Sa'ûd.

Born probably in 1882. Accompanied father on flight from Riyâdh upon its occupation by Ibn Rashid in 1891. Grew up under tutelage of Sheykh Mubârak of Kuwait, who gave asylum to family. Seized opportunity in course of local warfare in Eastern Arabia to deliver surprise attack on Riyâdh in January 1902 with very small force and retook it. Became recognised head of the family although his father 'Abdurrahmân survived until 1928. Extended his authority gradually over whole of Nejd and Qasim and in 1914 took the coastal province of Hasa from the Turks, who then made an agreement with him. Entered into treaty relations with His Majesty's Government through the Government of India in 1915. Took Hâil in 1921 and finally destroyed power of Beni Rashid. Next fought King Huseyn, an old enemy. Took Mecca in 1924 and completed conquest of Hejaz by compelling abdication at end of 1925 of Huseyn's son and successor 'Ali. Acquired suzerainty over 'Asir in 1926. Converted position into one of practical sovereignty in 1930 and later reduced 'Asir to status of ordinary province, following on repression of a rebellion there. Consolidated this position by the Saudi-Yemen Treaty of Taif of the 20th May, 1934, which secured his legal title to 'Asir and Najrân. Has thus become ruler of territory, seaboard of which extend from just south of Aqaba to just north of Medi in Yemen and from Kuwait neutral zone to north of Qatar Peninsula.

Ibn Sa'ûd has measured his titles by his acquisitions. He became in 1902 Amir of Nejd and Imâm of the Wahhâbis; in 1921 Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies; in January 1926 King of the Hejaz; in 1927 King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies; and finally in September 1932 King of the Kingdom of Sa'ûdi Arabia, defined as a single and united State, comprising his existing dominions, though without express mention of 'Asir.

The hero of this spectacular aggrandisement is a man of fine presence, some 6 foot 3 inches in height and handsome except for a blotch across the left eye due to neglected leucoma. He combines a strong character with courage, much native shrewdness and a charm which, though now a little stereotyped, is still attractive. He is feared rather than loved by his subjects on all of whom except those of the Shi'a persuasion he imposes at least the forms of Wahhâbism. His own Wahhâbism is sincere, but tempered by a readiness to compromise when his temporal position requires innovations contrary to the prejudice of extremists or sometimes even to the original principles of his sect. On his own ground he is an efficient ruler and a hard one, a Napoleon of the desert, but too much of the desert to cope quite successfully with the problems with which his conquest of the Hejaz and his attainment of an international position have confronted him. In diplomacy he is normally fairly honest, but difficult. He is as well disposed towards foreigners as is compatible with his fundamental belief that Islam is all in all. He has tried a strong constitution very high by living hard and by innumerable marriages. It was reckoned some years ago that he had already had over 200 wives, though never more than the permitted four at a time. He is known to find the natural decline in his powers in this direction disconcerting. In 1938 it was observed that he walked slowly and stiffly, and Mr. Philby stated that he was not only averse to physical exertion, but also indifferent to public

affairs; but he subsequently showed great activity of mind in the Palestine discussions.

Was made a G.C.I.E. in 1920, but does not now greatly prize an honour which he considers too reminiscent of a past connexion with the Government of India only and in some sense vassalish. Received the G.C.B. in November 1935, at the time of the visit to Riyâdh of Sir Andrew Ryan. His relations with Great Britain have been mainly friendly, and for the last three years or so he has acted as though he firmly believed in his repeated asseverations, that his interests and those of the Arabs in general are bound up with those of His Majesty's Government. In earlier editions he was described as expecting much for love, but his attitude throughout the Palestine crisis of 1937-39 entitles him to the cancellation of that description.

The King's eldest son Turki died in 1919, leaving issue. The following is a list of the King's immediate relatives, many of whom also have issue. Philby's *Arabia* is probably the best authority on the Sa'ûd family as a whole, but does not claim to be absolutely accurate.

Sons. All Amirs.

(2) *Sa'ûd ibn 'Abdul-'Azîz*.—Born at Kuwait in 1901 or early 1902 of a lady of Saudi stock. Has for some years been Viceroy of Nejd, and until 1934 seldom visited the Hejaz. Until 1935 he was less travelled than his half-brother, Amir Faysal, having only left the country once when he went to consult an oculist in Egypt shortly after the "Mahmal" incident of 1926. In 1935, however, he visited Europe and visited several capitals including London where he stayed about five weeks (he received the G.B.E. on that occasion), and he represented Saudi Arabia at the Silver Jubilee and at the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI.

Sa'ûd's designation as Heir to the Throne was formally announced on the 11th May, 1933. He resembles his father in appearance and physique. Also suffers from eye trouble, but has inherited Ibn Sa'ûd's "magnetic smile." Said to have had some schooling from Dr. 'Abdullah Damlûji and Sheykh Hâfiz Wahba, but to be in the main untutored. May in other respects be a chip of the old block, but has had little opportunity of displaying his quality to Europeans. Is strongly Islamic, but since his return from Europe has shown many signs of a broadened outlook and little, if any, of the fanaticism which seemed to characterise him earlier. Had commanded on the Eastern front in the Saudi-Yemen war.

(3) *Faysal ibn 'Abdul-'Azîz*.—Viceroy of the Hejaz in his father's absence and permanently President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and, in theory, War. Born of a lady of the family of 'Abdul-Wahhâb in or about 1905. Educated partly by Sheykh Hâfiz Wahba. Reported intelligent and has at least had more opportunity than most of his brothers of cultivating his intelligence and powers of observation as he has lived mostly of late years in the comparatively civilised surroundings of Mecca and has travelled in Europe: in 1919, when he was in England; in 1926, when he visited England, France, Holland and perhaps other countries; and in 1932, when he headed the Sa'ûdi mission which visited London and many other capitals. In physique a much feebler version of his father and elder brother owing to excessive delight in the harem from his youth upwards; possibly also to the use of alcohol and possibly to a tubercular tendency, though neither is proved. Very listless and rather nervous in European company, but can rise to an occasion, as he showed in 1932 by playing his part in London, albeit that of a figurehead, with a good deal of distinction. His decorum is not known to have broken down until he reached Kuwait, where his indulgence in night-life scandalised the Sheykh and his subjects. Believed not to see eye to eye with his father and joined in the onslaught by Fuad, Philby and others on Ibn Sa'ûd's principal henchman, 'Abdullah Suleymân, in October 1931. Although 'Abdullah Suleymân had the best of this in the end, the King has continued to treat Faysal with consideration. Received many decorations during his tour in 1932, including an honorary G.B.E. In 1935 showed surprising dash as a horseman in races held at Riyâdh on occasion of Sir Andrew Ryan's visit. Reported to have married in October 1935 a daughter of his aunt Nura (see 1 (23)). Represented Saudi Arabia at the London discussions on Palestine in 1939, and seems to have played the part well.

(4) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Azîz*.—Born in or about 1913. Headed the Sa'ûdi forces which entered Medina in 1925. Was made acting Viceroy when the

Amir Faysal went abroad in 1932, but got beyond himself and was replaced by his brother Khālid. Met Faysal at Kuwait on his return and shared in the bout of dissipation there. Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Saud in 1937 and 1938.

(5) *Khālid ibn 'Abdul-'Azīz*.—Born in or about 1916. Acted as Viceroy of the Hejaz in 1932 (see (4) above). Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Faysal in 1939.

(6) to (21). Sons of 18 and less in 1936 were said to number twenty-two in all. The names and order of age are not quite certain. The following is an approximately correct list in alphabetical order of the first sixteen, from various sources: 'Abdullah, 'Abdul-Muhsin, 'Abdur-Rahmān, Bandar, Badr, Fahad, Mansūr, Mish'al, Musā'id, Mit'ab, Nāsir, Nawwāf, Sa'd, Sultān, Talāl, Turki. Two of them, Mish'al and Sultan, are said to be adopted sons, of the family of the Beni Rashid (*q.v.*).

Brothers. All Amirs.

(22) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahmān*.—Said to be a little older than the King and to be a hard and stubborn man on whom Ibn Sa'ūd keeps a tight rein. Reported in 1926-27 to be a fanatical Wahhābi, married to a daughter of Ibn Bajād (*q.v.*); to be in sympathy with the extremists, whose opposition to Ibn Sa'ūd was then growing; and to have left Mecca in anger. Was, nevertheless, in charge at Riyādh in autumn of 1926, and was said to have got increased powers there. Now seldom heard of except on the occasion of journeys between Mecca and Riyādh. Might play a rôle in the event of his surviving the King, though said to have acquiesced in proposal in 1932 to make Sa'ūd heir. Has several sons, one of whom is married to a daughter of the King. Aged and infirm, but still takes a great interest in agriculture, especially fruit-growing. In 1938 his eldest son, Khalid, who was popularly regarded as the chief rival of the heir apparent, was killed in a motor accident.

(23) *'Abdullah ibn 'Abdurrahmān*.—Born about 1894. Described as neat and spruce in appearance and as ambitious in character, so that King keeps him also well in hand. Seems to like ships, as he visited H.M.S. *Emerald* by special request in 1926 and H.M.S. *Clematis* with King's younger sons in 1928. Like the Amir Muhammad (No. 22), whose close companion he is, he takes a keen interest in agriculture.

(24) and (25) *Ahmad* and *Musā'id*.—Younger men in late teens or early twenties, the children of the old age of 'Abdurrahmān ibn Faysal.

'Arāif Branch. Also Amirs.

Certain of the King's cousins are dealt with in separate notices, but a general mention may be made of the 'Arāif as being members of a senior branch of the family by virtue of descent from Sa'ūd ibn Faysal, an elder brother of the King's father and a former ruler at Riyādh. Their generic name of 'Arāif is one applied to raided camels, subsequently "recognised," as the root implies, and recovered by their owners. It seems to have been given to them because they had remained in the hands of the Beni Rashid, but escaped to Ibn Sa'ūd in the course of battle in 1904. Some of them rebelled against him in 1910, but the present members of the family form portion of the King's posse of satellite princes. Although inconspicuous, they might produce a claimant, by right of senior descent, to the throne. Various names are given in the *Almanach de Gotha* and Philby's *Arabia*. The most important of these princes, who bear individually the surname of al-'Arafa, would appear to be—

(26) *Sa'ūd ibn 'Abdul-'Azīz ibn Sa'ūd ibn Faysal*.—Married the King's sister Nūra. Seems to play a certain rôle in Ibn Sa'ūd's entourage. Probably the same Sa'ūd al-'Arafa who was described in a recent report from Kuwait as being, according to a reliable informant, a friend of the 'Ajman tribe and secretly hostile to Ibn Sa'ūd. Daughter reported to have married Amir Faysal (*q.v.*) in October 1935.

2. *'Abdul-'Azīz ibn Ibrāhīm*.

Governor of Medina (technically Acting Governor *vice* the King's son Amir Khālid, who never actually held the post) until May 1936, when he was replaced by Abdullah as Sdayri (No. 86 (1)). Had the reputation of being a severe and arbitrary Governor. Was Governor of Abha in 1926 at the time of the clash between the Ikhwan and the Yemeni pilgrim caravan, the 'Usba, in the Wadi Tanuma. In 1936 appointed a member of the Council of Ministers.

3. *'Abdul-'Azīz ibn Mu'ammār*.

Governor of Jedda until June 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Taif in the room of Amir Abdullah, maternal uncle of Amir Faysal (No. 16 (2)). Born in or about 1904. Comes of a former ruling family of Nejd, apparently the same Beni Mu'ammār of Ayaina, who were prominent in the early days of the Wahhābi movement and are mentioned several times in Philby's *Arabia*. Brought up principally at Riyādh. Was Governor of Yanbu' for some time and earned a good reputation there. Was appointed to Jedda in August 1932, with the title of Amir, on the death of Hajji 'Abdullah 'Ali Riza, a leading local merchant who had been governor with the old title of Qaimmaqam since King Huseyn's time. He is good-looking and pleasant, but pretentious, probably on the score of his blue blood. He is keen on riding and other forms of sport, and seems reasonably intelligent for a young man of his upbringing. Not related to Ibrahim ibn Mu'ammār (*q.v.*).

4. *'Abdul-'Azīz ibn Musā'id ibn Jiluwi ibn Sa'ūd*.

Second cousin to the King. Governor of Hail since 1925 or earlier. Said by the Sheykh of Kuwait in March 1932 to be only 40, but to have aged greatly owing to worry. Was much in evidence in 1929 as one of the King's right-hand men at the time of the Akhwan rebellion. Came into prominence in February 1930, when, apparently without the King's authority, he conducted a raid on the scale of a punitive expedition, which it was, in fact, intended to be, into Transjordan. Disavowed by the King at the time, but maintained in his governorate. Was in November 1932 put at the head of the principal force despatched to reduce the 'Asir rebels, and proceeded from Riyādh to 'Abhā and Jizān, where he assumed supreme command of the forces in 'Asir. Said then to be intended for the Governorate-General of the whole 'Asir area, but eventually returned to Hail. A man for occasions requiring drastic action. Appointed inspector of the frontier area on the Sa'ūdi-Iraq frontier in 1936, duties he combines with those of Governor of Hail. In 1939 was said to have aroused suspicion at Riyādh as having designs on the throne which he might try to carry out on the death of Ibn Saud.

5. *'Abdul-'Azīz ibn Shuheyf*.

Governor of Tebuk in or about 1929. Probably, despite a discrepancy of name, the same ibn Shuheyf of al-'Aridh in Nejd who took over that governorate in 1926. Later Governor of Turāba. Appointed Governor of Taif in September 1932. Commanded the troops sent from Taif in connexion with the repression of the revolt in 'Asir in November-December 1932, and has since been concerned in the arrangements which it was hoped would end in the surrender of Hasan al-Idrīsi to Ibn Sa'ūd.

6. *'Abdul-'Azīz (ibn Hamād) ibn Zayd*.

Inspector of Bedouin in Transjordan frontier area. Born probably about 1897. Comes of a Hail family said to be related to the Beni Rashid. Said to have been educated in Constantinople. Sent to 'Ammān in summer of 1926 to discuss claims in respect of raids, and attended with two other Sa'ūdi delegates an abortive conference at Ma'an in September. Was one of the two Sa'ūdi delegates on tribunal which sat at Jericho from February to May 1927 in accordance with the Hadda Agreement. Was later an Assistant Governor of Jedda. Sent to 'Ammān in August 1930 as Sa'ūdi agent at the MacDonnell investigation regarding raids. Appointed Inspector of Beduin in the frontier region in January 1931, and has since the 3rd June, 1931, held meetings at long intervals with Captain Glubb, his opposite number in Transjordan. Personally amiable, but will take no responsibility without reference to the King. From 1936 to 1938 was inspector of the whole Transjordan-Saudi frontier, under a scheme for dividing the northern frontier area into three sectors under inspectors with wide powers.

7. *'Abdul-Kerīm ibn Rumman*.

Governor of Teima. Little information is available about this man, whose family is not mentioned in the 1917 volume on personalities in Arabia. Seems to be important more as a town Sheykh than as a person having necessarily much influence with Beduin, according to a statement made by the Sheykh of Kuwait in 1932. Said to have maintained the quasi-independence of the Teima oasis even against Ibn Sa'ūd. Came into some prominence at the time of the Ibn Rifāda

rebellion in 1932, when he appealed to the Amīr 'Abdullah, with whom he appears to have been in correspondence previously, for assistance against the danger of attack by the Akhwān mobilised to repress the rebellion. Reported to be still defiant in January 1933, when he disobeyed the King's order to return certain land to a man who had appealed to the King, and imprisoned the man instead, possibly, it was suggested, because he thought the man likely to murder him with the Royal approbation. Was again the subject of similar rumours in 1934, when he was reported to be in correspondence with sympathisers in Trans-jordan, and to a less extent in 1935.

8. *'Abdullah ibn Blayhid.*

A leading figure among the Wahhābi Ulema. Comes from Hāil. Qādhi of Mecca after its occupation by Ibn Sa'ūd, and was described in Eldon Rutter's account of him (1925-26) as a "bent and wizened little man." Appointed Grand Qādhi of the Hejaz in January 1926. Was instrumental in May 1926 in obtaining a *fatwa* from seventeen Ulama of Medina in support of the Wahhābi policy of destroying tombs. Head of the Nejdī delegates at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Again visited Medina in November of that year in attendance on the King and in the company of 'Abdullah ibn Hasan (see 16 (1)), bent on purging the place of iniquity as Mecca had been purged. Vacated post at Mecca in 1928 and returned to Hāil. Was thought at that time to favour the extremists of the Akhwān movement. Still visits Mecca at intervals. Thought to be embarrassing in high places owing to his frankness and fanaticism. Signed the pronouncement by the Ulama of Nejd in favour of Jihād at the time of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932.

9. *'Abdullah ibn Jilūwi.* (Deceased.)

10. *'Abdullah Kāzim.*

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. Born about 1887. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Hussein's time. Appointed Sa'ūdi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1926 and still holds the post. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of Ibn Sa'ūd's delegates to negotiate about the E.T.C. cable and showed himself an obstructive negotiator. Was again pretty sticky in taking delivery of Marconi wireless in 1931-33, but created a good impression at the time of the cable and wireless negotiations in the spring of 1935.

11. *'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil.*

In 1926 Governor of Jauf, but had vacated the post by March 1928, when he was put in command of a force sent to quell the disturbance created at Wejh by Hamid ibn Rifāda. Probably identical with the ibn 'Aqil who was mentioned in May 1931 as a possible candidate for the governorship of Tebūk, but was not appointed. 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil commanded the Akhwān mobilised in June 1932 to repress the further rebellion of Hamid ibn Rifāda. May possibly be the same as the ibn Aqil appointed Governor of Jizan in July, 1935, on the death of Hamad ibn Shuway'ir (No. 99 of the last report).

12. *'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Fadhl.*

Vice-President of the Legislative Council and Assistant Viceroy. Probably born about 1883. Principal member of the Fadhl family *q.v.* Was formerly a merchant in Jedda. Described in 1917 as "anti-Sherif and pro-English" and as going by the sobriquet of "Englisi" in Jedda. Put in prison at that time in Mecca for some unknown offence. Played no particular rôle subsequently (and was so little valued for brain-power as to be known as "the Sheep") until ex-King 'Ali sent him on a delegation to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ūd at Mecca. Went over definitely to Ibn Sa'ūd and acted as his representative at Rabigh for the 1925 pilgrimage, in which employment he is said to have feathered his nest. Attached to the King's son, Muhammad, as adviser when the young Amīr occupied Medina later in 1925. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Obtained about the same period, in partnership with Indians settled in Mecca, a contract for motor transport, but lost it. Did better as purveyor to the Government. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Sa'ūd by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and so on to appointment to his present

post in or before 1929. Went in that year on a mission to Persia. Alleged in the same year to have done nicely in the company of 'Abdullah Suleymān by cornering benzine, &c., just before new duties were imposed. Appears to enjoy the King's confidence in a high degree and to steer an even or waggly course between rival factions. Not impressive in appearance or conversation; still somewhat of a sheep; but wears his recent dignities with an acquired air of dignity, sobriety and sagacity, which may be a part of his success. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhlis. Acting Viceroy during Faisal's absence in 1939.

13. *'Abdullah an-Nafisi.*

Important as being Ibn Sa'ūd's agent at Kuwait, where he is established as a merchant and once did a large business in rice, &c. Now elderly and less active. Seems sensible.

14. *'Abdullah Suleymān al Bassām.* (Deceased.)

15. *'Abdullah ibn Suleymān al Hamdān.*

Minister of Finance. Born about 1887. Of plebeian 'Aneyza origin. Started life in a small way with the Qusaibis, originally, it is said, as a coffee boy. Spent ten years as clerk in their Bombay office. Returned to Nejd some twenty years ago. Said to have gone bankrupt as a broker. Recommended by the Qusaibis to replace his brother, who had died, as a clerk in the King's Diwān. Rose to be head of the Diwān. Became Director-General of Finance and had acquired complete control of all financial matters by September 1928, when it was remarked that he travelled in greater state than the King himself between Mecca and Jedda. Has since been the most powerful of the King's advisers. His position was strongly assailed in October 1931 by a cabal, which included the Amīr Faysal, Fuad Hamza, 'Abdullah al Fadhl (perhaps a doubtful enemy) and Mr. Philby. Was sent for a time to lend a hand with the Tawil mission in Hasa, but had his place kept warm for him and returned to it. Was promoted in August 1932 from being Director-General of Finance to the post of Minister of Finance for the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, thus obtaining the title of Wazir, hitherto enjoyed only by the Amīr Faysal. Continues to be supreme in the financial administration and has his finger in many other pies, being in effect Comptroller of the Privy Purse, Grand Master of Ordnance, Quarter-Master-General on occasion, general manager of the King's establishment of slaves and pilgrimage-organiser. Appointed in 1935 to the specific additional post of Deputy Minister of Defence. Probably entirely faithful to the King, whose needs he supplies at the expense of others having demands on the Treasury, and who gives him a free hand in finance regardless of the effect on public opinion. A man of rather mean appearance, but emphatically a "live wire." Ready and energetic in conversation and full of ideas about development, but not really intelligent. Detested by Fuad Hamza and not loved by many. Has of late been at pains to cultivate relations with His Majesty's Minister. Has enriched himself and is credibly reported to be buying much real property in Beirut. Has provided posts for two relatives, viz., his brother Hamad (*q.v.*) and Muhammad, Director of the condensers at Jedda.

16. *Abdul-Wahhāb, Descendants of.*

The following seem to be the most notable of the descendants of the founder of Wahhābism:—

(1) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan.*—Is one of the leading Wahhābi Ulema in Mecca. Played a rôle in 1926, with 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid (*q.v.*), in the Wahhābi purging of the Holy Cities, and was in 1929 thought, like him, to favour the Akhwān extremists. Signed the pronouncement of the Ulama in favour of Jihād at the time of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932. Now Grand Qadhi. Proud and fanatical.

(2) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sheykh,* nicknamed as-Sahābi, formerly Governor of Taif, transferred to Riyādh in 1932 as Assistant to the Amīr Sa'ūd.

(3) *'Abdul-Latif Family.*—Four sons and a probable grandson of a descendant named 'Abdul-Latif were among the ten signatories of the declaration of Jihad referred to under (1). No. (2) and the mother of the Amīr Faysal (*q.v.*) also probably belong to this connexion.

17. 'Abdul-Wahhâb, Seyyid.

Born probably in or about 1883. Holds the post of Nâib-al-Harâm at Mecca. Was formerly Deputy for 'Asir in the Ottoman Parliament, but has never been there. Of no apparent political importance, but a familiar figure in high circles. A jolly little pock-marked man, whose deserved reputation as a raconteur is set off by his appearance. Appointed Director of Awqaf in 1936.

18. 'Abdul-Wahhâb Abû Malha.

A personage of consequence in 'Asir, possibly of the Sheykhly family of Malha near Sabya, although this cannot be affirmed. Was described in 1927 as Director of Finance in 'Asir, and was in that year one of four delegates sent by Ibn Sa'ûd to negotiate with the Imâm Yahya. Probably still has the title of Director of Finance and commanded the Sa'ûdi forces which entered Sabya in November 1932.

19. 'Abdur-Raûf as-Sabbân.

Born in the Hejaz probably between 1888 and 1893. Grandson of an immigrant from Egypt. Educated in the Hejaz and in Egypt. Associated with his father, Hasan, and others in what was in 1917 the principal hide and skin business in Jedda and Mecca. Impressed the Hejazis at that time by his knowledge and European manners. Was made Director of Education in Jedda, but was dismissed and reverted to trade in cotton goods and skins. Edited in 1925 the anti-Sa'ûdi paper *Al-Umma* in Cairo with the help of one of the Dabbâghs. Given a post by the Amîr 'Abdullah as manager of his estates in Transjordan in or before 1931. Was an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrâr-al-Hijâzi, and was concerned in 1932 in the press propaganda and financial arrangements of the outside promoters of movements against Ibn Sa'ûd. Seems to have gone at least once to Eritrea in this connexion. Was dismissed by the Amîr 'Abdullah in the autumn of 1932 as a result of these political activities, but went on with them. Excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan, whereupon he retired to Bagdad, where he was understood to have become a private secretary to the late ex-King Ali. Returned to the Hejaz with or at the same time as Ahmad-al-Mujallid in July 1935, and was appointed in 1936 a member of the Legislative Council. In 1938 did some propaganda for Ibn Saud in Egypt.

20. Ahmed 'Abdullah 'Ayshân.

Stated to have brought money from Transjordan to Aden in April 1932 for Huseyn ad-Dabbâgh. Presumably a member of the Mecca family, two members of which were mentioned in 1917, one as a wealthy merchant, the other a young man, born about 1914, named "Abdullah ibn 'Ashân" (perhaps identical with the subject of this notice), who associated with King Huseyn's sons and was specially intimate with the Amîr 'Abdullah. 'Abdullah 'Ayshân is one of the persons now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan on account of other anti-Sa'ûdi activities.

21. Ahmed Sa'id al-Kurdi.

Formerly Director of Police in Jedda. Of Kurdish origin, from Zakho. Was previously Director of Police at Rabigh and gave offence to the Legation by trying to commandeer a car which was taking the Nawab of Bahawalpur to Medina. Was transferred to Jedda in 1932 and confirmed in the post early in 1933. Seems to be supported by persons in high quarters, including probably Mehdi Bey (*q.v.*), and, not improbably, the Amîr Faysal and Fuad Bey Hamza. A man to watch but not to judge too hastily. Rides a horse, a thing now unusual in Jedda, and looks well on it. Was removed from his post in Jedda and apparently reappointed to Rabigh in 1933. Officer Commanding troops in Jedda in 1936, in which capacity he was in charge of aviation during the presence of the Italian Air Mission 1937-39. According to a Russian pilot, showed ability and a real desire to learn about aviation. Was cultivated assiduously by the Italian pilot, probably received bribes from him, and learned Italian. Very anti-British when the Palestine trouble was at its height.

22. 'Ali al-'Amâri.

Of Nejdi origin, but settled in the Hejaz before Ibn Sa'ûd conquered it. Born probably about 1887. Formerly a merchant. Became Director of Customs in Jedda in 1926 and, later, Inspector-General of Customs. Feathered his nest and put a good deal of money into building a house, which he presented or sold

to the King, but for which, if the latter is the case, he has never been paid. This is the house called the "Green Palace" outside Jedda. Appointed member of an Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930 and Assistant Governor of Jedda early in 1931. Exercised some authority in this post, but is now no longer employed, and does not appear to count for much nowadays. Probably a rascal, but cheery even now that he has gone poor again.

23. 'Ali Ridha Family (or Reza as they spell it themselves in English).

A rich merchant family in Jedda, of Persian origin. Have very important business connexions in India and elsewhere, and are agents for the Mogul Line (Turner, Morrison and Co.), which carries most of the pilgrims from India by sea. The best known members of the family were Zeynal 'Ali Ridha, who died some years ago, his son Qâsim, formerly an M.P. in Turkey and a man of parts, and 'Abdullah 'Ali Ridha, who combined business with the post of Governor of Jedda from King Huseyn's time until he died in 1932. The principal members of the family now in Jedda are:—

(1) *Yusuf ibn Zeynal 'Ali Ridha*, a pleasant man, born about 1885 to 1889, who lives half the time in India.

(2) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah 'Ali Ridha*, a bullet-headed young man, born about 1913, who has latterly come to the front as a man of enterprise in Jedda, and was honorary consul for Czecho-Slovakia until 1939. Conceited, and a great talker, especially when in drink. Was believed to be pro-German and pro-Italian at one moment, but this was when the Palestine troubles were at their height. Visited Germany in 1938 in connexion with a barter arrangement which worked out badly and cooled his enthusiasm. A loud exponent of the thesis that the Hejaz is exploited to keep an extravagant and dissolute Royal family in luxury, and that it ought to be independent.

(3) *Mas'ud ibn Qasim*, who had a Turkish mother, opted for Turkish nationality, but lives mostly in Jedda. He is by far the most intelligent of the younger generation.

Other members of the family are met with elsewhere. The family has Syrian family connexions, 'Abdullah having married a Syrian or Syro-Persian lady, and his son Muhammad, having married in 1933 the daughter of a well-known but decayed Syrian merchant in Jedda, Sadiq al Khoja. The latter is also connected with Huseyn Awayni (*q.v.*). A member of the family who may be specially mentioned is Muhammad Ali ibn Zeynal, who has done much for education in Mecca and Jedda, but resides in London and Paris.

24. 'Ali Taha.

Assistant Governor of Jedda since 1928, and, in addition, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since early in 1932. A Hejazi born about 1894. Rose from a small post as secretary to the Governor. Cadaverous and unhealthy. Speaks Turkish well. Well meaning, and not without intelligence, but frightened of his own shadow. Completely ineffective, except on the rarest possible occasions, in connexion with foreign affairs. Normally serves as no more than a transmitter of messages to and from Mecca.

25. M. Amin Shanqiti.

Said to be a recent import from Shanqit, somewhere in North-West Africa. At one time resided in Mecca, and became later a member of the Idrisi's Council, apparently with the sanction of Ibn Sa'ûd. Was a signatory in this capacity of the decision which signed 'Asir away to Ibn Sa'ûd in October 1930. Latterly concerned in anti-Sa'ûdi activities in connexion with 'Asir. Came to notice in that connexion in July 1932, when it was reported that he had returned to 'Ammân from Damascus, whither he had gone on the Amîr 'Abdullah's business and to be a bone of contention between the Amîr and his Government. Seems to have been back in 'Asir at the time of the rebellion of November-December 1932.

26. M. Amin Tamimi.

A Palestinian from Hebron, son of an official at Tulkaram. Came to the Hejaz in 1927. Had known Fuad Hamza in Palestine, and was employed by him in the Sa'ûdi Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Attached to Sheykh 'Abdul-'Aziz Ibn Zeyd for the purpose of the MacDonnell enquiry, and left with him in August 1930. Fell out with his chief, and was accused *inter alia* of selling a

cypher. Returned separately to the Hejaz and was re-employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Was probably still protected by Fuad Hamza, but left the Ministry in or about May 1931, and served for a short time with Sharqieh (Limited) in Jedda. Was by then very much under a cloud, and, according to his own story, had to use a ruse to get away on the 6th August, 1931. He had been accused of some irregularity in accounts, and may already have been under suspicion of stealing documents. Tried later to sell certain copies of British secret papers to the Embassy in Constantinople. Surrendered these voluntarily to the Residency at Cairo in June 1932, but may still possess Sa'ûdi documents. A very nasty young man, unlikely to return to Sa'ûdi Arabia, but worth mentioning because of his approaches to British authorities elsewhere.

27. 'Aqil Family of Mecca.

It is difficult to place various bearers of the name of 'Aqil, who may or may not be related to the Muhammad ibn 'Aqil mentioned in 1917 as a respectable Mecca merchant, whose grandfather, a learned and holy man, had prophesied that the English would take Mecca. A person of the same name, one of a Hadhrami family deported from Mokalla in 1928, died at Aden in 1931, leaving sons, of whom one, viz. :—

(1) 'Isa ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil was secretary to the Imâm's son, Ahmed.

More definitely connected with Mecca are the following :—

(2) Amin ibn Ishâq ibn 'Aqil, said to be son of a sister of Huseyn ad-Dabbâgh. Arrested at Mecca in June-July 1932 and deported to Riyâdh.

(3) 'Abbâs 'Aqil, one of the conspirators against Ibn Sa'ûd, said to have come on pilgrimage with two other conspirators and to have gone later to Mokalla to buy cartridges at Bir Ali.

The last-named may be identical with—

(4) 'Aqil 'Abbâs Bardaghash, mentioned in reports from Aden as a Meccan, or, according to others, an 'Asiri, associated with the Dabbâghs.

28. Ba-Jubayr Family.

An important merchant family among the numerous Hadhramis settled in Jedda. The most important present member of it, Ahmed Ba-Jubayr, was suspected in 1932 of complicity in the ad-Dabbâgh plot, and was arrested and deported to Riyâdh in June-July, but was subsequently allowed to return. As he had apparently been born in the Hadhramaut, it became a question whether the Legation should intervene, but his relatives themselves very sensibly preferred that it should not.

29. Ba-Nâjâ Family.

A merchant family of humble Hadhrami origin, long settled in the Hejaz. They have considerable property in Egypt, and are still wealthy. The principal members are the following :—

(1) 'Abdur-Rahmân, the patriarch, died in 1938 at the age of 90 or more.

(2) Ahmed, son of (1), had quarrelled with him before 1917. Was King Huseyn's Minister of Finance in that year, and was ridiculed for his airs, besides being condemned for his private vices. Returned to Egypt, but returned to the Hejaz in 1932.

(3) M. Sâlih Ba-Nâjâ, another son.

(4) Sufyân Ba-Nâjâ, a slave of the family, but now sole manager of the property. He was treasurer to (2) whilst he was Minister. Is a Jedda notable; lives a quiet life and is respected, though he is a slave.

All these are well-known in Jedda, where (4) is concerned in a motor transport concern. The family appear to enjoy considerable favour under the present régime.

30. Ba-Sâhî Family of 'Asir.

The principal member of this Hadhrami family, Muhammad Yahya, played an important rôle in 'Asir at the time of the Great War. They would appear to be still people of consequence there, as three of them were concerned in the

arrangements for the practical annexation of 'Asir by Ibn Sa'ûd in October 1930, viz. :—

(1) Muhammad Yahya 'Awadh Ba-Sâhî.—A member of the Legislative Council which signed the decision. Probably the same as the person named above. Seems to have tried to dissuade the Idrisi from revolting in October 1932.

(2) 'Abdul-Qâdir ibn Muhammad ibn 'Awadh Ba-Sâhî, also a member of the Legislative Council. Seems to have helped to get the Idrisi to fall in with the plans of the Dabbâgh conspirators in 1932.

(3) Muhammad 'Abdullah Ba-Sâhî.—One of the Idrisi mission sent to Mecca to complete the arrangements for annexation in 1930.

31. Bujâd (or Humayd) Family.

A leading family in the notoriously fanatical Ghutghut section of the 'Ateyba tribe. A confusing effect is produced by the use in past reports of the names Sultân ibn Bujâd, ibn Humayd ibn Bujâd and ibn Bujâd *tout court*, but they would appear all to apply to one and the same man. This is assumed in what follows regarding :—

(1) Sultân ibn Humayd ibn Bujâd.—Once one of Ibn Sa'ûd's stalwarts and one of the commanders of his troops when they took Mecca in 1924. Had a daughter married to the King's brother Muhammad. Noted early in 1927 as one of the extremists who were then inclining against the King. Became reconciled with him later, but finally stood in with Ibn Sa'ûd's opponents in the Nejd rebellion of 1929 and was accounted second only to Faysal ad-Dawish in importance. Was one of the earlier leaders to fall into the King's hands and was imprisoned at Riyâdh in the spring of that year. Appears to be still in close confinement, as no record has been found of the death of Sultân ibn Bujâd, the best known of the names cited above, and "ibn Humayd" was mentioned in a recent report as one of the prisoners who were receiving more lenient treatment than before, though, unlike the others, he was still not allowed to see his womenfolk. May still prove important, as he had a strong hold on his tribesmen, some of whom have been reported sullen over his imprisonment.

(2) Nâif ibn Faysal ibn Humayd.—A pretender to the chieftainship of the 'Ateyba, but moved to Iraq in 1924, having been ousted by No. (1). Played with the idea of recovering his position in June 1929 and sent a minor relative, 'Obeyd, to spy out the land, but was apparently dissuaded by King Faisal from going ahead. Mentioned in 1932 as being still a refugee in Iraq and as a possible aspirant to the hand of Mazyûna, sister of Faysal ad-Dawish, but the engagement or marriage was denied.

32. Dabbâgh Family.

A Mecca family of "Moorish" (i.e., some North-West Africa) origin. Appear to be Seyyids. Became prominent in 1932 in connexion with plot behind the revolt of Ibn Rifâda and the preparations for the retarded revolt in 'Asir. The family is numerous. Certain members of it still reside in the Hejaz, including two who were arrested and deported to Riyâdh in June-July 1932, viz. :—

- (1) Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah and
- (2) 'Isa ibn 'Abdullah.

More important are the following persons abroad :—

(3) Huseyn ibn 'Abdullah, brother of the above. Migrated to Mokalla in or about 1926. Has since done school-mastering in South-West Arabia and has been an active intriguer against Ibn Sa'ûd. Went to India in 1927 to enlist support for the Hizb-al-Ahrâr al-Hijâzi and their National Pact. Sought, and probably enlisted, the support of Shaukat Ali, who, with his brother, had been violently at loggerheads with Ibn Sa'ûd at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Went to Egypt and perhaps to Transjordan in 1929. Said to have attended Moslem Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931, when persons concerned in Hizb-al-Ahrâr seem to have devised a pendant organisation called Jami'at ad-Dif'a lil-Hijâz. Was using Aden as base early in 1932, but left in summer owing to adverse attitude of British authorities and seems to have since worked mainly in Eritrea. Now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Returned to Aden in 1936 and allowed to stay there. Opened a school, but soon began to send anti-British articles to Egyptian papers. Left for the Upper

Yafa' country, where he engaged in anti-British propaganda. Probably financed by the Italians.

(4) *M. 'Alī ibn 'Abdullah*, another brother. Less conspicuous, but also very active. Took a hand in the actual revolt in 'Asir. Reported drowned at Jizān, but report was contradicted later.

(5) *M. Tāhir ibn Mas'ūd*, uncle of the above. Described as "an egg-shaped man." Born in 1890. Had some employment under King Huseyn. Obtained British-protected passport at Cairo in 1926 on strength of alleged subjection to Sultan of Mokalla. Author of letter from Lahej to Amīr Shākir of the 20th February, 1932, which fell into hands of Sa'ūdi Government and revealed plans of conspirators. Seems to have gone further east, as he arrived at Aden from Singapore early in June 1932. Has since been very mobile, visiting Eritrea, Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan and 'Iraq. Was excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Was understood in January 1933 to be heading back to Massawa, and perhaps thence to Aden and the Hadhramaut. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd after promulgation of amnesty early in 1935. Returned to Sa'ūdi Arabia that year and in 1936 was appointed Director of Education.

Other members of the family need not be enumerated, but they all seem to hang together and to have *attaches* with Hashimites. One, Mas'ūd, a hanger-on at 'Ammān, was closely concerned in the Ibn Rifāda affair and was killed with Ibn Rifāda. The family also have *attaches* with the Idrisis, although there is nothing to explain one mention of (3) above as Huseyn bin 'Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh al-Idrisi.

33. *Dawish Family.*

A leading family in the Mutayr tribe. Its best-known member, Faysal ad-Dawish, famous as a raider, as one of Ibn Sa'ūd's principal lieutenants and as a rebel against him, died as a State prisoner at Riyādh in October 1931. His name is, however, still potent in Eastern Arabia, where he was regarded as more than an ordinary sheikh—a kingly man and a king maker. This gives importance to his sons, two of whom have figured in recent reports from Kuwait.

(1) *Bandar ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Still a young man. Said to be looked to by the Mutayr as the leader they desire, but to be himself very cautious and unwilling to move at present. Reported in December 1932 to have countered a question by Ibn Sa'ūd as to whom the Mutayr wanted for a leader by saying "No one but Your Majesty."

(2) *Al-Humaydi ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Visited Ibn Sa'ūd at Riyādh in the autumn of 1932, when the King was making efforts to reconcile the ex-rebel Mutayr and 'Ajman, still hostile to him, and was well received and rewarded.

The ladies of this family seem to count. The political agent at Kuwait, who had befriended them when Faysal was surrendered to Ibn Sa'ūd in January 1930, was visited by various of them on several occasions in 1932. They included Faysal's mother, who hid bitter hatred of the King beneath copious praises; a sister, whose rumoured marriage to a Harb Sheykh was regarded as an augury of reconciliation between his tribe and the Mutayr, but was afterwards denied; and a cousin, still a woman of considerable charm and humour, who had been married to Sheykh Mubārak of Kuwait, to a deceased son of Faysal ad-Dawish and, lastly, as prize of war, to Ibn Sa'ūd's brother 'Abdullah.

34. *Dehlavi Family.*

An Indian family long settled in Mecca. Wahhābis by faith. Still British, but allowed to own real property, and so much identified with the Hejaz that two members of it sat as representatives in the National Conference of June, 1931. They were—

(1) *'Abdullah Dehlavi*, elder brother (born about 1876); under Sherifian régime was member of various committees; is a trusted adviser of Ibn Sa'ūd, whom he has supported from beginning. Together with (2) is prime mover in the 'Ain Zubeyda Committee.

(2) *Obeidullah Dehlavi*, younger brother—born about 1880. Chiefly concerned in management of the family Motor Transport Company "El-Nijah." He is an intimate friend of Sheykh 'Abdullah Suleymān, and like his brother is a trusted adviser of the King. Both brothers interest themselves privately in affairs of the Sa'ūdi Government, but are not office seekers.

35. *Fadhl (al-Fazal) Family.*

Nejdis of 'Aneyza origin long settled in the Hejaz. An original 'Abdullah had at least five sons, all now deceased, with one possible exception. Each of these had issue. Members of the first and second generations after the original 'Abdullah were concerned in firms doing important business in the Hejaz and India, where they had a high reputation, enhanced by their position as business agents of Ibn Sa'ūd, until 1930. Family differences and bad trade led to the collapse of their business at Bombay and Karachi in that year. The two partners most actively concerned in the business in India absconded to the Hejaz, where a third tried to dissociate himself from the partnership. The affairs of the family have for some years been the subject of very complicated litigation and have engaged the attention of various British authorities for reasons too long to recapitulate. The family still have influential connexions in the Hejaz, and several members of it have been given employment by Ibn Sa'ūd. Apart from 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah, who is the subject of a separate notice, the following deserve mention:—

(1) *Muhammad*, son of the 'Abdullah just mentioned. In business in Jedda and does a tidy trade in grain.

(2) *Ibrahim ibn Abdurrahmān*.—One of the two who absconded from India in 1930. Appointed a member of the Legislative Council in October 1930. Became later a secretary to the Amīr Faysal. Was called on to resign, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, by Amīr Faysal. He is now living in Mecca and engaged in trade in an unimportant way; but is still said to enjoy the confidence of Amīr Faysal.

(3) *Muhammad ibn Abdurrahmān ibn 'Abdullah*.—Was a partner in the firm which collapsed in India in 1930, but resided in Jedda and tried to dissociate himself from the other partners, his brother and cousin.

(4) *'Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah*.—Private secretary to the Amīr Faysal in 1926. Afterwards one of the partners who absconded from India. Selected in 1931 for the post of Chargé d'Affaires in Holland, under scheme which did not materialise for having a Legation there with the Sa'ūdi Minister in London as Minister. Appointed Treasurer to the Government later in 1931, as a result of the cabal against 'Abdullah Suleymān. Later became Director of Finance in Jedda. Speaks a little English.

(5) *Ibrahim ibn Suleymān al 'Aqil*.—Son-in-law of father of (4), and has taken the place of (2) as Rais-i-Diwan of the Amīr Faysal. Is an important official and enjoys Amīr Faysal's complete confidence. Accompanied him to London in 1939 for the Palestine discussions.

36. *Fahad ibn Zu'ayr.*

Late Governor of 'Asir. Was head of the mission sent to 'Asir in May 1930 to make the arrangements which subsequently culminated in its practical annexation by Ibn Sa'ūd. Was later appointed Amīr, though probably not the first to hold the post. Reported to Ibn Sa'ūd with increasing urgency in the autumn of 1932 that the Idrisi was getting beyond himself. The Idrisi, professing complete loyalty to the King, complained bitterly of Fahad's rough treatment. The King, anxious to placate the Idrisi, steered a middle course and sent a commission to investigate. Before it could reach the spot the Idrisi had gone into open revolt and Fahad had to escape from his seat of government at Jizān. Was little heard of for some time afterwards, but was appointed Governor of Qunfida in or about June 1933.

37. *Farhan ibn Mashhūr.* (Deceased.)

38. *Fawzān as-Sabīq.*

Sa'ūdi Chargé d'Affaires in Egypt and consul-general in Cairo. Appointed in August, 1936, upon the conclusion of the Sa'ūdi-Egyptian Treaty of May, 1936. Previously Sa'ūdi agent in Egypt. Born about 1888. Belongs by origin to the 'Uqeyl, the guild, as it were, of recognised caravan-guides. Educated in a Turkish school at 'Ammān. Said to have lived for many years in Bombay. Is by profession a dealer in camels and horses and still appears to do this business. Was Ibn Sa'ūd's agent in Damascus before 1924. Moved in that year to Cairo, where he became Saudi Chargé d'Affaires in 1937. Is described by Mr. Smart as a devout Moslem, plain, slow, courteous and old-fashioned; politically rather innocent, but possessed of a certain native shrewdness. He is never used by Ibn Saud for important political work.

39. *Fuad Bey Hamza.*

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1900, he is a Druze of Abeih, in the Lebanon, where the family are less prosperous than they were. One brother Sa'îd was accused of complicity in the murder of a Christian priest at Abeih in 1930, but was finally acquitted in April-May, 1934. Educated in Turkish schools in Syria, the Teachers' Training College, Beirut, and the Syrian Protestant College, Beirut. Was Inspector of Schools at Damascus for a time. Obtained a post as clerk under the Palestine Department of Public Health in 1921. Resigned after a few months and took service under the Department of Education as a teacher in Acre. Transferred in 1922 to a secondary school in Jerusalem as teacher in English and remained until 1926. Studied simultaneously at the Law School, got a Certificate of Legal Studies in 1925 and qualified in five subjects, including Constitutional History and Public International Law, for the Diploma, but did not complete the course. Had a uniformly good record in Palestine, but was mixed up in politics and the Druze insurrectionary movement. May have feared arrest, although he was not, in fact, in danger of it. Left for Egypt on the 2nd December, 1926. Apparently was to go to India on a Syro-Palestinian delegation, but was drawn to the Hejaz, where, after giving English lessons for a time, he was taken into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Yusuf Yasin, then acting for Dr. 'Abdullah Danlûji. Became Acting Minister in July 1928, when Dr. Danlûji left on a mission, never to return. Had probably worked earlier to undermine Danlûji's position. Remained Acting Minister until the Amîr Faysal became titular Minister with Fuad as Under-Secretary, but still effective head of the Ministry in December 1930. Retained his post, with a seat on the Council of Ministers when the latter was constituted early in 1932. Prefers to call himself in English Deputy Minister. Visited Europe for the first time as a member of the Sa'ûdi Mission under the Amîr Faysal in the spring of 1932 and did all the real business. Was made an honorary K.B.E. during the visit to London, and for several years carried a passport in which he and his wife appeared as Sir Fuad and Lady Hamza. Visited Europe again in 1934 and 1935 and conducted important negotiations with the Foreign Office, and in 1939 went to London with the Amîr Faysal and took a prominent part in the Palestine discussions.

Fuad Hamza is alert, intelligent, well informed on matters pertaining to his work and industrious. Speaks English well and Turkish, but is hampered by lack of more than elementary French. Equally devoted to his own ambitions and to the cause of Arab nationalism, serving Ibn Sa'ûd as its exponent, though inclined sometimes to despair of the system of which he has made himself part. Keeps in touch with other Nationalists in Palestine, and probably Syria. Is used by the King as his instrument for foreign affairs, and makes the most of his position, but probably does not enjoy Ibn Sa'ûd's full confidence, so that his power varies. Very hostile to 'Abdullah Suleymân and took part in the unsuccessful drive against him in 1931. Is a very poor Moslem, and conforms to Wahabism no more than he is obliged to. Would like to see Sa'ûdi Arabia, a name of which he was one of the authors, develop on modern, more or less constitutional lines. Likes drafting laws. Would go to great lengths for the causes he has at heart, but is seldom, if ever, dishonest in diplomacy. Rather bumptious and sometimes difficult to deal with, but responds to personal handling. Has been spoken of as anti-British, and as pro-Soviet; probably wrongly. His attitude towards foreign Powers is determined by Arab nationalism, and if, as there is some ground to believe, he accepted a large bribe from the Italians at the time of the Ethiopian war, it does not follow that this affected his advice to Ibn Sa'ûd. Possesses a splendid villa in the best part of Beirut which could not have been built out of legitimate savings, even supplemented by a sum of £3,000 which Ibn Saud is said to have contributed to this object.

Taufiq Hamza, Fuad's brother, serves under him in the Ministry, but does not merit a separate notice. Speaks French.

40. *Gâbil Family* (more correctly Qâbil, but they use the other spelling).

Important merchants in Jedda of African slave origin. Take their name from an extinct Jedda family, one of whom owned the father, later a freedman. The firm consists of the two following brothers:—

(1) *Suleymân Amân Gâbil*—born about 1874. Worked up an important business connexion with Medina, India, &c., in his early days. Paid President

of the Municipality in Turkish times, and held the same post under King Huseyn. Had at that time a poor reputation for honesty. Took a leading part in the movement by notables of Jedda and Mecca to compel King Huseyn's abdication in October 1924. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of the delegates sent to negotiate about the Eastern Telegraph Company cable and was more helpful than his colleague, 'Abdullah Kâzim (*q.v.*). Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. A Vicar of Bray under three successive régimes, but can be outspoken, as when he displeased the King by his frank criticism of fiscal policy at the "National Conference" of June 1931. Described in 1928 as "a lively and entertaining host." Still pleasant to meet and apt to be met in Royal circles. Speaks moderate Turkish.

(2) *'Abdul-Qâdir Amân Gâbil*, several years younger than Suleymân, in whose wake he follows at a distance.

41. *Hâfiz (Hâfidh) Wahba.*

Sa'ûdi Minister in London. An Egyptian born probably between 1885 and 1890. Educated at Al-Azhar. Mixed up in Nationalist and pan-Islamic politics in early manhood and was closely associated with 'Abdul-'Azîz Shawish. Definitely anti-British at time of Great War and said to have been deported from India. Said to have been in Bahrein at one time. Started a school at Kuwait and passed thence in Ibn Sa'ûd's service. Became tutor to the Amîr Faysal and accompanied the prince to London in 1919. Was one of Ibn Sa'ûd's delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference in 1923-24. In supreme charge of the civil side of the Administration at Mecca in 1925, with a viceregal title, and did well. Read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Much employed on missions and negotiations during the ensuing years. *Inter alia* took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and expounded Ibn Sa'ûd's views and fears regarding Italian policy in the Red Sea, Bolshevik activity and Hashimite sovereignty in neighbouring countries to the Residency at Cairo early in 1928. During all this period waged a ding-dong struggle against the Syrian influences around the King, and had ups and downs. Was occulted towards the end of 1926, but returned to favour soon after and became Assistant Viceroy beside the Amîr Faysal. Thought to have indisposed the Amîr by his masterfulness as a tutor and his disregard as Assistant Viceroy for the Amîr's position. Relegated in July 1928 to the post of Director-General of Education. Went to London in 1929 to represent Ibn Sa'ûd at the International Postal Congress. While there was selected for the post of Minister in London, but did not take up the post for over a year, during which interval he went on a sort of undefined mission to Kuwait and was also employed much about the King's person, though he appeared on the whole to have lost ground to the Syrians. He and Fuad Hamza are deadly enemies. Has during his tenure of the Legation in London represented his country on international occasions, at Geneva and elsewhere. Was designated in 1931 to be Minister at The Hague, but the arrangements have never materialised for reasons of economy. Represented Sa'ûdi Arabia at the opening of the Tokyo mosque in 1938.

Hâfiz Wahba has sown his political wild oats. His anti-British sentiments are supposed to have undergone a change in or before 1928, when he was reported as being accustomed to say that, as regards Egypt, he would always be against Great Britain, but, as a servant of Ibn Sa'ûd, believed the King's interest to lie in friendly relations with His Majesty's Government. He has certainly shown himself well-disposed in London, and has on occasion been distinctly helpful. He is a good propagandist for Ibn Sa'ûd on the lecture platform and in society. Neither taciturn nor talkative, he appeals by his sense of humour and looks anything but a Wahhâbi (except that he abstains from alcohol and tobacco) at the Hyde Park Hotel or the Savoy. Likes the theatre too, and alleged to have a passion for night clubs to which he gave full rein in New York in 1938. Speaks moderate English, but is not fluent. A useful servant to the King, whose respect he commands, but not probably his entire confidence.

42. *Hamad Suleymân.*

Under-Secretary of State for Finance, brother of 'Abdullah Suleymân, *q.v.*, and has worked under him. Once a petty trader in Bahrein and fled the country to evade payment of debts. Acted for his brother as Director-General of Finance during his relegation to Hasa towards the end of 1931. Was appointed Wakil

or Under-Secretary when Abdullah was made Wazir or full Minister in August 1932. Has been employed on missions in 'Asir, notably in November 1932, when he was sent with Khālid-al-Qarqani to investigate the differences between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ūd's Governor. They were too late to reach the spot before the Idrisi went into open revolt. Went with a Sa'ūdi mission to the Yemen in 1933, and was reported to have been detained by the Imam at San'a on the situation with Sa'ūdi Arabia deteriorating. Returned well before the outbreak of hostilities in 1934. In 1935 was a member of a Sa'ūdi delegation which visited Bahrein, to negotiate the Transit Dues Agreement, and to Kuwait, to discuss the question of the Sa'ūdi blockade of that neighbouring state. Whilst at Bahrein he was sued by a local Persian merchant, the Political Agent reported, for an old debt. Fell into disgrace with Ibn Sa'ūd in the spring of 1936 (as he had done at least once previously) but was apparently begged off by his brother 'Abdullah.

43. *Hamdi Bey.*

Formerly Director-General of Military Organisation. Born about 1892 to 1896. Believed to be an Iraqi Kurd and to have risen to non-commissioned rank in the Turkish army. Was a colonel in the army of King Huseyn, but passed to the service of Ibn Sa'ūd and was officer commanding troops at Yanbu' before 1928. Became Officer Commanding in Jedda in that year. Appointed Director-General of Military Organisation in 1931 in succession to Faudhi Bey Kawokji. Presents all the appearance of a man who might be good in a rough and tumble; none of having the education necessary to create anything serious out of the embryo regular army, as Faudhi Bey might have done had he not lost favour. Hamdi seems to be a man of indifferent character, with a gift for intrigue, which he displayed in connexion with the vicissitudes of the British Staff of the Hejaz Air Force in 1931-32. Acts on occasion as A.D.C. to the King, attending him on his visits to Jedda and being sent to meet sloops, &c. Now insignificant, having ceased to hold any important military position and to be confined to duties as A.D.C. to the Amīr Faysal. Stated in 1939 that he had resigned and wanted to return to Iraq, but was not allowed by Ibn Saud to leave the country.

44. *Hamud al-Bagāwi.*

Officer in charge on the Kuwait frontier, with headquarters at Jariya. Appointed to this post in August 1932. Fourth person to hold it since 1930. A man of very evil reputation, described as having been chiefly responsible for all the raiding and killing in Kuwait territory eight or nine years ago. Known in Kuwait as the "butcher" of 'Abdullah ibn Jilūwi, Governor of Hasa, and apparently chosen for his present post to tighten up the embargo on trade between Kuwait and Nejd, responsibility for which had been transferred to ibn Jilūwi.

45. *Hamud ibn Ibrahim.*

Appointed Governor of Yanbu' in August 1931, but now no longer there. Known only from the announcement of this.

46. *Hamza al-Ghauth al-Madani.*

At one time consul-general designate for Java. Became first Saudi Minister to Bagdad 1938. A Hejazi of Medina, born perhaps 1895. Said to have been educated in Turkish schools and to have frequented Turkish society. Sided with Turks at time of Arab revolt, and edited an anti-Huseyn paper at Medina in their interest. Continued to be anti-Huseyn after the success of the revolt and fled. Said to have been sentenced to death by default during his absence. Seems, nevertheless, to have been given an important post at Damascus, which he continued to hold under King Faisal's régime there, even after King Huseyn had launched against him an accusation, probably trumped up, of having stolen valuables from the Prophet's Tomb. Was in Ibn Sa'ūd's service by end of 1923 and was one of his delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference of 1923-24, an appointment which led to a revival by the 'Iraqi delegates of the robbery charge. Became Assistant Governor of Medina after its occupation by Sa'ūdi forces in 1925. Was later employed in the Palace. Selected in 1931 for the proposed consulate-general at Batavia, to the creation of which the Netherlands Government agreed, but which has never been opened, probably owing to financial difficulties. Filled in time as a member of the Legislative Council, whence he was transferred to the Amīr Sa'ūd's Diwān in September 1932. Came in King's train to Mecca in March 1933. Much of a palace man evidently.

47. *Hashim Daghestani, called Sayyid Hashim.*

A Hejazi, born about 1885, descended from a family of Mutawwifs who derived their name from the fact that they looked after the pilgrims from Daghestan. This was a lucrative business in the good old days, and Sayyid Hashim was formerly well off. He seems to have lost a great deal during the war between Ibn Sa'ūd and King 'Ali, and has also lost heavily by being loaded up with now worthless roubles. Was formerly employed in the Awqaf Department, apparently in King Huseyn's time. Appointed "Chief Revenue Officer" under the new régime in January 1926, and was later local Director of Finance in Jedda. Ejected from this post and appointed a member of the Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930. Has since been employed in various financial connexions and hunts in couples with Sheikh 'Abdullah Suleymān, but his real importance lies in the fact that he is said to have an independent position as a sort of personal secret service agent of the King, and to correspond with the latter, when His Majesty is in Nejd, about persons and things in the Hejaz. Was on intimate terms with the former Indian vice-consul, to whom he sometimes supplied information. This connexion was of some value during the early stages of the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932. Put in charge of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company's business with the Government, in Hasa in 1935. Appointed Director of Finance there in 1936, on the dismissal of Muhammad at-Tawil (*q.v.*) and replaced, as liaison officer with C.A.S.O.C., by his son, Sayyid Sultan.

48. *Hithlayn Family.*

People of importance in the 'Ajman tribe, much concerned in the Nejd revolt of 1929. Its principal member, Dhaydān ibn Hithlayn, was slain treacherously in April of that year. The following other members of the family deserve mention:—

(1) *Nāif ibn Hithlayn* (nicknamed Abū 'I Kilāb).—Succeeded Dhaydān and carried on the revolt, but surrendered in January 1930 to the British authorities in Kuwait, and was in due course handed over to Ibn Sa'ūd. Has since been a State prisoner at Riyādh, closely confined.

(2) *Hāzim ibn Hithlayn* also took an active part in the revolt, and was one of two leaders who in July 1929 visited Kuwait in the hope of enlisting support. Was fighting together with Nāif in October. Eventual fate unknown.

(3) *Khālid ibn Muhammad ibn Hithlayn*, described as a "debonair and handsome young warrior." Was one of the Mutayr and 'Ajman Sheykhs living in 'Iraq under King Faisal's protection. Visited Kuwait in 1932 at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair, apparently to size up the chances of new anti-Sa'ūdi action. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd and returned to Sa'ūdi Arabia towards the end of 1934. Appointed Amīr al-Bādiya or Governor of the Ajman desert, with headquarters at 'Aweyma (80 miles W.N.W. of Al Qatif) in 1936.

49. *Huseyn al-'Awayni.*

A young Syrian merchant established in Jedda. An enterprising fellow, who derives some importance from being a friend of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin and having connexions in Manchester; notably with another Syrian, 'Abdul-Ghāni Ydlibi, the naturalised British head of a small company there. This association was close early in 1932, when Ydlibi visited Jedda in order to work up business and with great ideas of getting concessions of all sorts. They claimed to have important support in Lancashire, and specifically that of the Calico Printers' Association (Limited). It was understood in 1932 that 'Awayni was leaving Jedda for good, but he still returns occasionally. Now lives principally at Haifa. In February or March 1933 he went to Riyādh on behalf of certain merchants to try and dissuade the King from proceeding with the concession to the ex-Khedive's group for the creation of a National Bank. A man likely to have ups and downs of fortune, in dealing with whom commercially great care should be used.

50. *M. Huseyn Nasif.*

A well-known Hejazi of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Born about 1882. Inherited much property from his father, 'Omar Nasif, who was a notable personage in Turkish times, as well as the agency in Jedda of the Sherifs of the

'Abadilah branch. Occupies the largest house in Jedda and was once very prosperous, but is now probably less so. Was said in 1917 to have lost favour with King Huseyn, who had previously been accustomed to stay with him when in Jedda. Was said also to be desirous of British naturalisation at that time. Described as having been a Wahhâbi by conviction, even before the Sa'ûdi invasion. Deported to 'Aqaba during King 'Ali's short reign. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Was given the privilege of putting Ibn Sa'ûd up during the years following the fall of Jedda, but has not done so since the King acquired the "Green Palace." Has not held office, as was expected, under the Sa'ûdi régime, perhaps owing to doubt as to his trustworthiness. Rather a dark horse nowadays and may both dislike and be disliked by the régime, but keeps quiet. Said to be a good Arabic scholar and possesses what passes in Jedda for a remarkable library. An aldermanic figure. His eldest son, Husain Nasif, has written a book on the history of the Hejaz. A cousin, M. Salih Nasif, was the figurehead president of the Palestine Defence Committee in Mecca in 1937-38.

51. Ibrahim al Mu'ammâr.

Qaimmaqam of Jedda 1937. Identical with the Ibrahim al Junaifi mentioned in *The Heart of Arabia* and, according to the author, Mr. Philby, has a very doubtful claim to the historic name of Mu'ammâr, which he subsequently assumed. In early life travelled much in India, Persia, Egypt and elsewhere in the East, as trader and probably also as journalist and propagandist. About 1926 became head of Ibn Sa'ûd's diwan; transferred to that of the Amir Sa'ûd in 1932. In 1933 was appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad. His alleged undiplomatic activities were the subject of complaint on several occasions, and in 1937 necessitated his removal. An active, able man, interested in world affairs and with a great sense of humour. Has improved Jedda considerably, is useful in pilgrimage matters, and is helpful to foreigners within the limits of his powers. Much trusted by Ibn Sa'ûd, to whose interests he appears to be genuinely devoted.


52. Muhammad 'Id Rawwâf.

Formerly Sa'ûdi consul in Damascus. Born about 1898. One of a Sherari family which migrated from Jauf to Damascus in 1910. Family not highly considered in Damascus, but 'Id's father maintained close connexion with Ibn Sa'ûd and was helpful to him in negotiations with the Turks. He, the father, made a fortune in camel-dealing and left wealth to his two sons. According to his own account, Muhammad made a large sum of money during the Great War by buying up English banknotes in Damascus at a discount of 20 per cent. to 40 per cent., stealing away to Bagdad as soon as it fell into British hands, and cashing the notes at par. Appointed to his Damascus post in 1929 in succession to his brother Yasin. Had then only had primary education, but was stated last year to be busily improving on it. Was considered by His Majesty's present consul in Damascus rather stupid, though pleasant and useful. Well informed on local currents of thought and pushes in Syrian nationalist circles, without apparently carrying much weight, the idea of an Arab Empire with Ibn Sa'ûd as a suitable ruler for it. The brother Yasin Rawwâf, whom he succeeded, is said to have become Governor of Medina in 1929-30. He was appointed second assistant to the Viceroy of the Hejaz in September 1930, but has faded out of Sa'ûdi official life and now lives at Damascus. Muhammad 'Id Rawwâf was superseded as consul at Damascus by Rusheyd Pasha (q.v.) in May 1933 and appointed an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1935 was appointed Acting Governor (Qaimmaqam, not Amir) of Jedda, but in 1937 exchanged posts with Ibrahim ibn Mu'ammâr. Ceased to be Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad in 1938, when a Saudi Minister was appointed, and was made a member of the Council of Ministers.

53. Idrisi Family.

Founded by Ahmed al Idrisi, a native of Fez, who became a notable religious teacher at Mecca and created a Tariqa, or school of religious doctrine. Moved on to Sabya, in 'Asir, where he acquired land and died in the odour of sanctity about 1837 and where his tomb is still venerated. The Idrisis supplanted the Sherifian family, which had ruled at Abû 'Arish in the time of his son Muhammad and Muhammad's son 'Ali. The branch of the family most identified with

'Asir is descended from these two, as appears from the following table, which is not necessarily complete or accurate as regards order of birth:—



The numbered members of this branch deserve further notice.


(1) This Muhammad was a notable man in his day. Born in 1876. Studied in Egypt and at Kufra. Organised opposition to the Turks in 'Asir in and after 1904. Made treaties with His Majesty's Government through the Resident at Aden in 1915 and 1917. Came to terms with Ibn Sa'ûd in 1920, when he ceded to him any rights he might have in the country about 'Abhâ.

(2) Displaced (3) in 1926, after complicated events. Accepted in that year the suzerainty of Ibn Sa'ûd by a treaty signed at Mecca. Accepted in October 1931 the practical annexation of 'Asir by Ibn Sa'ûd, retaining a simulacrum only of quasi-sovereign rights. Joined in the rebellion against Ibn Sa'ûd in November 1932, and on its collapse in due course took refuge in Yemen. After strenuous efforts to obtain his surrender, Ibn Sa'ûd agreed recently that he should remain in the Yemen under the Imâm's supervision, and accorded him a pension. Appears to be a man of weak character, very amenable to influence. Was described some years ago as "monkish."

(3) Succeeded his father in 1923. Was upheld by the Masâriha and other tribes in 1924 against an attempt to displace him by his cousin Mustafa, No. (6), who established himself temporarily at Hodeyda, then an Idrisi possession. 'Ali, in turn, lost Hodeyda to the Imâm in 1925, and was displaced by (2) in 1926. Returned to Mecca in August 1926, and seems to have lived mostly there until he was suddenly arrested and deported to Riyâdh in the summer of 1932, under suspicion, apparently, of intending a *coup* in 'Asir. Recently attempted to escape. Was foiled, but did not die, as was rumoured.

(4) and (5), who died on the 5th April, 1935, were very active in organising and conducting the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932.

The original Ahmed has a numerous posterity through another son, variously called 'Abdul-'Al or 'Abdul-Mutâl. His descendants have been principally associated with Dongola, where his tomb is a place of pilgrimage, and with Egypt. The following table shows only those of the branch who have come to notice in connexion with Arabia in recent years:—



(6) Was a trusted British agent during the Great War. Later played a rôle in opposition to his cousin 'Ali, No. (3). Died in Egypt in 1930.

(7) One of the 'Asir delegation which came to Mecca in October 1930 to complete the arrangements for the absorption of 'Asir into Ibn Sa'ûd's dominions.

Concerned in the rebellion of November-December 1932, and left with No. (9) for Massawa after it collapsed.

(8) Has been politically active for many years. Works normally, it is alleged, in the Italian interest, but played an apparently pro-Sa'udi rôle in 1926-27, at the time of and after the establishment of Ibn Sa'ud's suzerainty over 'Asir. Visited Mecca at least three times from September 1926 to September 1927. Was thought perhaps to aspire himself to the post of ruler of 'Asir. Visited His Majesty's agent and consul in Jedda on the 15th September, 1927. Mr. Stonehewer Bird described him at that time as being the King's unofficial adviser in regard to 'Asir and Yemen. He found him a man of intelligence and broad views—pro-Sa'udi, but not pro-Wahhâbi. Accused by the Sa'udi Government in 1932 of again serving Italian interests, and of being concerned in the political plot behind the 'Asir revolt.

(9) Much concerned in the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932. Was at Jizân at the crucial time, and attempted by a letter and a visit to Kamaran to get His Majesty's Government to recognise what he represented as the restoration of Idrisi rule. Withdrew early in 1933 to Massawa, with his relative M. Al-'Arabi, No. (7).

All members of the family have the title of Seyyid. There is a close connexion between the family and the Senûsis, whose founder was a disciple of the original Ahmed al Idrisi. The spiritual relationship has been reinforced by intermarriage at various times. The Idrisis have also a connexion with the Mirghâni family, whose head resides in the Sudan, and is chief of yet another Tariqa, once powerful and still important.

54. *Ismail Ghuznavi.*

Of Amritsar in India. This Indian Wahhâbi has played an important anti-British political rôle in India since 1919. No full account of him would be appropriate in this report, but he deserves mention in it because of his frequent visits of long duration to the Hejaz. Was a delegate of the Indian Ahl-al-Hadith, the Indian equivalent of Wahhâbis, at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Was concerned in the arrangements for creating the Dar-al-Kiswa, or Holy Carpet Factory, in Mecca, and apparently incurred the King's displeasure in connexion with purchases for it in 1929. Now has close relations with Ibn Sa'ud, whom he serves as an unofficial agent in India, principally for purposes connected with the stimulation of the pilgrimage, but also, perhaps, the encouragement of Wahhâbism. In March 1933 the Indian Government refused his permission to come to the Hejaz, considering that the general danger of his activities must outweigh other considerations. Allowed to visit the Hejaz in 1934 and 1935. Claims, perhaps with truth, to have desisted from political activity in India, but continues to act as Sa'udi propagandist and has strongly expressed the thesis that British authorities should not concern themselves in any way with pilgrims in the Hejaz. The man is apparently devoted in an anti-British spirit to the cause of Islam, which he identifies with Ibn Sa'ud; but as he is paid by Ibn Sa'ud and almost certainly receives from the Mutawwifs a commission on the pilgrims he recruits, it is not necessary to believe that his motives are pure. In 1939 wrote articles praising Italian policy towards the pilgrimage, but perhaps only as a stick with which to beat the British.

55. *Jemâl Pasha Ghâzi (Ghazzi).*

Of Syrian origin, but born about 1883 at Gaza in Palestine; hence his surname. Graduated in the Turkish Staff College. Said to have been a member of a Turkish Military Mission lent to the Sultan of Morocco in 1910, to have seen service later in Gallipoli and to have been A.D.C. to Enver Pasha, to whom he claims to have been attached up to shortly before the armistice. Went to Basra after the armistice to manage the property of his wife, the daughter of a rich landowner there. Visited India more than once from Basra. Fell out with his wife and applied to Mustafa Kemal Pasha for employment, which was refused, possibly because of his past association with the C.U.P. Entered the service of Ibn Sa'ud and commanded the artillery during the siege of Jedda. Went to 'Asir in 1926 and was reported late in that year to be running Hasan al-Idrisi in company with Ahmed es-Senûsi and Mustafa al-Idrisi. Was reported in 1927 to be an Italian agent, trying to undermine Ibn Sa'ud's position in 'Asir. Re-employed later in the Hejaz. Was serving in the Amir Faysal's household early in 1931 as a sort of chamberlain, and was then scandalously spoken of as

M. le Procureur. Accompanied the Turkish Prince Ahmed Tewhid to India, with the permission of Ibn Sa'ud, in May 1931. Travelled a good deal afterwards, posing as Minister of War in the Sa'udi Government. He appeared in Jerusalem in November 1931 and played an ambiguous part in connexion with the then impending Moslem Congress. Whether he eventually attended it or not is not known in Jedda. Returned to India in June 1932 and continued alone the propaganda in favour of the pilgrimage which he and Prince Ahmed Tewhid had initiated in 1931. In a secret report from India of February 1933, he is stated to have expressed in one quarter the intention of enlisting Indian Moslem interest in Ibn Sa'ud's claim to 'Aqaba. Returned to the Hejaz for the 1933 pilgrimage.

Jemâl Pasha is presentable though unpleasantly fulsome. He speaks French, some English and probably other European languages. He is almost certainly a man of loose and untrustworthy character. His recent activities in India give him a certain importance. He is doubtless rewarded for his propaganda in favour of the pilgrimage, but should not be regarded as a responsible agent of Ibn Sa'ud for any other purpose. He is a mere hanger-on.

56. *Khâlid Al-Hakim.*

A Syrian or Palestinian, said to have served as an engineer officer in the Turkish army. Has been mentioned several times since 1926 as an intermediary for the purchase of arms, &c., by Ibn Sa'ud in Europe, acting apparently as a merchant, though he has also been in the King's official employment. His dealings in respect of arms appear to have been with German firms, perhaps with Italy and with Poland, where Ibn Sa'ud placed a very large order in 1930. Reported in August 1927 to have been dismissed, from what post is not clear, but accompanied Dr. Damluji in July 1928 to take part in the still-born conference at Haifa on the Hejaz Railway. Was heard of, for a time, in Haifa where he was occupied in the Sa'udi interest in connexion with the proceedings of the Preparatory Committee of the proposed Arab Congress. Appeared to be in with Kâmil al Qassab and other exponents of the idea that Ibn Sa'ud should dominate the Congress, even if held in Bagdad. Has since come to notice as a member of Amir Sa'ud's suite on his visit to Transjordan in August, 1935, on his way back from Europe, and was in the autumn of the same year employed in connexion with the Hejaz Railway Conference at Haifa. Brother of Hasan Bay al-Hakim, director of the Arab Bank at Jaffa.

57. *Khâlid Al-Qarqani (alias Al-Haud, alias Abu'l Walid).*

A Tripolitan, who is said to have served under the Senûsi, fought the Italians and retired into exile in Egypt, where he has a daughter married to Abdur-Rahmân 'Azzâm Bey, formerly a desert fighter in the Senûsi cause, now Egyptian Minister to Iraq and Sa'udi Arabia. Al-Qarqani was brought to Ibn Sa'ud's notice, it is said, by Sheykh Hâfiz Wahba, and came to the Hejaz in 1930. Was appointed in September 1930 First Assistant to the Viceroy, but apparently soon vacated the post and went into business with the German merchant, afterwards honorary German consul, de Haas. Was re-employed by the Government to accompany the American engineer Twitchell on his tours of survey for water and minerals. Was sent with Hamad Suleymân (q.v.) to 'Asir in November 1932 to investigate the dispute between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ud's Governor. This mission could not be accomplished by the two delegates, who, in the following year, with Turki al Madhi, formed an equally unsuccessful delegation to Sana before the outbreak of the Sa'udi-Yemen war. Was a Sa'udi delegate to the Bahrein Transit Dues and Koweit Blockade Conferences of 1935. Was also a Sa'udi representative at the negotiations over the Red Sea oil concession with Petroleum Concessions (Limited) (added in 1939). Acts as buyer for certain German goods for the Saudi Government. In 1938 was found to be on the staff of Amir Sa'ud, but later in the year officially appointed to that of Ibn Sa'ud. Said to have a large salary, out of which he is believed to maintain Qasim Bey (q.v.). Seems to be a trusted adviser, and said to be honest in negotiation, though not necessarily scrupulous in financial matters. Accompanied Dr. Mahmud Hammuda to London and Paris in 1939 in connexion with the proposed amendment of the Sanitary Convention.

58. *Khatib Family.*

Understood to be a Mecca family. Three of them became prominent in 1932 in connexion with the activities of the political organisations behind attempts to

undermine Ibn Sa'ūd, viz., the Hizb al Ahrār al Hijāzi and the Jami'at al Dif'al lil Hijaz. Actively connected with the organisation are—

- (1) 'Abdul Hamid al Khatib, and
- (2) 'Abdul Malik al Khatib

who appeared to have permanently settled in Egypt, where they have property, but (1) returned to Mecca in 1936 under the amnesty of the previous year. (2) may possibly be identical with a man of the same name who was described in 1917 as a Javanese of Mecca, well educated, who had been correspondent of the *Mokattam* and had influence with King Huseyn. A third person, viz.—

- (3) Huseyn Ali al-Khatib—

lived at Labej in 1932 and seems to have squandered in riotous living at Aden, &c., money given him by Huseyn ad-Dabbāgh for the purposes of the plot against Ibn Sa'ūd.

It is understood that Fuad al Khatib, formerly Foreign Secretary to King Huseyn and now secretary to the Amir 'Abdullah, is not related to this family.

59. Lami Family.

A Sheykhly family of the Jiblān section of the Mutayr tribe. Concerned in the Nejd rebellion of 1929. Not apparently of great consequence, but worth mentioning, because Jāsir ibn Lāmī was one of the Akhwān leaders who surrendered to the British authorities in Kuwait in January 1930, and was in due course handed over to Ibn Sa'ūd. He has since been a State prisoner at Riyādh, and is one of those who were recently reported to be receiving more lenient treatment than before.

60. Lari Family.

Persian Bahais long settled in Jedda.

(1) *Muhammad 'Ali Lari*, the head of the family, is a charming old gentleman, born about 1867. Was the principal carpet merchant in Jedda and rich, having an important connexion with Egypt. Health now impaired, but is still in business and highly considered. Has in the past acted as Persian consul, as did his father before him. Reads poetry and likes to commune with nature.

(2) *Ahmed*, son of the preceding, formerly in the business in Jedda. Was in charge of Persian affairs in his father's absence in 1925, and was reported to have come much under the influence of the then Soviet representative, Hakimov. Urged Ibn Sa'ūd at that time, according to Ibn Sa'ūd himself, to join in a great Eastern Union against the imperialistic Powers, with Persia and Afghanistan in it and Russia supporting. Has now (1939) settled down. In 1937 was Director of Customs at Ujair, then Inspector of Customs in Jedda, and is now Saudi liaison officer with the American Oil Company in Hasa, with whom at one time he worked as interpreter.

(1) has two other sons in the business, one in Jedda, one in Egypt. Unless there was a mistake in the name, one of these would appear to have been the "Persian trading consul" mentioned in a Jedda despatch of the 22nd November, 1927, as the would-be buyer of goods which arrived in Jedda in the Russian steamship *Tomp* at that time and were denied clearance from customs after having been landed.

61. Luwey Family.

Enjoy the title of Sherif. People of importance in the 'Ateyba tribe, chiefly because of the considerable rôle played by Khālid ibn Mansūr ibn Luwey, who died, apparently of illness, on the march from 'Abbā to Sabya to repress rebellion in 'Asir in December 1932. He had broken with the Hashimites, it was said, owing to a quarrel with the Amir 'Abdullah, who had slapped him on the mouth with a shoe. He had gone over to Ibn Sa'ūd some years before 1924, and was one of the leaders of the forces which occupied Mecca in 1924. Although supposed at a later date to be in sympathy with the extremist Wahhābis in Nejd, he continued faithful to the King and was apt to be called on for military service in times of special emergency. The present head of the family is his eldest son.

(1) *Sa'ad ibn Luwey*, who, immediately on Khālid's death, was appointed to succeed him in his command and as Amir of Khurma.

(2) and (3) *Huseyn* and *Zāmil*.

It was stated at the time of Khālid's death that he had left three minor sons in addition to the above.

62. Mahmūd Hamdi Hamūda.

Director-General of Public Health. A Syrian of Damascus, born about 1882. Studied in Beirut and Constantinople. Spent in all sixteen or seventeen years in latter place. Served in Turkish army during and up to the end of war, after which he settled in Syria. Held post in some hospital there under the French and was professor of rhino-laryngology at Damascus. Left Syria, apparently for political reasons, and joined Ibn Sa'ūd in Nejd early in or before 1925. Appointed to his present post in January 1926 and represented Ibn Sa'ūd, as King of the Hejaz, at the International Sanitary Conference of 1926. Seemed likely to be eliminated in August 1927 with other Syrians and was said to have resigned but to have been kept on pending an audit of accounts. Evidently weathered this storm. Was Sa'ūdi representative at meeting of International Health Office in autumn of 1932, following on accession of Sa'ūdi Arabia to Rome Convention. Speaks good Turkish and moderate French. Probably has reasonable medical attainments, but gives no impression of real capacity as Director-General of Public Health. Attends annual meetings of International Health Office with some regularity. Has advanced absurdly pretentious claims on behalf of a largely rudimentary Sa'ūdi Public Health organisation. Avowedly hostile to Government of India dispensaries maintained in the Hejaz for the benefit of pilgrims.

63. Mahmūd Shalhūb.

Former Director of Finance in Jedda. Comes of a Mecca family, one of whom was described in 1917 as controlling the distribution of Zemzem water, a very lucrative job. Mahmūd, who was born probably not later than 1883, was employed in Turkish times as a Government clerk in Mecca, and was later chief clerk in Huseyn's financial department. Continued to be employed in Mecca under the new régime and was appointed to his present post in 1930. A decent seeming man, but plays no important rôle in a domain in which 'Abdullah Suleymān is supreme. Replaced in his post as Director of Finance in Jedda by his clerk, 'Abdullah Zākir, in June 1933, and transferred to Mecca as head of the General Accountancy section of the Ministry of Finance. Chairman of Finance Council of the Ministry of Finance.

64. Mehdi Bey.

Director-General of Police, with headquarters in Mecca, for several years, but in 1938 was made Director-General of Public Security, though no change in his functions was announced or observed. An 'Iraqi, who has, however, lived little in 'Iraq. Said to have been a regimental clerk in the Turkish army, in which a brother of his is still an officer. Was employed also in King Huseyn's army. He appears to be arbitrary and ruthless and to wield considerable authority. A man of organising ability, and the Mecca orphanage, which is under his charge, has been declared by a competent Indian witness to be the best-organised concern in Sa'ūdi Arabia. In 1938, when he had extended the system of regular police to Hasa, he was given by Ibn Sa'ūd the title of *al Mushlih* (The Reformer).

65. Ibn Mubārak.

Formerly considered to be the same as the man of this name who was Governor of Bureyda. If so, he now no longer holds that post.

65A. 'Abdur-Rahmān ibn Mubārak.

Governor of Dhaba. Little known to the Legation, which cannot even trace his first name, but worth mentioning because of the importance of his post in relation to Egypt and Transjordan, and because he was one of the leaders of the forces, with advanced base at Dhaba, employed against Ibn Rifāda in 1932. Is possibly a tribal personage rather than an administrative Governor, and may be of the family of Huseyn ibn Mubārak of the Harb tribe, who was a power at Rabigh at the time of the Arab revolt. Later information. This man, whose first name is 'Abdur-rahmān, was transferred from Dhaba to Wejh in or about June 1933. An Abdurrahmān ibn Ibrahim ibn Mubarak, who may be the same, was appointed Governor of Qunfida in 1936, in place of Muhammad 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Madhi, who was transferred to Jizān.

66. Muhammad Khan Ghazi Khan.

An actively anti-British Indian, who, like Ismail Ghuznavi, cannot appropriately be dealt with at length in this report, but has resided much in Mecca, and has been associated more particularly with the Holy Carpet factory

or Dar-ul-Kiswa, a rallying-place for Indian sedition-mongers. Now lives mostly in India, but comes on pilgrimage. Has been at pains to ingratiate himself with the Legation, and professed, shortly before Sir Andrew Ryan left Jedda, to be loyal and hopeful of being elected to a provincial council in India under the new constitutional arrangements.

67. *Muhammad ibn Sultân.*

Commander of Ibn Sa'ûd's camelry in the Hejaz. As such, played an important part in the suppression of the Ibn Rifâda rebellion in 1932. Was also a powerful and much-feared element in the machinery set up to Wahhâbise public morals in Mecca until its rigours were relaxed. Camelry has since been suppressed and merged in the regular defence forces. Ibn Sultân is now little heard of.

68. *Muhammad at-Tawîl.*

A native of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Got a small post in the customs in Turkish times and rose to be Director of Customs in Jedda under King Huseyn. Played a leading part in the movement of the Hejazi notables to compel Huseyn's abdication and the accession of King 'Ali in October 1924. Remained in theory Director of Customs only, but wielded great influence under 'Ali, and was described as being "practically dictator" in November 1925, after his triumph in a dispute with Ahmed Saqqâf, the Prime Minister, who decided to leave. Promised at that time to devote to the cause of the Hejaz every penny of "certain economies" which he had effected while Director of Customs. Left the Hejaz on the fall of Jedda, but returned in 1927 or early in 1928 and started a motor transport business. Was said in 1928 to have been president of the Hizb-al-Ahrâr al Hijâzi, but made his peace with Ibn Sa'ûd after an absence at Riyâdh, which was described in February 1928 as a deportation. Was slow to receive official employment, and was perhaps considered unsuitable for such employment in the Hejaz, but was in September 1930 placed at the head of a commission to study and reorganise the financial and economic situation in Hasa. Remained for some time in this employment, despite rumours of assassination or flight. Appeared to have tightened up regulations and trodden on Qusaibi corns in the process, but not to have made the Hasa Customs as paying as he hoped. A capable and well-reputed man, liked by the authorities at Bahrein, but he fell foul of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company to such an extent that Sayyid Hâshim (No. 47) was sent to look after their business with the Government in 1935. At-Tawîl was recalled in 1936 and replaced by two separate officials (one being No. 47) in his posts as Director of Finance and Director of Customs. In 1938 appointed (against his will) manager of the Nejd Motor Transport Company.

69. *Muhsin al-Firm.*

Principal chieftain of the Eastern Harb tribe in Nejd. Mentioned early in 1929 in connexion with raids alleged to be in preparation against 'Iraq. Does not seem to have joined in the rebellion against Ibn Sa'ûd later that year, and has since been at enmity with the Mutayr owing to his having fallen upon them during the revolt and made off with camels of theirs. Said in 1932 to have refused to lead his tribesmen against Ibn Rifâda, owing to resentment at the holding up of a caravan of his by Ibn Sa'ûd's officials some time before.

70. *Mustafa Badruddîn.*

Director of Customs in Jedda. A North African or of North African origin. Born probably about 1892. Was given a small post in the Jedda custom-house some years ago, and later became Director of Customs at Yanbu'. Transferred to Jedda in the same capacity in 1930. A man of little ability, but was reported not long ago to be disconcertingly honest. If so, he has not seriously infected the custom-house as a whole with this malady.

71. *Mutlag as-Sûr.*

An important Mutayr leader closely associated with the late Faysal ad-Dawish and one of the sheykhs concerned in the Akhwân rebellion of 1929 who are now living under King Faysal's protection in 'Iraq. Visited Kuwait in December 1932 and February 1933. Appeared to the Political Agent to be in close touch with the Mutayr tribe, and may be watching for an opportunity of promoting or taking advantage of Ibn Sa'ûd's downfall.

72. *Muwaffaq al Alûsi.*

Omitted, as his connexion with Saudi Arabia seems to have ceased completely. See Personalities report for 1933.

73. *Ibrahim an-Neshmi.*

Formerly Amir of Jauf. Said to be a Nejdi; to have been originally a maker of native foot-gear; to have been in Medina while the Hashimites still held it; and to have escaped to the Sa'ûdi side, where his knowledge of the situation in Medina was so useful that he was given a command. He appears to have been employed at Tebûk and perhaps at Yanbu' in the ensuing years. He became notorious in February 1930 for a large-scale raid into Transjordan similar to that of 'Abdul-'Azîz ibn Musâ'id (q.v.) about the same time. He was apparently at the time already Governor of Jauf, a post from which the King dismissed him about the end of the year, not, it was explained, because the man was bad, but because the King desired to eliminate causes of quarrel with His Majesty's Government. Reappeared subsequently as Governor of Al-'Ula, but was transferred to an unspecified post in or about June 1933. Is now (May 1934) one of the more important subordinate commanders in the Western Army on the Saudi-Yemen border. Governor of Turâba in 1934 until September 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Najrân.

74. *Obeidullah, Maulvi.*

An Indian permanently established in Mecca. Has had a lurid past in India, having been at one time closely connected with the Bolsheviks and been involved in the Silk Letter conspiracy, &c. Was mentioned in March 1927 as a man who was attracting modest notice in Mecca as a lecturer on the traditions of the Prophet, and as belonging to the class of migratory agitators "whose flight is Kabul, Moscow, Berlin and Constantinople." Appears now to carry much weight as a religious teacher and is much frequented by Indians. Probably uses his influence in a definitely anti-British spirit, but has not come to notice latterly as a direct participant in conspiracies in India.

75. *Othmân 'Arab.*

A Hejazi, whose past connexion with the Hejaz is not known to the Legation. Came to notice in 1932 as one of those concerned in the Dabbâgh conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ûd. Was described as a man of 50 to 55, fairly wealthy, normally resident in Egypt, but in the habit in 1931-32 of visiting Jerusalem and holding telephone conversations with the Amir 'Abdullah and Abdur-Rauf Sabbân. Was supposed to be an intermediary between the Hejazi conspirators in Egypt and the Amir. Was certainly concerned in the anti-Sa'ûdi plot and is now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan.

76. *Philby, H. St. J. B., C.I.E.,* since 1917.

Born in Ceylon 1885. Educated at Westminster and Trinity, Cambridge. Passed for Indian Civil Service in 1907 and had normal career in India from 1908 to 1915, when he was detached for service in 'Iraq. Sent on mission to Central Arabia in 1917-18, visited Ibn Sa'ûd and crossed Arabia Peninsula from 'Uqayr to Jedda. Employed in Ministry of Interior in 'Iraq in 1920-21 and as British representative in Transjordan from 1921 to 1924, when he fell out with His Majesty's Government and tendered a welcome resignation from that post. Retired on a pension from the Indian Civil Service in 1925, but had already embarked on the recent career which entitles him to a place in this report. Came to Jedda in November 1924, shortly after the accession of King 'Ali, by whose father, Huseyn, he had been decorated in 1923. Was said, in 1924, to believe that republicanism was the nostrum for the Arab world. Was regarded on his arrival in Jedda as having necessarily been sent on a mission by His Majesty's Government, so much so that they officially denied it. Was one of the would-be peacemakers between 'Ali and Ibn Sa'ûd in the last two months of 1924, but was repulsed by Ibn Sa'ûd. Appeared at one moment in 1925 to hover towards the Hashimites, but had long believed in the star of Ibn Sa'ûd, whom he visited near Mecca towards the end of the year and for whom he plumped finally, if indeed he had ever really hesitated, after the fall of Jedda. Has since devoted himself to the King's cause in the press, in his books and in every other way. Resided principally in Jedda until 1930. Was prime mover, though not principal shareholder, in Sharqieh (Limited), whose business he directs in the Hejaz. Embraced Islam in August 1930 and has since spent much time in Mecca, but was away from

the Hejaz during most of 1932, when he effected an enterprising journey across the Rub'a-al-Khālī and then spent some months in England.

Mr. Philby has been variously judged and his influence in Arabian affairs variously estimated. He was for some time in and after 1924 a thorn in the side of British authorities and was described in 1925 as clinging tenaciously to his religion, "a simple dualism in which the spirit of darkness is represented by His Majesty's Government." Need now no longer be regarded as anti-British, except that he would still sympathise with Ibn Sa'ūd in any quarrel with His Majesty's Government, and will still rail on occasion against the British Empire as a system. He would as soon sell British goods as Standard oil or Ford cars and he got Ibn Sa'ūd's wireless contract for Marconi's in 1931. His influence with the King has been exaggerated by some into a legend, while many still believe him to be a British political agent. He has much access to the King and the King values his advice on certain occasions, but he presents no appearance of being in Ibn Sa'ūd's confidence on major political occasions. He is still one of the King's greatest foreign admirers, but in the last two years has conceived doubts of Sa'ūdi administration, especially that part of it for which 'Abdullah Suleymān is responsible and doubts even of the King's capacity to direct his own machine. The preceding note was written in 1934. Since then Mr. Philby has obtained for his company the monopoly for the supply of cars (Fords) for public transport, travelled nearly all the way to England and back to the Hejaz by car, and in 1936 aroused the just resentment of the Aden authorities by appearing at Shabwa, in the Aden Protectorate, with an armed Sa'ūdi escort, without warning. Enquiry shows that he obtained the escort from the Sa'ūdi authorities for topographical work in Najrān and went off with it, first into Yemen territory and then into that of the Aden Protectorate, without the knowledge of the Sa'ūdi Government. (What follows was added in May 1939). In 1937-38 Mr. Philby tried hard, on his own admission, to induce Ibn Sa'ūd to take up an attitude of open hostility to His Majesty's Government about Palestine, but without success. He has given up the car monopoly which has left him £60,000 or more to the bad—a sum which it will take some time to recover. His plans are uncertain. He is believed to have designs on a seat in Parliament.

77. Qattān Family.

(1) *Yusuf ibn Salīm Qattān*, said to have been originally a servant in a coffee-shop in Mecca and afterwards of the original Qattān family whose name he took. Became a guide for Javanese pilgrims. Rose to be president of the Mecca municipality under the Turks, but was still so uneducated that he was said to be unable to tell "the letter Alif from a telegraph pole." Became Minister of Public Works under King Huseyn. Was said in 1930 to be full of schemes connected with the pilgrimage and the advancement of his son No. (2) below. Has also come to notice as one of the agents concerned with the properties of the Sherifian family.

(2) *'Abbās Qattān*, an ambitious young man, born about 1901, who was himself president of the municipality in Mecca in 1930 and still occupies that post. He is the right-hand man of Shейkh 'Abdullah Suleymān, Minister of Finance, and is chief organiser of the hotels recently opened at Mecca, Jedda and Medina.

78. Qusaibi Family.

An important merchant family in the Persian Gulf. The Legation is indebted to the Political Agent in Bahrein for an account of them, which was drawn up in June 1931, and of which the following is a summary:—

Said to be descended from a butcher of Riyādh. Composed of the five brothers mentioned below; children of the same mother by two brothers, Hasan and Ibrahim, who married her successively; partners in business and property; engaged in trade between Bahrein, their headquarters, Hasa and Nejd. Accounted, despite the acquisition of wealth, extremely plebeian and disqualified by Arab custom from intermarriage with women of better birth.

(1) *'Abdul-'Azīz ibn Hasan*, simple and wise; the mainstay of the firm; reputed pious; respected by Ibn Sa'ūd. Was Sa'ūdi delegate to the abortive Blockade Conference at Kuwait in 1935.

(2) *'Abdur-Rahmān ibn Hasan*, more enlightened and a wonderful fellow for pearl dealing. Possessed of some knowledge of French and English and accustomed to go to Paris on pearl business. Sensible but conceited.

(3) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan*, intelligent and sharp, but of mean and low character and meddlesome. Inclined to be boastful and disliked by Ibn Sa'ūd.

(4) *Hasan ibn Ibrahim*, very foolish and gruff and as low a character as (3). Hot tempered.

(5) *Sa'ad ibn Ibrahim*, permanently resident in Hasa. Not personally known to Captain Prior. Said to be a good "mixer," but similar in character to (3) and (4).

When the above information was supplied in 1931 the Qusaibis had great influence owing to their position as agents of Ibn Sa'ūd in Bahrein and buyers of his requirements for Nejd, as well as to their wealth and their hold on many to whom they had lent money. Their most distinguished debtor was the King himself, who owed them in 1930 something like £80,000, and who, although about half of this had been paid off by June 1931, still owed them the balance. Abdurrahmān was given in the latter year a roving commission to try and raise the wind for the Sa'ūdi Government in Europe, but failed completely. The relations of the Qusaibis with the King no longer seem to be as close as formerly. They resented the reforms introduced by Muhammad at-Tawil (*q.v.*). They were driven by bad business to press the King for money. He has of late employed other persons to buy for him, but he is not known to have deprived the Qusaibis of their general agency for him at Bahrein.

79. Rashīd Family.

Former rulers of Hāil. Little is known of the remnants of this family once so powerful and later so fallen, even before its final collapse, that it was "accounted infamous, even in such a land of violence as Arabia, for its record of domestic murders." It deserves attention, however, because of the possibility of its reappearance on the scene, *e.g.*, if the Shammar tribes from which it sprang should go against Ibn Sa'ūd. It is understood that, after the fall of Hāil, the King pursued a policy of absorption, not of annihilation, and that many persons belonging to the Beni Rashīd, or connected with them, passed into his entourage. Two lads who are being brought up with his younger children and are included in the list of his sons are said to be the children of a Rashīd lady, whom Ibn Sa'ūd married after their birth. Their names are—

(1) *Sultān* and

(2) *Mish'al*—

the latter of which corresponds with that of an infant child of the last ruling Ibn Rashīd, as given in the 1917 volume of *Personalities in Arabia*. Two other persons have come to notice, who are said to be related to the Beni Rashīd, viz.—

(3) *Mansūr ibn 'Asaf*, who is said to have been taken into Ibn Sa'ūd's service and to have served for a term as Governor of Tebūk; and his brother—

(4) *Nāsir ibn 'Asaf*, who also served Ibn Sa'ūd, but was reported to have deserted into Transjordan in 1931.

As the information about this family is so meagre, it is worth noting that the following members of it accompanied Ibn Sa'ūd from Riyādh to Jedda in March, 1934:—

(5) Muhammad ibn Talāl (a daughter of his was married to Ibn Sa'ūd in 1938).

(6) Mash'al ibn Mas'ūd ibn 'Abdul 'Azīz.

(7) Rashīd al Muheysin al Jabr.

(8) Sultān ibn Talāl al Jabr.

(9) Fahad ibn Hamūd al Jabr.

Of these (6) and (8) may be identical with (1) and (2) given above. The *Umm al Qura* early in 1935 gave a list of the Beni Rashīd who came to the Hejāz with Ibn Sa'ūd in March of that year. This list gave all the names, except (6), unless the name Mash'al al Sa'ūd in the 1935 list corresponded with the same person. Two other names appear in the 1935 list.

(10) 'Abdullah al Mit'ib.

(11) 'Ubaid al 'Abdullah.

At least one Ibn Rashīd accompanied the King's son, the Amir Faysal, to the Yemen front in April, 1934.

The younger princes are greatly in evidence in Ibn Sa'ūd's entourage, being treated generally very much like his own younger sons.

The only member of the family outside Sa'ūdi Arabia, and therefore of some importance, is (12) Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Muhsin ar Rashīd, born about 1910. Lives at the Court of the King of Iraq (according to a 1935 report), out of whose privy purse he is said to receive a pension of about £20 a month. Twice stated to have set out, with the cognisance of the late King 'Ali, to raise the Shammar, cross the frontier and take Hāil, but returned on each occasion with standards still unfurled, having judged the moment not propitious. Still keeps in touch with the Shammar and maintains bedouin mode of life. Described as ordinarily a rather dull, brooding young man, and perhaps not very resourceful, but, presented with a good enough opportunity, he would quickly be off across the desert to recapture his ancestral home.

80. *Rifāda Family.*

Chiefs of the Billi tribe, with an urban establishment at Wejh. The most notable recent member of the family, Suleymān Afnān, played a not inconsiderable rôle during the Great War, but was killed in a raid in 1916 and left two sons, Ibrahim and Ahmed. His brother Salim, who had died earlier, left a son, Hamid. The cousins in this generation were at enmity. Hamid made a bid for the Sheikship on his uncle's death. He was one of several Hejazi Sheikhs who approached the Residency in Cairo in 1924, complaining both of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhābis. He came into greater prominence in 1928, when, having returned from Transjordan and taken to brigandage, he attempted a *coup* at Wejh, hoping to dislodge his cousin Ibrahim, who was Governor there and head of the tribe. After a further period of exile he came into still greater prominence in 1932 by invading the Hejaz at the head of a rebel band. He and two, it was said, of his sons were killed, but there may be survivors of this branch. At the outset of the revolt Ibrahim visited the King at the head of a loyal delegation. He is still head of the Billi tribe in the Hejaz, but the Governor of Wejh is now Ibn Mubārak (see No. 65A). The family have *attaches* with a section of the Billi established in Egypt.

81. *Rushdi Malhas.*

Was editor of the *Umm al Qura*, the more important of the two weekly newspapers published at Mecca and the unofficial organ of the Sa'ūdi Government, but no longer occupied post in 1936, though believed to be still connected with the newspaper. A Palestinian from Nablus. In 1937 or before was appointed Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan. The following year had a violent quarrel with his chief, Yusuf Yasin, but retained his position.

82. *Rushayd Pasha.*

Consul in Syria, stationed at Damascus. Born before 1887. A native of Hāil, said to be related to the Beni Rashīd and to 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Zeyd (*q.v.*). Was semi-official representative of Ibn Rashīd in Constantinople before the Great War. Said to have promoted Turkish efforts to curb the rise of Ibn Sa'ūd at that time. Was attached during the Great War to Jemāl Pasha in Syria, and was employed in Damascus, where he showed bitter hostility to the Hashimites. Retired to Constantinople after the fall of Damascus. Eventually made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd and returned to Sa'ūdi Arabia. Was selected in 1931 to be the first Sa'ūdi *Chargé d'Affaires* and consul-general at Bagdad, but has never proceeded, possibly because of difficulties over finance, aggravated by hostility on the part of 'Abdullah Suleymān. Showed signs about the end of 1932 of intending to leave for Bagdad overland, but is still in the Hejaz.

P.S.—Appointed consul at Damascus, instead of Bagdad, in May 1933, and left Jedda for his post on the 24th May.

83. *Muhammad Sadiq (or Siddiq).*

The King's chauffeur. An Indian or of Indian origin. Born in the Bombay Presidency, in or about 1898. Came with Ibn Sa'ūd from Riyādh in 1925; had been in his service since about 1924. He was probably introduced to King by either the Qusaibis or al-Fadhls. Worthy of mention in this strange country, not only because he is said to be the only chauffeur the King will trust, but because he has been concerned in buying transactions, which have carried him at least once as far as London. Quite a clever fellow and said to have amassed some

£20,000. Was recently reported to contemplate the creation of a canning industry at Wejh. Probably holds the speed record for Arabia, as he did the journey by car between Riyādh and Mecca in thirty-one hours a year or two ago, and is said to have reduced this recently to twenty odd. Some feat for a distance of about 600 miles over Arabian "roads."

84. *Salih ibn 'Abdul-Wahid.*

A man of no great standing, but who came to notice when Governor of Qāf. Had previously been Governor of Al-Ula, whence he was transferred to Qāf in 1931. Removed from Qāf in May 1936 and was succeeded there by Abdul Kerim ibn Zeyd (No. 101). At Qāf, as the nearest Saudi Governor to the Transjordan frontier, he proved himself an unpleasant neighbour. Probably identical with man of the same name whose appointment as Ibn Sa'ūd's representative with the Idrisi was announced in June 1927 and who played an important rôle in the Idrisi's entourage, *e.g.*, at the time of the negotiations regarding the Red Sea Petroleum Company's concession in the Farsan Islands.

85. *Salih Ibn Abu Bakr Shata.*

Born probably not later than 1890. Comes of a learned family in Mecca, where he was born. Much employed on committee for Waqfs, grain distribution, &c., under the Hashimite régime. Fled to Jedda after the Sa'ūdi capture of Taif. Was one of the Hejazi notables who compelled the abdication of King Huseyn in October 1924 and rallied in due course to Ibn Sa'ūd. Became one of two assistants to the Amir Faysal in his capacity as Viceroy. Spoken of in 1930 as a possible Minister of Education in a Cabinet then rumoured to be in contemplation, but, if the rumour was true, the project was not pursued. When the Cabinet was eventually organised on its present lines early in 1932 and the Amir Faysal was given the Ministry of the Interior, as well as others, Salih Shata was made his chief assistant in that Ministry. In 1936 was a member of the Legislative Assembly. Related to No. 110.

86. *Sdayri Family.*

Take their name from the district of Sdayr in Nejd. Are related to Ibn Sa'ūd through the fact that his mother was a Sdayri. He has, moreover, taken two wives from the family. Three members of the family have come to notice in recent years, viz.:—

(1) 'Abdullah as-Sdayri, Governor of Tebūk since about the beginning of 1931. Transferred early in 1936 to Medina (see No. 2).

(2) Turki as-Sdayri, appointed at the same time Governor of Jauf or Skaka to which the seat of government was transferred shortly before or after. Governor of Asir, with headquarters at Abha. Succeeded at Skaka by—

(3) 'Abdul-'Aziz as Sdayri, as Governor of Jauf-Skaka.

Little is known of No. (3), but (1) and (2) have been men of might in their setting.

87. *Sha'ibi Family.*

Important in Mecca as the Keepership of the Key of the Ka'aba is hereditary in the family. The prerogative is very lucrative because all persons entering the Ka'aba are supposed to make a present to the Keeper according to their means. The family are admittedly descendants of the Quraysh tribe, but not of the Prophet. It is claimed that the pedigree is continuous from pre-Islamic times and that the right to keep the key also dates from that early period. According to one story, there was a blot on the escutcheon in the 19th century, when the male descent failed and the succession passed through a lady of the family who married a slave. The late Keeper's physical appearance suggested that this might be true, but there is no proof of it. Another branch of the family, claiming similar descent, formerly lived in Tunis, but now resides in Mecca. The present Keeper of the Key is—

(1) Muhammad ash-Sha'ibi, an elderly man, probably the nephew of the late Keeper, who died in January 1934 and whom this relative was appointed to succeed.

(2) Abdullah ash-Sha'ibi, next in succession as Keeper of Key. Is member of the Legislative Assembly and has held numerous other important posts of an honorary nature. Highly respected.

The following two persons, who have come to notice in connexion with the activities of expatriated Hejazis against Ibn Sa'ūd, are not improbably members of one or other branch of this family:—

(3) *M. Huseyn Sha'iba*.—Accompanied Huseyn ad-Dabbāgh (*q.v.*) on his visit to India in 1927.

(4) *Hasan Sha'iba*.—Mentioned in reports from Aden as a Hejazi, who was in 1932 intimate with Huseyn ad-Dabbāgh, and had been a schoolmaster at Terim in Hadhramaut before coming from Mokalla to Aden in March 1932. If of sufficient age, he may possibly be identical with the man of the same name who was a member for Mecca of the Turkish Parliament for some years, fled from Constantinople to Mecca in 1916, and at first supported but afterwards turned against King Huseyn.

88. *Sherifian Family*.

Also called Hashimites by virtue of descent from the great-grandfather of the Prophet, but this name seems to be more particularly affected by the family of King Huseyn. There have been in the past and are in the present numerous families claiming this descent through one or other of the sons of 'Alī, the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet. There are in Arabia itself many individuals bearing the title of Sherif, which is held to imply descent from Hasan, the elder son of 'Alī, and whole clans known collectively as Ashrāf. The strains most conspicuous in the Hejaz trace this descent through an intermediate common ancestor Hasan ibn Abū Numey, who was Grand Sherif of Mecca in the latter part of the 16th century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important, viz:—

The Dhāwī Zeyd,
The Abadila, a particular branch of whom are the Dhāwī 'Aun, and
The Dhāwī Barakat.

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the 17th century were drawn from the rival Dhāwī Zeyd and Dhāwī 'Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former was 'Abdul-Mutallib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhāwī 'Aun, of whom came the late King Huseyn and his sons.

Although the most important members of the Sherifian family now live outside Sa'ūdi Arabia, their connexion with the Hejaz is so close as to justify this general notice. The following list, very incomplete, shows those who have come to notice in recent years:—

(A) *Dhāwī Zeyd*.

(1) *'Alī Haydar*.—Formerly resided in Constantinople. Worked in with the Young Turks and was at one time Minister of Auqaf. Appointed Grand Sherif to supersede King Huseyn in or about 1917, but was naturally unable to assume the post effectively. Sought early in 1926 for British support in obtaining post of Regent or Governor of Hejaz under Ibn Sa'ūd. Moved later that year to Beirut, where he died in 1934. Had several sons, the eldest of whom, Abdul-Majid, is married to a Turkish princess (who is not, however, as stated in the last Personalities Report, a daughter of the ex-Caliph Abdul Majid), and showed signs of political ambition after the Armistice. One of 'Alī Haydar's wives and the mother of two of his younger sons is of British birth. Yet another son studied at St. Andrew's and had the distinction of acting as best man at the marriage of a Scotch divine at St. Giles's Cathedral. Civilised people, important to keep in mind, though of no obvious political importance at present.

(2) *Ja'afar Haidar*, brother of the above. Also lived in Constantinople. If alive, may be identical with the elderly Sherif 'Alī Ja'far who lived at Lahej in 1932 and was described as a descendant of 'Abdul-Mutallib.

(3) *Sharaf Adnān Pasha al Ghālib as-Zeyd*.—Formerly frequented both Constantinople and the Hejaz. Spoken of in 1925 as a possible ruler of the Hejaz, if Ibn Sa'ūd won the war. Elected president of the Moslem Congress at Mecca in June 1926, and was later the vehicle of Ibn Sa'ūd's refusal to hold another owing to attitude of the 'Alī brothers. Represented Ibn Sa'ūd in 1927 at conference at Jizān to deal with the Red Sea Petroleum Company's concession in the Farsan Islands. Described in 1928 as "grizzled and doddering." Still resides in Mecca, but apparently a back number.

(4) *Sharaf Ridha*, usually called Sherif Sharaf *tout court*.—Appointed Acting Minister of Finance under Ibn Sa'ūd in January 1926. Resides in Mecca and is now a member of the Legislative Council. In 1936 appointed to be a member of the King's suite.

(5) *Khālid*.—A nephew of the 'Alī Ja'far mentioned at (2). Implicated in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ūd in 1932 and was active in and around Aden. Perhaps the same as Sherif Khālid Sadiq Adnān.

(B) *Dhāwī 'Aun*.

(6) *'Alī ibn 'Abdullah*.—Formerly Grand Sherif. Dismissed by the Turks in 1907. Resides in Egypt. Described in June 1932 as an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrār al Hijāzi.

(7) *'Alī ibn Huseyn*.—Ex-King of the Hejaz. Succeeded King Huseyn on his abdication in October 1924, but was compelled to abandon untenable position in Jeddah in December 1925. Resided mostly in Bagdad, where he died on the 13th February, 1935.

(8) *Faysal ibn Huseyn*.—King of 'Iraq. Died in 1934 and was succeeded by his son Ghazi.

(9) *'Abdullah ibn Huseyn*.—Amir of Transjordan.

(10) *Zeyd ibn Huseyn*.—Had a Turkish mother, a granddaughter of the well-known Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha, and has property interests quite distinct from those of his brothers. Born in Constantinople in 1900—formerly Iraqi Minister at Ankara. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935.

All these, except perhaps (10), have issue. So had King Huseyn's brother Nāsir, now deceased, who left six sons and four daughters.

(C) *Dhāwī Barakat*.

(11) *Sharaf ibn 'Abdul-Muhsin*.—Seems to have served King Huseyn in Egypt, but entered the service of Ibn Sa'ūd and became Amir-al-Arbān, or Director of Tribes. Appointed President of the Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930. Recently returned to Mecca from Egypt, but his present official status is not known, as the inspectorate is understood to have been abolished.

(D) *Apparently of the Abadila stock though not of the Dhāwī 'Aun*.

(12) *Shākir ibn Zeyd ibn Fawwāz*.—Formerly Governor of Taif, a post which seems to have been hereditary in his family. President of the Beduin Control Board in Transjordan and intimately associated with the Amir 'Abdullah, with whom he has thrown in his lot. Died at Amman in December 1934. Was a tenacious enemy of Ibn Sa'ūd and much less a play-boy than his master.

(13) *Hamūd ibn Zeyd*, brother of the preceding.—Lives quietly at Taif.

(14) *Sharaf ibn Rājih*, a cousin of (12) and (13).—Said to have also been Governor of Taif at one time. Now resides at Bagdad. Identified both in Jerusalem and Bagdad as being the Sherif Sharaf mentioned by Tāhir ad-Dabbāgh in February 1932, in a letter which fell into the hands of the Sa'ūdi Government, as a man who might be enlisted in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ūd.

(E) *Even less easy to place, but perhaps of the Abadila*.

(15) *'Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Mansūr*.—A younger member of a family, two of whom were prominent in King Huseyn's time and had great influence in the Harb tribe. This 'Alī has only come to notice as having been one of the persons arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyādh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932.

(16) *'Alī ibn Huseyn al Harithi*.—One of the Sherifs of Muda'iq, near Taif. Took part in the Arab revolt and is remembered as one of the conquerors of Damascus. Described by Colonel Lawrence as having been at that time an attractive young man, physically splendid and full of courage, resource and energy. Seems to have resettled in the Hejaz, as he was arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyādh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932.

(17) *Muhammad Mohanna*.—One of the Jeddah family, one member of which was Chief of the Controlling Department in 1917, and was then described as a

"bottle-nosed bandit," while his brother, still alive, was said to have acquired wealth by smuggling and general robbery. This Muhammad is only interesting because he was arrested at Jedda and sent to Riyādh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair.

(18) and (19) *M. 'Ali* and *Muhammad al-Bedeywi* (a corruption of Bedawi). Members of a family distantly related to King Huseyn and formerly important in the Juheyna tribe and in the coast towns of the Northern Hejaz. Despite the similarity of name, they would appear to be two distinct, though closely related, persons. Both were mixed up in the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932. *M. 'Ali* became an object of attention in Transjordan and was more or less arrested in July to the displeasure of the 'Amir. Muhammad seems to have been in trade at Suez and Dhaba and was concerned in attempts to get supplies by sea to Ibn Rifāda. It was probably he who was reported killed in the defeat of the rebels.

89. *Suleymān Shefiq Pasha Kemāly.*

Omitted, as he seems to have left Saudi Arabia for good. See Personalities report for 1933.

90. *Suwayt Family.*

Leaders in the Dhāfir tribe. Two members of it figured in reports from Kuwait about 1936:—

(1) *Ja'dān*, a disgruntled man, hovering between allegiance to King Faysal or to Ibn Sa'ūd and too proud to come to terms with either; and

(2) *'Ajemī*, recognised as chief of the tribe by Ibn Sa'ūd.

91. *M. Taufiq Bey Sherif.*

Syrian ex-officer in Turkish army, of remoter Yemeni origin. At one time secretary to Ahmed as-Senūsi. Later head of the divan of the 'Amir Faysal at Mecca. Figured as an 'Asiri delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926, and was appointed Secretary-General after an election hotly contested by the 'Ali brothers, who complained that 'Asir was not, in fact, represented and that Ibn Sa'ūd was packing the congress. Went to India later in that month to combat the 'Ali brothers and make propaganda for Ibn Sa'ūd. Floated in and out of the Hejaz in subsequent years and had hopes of great preferment with a mandate to reorganise the administration. Had very variable relations with Ibn Sa'ūd during this period. Finally broke with him so acutely that in June 1931 he decamped secretly in a pilgrim ship bound for India. The Sa'ūdi authorities accused him at that time of being concerned in a plot for circulating forged rupees on a large scale, but did not pursue the charge, which may have been trumped up. He later published violent attacks on the Sa'ūdi Administration. Has since ranged about in India and countries beyond the land frontier. Engages in trade as well as political adventure. Intelligent and active, but volatile; a superior type of adventurer, who might again make his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd and play a rôle in this country. Closely associated in the past with Mahmūd Nedim, former Turkish Vali of the Yemen, who seems to have gone to earth in Constantinople in his old age, after a long and curious post-war career; and with Ismail Ghuznavi (*q.v.*). May still be in touch with the latter, despite his breach with Ibn Sa'ūd. He had not returned to the Hejaz up to 1936, but, from reports received from India, left for Kashgar in (?) 1933, where he may have had contacts with Soviet representatives, returning to India in early 1935. Believed to have gone later to the Far East.

92. *Abu Tuqayqa Family.*

Formerly chiefs of the Tihāma, mainly Hejazi, section of the Huweytāt tribe, with an urban connexion at Dhaba. Rafī'a, their common ancestor, was chief of the tribe prior to his death in about 1870. One of his many grandsons, Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Rafī'a, was chief in 1917. He came to notice in 1924 as one of several Hejazi sheykhs who approached the Residency in Cairo with a complaint of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhābis. He appears to have been Governor of Dhaba in 1927, but in that year the family were apparently in serious trouble with the Government, as it is said that Ahmed and four others were "killed by Ibn Sa'ūd," and others fled to Egypt. Numerous members of the family were concerned in the rebel invasion of the Hejaz by Ibn Rifāda in 1932. Seven of them lost their lives in that adventure and five

more were reported by the Sa'ūdi commander to have been slain after Ibn Rifāda's defeat. Among the survivors was, however—

(1) *Muhammad ibn [?] Abdurrahim ibn Alwān ibn Rafī'a*, who was regarded as co-leader with Ibn Rifāda. He escaped, and after many vicissitudes left 'Aqaba for Egypt early in October 1932. May be the person against whom an exclusion order was made in Egypt rather later, but whose name is given as Muhammad bin Ahmed.

Another probable survivor is—

(2) *Mahmūd ibn Ahmed ibn Rafī'a*, who ratted on Ibn Rifāda early in the rebellion and tried to make his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd.

Although the above summary cannot be verified at all points, it is inserted in view of the obvious tenacity of the family hatred of Ibn Sa'ūd, and the survival of (1), who seems to have been an active leader and may crop up again.

93. *Turki ibn Madhi.*

Was in 1932 Inspector-General of 'Asir and was associated with Fahad ibn Zu'ayr in efforts to make Ibn Sa'ūd realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Identical with the person mis-named at the time 'Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Mahdi, who, with Abdul-Wahhāb Abu Malha and two chiefs of Asiri tribes, was sent on a mission to the Imām Yahya in June 1927. Took part in further negotiations with the Imām early in 1928. Would therefore appear to be one of Ibn Sa'ūd's experts in 'Asir and Yemen affairs. Accompanied Khalid al Qarqani and Hamad Suleyman on their fruitless mission to San'a in 1933, before the outbreak of the Sa'ūdi Yemen war.

94. *Weis, Leopold*, alias *M. Asadullah "Vyce."*

Now in Hyderabad.

95. *Yahya an Nasrī.*

Principal quarantine doctor at Jedda. A Syrian, like most doctors, now employed by the Sa'ūdi Government. Born probably about 1897. Studied in Constantinople and Beirut. Previously quarantine doctor at Yanbu'. Pleasant and well regarded by the Legation. Speaks Turkish and French. Was Sa'ūdi delegate to the meeting of the International Health Office, Paris, in October 1934.

96. *Yusuf Yasin, Shaikh.*

Probably born about 1898. A Syrian from Latakia, said by his enemies to be of Yezidi origin. Was at school in Jerusalem in 1917. Joined King Faisal at 'Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Huseyn in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir 'Abdullah at 'Amman, with whom he remained six months. Formed so low an opinion of the 'Amir that, according to his own account, he broke with Huseyn in consequence. Joined Ibn Sa'ūd in due course. Came to Mecca in 1924-25 and started the *Umm-al-Qura* newspaper. Figured as a Nejdī delegate at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Remained editor of the *Umm-al-Qura* for some years, but was also official Director of Publicity. Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928. Acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in absence of Dr. 'Abdullah Damlūji in 1926 and 1927. Reported in 1928 to have worked to undermine influence both of Damlūji, who resigned that year, and of Hāfiz Wahba (*q.v.*). Employed in various negotiations and again acted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for Fuad Hamza early in 1931, and for the 'Amir Faysal and Fuad as well in 1932, but has for some years been principally important as a personal secretary to the King, who made him head of the political section of his diwān in 1930, and whom he always accompanies. Was intermittently in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, during the absences of Fuad Hamza, in 1934, 1935 and 1936. Went to Bagdad at the end of 1935 to negotiate the Sa'ūdi-Iraq Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. Was notorious for his obstructiveness during the Clayton negotiations, and is naturally obstinate and hair-splitting in discussion, but can on occasion be amiable and even conciliatory. Takes his cue, in fact, from the King himself, to whom he appears to be genuinely devoted, and who probably trusts him as much as any of his near advisers except 'Abdullah Suleymān. Is probably a more convinced Wahhābi than most of the King's alien entourage and is also a strong Arab nationalist, with fewer ulterior motives than Fuad Hamza, having a simpler character and less European knowledge. Has th

eyes of a fanatic. Works very hard. Though a very useful factotum to the King, is rather a butt in high circles. A facile and sometimes intemperate writer, still responsible for contributions to the *Umm-al-Qura*. Speaks only Arabic well, but can manage a little English.

97. *Zawāwī Family.*

A Mecca family, worth mentioning because one of them, viz., *Yusuf 'Alī az-Zawāwī*, appears to have been concerned at Cairo in 1932 in plots against Ibn Sa'ūd; and because this or another Zawāwī may have been in reality the person who went to France in the summer to buy arms for the conspirators. The man who went to buy the arms was first described as being Muhammad Pasha az-Zawī [sic], and was afterwards identified at Aden as being Hamid Pasha al-Wādī, then head of the Amir 'Abdullah's diwān. It is difficult to reconcile this with what is known of Hamid Pasha al-Wādī's movements about that time. Anyhow, whoever went to buy the arms, whether Zāwī, Zawāwī or Wādī, was associated with another person, 'Abdul-Qādir Hamad ba-Hamid, and the names may have got mixed up.

98. *'Abdul-Latif 'Abdul-Jalil.*

Comes from Kuwait, where he held the post of Director of Customs, and was given the Indian title of Khan Bahadur. In 1930 or 1931, however, he vacated his post under a cloud. Has since moved about a good deal in Middle Eastern countries, including Sa'ūdi Arabia, and has attracted attention in Bagdad, Tehran and elsewhere by representing himself as empowered by Ibn Sa'ūd to engage in purchases and to promote various schemes, e.g., an overland pilgrim route to Mecca, oil concessions, &c. May have some general authority from Ibn Sa'ūd for his activities, and is therefore worth mentioning, but he is not known in Sa'ūdi Arabia itself as a man of real influence or importance. Not heard of since these adventures. Probably of no account from a Sa'ūdi point of view.

99. *Hamad ibn Shuway'ir.* (Deceased.)

100. *Muhammad Surūr as-Sabbān.*

Administrator of the Finance Department. Son of a slave of the Sabbān family (mother stated to have been Abyssinian), and became the moving spirit in their hide and skin business, which was at one time important, but became latterly bankrupt. Was a clerk in the municipality under King Huseyn, and is said to have tried to assassinate Ibn Sa'ūd when he conquered the Hejaz in 1925, and to have been subsequently incarcerated at Riyādh. Returned to the Hejaz about 1929 and was taken up by the Minister of Finance, whose powerful influence got him appointed about two years ago to his present post. Is nowadays second only to him in the Ministry of Finance in practical importance, and during the latter's absence at Hudeyda in May 1934 was in effective control of it. Manager of recently formed Arabian Export Company, a corporation formed to promote the export trade of the country. Continues to have great influence and to be much concerned in commercial enterprises. Reported in 1936 to have a great following in official circles. Pleasant, generous and said to be most capable. Has a younger brother, 'Abdullah, who is not, however, of any importance. By 1939 Muhammad Surūr had lost all influence, and was kept strictly to the limits of his post as head of the Accounts Branch of the Ministry of Finance.

101. *'Abdul Kerīm ibn Zeyd.*

Appointed Governor of Qaf in 1936 in succession to Salih 'Abdul Wahid (No. 84). Nephew of 'Abdul-Aziz ibn Zeyd (No. 6).

102. *'Abdullah Khawaitir.*

Of Nejdī origin. Born about 1887. Intimate of 'Abdullah Suleyman and Hamad Suleyman with whom he spent many years in Bombay. Head of a section of the Ministry of Finance and may be a coming man. Is spoken of as a rival to Muhammad Surūr (No. 100).

103. *Asaf ibn Huseyn.*

Appointed Governor of Najrān and the "territories of Yam" in 1934, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif with the Yemen. Had previously been Governor of Rus.

104. *Aziz Bey (Bagdadī).*

Of Iraqi origin. Born not later than 1887. Joined the Arab revolt during the war, after having been taken prisoner by the Allies. Held a subordinate military post at Taif at the time of the Wahabi invasion of the Hejaz. After fall of Taif was one of the first to join Ibn Sa'ūd. Held appointments as O.C. Artillery and Superintendent of Mecca Police subsequently, but was dismissed and was unemployed for many years. Recently appointed to succeed Tahsin Bey (q.v.) as Commander of the Mecca garrison.

105. *Ibrahim Shura.*

Egyptian. Born about 1897. Came to the Hejaz in about 1928 as a teacher. Appointed head of the Education Department at Mecca in 1930. Friendly with Sheykh Hafiz Wahba. Amiable but unimpressive. Has a smattering of English. In 1936 appointed head of the Sa'ūdi Pilgrimage Propaganda Bureau at Mecca.

106. *Jamil Daūd al Musallimi.*

Legal adviser, or assistant, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1906. A Hejazi trained in Egypt. Slight knowledge of English. Received his present appointment *vice* 'Id Rawwaf (No. 52) in January 1936. This was notable chiefly as a Hejazi encroachment on what has been for some time almost a Syrian preserve, and was attributed to the influence of Amir Feysal. Jamil Daūd is brother of a pilgrim guide whose activities have come to the unfavourable notice of the Legation.

107. *Kāmil al Qassāb.*

Syrian. Born about 1875. Formerly Acting Director of Education in the Hejaz under King Huseyn. Later threw in his lot with Ibn Sa'ūd and became Sa'ūdi propagandist. Prominent in 1936 during troubles in Palestine on account of his activities as Ibn Sa'ūd's go-between with the Supreme Arab Committee at Jerusalem, where he went from Egypt when charged with communications from Ibn Sa'ūd. Paid an unobtrusive visit in summer of 1936 to the Hejaz, and in 1937 tried to persuade Ibn Sa'ūd to take part in a Moslem conference on Palestine.

108. *Khairuddin Zarakli.*

Syrian journalist. Born about 1880. Editor of *Al Qibla*, Mecca newspaper, official organ of King Huseyn for some years. Later was Hashimite propagandist in Egypt. Go-between between King Ali and Ibn Sa'ūd. Later joined the latter. Adviser to the Sa'ūdi Agency in Cairo in 1935.

109. *Muhammad Sādiq ibn 'Abdullah.*

Born in Hejaz about 1888. In 1920 was principal of the Military School at Mecca. Was Commandant of the Jedda garrison during last days of King Ali. Left for Egypt in 1927.

An associate of Tāhir ad-Dabbāgh in anti-Sa'ūdi activities abroad. At instance of Sa'ūdi authorities was required to leave India in 1933. Subsequently travelled in 'Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. Returned with Tāhir to Saudi Arabia under the amnesty of 1935 and in 1936 was made successively Assistant Director of Auqāf and Director of the Census. Reported to be a man of integrity.

110. *Seyyid Muhammad Shata.*

Younger brother of Sālih ibn Abu Bakr Shata (No. 85). Born about 1908. Holder of an Egyptian degree in religious law. Inspector in the Ministry of Education. In 1935 member of an unofficial delegation for the collection of Waqf moneys in various Islamic countries and India, which did not, however, leave this country. In 1936 appointed Inspector of Sharia Courts.

111. *Muhsin At Tayyeb.*

Moroccan by origin. Born about 1887. Held police appointments under the Hashimite régime. Under Ibn Sa'ūd he was similarly employed. Promoted at the beginning of 1936 from a post in the Sa'ūdi police to be secretary and A.D.C. to the Deputy Minister for Defence.

112. *Najib Ibrahim Sālhā.*

A young man of Syrian origin, educated at the American College, Beirut. Born probably about 1902. Came in 1927 to the Hejaz via the Sudan, where employed for a short time by Gellatly, Hankey and Company (Sudan) (Limited).

After a short but troubled period of service with that firm in Jedda, he entered the Ministry of Finance. Speaking English well and of pleasant manners, he made himself useful to the Minister of Finance, whose secretary he became. In 1936 placed in charge of a newly created department of the Ministry of Finance, styled the "Office of Public Works," established to deal with the growing number of foreign concerns holding concessions in Sa'udi Arabia. By 1939 he had established himself in the confidence of Abdullah Sulaiman to the detriment of Muhammad Surur, was employed as purchasing agent for the Government, and was enriching himself almost openly by bribery and commissions.

113. *Sa'ud ibn 'Abdullah ibn Juluwi.*

Appointed Governor of Hasa upon the death of his father (No. 9 in the 1934 Personalities Report) in October 1935. Born about 1900. Made an unfavourable general impression on Sir Andrew Ryan, who was received by the new Amir at Hofuf with a singular lack of ordinary Arab politeness, in December 1935. Described as repulsive in appearance owing to a super-squint. Reported from Bahrein to take an even stronger line with the Bedouin than his father did, and that much of the father's work in the last four years of his life was, in fact, done by the son. Shows nervousness in the presence of foreigners, but this can be overcome. In 1938 it was reported that his powers were being curtailed by the King, and that troops not under his control were to be quartered at Hofuf.

114. *Sa'ud ibn Hedhlul.*

Appointed Governor of Tabuk in 1936 in succession to 'Abdullah as-Sdayri (No. 86 (1)). Reported from Transjordan to have made a popular start, partly by recruiting his bodyguard locally, a departure which created a favourable impression.

115. *Tahsin Bey.*

A Turk, originally an officer in the Turkish army. Born about 1887. Appointed Superintendent of Jedda Police on the occupation of the Hejaz by Ibn Sa'ud. Reported to have been too friendly with Soviet and Turkish representatives here, which led to his dismissal. After many years of unemployment was appointed Commandant of Mecca garrison. Later, on the creation of a Ministry of Defence was given the post of principal secretary to the Deputy Minister, Sheykh 'Abdullah Suleyman, being succeeded in his command by Aziz Bey (*q.v.*). In 1938 was said to have a small command in Mecca.

116. *Tahsin al-Saqqaf.*

Ex-slave of the Al Saqqaf family of East Indian connexions, by whom he has been left well-off. Is reported to be dissolute, lavish in hospitality, able and much frequented. Is said to be intimate with Dhafir, the intriguing interpreter of the Italian Legation.

117. *Tala'at Wafa'.*

Born about 1900 in the Hejaz. In 1934 member of Sa'udi boundary commission for the Yemen-Sa'udi frontier after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif. Police official of importance, being Director for the Provinces of Asir and Najran, and O.C. regular forces in Najran and Abha in 1936.

118. *'Ajaji Family.*

Merchants of Bahrein origin, living in Hasa (Hofuf), where they own much land, engage in trade, and enjoy the friendship of the Amir ibn Juluwi. There are at least three brothers in Hofuf and some in Bahrein.

119. *Asad al Faqih.*

A young Syrian. Counsellor to the Saudi Legation in Bagdad in 1938.

120. *Khalil Hajjan.*

Director of Police, Jedda. Formerly in Turkish army. Captured by the British during the Great War, but volunteered to join the Sharifian forces. Joined Ibn Sa'ud after the fall of Jedda in 1925. A heavy drinker.

121. *Khuraiji, Shaikh Muhammad al-*

Brother-in-law to Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, to whose influence is attributed the fact that he has become the wealthiest man in Medina.

122. *Mazru', Abdullah al-*

A journalist attached to the *Saut al Hijaz*, but travels much in Arab countries and writes articles, sometimes obvious Saudi propaganda, for various Arabic papers. A venomous article attacking the administration in Bahrein which appeared anonymously in an Egyptian paper in 1937 was traced to him.

123. *Qasim Bey (Casimir Moqadich).*

A Croat from Zagreb who came to the Hejaz as a political refugee about 1929, became a Moslem and married a Turkish wife. Worked with the German firm of de Haas and with Khalid al Qarqani, and is believed to be supported by the latter. Receives regular supplies of German books and papers, and appears to be pro-German. Incurred displeasure of Jedda authorities in 1939 for drunken and disorderly behaviour. Credibly reported to have said that he would return to his own country (and religion) if he could secure a pardon for his past revolutionary activities.

124. *Sa'd ibn Faisal.*

Governor of Duwadmi, 1938. Born about 1898. Son of a Royal slave.

125. *Sa'dun, Abdullah.*

A member of the well-known Muntafiq family. Born perhaps 1890 or rather before. A fanatic who claims to have left Iraq to live in Riyadh for religious reasons. A hanger-on of the Royal family, but seems to enjoy little consideration. Reputed to be anti-British.

126. *Shaikh al Ard.*

Family names of two young Syrians, brothers. The elder, Midhat, is doctor to the ladies of the Royal family. The younger, Fakhri, describes himself as an agricultural expert. Both talk French.

127. *Shaikh, Muhammad.*

One of the numerous young Syrians in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Accompanied the Amir Saud to the United Kingdom in 1935 for the Silver Jubilee. Sent to the Yemen in 1937 to sign various agreements on behalf of the Saudi Government. Talks French.

128. *Yusuf ibn Abdullah al Faudhan.*

Lives in Bombay, where he acts as unofficial agent for Ibn Sa'ud.

Obituary.

(Died since the last report—January 1937.)

29 (1). Ba-Naja, 'Abdul Rahman.

[E 4382/301/25]

No. 2.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 96. Confidential.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him the annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

Jedda, June 4, 1939.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda.

(Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from earlier reports.)

Belgium.

*Colonel Ibrahim Depui, an Islamised French officer (retired), was appointed honorary Belgian consul in Jedda by a Royal decree of the 30th January, 1935. He was already well known here, having been attached to the French Military Mission at Jedda during the war, and later employed as French Vice-Consul at Jedda, where he was distrusted and disliked by his successive chiefs, by the Shereefian authorities, and by all his colleagues. After vacating that post he paid frequent visits to the Hejaz, and was supposed to be interested in commercial schemes. He appeared to be a free-lance, though he was not placed on the retired list until September 1934. His formal appointment as Belgian Consul was made after he had failed in an attempt to assert a right to the post on the ground that, when he was acting French Consul on one occasion, the Belgian Government had appointed him Belgian Consul by name, and that they had never revoked the appointment. He left soon after his appointment, and has been back only for a few weeks on two occasions. During his long absences Belgian interests are in the hands of the honorary consul for Czecho-Slovakia. Depui poses as a man of mystery, but he is a ridiculous liar and, fortunately, too futile to be dangerous. A distinguished French general told the present writer that he had twice turned Depui out of Syria as an undesirable adventurer, but had found him in the country a third time, so he may have influence of some doubtful kind. He has revived an impertinence which he had to use with discretion in Shereefian times, that of describing himself as "Shereef." How a Frenchman who becomes a Moslem becomes also a descendant of the Prophet has never been explained. It is entertaining to see the assumption of this title was consecrated by its use in the exequatur of the Saudi Government. The best explanation of this that can be obtained is that in the religious democracy of the Wahhabis shereefs are of no more account than any other men, and that it is a matter of indifference to Ibn Saud whether persons using the title have a right to it or not.

In 1936 M. Depui concluded a commercial treaty on behalf of the Belgian Government with the King of the Yemen. He states that he is authorised to negotiate a similar treaty with Saudi Arabia, and to that end describes himself as Envoy Plenipotentiary on his cards. (Written in 1938.)

France.

M. P. A. Ballereau was transferred to Jedda as minister in November 1938, after eight years as consul-general in Singapore. He began his career in Morocco, where he spent many years, and later he was chargé d'affaires at Tehran. He speaks with great pleasure of his term of service in Singapore and with appreciation of his treatment by the British there. Seems to be genuinely anxious to co-operate with the British Legation, in which he is a pleasing contrast to his secretive predecessor. He talks English, rather unwillingly; his wife, who has English connexions, speaks English well.

M. Ballereau is the type of Frenchman for whom "Gringoire" caters in politics. He is energetic and business-like, but he is inclined to talk too much, in an effort to be convincing, and to utter indiscretions.

Iraq.

Ever since, in August 1938, Saudi Arabia appointed a minister at Bagdad, it has been expected that an Iraqi Minister would be appointed at Jedda, but the legation is still in the charge of Saiyid Thabit 'Abdul 'Aziz 'Abdul Nur (No. 88 in Iraq "Personalities," 1934), who took over in January 1938. S. Thabit, who is of Christian origin, is a strong supporter of Islam, though perhaps rather on political than on religious ground. As one of the band of ex-Turkish officers who fought with Faisal against the Turks he is naturally a pan-Arab, and his attacks on the Palestine policy of His Majesty's Government (before the white paper of June 1939), though intelligible, were often very indiscreet. Professes to admire Ibn Saud personally, but has a great contempt for the ways of Saudi Arabia, which he would like to modernise. A keen supporter of various abortive plans by which Iraq tried to hustle Saudi Arabia. An interesting man, with a real

enthusiasm for Islamic studies, but not sensible. He seems to have quarrelled with all four of the young men who have been members of his staff in Jedda. They have spoken of him openly with dislike and distrust, though, given the Iraqi character, it does not follow that he deserves all the criticisms passed on him.

Saiyid Thabit, who is accredited to the Imam also, went there in November 1938 for a month or two, but stayed there seven months, despite orders to return to Jedda, if we are to believe the secretary who was acting for him.

At the time of writing Saiyid Thabit is about to go on leave. According to his secretary, he is being removed from his post and will not return to Jedda.

Italy.

*Gr. Uff. Luigi Sillitti presented his credentials as minister on the 13th March, 1937. Most of his working life has been passed in the United States, where he held various consular posts. Came to Jedda from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Educated partly at Grenoble, and speaks good French as well as good English. Had no experience of the East before his appointment to Jedda.

M. Sillitti takes great pains to be agreeable to us. This was particularly marked after Coronation Day, when official instructions obliged him to stay away from the receptions at His Majesty's Legation. He is a clubbable little man and fond of society of the "regular guy" sort. Is naturally a member of the Fascist party, but has been known to protest humorously against the extra taxation he has to bear as a bachelor, and even to say that he does not believe in trying to force a régime suitable to one country on another, though he seems to be becoming more orthodox or more discreet in his spoken views.

M. Sillitti is about 55 years of age. (Written in 1938.)

Netherlands.

Dr. H. H. Dingemans, who served in Jedda for a month or two as counsellor early in 1939, is to become chargé d'affaires on return from leave in September. Like all his predecessors, he is a member of the Netherlands East Indies civil service. A quiet, agreeable man, with a taste for languages and music. Appears sincere and straightforward, but less able and vigorous than the Netherlands representative in Jedda is as a rule.

Turkey.

M. Sadullah Gören was appointed chargé d'affaires in January 1938. Among the posts at which he has served are London (where he learned little or no English), Tehran and Kabul. Amiable, but not very intelligent, and with the narrowest possible range of interests. The only thing that stirs his rather sluggish character is a party—given by someone else; and bridge. Although modern in outlook, he possesses to the full the Old Turk capacity for doing nothing whatever, and that suits his present post admirably.

*Representatives accredited to other Governments and resident elsewhere.**Afghanistan.*

Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujaddidi, who has for some years been Minister to Jedda, is now Minister to Egypt too. He lives in Egypt, and only comes to Jedda for a short period for the pilgrimage.

Egypt.

Abdul Rahman Bey Azzam. Is also Minister at Bagdad.

Germany.

Dr. Grobba, Minister at Bagdad, presented his credentials as Minister to Saudi Arabia in February 1939.

Iran.

The Iranian Minister in Egypt, Ali Akbar Bahman, is Minister to Saudi Arabia also.

Posts suppressed since the Report of February 1938.

Soviet Legation. Closed September 1938.

Czecho-Slovak Consulate (honorary). Closed March 1939.

[E 4739/1809/25]

No. 3.

Treaty concerning Tribal Nationality between Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

[Not ratified.]

[In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!]

HIS Majesty the King of Iraq and His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, desirous of effecting a final settlement of the problem of their respective tribes who migrated from their original home into the territories of the other State;

Have decided to conclude a treaty for that purpose, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

His Excellency Saiyid Taufiq-al-Suwaidi, Foreign Minister;

His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

His Excellency Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Private Secretary to His Majesty the King and head of the Diplomatic Section at His Majesty's Diwan;

Who, having exchanged their powers, found in good order, agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The Iraqi Government agree that members of the Dahamsha and Dhafir tribes resident in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be considered to have acquired the nationality of the said kingdom unless they return to Iraq within six months from being notified that their continued residence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will have the effect of depriving them of their Iraqi nationality.

ARTICLE 2.

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia agree that members of the Shammar Najd tribe resident in Iraq shall be considered to have acquired Iraqi nationality unless they return to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia within six months from being notified that their continued residence in Iraq will have the effect of depriving them of the nationality of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

ARTICLE 3.

The Governments of Iraq and Saudi Arabia agree not to employ for service on the frontier any individual whose nationality has been changed under articles 1 and 2 of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 4.

(a) The Iraqi Government undertake to compel members of the Shammar Najd tribe who choose Iraqi nationality to reside beyond the Euphrates or in localities as far from the frontier as the Euphrates; and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia likewise undertake to compel members of the Dhafir tribe who choose Arab Saudi nationality to reside beyond the Dahna or in localities as far from the frontier as the Dahna.

In the event of drought in these regions, the Iraqi Government and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia undertake, the former in regard to members of the Shammar Najd tribe and the latter in regard to members of the Dhafir tribe, both dealt with above, to adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent members of the said tribes approaching the frontier and to keep them at such distance therefrom as will prevent the possibility of their undertaking any activities disturbing the peace of the frontier.

(b) The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia further undertake to prevent members of the Dahamsha tribe who opt for Arab Saudi nationality from undertaking any act liable to disturb the peace on the frontier.

ARTICLE 5.

The present treaty shall come into force from the date of exchange of the instruments of its ratification.

Done at Bagdad this 24th day of the month of Rabi'-al-Awwal, 1357, A.H., corresponding to the 24th day of the month of May, 1938, A.D.

[E 4769/177/25]

No. 4.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 100.)

My Lord,

Jedda, June 18, 1939.

THE impression which I had the honour to report to you in my telegram No. 72, dated the 3rd June, that his Highness the Amir Faisal would like to see me at Taif, was borne out when I saw his Highness, who wished to deliver to me the letter from Ibn Saud which I summarised in my telegram No. 1 from Taif, dated the 13th June, and also to talk to me on the same subject, viz., the attempt of Iraq to secure a leading position in the Arab world at the expense of Ibn Saud. The Amir also spoke about Palestine (see my telegram No. 78 dated the 17th June), and several other subjects of smaller importance were likewise discussed.

2. In spite of the fact that his Highness has been Minister for Foreign Affairs during the whole of my time here as Minister, this was the first occasion on which I had been able to talk business with him. Hitherto, there had always been someone like Fuad or Yasin at hand, reporting to Ibn Saud direct rather than to the Amir Faisal. I was agreeably surprised by the readiness with which his Highness replied to considerations which I put forward. Perhaps the part he played in the London discussions has given him greater self-confidence, or the soundings taken by the French High Commissioner in Syria about a possible Saudi candidate for the Syrian Throne have awakened him from the lethargy in which he usually seems to be plunged.

3. His Highness spoke with high appreciation of the treatment which he had received in London, and with admiration and gratitude (if I may be allowed to mention this) of the patience and sympathy with which Mr. Malcolm MacDonald has presided over the Palestine discussions.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 4934/177/25]

No. 5.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 113.)

My Lord,

Jedda, June 27, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herein copies in translation of two messages from His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal which were communicated to me to-day by the Qaimmaqam of Jedda. The one of them which is dated to-day evidently refers to the other, which is dated the 22nd June, and which gives the text of a message to the Italian Minister at Jedda. Signor Sillitti is requested to induce the Bari broadcasting station to confine itself to correct news about this country. I imagine that the message to Dr. Grobba, referred to in the later enclosure, was sent to Bagdad on the date of the earlier.

2. I thanked his Excellency the Qaimmaqam warmly for these two communications, in which I said I knew your Lordship would be very interested.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

Telegraphic Message received from His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 4th Jumad-al-Awwal, 1358 (June 22, 1939), and communicated to the Italian Minister at Jedda on the Same Day.

(Translation.)

THE friendly relations existing between us and Italy make it necessary for us to be frank in all matters concerning our two countries. The Italian Government are aware of our general political position, and of our attitude towards the present European dispute. We, as far as possible, wish to avoid interfering in this dispute. It has happened that certain news has been broadcast from Italy and Germany concerning certain events such as the visit of Ibn-al-Waleed (Khalid Garqani) to Germany and the visit of Sir Bullard to the Amir Faisal at Taif. The two broadcasting stations have taken advantage of these two events to make propaganda against Great Britain. We, as the Italian Government are aware, wish to remain on friendly terms with all parties and have no wish to have our position exploited by one party against the other. We request, therefore, that this observation may be brought to the notice of the Broadcasting Administration in Italy so that only correct news may be broadcast about this country and so that we may not be compelled to issue a denial of the news broadcast in such cases.

9th Jumad-al-Awwal, 1358.
(June 27, 1939.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

Message from the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, communicated to the British Legation through the Qaimmaqam, Jedda.

(Translation.)

MESSAGE from His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, concerning the news which has been broadcast by Italy about us and the relations between us and the British Government. We have instructed our representative at Bagdad to speak to Dr. Grobba in the same sense, and have made the request that, in view of the friendly relations between us and Great Britain, they (i.e., the German Government) should not take us as a means for making propaganda against Great Britain. Their praise of us in the course of their anti-British propaganda does not please us; we have no desire to hear it. We have requested them to refrain from such propaganda and we give this news for the confidential information of the British Government in accordance with the friendship existing between us and Britain.

Tuesday, 9th Jumad-al-Awwal, 1358.
(June 27, 1939.)

[E 5081/1809/25]

No. 6.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, July 15, 1939.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed me that the result of discussions with Iraqi delegation was as follows:—

- (1) General discussions concerning existing obligations.
- (2) Agreement on frontier dispute concerning section between Al Awja and Inazeh.
- (3) Agreement concerning looted property: future cases to be settled by local officials.
- (4) Agreement as to ratification of the agreement concerning tribal nationality, the neutral zone and grazing questions.

(5) Nationality, wireless, postal questions, &c.

(6) Agreement to conclude a defensive military pact. Iraq Government will, in the first place, accept Saudis for military training and will send instructors to train Saudi army.

(7) Discussion on necessity for co-operation and unification policy towards Arabian matters in general and Syria and Palestine in particular.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 12, Saving.)

[E 4955/394/25]

No. 7.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Trott (Jedda).

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 22, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 79 [of 18th June: Armaments credits for Saudi Arabia].

It is impossible to guarantee that war-time ammunition is serviceable or undamaged, and the price of 16s. per thousand, which compares with £5 per thousand for new ammunition, takes into account the fact that a considerable proportion of war-time ammunition must necessarily have deteriorated. As a result of further consideration, I feel it would probably be better if Saudi Arabian Government were to purchase new ammunition, as I would not wish them to have cause to complain of condition of war-time ammunition, and no other ammunition is available from stock.

2. B.S.A. can supply rifles, if ordered through War Office, at a cost of £8 5s. each or £8 10s. ready packed at the works. This would mean that the Saudi Government would receive about 1,000 rifles for the £10,000 credit. 1,000 rounds of ammunition per rifle for 1,000 rifles would cost £5,500.

3. I will telegraph further regarding interest which it is proposed to charge for credits. Question of charging a uniform rate of interest for all armaments credits granted to foreign Governments is at present under consideration.

[E 5392/246/25]

No. 8.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 122.)

My Lord,

Jedda, July 18, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a record of a conversation which I had from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin this morning. The sheikh reached Taif a few days ago, just in time to greet the French Minister when he arrived on a two days' visit beginning on the 11th July. I had already heard from M. Ballereau that he had had important conversations at Taif with His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. The latter arrived in Jedda last night and requested me to call on him this morning.

2. The sheikh's statement, which was evidently communicated to me by express command of the King, shows how deeply His Majesty feels on two main points, viz., the Turkish menace to Arab independence, and the proposal to place a member of the Hashimite family on the Throne of Syria. M. Ballereau himself told me how keenly he appreciated the King's point of view on both these subjects and how he would use every effort to convince the French Government that it was essential to satisfy His Majesty about them both. As for the Turkish menace, M. Ballereau spoke bitterly of recent Turkish broadcasts, which had referred to the Hatay Agreement as something which merely returned to Turkey what had been hers all the time and had emphasised that there was no question of the Turks being grateful to the French for this correction of an obvious injustice. The French Minister proposed to speak to his Turkish colleague with a view to arranging that the Turkish broadcasting service should at any rate cease harping on this particular note, which gave great offence to many local listeners. As for the Throne of Syria, M. Ballereau had told me that he

had explained that that question had merely reached the stage of a series of vague proposals, which had originated with M. Puaux himself. He did not tell me that he had told the Amir that he personally (M. Ballereau) regarded the Amir Feisal as the ideal candidate. No doubt the King would like His Majesty's Government to be equally complimentary; the only comment I made on this question was to express hearty agreement when the sheikh said that whoever sat on the Throne of Syria would shoulder a heavy burden.

3. I have reported separately on the subject of arms. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin told me that he had not told M. Ballereau that the German Government had opened a credit of half a million pounds sterling for the purchase of arms nor that they had presented to the Saudi Arabian Government 4,000 rifles and 8 million rounds of ammunition. The conversation with M. Ballereau at Taif, however, turned on the subject of arms owing to the French Minister's enquiry concerning the activities of Khalid-al-Hud. It was M. Ballereau who first suggested that the French Government might well supply such munitions as guns, machine guns and tanks.

4. I also heard from M. Ballereau that some details of the letter sent by the King to Nuri Pasha Al Said early this year were given to him.

5. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin proposed to stay in Jedda for some days, and expressed the hope that a reply from His Majesty's Government giving their comments and advice might arrive before he had to return to Riyadh. I pointed out that such matters take a considerable time to consider. The sheikh said that the King was always glad to have the advice of His Majesty's Government; and that His Majesty also thought that His Majesty's Government might like to communicate what he had said, in some way best known to themselves, to the French Government.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch with the enclosure to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo and Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.
A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Record of Conversations between M. Ballereau, French Minister at Jedda, and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and the Amir Feisal.—(Communicated by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to Mr. Trott at Jedda on July 18, 1939.)

IBN SAUD realised that it was extremely important that the relations between the French and the British Governments should be close and cordial. Their own interests prompted this policy. It was therefore to be hoped that both the British and the French would be friendly with all the Arab nations, especially with those which border or are very close to Saudi Arabia; in fact, with Syria and Palestine. Ibn Saud has therefore done his best confidentially to help to settle the question of Syria and Palestine in an amicable way. For instance, he sent his letter to Nuri Pasha Al Said.

But the Saudi action was conditioned by four main principles:—

- (a) Ibn Saud did not wish to intervene in the Syrian dispute in any way.
- (b) But, if he felt in danger, he would feel obliged to change his attitude.
- (c) There were two events which would make him feel in danger:—

(1) If the Turks penetrated any further into the Arab countries, Ibn Saud would regard that as a threat to his independence.

(2) If the Throne of Syria was granted to a member of the Hashimite family, and still more if it was granted to the Amir Abdullah, he would consider that a hostile act and a threat to his independence.

(M. Ballereau, in reply to point (1), said that the recent treaty about Hatay had no clauses other than those which were well known; there were no other conditions or engagements about further acquisitions of territory by Turkey. As for (2), he said that it was not possible to appoint the Amir Abdullah to the throne; and that he would make sure on this point by referring to his Government for their confirmation.)

(d) Ibn Saud realised that it was to the interests of the British and the French Governments to have a peaceful state of affairs in Syria and Palestine, especially with the present situation in Europe, and Ibn Saud was prepared to co-operate to that end, and to help as far as he could to settle the Syrian question on the basis of securing French interests and protecting those of the Syrians. Trouble in Syria had repercussions in Saudi Arabia, and for that reason Ibn Saud wanted to help towards a just solution.

M. Ballereau spoke at some length about the Throne of Syria. He pointed out that the idea originated with the High Commissioner, who made certain tentative enquiries in a vague way. The personal opinion of M. Ballereau was that the best candidate for the Throne of Syria was the Amir Feisal. He knew that that was also the view of M. Puaux, and of several other prominent personages in the Government of Syria. There were, however, other opinions; some took the view that the appointment of the Amir Feisal would be unacceptable to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, because in that case the rule of King Ibn Saud would gradually extend to Transjordan and Palestine. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin did not know whether what M. Ballereau said on this point was true or not. But he was authorised to say that, if it would help towards a general settlement in Syria to have the Amir Feisal on the throne, Ibn Saud would accept that solution, though he knew that such an extension of his responsibilities would be a heavy burden.

Sheikh Yusuf Yasin told M. Ballereau that the King quite saw how essential it was from the French point of view that an agreement should be reached with Turkey so as to settle the question of the northern neighbours of Syria. The King could not help saying that as an Arab he had no confidence whatever in any treaty or other engagement signed by the Turks, who would attack Syria and Iraq to-morrow if they felt that there was any chance of success owing to any weakening by France or Britain. It was not that the Arabs hated the Turks. They wanted to live in amity and in neighbourly relations with them. But they felt that the Turks were not to be trusted, and the Saudi Government welcomed any help in securing the Arab territories from aggression by the Turks. Ibn Saud was able to assure M. Ballereau that, if the Syrian question were settled to the satisfaction of the Syrians, he would be willing to support the French in resisting any Turkish attack.

Sheikh Yusuf Yasin wished M. Ballereau to know that a Syrian named Adil Adhmi, a brother of Nabih Adhmi, who had been an important member of Jamil Mardam's Government, was now in Riyadh. The King was giving him good advice about the advisability of keeping order in Syria.

[E 4739/1809/25]

No. 9.

Agreement concerning the Administration of the Neutral Zone between Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

[Ratified by the Iraqi Parliament, August 2, 1939.]

[In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!]

HIS Majesty the King of Iraq and His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, being desirous of ensuring and maintaining peace and order in the zone defined in clauses (a) and (b), article 1, of Uqair Protocol No. 1 concluded between the Governments of Iraq and Najd on the 12th Rabi' Thani, 1341, A.H., corresponding to the 2nd December, 1922, A.D., hereinafter referred to as the Neutral Zone; and in pursuance of the provisions of clause (c) of the aforesaid article, which lays down that the said zone shall remain neutral and common to the two Governments of Iraq and Najd, who shall enjoy equal rights in it for all purposes;

Have decided to conclude an agreement for this purpose to be considered as forming an annexure to the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" concluded between them on the 20th Dhul Qi'dat, 1349, A.H., corresponding to the

7th April, 1931, A.D., and have appointed for this purpose as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

His Excellency Saiyid Taufiq-al-Suwaidi, Foreign Minister;

His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

His Excellency Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, private secretary to His Majesty the King and head of the Diplomatic Section at His Majesty's Diwan;

Who, having exchanged their powers, found in good order, agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The nationals of both high contracting parties shall have full freedom to graze and water, at all times as they may wish, within the Neutral Zone, and they shall be immune from all interference or control by the officials of the high contracting party of whom they are not nationals.

ARTICLE 2.

Either high contracting party may, through his appropriate officials, exercise his full authority over his own nationals within the Neutral Zone.

ARTICLE 3.

The authorities indicated in article 8 of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" signed at Mecca on the 7th April, 1931, or persons appointed by the said authorities, shall undertake the settlement of disputes arising between Iraqi nationals and nationals of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia while within the Neutral Zone, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the said treaty.

ARTICLE 4.

Disputes arising between nationals of either high contracting party and those of a third State while within the Neutral Zone shall be settled by the officials of the high contracting party whose nationals are party to the particular dispute to be settled, and, where nationals of both high contracting parties are involved in such dispute, the dispute shall be settled jointly by the authorities indicated in article 3 of the present agreement.

ARTICLE 5.

(a) In the event of troubles leading to the disturbance of peace and order in the Neutral Zone and affecting the interests of the high contracting parties or their nationals within or outside the Neutral Zone, the forces of the high contracting parties will adopt the necessary measures for the restoration of normal peaceful conditions in the said zone.

(b) The authorities indicated in article 3 of the present agreement shall confer together with a view to agreement as to the manner in which they shall carry out the joint measures provided for in the preceding clause of this article.

(c) The said authorities shall undertake the punishment of any individuals nationals of their respective Governments who may be arrested within the Neutral Zone, by the forces of either high contracting party, in the course of joint operations.

ARTICLE 6.

The high contracting parties shall each permanently maintain in the Neutral Zone a movable police post for the purpose of co-operation as may be necessary in the interest of the two States in accordance with the provisions of the present agreement.

ARTICLE 7.

Nothing in the present agreement shall conflict with the provisions of the treaties and agreements already concluded between the two high contracting parties.

ARTICLE 8.

The present agreement shall come into operation with effect from the date of exchange of the instruments of its ratification.

Done at Bagdad this 19th day of the month of Rabi'-al-Awwal, 1357, A.H., corresponding to the 19th day of May, 1938, A.D.

[E 5569/1809/25]

No. 10.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 412.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, July 29, 1939.

WITH reference to the seventh paragraph of my despatch No. 390 of the 18th July, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a translation of the agreement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, concluded at Bagdad in May 1938, in the form in which it has been submitted to Parliament for approval, together with the Government's statement explaining its purpose.

2. It will be seen that article 4 of the agreement contains provisions which in present circumstances would act solely to the advantage of the Saudi Government, since the Iraqi Government have now ceased to levy direct taxation on any kind of flocks or herds and have no interest in the collection of such taxes from Iraqi tribes grazing in Saudi Arabian territory.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

Agreement between Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the Regulation of Grazing and Watering Affairs.

[Not ratified.]

[In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!]

HIS Majesty the King of Iraq and His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, being desirous of laying down definite principles to ensure that their subjects enjoy, in accordance with custom, the use of grazing grounds and watering places on the borders of their respective States, and with a view to regulating grazing and watering affairs;

Have decided to conclude an agreement on the subject, to be regarded as forming an annexure to the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" concluded between them on the 20th Dhil Qa'dah, 1349, A.H., corresponding to the 7th April, 1931, A.D., and for this purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

His Excellency Saiyid Taufiq-al-Suwaidi, Foreign Minister;

His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

His Excellency Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, private secretary to His Majesty the King and head of the Diplomatic Section at His Majesty's Diwan;

[21053]

Who, having exchanged their powers, found in good order, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The tribes of either high contracting party, when out for grazing or watering in grazing grounds or at watering places in the territories of the other high contracting party, shall be exempt from customs duty in respect of their live-stock, tents, tent equipments, furniture, food-stuffs and all other materials for their personal use or consumption. Nevertheless, the high contracting parties each reserves for himself the right to levy customs duty on any live-stock or materials which become the subject of commercial transactions after their entry into his territories.

ARTICLE 2.

In the event of an outbreak of an infectious animal disease or epidemic or the like, the high contracting parties each reserves for himself the right to impose the necessary veterinary or sanitary measures, and enforce import and export prohibition orders as may be issued.

ARTICLE 3.

The high contracting parties each reserves for himself the right to limit the number of arms to be carried by each tribe desiring entry into his territories.

ARTICLE 4.

In the event of either high contracting party being desirous of collecting Government taxes from his tribes while in the territories of the other high contracting party, the authorities indicated in article 8 of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" shall thereupon communicate together with a view to notifying the tribes concerned of such desire, and shall use every possible means to induce such tribes to meet such desire. The high contracting party desirous of collecting taxes as above may detail one of his officers to effect service of the required notification, and in such case the officer so detailed is required to call on the appropriate officer of the other high contracting party, who shall detail one of his subordinates to accompany him, service being effected in the presence of such subordinate.

ARTICLE 5.

This agreement shall come into force upon exchange of the instruments of its ratification.

Done at Bagdad this 19th day of the month of Rabi'-al-Awwal, 1357, A.H., corresponding to the 19th day of the month of May, 1938, A.D.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

Reasons in support of the Agreement concluded between Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the Regulation of Grazing and Watering Affairs.

HAVING regard to the nature of the land in the two countries, which is such that it often happens that grazing and water supplies are available in abundance in the one country to the exclusion of the other, and in view of the provisions of treaties in force between the Government of Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it has been the practice for the tribes of either party to avail themselves of grazing grounds and watering places found in the territories of the other party. Accordingly, it was found desirable, in the interest of both parties, to regulate these matters by an agreement between the two parties, to be called "Agreement for the Regulation of Grazing and Watering Affairs," under which facilities as necessary will be ensured for the tribes of the two parties for the purpose of benefiting by grazing grounds and watering places in the territories of the two States. The present agreement accordingly provides for the exemption of tribes from customs duty on their live-stock and articles for their personal use or consumption. It also provides for the control of infectious animal diseases and the carrying of arms.

As the tribes of either party are likely to remain in the territories of the other party for periods extending beyond those fixed for the collection of taxes, which extended stay is calculated to obstruct the collection of taxes, the agreement has also dealt with this matter in such manner as would ensure the interests of the two parties and their tribes.

[E 5628/1699/25]

No. 11.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 123.)

My Lord,

Jedda, July 23, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the agreement which was signed at Riyadh on the 31st May last by representatives of the Saudi Arabian Government and of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company. The procedure of ratification by both parties will be understood from the terms of articles 15 and 16 of the agreement: the ratification of the Saudi Arabian Government was published in the Mecca paper *Umm-al-Qura* on the 7th July, 1939; the agreement itself was not published in the local press until the 21st July, which, under article 15, becomes the "effective date" on which the agreement enters into force. It is evident that the San Francisco office of the company must have forwarded its ratification, though no formal notice to that effect has yet appeared.

2. The text of the agreement will no doubt be studied by the competent departments of His Majesty's Government, and I propose to confine myself in this despatch to a few comments on some points, which, on a first reading, appear to me worthy of notice.

3. The references in this agreement to the previous one signed in 1933 accord perfectly with the text of the latter instrument, which was printed as an enclosure to Foreign Office Print (Confidential) No. 15474 of the 22nd September, 1938.⁽¹⁾ There is, however, no mention of any document dated the 27th May, 1933; the new agreement refers to the original 1933 agreement as "the Saudi Arab Concession," and says that it was signed on the 29th May, 1933, the same day as that on which Mr. L. N. Hamilton addressed to the Saudi Minister of Finance his letter containing four paragraphs and now called the "Second Principal Agreement."

4. The areas to which the new agreement, or rather the three agreements taken together, applies are set forth in the terminal schedule. Not only is the previous concessionary area in Eastern Arabia included, but a northern area, a southern area, and the two neutral zones are now allotted to the company for exploitation. I learn from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin that His Majesty turned over in his mind for a long time the question of the boundaries of the northern and southern areas: he is unwilling to have any oil prospecting in the centre of the country, and he knows that there is considerable doubt as to where its frontiers really are. The new areas cannot be traced on a map unless the position of such points as "the northern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana," "the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana," "the north-east corner of the boundary line between Yemen and Saudi Arabia," and of the northern edge of the Great Nefud are first determined. I have not yet been able to fix these places with any accuracy on any map.

5. No mention is made in the new agreement of the "contact line between the sedimentary and the igneous formations" which probably does not coincide with the eastern edge of the Red Sea Concession. But it is clear from article 12 that whatever preference rights the company possessed under the previous agreements over areas not yet assigned to them still persist.

6. The company has the right, under section (c) of article 6, to promote a company or companies of a nationality acceptable to the Government to exploit the oil in either of the neutral zones; it also possesses various rights of transport in and access to those zones.

7. Article 9 gives the company certain rights over the area assigned in 1936 to Petroleum Concessions (Limited) in the Red Sea area.

⁽¹⁾ See "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs," Part XLIII, No. 9.

8. The consideration paid and to be paid for these extensions of the company's area of operations appears very liberal. £140,000 gold is payable at once; thereafter an annual rental of £20,000 is to be paid; and whenever oil in commercial quantities is discovered in the additional areas a further sum of £100,000 gold will be paid. From July 1940 onwards, until oil is discovered in the new areas, 1,300,000 gallons of gasoline and 100,000 gallons of kerosene will be presented to the Saudi Arabian Government, and after such a discovery is made the amount of gasoline will be increased by 1 million gallons. I have not heard what actual sum in cash has passed; it is clear from the last words of article 4 that the rental due under the 1933 agreements had been overpaid, and I should not be surprised to learn that advances have been made on account of the increased sums which will be payable in future.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch and the enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, and to the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire.

I have, &c.
A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure in No. 11.

THIS agreement is made between his Excellency Sheikh Abdulla Sulaiman-al-Hamdani, Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia, acting on behalf of the Saudi Arab Government (hereinafter referred to as the "Government") of the one part, and William J. Lenahan, acting on behalf of California Arabian Standard Oil Company (hereinafter referred to as the "Company") of the other part.

It is hereby agreed between the Government and the Company in manner following:—

ARTICLE 1.

This agreement, known as the Supplemental Agreement, is supplemental firstly to the agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Saudi Arab Concession") made between the Government of the one part and the Standard Oil Company of California of the other part and signed on the 29th day of May, 1933 (corresponding to the 4th day of Safar, 1352, A.H.), and secondly to the Letter of Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Principal Agreement") addressed by L. N. Hamilton, on behalf of the Standard Oil Company of California, to and accepted by his Excellency Sheikh Abdulla Sulaiman-al-Hamdani, on behalf of the Government, and bearing the same date as the Saudi Arab Concession.

ARTICLE 2.

The Saudi Arab Concession and the Second Principal Agreement have been duly transferred to and vested in the "Company" (party hereto) after notification to and with the consent of the Government, all in accordance with article 32 of the Saudi Arab Concession, and the Company has duly undertaken and fulfilled to date the duties and obligations of the "Company" thereunder.

ARTICLE 3.

On the 16th day of October, 1938 (corresponding to the 22nd day of Shaaban, 1357, A.H.), the Company declared, under article 10 of the Saudi Arab Concession, that oil had been discovered in commercial quantities, and that all the obligations of the Company attendant upon such declaration have been duly fulfilled to date.

ARTICLE 4.

Both the Government and the Company are now desirous of adding to and otherwise extending the territory granted to the Company by the Saudi Arab Concession, and of making such other modifications and alterations to the Saudi Arab Concession and to the Second Principal Agreement as hereinafter appear, and the Company has undertaken to make, and the Government have consented

to receive, the following payments to or for the benefit of the Government in manner hereinafter provided, namely:—

- (a) The sum of £140,000 English, gold, or its equivalent, which sum shall become due upon the effective date of this agreement.
- (b) The sum of £20,000 English, gold, or its equivalent, annually as rental. The first of such payments, being rental for the year following the effective date of this agreement, shall become due upon the first anniversary of the effective date of this agreement, and subsequent payments shall become due upon each succeeding anniversary of the effective date of this agreement until the happening of any one of the following events, namely:—
 - (1) Discovery of oil in commercial quantities within the additional territories described and referred to in Part 2 and in Part 3 of the schedule to this agreement, and which additional territories are hereinafter called the "additional area." If the Company shall fail to declare so sooner, the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities shall be the date of the completion and testing of a well or wells within the additional area capable of producing, in accordance with first-class oil-field practice, at least 2,000 tons of oil per day for a period of thirty consecutive days.
 - (2) The relinquishment by the Company of the whole of the additional area.

If either of the events mentioned in (1) and (2) above shall occur during the period intervening between any two anniversaries of the effective date of the agreement, the rental payable for the year in which such event occurs shall be only that proportion of the annual rental above mentioned as the number of days that have intervened between the preceding anniversary date and the date of the occurrence of the event mentioned above bears to a full year of 365 days.

- (c) The sum of £100,000 English, gold, or its equivalent, upon discovery of oil in commercial quantities within the additional areas aforesaid.

Each of the foregoing payments shall be made within thirty days from the date upon which it becomes due and shall be made in accordance with and in the manner provided in articles 17 and 18 of the Saudi Arab Concession.

The foregoing payments are to be made by the Company in addition to any other payments by way of royalty or advance or otherwise already provided for by the Saudi Arab Concession and yet unpaid, and without prejudice to the right of the Company to recover advances already made under articles 4, 6 and 11 and yet to be made under article 11 of the Saudi Arab Concession, and to recover overpaid rental under article 12 of the Saudi Arab Concession.

ARTICLE 5.

From the effective date of this agreement, the terms and provisions of the Saudi Arab Concession, as herein amended, shall include and extend to:—

- (a) All lands, islands, waters, territories and interests included in article 2 of the Saudi Arab Concession, the description of which is repeated from the Saudi Arab Concession, Part 1 of the schedule to this agreement, and
- (b) All lands, territories and interests described and referred to in Part 2 of the schedule to this agreement, and
- (c) All right, title and interest of the Government now or hereafter, in or to the two territories described in Part 3 of the schedule to this agreement and known respectively as the "Saudi Arab-Koweit Neutral Zone" and the "Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone," and all rights and interests of a maritime or of a territorial nature now or hereafter appertaining to such two zones or either one of them.

And the Saudi Arab Concession shall be and is hereby modified to include all the lands, islands, waters, territories and interests of the Government described and referred to in the foregoing provisions of this article, and henceforth the Saudi Arab Concession as modified by the Second Principal Agreement and by this agreement shall be read accordingly. And, for convenience, all such lands, islands, waters, territories and interests may be referred to as the "exclusive area."

ARTICLE 6.

The following special provisions shall be applicable and shall have force and effect as from the effective date of this agreement in regard to the Saudi Arab-Koweit Neutral Zone and the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone:—

- (a) Computation of royalty accruing to the Government on oil and natural gas obtained from the Saudi Arab-Koweit Neutral Zone and from the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone shall be governed by the royalty provisions of the Saudi Arab Concession; it being understood, however, that the royalty as provided therein shall be payable to the Government only on that proportion of the total oil and natural gas so obtained as is represented by the Government's interest in the said Neutral Zones, respectively.
- (b) The Company shall be entitled to enter into such agreement or agreements as it deems necessary or desirable to enable the Company alone or with another or others or through the medium of another company or other companies formed by it (either alone or in conjunction with others), to prospect for and develop and remove the petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances of and from the Saudi Arab-Koweit Neutral Zone and the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone or either one of such zones; provided, however, that there shall be no violation of the provisions of article 32 of the Saudi Arab Concession. So far as the Company or any company or companies formed by it is concerned, any such agreement may contain the right of transport for all purposes of the enterprise by all manner of means of carriage over and along all ways within the Saudi Arab-Koweit Neutral Zone and the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone or either one of them and to and from any point or points within the said zones from and to any point or points within Saudi Arabia. And the right in respect of the Saudi Arab-Koweit Neutral Zone to use any ports and waterways free of all fees, dues, assessments and charges of any nature or kind whatsoever, in accordance with article 21 of the Saudi Arab Concession.
- (c) The Company may promote a company or companies of a nationality acceptable to the Government to explore and prospect for and exploit, remove and export petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances in and from both or in and from each or in and from either of the said two neutral zones.

ARTICLE 7.

The provisions of article 9 of the Saudi Arab Concession shall henceforth be replaced by the following provision, namely:—

For a period of ten years from the effective date of this agreement, the Company shall be under no obligation to relinquish to the Government any portion of the exclusive area covered by the Saudi Arab Concession, as modified by this agreement. Upon the expiration of this ten-year period, and from time to time thereafter, the Company shall relinquish to the Government such portions of the exclusive area as the Company may decide not to explore further, or to use otherwise in connexion with the enterprise. The portions so relinquished shall thereupon be released from the terms and conditions of the Saudi Arab Concession, as modified by this agreement; provided, however, that the Company shall, notwithstanding such relinquishment, continue to enjoy the right reserved by the Saudi Arab Concession to use the portions so relinquished for transportation and communication facilities, the Company interfering as little as practicable with any other use to which the Government may desire the relinquished portions to be put.

ARTICLE 8.

That portion of article 19 of the Saudi Arab Concession reading as follows:—
"during each year following the date of the completion of this plant, the Company shall offer free to the Government, in bulk, 200,000 American gallons of gasoline and 100,000 American gallons of kerosene, it being understood that the facilities provided by the Government for accepting these deliveries shall not impede or endanger the Company's operations"
shall be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:—

During the year following the first anniversary of the effective date of this agreement, and during each year thereafter, up to and including the year ending on the anniversary of the effective date of this agreement next following the discovery of oil in commercial quantities within the territories described and referred to in Part 2 and in Part 3 of the schedule to this agreement, the Company shall offer free to the Government, in bulk, 1,300,000 American gallons of gasoline and 100,000 American gallons of kerosene.

During the year commencing on the anniversary of the effective date of this agreement next following such discovery of oil in commercial quantities, and during each subsequent year of the Saudi Arab Concession as amended by this agreement, the Company shall offer free to the Government, in bulk, 2,300,000 American gallons of gasoline and 100,000 American gallons of kerosene.

It is understood that, following the completion of said plant, the gasoline and kerosene offered to the Government in bulk as aforesaid shall be delivered to the Government at or in the immediate vicinity of the said plant. The facilities provided by the Government for accepting deliveries shall not impede or endanger the Company's operations.

ARTICLE 9.

From the effective date of this agreement, all the rights and privileges conferred by article 22 of the Saudi Arab Concession may be exercised by the Company (a) anywhere in the "exclusive area" described in article 5 of this agreement; (b) anywhere in the area covered by the concession granted on the 9th day of July, 1936, to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) (it being understood that the exercise of these rights by the Company in the area covered by the concession granted to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) does not include the right to exploit oil therein, nor will it damage the property of the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) or impede its operations and interests, or interfere therewith. The Government shall be the sole judge to determine this); (c) anywhere in the Saudi Arab-Koweit Neutral Zone and in the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone, to the full extent that the Government is entitled to grant such rights and privileges with respect to said two neutral zones.

The rights and privileges conferred by article 22 of the Saudi Arab Concession may not be exercised by the Company in any other portion of Saudi Arabia, however, except with the express consent and approval of the Government; but it is understood, of course, that, should the Company, in order to exercise the rights and privileges conferred by article 22 of the Saudi Arab Concession, require rights of way from the territories described and referred to in Part 2 of the schedule to this agreement to the area covered by the concession granted to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited) on the 9th day of July, 1936, the Government will not withhold approval of such rights of way.

ARTICLE 10.

The Saudi Arab Concession, as amended by this agreement, shall, with respect to the territories described and referred to in Part 2 and in Part 3 of the schedule to this agreement, continue in full force and effect for a period of six years from the expiration of the sixty-year period provided in article 1 of the Saudi Arab Concession.

ARTICLE 11.

The provisions of article 3 of the Saudi Arab Concession and of paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the Second Principal Agreement, in so far only as said provisions relate to the Saudi Arab-Koweit Neutral Zone, are superseded by the provisions of this agreement.

ARTICLE 12.

It is hereby declared that the preference right granted to the Company by article 3 of the Saudi Arab Concession and by the Second Principal Agreement, except as regards the "exclusive area" defined in article 5 of this agreement, shall remain in full force and effect during the term of sixty years from the effective date of this agreement.

ARTICLE 13.

As modified by the foregoing provisions of this agreement, the Saudi Arab Concession and the Second Principal Agreement shall continue in full force and effect (excepting to the extent to which certain provisions of the Saudi Arab Concession and the Second Principal Agreement shall have already been complied with and are therefore of no further validity) to the intent that, as from the effective date of this agreement, all three documents shall be read together as and shall form one agreement.

ARTICLE 14.

This agreement has been drawn up in English and in Arabic and the provisions of article 35 of the Saudi Arab Concession shall apply to this agreement.

ARTICLE 15.

The effective date of this agreement shall be the date of its publication in Saudi Arabia, following the ratification of this agreement by the Company and by the Government.

ARTICLE 16.

It is understood that this agreement, after being signed in Saudi Arabia, shall be subject to ratification by the Company at its offices in San Francisco, California, and by the Government in Saudi Arabia before it shall become effective. After both texts of this agreement have been signed in triplicate in Saudi Arabia, two signed copies of each text shall be sent by registered mail to the Company in San Francisco, California, and within fifteen days after receipt in San Francisco, the Company shall notify the Government in writing whether or not it ratifies this agreement. If the agreement is not ratified by the Company within fifteen days after receipt of the document in San Francisco, it shall be null and void and of no further force or effect.

Upon ratification of this agreement by the Company, one signed copy of each text, together with the necessary evidence as to ratification by the Company, shall be returned to the Government. Also, upon ratification of this agreement by the Company, the Government shall issue a Royal decree announcing their ratification hereof, and officially publish that decree and this agreement.

Signed this 31st day of May, 1939 (corresponding to the 12th day of Rabi Thani, 1358, A.H.).

The Schedule above referred to.

PART 1.

All of Eastern Saudi Arabia, from its eastern boundary (including islands and territorial waters) westward to the westerly edge of the Dahana, and from the northern boundary to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia, provided that from the northern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana the westerly boundary of the area in question shall continue in a straight line north 30 degrees west to the northern boundary of Saudi Arabia, and from the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana such boundary shall continue in a straight line south 30 degrees east to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia.

PART 2.

The following two areas in Saudi Arabia:—

(1) All that portion of Northern Saudi Arabia south of Iraq and south and east of Transjordan which is bounded on the east, south and west by the following lines: (a) on the *east*, by a line commencing at the northern end of the

westerly edge of the Dahana and running in a straight line north 30 degrees west to the northern boundary of Saudi Arabia; (b) on the *south*, by a line commencing at the northern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana and running in a westerly direction along the northern edge of the Great Nefud (leaving the Great Nefud outside) to the north-west corner thereof, and thence in a straight line, passing through Tebuk, to the eastern boundary of the area covered by the concession granted on the 9th day of July, 1936, to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited); and (c) on the *west*, by a line commencing at the point where the straight line mentioned above joins the eastern boundary of the area covered by the concession granted to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited), and thence running in a northerly direction, along the eastern boundary of the area covered by the concession granted to the Petroleum Concessions (Limited), until it reaches the present northern limits of the territory under the administration of Saudi Arabia, which adjoins the southern end of Transjordan.

(2) All that southern portion of Saudi Arabia which is bounded on the *east* by a line commencing at the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana and running in a straight line south 30 degrees east to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia; (b) on the *north*, by a line commencing at the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana and running in a westerly direction, 50 kilom. south of the most southerly branch of the Wadi Dawasir, to a point 50 kilom. south of the source of the Wadi Dawasir, and thence continuing in a straight line to the north-east corner of the boundary line between Yemen and Saudi Arabia; (c) on the *west*, by a line commencing at the point where the straight line mentioned above joins the north-east corner of the boundary line between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and thence running in a southerly direction, along the eastern boundary of the Kingdom of Yemen, until it reaches the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia; and (d) on the *south*, by a line running along the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia between the most southerly limits of the lines mentioned under (a) and (c) above.

PART 3.

All the territory known as the Saudi Arab-Koweit Neutral Zone, including islands and territorial waters, if any, which are or may become a part thereof, and all the territory known as the Saudi Arab-Iraq Neutral Zone.

On behalf of the Saudi Arab
Government:

On behalf of the California Arabian
Standard Oil Company:

[E 5676/735/25]

No. 12.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, August 12, 1939.

MY telegram No. 106.

German Government have now informed Khalid as follows:—

2. In view of the King's friendship for the British and his determination to continue it, German Government feel that to supply His Majesty with arms would tend to assist their enemies and would be contrary to their interests, unless Saudi Arabian Government were prepared to make an agreement to remain neutral in any dispute which might arise between them and the British, whether in regard to propaganda or to military matters or to any other thing which might affect friendly relations.

3. His Majesty wishes to know, without ambiguity, His Majesty's Government's views on this proposal. If they have any objection to Saudi Arabian Government making such a neutrality agreement, the King will announce this favourable opportunity of getting arms cheaply. If they declare they leave decision to His Majesty, the latter will agree to German proposal and remain neutral in any conflict.

4. His Majesty asks for urgent reply which would reach him in time to withdraw Khalid before Nuremburg Conference.

5. From text of Khalid's report which follows by bag I gather that Germans would be glad of an excuse to avoid supplying promised arms. But the King is anxious to have them if His Majesty's Government do not object to conditional neutrality.

[E 5763/735/25]

No. 13.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 108.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, August 13, 1939.

MY telegram No. 107 of 12th August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs in a further interview this morning emphasised the dilemma in which the King found himself. On the one hand, he wanted to buy arms. On the other hand, he was reluctant at all events to bind himself to the Germans or to do anything contrary to British policy.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that His Majesty's Government might be able to give advice concerning the form of a neutrality undertaking which would not really bind him too much. I warned him that the Germans would insist on a binding declaration. Nevertheless, he begged me to put the question.

3. The main point is that the King feels that he cannot answer the Germans until His Majesty's Government give him some idea of what they would wish him to do if a war breaks out.

[E 5751/110/91]

No. 14.

Correspondence relating to Sheikh Said.

(1)

Copy of a Note verbale of May 19, 1939, from the French Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office.

LE Ministère des Affaires étrangères, en réponse à une démarche effectuée auprès de lui par le Ministre d'Angleterre à Paris au sujet de la question de Cheik-Saïd, avait répondu à M. Campbell que le souci essentiel du Gouvernement français était de se prémunir contre tout risque de mainmise d'une tierce Puissance sur ce point important de la mer Rouge.

D'autre part, M. Georges Bonnet a été interrogé il y a quelque temps par l'Émir Seïf-ul-Islam-al-Husseïn sur la position que la France compte adopter vis-à-vis de ce territoire. Le Gouvernement français estime pour sa part que le meilleur moyen de régler la difficulté serait de conclure un arrangement entre la France et l'Yémen.

En portant les indications qui précèdent à la connaissance de son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté britannique, l'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur de lui communiquer sous ce pli à titre confidentiel le texte d'un projet d'accord qui fait état de l'ensemble des données du problème.

M. Corbin serait reconnaissant à Lord Halifax de vouloir bien lui faire connaître son sentiment sur le document dont il s'agit. Le Gouvernement de la République serait heureux d'autre part de savoir si, le cas échéant, le Foreign Office serait disposé à user de son influence auprès de l'Imam pour que ce dernier consentît à souscrire à l'accord ainsi envisagé.

L'Ambassadeur de France saisit, &c.

*Albert Gate House,
le 19 mai 1939.*

Enclosure in (1).

(Projet.)

Protocole.

LA République française, soucieuse de consolider l'amitié que le traité du 25 avril 1936 a scellée entre elle et l'Yémen et, à cet effet, de marquer l'intérêt qu'elle porte au respect du *statu quo* territorial et politique des pays riverains de la côte arabique de la mer Rouge, déclare qu'elle n'a pas l'intention de soulever la question de Cheik-Saïd aussi longtemps que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Imam :

(a) Occupera effectivement la zone visée par l'acte enregistré à Aden le 1^{er} octobre 1868 et l'arrangement franco-ottoman des 4-5 juillet 1870;

(b) Ne donnera à bail, n'hypothéquera, n'aliénera, à titre onéreux ou gratuit, à une tierce Puissance aucune parcelle du littoral de son royaume, ni n'en déléguera, de manière expresse ou tacite, la défense.

La présente déclaration ne saurait affecter les droits que, par le contrat de 1868, se sont personnellement acquis les cessionnaires.

Sa Majesté l'Imam Yahya, Roi de l'Yémen, prend acte de la déclaration ci-dessus de la République française et acquiesce à sa teneur.

Le 23 mars 1939.

(2)

Copy of a Note verbale of June 22, 1939, from the Foreign Office to the French Ambassador in London.

THE French Ambassador, in his memorandum of the 19th May, was so good as to communicate to Lord Halifax the views of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs with regard to the question of Sheikh Said, and to enclose the text of a draft agreement with the King of the Yemen. M. Corbin requested that he might be informed of the views of Lord Halifax on the document and also enquired whether the Foreign Office would be disposed to use their influence with the King of the Yemen with a view to persuading His Majesty to sign an agreement on the lines proposed.

2. Lord Halifax has now considered the French Ambassador's memorandum and the draft agreement enclosed therein. He will be grateful if his Excellency will inform the French Government that His Majesty's Government welcome their readiness to declare that they have no intention of raising the question of Sheikh Said so long as the King of the Yemen continues to occupy Sheikh Said effectively, and refrains from ceding, leasing or mortgaging any part of his territory or entrusting its defence, either expressly or tacitly, to a third Power. The proposed declaration is in entire accordance with the declaration which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have themselves made in the Anglo-Italian Agreement of the 16th April, 1938, regarding certain areas in the Middle East.

3. The French Ministry for Foreign Affairs may, however, wish to consider the desirability of omitting the last paragraph of the draft agreement. This clause provides that His Majesty the King of the Yemen is to take note of the French Government's declaration, and is to express his acquiescence in its substance. It is not understood what practical advantage there would be in endeavouring to persuade the King of the Yemen to sign a statement on these lines. Its omission would, it is true, alter the form of the document, which, instead of being a bilateral agreement between France and the Yemen, would become a unilateral declaration by France and would not require the signature of a Yemeni representative. Such a unilateral declaration would, however, seem to be equally satisfactory so far as the interests of France are concerned.

4. If, on the other hand, it were thought necessary to put forward to the King of the Yemen the draft agreement as it stands, Lord Halifax considers it doubtful whether it would prove possible to persuade the King of the Yemen to accept it. The King might well fear lest, by signing such a document, he might subsequently be held to have recognised the existence of a claim which he has never

recognised in the past. He might also take the line that he is unwilling to assume, at least by implication, a limitation on his own freedom of action which might be thought to be incompatible with his sovereignty. The Middle Eastern Agreement has already led to representations by King Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud), who considered that certain of its clauses infringed the independence of Saudi Arabia; his attitude being that, while he has every intention of maintaining the independence and integrity of his own dominions, he sees no reason why he should be forbidden to do otherwise by some other State. King Abdul Aziz has thought it necessary to address identical notes to the British and Italian Governments asking for assurances (which have been given) that the agreement imposes no obligation on Saudi Arabia, and that the relations between the two Governments and Saudi Arabia are governed solely by international law and practice and the treaties in force between them. The King of the Yemen is certainly aware of the views of King Abdul Aziz on this question, and it may well be that he will view the agreement proposed by the French Government with equal suspicion.

5. If the French Government, after having considered the objections explained in the previous paragraph of this memorandum, should feel able to omit the last paragraph of their draft agreement, and to make a unilateral declaration on the lines of the remaining paragraphs of the draft, Lord Halifax would certainly be prepared to support the French Government's action. He would propose in that event to send, through the Governor of Aden, a message to the King of the Yemen stating that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been provided with an advance copy of the French Government's declaration, and that they have no doubt that the King of the Yemen will be highly gratified to hear of the French Government's action, which is clearly sufficient to remove any apprehension on his part with regard to French intentions towards the Yemen.

*Foreign Office, S.W. 1,
June 22, 1939.*

(3)

Cypher Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Aden.—(Sent August 10, 1939, 3 P.M.)

(No. 155.)

MY telegram No. 154. Proposed French communication to King of the Yemen about Sheikh Said.

French Government have now instructed their Minister at Jedda to proceed to Sana'a in order to communicate to the King of the Yemen unilateral declaration as suggested in paragraph 3 of Foreign Office memorandum for French Embassy of the 22nd June, see my secret despatch of the 7th July.

2. His Majesty's Government have undertaken to send a message to the King of the Yemen to support French Government's action. This message should be in the following terms:—

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been provided with an advance copy of the declaration which the French Government are addressing to your Majesty on the subject of Sheikh Said.

"His Majesty's Government have no doubt that your Majesty will be highly gratified to learn of the French Government's attitude, and feel sure that declaration will be sufficient to remove any apprehension which your Majesty may have entertained with regard to French intentions towards the Yemen."

3. The French Minister expects to reach Sana'a on the 16th August. You should therefore send a message by telegraph to the King of the Yemen in the terms indicated above, which should reach Sana'a a day or two before the arrival there of the French Minister.

(4)

M. Cambon to Viscount Halifax.

Le 15 août 1939.

M. le Secrétaire d'Etat,

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ayant bien voulu accepter de seconder l'action de la France auprès de l'Iman de l'Yémen, mon Gouvernement m'a prié d'être auprès de votre Excellence l'interprète de sa vive gratitude et de lui remettre à cette occasion le texte définitif de la déclaration que le Ministre de France à Djeddah a pour mission de faire à l'Iman Yahya.

J'ai l'honneur en conséquence de faire parvenir sous ce pli à votre Excellence le document en question et dont le texte a été arrêté d'accord avec les services compétents du Foreign Office.

Veuillez, &c.

ROGER CAMBON.

Enclosure in (4).

Déclaration.

LA République française, soucieuse de consolider l'amitié que le traité du 25 avril 1936 a scellée entre elle et l'Yémen et, à cet effet, de marquer l'intérêt qu'elle porte au respect du *statu quo* territorial et politique des pays riverains de la côte arabique de la mer Rouge, déclare qu'elle n'a pas l'intention de soulever la question de Cheik-Saïd aussi longtemps que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Imam :

- (a) Occupera effectivement la zone visée par l'acte enregistré à Aden le 1^{er} octobre 1868 et l'arrangement franco-ottoman des 4-5 juillet 1870;
- (b) Ne donnera à bail, n'hypothéquera, n'aliénera, à titre onéreux ou gratuit, à une tierce Puissance aucune parcelle du littoral de son royaume, ni n'en déléguera, de manière expresse ou tacite, la défense.

La présente déclaration ne saurait affecter les droits que, par le contrat de 1868, se sont personnellement acquis les cessionnaires.

GEORGES BONNET.

Paris, le 18 juillet 1939.

[E 5931/735/25]

No. 15.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Trott (Jedda).

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 24, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 107 and 108, Saving, [of 12th and 13th August: Neutrality of Ibn Saud].

Please convey the following reply to Ibn Saud:—

"His Majesty's Government are most grateful for the opportunity of expressing their views upon the message from the German Government. This mark of confidence is a further signal proof of the friendship which the King has shown to His Majesty's Government in so many ways in the past.

"2. His Majesty's Government suggest that the King might send the German Government an oral or at any rate an informal message to the effect that he does not agree that friendship for Great Britain is inconsistent with friendship for Germany or any other State, that his policy aims at friendship with all States alike, that he has signed no treaty of alliance with any Great Power and that so far as he is concerned the question of taking sides in any conflict between the Great Powers has not even arisen.

"3. His Majesty's Government make this suggestion because neither he nor any other statesman can foresee exactly how his country's interests will be affected in the event of general hostilities, and most Governments aim at keeping for themselves as much freedom of action in the matter of belligerency or neutrality as circumstances permit.

"4. Moreover, were the King to sign a formal agreement of this kind with the German Government, this would be interpreted by ignorant and thoughtless persons, of whom there are only too many in every country, as an indication that his sympathies lay with the Central Powers. This in its turn might have a most unfortunate effect upon the prestige of His Majesty's Government throughout the Middle East. His Majesty's Government hope that the King will agree that any action which added to the difficulties of His Majesty's Government and their allies, either in advance of or during a war, might be disastrous from the point of view of the Middle Eastern States themselves.

"5. From the foregoing the King will see that, since he has been so good as to consult them, His Majesty's Government would prefer him not to go beyond a message such as is suggested in paragraph 1, coupled possibly with an assurance that in the matter of propaganda and military matters he intends to hold the balance evenly between all countries.

"6. As regards these latter points, His Majesty's Government are not clear what the German Government mean by references to 'propaganda,' 'military matters' and 'other things which might affect friendly relations.' Presumably the German Government want an assurance that, apart from keeping neutral in war, the King will in ordinary times act in a strictly impartial manner as between Germany and His Majesty's Government.

"7. In the matter of propaganda in particular, His Majesty's Government ask nothing better, as the King knows, than that he should maintain strict impartiality between all countries. He has, they understand, set his face resolutely against propaganda on behalf of foreign Governments, no matter what these Governments may be. His Majesty's Government consider that this is a right and natural course for the King to pursue, although they hope that in the event of actual hostilities he would feel able to make it clear that, in his view, the victory of the allied Powers was desirable in the interests of the Arab States."

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 258; Bagdad, No. 269; and Cairo, No. 538.)

[E 5931/735/25]

No. 16.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Trott (Jedda).

(No. 114.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 24, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram [of 24th August: Neutrality of Ibn Saud].

Following observations are for your own information only:—

His Majesty's Government realise that the proposed message may not meet the requirements of the German Government, who are clearly under no obligation to supply Saudi Arabia with arms or credits and free to make what conditions they like before they do so. They would, however, prefer to await the King's reactions to the reply contained in my immediately preceding telegram before making any other suggestions.

2. You will note that the reply does not contain any precise answer to the King's enquiry as to the course which His Majesty's Government would wish him to pursue in the event of war. Although, as is suggested in the reply, His Majesty's Government hope that Ibn Saud will be able to show that he is in favour of an allied victory, they do not in fact either wish or expect that he shall enter the war as a belligerent, at any rate at the outset (should hostilities extend to the Middle East, and, in particular, should the Yemen join the Central Powers either of her own free will or under duress, the position would probably be different).

3. It is, however, one thing to wish Ibn Saud to remain neutral until the course of the war shows that there would be some definite advantage in securing him as an ally, and even to advise him that he would do well to remain neutral (although His Majesty's Government wish if they can to avoid giving any advice on this point). It is quite another thing to have him promise a prospective enemy of his country that he will remain neutral and *a fortiori* to advise him to do so.

4. Should the King fail, for whatever reason, to obtain from Germany the arms and credits for which he is now in negotiation, it is highly unlikely that His Majesty's Government will be able to supply him with these arms or credits themselves. You should therefore do your utmost to avoid being drawn into any discussion of such points. Should the King ask whether, in the event of his accepting the advice of His Majesty's Government, they would be able to make good to him the arms and credits which he loses thereby, you should say that you will report the enquiry.

5. As regards "military matters," the German Government may have in mind such things as military missions. His Majesty's Government would regard the acceptance of German or Italian military or other missions at the present time as most unfortunate, in view of the propaganda which they could carry out, and the impression which their reception would make upon the inhabitants of neighbouring States.

6. But although His Majesty's Government are always anxious in principle to assist Ibn Saud in any way they can, the demands upon their resources at the present time are so great that it is improbable that they could themselves spare officers for such purposes, even if the King were to invite them to do so. They would probably therefore be quite content if the King were to decide not to receive military or similar missions from any of the Great Powers.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 259; Bagdad, No. 270; and Cairo, No. 539.)

[E 6043/394/25]

No. 17.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Trott (Jedda).

(No. 116.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 27, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 105 [of 6th August: Armaments credits for Saudi Arabia].

Export Credits Guarantee Department have now informed Saudi Arabian Legation that they are prepared to conclude a guarantee agreement for a maximum of £85,000, that the rate of interest would be 5 per cent. per annum, and that the repayment period would be five years.

2. This agreement would cover—

- (a) Cartridge factory.
- (b) Raw material for factory.
- (c) 3,500,000 rounds of new ammunition.
- (d) 200 Hotchkiss guns.
- (e) £10,000 for the purchase of rifles.

3. Saudi Arabian Minister will report direct to his Government.

[E 6111/G]

No. 18.

Cypher Telegram from India Office to Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, August 29.)

(No. P.Z. 5189/39.)

(Secret.)

August 28, 1939.

YOUR telegram dated the 14th August. His Majesty's Government have approved proposal in paragraph 19 of Muscat Defence Scheme for presentation of arms to Sultan, though it is regretted that owing to numerous calls on their resources there may be some delay in delivery. For same reason it is doubtful whether it is possible to pursue the suggestion of a reserve of ammunition unless Government of India would be in a position to supply this. Please instruct Political Agent to approach Sultan orally informing him of His Majesty's Government's intention to present him with arms and asking him whether as *quid pro quo* he will be prepared to afford us the necessary facilities in his territory and waters in the event of war. His Majesty's Government would naturally in their own interests be prepared to protect Sultan against external aggression

resulting from a war in which they are engaged, and this fact may be pointed out to Sultan if he repeats his request for a guarantee. There would be difficulty in promising him guarantee against internal disturbance, but we could offer to give him such assistance as may be possible. Question of subsidy can be left for further consideration when we know Sultan's reaction to promise of arms, unless Sultan raises question in connexion with setting up of control port at Masirah Bay, in which case you may inform him that His Majesty's Government are prepared to consider the question.

2. For your own information.

3. I hope that it will be possible on above lines to secure facilities desired, and, in particular, to smooth matters if Sultan should by any chance take umbrage at action which Admiralty will in any case have been obliged owing to urgency to take at Masirah Bay.

(Repeated to the Government of India and Political Agent, Muscat.)

[E 4690/277/25]

No. 19.

THE FRONTIERS BETWEEN TRANSJORDAN AND NEJD AND TRANSJORDAN AND THE HEJAZ.

[WITH MAP.]

(A)—General.

THE frontier between the Mandatory State of Transjordan, which was formed out of Ottoman territory after the Great War, and the Sultanate of Nejd, which was an amalgamation of various Central Arabian tribes under the rule of Ibn Saud (Abdul-Aziz-bin-Abdul-Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud), was laid down in an agreement, commonly called the Hadda Agreement, which was signed on the 2nd November, 1925. The signatories were the late Sir Gilbert Clayton on behalf of the British Government, and Ibn Saud, described as Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies, on behalf of the Government of Nejd. In 1926 Ibn Saud, who had begun as Emir of Nejd and had become free of nominal Ottoman suzerainty as a result of the Great War, conquered the Hejaz; and he is now the ruler of a kingdom comprising both Nejd and the Hejaz under the title of Saudi Arabia. This kingdom has succeeded to the rights and obligations of Nejd, including those embodied in the Hadda Agreement.

2. Article 1 of the Hadda Agreement reads as follows:—

"The frontier between Nejd and Transjordan starts in the north-east from the point of intersection of meridian 39° E. and parallel 32° N., which marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and Iraq⁽¹⁾ [point A], and proceeds in a straight line to the point of intersection of meridian 37° E. and parallel 31° 30' N. [point B], and thence along meridian 37° E. to the point of its intersection with parallel 31° 25' N. [point C]. From this point it proceeds in a straight line to the point of intersection of meridian 38° E. and parallel 30° N. [point D], leaving all projecting edges of the Wadi Sirhan in Nejd territory; and thence proceeds along meridian 38° E. to the point of its intersection with parallel 29° 35' N. [point E].

"The map referred to in this agreement is that known as the 'International Asia Map, 1:1,000,000 [North H 37: El Djauf: compiled in 1918]."

The notes in square brackets do not occur in the original text, but are inserted here to facilitate later references to this text.

3. The settlement of the frontier between Transjordan and Nejd has not been followed by a corresponding settlement of the frontier between Transjordan and the Hejaz, because Ibn Saud has a claim, inherited from King Hussein of the Hejaz, to the Aqaba-Maan district of Transjordan. The merits of this

⁽¹⁾ By article 1 of the "Protocol of Uqair" of the 2nd December, 1922, between the King of Iraq and the Sultan of Nejd, the frontier between Iraq and Nejd runs (westward) "..... from Mukur to the Jebel Anazan (Anaza) situated in the neighbourhood of the intersection of latitude 32° north with longitude 39° east where the Iraq-Nejd boundary terminates."

claim need not be discussed here, and it will suffice to say that His Majesty's Government do not admit it. Its existence has, however, made it necessary for His Majesty's Government to lay down unilaterally a provisional frontier between Transjordan and the Hejaz which is accepted by Ibn Saud for so long as he does not wish to press actively his claim to the Aqaba-Maan district—a point upon which he has given certain confidential assurances. This provisional frontier is defined in a letter sent by Sir Gilbert Clayton to Ibn Saud on the 19th May, 1927, on the occasion of the signature of the Treaty of Jeddah on the 20th May of that year. The definition is as follows:—

"The frontier between the Hejaz and Transjordan starts from the intersection of meridian 38° E. and parallel 29° 35' N., which marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and Transjordan [point E], and proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Hejaz Railway 2 miles south of Mudawwara [point F]. From this point it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Gulf of Aqaba 2 miles south of the town of Aqaba [point G]."

As in the case of the extract from the Hadda Agreement, the notes in square brackets are added for convenience of reference.

4. The frontier between Nejd and the Hejaz (now Saudi Arabia) and Transjordan resulting from the Hadda Agreement and Sir Gilbert Clayton's letter, though never delimited, was observed for some years by the local authorities and populations on both sides without any serious difficulty arising, and nothing worse than a few local incidents occurred to disturb relations between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government.

(B)—The Discussions of 1934–35.

5. In 1934, however, two points about which there had been some dispute formed the subject of communications from the Saudi Arabian Government. These were:—

- (i) Hazim, an important well at the head of the Wadi Sirhan.
- (ii) Thaniyya Taraif, which was presumed to be one or both of two water-courses lying to the east of the Jebel Tubaik, in the south-eastern corner of Transjordan, and shown as Shaib Tarais and Shaib Thaniyya on the 1918 map.

6. The question of Hazim arose in the following way: A somewhat similar disagreement over the neighbouring well of Haditha had led a few years before to the recognition by Transjordan that the well lay within Saudi Arabian territory, and to the subsequent suggestion that if the Saudi Arabian Government would allow Transjordan patrols to water at Haditha Saudi patrols should enjoy the same facilities at Hazim. On the 2nd June, 1934, six months after this suggestion was made, the Saudi Arabian Government replied with a request to be supplied with the results of any "astronomic measurements" which might have been made at Hazim. The Saudi Arabian Government also indicated that they considered the well to lie exactly on the frontier with Transjordan. The Transjordan Government were convinced that it lay on their own side of the frontier, but owing to the state of ignorance in which His Majesty's Government then found themselves about the geography of the whole area in question, it was decided to leave the request for further information unanswered. The Saudi Arabian Government have not since returned to the charge; and it may be added that although at seasons when tribes are grazing in the Hazim area a small Saudi patrol has been encamped near the well, in addition to the seasonal post of the Transjordan Police, no serious incident has occurred there.

7. As regards Thaniyya Taraif, the first Saudi Arabian protest was made in October 1934. It was vaguely worded as regards the exact point complained of, and His Majesty's Government, being then still ignorant of the geographical facts, took advantage of this vagueness to conceal their doubts, and to reply that the car track on which the place named was situated had been used regularly by Transjordan patrols for the past three years and was in Transjordan territory.

A further protest was made by the Saudi Arabian Government early in 1935. It attempted to be more precise in indicating the place concerned, and this suggested that the Saudi Arabian Government were using the 1918 map. By this time His Majesty's Government had received maps compiled from recent surveys. These maps left no room for doubt that the car track round the southern and eastern flanks of the Jebel Tubaik used by armoured cars of the Royal Air Force and Transjordan Frontier Force when on patrol followed the water-courses shown as Shaib Tarais and Shaib Thaniyya on the 1918 map, and passed in doing so to the east of the line D-E on that map, and so through Saudi Arabian territory. His Majesty's Minister at Jedda took the view that this protest both increased the necessity for a clarification of the frontiers and provided an opportunity for suggesting the necessary steps to the Saudi Arabian Government.

(C)—Effect of the Surveys made since 1918.

8. But the surveys mentioned in the preceding paragraph had led to much more disconcerting discoveries than that relating to the Thaniyya Taraif. It was now clear that the whole Transjordan-Nejd frontier established as a result of the Hadda Agreement in 1925, and consequently also the eastern terminal (point E) of the Transjordan-Hejaz frontier, as laid down unilaterally by His Majesty's Government in 1927, were (although the Saudi Arabian Government might not know it) open to serious doubt as the results of these surveys, which showed:—

- (i) That the geographical positions of the physical features shown on the 1918 map were seriously in error, the latitudes and longitudes of such points as could be identified proving to be several miles to the south and east of their geographical positions as shown on the 1918 map; and
- (ii) That, in addition, much inaccuracy exists as regards the relations of the physical features shown on the 1918 map to one another.

9. The sectors where these inaccuracies are most marked are the extreme north, *i.e.*, the point at which the frontiers of Iraq, Nejd and Transjordan meet, and the extreme south-east, *i.e.*, the Jebel Tubaik area, at the eastern end of which lies the Thaniyya Taraif.

10. This discovery placed His Majesty's Government in a position of some perplexity, since:—

- (a) In the north, the Jebel Anaiza (the termination point of the Iraq-Nejd boundary) was now found to lie some 15-20 miles to the north-east of the point where it was thought to lie when the map was made in 1918 and the frontier described in 1925.^(*) But the consequence of moving the starting point of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier 15-20 miles to the north-east of the correct point of intersection of meridian 39° E. and parallel 32° N., and drawing the frontier line from this new point to Point B, might be, first, to place Hazim inside Saudi Arabia^(†) and, secondly, to reduce the width of the corridor (through which passed the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline) connecting Transjordan with Iraq. For this sector, therefore, it seemed at first sight to be to the interest of His Majesty's Government to adopt an interpretation of the Hadda Agreement, whereby the geographical co-ordinates mentioned therein should alone be taken into account in determining the frontier the 1918 map, all other considerations being disregarded (the result of such an interpretation may be called for convenience the "literal" frontier).

(*) The Jebel Anaiza does not in consequence appear upon the latest (1938) El Djauif 1:1,000,000 sheet at all, but on the Damascus sheet.

(†) As a matter of fact, the information embodied in the latest El Djauif and Damascus 1:1,000,000 sheets seems to show that Hazim lies in Transjordan whether point A is taken as the correct intersection of 39° E. and 32° N. or the summit of the Jebel Anaiza, and equally whether point A is placed at the 940 metre or the 935 metre summit (see (c) in paragraph 11 below).

- (b) In the south-east, parts of the Jebel Tubaik were now found to lie, for a distance of some 20-25 miles, to the east of the line D-E as established by the correct co-ordinates, and, similarly, for some 20-25 miles, to the south of the "literal" line E-F, instead of lying wholly to the north and west of the frontier. But the result of having so much of the Jebel Tubaik to the south and east of the frontier would be that the car tracks round its southern and eastern flanks, the continued use of which was considered essential for the defence of Transjordan (owing to the supposed impossibility of finding any alternative tracks further to the north and west) would also lie to the east and south of the frontier and so be outside Transjordan territory. For this sector, therefore, His Majesty's Government preferred an interpretation of the Hadda Agreement, whereby the frontier should bear the same relation to the physical features as it bore when drawn on the 1918 map, the correct position of the geographical co-ordinates being disregarded (the result of such an interpretation may be called for convenience the "true" frontier, but it must be understood that it is only true in the sense that His Majesty's Government have for their part formed the opinion, for reasons given below, that it represents the proper interpretation of the Hadda Agreement).

11. There were, however, yet further complications:—

- (c) The Jebel Anaiza had been found to have two summits, the higher (940 metres) being nearer to the correct intersection of meridian 39° E. and parallel 32° N., but the lower (935 metres), which lies some 8 miles to the north-east of the higher, being generally regarded by the Bedouin (according to Air Headquarters in Iraq) as the "Jebel Anaiza." In spite of the local interpretation, it was eventually decided that the 940-metre summit should be adopted for the purpose of marking the frontiers between Iraq and Nejd and Transjordan and Nejd on maps published by His Majesty's Government, the 940-metre summit corresponding more closely than the other with the terms of article 1 of the Hadda Agreement and article 1 of the Protocol of Uqair.
- (d) On a strict, and, indeed, on any, construction of the Hadda Agreement, the line C-D fell short at most points of the edges of the Wadi Sirhan, a Wadi which is reported to have such well-defined banks as to make it possible to state where an "edge" runs. It was, however, considered necessary that Royal Air Force machines should be able to fly up to, although not beyond, the "edges" of the Wadi, so as to be able to spot concentrations of raiders within it.
- (e) Most important of all, there was the special difficulty affecting the south-eastern sector (already mentioned in paragraph 7), where a part of the car track round the eastern end of the Jebel Tubaik (*i.e.*, the part in the Thaniyya Taraif area) lay to the east of the frontier (D-E) even as shown on the 1918 map, and, indeed, to the east of the frontier on any possible interpretation of the Hadda Agreement. It seems probable that, when the agreement was signed, the negotiators failed to realise that the spur between Shaib Tarais and Shaib Thaniyya, as shown on the 1918 map, and an adjoining bluff called the Thaila Maizala, formed part of the *massif* of the Jebel Tubaik, or that the features marked on the 1918 map to the south of the Jebel Tubaik were hopelessly inaccurate. However this may be, the Saudi Arabian Government had become aware that the track entered their territory at the Thaniyya Taraif, while His Majesty's Government, as has been stated, were most anxious to retain the use of this track.
- (f) A part of the car track round the southern flank of the Jebel Tubaik lay similarly to the south of the line E-F on any possible location of point E under the Hadda Agreement, and on any possible drawing of the frontier laid down in Sir Gilbert Clayton's letter. It was even found that a Royal Air Force landing ground to the south of the Jebel Tubaik lay beyond any frontier which His Majesty's Government could possibly claim.

(g) To make matters still more complicated, the position of point E, if this position is fixed on the latest El Djauf sheet on the basis of the relation which its co-ordinates as given in the Hadda Agreement bear to the physical features along the Transjordan-Nejd frontier, is different from the position of point E, if this position is similarly fixed in relation to the physical features along the Transjordan-Nejd frontier. In other words, so far as the straight line of Sir Gilbert Clayton's letter (E-F) is concerned, there are two possible versions of the so-called "true" frontier. For convenience the "true" frontier proper may be taken as the version which depends on the physical features along the Transjordan-Nejd frontier, and the version depending on the physical features along the Transjordan-Hejaz frontier may be called the "modified true" frontier, point E on the "modified true" frontier lying some miles due south of its position on the "true" frontier. (It would, however, be impossible for His Majesty's Government, in any negotiations which may take place with the Saudi Arabian Government hereafter, to make any claim on the basis of the physical features along the Transjordan-Hejaz frontier. Point E must, in fact, be fixed according to some interpretation or other of the Hadda Agreement only, without regard to any other data, and the "modified true" frontier is mentioned here by way of explanation only.)

12. In view of these difficulties and particularly of (e), it was decided to try to secure the consent of the Saudi Arabian Government to an interpretation which would ignore both the correct positions of the geographical co-ordinates and the 1918 map, and so not correspond exactly with either the "literal" or the "true" frontiers, but which would depend on the intentions of the negotiators of the Hadda Agreement, which had been, as there was good reason to assume, to leave the whole of the Wadi Sirhan to Nejd and the whole of the Jebel Tubaik to Transjordan.

(D)—*The Discussions of 1935-38.*

13. Instructions were accordingly sent to Sir Andrew Ryan, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, in fulfilment of which he addressed the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs (the Emir Faisal) on the 4th June, 1935, in the following terms:—

"My Government have now instructed me to inform your Royal Highness that the question of Thaniyya Taraif is necessitating exhaustive study, owing to difficulties in maps, but that His Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss it with his Excellency Fuad Bey [Fuad Bey Hamza, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs] in London. They trust this will be agreeable to the Saudi Arabian Government, and that Fuad Bey may be in a position to deal with the matter in accordance with the conversations regarding the various matters which it was agreed to reserve for further discussion during his visit to London."

It had been decided that there was no need to raise the question of Hazim until Fuad Hamza reached London.

14. The question of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier was duly discussed during the visit of Fuad Hamza, the first meeting being held at the Foreign Office on the 15th July, 1935. In the course of the discussion Mr. Rendel, the head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, proposed either:—

- (a) That the question should be left in abeyance for the present; or
- (b) That it should be cleared up, in which latter case he suggested—
 - (i) A new and detailed survey of the whole frontier area on both sides of the line.
 - (ii) The interpretation of the line laid down by the Hadda Agreement in the light of the known intentions of the negotiators.

(iii) When (i) and (ii) had been settled, a frontier delimitation commission should be set up "to delimit on the ground the nearest possible approach, in the light of the new information available, to the frontier which King Abdul Aziz and Sir Gilbert Clayton were trying to lay down in the Hadda Agreement."

15. Fuad Hamza did not welcome these suggestions, but agreed to submit them to King Abdul Aziz. In reply, he made the following two alternative proposals:—

- (1) That the frontier should be delimited on the ground purely in the light of the description by geographical co-ordinates, i.e., by latitude and longitude only as given in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement (a solution corresponding to the so-called "literal" frontier: see (a) in paragraph 10 above); or
- (2) That all existing physical features shown on the 1918 map as lying to the west of the frontier should be regarded as falling within Transjordan, and all of those shown as lying to the east of it should be regarded as falling within Saudi Arabia, irrespective of where they might actually be on the ground (a solution approximating to the "true" frontier: see (b) in paragraph 10 above).

16. Mr. Rendel subsequently wrote a letter to Fuad Hamza on the 19th July, 1935, embodying the substance of the discussion and the various proposals, but while undertaking to submit Fuad Hamza's proposals to the proper authorities, he held out very little hope of their being found acceptable. At the end of this letter was added the proviso that the discussion was to be understood to affect only the Transjordan-Nejd frontier and not the frontier between Transjordan and the Hejaz.

17. When, however, the record of the conversation of the 15th July, 1935, reached Jerusalem and Amman, the civil and military authorities immediately reported in favour of the acceptance of Fuad Hamza's second ("physical features") proposal (see (2) in paragraph 15 above).

18. The reason for this change of attitude was that the Royal Air Force had in the meanwhile discovered that a new car track(*) could be made further to the west in the Jebel Tubaik area, which would eliminate the necessity of insisting on the retention of Thaniyya Taraif within Transjordan. In a despatch to the Colonial Office, dated the 27th December, 1935, the Deputy High Commissioner for Transjordan wrote:—

"Examination of this proposal in the light of the known positions of the physical features leads me to the conclusion that it [the 'physical features' suggestion] would probably constitute a settlement of the question satisfactory both to the Royal Air Force and to the Transjordan authorities. Indeed, it appears that it would in most essentials agree with the intentions of the negotiators of the Hadda Agreement, which His Majesty's Government contend should form the basis of an agreed delimitation of the Hadda Agreement frontiers. It would place the whole of the Jebel Tubaik in Transjordan, with the exception of the small spur between Shaib Taraif and Shaib Thaniyya, which is shown on the (1918) 1/1,000,000 map as lying to the east of meridian 38° east [the line D-E when shown on the 1918 map]; it would establish the Transjordan-Nejd frontier generally along the south-western edge of the Wadi Sirhan; thus assuring to Transjordan an area valuable both for the grazing of Bedouin flocks and also from the point of view of the difficulties of Transjordan; it would assure Hazim to Transjordan; and it would fix the southern terminal of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier approximately 7 miles further south than its position according to geographical co-ordinates, thereby moving the Transjordan-Hejaz frontier between that point and Mudawara further to the south. . . . I have reached the conclusion that it would be to the advantage of His Majesty's Government and of Transjordan if a settlement of the frontier could be reached on the basis proposed by Fuad Bey Hamza, and I recommend that the proposal should be pursued at the earliest opportunity."

(*) This discovery, however, later proved incorrect (see paragraph 32 below).

19. The news that an alternative car track could be made came as a complete surprise to His Majesty's Government, since it had hitherto been thought that, unless the car track running round the eastern extremity of the Thaila Maizila bluff could be kept for Transjordan, the control of the Jebel Tubaik would become impossible, and the whole of the Jebel would, in practice, be lost. It was on the basis of this belief that Fuad Hamza's proposals had been given so discouraging a reception when they were first put forward. The new situation created by this discovery was immediately reviewed by His Majesty's Government and it was agreed:—

- (a) That His Majesty's Minister at Jedda should be instructed to remind Fuad Hamza of his undertaking (recorded in paragraph 15 of Mr. Rendel's letter of the 19th July, 1935, to Fuad Hamza) to submit the proposals of His Majesty's Government to King Abdul Aziz; and to press Fuad Bey for an early statement of the Saudi Arabian Government's views;
- (b) That Sir Andrew Ryan should be confidentially informed that, in view of the changed situation revealed by the despatch of the 27th December, 1935, from the Deputy High Commissioner for Transjordan, His Majesty's Government would now be ready to accept the second of the two alternative proposals put forward by Fuad Bey on the 15th July (see paragraph 15 (2) above); but that His Majesty's Government considered it preferable not to take the initiative in informing the Saudi Arabian Government to this effect.

20. Instructions on these lines were sent to Sir Andrew Ryan, and he accordingly spoke to Fuad Hamza on the 16th March, 1936, reminding him of his undertaking to submit to King Abdul Aziz the proposals made by Mr. Rendel in his letter of the 19th July, 1935, and pressed him for an early statement of the Saudi Arabian Government's views. Sir Andrew Ryan further intimated to Fuad Hamza that, if the Saudi Arabian Government found Mr. Rendel's proposals impossible of acceptance, His Majesty's Government might find means to overcome the difficulties which Fuad Hamza's own counter-suggestions appeared to present. On the 20th March Sir Andrew Ryan was instructed that, if Fuad Hamza definitely rejected Mr. Rendel's proposals, he might agree in principle to Fuad Hamza's "physical features" proposal without further reference home.

21. The action recorded above elicited from Fuad Hamza on the 30th March, 1936, the following oral reply:—

- (a) That there should be no departure from the text of the Hadda Agreement;
- (b) That the geographical facts should be ascertained (as suggested by Mr. Rendel);
- (c) That delimitation should be effected on the lines of Fuad Hamza's first proposal (i.e., delimitation on the ground in the light of the description by geographical co-ordinates (see (1) in paragraph 15 above)).

22. Sir Andrew Ryan indicated in reply that Fuad's suggestion under (b) in the preceding paragraph would lead up more naturally to his "physical features" proposal than to his "geographical co-ordinates" proposal. Thereupon Fuad Hamza suggested a combination of both proposals, i.e., a settlement partly on the basis of physical features, partly on the basis of co-ordinates. On being pressed to say more exactly what he meant, Fuad Hamza's final position seemed to be that geographical facts should be ascertained and that places adjoining the frontier should be assigned, with reference to the co-ordinates on the 1918 map, in relation to the general physical structure as shown thereon. This was still somewhat obscure, but he confessed that, in the last resort, the process would be one of "bargaining." Fuad Hamza stressed the fact that only the Transjordan-Nejd frontier was under discussion.

23. This reply was not very helpful, as Fuad Hamza's two alternative proposals of the 19th July were incompatible. The essence of the whole problem was that the Hadda Agreement itself contained these two incompatibilities. However, no doors had been closed and Fuad Hamza had, in effect, accepted the proposals for a new survey and a delimitation commission. The next step was to draw him back to his "physical features" proposal, which was to the

advantage of Transjordan, and away from the idea of delimitation on the basis of co-ordinates; further, to obtain a clear-cut understanding that the "physical features" proposal was to form the basis of the work of the survey and delimitation commission before that commission embarked on its task; and, finally, to make it clear that there could be no question of "bargaining."

24. Accordingly, Sir Andrew Ryan was instructed to reply to Fuad Hamza to the effect that His Majesty's Government were prepared to agree to his "physical features" proposal, provided that he abandoned definitely his "co-ordinates" proposal. Bargaining was to be excluded, but if the frontier resulting from a settlement on the basis of "physical features" proved to be inconveniently distorted, there might still be room for some adjustment with mutual advantages. On this understanding, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to proceed forthwith, in agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government, to the appointment of a frontier delimitation commission to carry out the survey and delimit the frontier on the basis of the "physical features" proposal.^(*)

25. The departure of Fuad Hamza for Egypt on the 14th April, 1936, obliged Sir Andrew Ryan to take the matter up with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin (Ibn Saud's private secretary), who was ignorant of the details. At the second discussion, the sheikh said he would convey the latest view of the Saudi Arabian Government by personal letter. At the third meeting on the 23rd May he proposed that when the joint commission had reported, and not until then, steps should be taken to determine the frontier in whatever manner might seem most suitable. On the 6th June Sir Andrew Ryan reminded the sheikh of his promise of a letter. On the 17th July the sheikh replied that the Saudi Arabian Government preferred to postpone going any further with the question until they had been able to obtain further information as to the nature of the frontier. He asked Sir Andrew Ryan to accept this oral statement instead of the promised letter.

26. At the end of December 1936 Fuad Hamza confirmed Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's statement that the Saudi Arabian Government wanted more information before replying, and it became apparent that no early progress was to be expected. Moreover, it had for some time appeared likely that the information which the Saudi Arabian Government desired before committing themselves was, in fact, information as to where His Majesty's Government thought the frontier lay, for a forward movement had recently been observed among the Saudi frontier posts. On their side the Transjordan authorities had, on the 31st December, 1936, reported unofficially that, since the end of the Palestine disorders of that year, two patrols had been sent out along the "physical features" line without apparent effect on the Saudi Arabian authorities.

27. The question of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier was next discussed with representatives of the Saudi Arabian Government at a meeting at Jedda on the 19th March, 1937, between Sir Reader Bullard (who had succeeded Sir Andrew Ryan as His Majesty's Minister at Jedda) and Mr. Rendel on the one side and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Hafiz Wahba (the Saudi Arabian Minister in London) on the other. Nothing would induce Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to agree beforehand upon the principle to be adopted for delimitation after a fresh survey had been effected and a correct map made. Instead, he proposed that the joint commission should first make a survey and prepare a map, and that the two parties should then compare the new map with the old and try to delimit the frontier in friendly discussion. The practical advantages of Fuad Hamza's earlier "physical features" proposal were again set before Sheikh Hafiz, but it was evident that that proposal was now regarded with great suspicion by the Saudi Arabian authorities (no doubt because His Majesty's Government had suddenly become so favourable towards it, after having first rejected it), and that it stood no chance of being accepted by them.

28. The new Saudi proposal was confirmed a day or two later in writing in the following terms:—

"In view of the desire (expressed) regarding the demarcation of the frontier between Nejd and Transjordan, and whereas it has been expressed on several occasions from the British side that there were mistake(s) in the

(*) The proposal for a commission to survey and delimit the frontier at one and the same time was later modified, as is explained below.

map referred to in the Treaty of Hadda, and under which the frontiers of Nejd and Transjordan had been defined, our Government, while preserving and adhering to the text of the said Treaty of Hadda, agree to the selection of a Joint Technical Committee for the survey of the territory along the frontiers and the making of a correct map thereof. And if, after comparing it with the one according to which the frontiers were specified in the Treaty of Hadda, a discrepancy is found between the two maps, whether as to longitude or latitude, or places, friendly discussion shall take place between the two Governments with a view to reaching an understanding and agreement thereon. If an agreement be reached, well and good; if not, then the two parties shall have recourse to the text of the Treaty of Jedda."

29. Although the new Saudi scheme involved the risk of duplication of work and expense—for it might entail a delimitation commission in addition to a survey commission—it had, in Sir Reader Bullard's opinion, advantages which far outweighed its possible drawbacks:—

"By giving way to a point to which the Saudi Arabian Government seem to attach great importance, we can show that our own proposal was not a trap and make them feel that they are being given fair treatment, while our interests are protected by the fact that, whatever procedure is adopted, in the end the frontier must be drawn according to the places shown on the (1918) map."

30. This recommendation was accepted after consideration by His Majesty's Government, and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba were duly informed by Mr. Rendel on the 30th June, 1937, that the Saudi proposal for a joint survey was acceptable. At the same time His Majesty's Minister at Jedda was instructed to inform the Saudi Arabian Government in similar terms.

31. The next step was to devise practical arrangements for the execution of the proposed survey, and His Majesty's Government gave consideration to the various points to be settled. Unfortunately a number of difficulties of a technical character arose, mainly in connexion with the terms of reference of the survey party and the question of the precise moment at which the Saudi Arabian Government should be informed of the results of the latest surveys in the frontier area; and over a year had elapsed before it was possible to formulate concrete proposals. In October 1938, however, Sir Reader Bullard was instructed to communicate draft terms of reference for the survey party (Annex A) to the Saudi Arabian Government and ascertain whether they were in agreement with them, or whether they wished to propose any additions or amendments. To this enquiry no reply has yet been received. Sir Reader Bullard was also instructed to communicate in due course copies of the latest (1938) El Djauf sheet of the 1:1,000,000 international map of the Saudi Arabian Government.

32. Meanwhile, a further survey of the frontier had been carried out by Squadron-Leader Dawson in May 1937, which threw fresh light upon the position with regard to possible alternative tracks round the Jebel Tubaik and along the Transjordan-Hejaz frontier. The report of Squadron-Leader Dawson showed that the information recorded in paragraph 18 was incorrect, and that for strategic reasons the retention of the present *de facto* frontier was of great importance, since no satisfactory alternatives could be found—

(a) To the armoured car route passing to the east of the Jebel Tubaik and thence to the east of the line D-E on the Transjordan-Nejd frontier; it seemed that although a track known as "T track" passing south from point A 120 through Kilwa to Ferdat was passable for armoured cars, there was a gap of about 12 miles between this track and the track round the Jebel Tubaik used by the Transjordan patrols (CTJ track). This gap was filled by a track of kinds down the Wadi Chadelwiyat and the cliffs on the southern face of the Jebel Tubaik, which Squadron-Leader Dawson followed in a light car; but he formed the opinion that armoured cars could not use it and might be easily ambushed if they did so; the most he found possible was, having once descended the face of the Jebel, to join TJ track from JTA track without going south of the line E-F.

(b) To the tracks on the present Transjordan-Hejaz frontier which lie to the south of the line E-F as it appears on the 1938 El Djauf map; this refers to two tracks known as "BA track" and "Major Glubb's southern track," running westwards from the neighbourhood of point JTA to Mudawara; no track running further north from Ferdat to Mudawara could be found.

(E)—Conclusion.

33. It may be convenient in conclusion to summarise more explicitly the views which His Majesty's Government have formed as a result of the study of this question during the last four years.

34. His Majesty's Government have reached the conclusion that a frontier settlement based on the supposed intentions of the negotiators of the Hadda Agreement only cannot be sustained; and that the proper method of applying the provisions of the agreement is one producing a frontier line based upon the text and the 1918 map in conjunction (called the "true" frontier in (b) in paragraph 10). In arriving at this conclusion His Majesty's Government have given full weight to the arguments which may be put forward on the other side in support of the contention that the boundary, as defined by co-ordinates alone in the text of the agreement (*i.e.*, the so-called "literal" frontier), is the legal frontier and that all passages in the text which conflict with this interpretation, including the reference to the 1918 map, should be ignored. They consider, however, that such an interpretation would not only be at variance with the intentions of the negotiators of the agreement, but would also be unjustifiable as involving the rejection of certain passages in the text, which must have some meaning.

35. A detailed opinion leading up to this view of the Hadda Agreement is contained in a memorandum dated the 26th February, 1938, by the second legal adviser at the Foreign Office, which forms Annex B hereto. It is only necessary to say here that His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that the co-ordinates mentioned in the Hadda Agreement must be regarded, not as specified points on the frontier, but as guides to indicate the position of points on the 1918 map, used in a manner similar to that in which grid co-ordinates would be used on a gridded map; and that in transferring to the ground the points fixed by geographical co-ordinates on the 1918 map they should be transferred to positions as far as possible in the same relation to the physical features as their positions occupied to those features on the 1918 map.

36. If in 1925 a map had been available which correctly represented the topography of the area in question, there would be no difficulty, on this interpretation, in determining the exact location of the intended frontier. The relations between the physical features on the 1918 map are, however, as has been seen, entirely inaccurate, and there might, therefore, be some difficulty, when the time came for determining the exact location of the frontier, in deciding exactly where some of the points indicated by intersections in the Hadda Agreement, or, indeed, any points on the 1918 map, would lie on the ground; similarly, it might be found that lines which are said to be straight in the Hadda Agreement will not be straight when applied to the ground if they are to remain in the same relation to the physical features as on the 1918 map. These difficulties are especially great in the south-eastern area. In this area no interpretation of the Hadda Agreement or appeal to the intentions of its negotiators, however justifiable, is likely to suffice to establish the exact location of the boundary line, since it is impossible, by comparing the physical features as shown on the 1918 map with those on the maps produced as the result of later surveys, to deduce in any detail the intended frontier.

37. In general, however, His Majesty's Government consider that, so far as these difficulties admit, the proper principle to be observed in delimiting the frontier should be that it should be drawn in such a way as to leave these physical features which in the 1918 map appear on the Transjordan side of the frontier within Transjordan, and those which appear on the Saudi Arabian side in the same map within Saudi Arabia; and that, where difficulties arise over the application of this principle, they should be settled by negotiation between the two parties in the light of the geographical information which it is hoped to

obtain as a result of the forthcoming survey. In this connexion His Majesty's Government believe that it can justifiably be maintained that the frontier as shown on the map of the Hadda Agreement was intended to leave the Jebel Tubaik massif as a whole in Transjordan, just as the same agreement gave the whole of the Wadi Sirhan, with all its projecting edges, to Saudi Arabia; and, although the intentions of the negotiators cannot be set up against the terms of the agreement and the 1918 map, they hope that, if it comes to a question of negotiation after the proposed survey has been carried out, this consideration may be sufficient to secure their main desiderata in many cases where the agreement and the map defy interpretation, and especially in the south-eastern sector.

38. Finally, His Majesty's Government consider that adherence to the principle enumerated in the preceding paragraph is not only the correct course in itself, but is the method (short of the maintenance of the *de facto* frontier) by which the desiderata of Transjordan in respect of the frontier with Nejd as a whole can now best be secured. They have accordingly decided that, if and when, after the proposed survey has taken place, the whole frontier question comes up for discussion with the Saudi Arabian Government, the argument regarding the starting-point of the frontier at the Jebel Anaiza, indicated in Annex B, should be openly admitted and maintained, both on grounds of equity, because it clearly represents the true intentions of the negotiators of the Hadda Agreement, and because to withhold it would render it impossible for His Majesty's Government to use the same argument in respect of the rest of the frontier, this argument being of particular importance for the south-eastern area.

39. A further point which has to be considered is the effect on the *de facto* Transjordan-Hejaz frontier of a redefinition of the frontier between Transjordan and Nejd. Although the Saudi Arabian Government have not hitherto indicated that they wish to alter in any way the first of these frontiers (which it is difficult for them to discuss at all in view of their claim to Aqaba and Maan), and although they have admitted that the forthcoming survey is of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier only, the alignment of the eastern sector of the Hejaz frontier, between the Jebel Tubaik and the point 2 miles south of Mudawara (point F), depends on the position of the southern terminal point of the Nejd frontier (point E). It has already been stated that the *de facto* frontier (*i.e.*, the frontier constituted by the tracks used by Transjordan patrols) lies south of either the "true" or the "literal" frontiers on any interpretation of the position of point E of the Hadda Agreement. Indeed, while it is clear that it is in the interests of His Majesty's Government that point E should be established as far to the south as possible, it seems equally clear that His Majesty's Government will not be able to secure its establishment so far south that a straight line drawn from it to point F would leave all the southerly spurs of the Jebel Tubaik, and with them the southern curve of the Transjordan car track, within Transjordan.

40. The High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan and the military authorities in Palestine and Transjordan consider the retention of the car tracks along the Transjordan-Hejaz frontier, as well as the car tracks to the east of the Jebel Tubaik, as of great strategical importance. It would therefore be eminently satisfactory if the Saudi Arabian Government were to let the whole question drop, so that the *de facto* frontier could be retained throughout. There is not much hope of the Saudi Arabian Government allowing the question to rest, but it is to be hoped that, if the remainder of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier can be satisfactorily settled, His Majesty's Government may be able to persuade the Saudi Arabian Government to accept the existing car track to the east of the Jebel Tubaik, and also, wherever the necessity arises, the *de facto* Transjordan-Hejaz frontier, notwithstanding the fact that parts of it lie south of any line which can possibly be established on the basis of Sir Gilbert Clayton's letter. At the same time, it must be recognised that the Saudi Arabian Government are in a strong legal position so far as these last two points are concerned and it is therefore desirable that the search for alternative and more northerly armoured-car tracks from Ferdat to Mudawara, or at any rate for an alternative and more westerly armoured-car track from the northern side of the Jebel Tubaik to the neighbourhood of point J.T.A., should be continued whenever the opportunity offers.

Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
September 1939.

(F)—Postscript.

41. On the outbreak of war on the 3rd September, 1939, it became impossible for the War Office to find survey officers to form part of the party which it was intended should participate on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the survey of the frontier (see paragraph 31). The Colonial Office also stated that it would be impossible for the local authorities to undertake the survey without the assistance of an experienced survey officer. It was therefore suggested to Sir Reader Bullard that a visit which he was to pay to Riyadh in the autumn of 1939 might afford a good opportunity to explain to Ibn Saud the difficulty in which His Majesty's Government were placed by the demand, occasioned by the outbreak of war, on the supply of officers with survey experience, and he was instructed to add that, although His Majesty's Government had no intention of withdrawing from the agreement for a joint survey, they hoped that in the circumstances the Saudi Arabian Government would agree to defer the matter until it should be possible to find an officer with the necessary qualifications.

42. After Sir Reader Bullard had explained the situation, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin replied that both the Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Governments were, nevertheless, anxious to continue with the demarcation of their own common frontier (which had been proceeding, with interruptions, for some time), and that a joint Saudi-Iraqi survey party would recommence work on this frontier in the early part of November, beginning from Judaidat Ar'ar. It was expected that the demarcation of this portion of the frontier would be completed in three or four weeks. The joint Saudi-Iraqi survey would thus arrive (towards the end of November) at Jebel Anaiza (the junction of the frontiers of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Transjordan), and the Saudi Government therefore requested that a technical commission should be sent from Transjordan to participate in the survey at this point. Similar representations were made on behalf of the Iraqi Government to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

43. In view of these requests, arrangements were put in hand for the co-operation of a British official representing the mandatory Government as well as the Government of Transjordan in the work of fixing on the ground the meeting point of the three territories. But on the 10th December news was received from Mr. de Gaury (who had gone to Riyadh as a permanent representative with Ibn Saud of His Majesty's Minister at Jedda) that the Saudi-Iraqi survey party had ceased work on account of the non-ratification of a frontier agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq dealing with tribes on the frontier which had been signed on the 19th May, 1938, and owing to disputes about the site of a place called Muqur an Naam. In the circumstances, it seems unlikely that the demarcation of this frontier will be completed at any early date.

December 20, 1939.

ANNEX A.

The British-Saudi Arabian (Transjordan-Nejd) Frontier Reconnaissance-Survey Commission.

THE terms of reference of the commission are as follows:—

- (a) The commission shall reconnoitre and survey the ground along, and within a distance of approximately 5 to 15 miles on either side of, the frontier at present observed between Transjordan and Nejd or within such greater or lesser distance on either side of that frontier as circumstances may, in the light of the desiderata set out below, render necessary at different points along that frontier.

- (b) The commission shall identify and fix the true geographical position of all the main physical features which exist in the neighbourhood of the *de facto* frontier.
- (c) The commission shall prepare a map to the scale of 1/500,000 of the area surveyed, on which shall be marked all the physical features identified and fixed.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Saudi Arabian Government agree that—

- (i) The area of ground selected for the reconnaissance-survey does not prejudice the question of where any part of the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan should lie on a proper construction of the Hadda Agreement of 1925.
- (ii) The reconnaissance-survey is intended only to furnish the two Governments with necessary information on which the two Governments themselves can subsequently decide between them where the frontier is to lie, and therefore—
- (iii) The resultant map must show, without unnecessary detail, the true geographical position of any physical feature which the representative of either Government may, for the reason that he considers it is, or may be, relevant to a later consideration of the frontier question, wish to have identified and fixed.

3. The British and Saudi Arabian parties shall meet at the western end of the frontier separating Iraq from Nejd on or about _____ and, having formed themselves into a commission, shall proceed with the duties laid down in these terms of reference with as much expedition as the circumstances allow.

ANNEX B.

Interpretation of the Hadda Agreement of November 2, 1925.

THE interpretation of article 1 of the Hadda Agreement must be approached on the basis of the principles laid down in international decisions and accepted in international practice with regard to the interpretation of international agreements generally. The following three principles are relevant and important in this connexion:—

- (1) The interpretation to be sought must be that which gives effect to the intentions of those who concluded the agreement; these intentions, however, must be deduced from the text, and it is not permissible to have recourse to outside evidence (such as the minutes and records of the preparatory work at which the document was drawn up) unless the text is ambiguous and it is not possible to ascertain what was intended without having recourse to evidence outside the text. In any case, it is not possible by means of such outside evidence to adopt an interpretation which contradicts anything in the written text.
- (2) If possible an interpretation must be found which gives effect to every word in the text, and it is only if it is impossible by any means to reconcile, and give meaning to, everything which is written in the text that it is permissible to adopt an interpretation which rejects any part of the text as otiose or inconsistent.
- (3) If, but only if, it is impossible in accordance with principle (2) to find an interpretation which gives a meaning and effect to every word written in the text and it is therefore necessary to disregard certain words, then, in the process of selection of what words to keep and what words to disregard, the principle applies that in a frontier agreement a reference to a definite and well-known point prevails over a reference to a less definite point, such as a little-known place marked on a map or the intersection of geographical co-ordinates.

2. Article 1 of the Hadda Agreement runs:—

"The frontier between Nejd and Transjordan starts in the north-east from the point of intersection of meridian 39° east and parallel 32° north, which marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and Iraq. . . ."

The same point is referred to here by two descriptions:—

- (i) The end of the frontier between Nejd and Iraq.
- (ii) The intersection of two geographical co-ordinates.

Since of these two descriptions (i) would clearly be the prevailing one if there were any unreconcilable divergence, it is permissible to refer to the Protocol of Uqair of the 2nd December, 1922, concluded three years earlier, to fix the frontier between Nejd and Iraq which fixed this terminal point.

3. The end of article 1 of the Protocol of Uqair reads:—

" . . . to the Jabal Anaiza situated in the neighbourhood of the intersection of latitude 32° east with longitude 39° north where the Iraq-Nejd boundary terminates."

It is to be noted here that Jabal Anaiza is clearly adopted as the terminal point, and the geographical co-ordinates referred to are only added as a rough description of where to find this point. Further, the actual spot at the top of the Jabal Anaiza which is accepted as this terminal point has now been fixed and marked on the ground. There is no doubt, therefore, that in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement the first point is this spot on the top of the Jabal Anaiza which marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and Iraq.

4. There remains, however, in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement the further description of this point by two geographical co-ordinates; but, if these geographical co-ordinates are to be interpreted as being the true geographical co-ordinates, there is a conflict, because they do not intersect at this point on the top of the Jabal Anaiza, but at a point some distance away. These words, however, must not be rejected as otiose or inconsistent unless there is no way under which they can be reconciled, and there is here a way by which the words can be reconciled.

5. At the end of article 1 the following sentence occurs:—

"The map referred to in this agreement is that known as the international Asia map 1/1,000,000."

and, since this sentence occurs, some meaning and effect must be given to it. In fact, there is no other reference in this agreement to a map at all. The whole of article 1 from beginning to end consists in a series of points fixed by geographical co-ordinates, and if these geographical co-ordinates were intended to be the true geographical co-ordinates and the points to be wherever they intersect, there is no need for any reference to any map whatever and the sentence at the end of article 1 becomes meaningless. It follows, therefore, that if the geographical co-ordinates referred to in this article are interpreted as meaning the true geographical co-ordinates, we are obliged to strike out the last sentence of article 1 as being otiose, and to strike out at the beginning of the article the words "the point of intersection of meridian 39° east and parallel 32° north which marks" as being inconsistent. We must not adopt this interpretation, however, if there is a way of reconciling and giving meaning to all the words in the text, and there is, as has been said, a way in which this can be done.

6. If the 1/1,000,000 map existing at the date of the conclusion of the Hadda Agreement (which bears the date 1918) is looked at, it is seen that meridian 39° east and parallel 32° north are shown on that map as crossing at the summit of Jabal Anaiza, and this at once explains both the reference to the map and the inclusion of these co-ordinates. It at once becomes clear that those who framed article 1 were referring to points on the 1/1,000,000 map of the day where the geographical co-ordinates marked on the map intersected. If, then, the interpretation is adopted that the points referred to in article 1 are points on the map where the co-ordinates referred to intersect, at once the whole article becomes consistent, and the last sentence, so far from being otiose, is very important as explaining what the draftsmen intended. Since this interpretation alone gives

effect to the whole text, it is the one which, under principle of interpretation (2) above, must be adopted.

7. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, towards the end of article 1, a straight line is fixed between two points as the general line of the frontier, and it is then said that this frontier must leave "projecting edges of the Wadi Sirhan in Nejd territory," and it is seen that when the 1/1,000,000 map is looked at, this straight line cuts through certain form lines which are shown on this map as the edge of the Wadi Sirhan leaving projecting edges to the west.

8. Secondly, the conclusion is reinforced by the obvious practical consideration that it is rather strange for negotiators to draw up a treaty fixing a boundary by reference to true geographical co-ordinates when they had no idea where these would fall, but that it was quite natural for them to take a map and to mark upon the map certain points which they selected as the boundary and then to describe these points by reference to the geographical co-ordinates shown on the map.

9. It follows from the above that all the boundary points fixed in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement must be taken to be points on the 1/1,000,000 map existing at the time of its conclusion—i.e., the 1918 map—and that the boundary on the ground consists of the points on the ground which correspond as nearly as possible to these points on the 1918 map given their relation to other points marked on the map which can be recognised on the ground. If it is possible to fix on the ground a boundary from the indications given on the 1918 map, then this is the boundary which results from article 1 of the Hadda Agreement.

10. If, however, it is found that the 1918 map is so inaccurate that it is impossible to do this, the result is that article 1 of the agreement cannot be applied at all and has failed to fix the frontier. The position is open, and consequently those who claim that the frontier must be the *de facto* frontier which has been observed by both sides for a long period of years are on strong ground. It would not be possible in these circumstances to say that the frontier was fixed by an interpretation of the Hadda Agreement, which demonstrably is not the correct interpretation of it as a legal instrument, and cannot have been intended by those who drew it up; that is to say, we cannot fix the frontier by interpreting the co-ordinates referred to in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement as being true geographical co-ordinates, and not those marked upon the 1918 map.

11. I have arrived at this conclusion by confining myself to the text and without invoking "outside evidence" of the intentions of the negotiators. If, however, it were held, in spite of these arguments, that there was an ambiguity and recourse were had to what actually happened in the negotiations, the evidence of what happened only confirms this conclusion. It would show that the negotiators with the map before them began by agreeing to allocate this or that named point on the map to one side or the other—Kaf and the Wadi Sirhan to Ibn Saud, some salt pans to Transjordan, &c.—and then drew a line on the map, and that true geographical co-ordinates, as opposed to those shown on the map, were never in their minds at all.

W. E. BECKET.

Foreign Office, February 26, 1938.


N.B.—There is evidently an error in article 1 of the Protocol of Uqair which is quoted at the beginning of paragraph 3. The quotation should obviously read "latitude 32° north" and "longitude 39° east."

W. E. B.

AL JAUF

Jebel Anziz







Geographical Section General Staff No 2555,
Published at the War Office, 1918
2nd Edition 1938

Towns of importance (towns to scale)	Villes de l'importance (l'échelle)
27	27
27	27
40	40
57	57
61	61
Runes important	Runes importantes
Names of provinces	Noms des régions
Local names	Noms de lieux
Regions, Localities	Régions, Localités
Mountains, Massifs and important hills	Montagnes, Massifs et monts importants
Wells, Pools, Springs, Fountains, Gorges	Calottes, Puits, Caves, Fontaines, Gorges, Vallées
Valleys, Prairies, Plateaux, Cores, and Isles	Prairies, Plateaux, Caves, et îles
Boundary, International	Limite d'Etat
Boundary, International not demarcated	Limite d'Etat non bornée
Boundary, Provincial	Limite de province ou de département
Railway, Single track	Chemin de fer à une seule voie
Railway, Narrow gauge or light	Chemin de fer à voie étroite, tramways
Roads suitable for motor traffic in all weather	Routes automobiles utilisables toute l'année
Roads suitable for motor traffic in dry weather only	Routes automobiles utilisables en saison sèche
Tracks or paths	Voies ou sentiers
Explorers route	Route d'exploration
Telegraph along roads or tracks	Ligne télégraphique le long des routes
Telegraph not along roads or tracks	Ligne télégraphique ne suivant pas les routes
River perennial	Cours d'eau permanent
River, sometimes dry	Cours d'eau à sec une partie de l'année
River, unsurveyed	Cours d'eau non levés


RIYADH
Lulla
Kharfa
Qatana
Muharrat
CHER
ATAIBA
TUWAIQ
Al Ghadhara

Falls, Rapids, Fords, Forges, Dams	Chutes, Rapides, Sûls, Bacs, Barrages
Well or spring, Perennial, non-perennial, named	Puits ou source, permanent, tarissable, en nom
Waterhole	Point d'eau
Cistern, Reservoir, named	Cisternes, Réservoir en nom
Pipe line, water	Pipe line pour eau
Pipe line, with pumping station	Pipe line pour électricité avec station de pompage
Contours, Principal, auxiliary, approximate	Courbes de niveau, principales, auxiliaires, non levées
Heights in metres	Altitudes en mètres
Trigonometrical or astronomical point	Point trigonométrique ou astronomique
Telegraph or telephone office	Bureau de télégraphe ou téléphone
Post office	Bureau de poste
Post office with telegraph or telephone	Bureau de poste avec télégraphe ou téléphone
Wireless telegraph station	Station de télégraphe sans fil
Fort	Fort
Christian mission, Mosque, Minaret, or Tomb	Mission chrétienne, Mosquée, Minaret, ou Tombe
Pagoda or Temple	Pagode ou Temple
Sand	Sable
Sand dunes	Dunes
Stony area	Région pierreuse
Lake	Lac
Mud	Boue
Marsh or swamp, fresh	Marais d'eau douce
Salt lake	Lac salé
Area liable to inundation	Zone d'inondation
Gully	Fossés
Depressions	Dépressions
Cave	Tonnel

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
Kilomètres 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Kilomètres

1 Millimètre = 1 Kilomètre

ALTITUDE TINTS
(TEINTES HYPSOMETRIQUES)



Trigonometrical Survey	
Astronomically controlled Air Survey	
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Southern Desert Iraq Surveys, 1:500,000, 1930-37
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- BLACK LINE** The frontier according to the true positions of the geographical coordinates mentioned in the Hadda Agreement of the 2nd November, 1925.
- BLUE LINE** The frontier according to the points, whose geographical coordinates are given in the Hadda Agreement, if:-
(1) these points are shown, not according to their true geographical positions, but as nearly as possible in the same relation to physical features along the section of the frontier covered by the Hadda Agreement (i.e. the Transjordan-Nejd section) as the marked position of those geographical coordinates bore to physical features on the 1918 edition of the present map, and if:-
(2) the straight line constituting the section of the frontier covered by Sir G. Clayton's letter of the 19th May, 1927 (i.e. the Transjordan-Hejaz section) is drawn to the terminal point of the Transjordan-Nejd section arrived at by the method indicated under (1).
- BLUE DOTTED LINE** The frontier if the position of the terminal point of the section covered by the Hadda Agreement (i.e. the Transjordan-Nejd section) is altered so as to enable the straight line mentioned in Sir G. Clayton's letter to bear as nearly as possible the same relation to physical features along the section covered by that letter (i.e. the Transjordan-Hejaz section) as the straight line bears to those features on the 1918 edition of the present map.
- GREEN LINE** The "de facto" frontier, (i.e. the "B.A. Track" and "Major Glubb's southern track") marked as accurately as possible in the absence of exact geographical information.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 133.)

My Lord,

Jedda, August 22, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to report that during the last few days several events have brought into prominence two matters which are already well known to your Lordship: viz., the apprehensions of the Saudi Royal family lest the throne of Syria should be given to a Hashimite candidate such as the Amir Abdullah, and the feeling, expressed on several occasions by King Abdul Aziz, that he is being subjected to organised attacks from certain elements in neighbouring Arab countries.

2. On the 16th August the King's secretary, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, brought for my inspection a postal bag containing a great number of letters addressed to prominent persons at Jedda, Mecca and Medina. Each letter was franked with Syrian stamps and postmarked at Bloudane on the 29th July. Each contained one or more copies of a printed circular headed in large type "The Party of the Free Hejazis," followed by the words "The first issue" and a long manifesto appealing to the Hejazis to exert themselves to expel their Saudi rulers, who, as instruments of British Imperialism, had expelled the country's rightful rulers and were busily engaged in sucking the country dry and oppressing it in many ways. I enclose herein the text of the manifesto with a summary translation. It appears that the Saudi authorities were vigilant enough to intercept all these circular manifestoes. The French Minister was informed about them and is understood to be taking appropriate action with the authorities in Syria. Sheikh Yusuf, in drawing my attention to the seriousness of this form of propaganda, endeavoured to prove that such a document bore obvious traces of Hashimite authorship, and said that it was his firm opinion that the Amir Abdullah, for whom he expressed the greatest dislike, was the real author of the circular. I made it plain to him, however, that I personally could not see that his suspicions about the Amir Abdullah were supported by any actual evidence.

3. On the 21st August the Qaim Maqám of Jedda brought to me a long document which he had received from the Amir Feisal. His Excellency was instructed to communicate to me the contents of a letter which, he said, had been intercepted. The original was with the King. What he then read to me was a copy: it purported to be a letter from the Amir Abdullah to the well-known pan-Arab propagandist, Sheikh Kamil-ul-Qassab, who, it will be remembered, paid a visit to His Majesty at Riyadh in the summer of 1937 with the object of persuading the King to intervene openly on the side of the Arabs in Palestine. A summary of the contents of the letter in translation is enclosed. It will be seen that the writer of the letter lays down certain desiderata for the good government of this country. His Majesty was evidently excessively annoyed at reading these criticisms of his system of government, and the Amir Feisal instructed the Qaim Maqám to protest to me most vigorously against the intervention which the Amir Abdullah was making in the internal affairs of a foreign State. I replied that all I could do was to communicate the letter and His Royal Highness's remarks to your Lordship, and to send a copy to the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan in case he could throw any light on the matter. I am also sending to the High Commissioner a copy of the actual Arabic text of the letter said to have been sent by the Amir Abdullah, in case it may be possible for him to form an opinion on the genuineness of the letter from the Arabic style in which it is composed. I am sending to your Lordship a summary translation only of the Amir's letter, as it is full of historical references, and other anfractuosities. In his letter of instructions the Amir Feisal made the point that the similarity between the expressions in the latter part of the letter and those used in the manifesto supported the Saudi theory that the Amir Abdullah was responsible for the letter. I must confess, however, that there is in my view no very obvious connexion between them.

4. These matters serve to illustrate and emphasise the Saudi-Hashimite feud which appears at present to be one of the main preoccupations of the King. During the recent visit of the Amir Feisal to Jedda I elicited from His Royal Highness the fact that he felt that one or two questions which had been referred

to His Majesty's Government for decision or for advice had not yet been dealt with: and when I pressed him for details he said that he was not referring to such routine questions as Koweit (though he would be very grateful to get these settled) but that he was thinking more particularly of the letter from His Majesty which had been communicated to Sir R. Bullard at Taif last June. I imagine that His Majesty's way of looking at the matter is as follows. He feels that the Hashimites are being allowed to intrigue against him. The limits of his patience have been reached. Therefore he wants one of two things: either that His Majesty's Government should declare their policy towards him in such a way as to ward off these attacks (which implies a hint that by appropriate representations to Nuri Pasha, the Amir Abdullah and others we could stop the anti-Saudi campaign if we tried); or that His Majesty's Government should agree to give him a free hand in retaliating. But hitherto His Majesty's Government have not dealt with the King's dilemma. And now the campaign of anti-Saudi propaganda seems to be gaining strength. The news that Nuri Pasha blocked the ratification of two of the agreements signed at Riyadh in July, together with the constant newspaper reports that Abdullah is a most favoured candidate for the Syrian throne, have irritated His Majesty beyond measure. As an instance of recent newspaper reports I may cite the Cairo illustrated paper *Al-Lataif-al-Musawara* of the 7th August; on its front page was a large picture of the Amir Abdullah headed "The new Arab King." That paper is popular here but I hear that the issue of 7th August was confiscated by the postal authorities on arrival.

5. Such is, in my opinion, the King's attitude at present, and, though I see no sign of His Majesty's relaxing his fixed policy of referring to His Majesty's Government any question in which they are interested or in which he would like His Majesty's Government's advice (on the contrary I think that policy has been even more prominent than usual this summer), I am sure that the King would welcome any help which His Majesty's Government might feel able to give him with regard to the suppression of anti-Saudi propaganda by any means which may be within His Majesty's Government's power.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo and Bagdad; to the Middle East Intelligence Centre at Cairo; to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem; to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus. To Damascus only I am sending the original cover of some of the circulars from Bloudane, in case they may help him to trace the real origin of these pamphlets.

I have, &c.
A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 20.

Summary of a Manifesto entitled: "The Party of the Free Hejaz."

(First Issue.)

O People of the Hejaz:

NEVER in its past history did the Hejaz submit to tyranny and exploitation; on the contrary, it was the Hejaz that bore the standard of conquest and led the Arabs in their great career of religious and imperial expansion.

Such was the spirit of your fathers; but yours is tamer, the glorious past would not recognise it. You have basely submitted to tyrannous régime and given yourselves up to despair.

Great Britain desires to make a colony of Arabia in general and of the Hejaz in particular, but, knowing that direct annexation is impossible, being too costly in effort and lives, she has entrusted the business to Ibn Saud. You remember with what atrocities Ibn Saud conquered the Hejaz, using English arms, and finally became King in name over the land, while in fact he governed it merely as a viceroy for the British, executing their policy and submitting to their wishes.

When Ibn Saud had become King of the Hejaz thanks to British gold and munitions, he assumed that it was his hereditary domain, and we, its people, serfs bound to the land. He behaved like a landlord on his own estate and we became

his slaves and the slaves of his slaves; our wealth, our livelihood, our honour lay at his mercy.

Do you not see the Government departments swarming with Nejdīs—whose only qualification for office is that they are Nejdīs? Do you not know that a Nejdī official is paid—out of your money—many times the salary that a Hejazi of the same grade receives? Are you not aware that a Hejazi can work in the Government service and never get his pay, little as it is, while a Nejdī gets an exorbitant salary and increments and bonuses—all out of the money of the Hejazis?

Has no one ever told you that it is the Hejazis who pay the taxes? That they are forbidden to move from place to place in their own country unless they pay a tax? That, on the other hand, the Nejdīs can travel about freely wherever they care?

Have you never heard that the Hejazis are the milch-cow from which Ibn Saud and his men and the sons of Nejd draw their profits, and when the milch-cow's milk runs dry these tyrants will suck her blood?

O Brothers, the days of contempt and submission and surrender are done. The real intentions of the tyrants are revealed to you. You know now the character and aims of Ibn Saud. Prepare for the approaching battle, the battle that will give you the chance to die for glory and freedom.

Brothers, "the Free Hejazis" speak to every Hejazi who has sentiments of honour and patriotism. We ask every compatriot to prepare for the approaching day when we shall sweep away the tyranny of exploitation and write with our blood a golden line in the history of the Hejaz.

Brothers in freedom, prepare!

Enclosure 2 in No. 20.

Summary of a Letter from the Amir Abdullah-bin-al-Hussein, dated at Amman, 7th Jumada'l Ula, 1358 (June 25, 1939), to Sheikh Kamil-al-Qassab.

(Salutations.)

I WAS very pleased to receive your letter dated at Damascus, 3rd Jumada'l Ula, 1358. You mention that my letter has reminded you of the time when we used to talk so much together about the future of the Arab nation. You say that I am well aware that you were the first person to develop the idea of uniting the Arabs, and that you put this idea before His late Majesty more than once when you were in Mecca, begging him to communicate with the Arab Princes and offering yourself as an intermediary. The late King was not inspired to adopt the idea, but, nevertheless, we are grateful to you for your efforts.

(Here follows a recapitulation of the history of the Arab revolt against the Turks; the prominent part played therein by the addressee; King Hussein's attitude towards Ibn Saud, the Idrisi and British interests in Arabia at that time.)

Regarding your proposal that, should the moment be opportune, we should make a general pact with the Saudi Kingdom, the Yemen and Iraq of such a nature as to guarantee the independence of these States and of Transjordan, in which proposal (you say) you have no doubt that His Majesty King Ibn Saud will assist us, he being so sincere in his piety and devotion to the national cause, I thank you warmly and declare that I am perfectly prepared to follow your advice on condition that you request His Majesty in your name and in the name of the religion and nationalism to which he is so devoted to institute general reforms in the Hejaz and Nejd by granting a Constitution such as will ensure a regular constitutional Administration in the country, as in Iraq and Transjordan, and will protect the people's liberties, draw up a public budget, set up a Ministry responsible to a general Assembly, organise a defensive army, and generally set up a proper machinery of government. In this way the pact may be a real and useful one with some possibility of permanence.

The first of these conditions is the rebuilding of the Hejaz railway line to provide a modern means of communication between these countries and also the Yemen.

When you have done this I, Abdullah-bin-al-Hussein, will join hands with him to carry out my obligation.
Time, as I have said, is short, and the little that is left of our lives must not blow vainly down the wind.

Peace be upon you, &c.

ABDULLAH.

[E 6283/735/25]

No. 21.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Trott (Jedda).

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 14, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 119 [of 3rd September: German offer of arms to Saudi Arabia].

Please inform Ibn Saud that if Germany is still able to supply these arms notwithstanding outbreak of hostilities and still willing to do so without unacceptable conditions, His Majesty's Government see no reason why His Majesty should not take advantage of the offer.

2. His Majesty's Government are, however, anxious that no gold should reach Germany as result of payments by Ibn Saud. They could, if necessary, suggest alternative method. Please telegraph whether first annual payment is due at once, or only after the lapse of a year, and in what form such payment is to be made.

[E 6745/735/25]

No. 22.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 6, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 127 [of 2nd October: Supply of German arms to Saudi Arabia].

His Majesty's Government would be most reluctant to see any payments made to Germany in gold or in sterling or other free currency, and therefore hope that Saudi Arabian Government will not ratify contract in its present form. An alternative method would be for Saudi Government to offer payment in marks, which might be purchased from neutrals having mark balances in Germany. If German Government were to refuse such terms His Majesty's Government would prefer deal to be postponed, since provision of even small amount of free exchange to Germany would contribute *pro tanto* to prolongation of war, which Ibn Saud must be as anxious as His Majesty's Government to avoid.

2. At same time I realise that amount due under contract in near future (*i.e.*, four months after delivery of arms) is relatively unimportant (it must, however, be remembered that this particular contract only covers a portion of whole credit of £500,000 supposed to have been offered, and there may be corresponding payments under other contracts), and that whole circumstances may have changed before any further payment is due thereafter. Moreover, impossibility of His Majesty's Government themselves supplying arms required adds to difficulty of taking advantage of Ibn Saud's friendliness.

3. In these circumstances I leave it to you to deal with problem as best you can (for preference during visit to Riyadh) with discretion to accept contract as it stands in last resort if you find it essential to do so.

[E 6783/6697/89]

No. 23.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 6, 1939.

MR. TROTT'S despatch No. 133 [of the 22nd August: Ibn Saud's suspicions of the Emir Abdullah and General Nuri].

This despatch reached me when reply to Mr. Trott's earlier despatch No. 122 [of the 18th July] was about to be sent.

2. I had intended to say that His Majesty's Government had no desire to be drawn on subject of Syrian Throne, and that, although it might be necessary to deny that they had ever said Amir Faisal would be unacceptable, definite pronouncement in his favour might be used to obtain French support for his candidature, which in its turn would offend Iraqi Government and Amir Abdullah; objections of latter to having Saudi rulers on both sides would be intelligible, and in all circumstances it would probably be best for His Majesty's Government if future King were neither an Al Saud nor a Hashimite; meanwhile, it was evidently best that His Majesty's Government should commit themselves as little as possible on such controversial questions, where anything they said must offend one side or other. On basis of these views you would have been instructed to return a non-committal answer.

3. But although His Majesty's Government would still prefer to maintain non-committal attitude, latest despatch, while confirming my view that future King should belong to neither of rival houses, makes me doubt whether maintenance of such an attitude is possible. At present, both sides (to say nothing of rivals among the Hashimites themselves and possible Egyptian candidates) probably hope for British support, while fearing it is being given elsewhere. An effort now by His Majesty's Government to eliminate major contestants, while causing some disappointment, may avoid growing suspicion and irritation and much greater disappointment and bitterness later. I do not suppose jealousies over Syrian Throne are whole extent of trouble, but their elimination would at least remove constant irritant, even though general struggle for leadership of Arabs might continue.

4. I realise that distrust of Iraq and Transjordan seems more of an obsession with Ibn Saud than *vice versa*, and that from many points of view it would be more natural for a Hashimite to rule over Syria than an Al Saud. But recent reports from His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad suggest that Iraqi Government, too, entertain strong suspicion of Saudi designs against the Iraqi dynasty. Attitude of both sides may cause no serious harm while Syrian Throne remains in present nebulous state, but might do so if French Government were to show signs of coming to decision. In any case, His Majesty's Government cannot ignore the loyal friendship which Ibn Saud has shown through so many years, and especially in last few months, and must do their best to respect his feeling over this question.

5. I should therefore welcome your views as to the desirability of His Majesty's Government giving a lead, possibly on lines of my immediately following telegram.

6. Similar enquiries are being addressed to High Commissioner for Palestine and His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad. Until their views are known and you have received my further instructions, you should not go beyond terms of my telegram No. 140 [of 6th October] when discussing this question at Riyadh, to which your visit cannot, I realise, be longer delayed.

7. If communication suggested in my immediately following telegram were to be made, and question were to be raised whether His Majesty's Government's proposal included Egyptian Royal family, you could say His Majesty's Government would like to learn views of Ibn Saud. As a matter of fact, if Ibn Saud and Hashimites saw no objection, an Egyptian Prince might be a good solution, provided one could be found who would take a course independent of King Farouk.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 138. Repeated to Alexandria, Bagdad (for observations), Jerusalem and Paris, Saving.)

[E 6783/6697/89]

No. 24.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 139.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 6, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram [of 6th October: Ibn Saud's suspicions of the Emir Abdullah and General Nuri].

Following is possible communication referred to in paragraph 5:—

His Majesty's Government have learned with regret that propaganda directed against Ibn Saud still continues. They note that circular has been mentioned to French Minister and hope such activities will cease.

2. As regards letter from Amir Abdullah, His Majesty's Government await report from High Commissioner. They agree that, if genuine, it was unwise and discourteous and they will, if necessary, convey their views to Amir.

3. But greater problem is growing ill-feeling between Ibn Saud and Hashimite family, which His Majesty's Government view with much concern. On this subject His Majesty's Government desire to speak with complete frankness.

4. His Majesty's Government fear that this ill-feeling is being fanned by question of Throne of Syria. They suggested in June (see my telegram No. 99 [of the 23rd June]) that idea had not got beyond stage of vague proposal, and although they have not consulted French Government, they believe this is still true. In any case, they feel sure that King (if any) will remain under French tutelage for many years.

5. His Majesty's Government are, however, rapidly reaching conclusion that it will be in best interests of all concerned if King is chosen from outside leading Arab Royal families. In this connexion they must in honesty state that while they would never willingly see anyone chosen for Throne of Syria who was distasteful to Ibn Saud, they could equally not view with equanimity choice of an Al Saud, if this choice were distasteful to Amir Abdullah, for whom they have a mandatory responsibility, or Royal family of Iraq, which is their ally. This does not mean (as French Minister had heard) that His Majesty's Government have ever said that Amir Faisal would be unacceptable to them. On contrary, in their view, Amir Faisal would, in different circumstances, make an excellent candidate.

6. Question is, however, for French Government and people of Syria, not for His Majesty's Government. All His Majesty's Government could do, if Ibn Saud thought it would do good, would be to express similar views to Iraqi Government and Amir Abdullah, who must in fairness be consulted, and if all concerned agreed to suggest to French Government that they should somehow make it known—

- (a) That question of Syrian Throne is not actual (if this is case); and
- (b) That in any event French Government think it will make for future peace of Middle East if King is chosen from outside ranks of leading Arab Royal families.

7. His Majesty's Government make this suggestion the more readily because they realise that Ibn Saud does not hanker after Syrian Throne, and that it is only out of duty to Arab peoples that he is willing that one of his sons should accept it. His Majesty's Government cannot naturally foresee reaction of French Government or effect upon people of Syria of possible French compliance.

8. His Majesty's Government hope that if question of throne could be got out of way, relations of Ibn Saud with Iraq and Transjordan would again improve. They know of no real issue which should divide these States (and incidentally they believe that it was not in any way General Nuri's fault that two of agreements recently concluded at Riyadh were rejected by Iraqi Parliament). In any case they count on his long friendship to realise that they disapprove entirely of attacks upon his dignity, and will always do their best to stop such attacks where it lies in their power to do so.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 139. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 384; Alexandria, No. 746; Jerusalem, No. 794; and Paris, No. 782, Saving.)

[E 6783/6697/89]

No. 25.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 6, 1939.

MY telegram No. 138 [of 6th October: Syrian Throne], paragraph 6.

Following is communication which you may at your discretion make forthwith to Ibn Saud when you see him at Riyadh:—

2. You could begin by speaking in sense of first four paragraphs of my telegram No. 139 [of 6th October]. You could then say that His Majesty's Government feel sure French Government have not reached stage of seriously considering any particular candidate, or even of making up their minds to have a monarchy at all. In particular, His Majesty's Government know of no ground on which Amir Abdullah could possibly suppose he is likely to be chosen for the throne by the French Government. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government hope that Ibn Saud will accept their advice not to worry himself further about a question which so far as they know has no reality.

3. In conclusion you could add—

- (a) (With reference to the discussions with French Minister), that His Majesty's Government have never expressed any views as to the acceptability or unacceptability of Amir Faisal or any other possible candidates; and
- (b) His Majesty's Government feel that they can count on Ibn Saud's long friendship to realise that they entirely disapprove of attacks upon his dignity and will always do their best to stop such attacks where it lies in their power to do so.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 385; Alexandria, No. 747; Jerusalem, No. 795; and Paris, No. 783, Saving.)

[E 6880/6697/89]

No. 26.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 8.)

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

October 7, 1939.

ADDRESSED to Transjordan, No. 69. Repeated to Jedda, No. 141; Bagdad, No. 386; and Cairo, No. 749.

You will have seen Foreign Office telegrams No. 138 and No. 139 to Jedda with reference to Trott's despatch No. 133 of the 22nd August, of which a copy has been communicated to you.

2. Before reaching a conclusion on Foreign Office proposal regarding Syrian Throne I shall be glad to have your observations. As you are no doubt aware, Abdullah is under the impression that Mr. Winston Churchill promised in 1921 that His Majesty's Government would back him for the Throne of Syria. The following passage from minutes of Middle East Conference of March 1921 is relevant:—

"It was pointed out to him (Abdullah) that if he succeeded in checking anti-French action for six months he would not only convince the French Government that so far from being actively hostile to them the Shereefian family was prepared loyally to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in protecting them from external aggression, and would thus reduce their opposition to his brother's candidature for Mesopotamia, but he would also greatly improve his own chances of a personal reconciliation with the French which might even lead to his being instated by them as Amir of Syria in Damascus. It was made perfectly clear to him that while they would do everything they could to assist towards the attainment of this object, His Majesty's Government could not in any way guarantee that it would be achieved."

[21053]

3. If Ibn Saud were now to be informed as proposed by Foreign Office that in opinion of His Majesty's Government it would be in best interests of all concerned that King of Syria should be chosen from outside leading Arab Royal Families it would obviously be necessary for you to make similar communication simultaneously to Abdullah. While passage quoted above cannot be held to bind His Majesty's Government in widely different circumstances of the present day, there is a risk that if we now administer cold douche to Abdullah's Syrian aspirations he will be grievously disappointed and our relations with him may be disturbed. It might therefore be argued that any declaration of views by His Majesty's Government should be postponed to latest possible date and at least until proposal for creating a King of Syria, which is at present nebulous, assumes definite shape.

4. Alternative would be to add nothing by way of further statement later to message which Bullard has been authorised to deliver (see Foreign Office telegram No. 140 to Jedda).

5. Please telegraph your views. I shall also be grateful for your early comments on Ibn Saud's allegations (see Trott's despatch of the 22nd August) regarding propaganda against him by Abdullah.

[E 6883/1809/25]

No. 27.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 11.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 9A. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Jedda, September 26, 1939.

BAGDAD telegram to Foreign Office, No. 108, dated 26th August.

This Saving telegram did not reach me until 24th September, and Bagdad despatch No. 458 not received. Outbreak of war and other recent developments, e.g., departure of German Minister from Iraq and adoption of neutral attitude by Italy have affected situation. But there was never any likelihood that Ibn Saud would admit German or Italian personnel for training of his armed forces. He had difficulty enough in getting rid of Italian Air Mission, whose presence was always displeasing to him.

There is some talk here of movement of Saudi forces towards the Iraq frontier. I may hear more about this when I go to Riyadh a few days hence. Ibn Saud may fear an Iraqi attempt on Koweit while we are busy elsewhere. Or he may be taking the special measures against smuggling from Koweit, which, he said, would be essential unless the trade agreement could be concluded. But I regard it as out of the question that Ibn Saud should attack Iraq. Even if Iraq was not in special relations with His Majesty's Government, he would hardly attack a country so much more highly developed and possessing so much more powerful forces; but that he should attack a country in special treaty relations with us would be incredible even in peace time, and can be excluded altogether as practical politics now that His Majesty's Government and Iraq are Allies in a war. It is true that if His Majesty's Government should be completely defeated by the Germans, Ibn Saud might at the last moment try to absorb some of the small States on the Persian Gulf, not from hostility to His Majesty's Government, but to prevent those States from falling into hostile hands, but, except for that contingency, which I trust and believe will not occur, Ibn Saud, I firmly believe, will not attack any territory in which we have special interests, and that is what would be involved in an attack on any member of the Hashimite family. His hostility towards the Hashimites is well known, as theirs towards him, but he has now found a safety valve in the appointment of Fuad as minister to France, to work against Hashimite claims to the Throne of Syria.

I do not know whether the Prime Minister of Iraq fears the possibility of collusion between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is my experience that Ibn Saud is

highly suspicious of Iran, and would be most unwilling to see her influence extended at the expense of any Arab territory. I may remind your Lordship that, although an Iranian Legation exists in Jedda, it is closed except for a few weeks at the height of the pilgrim season, and even then is usually in the charge of a junior secretary.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 18, Saving, and Tehran, No. 1.)

[E 6913/735/25]

No. 28.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 132.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, October 12, 1939.

FOLLOWING from Minister, Riyadh:—

"Your telegram No. 137.

"Ibn Saud showed me a letter written by German Secretary of State to Khalid, after outbreak of war, saying that arms and ammunition could be exported to Jedda by Dutch steamer at Saudi risk; otherwise, they would remain at the disposal of Ibn Saud in the safe-keeping of the German Government. The King says, however, that he has decided not to proceed with the transaction during the war lest his action should be exaggerated by the Germans or misinterpreted by others. I made suitable reference to the wisdom of this decision. Ibn Saud stated, with a meaning smile, that after the Allied victory, for which he hoped, German arms might be going for nothing."

[E 6919/246/25]

No. 29.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, October 13, 1939.

FOLLOWING from Sir H. Bullard at Riyadh:—

"Nothing could be less neutral than Ibn Saud's language about the war. He hates Hitler as a disturber of peace and the Soviet as a menace to the social and religious principles of Islam, and he fears Soviet pressure may induce Turkey to attack Arab countries. All this confirms him in his often-repeated opinion that the interests of the Arab world are bound up with those of His Majesty's Government.

"2. These views, which I am [group omitted] Jedda, are genuine, combining numerous marks of confidence shown to us recently with the decision not to proceed with orders for arms transactions with Germany. His Majesty's Government can count upon his Government's moral support during the war.

"3. When I called on the Amir Saud, he said at once and emphatically (though there was an American doctor present): 'We are on the side of the Allies.'"

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 30; Bagdad, No. 37; and Jerusalem, No. 15.)

[E 6959/6697/89]

No. 30.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 135.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, October 16, 1939.

FOLLOWING from Riyadh:—

"Your telegram No. 138 to your telegram No. 141.

"I made to Ibn Saud on 13th October the statement in sense of your telegram No. 140. He showed great satisfaction and replied to the following effect:—

"2. 'I do not want Syria or anything else outside Saudi Arabia, but fear lest addition of Syria to Transjordan or Iraq should facilitate designs on Hedjaz or the Nejd. Like His Majesty's Government in Europe I want balance of power in Arab world; so long as no Hashimite becomes King of Syria, let the Syrians choose for themselves [? some] king from outside.'

"3. Thus Ibn Saud has provided in advance reply to the statement in your telegram No. 139, which would have to be made to him in certain circumstances.

"So far as Ibn Saud is concerned, it would be better to adopt the alternative in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 141 and leave things as they are at present. If either party continued to push its claims, the matter could be reconsidered.

"4. Since above was written I have seen Yusuf Yasin, who reports Ibn Saud as saying that all he wants is to be secure in his own possessions, and as very glad indeed with statement of 13th October."

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 16; Bagdad, No. 38; and Alexandria, No. 31.)

[E 7015/98/25]

No. 31.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 137. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Jedda, September 5, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the annual report on the pilgrimage to the Holy Places of the Hejaz for 1939.

2. I am indebted to the same officers as last year for reports on the various aspects of the pilgrimage, i.e., to Mr. Lal Shah Bukhari, the Indian Vice-Consul, for the Indian pilgrimage, to Haji Abdul Majid for the Malay pilgrimage, to Dr. Ghulam Rasul for the quarantine and health sections, and to Mr. Ousman for most of the nationalities other than Indian and Malay. I have again adhered strictly to the general lines of the previous report.

3. I venture to draw attention to the confidential nature of the report. It contains certain critical reflections on Saudi policy which, if seen by certain mischief-makers in India, might be reported by them to Saudi authorities to the detriment of our good relations with them.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Government of India (External Affairs Department), the Government of India (Department of Education, Health and Lands), and the Governor of the Straits Settlements.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure in No. 31.

PILGRIMAGE REPORT, 1939.

(1) *Introductory and General.*

SINCE the last report was written several indications have shown, even more clearly than before, that the chief interest the Saudi Arabian Government have in the pilgrimage is to make money out of it. The most direct proof of this

is a statement made by Dr. Hamouda, the second official representative of the Government at a recent meeting of the International Health Office in Paris. Dr. Hamouda, after stating his country's desire that the international requirements for pilgrims as regards air space should be rendered more rigorous still so that less persons could travel on any one ship, explained that they did not mind the resulting increase in fare for each pilgrim, because what they wanted was not more pilgrims of every sort, but more rich pilgrims, in order that they could spend more money in Saudi Arabia. It is true that the speaker also stated that every pilgrim on landing was inoculated against typhoid, a statement which is completely untrue, and that the first delegate, Khalid-al-Hud, was sent with Dr. Hamouda largely in order to curb the latter's tendency to prevarication; but the first delegate did not deny the astonishing confession that the Wahhabis look upon the pilgrimage primarily as a means of making money. The treatment of destitute pilgrims bears out the same theory; these unfortunates seem to be treated more and more severely as the years go on; during the last pilgrimage they were made to beg till they collected enough money to pay the large pilgrimage dues. A third indication of a desire to make sure of having fees paid in advance is the proposal, hitherto abortive, to make all shipping companies collect in advance the Saudi fees for each pilgrim at the same time as he purchases his ticket.

2. Of course, there is a good deal of criticism from the pilgrims, especially from Indians, Iraqis and Egyptians, all of whom are beginning to realise what good government ought to mean. It is often stated that pilgrims were really better treated in the bad old days when there were Bedouin lying in wait for them on all the roads; the misery of those days is forgotten, and present taxation is remembered instead. It is said that in the old days mutawwifs who oppressed pilgrims used to be punished, but that there is now no check on them. The Minister of Finance, who has a pretty free hand in pilgrimage matters, is said to listen to no complaints, but to confine himself to insisting that all dues must be paid by every pilgrim. It is impossible to deny, what every thinking pilgrim must see for himself, that the transport charges are enormous and the roads execrable; apologists of this régime may say that the sums accruing from "kushan" or road taxes are accumulating somewhere and will be spent on road construction soon, but that is small comfort to the man who has paid them and seen nothing result.

3. On the other hand, it is known that the King takes an interest in pilgrimage matters; he makes a special journey to the Hejaz and holds several banquets; the Minister of Finance always says he will investigate thoroughly all complaints; and some pilgrims must be very tiresome to deal with. Moreover, now that considerable sums are coming in to the Royal exchequer from the new Hasa oil royalty, it is to be hoped that the hint that Sheikh Yusuf Yasin once threw out, that the King would gradually reduce taxation of the pilgrims whenever he could, will be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the opposite tendency, that new resources create new appetites, may come into play. At any rate, it is clear that at the present moment the Saudi Arabian Government are exploiting their monopoly in a pretty harsh manner.

4. As for the political situation, there is no change to report. The new oil concession has been referred to above; the port of Ras Tanura is rapidly being developed and exportation of oil is going on rapidly, with royalties of 4s. (gold) per ton accruing to the Government. The German Minister in Iraq has been accredited to Saudi Arabia and visited that country about pilgrimage time. The Japanese Minister to Egypt also visited the King. The Sheikh of Bahrain received a cordial visit from his Saudi cousin, and most cordial relations exist between the two.

5. Prince Mohammad Ali, heir presumptive to King Faruq of Egypt, performed the pilgrimage returning by aeroplane, and a good deal of propaganda was made to increase the number of Egyptian pilgrims; but actually the number was lower than last year.

6. The usual army of propagandists invaded the Moslem world, with the exception of Turkey and Iran; but the total number of overseas pilgrims fell short of last year's figure by about 5,000. This decrease is attributed to less favourable economic conditions in the East Indies and Egypt. Pilgrims from Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland came at Government expense, as last year, but do not seem to have done much good in regard to propaganda for the Duce.

7. Difficulties about the Moslem calendar seem inseparable from the pilgrimage. This year the Government announced, a day or two in advance, that the official Haj date would be Monday, the 30th January. So the hopes of a Haj-Akbar, when the great day falls on a Friday, were again unfulfilled, as they have been for about ten years past. Some 100,000 pilgrims assembled at Arafat, and in spite of showers of rain everything passed off as usual and there were few casualties or illnesses.

8. Measures to protect the life of the King and other important members of the Royal family were taken in the *haram* and outside it. At Muna when pilgrims were ushered in to file past the King they were made to pass through a double row of Saudi officials, who, under pretext of leading them to the King, felt their clothes and pockets lest they should be armed.

9. The improvement in the general economic condition of the country has been alluded to already. Oil royalties and payments by the flourishing gold mine at Mahd Dhabab must have swelled the Royal income by several thousands of gold pounds; but no relief to the poor pilgrim has yet been observed.

10. Sir Nizam Jung's present to the Saudi Arabian Government of 12,000 rupees for the construction of a rest-house at Rabigh on the road to Medina, was entrusted by the Government to the son of the Amir of that place; but as yet there is no rest-house. The chief engineer to the Hyderabad State, Nawab Ahsan Yar Jung Bahadur, had a strange experience of Saudi taxation; by order of the Nizam he brought with him a well-made model of a library which it was proposed to erect at the birth-place of the prophet; he was charged customs dues for importing the model. His proposal to light Medina at the expense of the Nizam's Government was discussed, but the Saudi Arabian Government laid down certain conditions about guaranteeing running costs which have caused, at any rate, a temporary hitch.

11. The Nawab of Banganapalle is reported to have performed the pilgrimage this year via Iraq. He appears to have approached King Abdul Aziz, through the Iraq ulema, for permission to reconstruct, at his own expense, the tombs of a few Imams buried in the Jannat Baqieh at Medina, which were razed to the ground when the Wahhabis established themselves in the Hejaz. Nothing happened, and it is doubtful if the message even reached the King; it is very unlikely that such a request would have been granted.

12. The Saudi currency, which is supposed to be pegged to gold at the rate of 20 Saudi riyals to 1 pound gold, varied a good deal at pilgrimage time, and cannot be said to be stabilised. It appreciated during the rush time of the pilgrimage when everybody wanted riyals; and in the slack times it sank to about 24 to the gold pound.

13. Saudi aviation is in a state of quiescence. The Italian mission has been sent away, and several semi-trained pilots are now being instructed in Egypt. The Saudi aviation fund still appears to exist, for the Mehtar of Chitral gave a donation to it. Allusion will be found in section (5) to the absence of an air service run by the Banque Misr from Jedda to Medina. The Saudi road taxes, payable by vehicles which use the air as well as the roads, proved prohibitive.

14. More Indian propagandists than usual came on pilgrimage this year. Ismail Ghaznawi came accompanied by Abdul Aziz, the editor of Ghaznawi's paper the *Khadim-i-Ka'ba*. No privileges were given to them on arrival; they were not exempted from payment of customs dues or Saudi pilgrimage dues; nor was Ismail Ghaznawi invited to the King's banquet. However, he seemed to be on good terms with some of the Saudi officials. And he was not obstructive to the Indian vice-consul. He is reported to have received his present from the king, but his request for a car in which to carry on propaganda in India was not granted. Mohammad Khan and Mohammad Amin were also present; they endeavoured to neutralise Ismail Ghaznawi. Dr. Shafi Ahmed of Delhi also came, after an interval of some years. His line was to advise pilgrims not to take their complaints to the British Legation in case they might suffer in consequence from the resentment of the local authorities; however, such intrigues had little or no effect. Maulana Hasrat Muhani, a prominent member of the Moslem League, went to Syria after the pilgrimage in order to interview the Mufti, but his efforts failed. It is reported that the Saudi Arabian Government paid his passage to Syria. Maulana Obeidullah Sindhi, a Moslem of note who had resided in Mecca for ten years, was finally allowed by the Government of India to return to India, and he did so after the pilgrimage.

15. The relations between the Finance Minister and the Indian vice-consul were excellent, and current questions were settled without difficulty by direct reference to the Minister. Other Saudi officials, including those of the quarantine, also co-operated with Seyyid Lal Shah in various ways.

16. The Black-List system is still maintained, the names on the list being decided on by the Government of India. A certain control is also exercised in this way on Malay mutawwifs. One, Muhammad Ali Yamani-al-Zamzami, convicted of assault in Singapore, has been refused a visa, and his petition, in which he made the untrue statement that he had a wife and children in Singapore, has been rejected.

17. The Banque Misr barges were not used this year: the reason being that the Saudi authorities insisted on collecting the dhow charges in spite of the fact that the Banque Misr was paying for the barges. The new Banque Misr Hotel in Mecca was patronised by the rich class of pilgrim. The upper part was reserved for Prince Mohammad Ali and his sister Princess Khadija Abbas during their short stay.

18. Foreign residents still have to pay the annual registration fee of 10 riyals: a charge to which the considerable number of foreign Moslems settled in this country violently object. They also object to paying the *koshan* tax levied on all foreigners who use the roads.

19. Little attention seems to have been paid to the Palestine question during the pilgrimage, though subscriptions for the Arabs of Palestine were collected. The Government permitted no meetings or other outward manifestations of anti-Jew feeling.

20. The complications caused by the arrival of destitute pilgrims have been dealt with elsewhere in this report. The Saudi Arabian Government officially requested this legation this year to restrain destitutes as far as possible: however, owing to the cheap fares about 500 more or less indigent persons, more than last year, eventually arrived from India. Not one was refused permission to land—the Saudi Government cannot risk such obvious interference with religious observance—but all were subjected to various kinds of pressure, and either found the money somehow or were released at the last moment. The next move was the issue of a circular to the legations announcing that the Saudi Arabian Government had "decided" that in future shipping companies should collect pilgrimage dues at the ports of embarkation: the new tariffs on that basis were actually prepared and despatched to Malaya. Although the Italians accepted and the Egyptians were already working on a similar scheme, there was great opposition from the Far East, from India, from the French, &c. The shipping companies in those countries take the reasonable view that (a) such a "decision" cannot be legally binding outside Saudi Arabia; (b) to put up the apparent fare in this way would greatly affect the volume of traffic, always sensitive and elastic to financial considerations; and (c) the companies were being made to collect Saudi charges to their own hurt. Faced with determined criticism from the Dutch and the French as well as from this legation, the Saudis eventually agreed to postpone their plan for a year.

21. Security remained good throughout the country: though a few cases of pilfering at Mecca were reported by the Malayan pilgrims.

22. The King held two banquets for distinguished pilgrims, and more than 200 Indian pilgrims managed to get invitations. At one of them an Indian barrister from Peshawar named Abdul Aziz made an unexpected speech: the King followed it by a religious oration, and the Hyderabad "Qafilat al-Salim," or leader of the pilgrims, Abdul Qadir Muhi-ud-Din, made a speech in praise of the Saudi management of the pilgrimage; some of his flock had hoped that he would seize the opportunity to point out a few home-truths, but the mellowness caused by a good dinner, together with the awkwardness of criticising the host, restrained the orator and a unique opportunity of ventilation of grievances was lost.

23. Among the important persons who made the pilgrimage this year were the following:—

His Highness the Mehtar of Chitral, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Hassan Suhrawardy, Syed Hassan Ali, M.L.A. (United Provinces); Raja Mohammad Akram (Punjab), Nawab Ahsan Yar Jung Bahadur of Hyderabad, Prince Mohammad Ali of Egypt and his sister Khadija Abbas, and the brother of the Afghan Minister.

24. Arrangements for the return of Indian pilgrims worked very smoothly this year.

25. H.M.S. *Weston* (Lieutenant-Commander Segrave) visited Jedda the Haj week, and the usual regatta was held.

26. The Afghan Minister stayed in the Hejaz for a longer period than usual, perhaps because he felt it might be his last chance. He was seldom seen at Jedda, and the number of Afghan pilgrims was less than usual, a fact which the Saudi Arabian Government were inclined to attribute to the Minister's obstructive policy. It, at any rate, appears that the Afghan representatives here are more concerned to catch out persons who have wrongly declared themselves Afghan subjects at Bombay than to help Afghans out of difficulties.

27. With regard to the proposal referred to in paragraph 28 of the 1938 report, it has now been decided that ships transporting Indian pilgrims should land the Karachi pilgrims at that port instead of taking them to Bombay if the number bound for Karachi reaches eighty.

28. There is now quite a colony of "Bukharis" or refugees from Central Asia settled at Mecca, where their native shrewdness has made them such serious competitors of the more indolent Meccans in various departments of business that it has been proposed to confine them in a separate colony on the outskirts of Mecca.

29. An extraordinary story about 1,000 pilgrims from Bokhara or Hsinking has been heard from more than one source: it is that all of them save one were murdered by Russians before they reached India or Afghanistan.

30. Nearly 2,000 pilgrims came via Najaf by the overland route, and nearly 1,000 were entered as Iranians. It might be supposed that this increase in the number of Iranian Hajis showed the influence of the recent Egyptian matrimonial alliance. Actually, however, most of the Iranians came from outside Iran, or had got out of Iran on other pretexts than that of the pilgrimage.

31. A good many Japanese propagandists visited the country and endeavoured to explain what their country's "new order" really meant. Their efforts were countered by a deputation of Chinese students from Al Azhar University, Cairo, who told a very different story. The principal Japanese propagandist from Japan was a certain Tang Yi-chen, and he seemed to be anxious to avoid a "Bokharan" pilgrim guide's son named Yahya, who is also understood to be in Japanese pay.

32. Correspondence again passed between the legation, the Government of India, and the Saudi Arabian Government concerning the space to be allotted to children under 1 year of age. It will be remembered that article 100 of the International Sanitary Convention of Paris, 1926, reckons such infants as accountable in assessing the space available in pilgrim ships: whereas the Indian Merchant Shipping Act states that children under 1 year of age need not be reckoned in. The Saudi Arabian Government finally agreed to prolong, for the present pilgrimage season, the existing informal arrangement whereby such infants have not been reckoned, and it is understood that the Indian Merchant Shipping Act is being amended so as to bring it into line with the Paris Convention on that point.

33. The text of an agreement between the Egyptian and the Palestine Governments concerning the transit of Palestinian pilgrims through Egyptian territory was published in the *Bulletin Quarantenaire* of the 21st December, 1938. As far as this legation is aware arrangements for this transit traffic worked smoothly this pilgrimage. The vexed question of precedence in returning Egyptian boats was not heard of this year, perhaps owing to a decline in the number of pilgrims: it seems that the Egyptian Legation was being generous to the Palestinians and was not applying strictly a principle which we could hardly have contested, viz., that since the shipping arrangements are made by the Egyptian Government, Egyptian pilgrims are entitled to return-berths before Palestinians.

(2) Statistics.

34. The following tables, compiled from information collected unofficially by the Indian Vice-Consul, give the usual statistical information. The increase in the number of Indian pilgrims is no doubt due to the extremely low rates

charged towards the end of the pilgrimage season by the rival Indian shipping companies. But the total number of pilgrims from over-sea is more than 5,000 less than last year. The item "Javanese" is this year split up into two categories, "Malayan" and "Dutch East Indies," though it would not be safe to assume that all the former are British-protected persons, or all the latter Dutch.

TABLE (A).

Number of Pilgrims arriving by Sea and landing at different Ports of the Hejaz, arranged by Nationality.

Nationality.	1938.	1939.	Landed at—			
			Jedda.	Yanbu.	Lith. (*)	Jizan. (*)
India and Far East—						
Indian	15,238	17,669	17,615	12	27	15
Malayan	2,059	2,059
Dutch East Indies	16,089	11,443	11,434	...	9	...
Chinese	55	162	162
Japanese	4
Africa—						
North African	3,240	3,704	3,674	30
Egyptian	10,096	8,314	8,277	37
Sudanese	2,054	1,238	1,237	1
West African	6,046	4,217	4,209	8
Senegali	17	159	159
Somali	771	289	289
Zanzibari and East African	238	42	42
South African	76	130	130
Abyssinian	501	469	469
Arab countries—						
Syrian	1,552	1,225	929	296
Iraqi	13	19 ⁽¹⁾	13	6
Palestinian and Trans-jordanian	736	93	82	11
Yemeni	557	1,696	1,290	...	13	393
Hadhrami	607	553	478	...	67	8
Hejazi	706	1,570	1,550	20
Persian Gulf (including Muscat and Bahrein) ...	280	226 ⁽²⁾	100	...	126	...
Miscellaneous—						
Afghan	3,709	1,451 ^(*)	1,451
Bokharan	890	378	375	...	3	...
Persian	11	24 ^(*)	24
Turkish	171
Kurdish	72
European countries—						
Turkish, Yugoslavian and Albanian	472	396	76
Total	63,788	57,602 ^(*)	56,444	489	245	424

(¹) Indicates the number of Iraqis who came by sea; a greater number arrived by motor vehicles overland; the exact figure is unknown.

(²) The figure includes 202 Muscatis and 24 Persians.

(*) In addition to the above number of overseas pilgrims, there were 2,034 pilgrims who travelled by overland route in motor vehicles via Iraq and Syria, almost all of whom returned by the same route. There were also 298 destitute Indian pilgrims who travelled overland or by dhow, &c., but were returned by ship.

(*) The pilgrims shown under column "Lith" and "Jizan," arrived at those ports by dhow.

(*) Nearly two hundred Persians are reported to have come, but the official figures do not describe them as such. They seem to have been included amongst Iraqis and Syrians.

(*) The Saudi figures for Afghans have been rejected and more reliable figures given in this table.

TABLE (B).

Number of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation.

Country of Embarkation.	1938.	1939.
India and Far East—		
India	20,238	19,817
Malaya	7,850	3,750
Dutch East Indies	8,414	10,358
Colombo	11
Africa—		
North Africa	2,196	3,553
Egypt	11,527	10,182
Sudan	8,141	5,485
Eritrea	654	418
Somaliland	611	398
East Africa	128	105
South Africa (Cape Town)	44	184
Arab countries—		
Syria	829	705
Aden and Hodeida	1,120	1,466
Hadhrumaut	61	501
Palestine	41	...
Miscellaneous—		
Europe	860	...
America	1	...
By dhow from different places but landed at Lith and Jizan	1,073	669
Total	63,788	57,602

NOTE.—The statistics for Aden, Hodeida and the Hadhrumaut were given as follows thus: Aden and Hodeida 3, Aden and Jibuti 49, Aden 1,414, and Aden and Mukalla 166, Mukalla 335. It is impossible to distinguish the number of pilgrims who really came from each of these places. I have therefore added up the first three and called the result "Aden and Hodeida" and have called the sum of the last two items "Hadhrumaut." This may not be quite accurate, but it enables a comparison to be made with last year's figures.

TABLE (C).

Number of Ships transporting Pilgrims to the Hejaz, and Number of Pilgrims carried under each Flag.

Flag.	1938.		1939.	
	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.
British	39	30,608	42	27,185
Dutch	17	7,767	14	7,748
French	1	1,676	2	1,974
Italian	24	1,595	35	3,717
Danish	1	11
American	1	1
Spanish	1	859	1	1,043
Egyptian	48	20,208	43	15,255
German	1	1
By dhow	1,073	...	669
Total	132	63,788	138	57,602

N.B.—The figures given relate to the actual pilgrimage season and not to the whole Arabic year.

35. The chief items of interest in Table (C) are the following: The number of pilgrims brought in British bottoms was slightly less than before, but the number carried in Italian ships increased a good deal; the number of voyages by Italian ships also increased, though the average number of pilgrims carried per voyage was only about 100, much less than the corresponding British figure.

(3) Quarantine.

36. For the pilgrims travelling overland from Iraq, quarantine arrangements were similar to those of last year. The Iraq Government maintained a quarantine post at Rahbah, while the Saudi post was at Hail. Pilgrims returning to Iraq after the pilgrimage were detained for one night at the Iraq post at Rahbah, after which, the pilgrimage having been declared clean, they were allowed to proceed to their destinations in Iraq. The Saudi personnel in charge of preventive and curative measures on this route were Dr. Taufiq Qassaibati and one dispenser.

Kamaran.

37. As far as Kamaran was concerned, the pilgrimage season opened with the arrival of the M.S. *Kota Baroe* from the Netherlands Indies on the 6th September, 1938, and closed with the departure of the steamship *Rahmani* on the 24th January, 1939. During that period 34,537 pilgrims were dealt with, a slight decrease as compared with last year's figure of 37,543. Twenty-three steamers came from India, thirteen from the Netherlands Indies, five from the Straits Settlements, and seven from the Arabian and African coasts. More pilgrims than last year came from the Netherlands Indies, but fewer from the Straits Settlements, British India and Arabia and Africa. The health of the pilgrims was very good once more. Only four cases of infection of infectious disease were reported: one case of modified small-pox on a ship from India, and three cases of measles, also on an Indian ship. One of the three cases had proved fatal before arrival at Kamaran, and a second death occurred on the way to Jedda. None of these cases were landed at Kamaran for treatment; adequate precautions for isolation were taken on board. In view of this healthy record all steamers were dealt with according to the measures prescribed for "healthy" ships in article 20 of the Anglo-Dutch Agreement of 1926. All the steamers calling at Kamaran were exempted from landing pilgrims. The inspecting staff at Kamaran noticed the interesting fact that more camp beds were in use than ever before; a practice which is to be encouraged, though it takes up more space than sleeping on the deck. None of the ships were reported to be full, except the *El Hind*. All pilgrims reached Kamaran duly protected against cholera and small-pox. The Italian troopship *Sannio* again brought pilgrims from Mogadiseio, to the number of 398, a considerable reduction on last year's figure. A great improvement was noticed in regard to baggage, as much more than in previous years was stored below.

38. The quarantine fee remained at 3 rupees per person. His Majesty's Minister was able once more to dispense returning ships from calling at Kamaran, in the same way as was reported last year.

39. More pilgrims than previously are beginning to land at Kamaran under arrangements made by the Civil Administrator; those who landed greatly appreciated the opportunity of a few hours ashore.

Tor.

40. The quarantine station controlled by the International Quarantine Board of Alexandria was maintained in the same way as last year. The board's delegate for the Hejaz this year was Dr. Aly Abdel Wahid Aly. The return pilgrimage was declared clean on the 13th February, 1939, the health of the returning pilgrims being good; the Tor station closed soon after the 15th March, and the Quarantine Board declared the pilgrimage closed on the 31st March. The statistics kept at Tor give the total number of pilgrims proceeding to the Hejaz as 13,479, made up of 7,960 Egyptians, 85 Palestinians and 5,434 pilgrims of other nationalities.

40A. It is still too early to say exactly what the future of the Tor station will be now that the Quarantine Board is disappearing and its functions are being

taken over by the Egyptian Government; moreover, the views of the Saudi Arabian Government, as put forward by Khalid-al-Hud and Dri Hamouda at the Paris Office of Health in March, 1939, may result in some changes.

Suakin.

41. The Sudan Government quarantine station at Suakin was maintained on the same general lines as previously; all pilgrims were vaccinated and inoculated for small pox and cholera before they left for Jedda, and delousing as a precaution against relapsing fever was also carried out where necessary. The health of returning pilgrims was good, the only cases of epidemic disease being fifteen cases of chicken-pox. The pilgrimage having been declared clean, the period of quarantine on return was reduced to twenty-four hours.

42. Great improvements, costing £E. 6,000, have been carried out in the quarantine camp at Suakin. The quarantine jetty has been reconstructed and widened, a lorry and a hand trolley for the transport of baggage have been supplied; the first-class and third-class accommodation has been increased, while the former has been made more popular by the reduction of first-class charges from 50 pt. to 30 pt. The total capacity of the third-class accommodation has been increased to 1,560 persons, so that two boat-loads of pilgrims can be accommodated at the same time. Electric light has been extended in such a way that the work can go on at night; and the water supply and the latrines have been extended and improved.

Jedda.

43. At Jedda Dr. Yahya Nasri performed the functions of quarantine medical officer and port health officer, though, owing to preoccupation with his private practice, he left most of the work of visiting ships to his assistant, Dr. Izzat Faraoun. They were assisted by one dispenser and one vaccinator.

(4) Health.

General.

44. There were no epidemics and the general health of the pilgrims was quite satisfactory. The most prevalent diseases were malaria, pneumonia, diarrhoea and dysentery. One case of the sub-tertian form of malaria was successfully treated. A few diabetic Indian pilgrims developed gangrene of the extremities and carbuncle. The Afghan Minister, having partaken of fish at Kabigh on his way from Medina to Mecca, developed alarming symptoms suggestive of cholera; he was treated successfully and it was finally decided that he has been suffering from fish-poisoning. Heavy rainfall at Arafat was the cause of a good many cases of pneumonia, owing to exposure and chill.

45. A good deal of publicity has been given to the activities of the Saudi First-Aid Society, which is supposed to treat urgent cases of accident or illness among the pilgrims. Its annual report publishes a balance sheet, from which it appears that its income is derived from private subscriptions, from the sale of charity stamps and from the Taif Hospital. On the expenditure side we see that 85,000 Saudi piastres are spent in wages, 80,000 on buildings at Mecca and Muna, 58,000 on motors and motor cycles, but only 12,000 on medicines and surgical instruments. The ambulance was sometimes to be seen dashing about, but whenever it was urgently needed (*e.g.*, on one occasion when a lorry containing a party of Persian pilgrims overturned just outside the Medina gate at Jedda), neither the ambulance nor the doctors could be found. The annual report also reveals that 2,062 Saudis were treated, but only 1,706 foreigners. In fact, the more or less forced contributions from local notables do little more than maintain a couple of doctors and some chauffeurs in affluence. But no doubt much will be heard of this society in the coming Medical Conference next winter.

Saudi Medical Services.

46. The organisation of Saudi medical services remained similar to that of previous years, and the following list only draws attention to points of interest peculiar to this year's pilgrimage:—

Mecca.—The veterinary surgeon was duly engaged and employed at Mecca. He was an Egyptian, as were the lady doctor and the midwife. All the rest of the staff were Syrians.

Jedda.—Dr. Akram Shooman was assisted by Dr. Ibrahim Adham, who appears to be coming back into favour; these two Syrian doctors were assisted by a dispenser and a midwife, both Egyptians.

Medina.—The same as in the previous pilgrimage, save that Dr. Faud-ul-Mahroos does not seem to have been employed.

Bahra.—A first-aid post was maintained under one official.

Taif, Jauif and Yambo had the same staff as last year; *Wedj* had one doctor, and *Hail* one doctor and one dispenser; and in addition to the itinerating doctor there was the following staff at places not mentioned last year: at *Rabigh* one first-aid official; at *Al Massajid* the same; at *Jizan* an Indian doctor and an assistant dispenser; and the same at *Abha*. There was also Dr. Ramzy, the Turkish army surgeon, and the following Indian staff on the Persian Gulf side: at *Al Hasa*, Dr. Syed Bashir Hussein with one dispenser, and at *Qatif*, Dr. Abdul Latif also with one dispenser.

Local Government Hospitals.

47. *Jedda.*—The local Government hospital continued to function as last year, Dr. Akram Shooman being the surgeon on the staff. He and the British Legation doctor performed some successful operations. The equipment of the hospital is very poor, and the medical wards were usually empty. A Syrian eye surgeon named Dr. Qusaibati has done some operations on eyes, for very large fees. The foreign dispensaries continue to be much more popular in view of the better and cheaper treatment they give; though one of them, the Russian, has been closed; the Russian doctor, however, Dr. Stepukhoff, having refused a summons to return to his native country, continues to treat patients on his own account, principally venereal diseases cases.

48. *Mecca.*—The X-ray plant continues to receive great publicity, though it is doubtful whether its results are trustworthy. Some operations have been successfully performed, and the out-door dispensary was well attended this year. The Saudi medical authorities endeavoured to have orders issued to all mutawwifs that their protégés should be medically attended, in return for high fees, by a Syrian doctor; this rule was, however, relaxed when Indian indignation made itself felt, and Indians were after all allowed to go to their own doctors.

Medina and Taif.—No change from last year.

49. A new feature of the pilgrimage this year has been a series of lectures given by the Syrian doctors to pilgrims on the various subjects, such as venereal diseases, tuberculosis, malaria, cholera, &c., in which they are supposed to be specialists. These lectures all formed part of a publicity campaign by the Society for First-Aid to the Injured and the Sick. Actually the lectures were little more than self-advertisement of the lecturer's profound knowledge, and an excuse to collect money. Collections of this sort were also made at the posts where the Koshan tax is collected, in the Haram itself, and by personal visits to prominent pilgrims. Whenever an accident happened, however, or a destitute person applied for treatment, either the ambulance could not be found, or it had gone out for the day, or the destitute sufferer was sent away.

50. The Indian medical officer's return of cases treated and deaths from infectious diseases in Government hospitals during the year ended the 31st May, 1939, compiled from the weekly reports of the local health authorities, is as follows:—

Diseases.	Cases.	Deaths.
Dysentery	1,731	19
Whooping cough	143	Nil
Puerperal fever	68	37
Typhoid fever	47	10
Measles	18	5
Chicken-pox	7	Nil
Leprosy	5	Nil
Mumps	4	Nil
Influenza	4	Nil
Consumption	3	3
Small-pox	1	Nil
Total	2,031	75

51. Not much reliance can be placed on these figures. Diagnosis is probably wrong; diseases such as all venereal maladies, which are extremely rife, are not mentioned, and many patients are treated by the three legation dispensaries. Even if there had been a serious epidemic it would certainly have been called something else, or all mention of it suppressed.

General Sanitary Conditions.

52. Dr. Ghulam Rasul has not observed any improvement in general sanitary conditions. Flies on meat and vegetables were just as common. The mutawwifs' houses at Jedda and Mecca were grossly overcrowded, the cubic space per head being much less than is allowed in Indian jails. There is no proper latrine or bath arrangements for the pilgrims. The state of Mecca and its surroundings remained the same. Dr. Ghulam Rasul was able to visit Medina this year, and he reports it to be comparatively free from flies and mosquitoes, the main streets being washed with water daily. It must be remembered, however, that fewer pilgrims visit it than was the custom in the past.

Government of India Dispensaries.

53. The Jedda dispensary worked as usual throughout the year, except for a fortnight during the rush season when all the staff were employed at Mecca.

54. The Mecca dispensary remained open from the 25th December, 1938, to the 7th March, 1939, the opening being slightly delayed as the temporary doctors' diplomas did not arrive from India at the proper time. The temporary doctor, sub-assistant surgeon Dr. Syed Ali Noor, together with the temporary compounder, Mohammad Hussien, came from the Bihar Subordinate Medical Service. One of the three Jedda dispensers, Bashir Ahmed, was also detailed to help during the busiest two months at Mecca, and Dr. Mirza Ghulam Rasul himself, with his two remaining dispensers, were at Mecca for the rush period. The arrangements at Muna were the same as those of last year.

Cases Treated in the Indian Dispensaries.

55. The total number of cases treated in the Jedda dispensary during the year ending the 31st May, 1938, was 50,034, as compared with 44,573 the previous year. Of these, 9,392 were Indians and 115 Europeans. At Mecca 11,952 cases were treated, of which 6,746 were Indians. Three hundred and ten cases were treated at Muna. Forty-seven surgical operations were carried out, and 3,616 minor operations.

56. The following table shows the percentage of the various diseases treated during the year in the Indian dispensaries:—

	Percentage.
Ulcers	17.54
Digestive system	11.40
Malaria	11.32
Eye	10.56
Respiratory system	8.69
Skin diseases	6.29
Rheumatism	5.75
Injuries	5.61
Gonorrhoea and its sequelae	1.83
Teeth and gums	1.75
Urinary system	1.54
Nose diseases	1.32
Diarrhoea	1.34
Nervous system	2.07
Other diseases, including dysentery, syphilis, sand-fly fever, measles, pneumonia, and deficiency diseases, &c. (less than 1 per cent. in each case)	12.99
	100.00

57. About 300 visits were made to patients in their houses without charge.

Other Foreign Medical Assistance.

58. The Egyptian Legation maintained a doctor without a dispensary for about seven months. At Mecca the same arrangements were made as last year. At Medina an Egyptian dispensary was opened for the first time.

59. The Netherlands Legation maintained one doctor at Mecca, with one dispenser.

60. The Italian Legation doctor was here throughout the year, and is a Fascist propagandist, with friendly feelings towards the Syrian doctors, who appear to share his views.

61. The Russian Legation having been withdrawn from Jedda, no official Russian doctor was in practice; but, in fact, the legation doctor, Stepukhoff, refused to be sent back to Russia, and remains at Jedda, where he treats a considerable clientele, mostly of venereal cases.

62. The Afghan Government again engaged a doctor to be in charge of their dispensary at Mecca for one month; he was a British Indian subject.

Legation Medical Staff.

63. Dr. Mirza Ghulam Rasul continued in charge, assisted by three dispensers. Sub-assistant surgeon Dr. Syed Ali Noor, with one dispenser, worked at Mecca during the pilgrimage season.

(5) Internal Transport.

64. The only pilgrim who travelled by air was Prince Mohammad Ali, who, after arriving by boat, flew in a specially chartered plane from Jedda to Medina, and thence back to Egypt. The Banque Misr did not run any air service for pilgrims; previous experience had shown that it was expensive and troublesome to arrange. Nor was it popular with pilgrims. The heavy landing charges exacted by the Saudis were sufficient to make pilgrims avoid this method of travel.

65. The chief means of transport was again by motor buses and cars. The Arab Motor Company does not seem to have done quite so well out of its monopoly this year as in 1938, if any reliance can be placed on its returns. It was prophesied in last year's report (paragraph 102) that if the same number of pilgrims were to come this year, and were to travel in the same way, the Government stood to gain £30,000 gold. They did not do so. The income of the company is given as about 8 million piastres miri (equivalent to about £73,000 gold) less than that of last year, in spite of the fact that the total number of pilgrims who travelled by car exceeded last year's figure by 6,181. The explanation is that the real increase in fares for those who went to Mecca first and then to Medina via Jedda resulted in a great decrease of travellers by motor to Medina. The demand was, in fact, very elastic. The alternative method, which received an unexpected boom, was camel transport; and some who could not afford to hire a camel to Medina walked. The number of pilgrims who travelled between Jedda and Medina by car fell by 4,409, as compared with 1938. The number of travellers by motor transport to Arafat also fell by about 1,000.

66. The Ministry of Finance purchased a further lot of 140 shares in the Arab Car Company at £10s. gold per share. There cannot be very many private shareholders left now.

67. The Car Company purchased twenty-four new cars and ninety-two new lorries for this season for £24,439 gold. They sold twenty-six vehicles for £3,604 gold. In all the company had 605 vehicles in working order during the pilgrimage season, of which 492 were lorries. These figures are taken from the company's own returns.

68. The following table shows the number of pilgrims who used motor vehicles for transport during some part of their pilgrimage, last year's figures being given for comparison:—

	1938.	1939.
From Mecca to Medina and back	16,478	...
From Jedda to Medina and back	5,069	18,744
From Mecca to Jedda (single)	8,700	...
From Jedda to Mecca (single)	31,764	...
From Jedda to Mecca and back	...	52,169
From Yembo to Medina (single)	76	247

From Yembu to Medina and then back to Mecca	1938. 195	1939. ...
From Medina to Mecca and back to Medina, and from Medina to Mecca only	1,706	...
From Mecca to Arafat and back	5,002	3,951
From Mecca to Taif and back	...	60
Total	68,990	75,171

69. It will be observed that while the single fares from Mecca to Jedda, and Jedda to Mecca, disappeared, return fares more than took their place; but, on the other hand, the total number going from Mecca to Medina and back and from Jedda to Medina and back in 1938 was higher than in 1939; and passengers from Medina to Mecca and back to Medina, and from Medina to Mecca only, amounted to 1,706 last year, but nil this year.

70. No Sudanese drivers were employed this year, though there was in fact a shortage of chauffeurs in the rush period. Complaints of extortion and incivility from chauffeurs were legion; those made by Indians were dealt with by the Indian vice-consul, and some of the drivers were punished as a result.

71. The doings of the "Nejd Car Company" remain as mysterious as before. Its main function is to organise transport for the King and the tribes of Nejd. It runs a service between Riyadh and the Hejaz. As for the interest of the Arab Motor Car Company in this company, the accounts of the former show that a further sum of £6,600 gold was paid to the Nejd company this year. According to the current rumour, the Arab Motor Company pays for the upkeep of the Nejd company, which has no other income; nor, in all probability, does it ever produce any account.

72. The large garage at Mecca, referred to in paragraph 71 of the last report, has been completed.

73. No road construction worthy of the name has been done. The negotiations with the Egyptian engineers for a properly built road to Mecca have had absolutely no practical result up to the time of writing this report.

Overland Routes.

74. The Iraq Motor Company again made adequate arrangements for the transport of pilgrims travelling from Iraq via Najaf to Medina. The latter place was the terminus beyond which the Iraq cars were not allowed to go. From there pilgrims had to travel by cars supplied by the local monopoly, and pilgrims complained that such cars were greatly inferior to those of the Iraq company.

75. The total number of pilgrims travelling overland from Iraq was 1,800 as compared with 1,350 the previous year. Of these, forty-eight were British Indians. The monopoly for the Medina route was granted this year by the Iraq Government to Haj Omer-bin-Othman, Najm Abood-al-Mukhtar and Ahmed-al-Haj Hussein-al-Behbahani. The fares charged were as follows:—

	First class. I.D.	Second class. I.D.	Third class. I.D.
(A) Bagdad-Najaf, Medina-Najaf-Bagdad	15.750	12.500	8.150
(B) Najaf-Medina, Medina-Najaf	15.250	12.3000	7.950

During the conversations which took place at Riyadh in July 1939 the Iraqi Government accepted in principle the Saudi proposal that the dues and fees leviable from pilgrims travelling overland should be collected in advance through a bank in Iraq and remitted to the Saudi Government in a lump sum.

Camels and Cabs.

76. The same remarks apply as last year.

Dhows.

77. Last year's arrangements continued. The vexed question of the non-collection of dhow fees in India was not again raised; the local authorities arranged matters through the mutawwifs and their subordinates.

General.

78. There were the usual difficulties about pilgrims who failed to pay their dues; such persons were detained in Jedda, but the Saudi Arabian Government did not venture to keep them away on pilgrimage day. Those who had paid were allowed to go to Mecca on foot if they wished. To Medina it was forbidden to go on foot owing to the long distance; but a judicious tip could get round this regulation. Nearly 200 Indians came on foot via the Yemen and reached Mecca in a state of destitution. Those whom the Saudi frontier guards caught were detained at Jezan till they had paid their dues.

(6) Customs.

79. The only new feature to report this year in regard to the customs is the dismissal of some of the notoriously corrupt customs officials. They were replaced by rough, uneducated Nejdīs, who were not very careful in handling baggage. Moreover, there seems to have been as much venality as ever. Indian pilgrims continue to arrive with ghee, rice and flour of their own. They have to pay heavy customs duty and very high transport charges, unless they leave this food behind at Jedda, in which case when they return they find that some of it has been stolen. It would be an advantage if Indian pilgrims could be advised at the port of embarkation not to bring these food-stuffs with them. There was no change in the customs schedule this year.

(7) Religious Policy.

80. On the whole Wahhabi intolerance has shown signs of diminishing. One of the Qazis at Taif is reported to have been expelled from the Hejaz by orders of the King for excess of zeal in smashing gramophones and stopping smoking. As for drinking alcoholic liquors, the laws are still strict, but when an illicit araq still was discovered at Jedda by the vigilant Mehdi Bey, chief of the police, it was found that several very highly-placed persons were customers.

81. The dislike which the Wahhabis always have had for memorial buildings and monuments still persists. Nawab Ahsan Yar Jung Bahadur endeavoured to persuade the local authorities to let him erect a mosque and a library according to his own design at the birthplace of the Prophet; but he was no more successful than Sir Nizam Jung last year (paragraph 83 of the 1938 report).

82. As for destitute pilgrims who cannot pay their pilgrimage dues, they fared even worse than last year. They were detained for long periods and made to beg from richer pilgrims in order to get enough to pay the dues. They were all permitted to attend the pilgrimage at the last moment. As time goes on it becomes clear that what the Saudi Government want is rich pilgrims, in order that they should make money out of them. Three indications of this fixed policy have been observed this season. In the first place, the Saudi Arabian Government requested the Government of India officially, through this legation, that no destitute pilgrims should be sent. In the second place, an attempt was made, and is still being pursued, to make the shipping companies collect Saudi pilgrimage dues from each pilgrim before he embarks in the foreign port. But the third instance was the most remarkable of all: at the International Sanitary Office in Paris the two Saudi delegates, Khalid-al-Hud and Dr. Hammouda, declared quite frankly that the Saudi Arabian Government's desire was to attract more rich pilgrims and prevent the arrival of destitutes; in fact, the main idea of their attitude about the International Sanitary Convention seems to be that present regulations do not make the pilgrimage expensive enough.

83. The disposal of deceased pilgrims' estates became a question of some importance in connexion with the estate of the late Sahebzadi Begum of Baroda. She was more a resident in Mecca than a pilgrim; and she left explicit directions that her personal estate was to be handed over to this legation as a deposit, in order that the bequests in her will could be carried out. The Saudi authorities, however, have argued with some emphasis that according to local law and practice the Beit-al-Mal or Treasury is the only competent authority. The matter is under discussion.

(8) *Mutawwifs.*

84. The mutawwifs and their agents behaved as they always have done in the past. Large numbers of them visited the areas from which pilgrims come and brought along as many persons as possible. Once the pilgrims were in the holy land they had to pay all the Saudi taxes. This year mutawwifs appear to have been more ruthless than previously in their exactions. However, each mutawwif has to render an account to the Government of the number of pilgrims he controls, and the fees in full have to be paid by the mutawwif to the Government; it is not, therefore, surprising that the mutawwif does his utmost to get his pilgrims to pay. The indigent and destitute ones were imprisoned and detained, and hardly any of them were released until they had raised the money somehow.

85. Two mutawwifs were accused of definite irregularities. One of them, Seyyid Jamil Abu Saud, was refused a visa for India. His fault had been that he swindled a dying pilgrim of some money. He has now offered to pay back the sum in question. The other, named Ali Mahmud, was put on this year's black list by the Government of India at the suggestion of this legation, for refusing to return to a woman pilgrim a sum of money she deposited with him. From the vociferous applications which Ali Mahmud has made to have his case revised it appears that the black list has a salutary effect.

86. The sustained agitation by the Memon pilgrims against the *tagrir* system, whereby one mutawwif only is detailed to look after that community, has had an effect. As the result of correspondence with the Government of India representations were made by the Indian vice-consul to the Minister of Finance on this subject. The latter assured Seyyid Lal Shah that he had warned the mutawwifs concerned, and that if they abused their privileges he would have them removed. Moreover, the Saudi Government have refrained from pursuing a policy which they favour, i.e., a policy of extending the *tagrir* system to other parts of India; no doubt mutawwifs would have to pay large sums to the Government for such a monopolistic position. However, in one case the *tagrir* system was extended: the private secretary to the Finance Minister had been promised rights over the Assam pilgrims. That province was, however, divided into three parts according to the Moslems in it, and only one-third of the province was allotted to the deserving secretary.

87. The mutawwifs and their underlings were not instructed to refuse co-operation in the registration and the rotation systems, which therefore worked excellently, a tribute to the tact and efficiency of the Indian Vice-Consul.

88. Although the Saudi Government representatives always protest that they keep a stern eye on the mutawwifs, it does not appear that they really bother about their activities at all, provided they pay their dues to the Government. A good many small grievances were brought to the notice of Government authorities by pilgrims, but in no case was a mutawwif openly punished. But we know already that the Government is not interested in poor pilgrims: it only wants rich ones.

89. The conduct of mutawwifs in the ports of embarkation of pilgrims left much to be desired: they, as usual, acted as touts for shipping companies, invaded camps of *hajjis*, and misled the ignorant pilgrims in many ways. The interests of the pilgrims would be better served if these parasites could be kept out of pilgrim camps.

(9) *Pilgrimage Tariff and Cost of Pilgrimage.*

90. Although the official statement issued by the Government claimed that pilgrimage fees had not changed in any essential point, it will be seen from the following that the Saudi Government received more, and the average pilgrim had to pay more, than in the previous year:—

91. By a clever manipulation of the tariff rates for journeys to Medina, almost every pilgrim who visited that place had to pay £1½ gold more than he would have the previous year. In previous years the fare from Mecca to Medina and back to Jedda or Mecca by bus (the method by which most pilgrims travel nowadays) was £7½ gold. This year this charge was made for the journey from Jedda to Medina and back to Jedda. Indian pilgrims who like to land in this country in *Ithrams* and go straight to Mecca were affected by this revised charge. To go to Mecca and return to Jedda they had to pay separately, and the net increase for such pilgrims was £1½ gold.

92. In the second place, camel fares were increased: a fact which was noted in the official tariff. The explanation given was the increased cost of fodder. However, it appears that the extra charge was not allowed to benefit the camelmen, but was taken by the Treasury. The consequence was that the camelmen went on strike, and about 1,000 Indian pilgrims had to wait at Mecca for some time, thereby missing a returning boat.

93. In the third place, the additional charges for overstaying the usual period at Medina were increased by ¾ of a piastre per day.

94. Mention should also be made of the tax of nearly 4 annas per animal which was collected from each pilgrim who slaughtered an animal at Muna. As nearly 400,000 animals were slaughtered the Saudi Government must have realised a considerable sum from this tax.

95. The tax known as *kushan* constitutes about three-quarters of the actual fare paid by the pilgrim, though this tax is not mentioned in the official tariff.

96. The fares from Medina to Mecca charged to pilgrims coming overland from Iraq via Najaf were also raised slightly, from £4.13½ gold to £4.55 gold.

97. One tax which did not alter was the so-called quarantine fee for almost non-existent quarantine services at Jedda, amounting to £1.10 gold per pilgrim. This charge, oppressive and unjustified as it is, is not more extraordinary than the high fees paid for motor transport: these fees are so high that it is reckoned that one journey from Jedda to Mecca and back in a lorry filled chock-full of pilgrims will almost pay for the capital cost of the lorry.

98. Then there is the tax called "Road Development Scheme Tax." Every pilgrim travelling from Jedda to Mecca and back in a motor vehicle had to pay over 2 rupees, and for the journey to Medina and back 5 rupees. Pilgrims who travelled by camel had to pay half fees. No accounts have been seen of the large sums which this tax ought to have by now produced, but what is certain is that no appreciable amount of it has ever been spent on road development. Egyptian engineers engaged through the Banque Misr are always supposed to be arriving very soon with the mission of making a proper road from Jedda to Mecca, but they have not arrived yet.

(10) *Indian Pilgrimage.*

99. The first Indian pilgrimage boat, steamship *Jehangir*, arrived on the 1st October with 139 pilgrims: a small number because pilgrims hoped that the competitions with the rival line would result in lower fares later on. Consequently, out of a total number of 19,670 pilgrims embarking at Indian ports, 15,386 of them arrived in the last month, i.e., between the 24th December, 1938, and the 26th January, 1939. Some 13,000 of the latter were British Indians and had to be dealt with according to the normal routine: the staff of the Indian section, however, proved equal to the emergency. In actual fact, fares were not reduced very much. Pilgrims who deferred their arrival till the last month, but on arrival at Karachi found that the rates had not been substantially reduced, usually paid up and came on pilgrimage after all.

100. The following table shows the number of pilgrims from each province of India, from Burma, and from Ceylon, classified according to ports of embarkation:—

British Subjects.

Province.	Total Number of Pilgrims in 1938.	In 1939—			
		Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Bengal and Assam ...	3,816	1,483	111	1,691	3,285
Punjab ...	3,897	151	4,742	1	4,894
Bombay Presidency ...	1,509	1,596	18	...	1,614
United Provinces ...	1,484	1,049	654	2	1,705
Madras Presidency ...	388	297	4	...	301
Sind Province ...	2,340	...	2,315	...	2,315
Behar and Orissa ...	251	146	21	6	173
Central Provinces ...	78	161	9	...	170

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Province.	Total number of pilgrims in 1938.	In 1939—			
		Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Baluchistan...	728	46	711	...	757
N.W. Frontier Province...	507	116	489	2	607
Hyderabad (Deccan)...	263	292	292
Delhi...	211	41	256	...	297
Central India Agency...	143	249	111	...	360
Burma...	117	136	19	30	185
Ceylon...	33	12	12
French India...	2
Mauritius...	...	2	2
Malayan...	...	5	5
South Africa...	...	29	29
East Africa...	1	...	1
Portuguese India...	2
Rajputana States...	259
Miscellaneous...	10	25	25
Total ...	16,038	5,836	9,461	1,732	17,029

101. In the chapter on "Statistics" above it will be seen that 19,817 pilgrims sailed from Indian ports; the discrepancy between the latter figure and that given above is explained by the fact that some of those sailing from Indian ports were not Indians. The "Statistics" section also gives the number of Indians making the pilgrimage as 17,669; no doubt some of that number came from Egypt or other countries apart from India. The figures in the "Statistics" section were compiled from Jedda sources, while those in this section came from lists of pilgrims sent to this legation by the various Indian Port Haj Committees.

102. It will be seen that about 1,000 more Indians made the pilgrimage this year than last. A comparison of the figures for the two years does not give any striking results. This year no pilgrims were registered from the Rajputana States; there was an increase in Burmans and pilgrims from the Central Provinces. Pilgrims from the Punjab and United Provinces increased a little, while those from Bengal and Assam were a little less.

103. The following list shows the number of non-Indian pilgrims who travelled to the Hejaz via Indian ports:—

	1938.	In 1939.			
		Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Chinese (Turkestan)...	402	6	64	...	70
Russian (Turkestan)...	84	4	59	...	63
China...	28	118	118
Afghans...	2,677	88	1,343	...	1,431
Nepalese...	11	4	4
Persians...	7	...	6	...	6
Hejaz-Nejd subjects...	261	183	47	48	278
Far East...	45	46	46
Arabs from Persian Gulf...	130	11	44	...	55
Arabs from Hadhramaut...	...	5	5
Iraqians...	...	1	1	...	2
Yemenis...	...	2	2
Syrians...	...	4	4
Tibetans...	...	8	8
South Africans...	44
East Africans...	4
Miscellaneous...	2	11	11
Total ...	3,695	491	1,564	48	2,103

104. These figures were compiled from the Port Haj Committees' returns. Numbers are generally less than last year. The Afghan figures are discussed later in this report. Chinese from Turkestan were very much less; it is surprising that even seventy managed to get to Indian ports in these troublous times. The number of Saudi subjects increased still further; they are for the most part returning pilgrimage propagandists. Arabs from the Persian Gulf were fewer.

105. No exact statistics of the number of Indians who travelled overland exist. It is thought that the number was about the same as last year, i.e., 300.

106. The same two steamship lines dealt with the pilgrimage traffic from India as last year, and no arrangement has been arrived at between the two rival companies about rates. The Scindia Steam Navigation Company (otherwise known as the Haj Line), still a Hindu concern, replaced steamship *Englestan* by steamship *El-Hind*. The Mogul Line, managed by Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., had seven ships in the pilgrimage traffic, while the rival line had two.

107. The details of the return traffic to India may be seen from the following table, which gives the number of ships in port on various dates, as well as the number of pilgrims awaiting return, together with the number actually shipped back to India:—

Dates.	No. of ships in port.	Pilgrims awaiting embarkation.		Pilgrims despatched.		Total.	Pilgrims remaining.		Remarks.
		Mogul Line.	Haj Line.	Mogul Line.	Haj Line.		Mogul Line.	Haj Line.	
1939—									
February 8...	8	4,516	1,806	3,109	897	4,006	1,407	909	Rahmani, Islami, El-Medina.
February 9...	5	1,499	933	...	915	915	1,499	18	El-Hind.
February 10...	4	1,538	18	1,347	...	1,347	191	18	Rizwani.
February 18...	3	1,821	402	1,027	...	1,027	794	402	Alavi.
February 20...	2	1,105	595	1,105	...	1,105	...	595	Khosrou.
February 26...	2	1,879	1,263	1,012	...	1,012	867	1,263	Jehangir.
February 27...	1	956	1,277	...	897	897	956	380	El-Medina.
March 1...	1	1,262	402	1,262	...	1,262	...	402	Rahmani.
March 7...	3	815	628	...	628	628	815	...	El-Hind.
March 9...	2	1,169	22	1,169	...	1,169	...	22	Islami.
March 16...	1	2,438	494	1,446	...	1,446	992	494	Rizwani.
March 24...	1	1,741	847	...	847	847	1,741	...	El-Medina.
March 25...	1	1,805	4	1,027	...	1,027	778	4	Alavi.
April 9...	1	1,268	16	1,284	...	1,284	Akbar.
				13,788	4,184	17,972			

108. Between the 10th February and the 26th February there was no Scindia Line boat, and that line had therefore to pay compensation to its pilgrims, who were forced to spend more than a fortnight in Jedda watching the rival line taking away their friends. The last Scindia Line boat left on the 24th March, and all pilgrims by that line who wished to return after that date had to do so by the boats of the rival line.

109. The following table gives the number of ships employed, voyages effected, and pilgrims carried by the Mogul and the Scindia Lines:—

Lines.	Outward from India.			Homeward to India.		
	Number of ships.	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.	Number of ships.	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.
Mogul Line...	7	17	15,104	7	12	14,173
Haj Line...	2	6	4,566	2	5	4,208
Total ...	9	23	19,670	9	17	18,381

110. In the same way as happened last year (see 1938 report, paragraph 113), the discrepancy between the figure of 19,670 given above and that of 19,817 given in Table (B) of Section (2) above is due to the fact that the

latter figure includes infants, while the shipping companies' figures, given above, only include persons for whom quarantine dues are payable. The homeward figure includes about 298 destitutes who came overland and by devious routes, but who were returned by steamer at agreed rates sanctioned by the Government of India. Some pilgrims also came from India not during the pilgrimage season, and returned with other pilgrims. Eight hundred and thirty-four return tickets remained in deposit at this legation. The figures given above bring out the fact that the Haj Line brought 358 more pilgrims than it took back; the persons it did not take had to travel by Mogul Line boats at the expense of the Haj Line.

111. The following table shows the ports of embarkation and destination of the India pilgrims mentioned above:—

Port.	Pilgrims embarked.	Pilgrims returning.
Bombay	6,327	7,215
Karachi	11,025	11,166
Calcutta	1,780	...
	19,132	18,381

112. The number of pilgrims who purchased single and return tickets in India, or deposited the amount of the return passage, is shown in the following table:—

Port.	Deposit.	Single.	Return.	Total.
Bombay	14	296	6,017	6,327
Karachi	2	34	10,989	11,025
Calcutta	...	31	1,749	1,780
	16	361	18,755	19,132

113. The decline in the number of deposit-paid fares (sixteen as compared with 400 last year) is attributable to the cheapness of the return fare.

Return of Pilgrims to India: General.

114. The rules of the rotation system were strictly observed this year; the Indian Vice-Consul, helped by the local agents of the shipping companies, was able to ensure that return passages were booked according to the order of arrival of the pilgrims in Jedda. Some pilgrims, knowing this rule, attempted to get round it by sending on their friends to seek passages for them before they arrived themselves. With the co-operation of "wakils" this practice was stopped and the offenders had to wait their turn. It has already been mentioned that Scindia Line passengers had sometimes to wait at Jedda much longer than passengers by the other line; some of them threw away their Scindia ticket and bought a cash return fare by the Mogul boat.

115. The Indian vice-consul has this year attempted to solve the perennial problem of congestion of returning pilgrims at Jedda by persuading the rival companies to open publicity offices in Mecca and Medina with the object of informing pilgrims of the probable date of sailing of any particular boat. Even as long as Saudi transport arrangements are so unreliable, it is impossible to ensure that pilgrims always catch the boat they want. The Indian vice-consul hopes to improve publicity arrangements at Medina in future years.

116. The strike of the camelmen for higher fares has been mentioned elsewhere in this report. Pilgrims who had paid their return fare by camel before the haj were stranded and missed their boats. Some of them arrived at Jedda so late that they missed the compensation which is payable to waiting pilgrims during the first six weeks after the haji day. Representations were made to the Saudi Arabian Government, who promised to look into the matter, though in actual fact the main difficulty seems to have been that, while camel fares were put up, the increase was taken by the Government. Some Indian pilgrims

were stranded on the Medina road for several days; when this legation heard of their plight they approached the Saudi Arabian Government, who sent out lorries to bring the sufferers in.

Food, Accommodation, &c.

117. Food supplied on ships was, on the whole, better than in previous years. It is understood that the Mogul Line is proposing to remove their present contractor and to do their own catering.

118. Few difficulties were recorded about the baggage of returning pilgrims. The customs authorities were not obstructive.

119. Complaints about lack of space were again heard. A Bill on this matter is said to be in course of preparation for submission to the Legislative Assembly. But the real difficulty is not that the present legal allowance of air is too small, but that the mentality of most pilgrims is such that they insist on having their heavy baggage with them on deck instead of stowing it in the hold. If all such baggage, not wanted on the voyage, were put in the hold, the problem would be solved.

120. The system of appointing an unofficial "Amir-ul-Haj" for each pilgrim ship was continued and resulted in a series of reports, some of which contained useful matter.

121. The question of the attachment of a photograph to each pilgrim-pass made little progress. As long as Indian pilgrims, alone of all the many nationalities of pilgrims in the world, are not obliged to have their photographs affixed to their passes, fraud and traffic in passes is bound to go on.

122. The Indian Pilgrimage Section issued this year 178 emergency certificates to pilgrims who had lost their original documents, and a further 268 emergency certificates to pilgrims who had travelled overland on foot, but possessed no travelling documents.

Refunds on Deposit-Paid Passes and Return Tickets.

123. It was noticed this year that refunds on the unexpired half of a return ticket had in certain cases been claimed, and received, by pilgrims who had stayed on in the Hejaz for eighteen months; and that these persons had had merely used the refund to keep themselves going for a few more months, until complete lack of funds finally obliged them to seek repatriation at Government expense, which was granted. Under section 208 C (2) of the Pilgrimage Regulations this legation is empowered to withhold such a cash refund until eighteen months after the pilgrim left India. One object of this provision was doubtless to discourage pilgrims from getting their half-fares back soon after they had done the pilgrimage, on the theory that if a pilgrim stays eighteen months in the country, that long sojourn raises a presumption that he intends to settle down in this country. But in the cases cited above, the men just lived by begging, &c., for eighteen months, then got their refund, and lived on that as long as possible.

Registration.

124. Out of 16,898 Indian pilgrims who arrived by sea, only 427 failed to register: these included persons who held single tickets and need not register, and also some Shi's Moslems. The latter kind of pilgrim is now allotted to mutawwifs who deal with Persians, and the Indian vice-consul has succeeded in arranging with those mutawwifs that Indian Shias should next year be registered at the legation and their return tickets deposited. It is clear that the registration system is working well.

125. One hundred and six unclaimed return tickets are at the legation and will be forwarded to India in due course.

126. Twenty-one Indians and fourteen foreign pilgrims reported the loss of their return tickets. Suitable arrangements were made to repatriate them by obtaining embarkation tickets from the shipping companies.

Rotation System.

127. As mentioned above, this system worked well this year: the rule "first come, first away" for returning pilgrims was rigidly observed.

Hyderabad State Caravan.

128. Arrangements were the same as last year. The Qafila Salar, Abdul Qadir Muhi-ud-Din made a speech at the King's banquet praising the Saudi management of the affairs of the pilgrimage.

Destitutes.

129. The number of destitutes repatriated at the expense of the Government of India this year was only eleven more than last year, the number this year being 188. But as the Government had sanctioned a flat rate of 40 rupees per pilgrim plus food expenses, the net expense of Government was much higher than last year. The total cost was 8,911-8-0 rupees. All these destitutes were rounded up and sent off by steamship *Alari* on the 1st May, 1939, in view of the grave European situation then threatening. The Indian vice-consul also despatched on earlier dates a number of more or less destitute pilgrims, with the aid of funds which he was instrumental in collecting from rich pilgrims.

130. The following tables analyse the repatriated persons by provinces of origin and routes of access:—

(a) Provinces of origin—

Bengal	74
Assam	14
Punjab	24
Sind	24
Baluchistan	16
North-West Frontier Province	3
United Provinces	10
Hyderabad (Deccan)	3
Madras	13
Bombay	7

(b) Route—

(1) Overland—

Via Gwadar-Muscat-Mokalla-Yemen	37
Via Gwadar-Hasa-Nejd	15
Via Karachi-Basra-Nejd	11
Via Persia-Nejd	1
Via Palestine-Medina	1
Via Karachi-Aden	1
Via Karachi-Muscat-Mokalla-Yemen	28
Via Mandvi-Muscat-Mokalla-Yemen	4
Via Bombay-Muscat-Mokalla-Yemen	76

(2) By sea—

Bombay (steamer)	9
Karachi (steamer)	3
Mokalla (dhow)	1
Aden (dhow)	1

14

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131. The general question of destitutes is referred to in paragraph 20 of the introductory section. A further side-light on the question is thrown by the fact that certain pilgrims travelling via Iraq to Saudi Arabia, proceeding by overland route, held pilgrim passes endorsed to the effect that a deposit of 100 rupees had been made in India to cover eventual repatriation expenses. As they had deposited this sum they were exempted from the payment of the basic deposit of 7 Iraqi dinars which is normally taken from pilgrims from Iraq using this route.

132. The chairman of the Karachi Port Haj Committee, Mr. Haji Muhammad Hashim Gazdar, who himself made the pilgrimage this year, wrote an article containing some outspoken criticisms of pilgrimage conditions, and made the courageous suggestion that the problem of destitutes should be solved

by a regulation under which intending pilgrims should have to deposit the sum of 500 rupees to cover their minimum expenses.

133. The Government of India have this question under careful consideration. To impose an additional cash deposit in India would involve the amendment of section 210 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, which would be difficult. The Government is therefore considering an alternative suggestion that a rule should be inserted in the *Indian Pilgrim Ships' Rules, 1933*, empowering the pilgrim pass-issuing authorities to refuse passes to persons who cannot satisfy them that they have sufficient means to meet the full pilgrimage expenses. Control over country craft sailing across the Persian Gulf from ports in Sind and British Baluchistan is also being considered.

Publicity.

134. The usual *Manual of Instruction for Pilgrims* was not extensively distributed this year, and the copies sent to the legation arrived long after the pilgrimage day.

Banking Facilities.

135. A sum of 7,570 rupees was deposited for safe keeping at this legation by a few pilgrims.

Indian Staff.

136. There was no change to report except the replacement of Mr. Iqbal Din, after five years' service, by Mr. Abdul Rahim Khan, B.A., of the Civil Secretariat of the North-West Frontier Province, who arrived on the 10th December, 1938. All the staff worked efficiently.

(11) Afghan Pilgrimage.

137. Less than half the number of pilgrims in 1938 came to the present pilgrimage. The number last year was 3,709 and this year 1,451. The reason given is the fall in Afghan currency.

138. The Afghan Minister attended the pilgrimage and stayed longer than is his wont. His longer stay was not marked by any greater interest in the welfare of Afghan pilgrims.

139. Dr. Abdur Rahman came on pilgrimage as a medical officer for Afghan pilgrims. He visited Medina during his short stay here and then left on return to Kabul. He cannot have done much doctoring, as he brought no medicines and had no dispenser. When the Afghan Minister fell ill in Mecca, he was treated at the Mecca dispensary of the Government of India.

140. The Afghan Chargé d'Affaires requested this legation shortly after the pilgrimage to decline to endorse the return tickets of Afghan subjects for a refund of fares under section 208 C (2) of the regulations unless the return tickets were first certified and endorsed by the Afghan Legation. His point appeared to be that he could, therefore, keep track of fraudulent persons, who either passed themselves off as Afghans without possessing regular Afghan passports, or impersonated other people. His request was acceded to, though it was made plain to him that His Majesty's Minister was not legally bound to comply with his request. It appears very probable that some pilgrims who obtain passes at Indian ports as "Afghans" are not really Afghans in the strict sense of the Afghan Nationality Law. It is also very likely that there is a traffic in passes, owing to the absence of photographs, so that it is difficult to check whether the holder is the person to whom the pass was originally issued.

(12) Malay Pilgrimage.

141. The Malay pilgrimage season started with the sailing of steamship *Menelaus* from Singapore on the 6th September, 1938, and ended with the departure of the last pilgrim ship on the 26th March, 1939. The reduction in the number of pilgrims this year is shown by the fact that there were only five ships on the outward journey and four on the homeward. All the ships were of the Blue Funnel Line.

142. The total number of pilgrims from Malayan ports, including Javanese, Philipinos and Saudi Arabs, arriving at Jedda was 3,728. Of these, 2,059 were Malays (excluding infants). According to the register kept here, this figure was made up as follows:—

Straits Settlements—

Singapore	38
Penang and Province Wellesley	96
Malacca	76
Labuan	3

Federated Malay States—

Perak	439
Selangor	189
Negri Sembilan	119
Pahang	149

Unfederated Malay States—

Johore	400
Kedah	164
Perlis	19
Kelantan	254
Trengganu	97
Brunei	18

Total ... 2,059

This shows a decrease of about 55 per cent. as compared with last year.

143. The above figures do not include the few Malays and Malayan-born Indians who came on pilgrimage during the season via Egypt and India; their exact number is unknown. The Saudi returns quoted in section (2), Table (B), give the total number of pilgrims from Malayan ports as 3,750; this is very close to the above-quoted figure 3,728; the extra 22 were probably from the Dutch East Indies.

Notable Malay Pilgrims.

144. From Kedah—

Tunku Eshah.
Tunku Ahmad Tajudin.

From Johore—

Captain Wan Ngah.
Inche Esa-bin-Abdullah.
Inche Mohamad Said-bin-Mohamed Salleh.

From Perak—

Raja Marthiah, widow of the late Sultan Abdul Jalil of Perak.
Inche Mohamed Zin.

From Negri Sembilan—

Dato Panglima Sutan and Paduka.
Besar Hassan.

From Singapore—

The ex-Sultan of Trengganu (Tunku Kichi Muda).

Assistance to Pilgrims.

145. Two pilgrims were assisted with loans of money on the guarantee of their relatives in Malaya. Three others were given advances against their pensions and salaries due from Government departments in Malaya. A few Government servants, who proved by the production of their leave papers that they had to return at the earliest possible moment, were allowed to proceed sooner than they were entitled to according to the strict rule of rotation. The Dutch Medical Mission at Mecca again looked after the health of pilgrims, though that

mission had to give precedence to Javanese, and to natives of Saudi Arabia. A Royal party from Kedah was accorded special facilities on landing by the Saudi authorities, at the instance of the British Legation.

Cost of the Pilgrimage.

146. The rates for return first-class and deck passages by the Blue Funnel Line, the only line in the traffic, remained the same, namely, \$605.88 and \$215 respectively, including quarantine dues. The fare for third-class berthed accommodation, provided this year for the first time, was fixed at \$350. The rates for "all-inclusive" services in the Hejaz, including road-tax, as fixed by the Saudi Government (converted from gold pounds at the rate of \$15.40 to £1 gold) were as follows:—

	<i>With Medina Visit.</i>	<i>Without Medina Visit.</i>
	\$	\$
By camel	299.85	151.58
By bus	298.00	177.34
By car	383.40	197.15

147. Flats for first-class pilgrims, who wanted better accommodation than that allotted to the ordinary pilgrims, were paid for at rates ranging between £15 gold and £30 gold each.

148. Children under 5 years of age were exempted from payment of fares: those between 5 and 10 paid at half rates, and the rest at full rates.

Deceased Pilgrims.

149. From the arrivals this season there were seventy-two deaths reported, up to the date of departure of the Malay pilgrimage officer: making 3.5 per cent. of the total.

150. The effects of deceased pilgrims were dealt with as usual; they were first handed over to the Beit-ul-Mal, whence they were transferred to the relatives; the effects of those deceased persons, who left no relatives, were eventually handed over to the British Legation for disposal.

Miscellaneous.

151. The smaller number of pilgrims this year may perhaps be due to the unpopularity of the residence-permit, for which the annual fee of 10 riyals (Saudi) has to be paid. At any rate this, together with the travelling taxes or "Koshan" levied on foreigners, caused large numbers of Malays, who had been in the Hejaz for years, to return to Malaya.

152. Passes were issued for each Malay pilgrim, one pass for one pilgrim, except where there was an infant under 1 year of age, when its photo was stuck on its parents' pass, and its name inscribed thereon.

153. A pilgrim from Trengganu ran amok on the 25th January, 1939, and was detained for observation.

154. Instead of a "second-class" the Blue Funnel Line this year supplied on certain ships a class called "third-class berthed"; it was, however, not very well patronised.

155. The arrangements made this year for providing first-class pilgrims with Malay food instead of English as hitherto were universally appreciated.

156. The employment of Malay-speaking dressers to help the ships' doctors was also a very welcome innovation.

Staff.

157. The same arrangements were made as last year, Haji Abdul Majid and Haji Mohammad Jamil again applying their long experience with great success.

(13) Sudanese Pilgrimage.

158. According to Saudi returns (see section (2), Table (A)) 1938, Sudanese pilgrims arrived this year in Pharaonic Mail ships from Suakin, as compared with 2,054 last year. The official figures published by the Sudan Medical Service show that 1,255 pilgrims embarked at Suakin this year, as compared with 1,851 in 1938. Emergency certificates were issued to thirty-six pilgrims, who reported the loss of their Suakin pilgrim passes.

159. For many years past large numbers of Sudanese pilgrims have arrived in this country with insufficient funds to cover the cost of pilgrimage. After the pilgrimage of 1938 the relatively large number of 212 indigent pilgrims were each advanced the sum of £E. 1-500mm. In most cases the money was required to enable them to pay their mutawwifs' dues. As a result of further correspondence between the Sudan Government and this legation (see paragraph 157 of last year's report), a scheme was evolved which required all Sudanese pilgrims to deposit the sum of £E. 1-500mm. with the authorities at Suakin as a guarantee against destitution. The deposit could be refunded either at Jedda after the pilgrimage, or by the authorities at Suakin on the pilgrim's return to that port. The scheme was brought into operation this year, and proved highly successful so far as this legation was concerned. During the return season 640 pilgrims were refunded their deposits by this legation. The work of the quarantine camp at Suakin is described under section (3). "Quarantine."

160. Shipping arrangements, both before and after the pilgrimage, were satisfactory and no serious complaints were received. The traffic was dealt with entirely by steamship *Talodi* and steamship *Taif*.

161. Nine Sudanese pilgrims, including one Arab Sudani, are reported to have died during the pilgrimage.

162. Repatriation of Sudanese:—

(a) Applications considered	2
(b) Applicants repatriated	Nil
(c) Applicants assisted	1
(d) Applications still under reference	Nil

(14) West African Pilgrimage.

163. According to Saudi quarantine returns, 4,217 West Africans arrived for pilgrimage by sea this year, a decrease of 1,829 on last year's total of 6,046. Although the ports of entry are not mentioned, it is safe to assume that the large majority of West African pilgrims entered the port of Jedda from Suakin. The Sudan returns give 4,268 as the number of West Africans leaving Suakin for Jedda; it is unlikely that any of these went to ports other than Jedda, so the Saudi figures appear to be too low. Since the Saudi authorities have instituted controls at the southern ports of Lith and Qundida the route between Massawa and those ports has lost much of its attraction. Fifty-nine emergency certificates were issued to pilgrims who satisfactorily proved the loss of their Suakin Pilgrim Passes.

164. Ninety-one West Africans travelled under the auspices of the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme this year, as compared with ninety last year. By the end of May eighty-seven of them had collected their return tickets and the balance of their deposits, and most of these had left the country by the 15th June.

165. Repatriation of West Africans:—

(a) Applications considered	3
(b) Applicants repatriated	Nil
(c) Applicants assisted	1
(d) Applications still under reference	Nil

(15) Somali Pilgrimage.

166. According to Saudi quarantine returns, 289 Somalis arrived for pilgrimage by sea this year, as compared with 771 last year. There were also forty-two Zanzibaris and "East Africans" (see section (18)). Probably not more than 60 per cent. of the total were British-protected persons. No figures are available regarding those who came overland.

167. No advances were made to Somali pilgrims during the return season.

168. No Somali pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.

(16) South African Pilgrimage.

169. Saudi official quarantine returns show that 130 South African pilgrims disembarked at Jedda this year, an increase of fifty-four on last year's total of seventy-six. They were, as usual, mostly of Indian extraction and people of some means.

170. Two South African subjects applied for repatriation this year on the grounds of destitution. Their application has been referred to the authorities in the Union of South Africa.

(17) Palestinian and Transjordan Pilgrimage.

171. According to the figures published by the Government of Palestine Department of Health, only sixty-four Palestinian and Transjordanian nationals were registered this year as intending pilgrims, as compared with 725 last year. The Saudi returns (see section (2)) show the number of Palestinians and Transjordanians who entered this country through the ports of Yanbu and Jedda as ninety-three. Palestinians and Transjordanians do not appear in the Saudi returns relating to pilgrims who travelled overland, and it is doubtful whether any pilgrims used that tortuous route this year.

172. Applications for refunds of deposits were relatively few, and during the return season eleven pilgrims were refunded the total sum of £44 10s.

173. No complaints were received this year regarding shipping facilities.

174. According to the quarantine authorities, no Palestinian or Transjordanian pilgrims were reported to have died on pilgrimage this year.

175. No applications for repatriation were received by the legation this year.

(18) Zanzibari and East African Pilgrimages.

176. Saudi official quarantine returns show that only forty-two Zanzibari and East African pilgrims entered the country via the port of Jedda this year, as compared with 247 last year.

177. No Zanzibari or East African pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.

(19) Muscati, Bahreini and Koweiti Pilgrimage.

178. According to Saudi quarantine returns, 226 Muscati and Persian Gulf pilgrims arrived for pilgrimage by sea this year, but the ports at which they disembarked are not mentioned. No figures are published this year regarding Koweiti pilgrims who travelled overland.

179. No Muscati, Bahreini or Koweiti pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.

(20) Sarawak Pilgrimage.

180. Only fifteen Sarawakis made the pilgrimage this year, as compared with 111 last year.

181. One Sarawaki pilgrim is reported to have died at Mecca during the pilgrimage.

(21) Pilgrimages of Inhabitants of the Colony and Protectorate of Aden.

182. Saudi quarantine returns show that 553 "Hadhramis" arrived for pilgrimage by sea this year. No reference is made to pilgrims who travelled overland from the southern ports of Lith and Qundida, or of those who used the overland route from the Yemen. The latter routes appeared to be less frequented this year than in previous years.

183. During the return season the comparatively small number of 129 emergency certificates were issued to natives of the colony and protectorate, as compared with 203 last year.

184. Several complaints were received from Hadhramis regarding transport and road conditions between Jedda and Medina. Accidents on that road were more numerous this year, and were mostly due to negligent driving and excessive speed. A bus full of pilgrims returning from Medina overturned, injuring a number of its passengers, only half a mile from Jedda. Consequently, the authorities have issued a warning that severe action will be taken against the driver of a vehicle which is involved in an accident through negligent driving.

185. Prominent among pilgrims from the Aden Colony and Protectorate were Sultans Hussein-bin-Ahmed and Jibil Muhammed, who arrived at Jedda

in the steamship *Rizwani* on the 25th January, accompanied by ten followers. They were in possession of letters of recommendation from the Aughali Sultan and from Colonel Lake. During the pilgrimage they ran short of funds, and after reference to the authorities at Aden were advanced the sum of £40.

186. Few serious complaints were received regarding shipping arrangements during the return season.

187. Two natives of the colony and protectorate are reported to have died during the pilgrimage.

188. Repatriation of natives of the Aden Colony and Protectorate:—

(a) Applications deserving of consideration ...	30
(b) Applicants repatriated	Nil
(c) Applicants assisted... ..	26

(22) Italian Pilgrimages.

189. The Italian Government made all arrangements, as in the previous pilgrimage. All the pilgrims had to do was to pay a fixed sum in advance, and the Government released the necessary exchange.

190. The Italian arrangements were similar to those of last year, instead of 616 pilgrims in 1938, steamship *Sannio* only brought 398 pilgrims from Mogadiscio. From Massawa the number appears to have been about 530, making 928 pilgrims altogether. In the Saudi returns of persons landing for the pilgrimage these pilgrims appear to be entered under the three categories of Somalis (289), Abyssinians (469), and Senegalis (159), totalling 917, which agrees fairly well, except that "Somalis" ought to include some British Somalis.

191. As for pilgrims from Tripoli, steamship *Sicilia* sailed from Tripoli on the 11th January with 470 pilgrims from Tripoli and Misurata, and was due to pick up 200 more at Benghazi. This makes the total number of Italian pilgrims about 1,600, as follows:—

Italian Somaliland (Mogadiscio)	398
Massawa	530
Tripoli and Misurata	470
Benghazi	200
	<hr/>
	1,598

(23) Spanish Pilgrimage.

192. Steamship *Marques de Comillas* left Ceuta early in January bringing about 1,200 Moors, including many important notables from Tetuan and the Spanish Zone of Morocco. She left Jedda on return on the 19th February. The pilgrims were in charge of a person who called himself "honorary Spanish consul," though the Saudi authorities knew nothing of such a rank.

(24) French Pilgrimage from Algeria, &c.

193. No precise statistics or details are available concerning these pilgrims. From the Saudi returns it appears that 3,704 pilgrims arrived from North Africa in the steamship *Sinaia*; deducting 1,200 for the Spanish pilgrims from Ceuta, we gather that 2,504 other pilgrims came from North Africa, most of them no doubt from French Morocco, Algeria and Tunis.

(25) French Somali Pilgrimage.

194. Fifty pilgrims left Jibuti on the 15th January by the Besse Line steamer *El Hak*. They included Arabs, Somalis and Dankalis. They were under the supervision of Hoomud Benoita, a Dankali, uncle of the Sultan of Tajura, of Gadi Amare, a Somali Aqil, of Muhammad Daleita, a Dankali notable, and of Sheikh Haj Mohammad Shami, a local Yemeni. It is understood that the pilgrimage was subsidised to the extent of 50,000 fr. This was considered a successful pilgrimage, all the more remarkable because of local economic distress.

[E 7017/549/25]

No. 32.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 140.)

My Lord,

Jedda, September 19, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to submit a brief report on the situation as seen at Jedda.

2. The German attempt to represent the visit of Khalid-al-Gargani, the envoy of Ibn Saud, to Berlin as having great political significance did them more harm than good in the eyes of Ibn Saud, who has no wish to be tied to Hitler's chariot and to fly from known to unknown evils. It was reasonable that he should try to obtain from the Germans arms which we could not supply, especially if they were willing to grant favourable credits. Ibn Saud communicated to His Majesty's Government the correspondence in which his envoy related the progress of the negotiations with the Germans, and requested their advice when the Germans asked for a neutrality agreement in return for the facilities promised. The advice being rather long in coming, he on his own initiative sent a polite refusal to enter into a neutrality agreement. It is interesting to learn that the Germans hastened to accept Ibn Saud's point of view. Unless the correspondence communicated to us has been falsified (and there is no reason to believe this), Ibn Saud told the Germans openly that his interests prevented his taking any step which would involve him in difficulties with His Majesty's Government. The outbreak of war brought the negotiations to an end, and on the 13th September Ibn Saud sent Khalid a telegram instructing him to return home. Khalid had not enough money for the return journey, and as Ibn Saud considered it impossible to send money to Germany, he instructed Khalid to go to some neutral country, preferably Switzerland, where he could receive money from Saudi Arabia for the journey home. Khalid is said to be due here soon, but I have no official information on that point.

3. As Mr. Trott reported to you at the time, towards the end Khalid gained the impression that the Germans were not anxious to supply the arms in any case. If the Germans expected hostilities to break out soon, that might well be the case: they would need all the arms they could get; Ibn Saud could not be relied upon not to be sympathetic towards their enemy, Great Britain; and the foreign exchange to be paid for the arms in instalments would probably never reach them. Later, however, they seem to have been keen to supply the arms, and the agreement was signed. Ibn Saud, however, seems to have taken it for granted that the outbreak of war destroyed all hope of his getting the arms. I have received your telegram No. 126, dated the 13th September, in which it is stated that if the Germans are still willing to supply the arms without unacceptable conditions, His Majesty's Government see no reason why Ibn Saud should not take advantage of the offer, though as to the method of payment, about which His Majesty's Government could make suggestions, they would deprecate the transfer of gold to Germany. The agreement, a copy of which was transmitted in Mr. Trott's secret letter of the 6th September to Mr. Baxter, provides for the sale of 10,000 Mauser rifles complete and 10 million cartridges for the sum of £119,962 3s., c.i.f. Jedda, payment to be made in seven equal instalments at dates from four to seventy-six months after delivery of the goods.

4. It was to be expected that when the German Minister was handed his passports by the Iraq Government he would try to make for Saudi Arabia, where from the shelter of his other legation he might be a thorn in the side of the Allies, and, in fact, he applied to Ibn Saud for permission to travel to Saudi Arabia by land from Najaf, with several cars. Ibn Saud did not want to have Dr. Grobba in his country at all. He could not refuse to receive him altogether, since Dr. Grobba is accredited to him, but he found a good excuse for refusing to allow him to come by land: he alleged that the tribes on the route, excited by the talk of hostilities, and particularly by the news that Iraq had entered the war, might make some regrettable mistake. It was expected here that after reaching Syria, Dr. Grobba would make an attempt to reach Jedda by sea, but I have no news of his movements or intentions.

5. The situation in Jedda is much more tranquil at present than I had reason to expect a year ago. It seemed almost certain that Italy would be against us if we went to war with Germany, and this would have turned Jedda into a

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centre of propaganda and brought the war much nearer to Ibn Saud. Moreover, at that time it was not foreseen that a conference would result in the adoption by His Majesty's Government of a Palestine policy which not even the Arab extremists could deny to be an improvement from their point of view, and which would enable the Arab States to side with us whole-heartedly in case of a European war. The Italian wireless broadcasts are carefully neutral and the Italian Legation are not distributing any objectionable propaganda. Among certain sections of the populace the violent German broadcasts, professing love for the Arabs and disinterested wishes for their independence and their liberation from the Jews, are not without effect, but on the other hand, it is the pilgrimage that matters to Jedda and, indeed, to Saudi Arabia as a whole, and for that the country is largely dependent on Great Britain and not at all on Germany. Moreover, public opinion here has little or no effect upon Ibn Saud, who steers his own course.

6. Ibn Saud defined his attitude in a message, which was reported in the last paragraph of Jedda telegram No. 119, dated the 3rd September. In this message Ibn Saud assures His Majesty's Government that he would never give any undertaking or take any secret or open action with any Moslem or (other) foreign Government which might damage British interests or affect his relations with His Majesty's Government. This assurance is of a piece with Ibn Saud's policy for many years past. He does not claim that he has any greater affection for us than any other non-Moslem foreigners, but only that his interests are in essence identical with ours.

7. It is early to say what course the war will take. The attitude of Italy and Turkey must naturally be of great concern to Ibn Saud, and what policy they will eventually adopt is at present unknown. All that can be said is that for the moment the task of His Majesty's Legation in Jedda is easier than I expected it would be. Ibn Saud is impatient to see me to discuss matters of common interest, and in my telegram No. 123, dated the 13th September, I suggested that, in the first place, I should pay him a visit at Riyadh; as an alternative, he seems much to prefer to a suggestion that Captain de Gaury should visit him. It was I who originally proposed that if war broke out it might serve the interests of His Majesty's Government well if Ibn Saud would allow us to have a representative at Riyadh, and suggested Captain de Gaury as the ideal officer for this purpose, but from the comments of Ibn Saud, some received before and some after the despatch of my telegram No. 123, it is evident that if this project is still desirable, and is ever to be realised, it requires preparation by a visit from the Minister at Jedda, which, as Ibn Saud says, would be generally considered natural and not, like a visit from Captain de Gaury, a highly abnormal event. I am expecting to receive at any moment your instructions whether I am to go to Riyadh.

8. The Foreign Office were aware, before I left England, that Ibn Saud had decided to establish a legation in Paris and that Fuad Hamza had been selected for this post. My French colleague, M. Ballereau, who is as active as his predecessor was supine, claims that this step has been taken as a result of his insistence. He declares that the Quai d'Orsay do not understand the Arab point of view, and that he urged upon the Saudi Government their responsibility to enlighten the French Government on this subject. It is more than probable that Ibn Saud's main object is to urge the claims of his family to the Throne of Syria and to counteract the influence of the Shereefian family, but M. Ballereau, whether conscious of that fact or not, did not allude to it. But whatever is behind the appointment, it can hardly fail to be advantageous to the Allies that the only legations maintained by Ibn Saud abroad should all be in Allied countries—Great Britain, France, Egypt and Iraq.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine, his Excellency the Governor-General of the Sudan, his Excellency the Governor of Aden Colony, the Political Agents at Bahrein and Koweit, the Commissioner at Port Sudan, and to the Middle East Intelligence Centre at Cairo.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 7407/1108/25]

No. 33.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 147 E. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Jedda, October 17, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 5th October, 1939, an agreement concerning the construction of the roads between Mecca and Jedda, and Mecca and Arafat, together with portions of the road from Jedda to Medina, and certain other matters, was signed by His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal, Viceroy of the Hejaz, on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government, and by the newly-arrived Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires, M. A. Behjat, on behalf of the Egyptian Government. The text of the agreement has not yet been published here, but I have obtained from M. Behjat a copy in Arabic, of which I enclose herewith⁽¹⁾ an English translation. I also enclose a translation of a Royal Rescript, which was published in the Mecca newspaper *Umm-ul-Qura* on the 13th October, 1939, which amounts to a formal ratification of the agreement by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz.

2. Discussions on this matter have been proceeding in a leisurely manner for two or three years, and various notices have appeared in Egyptian papers concerning tenders for road construction in this country. I have been informed by the late Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires that an English firm named Macdonald, Gibbs and Co. had been awarded an important contract in this connexion, though I have received as yet no details or confirmation of this report. From the same source I gathered that there were grounds for believing that the Saudi Arabian Government had already spent on other matters the sums collected for "Road Tax" during the last three years, in which case there may be some difficulty in effecting the initial payment of £E. 60,000, and there may be still further delays.

3. It will be observed that the agreement deals not only with the road projects, but also with water and electricity installations costing £E. 100,000, and with the appointment of a bacteriologist.

4. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Alexandria, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

(For the Minister).

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure in No. 33.

Translation of the Text of a Royal Decree issued by His Majesty the King on Shaaban 24, 1358 (October 8, 1939), concerning Repairing the Road between Jedda-Mecca-Arafat and certain parts of the Road between Mecca-Medina.

[In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!]

FROM Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdurrahman-al-Feisal to his son Feisal, Viceroy in the Hejaz. May God preserve him!

May peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you!

After reliance upon God, and in view of the agreement concluded between our Government and the Egyptian Government, signed by you and the Chargé d'Affaires of the Egyptian Legation at Jedda on the 21st Shaaban, 1358 (5th October, 1939), in connexion with certain charitable projects in the Hejaz, and in view of the fact that our Government have decided to take part in repairing the road from Jedda to Arafat and certain parts of the Mecca-Medina road, and whereas the sum of £E. 148,000 has been fixed for repairing the said roads, and will be paid by our Government in instalments to the Egyptian Government who will arrange contracts, and supervise the work of repair, we, therefore, give the following order:—

1. The sum of £E. 60,000 shall be paid to the Egyptian Government on demand in order to proceed with the work of repairing the roads, this sum being

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

in respect of the instalments for the years 1355, 1356 and 1357 at £E. 20,000 each instalment.

2. The sum of £E. 20,000 shall be paid to the Egyptian Government at the end of each Hejri year subsequent to the year 1357, till the sum of £E. 145,000 fixed for repairing the roads is fully paid.

3. This order shall be communicated to the Ministry of Finance for compliance. We pray the Almighty to grant you success.

Written in our palace at Riyadh on the 24th day of Shaaban of the year 1358 (8th October, 1939).

ABDUL AZIZ.

[E 7409/177/25]

No. 34.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 150.)

My Lord,

Jedda, October 24, 1939.

DURING my recent visit to Riyadh I sent brief telegrams on the various matters discussed, and on my return to Jedda I have the honour to submit some general remarks, in the light of my visit, on the relations at this critical moment between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud.

2. I found the King not at all inclined to sit on the fence, waiting to see how the war in Europe would go, but outspoken in his sympathy for the Allies and anxious to do all he could to ensure that there should be nothing to prevent the Arabs of the territories with which Great Britain and France have special relations from co-operating with them. One of the first remarks of the Amir Saud (in the presence of an American doctor, too) was: "We are on the side of the Allies," and he said something of the same kind when I called on him to say good-bye; but his father was just as outspoken. Nor has Ibn Saud been content with assurances to us. Apart from his general support in the Palestine question and his remarkable frankness in communicating to us over the last two years some at least of the particulars of negotiations with Iraq, Italy, Japan and Germany, we have recent evidence of his decision not to proceed, while the war lasts, with the negotiations for the supply of arms and ammunition from Germany, and of his consent to receive a representative of His Majesty's Government to reside at Riyadh for a considerable time.

3. Ibn Saud's desire that His Majesty's Government should be on the winning side in the present war agrees with the tenor of his previous words and acts, but is none the less satisfactory, in view of the relative insignificance of the material help we have been able to give him in contrast to the greater generosity (as it might seem) of the Italians and, more recently, the Germans, in letting him have, in part at low prices and in part as a gift, arms and ammunition which he badly needs and which we are unable to furnish on any terms. Ibn Saud estimates Danaan gifts at their true value, and accepts them without illusions. On the other hand, we know, from copies of correspondence which he has shown us, that he has not secured the German arms by protestations of exclusive friendship. He seems to have told the Germans flatly that his interests were too closely connected with those of His Majesty's Government for him to adopt a policy hostile to their interests, and in the end to have forced the Germans to accept the position and to sign the agreement for the supply of arms without insisting on the condition that Ibn Saud should agree to observe neutrality in case of any dispute which might arise between Germany and Great Britain. So eager were the Germans to conciliate Ibn Saud that, after the outbreak of war, Herr Woermann gave Khalid-al-Qarqani, the King's envoy, an official letter offering to supply the arms now, to be exported to Jedda on a Netherlands steamer at Saudi risk, or to hold them, in the safe-keeping of the German Government, at the disposal of His Majesty. The King decided, however, not to proceed with the transaction during the war. He was grateful to His Majesty's Government for the suggestions as to the best means to overcome the difficulties of finance, but he felt that the political objections were insuperable. He feared that, if the arms were shipped to him, the fact would be used as a basis for exaggerated

claims by the Germans, whose wireless propaganda about Khalid's visit to Berlin will be remembered, and that his action might be misinterpreted in Arab countries and elsewhere. This decision is satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, who do not wish to see even £120,000 in gold or free exchange pass into German hands. With characteristic frankness, Ibn Saud did not claim that political considerations alone underlay his decision; on the contrary, he said with a grin that after the war German arms might be going for nothing. Nevertheless, I am sure that he did not wish to give the German cause even the small fillip that the confirmation of the order might have given it.

4. It might be expected that Ibn Saud, as a dictator himself, would sympathise with the totalitarian States, but that is not so. Ibn Saud does not regard himself as a dictator of the Hitler order, but as a monarch limited by the precepts of the Quran. On one occasion he accepted as correct a suggestion I made that he ruled under a "religious constitution." To him there is a fundamental difference between the theocracy of Saudi Arabia and the despotism, tempered neither by the fear of God nor readiness to listen to human advice, of a man like Hitler. But he frankly says that Hitler is mad, and quotes an Arabic proverb which affords a close parallel to "Quem deus vult perdere." As a final proof of Hitler's madness Ibn Saud cites the pact with Soviet Russia, which he believes will be one of the causes of Germany's downfall. His own hostility to Soviet Russia is intense. Self-interest, injured by the cessation of the stream of pilgrims from Moslem communities now under Soviet rule, may have something to do with this, but Ibn Saud also dislikes a rule which can find no room for the religion and the social system of Islam. The prolonged negotiations between Soviet Russia and Turkey gave him acute anxiety. His suspicions of Turkey, as nursing an undying grudge against the Arabs, are well known to His Majesty's Government, and it was not surprising that he should imagine Soviet Russia as offering Turkey a free hand to the south in return for a free hand for Russia in the Balkans. The news of the signature of the pact between Great Britain, France and Turkey, which arrived just before I left Riyadh, did something to reassure His Majesty.

5. Having taken up an attitude of neutrality so benevolent towards the Allies it is natural that Ibn Saud should desire that Palestine should cease to be a cause of irritation to the Arab world. Although he ridicules German propaganda as overdone, he fears lest the Arabic broadcasts from Berlin, conducted with vitriolic skill and force by such people as Yunus Bahri, may have some effect on Arab minds, and he considers that the restoration of peace in Palestine and some form of open support by the Palestinian Arabs for the Allied cause would be the greatest blow to Germany. I found him still in the stage of the armistice-amnesty idea. One can understand that, having no obligations of alliance towards His Majesty's Government such as those of Iraq and Egypt, he should be unwilling to make yet another appeal to the Palestinian Arabs unless he has something to offer. Nevertheless, he accepted the statement which I gave him, based on Foreign Office telegram No. 133 of the 2nd October, explaining the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Mufti and towards a possible appeal by the Arab States to the people of Palestine. He conveyed this statement to Jamal-al-Husaini, who was then in Riyadh, and telegraphed it to his representative in Bagdad, with the suggestion that Iraq should approach Egypt and he himself the Imam of the Yemen, with a view to concerted action to bring about peace in Palestine.

6. We need have no fear that Saudi Arabia may become a centre for anti-British intrigue during the war. Anti-British broadcasts will be listened to, but only in private houses; wireless broadcasts in coffee-shops are not permitted, and a Royal decree forbids the populace to discuss the international situation, with which, it says, they have no concern. The ground for the decree is stated therein to be the inherent unsuitability of the Holy Land of Islam for propaganda. This decree suits His Majesty's Government very well, since we cannot compete with our enemies in vituperation. Dr. Grobba, who, on having to leave Iraq, wanted to make for Riyadh by land, was deflected from his purpose by an ingenious excuse, and Ibn Saud told me with great vehemence that he knew Dr. Grobba only wanted to engage in propaganda, and that he was resolved not to have him in Riyadh at any cost. We know that Ibn Saud also refused to allow Dr. Ruwaiha, the doctor to the German Legation in Bagdad, to come to Saudi Arabia. He showed me a number of papers about Mizhir-al-Shawi,

whose journey from Iraq to Saudi Arabia had excited suspicion; they tended to show that the main, if not the only, reason for the journey was to escape vengeance or punishment for a tribal murder, and proved in any case that Ibn Saud was keeping a close watch on the man. He declared with great vehemence that he was entirely opposed to having to receive the Mufti in his territory—a man whom he despises as a shifty self-seeker. Jamal-al-Husaini, who had gone to Riyadh from Bagdad to see him, was received in audience only once (so the King said), and then only to be told the latest decision of His Majesty's Government about the Mufti and the Palestine situation, and to be dismissed back to Bagdad; and when, just after Jamal's departure, Ibn Saud learned through me that Jamal was considered by the High Commissioner of Palestine to have invented and spread abroad unfounded tales of ill-treatment of returning Palestinian refugees by the Palestine authorities, he telegraphed to his representative in Bagdad in very strong terms, to urge Jamal and the Mufti not to engage in any propaganda or other activities against Great Britain, as that would be ruinous to the Arab world.

7. It was after this that Ibn Saud went over with me the history of his efforts in connexion with Palestine during the last year. He claimed that if, some little while after the issue of the white paper, hostilities in Palestine died down, it was partly owing to his efforts, and he instructed Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to show me the correspondence. Sheikh Yusuf produced a sheaf of correspondence, direct and indirect, between the King and the Syrian and Palestinian leaders. It began with a letter to the Saudi Consul in Damascus, through whom, together with Bashir-al-Sadawi, Ibn Saud was in touch with the leaders. This letter was rather on the lines of the letter from Ibn Saud to Nuri Pasha, which the latter showed, perhaps in a mutilated form, to many Arabs, in an effort, it would seem, to discredit Ibn Saud as anti-Arab. It advised the Arab leaders to become reconciled to Great Britain and France, lest the British and French Governments should grow tired of unceasing opposition and join with the Turks and the Jews against the Arabs; and suggested that if only the question of Palestine could be settled, a solution of the Syrian problem would follow. I was shown individual replies from Jamil Mardom and Shukri Quwatli and a joint letter signed by them and five others. Shukri served as go-between with the Mufti. It is not necessary to take at their face value the protestations in these letters, promising to be guided by the King's advice, but the correspondence did show what efforts the King was making in the interests of peace in Palestine—not, he was as anxious as ever to explain, to give pleasure to His Majesty's Government, but because he felt it essential in the interests of all Arabs. His interest in Syria was doubtless prompted in part by his desire to obtain French support for the Amir Faisal as a candidate for the Syrian Throne.

8. Ibn Saud showed no sign of wanting anything from His Majesty's Government in these days. He is not of the blackmailing type, and he would probably admit that the defeat of Germany, whom he regards as a danger to Islam and to the East in general, will be a reward in itself for his benevolent neutrality. He seemed grateful for such action as we have been able to take to temper the wind of war to his country. His immediate preoccupation in these days is the pilgrimage, which, as a result of war conditions, is likely to be a small one and so to affect his budget and to arouse discontent in the Hejaz. I was able to give him some consolation by reporting that the resumption of sailings of Indian pilgrim ships was being actively considered, and by reminding him of the very helpful attitude of the Government of India on the matter of the export of food-stuffs to Saudi Arabia. I also told him that we were appealing to Egypt to allow the export of certain machinery parts required by the gold mine at Mahd, and to Transjordan in connexion with his desire to import food-stuffs from there in spite of the general prohibition of export. But what Ibn Saud valued most was the statement in which His Majesty's Government say that they know of no ground on which the Amir Abdullah could possibly suppose that he is likely to be chosen for the Throne of Syria by the French. His cheerfulness after this statement lends support to his contention that he doesn't want Syria himself, but doesn't want to see a Hashimite there.

9. The proposal that Captain de Gaury, until recently political agent at Koweit, should go to Riyadh as a representative of His Majesty's Legation, threw Ibn Saud into a panic when first broached some weeks ago, but was

eventually accepted with manifest pleasure. Having got used, during my visit, to having someone at hand to talk to, the King did not like the idea of my leaving, but he was easily persuaded to accept Captain de Gaury as a substitute. To fill an interval of several weeks I left behind Mr. Wall, who knows Arabic exceedingly well, to serve as liaison officer, and Ibn Saud seemed much pleased with this arrangement. He waved aside the suggestion that other Powers might wish to have representatives at Riyadh. Who was there? he asked. The French wouldn't mind, and that left only the Italians, and they had no business to speak of that would justify their sending anyone to Riyadh.

10. When talking about the course of the war at my farewell interview with him, Ibn Saud said with feeling: "When I heard that that battleship of yours had been sunk I felt as though one of my own sons had been drowned." It would be possible to belittle this statement as diplomatic exaggeration, or perhaps as the remark of a man to whom a son more or less makes little difference, but I am sure that the utterance was genuine. The King has gone so far in supporting us that a blow to us is a blow to his own pride and honour. We must win, not only in our joint interests but to vindicate his reputation as a statesman; and he is cheerfully convinced that we shall win.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine and to the Middle East Intelligence Centre.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[C 18115/23/17]

No. 35.

Sir R. H. Campbell to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 1515.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 9, 1939.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 2231 of the 7th September, I have the honour to report that M. Fuad Hamza called on the President of the Republic on the 4th November and presented to him his letters of credence appointing him Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary in Paris of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.

2. In the course of his speech on that occasion, M. Fuad Hamza said that the honour conferred on him in appointing him Minister did not consist exclusively in the fact that he was thus inaugurating a new era in the relations between France and his country, but also in that the appointment, which was made in such grave circumstances, was a material and manifest proof of the friendship and esteem of his Sovereign for liberal France. Those relations had become closer when His Majesty the King had become protector of the Holy Places of Islam and he had extended his kingdom over the greater part of Arabia. France had a large number of Moslem and Arab nationals, which made it necessary, and even indispensable, that the relations between the two countries should be strengthened and based on a sincere friendship and mutual interests. It was indisputably of great importance that Saudi Arabia was a neighbour of France in her capacity as mandatory Power in Syria and the Lebanon. Racial, cultural and religious, not to mention political and economic, considerations gave a special character to the relations between the two countries.

3. In the course of his reply, the President of the Republic said that, as the traditional friend of Islam, which places so high a value on family unity and the obligations of hospitality, France knew to what extent Mahometans were indebted to him to whom it fell to guard the Holy Places of their faith. Wherever her authority extended, France endeavoured to assure to Moslems the means of conforming to the precepts of the Koran. She was well aware of the solicitude with which Saudi Arabia welcomed those who were called to Mecca and to Medina for the accomplishment of the most sacred of their religious duties. France was also bound to His Majesty the King by the mutual interests created by the proximity of their territories. Convinced that the benefits of liberty were only fruitful when combined with those of order, she sought to place on solid

foundations the prosperity of Syria and the Lebanon. Her only pride was to earn the gratitude of those whom she had set herself the task of leading and helping.

4. I enclose herein copies of the full texts of these speeches.⁽¹⁾
5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Jedda.

I have, &c.

RONALD H. CAMPBELL.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 7604/549/25]

No. 36.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 154.)

My Lord,

Jedda, October 29, 1939.

AS I informed your Lordship in Jedda telegram No. 135, dated the 16th October, Ibn Saud showed great satisfaction at the statement which I made to him on the lines laid down in Foreign Office telegram No. 140. The statement was read out in Arabic, and at the request of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin a copy of the Arabic was given to him. A copy of the English original is attached. I included the opinion of His Majesty's Government that the letter purporting to have been written by the Amir Abdullah to Sheikh Kamil-al-Qassab, if genuine, was unwise and discourteous, but thought it well to keep in reserve the phrase "and they will, if necessary, convey their views to the Amir."

2. The essence of Ibn Saud's reply is given in the second paragraph of my above-mentioned telegram. The King said emphatically that he did not want anything—Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq or any other territory—outside his own dominions, but he feared lest the addition of Syria either to Iraq or Transjordan should facilitate Hashimite designs against the Hejaz or even Nejd. The King compared his own policy (with apologies for comparing small things with great) with what he conceived to be the policy of His Majesty's Government in Europe: Great Britain wanted a balance of power in Europe, and he wanted a balance of power in the Arab world. So long as no Hashimite became ruler of Syria the Syrians, he said, might choose for themselves what form of government they wanted—whether to remain under mandate or to have a republic, or to choose a king from outside. The will of the people ought, after all, to be taken into consideration. He himself would not wish to retain his kingdom if the people of Nejd did not wish him to do so. As for Abdullah ("saving your presence"), but for the support of the British Government he would not be even Amir of Transjordan for another day.

3. My impression that Ibn Saud was pleased with the statement was borne out by Sheikh Yusuf, who informed me next day that the King had said that all he wanted was to be secure in his own possessions, and had expressed satisfaction at the statement I had made to him ("very pleased indeed" was the expression used). I see no reason to modify the opinion which I gave in my telegram No. 140, that so far as Ibn Saud is concerned it would be better not to add anything to the statement made to Ibn Saud on the 13th October, but to re-examine the question if either side should continue to push its claims. It would appear from reports from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan that the Amir Abdullah has given up any hopes of the Syrian throne that he may have had, while Ibn Saud has renounced any claim to it so long as it is not given to a Hashimite.

4. A copy of the secret despatch on the subject of the letter to Qassab and the Bludan pamphlets, which was addressed by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Colonial Office on the 29th September, under No. TC/58/39, reached Jedda in time for me to receive a telegram from Jedda on the subject before I left Riyadh, and I spoke to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin about the matter. I said that the High Commissioner considered that the Amir Abdullah had had nothing to do with the Bludan pamphlets. As to the letter, I said that not only did the Amir admit he had written it, but he claimed to have written several others to Qassab, and to have written them knowing that Qassab was one of the

chief supporters of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz in Syria, and that they would infallibly be communicated to him. Sheikh Yusuf was a little taken aback at this, and I thought it well to say that while the letter was unwise and discourteous, as His Majesty's Government had said, Qassab was perhaps something of an *agent provocateur* in carrying on the correspondence and communicating it to another party. Eventually Sheikh Yusuf admitted that had Qassab been an ordinary person his action would have been improper, but he maintained that as Qassab had formerly been in Saudi employ as Director of Education, he was only doing his duty in transmitting the correspondence to the King. Anyhow, said Sheikh Yusuf, His Majesty's Government said the letter was unwise and discourteous; what were they going to do? I pointed to the general assurance at the end of the statement which I had made on the 13th October, and when Sheikh Yusuf pressed for mention of some specific action I said I thought that His Majesty, as a ruler himself, would realise that His Majesty's Government might not find it convenient to say exactly what action they would take with another ruler in such circumstances. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin left that point and said that Ibn Saud was in a difficulty in that the Amir Abdullah, whom the King could easily deal with had the Amir stood alone, had attacked the King from under the ægis of the King's friends, the British Government. I said that His Majesty's Government had specifically recognised their responsibility in the statement which I had made. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin then said that they were convinced that the Bludan pamphlets must have been prepared with the knowledge of the Amir Abdullah: he repeated that the pamphlets were conveyed to Bludan by Fuad-al-Khatib, and suggested that Fuad-al-Khatib even arranged for the printing at the press in Damascus to which the pamphlets had been traced. I said it seemed to me that if the Amir had been behind the pamphlets he would have chosen a less prominent emissary than Fuad-al-Khatib, and I made light of Sheikh Yusuf's argument that the Amir's complicity was established by a similarity between the tenor of the Qassab letter and that of the pamphlets. The tenor of the pamphlets, I argued, was common form; every attempt to stir up a revolution, or internal political discontent, used the argument that someone was enjoying someone else's money. I should have liked to add that the pamphlets might have been written by a Syrian, since they mentioned only the Nejdīs as blood-suckers, whereas the Hejazi classes Nejdīs and Syrians together in this respect, and has no more use for the greedy and corrupt Syrian Director of Works than for his Nejdī chief, the Minister of Finance. The following day Sheikh Yusuf Yasin said that he had conveyed to the King what I had said; the King had listened attentively, but had made no comment. I am certain that Ibn Saud would do more justice than Sheikh Yusuf to my argument that Qassab was asking for trouble. At any rate, when I saw the King a few minutes afterwards, for my final interview, he was as cordial as ever. Indeed, it was then that he made the statement which I have recorded in another despatch, that when he heard of the sinking of the British battleship he felt as though a son of his had been drowned.

5. Since my return to Jedda I have received a copy of the telegram, No. 373, which the High Commissioner at Jerusalem addressed to the Colonial Office on the 21st October. I at once telegraphed instructing Mr. Wall to inform Ibn Saud of the Amir Abdullah's personal assurance that he had no knowledge of the pamphlets until the British Resident brought them to his notice.

6. I notice from the High Commissioner's telegram just quoted that his Excellency is inclined to believe that the relations between the Amir Abdullah and Ibn Saud are definitely improving, and that he cites in evidence the exchange of telegrams about the accident to the Amir Saud and the beginning of Ramadan. I should perhaps share the views of Sir Harold MacMichael, had not Ibn Saud stated the contrary opinion on this point. In the course of the conversation on the 13th October the King said that, superficially, relations with the Amir Abdullah were friendly: the moment the Amir heard of the accident to the Amir Saud he sent a telegram of condolence; he always did that sort of thing, but it made no difference to his real sentiments and aims. Abdullah's fine words, in fact, butter no parsnips with Ibn Saud. The King probably regards it as inevitable that the Amir Abdullah should resent the loss of the Hejaz to the Hashimites, and should cherish a feeling of revenge for the personal humiliation he suffered when the Hejazi force he nominally led was annihilated by the Wahabīs and he himself escaped in his shirt. Moreover, Ibn Saud must feel that his

own rule over the Hejaz is not popular. On one occasion during my visit he spoke with contempt of the Hejazis, and I noticed that when he claimed to be ruling with the consent of the people of Nejd he said nothing about the people of the Hejaz. The Hejazis are a scurvy lot, who will judge any ruler by the amount of money he lets them make out of the pilgrimage; and as Ibn Saud takes most of the profits of the pilgrimage himself he is bound to be unpopular in the Hejaz.

7. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin referred one day to Hashimite intrigues from Iraq in the days of King Faisal. Faisal, he said, was an intriguer beside whom Abdullah was a child. Abdullah left written evidence against himself all over the place; Faisal never committed himself in writing, but he never ceased to intrigue against Ibn Saud, and the King knew all about it and had never forgotten it. The King has frequently mentioned to me his suspicions of Iraq, though never the alleged intrigues of the late King Faisal. His suspicions attach to living Iraqis, especially Nuri Said, and what with the attitude of Iraq towards Koweit a few months ago, and to Nuri's conduct at various occasions in the matter of Palestine, these suspicions are not unreasonable. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that there is any foundation for the suspicions of the Iraq Government referred to in the fourth paragraph of Foreign Office telegram No. 138 of 6th October, that Ibn Saud has designs against the Iraq dynasty, unless his recent counter-propaganda about the throne of Syria affords ground for such suspicion. It is believed that Ibn Saud enjoys among the tribal elements of Iraq a personal reputation which the Bagdadi politician or official cannot hope to equal, and that doubtless tends to awaken jealousy, and from jealousy to suspicion is a short step. But according to the telegram from the High Commissioner at Jerusalem, No. 373, of the 21st October, even the Amir Abdullah is now convinced from the reports received from Bedouin visitors to Transjordan that Ibn Saud has no hostile intentions against him. If that is a genuine conviction there is some hope for better relations with Transjordan, if only what the High Commissioner calls the Amir's almost childish indiscretions can be kept in check, and that may perhaps improve the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

8. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, and to His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Statement made to Ibn Saud at Riyadh by His Majesty's Minister on October 13, 1939.

HIS Majesty's Government have learned with regret that propaganda directed against His Majesty still continues, e.g., the circulars posted from Bludan to persons in the Hejaz. They note that this was mentioned to the French Minister at Jedda and trust that such activities will cease.

As to the letter alleged to have been written by the Amir Abdullah, His Majesty's Government await a report from the High Commissioner. They agree that, if the letter is genuine, it was unwise and discourteous.

His Majesty's Government view with great concern the growing ill-feeling between His Majesty and the Hashimite family. On this subject they wish to speak with complete frankness.

They feel that this ill-feeling might be exacerbated by the question of the throne of Syria. In June they stated their belief that the idea had not got beyond the stage of a vague proposal and, although they have not asked the French Government, they believe that is still true. They feel sure that the French Government have not reached the stage of seriously considering the suitability of any particular candidate or even the stage of making up their minds to convert Syria into a monarchy. In any case they feel sure that, if anyone was chosen King of Syria, he would remain under French tutelage for many years. His Majesty's Government know of no ground on which the Amir Abdullah could

possibly suppose that he is likely to be chosen for the throne by the French Government. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government hope that His Majesty will accept their advice not to worry himself further about a question which, so far as they know, has no reality.

As to a certain statement which was made by the French Minister, His Majesty's Government wish to state emphatically that they have never expressed any views as to the suitability or unsuitability of His Highness the Amir Faisal or of any other possible candidate.

Finally, His Majesty's Government feel that His Majesty's long friendship for His Majesty's Government will enable him to realise that they entirely disapprove of attacks upon his dignity and will always do their best to stop such attacks.

[E 7792/6/31]

No. 37.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 164.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, December 3, 1939.

MY telegram No. 163 of 30th November.

De Gaury reports the view of Ibn Saud as follows:—

Taking advantage of the situation, Nuri and Iraq wish to bring changes in Arab world to the advantage of Iraq. For instance, if Great Britain (France is also mentioned) did not reply to the invitation of Arab States to issue proposed declaration, the small Arab States would take it as a tacit admission that they would be independent after the war and would fall increasingly under the influence of Iraq, who "will walk in as we walk out." Roughly, Ibn Saud is for *status quo*, but if there are to be changes, he does not want to be left out.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 43; Bagdad, No. 47; and Jerusalem, No. 27.)

[E 8025/6278/25]

No. 38.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 164.)

My Lord,

Jedda, November 21, 1939.

IN my telegram No. 153 of the 13th November I reported the approaching departure of Captain de Gaury and Mr. Heber Percy for Riyadh. They left Jedda on the 14th November, and arrived at Riyadh on the 18th. Mr. Wall, whom I left at Riyadh as liaison officer, left for Jedda on the 20th.

2. Enclosed is a copy of the instructions which I gave to Captain de Gaury to take with him.

3. As I reported in the ninth paragraph of my despatch No. 150, dated the 24th October, the King waved aside my suggestion that the presence of a British representative at Riyadh might lead other Powers to ask for the same privilege, but the Italians have, in fact, already raised the question. According to a message from Ibn Saud which I have received through Mr. Wall, the translator of the Italian Legation referred to the journey of Captain de Gaury to Riyadh in a conversation with Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, Minister of Finance, and asked whether the King would allow other Governments to have representatives there; whereupon the King instructed Sheikh Abdullah to let the Italian Minister know, in some suitable manner, that the King himself had asked that a British representative should stay temporarily at Riyadh "because of the frequent necessity for business discussions in connexion with neighbouring British territories," and had wanted Sir R. Bullard to stay, but that being impossible, Sir R. Bullard had offered to send someone else as representative and the King had accepted the offer.

4. My French colleague, far from objecting to the presence of a British representative at Riyadh, where France is not represented, declares himself delighted, and has asked whether, in case he should have some message of special importance to send to the King, he may send it through the legation and Captain de Gaury. M. Ballereau is a very good colleague and is anxious to show a united Allied front in this country, and as I share his desire, I am not only

exchanging information with him, but have promised to convey to the King any messages with which he may entrust this legation.

5. It is impossible to forecast how long it will be possible to keep Captain de Gaury at Riyadh. If this were a normal year, Ibn Saud would come to Mecca towards the end of December and stay for two months or so, and that would be a signal for Captain de Gaury to leave the King, since he could not go to Mecca, and, in any case, so long as the King is in the Hejaz, it is always possible to arrange an interview for a minister in case of urgency. But it is possible that the King may not come to the Hejaz this year: this would be an obvious economy, in cost of transport and of hospitality to distinguished pilgrims, for the King to make while his finances are straitened. If he does not come to the Hejaz, it will be for Captain de Gaury to discover whether his presence is becoming irksome to the King in any way. The object of sending a British representative to reside near the King being to induce the King to maintain a favourable attitude towards us, the arrangement loses its point if it ceases to be agreeable to the King.

6. I am forwarding copies of this despatch, without enclosure, to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine, and to the Middle East Intelligence Centre.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Instructions to Captain de Gaury.

Captain de Gaury,

IN accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in Foreign Office telegram unnumbered of the 11th September, you are proceeding to Riyadh to reside there as the personal representative of His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, in order to be in a position to supply His Majesty King Abdul Aziz day by day with first-hand information, and also to act as liaison officer with the legation. Mr. Heber Percy will accompany you as your assistant.

2. The Foreign Office have arranged that you should have the local rank of first secretary, and Mr. Heber Percy that of honorary attaché, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are being informed accordingly in a letter of which a copy is attached.⁽¹⁾

3. As you are aware, the object of the plan by which you are to reside at Riyadh is to help to consolidate the good relations between His Majesty's Government and the King, and to ensure his remaining friendly to us during the war. This being so, there would be no point in your staying at Riyadh if it appeared that your presence was becoming irksome to His Majesty in any way. Please keep this in mind and let me know for the information of His Majesty's Government how the plan works in practice. If the King comes to the Hejaz for the pilgrim season, as he usually does, it will be natural for you to return to Jedda, at any rate for a time, since, when the King is at Mecca, it is always possible to arrange an interview with him.

4. Any dangerous dogs that are sleeping should be allowed to sleep on, e.g., Khor-el-Odeid, and I trust that you will also be able to damp down any fresh questions that arise that do not seem to call for action. On the other hand, where, as in the case of the islands between Bahrein and the mainland, there is a possibility that friction may arise, please inform the legation at once so that His Majesty's Government may be warned in time.

5. The principal objections raised by the Sheikh of Koweit to the King's counter-proposals for the Trade Agreement have been received by telegram and communicated to you so that you will be able to discuss them with the King at once. There is, however, a despatch on the way which may contain other points.

6. During my visit to Riyadh last month I kept a full diary giving the essential parts of all talks with the King and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and any items of news that I managed to pick up. I should be glad if you would keep a similar record and send me a copy of the current portion whenever there is an opportunity.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 8085/549/25]

No. 39.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 169.)

My Lord,

Jedda, November 30, 1939.

THE foreign policy of this country, that is to say, of Ibn Saud, has been fully dealt with in despatches written since my recent return from Riyadh, and a brief note on the armed forces of Saudi Arabia is being sent by this bag. I now have the honour to submit a short report on the internal situation, to round off the position of Saudi Arabia before leaving for another post. There is little in it that has not been said before in despatches from Jedda.

2. Few countries in the world can have a better record for the maintenance of law and order than Saudi Arabia has at the present time. The only crime of violence that I have heard of for months was a case of rape and murder, which was recently punished at Riyadh by the execution of three men in the public square. Theft and robbery continue to be punished with a Quranic severity which makes the immunity enjoyed by highly-placed embezzlers of public moneys rather repulsive. What is most remarkable is the complete suppression of the tribal raid and blood-feud. There is no evidence of the effect which this is having or may have in the long run. It may be suppressing feelings which will break out as soon as the hand of Ibn Saud is weakened or removed. It must be causing an increase of population, which sooner or later must find a livelihood outside the narrow limits of desert pasturage. The oil industry in Hasa will absorb a considerable number (I believe that it already employs over 2,000 workmen), and attempts are being made to utilise existing water supplies to better advantage and to find fresh ones, so that there may be a demand for more cultivators. How far the new opportunities for making a livelihood will keep pace with the expected growth in the population must be a matter of speculation.

3. I have reported more than once, as a matter for regret, the weakness of Ibn Saud's régime in the matter of administration. The King is evidently a past-master in desert politics and in the maintenance of law and order even in places so unruly as Asir, and, in spite of his lack of personal experience of the outside world, he grapples with the problems of foreign policy with success. But he seems to have no conception of the importance of the revenue and finance side of the administration to the common people, and leaves that to inexperienced and venal officials, whose only unpardonable crime would be to keep the King short of money. In justice to the King, however, or to his officials, it must be recorded that he suggested in August that a National Bank (preferably British) should be established in this country to finance the operations of the Saudi Government and keep the currency stable; and that the threat of war induced the authorities to promulgate certain financial measures which have had a beneficial effect upon the market in Jedda: the customs dues were reduced, as a temporary measure, by 20 per cent.; facilities were offered which enable the importer to store his goods without charge, and to postpone payment of the customs dues on them, until he can sell them; and the Government even offered to lend to importers, without interest, one-fifth of the cost of food-stuffs ordered from abroad. The Government has also taken an interest in agriculture to the extent of obliging the California Arabian Standard Oil Company to search for water in various places for the Government, and bringing in Iraqi irrigation engineers to utilise the waters of the "bottomless" wells of Kharj, 100 miles or so from Riyadh. It will probably be found that people like the Minister of Finance, Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, and the King's family will have most of the new land, but it is something that production has not been entirely forgotten in the delight of spending. The drafting of this despatch had just reached this point when news was received from Iraq that certain Iraqi cultivators, attracted by the reports from Kharj, had left for Saudi Arabia. It might have been better for the Saudi Government to develop the new land more slowly with their own people, but Ibn Saud will have been flattered to find the tide of migration flowing back from the town to the desert.

4. Over a year ago I suggested that the gradual replacement of income from the pilgrimage by oil royalties, paid direct into a bank abroad by a foreign company, as the main item in the State revenue, should increase the independence of the crown, but this process has been interrupted by the war. The California

Arabian Standard Oil Company are confident that the Hasa oil-field is going to be one of the most important in the world, and that it will not be long before Ibn Saud receives from it much more than he ever received from pilgrims, but the increase in the revenue from oil royalties, plus the lump sum received for the new concession granted to the California Arabian Standard Oil Company this year, has been more than offset by the war slump in the pilgrimage, and Ibn Saud has just obtained from the California Arabian Standard Oil Company an advance of a million dollars on account of future royalties. No one, except the King and one or two others, know what the financial situation of Saudi Arabia really is and, above all, whether there is a considerable reserve at home or abroad, but the impression made on me is that the King's cheerfulness about his finances is due to his belief that the war will not last more than another six months or so, and that, if the low figures of this pilgrimage should be repeated next year and perhaps the year after, Ibn Saud might be in serious financial straits. The Minister of Finance is said to have urged the King to have economies made in the public departments, and to have proposed that the King should not come to Mecca this season, but economise in transport and entertaining by staying at home. There was little sign of economy when I was in Riyadh, but it is stated that the King has, in fact, agreed to the division of all estimates into urgent and non-urgent and to have ordered the latter to be suspended.

5. It is unfortunate from the moral point of view that the new form of revenue in this country is almost as demoralising as the old. The exploitation of pilgrims is not an elevating means of livelihood, but it is also demoralising to draw a large revenue from a natural product whose extraction depends entirely upon the technical and organising skill of foreigners. But just as fate has given Saudi Arabia a perfect monopoly in the possession of the shrine at Mecca, so it has given them a share in the limited quantity of oil in the world, and one cannot expect them to worry about its effect on their character. I am told that the demoralising effect of easy oil money on the Saudis is already apparent, in that whereas ten years ago the rent of 5,000 gold pounds was counted out with the greatest care, to-day an expenditure of 50,000 gold pounds is considered nothing. But the effect is visible to any observer at Riyadh, where there is a strong contrast between the poverty of the common people and the sprawling waste and extravagance of the Royal households. The huge new palace, built by the King himself without any proper plan, is typical of everything. It is said that 2,000 or 3,000 people feed at the King's expense, and this is probably not an overstatement. There are the brothers and uncles and cousins, and the Rashids; and the twenty-five or more princes and their unnumbered sisters, each one the nucleus of a group of idle servants and slaves and expensive cars, and the men with wives and concubines in addition. And there is no education or moral training or experience to keep a check on the indulgence in pleasure and luxury. Except for the King himself and the two eldest sons (and perhaps another son, Nasir, who, as the son of a slave mother, has been considered low enough in status to be governor of the town of Riyadh), not a single one of the Royal personages does any work. None of the King's sons have been educated, and only four of them have seen anything of the outside world. What the Amir Saud will do, when he succeeds to the throne, with his useless and possibly dangerous younger brothers, it is difficult to imagine. At present they are not allowed to go abroad, but Muhammad and Khalid have seen something of Europe, and the appetite of some of the younger ones has recently been whetted by a sight of the glories of Bahrein, and I am inclined to think that once the King is dead, many of the sons for whom there is no work at home will demand from the new king allowances to enable them to travel and even to live abroad. He would probably be wise to buy them off with allowances out of the oil royalties, though the lives these uneducated, untrained and dissolute young men will lead will probably do little credit to Saudi Arabia. This problem may be postponed for years by the prolongation of the King's life, but even during the King's life the presence of a crowd of idle and expensive sons must be a cause of serious weakness to the régime.

6. It is impossible to know whether any community of feeling is growing up between—say the Saudi tribes near Koweit and the once-turbulent population in Asir. Probably not. But it can be stated with certainty that there is no community of feeling between the Hejaz towns and Nejd. The King speaks

with a contempt which must be admitted to be well deserved of the people of the Hejaz, and while he claims to rule with the approval of Nejd, he cares nothing for Hejazi approval. It is probable, however, that no ruler would be popular in the Hejaz who did not leave to the Hejazis their traditional liberty to exploit the pilgrims for their own advantage. The necessity to find money to subsidise the Nejd tribes, both to induce them to refrain from raids and to be ready to wage war for the King in case of need, has driven Ibn Saud to raise pilgrim dues to unprecedented heights, and not only does he leave the pilgrim little to spend in the Hejaz, but he represses the grosser forms of extortion by which the Hejazi might still squeeze a living out of the "respected guests of the Holy Land." The Hejazi likes to regard himself as exploited by Nejd, Syrians and other "foreigners," and for this view there is some justification. Whether the Hejaz, if independent, could support and defend itself is doubtful, but the Hejazi will think of the evil from which flight at present seems impossible rather than of the alternative ills. It would be sufficient for a pretender to the throne to promise a lowering of pilgrim dues and to hint at a freer hand for pilgrim guides, for him to win much popularity. As I have suggested before, it is conceivable that Hasa and Nejd may one day be the richer half of the peninsula, but whether that would induce the Hejaz to desire to maintain the present connexion would depend upon the policy of the Government. Should Ibn Saud live long enough, and should the oil revenue increase as it is expected to do, it would be possible for him to create for the Hejaz such favourable conditions that even the Hejazis might realise their value. The dues on pilgrims would be so greatly reduced that the visitors would be able once more to spend largely in the Hejaz to the benefit of the local people, while the menace of the desert tribes would be kept in check by subsidies paid out of the royalties from Hasa oil. Whether such a situation, which would help towards the unification of the peninsula, would be allowed to develop in peace, would depend largely on the attitude of the northern neighbours of Saudi Arabia, and at present there is little evidence that the rulers of Iraq and Transjordan wish to see a strong, united and independent State on their southern borders.

7. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine and to the Middle East Intelligence Centre.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

[E 8086/753/25]

No. 40.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 170.)

My Lord,

Jedda, December 2, 1939.

IN any country where the power is concentrated in the hands of a personal ruler the extent to which his word can be relied upon is a matter of supreme importance to the foreign representative who is called upon to deal with him. We have assurances from Ibn Saud which, taken at their face value, lead us to believe that we can count upon his benevolent neutrality in this war—unless, as I have frequently said, the Allies should be defeated, when at the last moment he might well try to absorb some of the smaller Arab States on the Persian Gulf in order to forestall a similar advance from Iraq or Iran. On the other hand, when the war began the Amir Abdullah seems to have believed that Ibn Saud was threatening his territory, and although the Amir subsequently stated that he was satisfied on this head, it is always possible that the recent movement of Saudi forces to the north may revive his suspicions. It seems probable that the movement is towards the Iraq frontier, however, and some local wiseacres forecast an attempt to seize Koweit while His Majesty's Government are busy elsewhere. The fact that an emissary of Ibn Saud's visited Herr Hitler just before war broke out was bound to give rise to speculation. The Germans gave the visit a political tinge in their news, and Ibn Saud was not in a position to divulge to the world the information he gave to His Majesty's Government about the object of the visit. Hence a belief in some circles in Jedda (the Turkish Legation, for instance, who have little direct contact with Ibn Saud) that the Saudi Government are pro-German.

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2. My own belief is that, if we take Ibn Saud's assurances at their face value, we shall not be far out. The behaviour of Iraq in the matter of Koweit early this year, the assumption of a sort of moral protectorate over the smaller Arab States in the Gulf by certain political and journalistic circles in Iraq, and the conduct of Nuri Pasha as seen through the eyes of Ibn Saud, are sufficient to account for the despatch of Saudi forces towards the Iraq border, even if the King had not had trouble there from tribes which, he believes, try to play off the two Governments against each other. I do not believe that he would welcome a German victory, even if Germany had not allied herself with Russia. The attitude which he has held towards His Majesty's Government during the three years I have been here seems to me consistent with his wider interests. His attitude was well described to my French colleague recently by Fuad Hamza, who said that the King would never quarrel with His Majesty's Government about the Mufti, for instance, for while it was a Moslem and Arab interest for him to support the Palestinian claim, he considered that the wider interests of the Arab and Moslem world compelled him to remain close friends with His Majesty's Government.

3. Ibn Saud has never pretended that his attitude towards His Majesty's Government is due to mere affection. He claims, for instance, to have told the Hadhramis, who came fishing for sympathy, that if the British were not in the Hadhramaut some other Power would be, and that they might think themselves fortunate to have secured the best of the Powers. He has often said that, as an Arab, he sympathises with any movement for Arab independence, but next to independence he considers British rule or protection to be the least galling arrangement. When justifying his support for Great Britain in the East, he points to the independence of Iraq and Egypt and the constitutional development in India, saying that, while His Majesty's Government have doubtless acted in accordance with their conception of their own interests, no other European Power would have shown such consideration to the peoples concerned. Finally, he always asserts that his friendship with His Majesty's Government is based on his conviction that his own country stands or falls with Great Britain. It would be possible, of course, for a statesman, and not merely an oriental statesman, to create and maintain this attitude as a façade, and behind it to be working for our undoing, but I think that the King's actions for the last few years are sufficient to dispose of this hypothesis. There was reason to believe that when the Palestine revolt was at its worst he was persuaded into agreeing to let the malcontents have some rifles and ammunition, but when one realises what pressure must have been put upon him, by the Arabs and by his own religious convictions, one hesitates to judge this harshly, especially when one remembers the efforts he had made to keep the peace while the question was being studied, and the advice he had frequently given to His Majesty's Government to move in a direction in which, with the issue of the White Paper of 1939, they have now moved. The perfect friend would, of course, have refused all help to the Palestinians and, if necessary, risked his own position, but I consider Ibn Saud comparatively, as he considers His Majesty's Government, and I find him, as he finds us, able to stand comparison. In particular, after reading some ten years of the Persia print as a preparation for a new post, my opinion of Ibn Saud's qualities has gone up rather than down.

4. Ibn Saud has certain grave faults. His attitude towards slavery, and especially towards women slaves, is difficult to excuse; his treatment of his huge family of sons is unwise and must lead to embarrassment, if not in his own time, in the reign of his successor; and his indifference to the financial side of administration is a serious defect in a ruler. But, on the whole, he has shown himself a great ruler. No man who had not had a firm hold over himself, as well as over his people, could have steered the course in regard to Palestine which he has steered for the last two or three years. It is not that he is cynical: the depths of his personal feelings could not be doubted by anyone who had heard him repeat some of the Quranic texts about the Jews, or seen him trying to suppress his tears at the wireless announcement of the hanging of an Arab for participation in the armed movement in Palestine; but he is not led away by his feelings, but keeps his eyes fixed steadfastly on the main lines of the policy which he has adopted. I do not think that the possession of a certain greatness of mind can be denied him.

5. I am aware that there are English men and women who "adopt" some foreign country whose real or alleged virtues they never cease to praise, and whose interests they support exclusively, and that I risk being classed in this respect

with the Aubrey Herberts, the Miss Durhams, and the Gertrude Bells. But no Englishman who has lived within 45 miles of Mecca for five years could have any illusions about the "noble Arab," though, perhaps, the exploiters of the pilgrimage have keen competitors in baseness in those Iraqi politicians, who, it appears, sponsor the view in the local school-books that the independence of Iraq was won, not from the Turks by the Allies, but from the British by the Arabs. No, my good opinion of Ibn Saud is not part of an illusion about the Arabs, but is based on my experience of his actions for three years and of some other countries for various periods. For instance, all orientals are supposed to be highly suspicious, but I have found Ibn Saud less suspicious than the French in Morocco; again, the Soviet officials with whom I had to deal for nearly four years serve to elevate the character of Ibn Saud by contrast to a high level of probity and good faith.

6. The personal relations between Ibn Saud and the British officials with whom he has been brought into contact over a period of nearly thirty years have been almost uniformly good, and I should be glad to know that my official relations would always be as easy in future as they have been here. I feel a real regret that I have probably had my last talk with Ibn Saud, and shall never again listen to one of his long monologues, rambling and repetitive but by no means pointless, and none the less sound on European politics because all foreign names but the most simple are beyond his capacity, so that even the familiar "Inghilterra" becomes "qandara," which in the mouth of any other Arab means "bridge"; "Czecho-Slovakia" is a despairing wave of the hand; and a certain Miss O'Looney, who flits in and out of the talk like some engaging friend of Mr. Flurry Knox's, turns out to be an eminent Italian statesman.

7. Ibn Saud being a firm and capable ruler and, as I think, a loyal friend to His Majesty's Government, it is naturally a matter of great importance how long his effective rule will last until cut short by death or by incapacity. I can only say that in October this year he seemed less heavy in his movements than a year ago, and that in spite of Mr. Philby's gloomy prognostications I see no sign of mental break-up in him.

8. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine. I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 4744/1022/93]

No. 41.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 319. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, June 26, 1939.

WITH reference to your Lordship's circular despatch of the 9th June, 1938, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Iraq for the year 1939.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Bagdad.

[The portions marked with an asterisk are copied from previous reports.]

Egypt.

Abdul Rahman Azzam presented his letters of credence to the late King Ghazi as Minister for Egypt on the 3rd August, 1936. He was at first also accredited to Tehran and Kabul, but in July 1938 the legations at Tehran and Kabul were placed under a separate minister. In November 1938 Abdul Rahman Azzam was also appointed to Jedda.

He left Bagdad in May 1938 on sick leave, and did not return to his post until May 1939. He left again early in June owing to the illness of his wife. He attended the London conversations on Palestine in January 1939 as an Egyptian delegate. He has great faith in Anglo-Egyptian friendship, and when here exercises a sound influence in Iraq political circles.

He fought against the Italians in Tripoli, and has the reputation of being a sincere and reasonable supporter of pan-Arabian ideals.

He is popular in political circles in Bagdad, and when here is generally well informed about local political activities.

France.

M. Jean Lescuyer presented his letters of credence as minister to the late King Ghazi on the 26th February. He came from Angora, where for some years he had been counsellor. He is frank and friendly and always ready to exchange information and ideas. He is married and has a grown-up daughter.

Germany.

*Dr. Fritz Grobba came to Bagdad as chargé d'affaires in March 1932, and was promoted to be minister plenipotentiary on the 13th December of that year. Before then he had served as consul at Jerusalem, minister at Kabul, in the Eastern Department of the German Foreign Office, and, during the war, with the Turkish armies in Palestine. This means that he has a fairly wide experience of the Middle East.

He is a man of some ability. He is certainly zealous and energetic in pushing German interests in this country. Buttoned rather tightly into his somewhat old-fashioned black cut-away coat, which he seems always to wear, he suggests at first glance a typical middle-class German official of before the war—wooden, correct, formal and a little inhuman. But most of this soon passes, and, when he unbuttons, he reveals some geniality and humour. He does his best to be a friendly colleague, and is always ready to talk freely about current events

in Iraq, upon which he seems to be well informed, and about his own difficulties. But the very nature of his duties has obliged him to try to secure for his country things which we tend to claim as ours. About this he is secretive and, when detected, shamefaced.

He went on leave in 1935, for the first time for four years, in order that he might get into personal touch with his new masters and acquire something of what he described as the "atmosphere" of nazism. When he returned he was in many ways a changed man, clearly much impressed by all he had seen and heard, and full of the breezes of Nuremberg. Since that time he has pursued a more forward policy than in the past.

For the purpose, presumably, of gathering information, he and his wife, who are both at ease in the English language, move freely amongst the British colony and the officers of the Royal Air Force, whom they are at pains to entertain. With the Iraqis perhaps Dr. Grobba's position has been slightly damaged on account of his intimate association with the late Bakr Sidqi, but he will doubtless live that down. (Written in 1938.)

During 1939 the German Legation has given active support to Arab agitation against British policy in Palestine.

Iran.

Mr. Noury Esfandiary presented his letters of credence as minister on the 5th September, 1938. He discharges his duties in a quiet and straightforward manner. He is married, but his wife does not appear at social functions.

Italy.

*M. Luigi Gabbrielli, the first Italian representative who has been accredited to Bagdad with the rank of minister, presented his letters of credence on the 5th December, 1936. He has served for many years in Cairo and Beirut, and is said to have a good knowledge of Near and Middle East questions. He is a red-headed Piedmontese of unprepossessing appearance. He is an active propagandist of his country, but so far his work has been without effect. He carries no conviction with the Iraqis. He is a bachelor. He speaks French and some English. (Written in 1938.)

In appearance and manner I find him somewhat faded. In the conduct of Italian propaganda he has had of late to bat on a bad wicket and may be feeling discouraged.

Saudi Arabia.

Sheikh Hamza-al-Goth presented his letters of credence to the late King Ghazi as Saudi Arabian Minister on the 12th October, 1938. He is pleasant and friendly, but does not seem to have established close relations with any of the leading men in public life in Iraq.

Turkey.

*Tahir Beg Lutfi Tokay has been Turkish Minister in Bagdad since the 2nd January, 1930. Hitherto he had served mainly in the Balkans.

M. Tokay has proved to be a good and trustworthy colleague to my predecessors. He is elderly, slow-witted and uninteresting, but he possesses qualities—honesty, solidity and calm—which command respect. He has the confidence of the Iraqis, and has been from time to time fairly close in their counsels. He professes to have much at heart good relations between Turkey and Great Britain. His wife is deservedly popular. (Written in 1938.)

United States of America.

Mr. Paul Knabenshue has been in Bagdad as minister resident since the 7th November, 1932. It is his first diplomatic post. He came from Beirut, where he had been consul-general. Before that he had served in Jerusalem and Cairo. He likes to talk of the happy times he had at both these places, and of his close personal relations with His Majesty's High Commissioners. His father was consul-general at Belfast, and it was there that he met and married his Irish wife.

Mr. Knabenshue seems friendly and ready to pass on any information that has reached him. He strikes me as a reasonably capable and a fair average type.

In 1936 he paid an official visit to Muscat in order to convey to the Sultan the good wishes of the President on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the United States and Muscat. But it was said at the time that he was more interested in oil in the Persian Gulf than in the treaty.

The Iraqis seem to like him. He educates his children in England and professes great faith in British institutions in general.

He has used such influence as he has to persuade the Iraqis to take a reasonable view of the white paper on Palestine.

Representatives Accredited in Iraq but Resident Elsewhere.

Belgium.

M. Egbert Graeffe presented his letters of credence as minister to the late King Ghazi on the 27th April, 1938. He is also Belgian Minister at Tehran, where he resides.

Czecho-Slovakia.

Dr. Vladimir Fric was appointed chargé d'affaires on the 1st December, 1934. He is also in charge of the Czecho-Slovak Legation in Tehran, where he lives.

Pending a decision by the Iraqi Government on the attitude which they will adopt towards the annexation of his country by Germany, Dr. Fric continues to enjoy official recognition of his diplomatic status.

Denmark.

Dr. A. C. Fensmark, who resides in Tehran, was appointed chargé d'affaires at Bagdad on the 17th June, 1939. He may open an office in Bagdad later. He struck me as a good and typically friendly Danish type. He is married.

Hungary.

M. Zoltan de Mariassy, who is the first Hungarian Minister to be accredited to this post, presented his letters to the late King Ghazi on the 15th November, 1937.

M. de Mariassy, who is also accredited to Iran and Turkey, lives at Angora.

He has not visited Bagdad since November 1937 and little is known of him here.

Netherlands.

M. C. Adriaanse was appointed chargé d'affaires on the 9th May, 1936. He came from Jedda, where he is also accredited and where he lives. He stayed no more than a few days in Bagdad, and has not yet paid another visit.

Poland.

M. Jan Karszo-Siedlewski became Polish Minister at Bagdad on the 27th March. He is also minister at Tehran and Kabul and resides at Tehran.

Sweden.

M. Hugo von Heidenstam, who was appointed Swedish Minister to Iraq in succession to Baron Gyllenstierna and presented his letters of credence on the 11th December, 1936, is accredited to Iran also, and spends most of his time at Tehran, making short yearly visits to Bagdad. His mother was a Scotswoman and he speaks good English. A pleasant, talkative man, who seems inclined to restrict his interest in Iraq to the hope of securing some public works contracts for Swedish firms. He is married.

[E 4745/4745/93]

No. 42.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 323.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, June 27, 1939.

WITH reference to your circular despatch of the 9th June, 1938, I have the honour to transmit herewith a revised report on the leading personalities of Iraq for the year 1939.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

Enclosure in No. 42.

Report on the Leading Personalities in Iraq.

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THE ROYAL FAMILY.

1. *King Faisal II.*

Born in Bagdad the 2nd May, 1935. Succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Ghazi I. His mother is a sister of the Amir Abdul Illah. He has an English nurse, and is a bright, intelligent child.

2. *Abdul Illah, His Royal Highness the Amir.*

Only son of Ali-bin Hussein, ex-King of the Hejaz, who died in 1935. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Bagdad as a child with father in 1926, after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly at home and partly at Victoria College, Alexandria.

He speaks good English.

In November 1936 he married in Bagdad the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg and grand daughter of Amin Yahiyah Pasha of Cairo.

He is keenly interested in Arab horse racing and maintains a large stable.

Became Regent on the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April, 1939. Although in Iraq he only enjoys the title of Highness, it is considered proper for foreigners to refer to him as His Royal Highness.

3. *Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir.*

Born in Constantinople in 1900. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Sharifian army.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man, and speaks excellent English and Turkish.

In 1933 he married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her husband. This *mésalliance* mattered little so long as he was not living in Iraq, but when he was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and came to live in Bagdad it was counted against him locally. But for his wife he would probably have been made Regent after the death of King Ghazi in April 1939.

OTHER PERSONALITIES.

1. *Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha.*

Chieftain of the Pizhder tribe (Kurdish) (see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

2. *Abbas Mahdi.*

Shiah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace, March 1937. Joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

Transferred to the Ministry of Economics and Communications in October 1938, and resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938.

3. *Abdul Aziz-al-Mudhaffar, M.B.E.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Rasafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Rasafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1935.

In the spring of 1937 he was accused of giving false certificates for munitions bought for Spain and recalled to Iraq. In Syria he was arrested, but extradition was refused and he was released, but remained in Syria. He is married to a daughter of Naji-al-Suwaidi, and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December.

He returned to live in Bagdad in January 1938, and shortly afterwards it was officially announced that it had been proved that he was innocent of the charges made against him in 1937.

4. *Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Kaimakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutessarif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutessarif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade I, November 1933.

He was appointed Minister for the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937, in succession to Taufiq-al-Suwaidi.

5. *Abdul Ghafur-al-Badri.*

Ex-cadet in the Turkish army and second lieutenant in the Sharifian army.

Since 1920 has been editor of the Nationalist newspaper, the *Istiqlal*. This journal has been suspended many times for its violent attacks on the British Government and on British officials in Iraq.

Elected Deputy for Diyala 1933. Re-elected for Kut in the general election of 1934. Lost his seat in August 1935. His paper, the *Istiqlal*, was suspended in November 1936 for one year by Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet for publishing articles defending Yasin-al-Hashimi's administration.

This order was cancelled when Jamil-al-Madfai succeeded Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937.

Elected Deputy for Kut, December 1937.

In October 1938 he was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for publishing unfounded allegation against the Government in his paper the *Istiqlal*. Released when Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister on the 25th December, 1938, and returned for Kut in the elections of June 1939.

6. *Abdul Latif Nuri*.

Born in Bagdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted *aqid* (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and *zaim* (colonel) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted *amir liwa* (brigadier) in 1932.

Joined General Bakr Sidqi as leader of the army revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi in October 1936, and became Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

7. *Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid)*.

Shiah of Shutia (Muntafiq). Born about 1894.

Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqatah). Deputy for Kerbala in Turkish Parliament, and in Iraqi Chamber in 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

He was a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani).

After the dissolution of the party in 1935 he played no part in politics, until he was again elected to the Chamber in December 1937.

He was again returned for this constituency in June 1939.

8. *Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid*.

Sunni of Bagdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency, until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933.

9. *Abdul Wahid, Shaikh*.

Chief of the Fatlah tribe, son of Haji Sikkar, once the most powerful shaikhs on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivates extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintain to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellaheen.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Jaudat's Cabinet.

He had much influence during Yasin-al-Hashimi's tenure of office, but so abused it that after Yasin's fall in October 1936 he was afraid to return to his tribe.

He was elected to the Chamber in February 1937, but in July 1937 he was arrested and imprisoned for fomenting tribal disturbances in Diwaniyah. After the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government in August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept under surveillance first in Sulaimani and later in Samawa.

He was permitted to return to his home in July 1938 and elected Deputy for Diwaniyah in June 1939.

10. *Abdullah-al-Damluji*.

Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Bagdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saud to London in 1926, and took part in the negotiations leading to the

conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was a failure, and when it ended, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damluji came to Bagdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Bagdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi consul-general, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damluji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jedda in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damluji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December, but resigned a few months later.

For nearly two years he remained out of public life, but in July 1937 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in succession to Abbas Mahdi.

He headed the Iraqi representatives at the funeral of Ataturk in November 1938. Soon after Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister in December 1939 he was removed from the Palace to an obscure appointment in the Health Department.

11. *Ahmad, Shaikh of Barzan*.

A chieftain of the Kurdish Zibar tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Barosh and Mazuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barosh and Mazuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Agra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradost, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalil Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

Permitted to come to Bagdad in April 1935.

12. *Ahmad-al-Shaikh Daud, Saiyid*.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1875. He comes of a family of learned men, his father was a well-known teacher in Bagdad, under whom most of the men of Sheikh Ahmad's generation studied. In the early days of the occupation he

was a prominent Nationalist. He was arrested and deported to Henjam in August 1920, but was allowed to return to Bagdad in February 1921. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in March 1924, he opposed the treaty of 1922 and voted against it. Failed to secure a seat in the subsequent general election, but was successful at a by-election. In October 1925 he became pro-treaty, but in January 1926 voted against ratification of the extension of the treaty period. Minister for Aqaf under Abdul Muhsin Beg in January 1928, but resigned office April 1929. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in October 1933, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934.

Lost his seat in August 1935.

He is now an ageing man and is unlikely again to play a prominent part in politics.

Made a Senator in May 1937. Resigned October 1937.

His daughter Sabiha (a teacher on the Women's Training College) became the first woman student in the Bagdad Law College in 1937.

13. *Ahmad-i-Taufiq.*

A Kurdish notable of Suleimani, born 1898, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days of the occupation of the Suleimani Liwa. Was appointed mutessarif after the reoccupation of Suleimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but those chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1933) been mutessarif without interruption since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizher tribe, and owns property in the Surdash nahiyah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutessarif to Arbil in April 1935.

Made an administrative inspector April 1939.

14. *Ahmad Zaki-al-Khaiyat.*

Shiah Baghdadi. Born 1896. Educated Bagdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, consul-general at Muhammerah and Bombay, kaimakam in several places, Mutessarif of Kut and Hillah and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1937.

15. *Ajil-al-Yawar.*

Paramount Sheikh of the Shammar Jarba (Arab) tribe of Iraq.

His tribal authority is exercised over the Northern Jazirah from the Sinjar to the Aqaruf depression to the west of Bagdad. A fine man physically, who has cleverly adapted himself to the changing political conditions which have followed the British occupation of Iraq. For some years after the division of the Jazirah between the British and French mandates, tribal troubles were caused by his rivalry with Diham-al-Hadi, the chief of the Shammar, whose territory now lies in Syria. Latterly (1933), however, both Diham and Ajil have settled down to a mutual acceptance of the division of the tribes, and have seemingly agreed to leave each other in peace. Ajil is eager to adopt modern methods of cultivation, and has a number of irrigation pumps. He has also profited largely from the activities of the British Oil Development Company, whose field lies in the Shammar tribal territory.

His eldest son, Sufuq, was educated at the American college at Beirut, but has now finished his schooling and has returned to live with the tribe. He is a great help to his father.

Ajil visited England for the Coronation in May 1937 and afterwards travelled in Germany and France.

In November 1938 he came into conflict with the Aqaidat tribe of Syria on account of his collecting khawa from Aqaidat caravans collecting salt at Milha Adaid on the frontier. The dispute was settled by Syrian and Iraqi frontier commissioners.

An ancient feud between the Shammar and the Ubaid broke out again in February 1939. A Shammari related to Ajil murdered the Shaikh of the Ubaid, and three days later an Ubaid tribesman murdered a Shammari Shaikh outside his house in Bagdad.

After a period of tension the feud was settled in May by a tribal court presided over by the Prime Minister. Both sides accepted peace and pledged themselves to maintain it.

During 1938-39 the German Legation in Bagdad made a special effort to establish close touch with Ajil, and several German travellers visited him.

16. *Akram Mushtaq.*

Born Bagdad 1903. Moslem Sunni. Brother of Talib Mushtaq (q.v.). Gazetted officer in army 1927. Passed through Cranwell and appointed to Royal Iraqi air force in 1930. Promoted captain 1932. Took an active part in the *coup d'Etat* of October 1936. Promoted major 1937 and lieutenant-colonel in 1938. Appointed Commander of Iraqi air force in September 1937. Retained this post until April 1939, when he was relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director of Civil Aviation.

17. *Ali Jaudat.*

Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1886. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shuaibah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sharif. He was a member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo after the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutessarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by underestimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the *mujtahids*. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askari Cabinet, November 1923-July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutessarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yasin-al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. Transferred to Paris in December 1936.

He came to Bagdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in April 1939.

Has a son, Nizar, who is being educated in England.

18. *Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali.*

Born 1902. Sunni Arab connected with the Ubaid tribe. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School in 1923 and practised as a lawyer for about thirteen years. He also learnt to speak English and French. He became well known as an extreme Nationalist and contributed many articles to the newspaper the *Istiqlal* attacking British policy in Iraq. He was arrested in 1924 on account of his agitation against the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but was acquitted on trial. He was brought before the courts again in 1930 for a similarly violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the delegation of Iraqi notables which visited Palestine and Egypt in 1936, and a short time after his return he was appointed (through the personal influence of Yasin-al-Hashimi, the Prime Minister) to a judgeship in the Court of Appeal. In this post he has shown more talent and good sense than was to be expected from his past career. Appointed Minister of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in November 1938, but was permitted to return when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. In February 1939 he was appointed Mutassarif of Basra, where he soon began to make troubles for the Sheikh of Koweit.

19. *Ali Mumtaz.*

Born 1901. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Daftari family. Graduated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Married a daughter of Yasin-al-Hashimi in 1933. Appointed Director-General of Revenues in 1935, but was obliged to leave Iraq for a time when Bakr Sidqi overthrew Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government in 1936. In January 1939 he was reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet.

20. *Amin-al-Umari.*

Born Mosul 1889 of the notable family of the Umaris. Passed out of the Military College in Bagdad in 1906 and then entered the Artillery School in Constantinople, where he remained for three years. Gazetted second lieutenant in 1909 and posted to Adana. Later he served in 1910 in operations against the Shammar and in 1911 and 1912 against the tribes in Samawa, Abu Sukhair and Rumaitha. Entered the Turkish Staff College in 1912. Fought in the Balkan war and was mentioned in despatches for good work on the Chitaljah lines. After the war of 1914-17 he took part (with Jamil-al-Madfai) in the Arab insurrections at Deir-ez-Zor and Tell Afar. He returned to Mosul after the general amnesty in 1920 and joined the Iraqi army at the time of its formation. He was promoted Assistant Chief of the General Staff in 1935 and General Officer Commanding the Northern Area in 1937. In August 1937 he refused to carry out the orders given to him by the Government to arrest a number of officers charged with co-operating in Bakr Sidqi's murder, and this successful defiance brought about the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Soon after, when Jamil-al-Madfai came into office, Amin-al-Umari was transferred to command of the Bagdad District.

Went to Europe on leave in the winter of 1938 to undergo medical treatment. As a soldier he is out of date and obstinately refuses to modernise his tactical ideas.

21. *Arshad-al-Umari.*

Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Speaks French and understands some English. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Muhsin Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made *Amin-al-Asimah* (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of Bagdad.

22. *Asim-al-Naqib, Saiyid.*

The fourth son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Saiyid Mahmud. Born Bagdad 1879. Appointed Naqib on the death of Saiyid Mahmud in July 1936. A man of little character, but he has successfully acquired the conventional appearance of a Sunni Alim and holy man.

23. *Ata Amin.*

Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angora.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, the Iraqi Minister in Angora and younger brother of King Faisal. This was regarded as a scandal at the time, but later on he was forgiven. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935. Transferred to Paris as chargé d'affaires in August 1938 and to Berlin in February 1939.

24. *Bebekr Agha.*

A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Suleimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

25. *Daud-al-Haidari.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1880. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Bagdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin-al-Umana (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for the treaty 1924. Hazb-al-Shah and opposed treaty of 1926. Minister for Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, April-November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Bagdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

26. *Daud-al-Sadi, Saiyid.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Hillah in August 1935.

Appointed public prosecutor in August 1936 by Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet. Resigned in December after Yasin's fall.

Elected to the Chamber for Kut in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai in December 1938, but returned so soon as Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister.

27. *Fadhil Jamali, Dr.*

Born Kadhimain 1902. Shiah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921-27. Columbia University New York 1927-29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education, where he soon made his mark. In 1933 he was made Director-General of Instruction, and has filled this post with success. Keen and competent, but with a natural predilection for American methods.

In early 1938 he was invited by the British Council to visit the United Kingdom to study British educational methods. He was well entertained and shown the best colleges and schools of all kinds. As a result he became far more favourably disposed towards British education.

28. *Fahmi-al-Mudarris.*

Born about 1874. Superintendent of the Government press under the Turkish régime. Joined the Amir Feisal in Syria, and was with him in London in 1920. Appointed Chamberlain on King Feisal's accession. Was in close touch with the extreme Nationalists in 1922, and at the High Commissioner's request was dismissed from the Palace. In June 1924 he was appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College, but lost this post in 1930 when the college was closed. In March 1932 he was expelled from Bagdad to Arbil on account of his subversive political activities, but was permitted to return to the capital a month later. Since then he has not been prominent in politics, but frequently contributes articles to the press in which he expounds Nationalist views.

Appointed Rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College in 1937.

29. *Faris Agha.*

Chieftain of the Zibar tribe (Kurds), who lives at Huki in the Aqra district. From the time of the British occupation of the Mosul liwa in 1918-19 until 1923,

he has a stormy record of hostility towards the authority of the Government. Since 1923 he has been quieter, though he and his tribesmen are always a perpetual danger to the peace of the Aqra district, and the local authorities have little real authority among his villages. He has an old feud with Ahmad of Barzan, whose territory lies adjacent to that of Faris on the opposite side of the Greater Zab River. Elected Deputy in February 1937, but lost his seat in the elections of June 1939.

30. *Hanna Khayat.*

Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Baghdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector-General of Health September 1937.

31. *Hikmat Sulaiman.*

Sunni. Born 1886. Director of Education in Baghdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933. He played an active part in organising intensive opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is much respected.

In October 1936 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government, and upon Yasin's resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was disappointing. His intentions were excellent, but his impatience with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the malign influence exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of importance.

A well-mannered man of wide Liberal views.

In 1938, though he took no active part in politics, he was on the alert to keep Nuri-al-Said from returning to power. When Nuri-al-Said formed a Government in December 1938, he sent messages of goodwill to Hikmat and later calls were exchanged between Hikmat and Sabah, Nuri's son. In spite of their reconciliation, he was arrested early in March 1939, tried by court-martial for treason and sentenced to death. This was at the same time commuted to five years imprisonment.

32. *Husain Afnan Saïyid.*

Grandson on the maternal side of Baha Ullah, the Persian reformer. Born at Acre in 1889; educated at the Quaker School at Brumana, the American College, Beirut, and Cambridge, where he graduated. He is married to a tiresome woman. Freethinker, but very proud of his grandfather. Appointed Secretary to the Council of Ministers in November 1920, which post he filled with distinction until dismissed in 1924 by Yasin Pasha. He then took up commerce in partnership with Shafiq Haddad, but failed. In 1928 he was appointed *chef de protocol*, and in January 1930 secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London. Transferred in September 1932 as secretary to the Legation at Ankara, but the post was abolished soon after his appointment. In May 1934 he was given a good post in the Railway Directorate.

33. *Husain Fauzi-bin-Hassan.*

Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Bagdad in 1889. Entered the Military College in Istanbul and received a commission in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army (artillery) in May 1922. Promoted major 1925. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Belgaum, India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1929 and colonel in 1933. In 1934 he was appointed Commandant of the Staff School, Bagdad, and in February 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District. In August 1935 he became a brigadier, and in November 1936 he was made G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division. A pleasant man with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

34. *Ibrahim Hilmi-al-Umar.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1895. Clever writer and experienced journalist. Was in Syria during the war and at one time worked for T. E. Lawrence. Came back to Bagdad in 1921 and started the *Lisan-al-Arab* on pro-Feisal and pro-British lines. A year later he changed sides and joined the Shiah agitation against the first elections. Went to Persia with the Ulama and attacked British policy in the Persian press. Returned to Bagdad in March 1923, and in May 1924 became editor of the *Mufid*, a newspaper run by Jafar Pasha. Continued active in journalism until 1931, when he was made Superintendent of the Press Bureau in the Ministry of the Interior. Since then he has kept quiet. Ibrahim Hilmi is a thoroughly worthless and contemptible character, who will do anything (or anybody) for money or drink. Appointed Acting Director of the Department of Propaganda and Publicity in the Ministry of Interior in June 1935. Placed on pension in November 1936 after the fall of the Hashimi Cabinet, but later he was re-employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and put in charge of foreign propaganda. In August 1937 he was reinstated in his old post as Director of Propaganda and Publicity in the Ministry of the Interior.

Visited Germany in 1938 and returned much impressed by the organisation of German propaganda. In June 1939 Talib Mushtaq was placed over him as Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting.

35. *Ibrahim Kamal.*

Sunni. Born 1895. Captain in the Shereefian army. A very good officer in the field, where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Maan. Legal officer to O.C., Damascus, under Feisal's régime. Came to Iraq with Jamil-al-Madfai in 1919 making propaganda for the Shereefians. Was afterwards at Dair, but not known to have participated in the attack on Tall Afar. He was in Damascus in April 1921, but subsequently returned to Iraq, and was said to be engaged in inciting people against any form of British control. Was appointed commandant of police, Bagdad, on the resignation of Abdul Latif Felahi. He did well in some ways and kept excellent discipline, but was removed after innumerable complaints of various kinds. After leaving the police he took up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave up politics for a well-paid and influential post in the Ministry of Finance. Since then he has given no trouble. Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise in June 1934.

Proved to be a very efficient director. In November 1936, after Hikmat Sulaiman had had Rustam Haidar removed, Ibrahim Kamal was appointed principal private secretary to King Ghazi. He was not happy in this post for long and in July 1937 reverted to the Customs Department as Director-General. In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister of Finance.

Concluded convention for the south of Iraq with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938 after the military *coup* made against them by Nuri-al-Said.

36. *Jafar, Abu Timman.*

Shiah of Bagdad. Born about 1885. Well educated, with a good deal of influence. Always a strong Nationalist, he joined with Yusuf Suwaidi, Muhammad Sadr, Sheikh Ahmad Daud and Ali Bazirgan in the independence movement of 1920 and actively incited the tribes to rebellion. He evaded an attempted arrest in August 1920 and fled from Bagdad to Najaf. Returned

in September 1921 and was energetic in promoting all Nationalist movements, especially the anti-mandate agitation. Minister of Commerce from April 1922 till the end of June, when he resigned after a prolonged opposition to the terms of the treaty. He then organised the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party), of which he became general secretary. He was subsequently arrested and deported to Henjam, where he remained till May 1923. On his return to Bagdad he relapsed for a time into private life, and refused to join the Shiah Hizb-al-Nahdhah. Returned to politics on his election to the Chamber in a Bagdad by-election June 1928. Reformed the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) September 1928. Telegraphed congratulations to the Labour party on their success in the general election in England in 1929. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1930, but remained active as the secretary-general of the Nationalist party. Resigned from the Nationalist party in October 1933, declaring that he was withdrawing from politics until there should be a change of heart among those in public life. He returned to active politics in January 1935 and joined with Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in attacking Ali Jaudat's Cabinet. He did not, however, join them in the Cabinet formed after the latter's resignation. Elected president of the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce in November 1935.

During the summer of 1936 he became an active critic of Yasin-al-Hashimi's Administration and led a deputation to King Ghazi to protest against the severity of the measures taken by the Government to suppress tribal disorders in Diwaniyah. In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister for Finance.

In June 1937 he resigned as a protest against the influence of Bakr Sidqi in Cabinet affairs, and the undue severity with which he considered that the Government were conducting punitive operations against the tribes in Samawa. Made a Senator in February 1937, but lost his seat in the summer of the same year under article 31 of the Constitution.

37. Jafar Hamandi.

Shiah. Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school-teacher in Bagdad. After the war he graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhimain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and became kaimakam of Najaf, then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutessarif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was appointed Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937, and in September he was appointed Director-General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kut September 1938, and transferred to Muntafiq February 1939.

38. Jalal Baban.

Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892.

In early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutessarif in Nasiriyah, Karbala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister for Economics and Communications in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934. Transferred to be Director-General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in December 1936.

In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned in May 1938 on account of insinuations made by his colleagues (not without reason) that he had made a corrupt agreement with a Government road contractor.

39. Jamal Baban.

A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928.

Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfai reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil-al-Madfai to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owed his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

Returned for Arbil in the elections of June 1939.

40. Jamil-al-Rawi.

A Bagdadi; born 1892, officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Shereefian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jedda, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutessarif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935. His services were dispensed with by the Hashimi Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine.

41. Jamil-al-Madfai.

Of Mosul. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Shereef. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutessarif and saw service in a number of different *liwas*. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936-37 he went to the Yeman to obtain the adhesion of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937, after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.

He lacks administrative ability, but is a figurehead in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinions in an honest, downright manner.

Throughout 1938 he held his Cabinet together and carried on the Government of the country in difficult circumstances with success. Forced to resign on the 25th December, 1938, by a military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi, the Chief of the General Staff, and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said.

42. Jamil-al-Wadi.

Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shakir-al-Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal.

Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in July 1937, but lost this post when Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet fell, and was passed into obscurity as an inspector in the Ministry of Justice.

Appointed Director-General of Tapu in January 1938.

43. *Kamil Chadirji.*

Sunni, born Bagdad 1901, brother of Rauf Chadirji. His sister is the wife of Mahmud Subhi-al-Daftari. Educated locally and graduated at the Law School. For a short time he held a minor post in the Ministry of Finance, but soon gave up the civil service for journalism and political agitation. In 1930 he was editor of *Al Ikha-al-Watani*, and his paper was suppressed for its attacks on Nuri Said's Government. He later edited *Al Akhbar*, which suffered the same fate as *Al Ikha-al-Watani*. In May 1934 he was convicted and fined £20 for publishing false news in a third newspaper, *Sawt-al-Ahali*, of which he was the responsible editor. In September of the same year he was arrested and charged with the publication of pamphlets attacking King Ghazi, but he was released a few days later as there was no evidence against him. He holds left wing views on social and political questions. He was appointed Minister for Economics and Communications in the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936.

He resigned in June 1937 on account of his disapproval of the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and left the country for several months. When he returned in the autumn he was suspected of encouraging communistic propaganda.

Nothing was heard of him during 1938-39.

44. *Khalid Sulaiman.*

Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (*q.v.*). Born 1877. Returned in 1926 from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce. Was Minister for Education under Taufiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhsin Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaida. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

Has been in Bagdad on leave since March 1939.

45. *Khalil Ismail.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1903. Graduate of Law College, Bagdad. Held various positions under the Ministry of the Interior 1925-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director-General of Ministry of Interior 1935. Director-General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937, but in October he was sent to be Mutessarif of Amarah.

Director-General of Ministry of the Interior September 1938.

46. *Khushaba, Malik.*

Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urumia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

Since hope of moving all the Assyrians from Iraq has been abandoned, Malik Khushaba has settled down to a quiet life in his village.

47. *Mahmud Subhi Daftari.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Appointed *Amin-al-Asimah* (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and *Amin-al-Asimah* October 1933. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director-General of Municipalities in November 1936. He soon quarrelled with Arshad-al-Umari, the *Amin-al-Asimah*, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1937.

Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.

Became Minister of Justice in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but devoted more attention to his entertaining than to his official duties.

48. *Mahrut-bin-Hadhdhal, Shaikh.*

Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1896. Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Bagdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

49. *Mahmud, Shaikh.*

Of the family of Barzinja Sayyidis. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made *Hukumdar* of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstated as *Hukumdar* of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Sheikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Bagdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees a month from the Iraqi Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and lives in Suleimani. Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1938 and again in June 1939. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, was sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. On his return in 1938 he was given employment in the railways. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has a chance to do so.

His properties in Sulaimani were confiscated in 1931, but restored by special Act of Parliament in December 1938.

50. *Mar Shimun.*

Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholicos of the Church in the East).

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraqi Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Surma joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack

on the Iraq army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £780 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935 and 1936, spending much time in London.

In 1939 he was granted British naturalisation and went to live in Cyprus.

51. *Maulud Mukhlis.*

Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Sharifian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Bagdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraq army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Bagdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulema. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *mujtahids*. An impulsive man, who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1937 after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 an attempt was made to assassinate him and three of Bakr Sidqi's aides-de-camp were suspected. Maulud then went to live in Syria, but returned soon after Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937. Has been a Senator since 1925.

He was elected president of the Chamber in December 1937.

Attended the Arab Parliamentary Conference on Palestine arranged by Alubba Pasha in Cairo in the summer of 1938.

Re-elected president of the Chamber November 1938 and again in June 1939.

52. *Muaffaq-al-Alousi.*

Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Bagdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Bagdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damlujji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Bagdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul-general at Bombay December 1936. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

Remained in Syria until January 1939 when he returned to Iraq. Returned to the Foreign Service in February 1939 and posted to Paris as *chargé d'affaires*. Transferred to be consul-general at Damascus June 1939.

53. *Muhammad Ali Mahmud.*

Sunni. Born 1895. A lawyer who has served in many posts under the Ministry of Justice, including that of Director-General of the Ministry, Director-General of Tapu and judge of the Court of Appeal. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in 1935 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of chairman of the Finance Committee in 1937. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's

reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet. He has a reputation for moderation and sound judgment.

Elected Deputy for Arbil December 1937 but lost his seat in June 1939.

54. *Muhammad Amin Zaki.*

A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists without compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1937 and again in June 1939.

55. *Muhammad Husain Kashif-al-Ghata (Saiyid).*

Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms against Yasin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shiah community a greater share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

Declared a jihad for Palestine in the summer of 1938.

In 1939 it was suspected that he had accepted money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling.

56. *Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi.*

Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1880. Belongs to a well-known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with the chief permanent officials of his Ministry, and he resigned in September 1935. He became President of the Senate, February 1937, and was reappointed Minister for Education in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1937. He is president of the Bagdad branch of the Pen Club and has a considerable reputation as a man of letters. Resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i in December 1938.

57. *Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz.*

Bagdad mechanic. Born about 1898. Has recently come into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he always thrusts himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and has been especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Bagdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1933.

During the premiership of Yasin-al-Hashimi he was not allowed to agitate, but when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office in October 1936 Muhammad Salih became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League which was organised by Kamil Chadirji with a left-wing programme. His activities became so tiresome that in February 1937 he was sent to live in Ramadi, where he remained until December 1937, when he was released.

58. *Muhammad-al-Sadr, Saiyid.*

Born about 1885. An influential Shiah divine of Kadhimain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Feisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the

Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925 and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session, until February 1937, when Ridha-al-Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937 and again in December 1937 and June 1939.

59. *Musa Shabandar.*

Bagdadi Sunni, born 1899.

Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and has since been living in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin. Has frequently contributed anti-British articles to the Bagdad press, using the pen-name of "Alwan Abu Sharara."

Came to Bagdad in autumn of 1932, and in January 1933 was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations.

Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1935.

Early in 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain and recalled to Bagdad, where he was placed under arrest. In December proceedings against him were dropped and it seems doubtful whether there was ever any real evidence against him. Elected Deputy for Amarah December 1937.

Lost his seat in June 1939.

60. *Mustafa-al-Umari.*

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born 1893. Graduated in Law School in Bagdad just before the war. Served as an officer in the Turkish forces fighting in Mesopotamia during the war and was made a prisoner just before the fall of Bagdad. Returned to Iraq after the armistice and entered Government service. Since then he has served in the Waqf Department and in the Ministries of Finance and Interior. His posts include the following: kaimakam in several districts, Accountant General, Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior and mutessarif in a number of liwas. In 1936 he was appointed Mutessarif of the Muntafiq liwa and in June 1937 he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. He retained this portfolio in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in August 1937.

During the first half of 1938 he acquired a reputation for taking large bribes, and, though no allegations were proved, the Prime Minister thought it well to transfer him to another Ministry. He accordingly went to Justice in October 1938. In December 1938 he resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet after the military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said.

61. *Muzahim-al-Amin Pachahji.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimi Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of British politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931 and shortly after Minister for the Interior, in which post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the *Amin-al-Asimah*. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrate's court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October 1934 he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1935 he was relieved of his duties at Geneva.

62. *Dr. Naji-al-Asil.*

Bagdadi, born 1895. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became

destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi consul-general and Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. Appointed consul, Mohammerah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs April 1933. Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran April 1935.

In June 1936, while on leave in Bagdad, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the palace, and accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs when Hikmat Sulaiman formed his Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned with Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937, and was not included in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai.

A pleasant man of considerable intelligence.

63. *Naji Shaukat.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Sharif and was at Aqabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability, and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928, Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Muhsin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933, resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934. He accompanied Taufiq Rustu Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his official visit to Bagdad in the summer of 1937, and was then offered a Cabinet post in Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He declined because of his objection to Bakr Sidqi's influence.

Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939.

64. *Naji-al-Suwaidi.*

Born in Bagdad 1883. Educated at Bagdad and in the school of law at Constantinople. Speaks French and English. Public Prosecutor in the Yaman 1905; president of the Commercial Tribunal, Basra, 1908; member of the Bagdad Court of Appeal 1910; Kaimakam of Kadhmain 1910-11; of Najaf 1911; and of Hindiyah 1912; Civil Inspector for Diarbekr, Urfa and Mardin, 1913; Inspector for the Eastern Region (Adana to Mosul) 1915; Civil Inspector of the Adana Vilayet 1916, whence he was transferred to Konia; Civil Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior, Constantinople, 1917. Returned to Syria after the armistice and was appointed Deputy Military Governor of Bagdad, but resigned the appointment after a few days and returned to his former post in Aleppo. Returned to Bagdad in March 1921, and was active in the preparations for the reception of the Amir Feisal. Was appointed Minister of Justice in September 1921 and held the post till November 1923, having served for a short time also as Minister of Interior. Deputy for Bagdad in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924. He opposed the treaty and voted against it. Became Prime Minister in November 1929. His Cabinet resigned in March 1930. Re-elected for Bagdad in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931 as a protest against the alleged unconstitutional conduct of the Government. Accompanied King Feisal to Tehran in April 1932. Appointed Senator January 1933. Joined Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in February 1934 as Minister for Finance, and resigned with his colleagues in August 1934. He presided over the Arab Congress held at Bludan (Syria) in August 1937, to protest against the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine, and on returning to Iraq reorganised and strengthened the Palestine Defence League.

In 1938 he did useful work on Government committees.

65. *Nasrat-al-Farisi.*

Lawyer of Bagdad, born about 1890. In the early days of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years.

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Was relieved of this appointment in the summer of 1938 when it was decided to withdraw the Iraqi delegation from Geneva. He then returned to the Bar.

66. *Nishat-al-Sanawi.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. *Amin-al-Asimah*, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935.

Appointed Chief Finance Inspector, May 1936.

67. *Nuri-al-Said.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913, and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jedda in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angora with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil-al-Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a solution of the problem of the future of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

But for two short visits to Bagdad, Nuri-al-Said spent the whole of the year 1938 outside Iraq, occupied principally in desultory conversations about Palestine with politicians in Syria, Egypt and London. On each of his short visits to Bagdad his presence gave rise to rumours concerning his political intentions, but these died away as soon as he left.

In December 1938 he came back to stay, and a few days later a military demonstration in his favour organised by Taha-al-Hashimi and Husain Fauzi overthrow Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet and brought Nuri-al-Said into office as Prime Minister. He represented Iraq at the opening of the London conversations about Palestine in January 1939.

68. *Rashid Ali-al-Gilani.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul practised as a lawyer. In May 1921 he was appointed a judge in the Court of Appeal. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yasin-al-Hashimi, Naji-al-Suwaiti and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the *Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani* (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yasin-al-Hashimi.

After Bakr Sidqi's military revolt against the Hashimite Cabinet in October 1936, Rashid Ali fled to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937.

During 1938 he made several speeches in the Senate attacking the policy of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet.

Deported to Anah December 1938. Returned a few days later when Nuri-al-Said succeeded Jamil-al-Madfai as Prime Minister. Appointed chief private secretary to the Palace in January 1939, and remained in this post after King Ghazi's death in April 1939.

69. *Rashid-al-Khojah.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi consul-general at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-general, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general at Jedda, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shaukat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shaukat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfai. Reappointed Minister for Defence in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the

Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al-Madfai. Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in September 1937.

Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in January 1939.

70. *Rauf-al-Bahrani.*

A Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise, January 1938.

71. *Rauf-al-Chadirji.*

Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the law school August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Appointed Iraqi Minister in London in December 1936, and proceeded to his post early in 1937.

A cultured, likeable and intelligent man.

72. *Rauf-al-Kubaisi.*

Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kaimakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Auqaf in summer of 1933, and Director-General of Census in November 1937.

Mutessarif of Bagdad November 1938 and Director-General of Auqaf April 1939.

73. *Rustam Haidar.*

Shiah of Baalbak (Syria), where his family owns considerable estates. Born 1889. Well educated, speaks French and English. Pleasant mannered, quiet and well bred. He came to Iraq with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and after the coronation was appointed head of the King's diwan. Appointed Minister for Finance November 1930, in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Acted as Prime Minister twice during Nuri Pasha's absence from Iraq. Went to Europe with King Feisal in summer of 1931. Resigned from the Ministry of Finance when Nuri Pasha's Cabinet fell in October 1932. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and was reappointed to the same Ministry under Jamil Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, and returned to the Palace as Rais of the Royal diwan in November 1934.

Resigned in November 1936, when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office. Was offered the Iraqi Legation at Paris, but refused. He left Iraq for Syria in December 1936, but came back in November 1937.

Elected Deputy in December 1937 and played an active part in the Chamber during the sessions of 1937 and 1938. Became Minister for Finance in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said on the 25th December, 1938, Senator, April 1939.

74. *Sabih Najib.*

Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Bagdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syrio-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor, Berlin, June 1935. Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

Made Minister for Defence in October 1938. Resigned with the whole Jamil-al-Madfai Cabinet the 25th December, 1938.

75. *Sadiq-al-Bassam.*

Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1895. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School, and for several years practised as a lawyer. Deputy for Kut 1930-34. In the Chamber he gave steady support to Yasin Pasha, and was a member of the Ikha-al-Watani party. In June 1935, as a reward for his political services, he was appointed Director-General of Government Lands and Properties in the Ministry of Finance, and became Minister of Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935. Resigned in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Kut December 1937 and for Bagdad in June 1939.

76. *Said-bin-Ali.*

Mir (chief) of the Yazidis. Lives at Baidra near Mosul. Weak character, drinks heavily and indulges in every sort of vice. Much under the control of his mother, Maiyana, who is a woman of personality and was at one time a noted beauty. The Yazidis are dissatisfied with Said Beg on account of his profligate living, and from time to time there is a movement to depose him and substitute another member of the ruling family. So far, however, traditional loyalty has been strong enough to keep Said in his position.

77. *Said-al-Haji Thabit.*

Born Mosul 1883, Sunni. Merchant. Elected Deputy for Mosul 1925. Delegate to the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem 1931. Deputy 1933-34-35. Nationalist. He has taken a prominent part in all movements in Iraq in support of the Arabs in Palestine. President of the Palestine Defence Society which was particularly active in raising money for the Arabs of Palestine during the disorders of 1936. He attended the Bludan Arab Congress in August 1937.

Worked actively on behalf of the cause of the Arabs in Palestine throughout 1938. Elected Deputy for Mosul June 1939.

78. *Salman-al-Barrak.*

A tribal notable of Hillah, Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President.

79. *Salih Jabr.*

Young Shiah lawyer of Najaf employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfai November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in April 1935 where he proved successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Euphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil-al-Madfai formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Became Minister for Education in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938. Elected for Diwanayah June 1939.

80. *Sami Shaukat.*

Born Bagdad 1893. Sunni. Brother of Naji Shaukat. Graduated at Military College of Medicine, Constantinople, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director-General of Education. Became Director-General of Public Health in 1936. An ardent Arab Nationalist.

Appointed Director-General of Education in March 1939. He has done much to increase military education in the secondary schools.

81. *Shakir-al-Wadi.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1894. Brother of Jamil-al-Wadi. Served as an officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the Armistice. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Captain 1928. In 1929 he was attached for training to various units in England, and in 1930 he was promoted major and made aide-de-camp to King Feisal. He was on King Feisal's staff during His Majesty's State visit to England in 1933. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1935 and attended the Staff College course. Returned to Iraq 1936 and was appointed G.S.O.1 in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bakr Sidqi was the G.O.C. He was right hand man to Bakr in the military revolt of October 1936. He is intelligent, capable and ambitious and is one of the few officers in the army who are of good family, have a decent private life and presentable manners. After Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937 he was appointed military attaché in London, but a few weeks later he was dismissed and placed on the retired list.

Banished from Bagdad in December 1938 for intrigues against Jamil-al-Madfai's Government, but permitted to return in January 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had formed a Government. Appointed to the Iraqi diplomatic service in June 1939 as second secretary to the Iraqi Legation, Tehran.

82. *Taha-al-Hashimi.*

Brother of the late Yasin-al-Hashimi. Born 1888. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted *fariq* (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahiyah of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

He is popular with the British officers of the military mission. In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

He was in Angora in October 1936 when Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi forced Yasin-al-Hashimi to resign and wisely did not return to Iraq. He came back in September 1937 and was offered the post of Director-General of Works. He refused this offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to accept any position lower than that of Chief of the General Staff.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad in December 1937. Opposed Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in the Chamber. Worked actively on the committee of the Palestine Defence League in 1938. On the 25th December, 1938, in collaboration with General Husain Fauzi, he organised a military demonstration against Jamil-al-Madfai's Government, and became Minister for Defence in the Cabinet which Nuri-al-Said formed when Jamil-al-Madfai resigned. Became a Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939.

83. *Tahsin Qadri.*

Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Feisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the palace March 1932. Accompanied King Feisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1936 he was compelled to resign from the palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of Princess Azzah. He was later appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Tehran and took up his post in November 1936. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever.

Appointed Director of Ceremonies in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February 1939.

84. *Talib Mushtaq.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1900. Father was head clerk in Baquba. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931 when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Angora. Appointed Director of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937.

Withdrawn and dismissed from the service in February 1938. He remained for a time in Syria, but returned to Bagdad when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. Appointed Accountant-General in January 1939 and Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting in May 1939.

85. *Taufiq-al-Suwaidi.*

Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1913. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August. Held Cabinet office for twelve days as Minister for Justice in Jamil-al-Madfai's short-lived Cabinet in March 1935, and in October was appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937, and headed the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Palestinian questions with tact and moderation.

Again represented Iraq at the League of Nations in the autumn of 1938, and afterwards visited London as the guest of His Majesty's Government. There he had conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies about Palestine.

Resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet on the 25th December, 1938, as the result of a military demonstration made against them. Represented Iraq at the London conversations on Palestine in 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had returned to Iraq.

86. *Thabit Abdul Nur.*

Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikole. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Bagdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. His post was abolished in November 1936, and he remained without employment until December 1937, when he was appointed to the Iraqi Diplomatic Service.

Early in 1938 he was appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda. There he put forward a number of fantastic proposals to the Saudi Arabian Government.

for which he had been given no authority by the Iraqi Government. The Saudi Government soon detached the folly of his schemes and gave up taking him seriously. In December 1938 and January 1939 he was in Sanaa visiting the King of the Yemen.

87. *Umar Nazmi.*

Born Kifri 1893. Graduated at the Bagdad Law College 1913. Appointed Judge, Khaniqin 1913; Baqubah 1914; on the outbreak of the war joined the Reserve Officers' School and was named Public Prosecutor to the Military Court, Bagdad. Appointed Judge, Civil Courts, Kirkuk 1921; Arbil 1923; Kirkuk 1924; Vice-President, Civil Courts, Mosul 1924; Hillah 1925; President, Civil Courts, DIALA; Mutessarif of Kirkuk Liwa 1927, Mutessarif of Kut and Basra Liwas; Administrative Inspector 1931; Mutessarif of Mosul Liwa 1934.

Held other Government posts up to August 1937, when he was made to be Director-General of Revenues. Became a Minister of Economics and Communications in December 1938 in the Cabinet of Nuri-al-Said.

Made a Senator April 1939.

88. *Yusuf Ghanimah.*

An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; born abt. 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as *rapporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber. Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) and the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general-manager of the Agricultural-Industrial Bank in December 1936.

89. *Yusuf Iz-al-Din.*

Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurd of Sulaimani. Born Bagdad, 1891. Married to the daughter of Ali Agha of Sulaimani. Owns property in Bagdad, Amara and Sulaimani. Educated locally and entered the civil service in 1918. Graduated at the Law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934, Accountant-General June 1935. Appointed Minister of Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in October 1936. He resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and with Bakr Sidqi's influence over the Prime Minister.

Obituary.

The following persons included in the personalities for 1937 have died since January 1938:—

King Ghazi I.

Abdul Husain-bin-Ali-al-Hujaiji.

[E 4925/374/93]

No. 43.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 352 E.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, July 6, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 234 of the 29th June on the subject of the Iraqi Government's proposed four years' capital works programme, I have the honour to enclose a translation of the draft law in the form in which it has, I understand, been submitted to the Chamber of Deputies, together with a translation of the message which accompanied it.

2. The Bill has passed its first reading and is now being studied by the Finance Committee of the Chamber.

3. Provision is made for an expenditure of I.D. 10,945,000 (not I.D. 11,350,000, as stated in my telegram under reference) on capital works over the period 1939-42 inclusive, as against I.D. 8,230,000 authorised under the 1938 Capital Works Law for the five years 1938-42. In the message referred to above it is pointed out that, on the one hand, the increase was necessary in order to permit of the completion of works such as the Habbaniyah scheme and the Baiji-Tel Kotchek Railway extension, for which the funds already voted were insufficient, and, on the other, that it was made possible by the loan of I.D. 3 millions obtained from the oil companies. Including this sum, the total revenues on capital works account during the four years 1939-42 is estimated at I.D. 11,355,000, leaving a surplus over the proposed expenditure of I.D. 410,000.

4. As the programme may be modified before it is finally approved, I propose to comment only on certain of its details in so far as they have a bearing on the credits question. In this connexion the inclusion of I.D. 1 million for "Foreign Credits Service" under item 20 of Schedule (A) is especially interesting. The Minister of Finance has informed me that this item was inserted in the event of an agreement being reached on the original credit proposals, which would entail the repayment of a maximum of I.D. 500,000 in each of the years 1941 and 1942, and that it will be amended, if necessary, by the Finance Committee in accordance with the outcome of the present negotiations. He has also explained that the advance of I.D. 900,000 to the railways is to meet expenditure incurred in Iraq, and not the cost of materials purchased in the United Kingdom. He suggested that special legislation would be introduced to cover these purchases and any credits that might be arranged in connexion with them.

5. The financial requirements of the railways in relation to capital works have been discussed with Mr. Loggin. He states that the latest estimate for the total cost of the Baiji-Tel Kotchek Railway extension, including rolling-stock, is I.D. 3,102,300 (a reduction of I.D. 160,000 on the previous estimate) and that, of this amount, I.D. 2,192,300 is covered by existing legislation (Laws Nos. 39 and 47 of 1938), leaving I.D. 910,000 still to be authorised. In addition, the railways need authority to spend I.D. 226,000 on the metre-gauge system and nearly half of this sum would be used to purchase materials from the United Kingdom.

6. According to Mr. Loggin, the railways, however, require in all an advance of I.D. 1,440,000 from the Government to complete the above works. The Minister of Finance has apparently arrived at the figure of I.D. 900,000, which it is proposed under the four-year capital works programme to advance to the railways, by subtracting from the sum of I.D. 1,440,000 the amount of I.D. 540,000, which represents the commitments still outstanding in the United Kingdom and which he hopes will be included in the credits scheme. Mr. Loggin will endeavour to clarify the position with the Minister of Finance, in order to ensure that the total proposed expenditure of the railways on the Baiji-Tel Kotchek extension and the metre-gauge system would be fully covered by legislation.

7. During the course of his speech introducing the budget estimates in the Chamber of Deputies on the 3rd July, the Minister of Finance referred to the capital works programme, which, in addition to the usual oil royalties, was, he said, to be financed from the loan obtained from the oil companies, and also from credits which he hoped to secure very shortly from His Majesty's Government.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
J. S. SOMERS COCKS.

[21053]

M

Enclosure 1 in No. 43.

(Translation.)

Draft Capital Works of Development (Four Years' Programme) Law No. of 1939.

Article 1. A sum of 10,945,000 dinars is voted for expenditure, during the years 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942, on capital works of development, as set forth in Schedule (A) attached to this law.

Art. 2. Revenues for the years mentioned in the preceding article are estimated at 11,355,000 dinars, as set forth in Schedule (B) attached to this law.

Art. 3. The Minister of Finance may distribute the appropriations among the sub-votes under the various headings.

Art. 4. The Minister of Finance is empowered to distribute the estimate voted in article 1 above over the years mentioned therein, provided that the total allocations to the votes in any one year shall not exceed the total estimated receipts for that year.

Art. 5. The Minister of Finance is authorised to make the loans, set forth in votes 15, 16 and 17 of Schedule (A) attached to this law, in accordance with terms to be approved by the Council of Ministers, provided that the rate of interest shall not exceed 4 per cent. or be less than 3 per cent. per annum and the period for the redemption of these debts does not exceed twenty years.

Art. 6. The Minister of Finance may increase the allotment made for banks in proportion to any increase realised in Iraq Currency Board receipts.

Art. 7. The estimates voted under this law shall be regarded as forming a supplementary budget annexed to the general budget for the year to which they belong.

Art. 8. The Five Years' Capital Works Law No. 45 of 1938 is hereby repealed.

Art. 9. This law shall come into force with effect from the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 10. The Minister of Finance is charged with the execution of this law.

Annex to Enclosure in No. 43.

SCHEDULE (A).

Section.	Expenditure.	Dinars.
1.	Equipment and buildings for the army ...	2,200,000
2.	Irrigation works and bunds ...	1,640,000
3.	Roads ...	800,000
4.	Bridges ...	400,000
5.	Telegraph and telephone lines ...	165,000
6.	Buildings, hospitals, schools and museum ...	300,000
7.	Buildings, Government offices and institutions ...	300,000
8.	Village schemes ...	300,000
9.	Houses for junior Government officials and poor workmen ...	300,000
10.	Summer resorts ...	100,000
11.	Educational and athletic sports clubs ...	60,000
12.	Infant and maternity institutes ...	30,000
13.	Live-stock improvement and sheep-dipping ...	80,000
14.	Desert grazing grounds and artesian wells ...	100,000
15.	Loan for grain silos ...	200,000
16.	Loan for water, lighting, water supply and other municipal schemes ...	400,000
17.	Loans to the railways ...	900,000
18.	Oil refinery ...	750,000
19.	Banks ...	570,000
20.	Foreign credits service ...	1,000,000
	Total ...	10,945,000

SCHEDULE (B).

Section.	Receipts.	Dinars.
1.	Royalties from the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited)	5,040,000
2.	Royalties from the British Oil Development Company (Limited) ...	1,260,000
3.	Royalties from the Basra Petroleum Company ...	1,400,000
4.	Loan from the above three companies in accordance with agreement with them ...	3,000,000
5.	Treasury share of Currency Board profits ...	370,000
6.	Repayment of loans ...	85,000
7.	Proceeds of sale of Government real estate ...	200,000
	Total ...	11,355,000

Enclosure 2 in No. 43.

(Translation.)

Reasons advanced in Support of Capital Works of Development (Four Years' Programme) Law.

IT having been observed that the existing Capital Works Law was not consistent with the Cabinet's economic development and construction policy, as stated in their programme, and in view of the fact that the appropriations provided in the existing capital works programme are not sufficient for the completion of the works for which they are intended, such as the Habbaniyah scheme, the Tel Kotehek-Baiji Railway line, &c., it was considered necessary to draw up a revised four years' programme which will ensure the achievement of the desired objects and which will include revised allocations for the various works based on the actual cost of the works, and new projects, such as summer resorts, infant and maternity institutes, desert grazing grounds, the oil refinery, and educational and physical sports clubs, will be included. Such expansion in the programme was made possible by the loan of 3 million dinars obtained by the Treasury through the recent agreement concluded with the oil companies, which sum the Government decided to allot to the capital works budget.

[E 5620/474/93]

No. 44.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 418.)

Bagdad, July 29, 1939.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 417 of the 29th July on the subject of the request made to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs for my intervention to obtain for Akram Zuaiter a visa for Syria, I have the honour to report that I used the opportunity afforded by the minister's request to speak to his Excellency frankly and at some length on a matter which may be of considerable ultimate importance, that is, the persistent poisoning of the mind of the youth of this country with hostile ideas about Great Britain.

2. I told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it had caused me surprise and anxiety for the future of his country to discover that in the press and in the schools the history of the British association with Iraq was deliberately distorted. Young people were taught that Iraq had gained her freedom in a triumphant struggle against British oppression, and that only British imperialism now stood in the way of the rapid progress and development of the new Iraqi State. Nothing was said of the fact that it was Great Britain that had created Iraq out of three obscure provinces of the Ottoman Empire, given her national cohesion and set her up in the short space of ten years as an independent State member of the League of Nations. Nor was it ever made clear to the youth of the country

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that, but for the alliance with Great Britain, the liberty and independence newly gained by Iraq with our help might prove short-lived. The very existence of Iraq depended on Anglo-Iraqi friendship and co-operation, and yet the youth of the country (who would be its rulers in a few years) were being taught to believe that the essence of patriotism was enmity towards the one country which assured their independence. These young men, I said, would grow up and come into power with an utterly false understanding of their country's international position, and there was a grave danger that they would make political blunders that would jeopardise the whole future of the country. National education was an essential factor of national unity, but it was vital that a sound and not a false national doctrine should be taught in the schools, and that the fundamental importance of friendship and co-operation with Great Britain should be impressed upon the minds of Iraqi children and students.

3. The minister was rather taken aback by the emphasis and gravity of my remarks, but did not attempt to dispute the accuracy of what I had said concerning the nature of the ideas generally given to Iraqi children about Great Britain, or to deny the complete dependence of Iraq on the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance. He endeavoured, however, to argue that I was overstating the extent to which there was public ignorance of the facts of Iraq's international position, and claimed that all thinking people appreciated how much their country owed to Great Britain. I replied that I did not doubt that the facts were understood by his Excellency and his colleagues and men like them, with whom we were happy to maintain such excellent relations, but we must all have regard to our responsibilities for the future, and my point was that the realities of Iraq's history and of her future were being deliberately concealed from the youth, who were being filled during their most susceptible years with dangerously false doctrines.

4. I went on to speak of the need for care in sending students abroad for higher education. Students sent to the United Kingdom were never subjected to political influence by the British Government, but this was not the position in many countries. For example, in Germany it was part of the policy of the Government to subject all foreign students, and especially those from Arab countries, to intensive Nazi propaganda. For some time the Iraqi Government had been sending a number of students each year to Berlin. There they were persuaded to join political societies organised by the Nazis, and were encouraged to take part in political activities which, though nominally inspired by the ideals of Arab nationalism, were in fact aimed entirely at furthering German interests, and were in no way concerned with the cultural or moral development of the students themselves. Moreover, the leaders, who were employed to direct these activities among the Arab students, were, it seemed, often men of low character, whose influence could only be bad. I instanced the notorious Yunis Bahry (the Arabic announcer at the Berlin Radio Station), and said that I had drawn the attention of the Prime Minister to his activities among Arab students in Berlin. The Prime Minister had told me that, to the best of his knowledge, no new students were being sent to Berlin this year, and I sincerely hoped that his Excellency's information on this point was accurate.

5. The upshot of our talk was that the Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook to discuss my observations with the Minister of Education, but, although Ali Jaudat seemed impressed, I doubt whether much result will accrue. If your Lordship approves, I propose therefore to take such further opportunities as may occur from time to time to speak on similar lines. I hope, furthermore, that the propaganda which is now being developed by His Majesty's Government may find means of remedying in some measure the deficiencies of those responsible in Iraq for the education in foreign affairs of the youth of the country.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

[E 5724/72/93]

No. 45.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 436.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, August 8, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Iraqi Parliament was adjourned on the 7th August. The session will be continued early in October. In the meantime most of the Ministers intend to take a holiday, and the Prime Minister is planning a tour in the north with the Regent. The session began on the 12th June after a general election, and a great deal of business has been dealt with in two months' work.

2. Over forty laws have been passed through all the necessary stages, including the budget for 1939-40 and the Liwa Administration Law, a measure of first-class importance which aims at widespread decentralisation in the administration of the provinces. The law amending the Constitution, the present Government's principal scheme, will not be ready until Parliament meets again in October. The other chief laws enacted are set out in the enclosed schedule⁽¹⁾.

3. The Ministers seem confident of a quiet recess, and although one hears the usual stories of unrest here and there no indications of any impending political change are apparent. A revival of political activity may be expected when the out-of-office leaders return from summering in the Lebanon. Some distrust is felt at the rôle of Rashid Ali, the chief official at the court, who is an ambitious intriguer.

4. Apart from the usual whirlpools set up by personal enmities and ambitions, the main current in the political stream still flows from agitation about Palestine. The Prime Minister stands squarely for help and support for the Arabs of Palestine within the bounds imposed by his adherence to a policy of close friendship with His Majesty's Government. There are many, however, among whom Taha-al-Hashimi, the Minister of Defence, is conspicuous, who would rather that the Iraqi Government took up more actively and openly the cause of the Arabs in Palestine, even at the risk of damage to Anglo-Iraqi relations. The conflict of view which has existed regarding this question has threatened at times to divide the Cabinet, but up to the present the Prime Minister has continued to hold his team together. The Government have, however, incurred much criticism among the extremists for its moderate and correct policy both in regard to Palestine and Syria, and the enemies of the present Administration and of His Majesty's Government have exploited, and will continue to exploit, the situation to their advantage.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Alexandria, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo, and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 5995/474/93]

No. 46.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 273.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, August 25, 1939.

(R.) YOUR despatch No. 406, Secret.

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs called on 25th August and in the course of general discussion of situation they assured me that Iraqi Government were ready to (end of R) play their part as an ally and to issue a declaration of war. They had been given the requisite powers at a recent council of Ministers, but did not wish to act late in applying them, but equally they must not act too soon. They must rely on obtaining necessary advice from me. I beg, therefore, that I may be given timely instructions. Meanwhile, I have advised

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that they should declare war so soon as it is known for certain that war has been declared either by or against United Kingdom.

I had heard previously from British Military Mission that Ministry of Defence (General Tama) had been insistent on the view that Iraq could sufficiently discharge her obligations without declaration of war.

(Repeated to Alexandria, No. 36, for M.I.C.E.)

[E 5995/474/93]

No. 47.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 280.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 28, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 273 [of 25th August: Attitude of Iraqi Government]

(R.) Please convey to Iraqi Government an expression of my warm appreciation of their declaration. In view of sincere friendship between two countries and our common interest in resisting aggression, I did not doubt that Iraqi Government would honour their obligations to the full, but I greatly value their prompt and helpful assurance in this hour of grave decision. (End of R.)

2. I note that they propose to await advice from you before taking further action. This is quite right. Full and prompt instructions will, of course, be sent to you when necessary.

[E 6090/4342/93]

No. 48.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 463 E.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, August 21, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 352 E. of the 6th July, in which I transmitted a translation of a draft law in respect of the Iraqi Government's four years' capital works programme, I have the honour to enclose a translation of the law as finally approved and published in the Arabic edition of the *Official Gazette* on the 5th August under No. 37 of 1939.

2. The only material amendment made to the draft law is under the heading of "Equipment and Buildings for the Army," the vote for which has been increased from I.D. 2,200,000 to I.D. 2,390,000. This increase brings the total expenditure up to I.D. 11,135,000 against receipts estimated at I.D. 11,355,000, leaving a surplus of I.D. 220,000.

3. The Five Years' Capital Works Law, No. 45 of 1938 (see Sir Maurice Peterson's despatch No. 238 E. of the 28th May, 1938) has been repealed. That law authorised an expenditure of I.D. 8,230,000 over the years 1938-42. Assuming that the amount allotted to the years 1939-42 would be 80 per cent. of the total, or I.D. 6,580,000, the expenditure over the latter period has been increased by I.D. 4,552,000, which is covered, except for I.D. 112,000, by new revenue in the form of the I.D. 3 million loan from the oil companies and the dead rent for the Basra oil concession amounting to I.D. 1,400,000 over the years 1939-42. The remaining items on the revenue side are:—

	I.D.
Iraq Petroleum Company royalties	5,040,000
British Oil Development royalties	1,260,000
Currency Board profits	370,000
Repayment of loans	85,000
Proceeds of the sale of Government property	200,000

4. As regards expenditure, the chief item is the appropriation of I.D. 2,390,000 for the Ministry of Defence, to which reference has already been made. The importance attached to the development of irrigation is illustrated by the larger vote under this head as compared with that in the 1938 five years' programme—I.D. 1,640,000 as against I.D. 1,080,000. Of the former sum, I.D. 880,000 will be required for the Habbaniya Escape to be constructed by Messrs. Balfour, Beatty and Co.

5. In the field of communications, roads and bridges have been allotted I.D. 800,000 and I.D. 400,000 respectively, both figures indicating an appreciable expansion on the programme approved in 1938. It appears that the Government have at last decided to create a competent department to supervise and carry out road construction, and not to appoint a foreign firm to undertake this work (see my letter of the 29th July, 1939, to Mr. C. W. Baxter). Most of the sum of I.D. 165,000 voted for the telephone and telegraph service will be spent on the Bagdad Automatic Telephone Exchange, the equipment for which is being supplied by the General Electric Company (Limited). Tenders for the cables and accessories required have recently been invited, and it is hoped that this contract will also be awarded to a United Kingdom firm.

6. The appropriation for buildings is I.D. 1,100,000 (as against I.D. 980,000 in the 1938 five years' programme), and of the former sum I.D. 800,000 will be devoted to hospitals, schools and museums. The increased expenditure in this respect reflects the declared policy of the Iraqi Government to improve the social services and to raise the standard of living, which is further illustrated by the large sums voted for village improvement schemes (I.D. 300,000), houses for workmen and junior Government officials (I.D. 300,000), educational and sports clubs (I.D. 60,000) and infant and maternity institutes (I.D. 80,000), and amounting in all to I.D. 840,000. The total vote under these heads in the 1938 five-year programme was only I.D. 90,000.

7. In pursuance of the Government's policy of developing the pastoral industry, I.D. 80,000 has been voted for the improvement of live-stock and I.D. 100,000 for the improvement of desert grazing lands, including the construction of artesian wells. Grain silos are included in the four-year programme with an allocation of I.D. 200,000. The 1938 five-year programme included a loan to the Port Administration of I.D. 400,000, I.D. 350,000 of which was intended for the construction of a silo at Basra. The reduced amount authorised for this purpose in the revised programme may be attributed to the Minister of Finance, who is understood firmly to hold the view that a much smaller silo than that under consideration would be adequate for local needs. (According to an estimate submitted by Messrs. Henry Simon (Limited) to the Iraqi Government at the latter's request, the cost of the silo of the capacity hitherto proposed would exceed I.D. 600,000.)

8. The proposed State oil refinery appears in the Government's public works programme for the first time, the expenditure authorised in this respect being I.D. 750,000. It remains to be seen, however, whether this project will be carried into effect, as it offers many problems which previous Governments have apparently found too difficult to solve.

9. As explained in paragraph 6 of my despatch under reference, the sum of I.D. 900,000 to be lent to the Railways Administration will bring the total authorised advances against the cost of the Baiji-Tel Kotchek extension to I.D. 3,092,300, or only I.D. 10,000 short of the final estimated cost. The Railways Administration will, therefore, be able to proceed with the extension without any risk of being criticised, as hitherto, for undertaking heavy expenditure without proper authority.

10. Most of the appropriation of I.D. 370,000 for banks will presumably be used to extend the activities of the Industrial and Agricultural Bank, while at least I.D. 50,000 is no doubt earmarked for the Government's share in the capital of the proposed National Bank (see my despatch No. 451 E. of the 14th August).

11. The development of electricity supply and other services in the provinces is reflected in the loans amounting to I.D. 400,000 to be granted to municipalities.

12. Finally, provision is made for the payment of I.D. 1 million by way of "Foreign Credit Services." As it is understood that the Iraqi Government will suggest that the credits, which they have accepted from His Majesty's Government, should be repaid in annual instalments of I.D. 400,000, including interest, the sum mentioned would suffice for two and a half years' redemption on this basis.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

Enclosure in No. 48.

Translation from Al Waqayah-al-Iraqiyah, dated August 5, 1939.

Capital Works of Development (Four-Year Programme) Law No. 37 of 1939.

WITH the approval of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, we hereby order the enactment of the following law:—

Article 1. A sum of 11,135,000 dinars is voted for expenditure, during the financial years 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942, on capital works of development, as set forth in Schedule (A) attached to this law.

Art. 2. Revenues for the years mentioned in the preceding articles are estimated at 11,355,000 dinars, as set forth in Schedule (B) attached to this law.

Art. 3. The Minister of Finance may distribute the appropriations among the sub-votes under the various headings.

Art. 4. The Minister of Finance is empowered to distribute the estimate voted in article 1 above over the years mentioned therein, provided that the total allocations to the votes in any one year shall not exceed the total estimated receipts for that year.

Art. 5. The Minister of Finance is authorised to make the loans, set forth in votes 15, 16 and 17 of Schedule (A) attached to this law, in accordance with terms to be determined by the Council of Ministers, provided that the rate of interest shall not exceed 4 per cent. or be less than 2 per cent. per annum, and the period for the redemption of these loans does not exceed twenty years.

Art. 6. The Minister of Finance may increase the allotment made for banks in proportion to any increase realised in Iraq Currency Board receipts.

Art. 7. The estimates voted under this law shall be regarded as forming a supplementary budget annexed to the General Budget for the year to which they belong.

Art. 8. The Five Years' Capital Works Law No. 45 of 1938 is hereby repealed.

Art. 9. This law shall come into force with effect from the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 10. The Minister of Finance is charged with the execution of this law.

Done at Bagdad this 3rd day of August, 1939.

SCHEDULE (A).

Expenditure.

Section.	Dinars.
1. Equipment and buildings for the army	2,390,000
2. Irrigation works and bunds	1,640,000
3. Roads	800,000
4. Bridges	400,000
5. Telegraph and telephone lines	165,000
6. Buildings—hospitals, schools and museums	800,000
7. Buildings—Government offices and institutions	300,000
8. Village schemes	300,000
9. Houses for junior Government officials and for workmen	300,000
10. Summer resorts	100,000
11. Educational and athletic sports clubs	60,000
12. Infant and maternity institutes	80,000
13. Livestock improvement and sheep-dipping	80,000
14. Desert grazing grounds and artesian wells	100,000
15. Loan for grain silos	200,000
16. Loan for water-lighting, water supply and other municipal schemes	400,000
17. Loans to the railways	900,000
18. Oil refinery	750,000
19. Banks	370,000
20. Foreign credits service	1,000,000
Total	11,135,000

SCHEDULE (B).

Receipts.

Section.	Dinars.
1. Royalties from the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited)	5,040,000
2. Royalties from the British Oil Development Company (Limited)	1,260,000
3. Royalties from the Basra Petroleum Company	1,400,000
4. Loan from the above three companies in accordance with agreement with them	3,000,000
5. Treasury share of Currency Board profits	370,000
6. Repayment of loans	85,000
7. Proceeds of sale of Government real estate	200,000
Total	11,355,000

[E 6145/474/93]

No. 49.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 288.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, August 29, 1939.

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 280.

I conveyed your message to Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs on 29th August (end of R), but regret that this did not prevent them from subsequently raising the question as to whether formal declaration of war would be necessary. They explained that all their colleagues were unanimously in favour of doing everything necessary as an ally under treaty, but some of them doubted whether this required a declaration of war, pointing out that Iraq would, in consequence, be excluded from Saadabad Pact (presumably article 6 is meant that, on this question, it was proposed to consult Egypt, which was in the same position as Iraq, and might not wish to declare war if Italy were neutral).

I made my opinion clear to the Prime Minister that if the Iraqi Government refrained from a declaration of war, they would be going back on his previous assurances, which had been given with the authority of his colleagues. Whether legally necessary or not, it was obviously most desirable that the Iraqi Government should make its position clear and regular in the eyes of the world and not give a handle for every kind of intrigue and German propaganda by omitting to declare war. As the Iraqi Government would, in fact, be at war, it was important to allow no ambiguity, while the absence of a declaration might also hamper them in taking necessary war measures.

Prime Minister emphasised that all the obligations of Iraq under Ministry of State would be faithfully fulfilled, and said that he was himself in favour of a formal declaration of war, but there was, however, this doubt whether a declaration was necessary or not, to which I reiterated that, in any case, it was obviously desirable from every point of view. I gathered that the notorious Rashid [group undecipherable] was one of those who wished to hedge, and will get in touch with him. I feel, however, that the attitude of Egypt will probably prove decisive. Prime Minister informed me that on the outbreak of war he proposed to make a public pronouncement which would leave the position of Iraq as an ally of Great Britain in no doubt. I suggest he should, meanwhile, give public opinion such guidance as he could in advance.

(Repeated to Alexandria, No. 37.)

[E 6449/474/93]

No. 50.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 296.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 288.

Bagdad, August 30, 1939.

(R.) British legal adviser to Ministry for Foreign Affairs has explained to me that (end of R) definition of aggression both in Saadabad Pact and in Treaty of Arab Brotherhood (with Saudi Arabia and Yemen) includes "declaration of war." He has therefore suggested to Minister for Foreign Affairs that position under these two instruments may be eased if, instead of communicating a formal declaration of war to German Government, it were merely announced that a state of war existed between Iraq and Germany. If Iraqi Government attach importance to such a distinction without a difference, there is perhaps no reason why we should object.

On the other hand, I saw the Regent 30th August in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and had the impression that Iraqi Government now appreciated more clearly importance of making declaration of war in order to leave their position in no doubt from outset.

French Chargé d'Affaires [?] was asked by Minister for Foreign Affairs on 30th August to let his Government know that Iraqi Government would fully honour their obligations towards Great Britain.

(Repeated to Alexandria, No. 39.)

[E 6149/474/93]

No. 51.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 293.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 1, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 288 and 296 [of 29th and 30th August: Attitude of Iraqi Government in the event of war].

As you will have seen from Alexandria telegram No. 482 [of 30th August], Egyptian Government merely intend to announce that a state of war exists between Egypt and Germany, which was form used in 1914. Proposal to that effect was made by Egyptian Prime Minister, who felt it would be presumptuous for Egypt to declare war on Germany. It was considered acceptable by His Majesty's Government, since essential point is that *as soon as* United Kingdom and Germany are at war, Egyptian Government should, in whatever manner they prefer, publicly announce that they are also at war with Germany.

2. Iraqi Government may certainly act similarly if this is easier for them.

3. I do not wish to raise legal points at this time, but, apart from fact that terms of Arab and Saadabad Pacts cannot release Iraqi Government from their earlier obligations to His Majesty's Government under 1930 treaty, it is specifically stated in Arab Pact that it does not prejudice the undertakings of Iraq in the 1930 treaty. Moreover, it is specifically stated in both pacts that action taken in enforcement of article 16 of the League Covenant, in pursuance of decision emanating from League Assembly or Council, or in application of article 15, paragraph 7, of Covenant, or assistance to State subjected to attack, &c., contrary to Kellogg Pact, do not constitute act of aggression. Whatever exact position under League procedure may be, Iraqi Government, in fulfilling their obligations to His Majesty's Government, who in their turn were coming to assistance of Poland, would certainly be acting in spirit of their obligations under Covenant. Moreover, if assistance is given to Poland it will be because she has been attacked in violation of Kellogg Pact. Should any other signatory seek to argue that Iraqi action entitled them to denounce Saadabad or Arab Pacts, it should therefore be open to Iraqi Government to argue that this was unfounded.

(Repeated to Alexandria, No. 571.)

[E 6252/474/93]

No. 52.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 301.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Bagdad, September 2, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 288, last paragraph.

Prime Minister broadcast statement Iraq's attitude last night. He expressed sympathy Poland and condemned policy based force, threatening existence small States like Iraq. Iraq supported policy based justice and negotiation peaceful settlement disputes. He defined Iraq's attitude as governed by Treaty Alliance Great Britain, and read article 4 in full. He said Iraq's obligations would not extend beyond facilitating British communications within Iraq. Iraq not obliged to participate conflict, but if attacked, would defend herself. He warned public against foreign propaganda in Iraq in event of war.

[E 6262/474/93]

No. 53.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 310.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, September 3, 1939.

(En clair.) YOUR Most Immediate war telegram of to-day.

I have informed Prime Minister, who authorised me to reply that Iraqi Government would do their utmost in accordance with Treaty of Alliance. Iraq did not forget what they owed to Great Britain. (End of *en clair*.)

State [? of war] with Germany will probably be announced after Council of Ministers on 4th September.

[E 6291/735/25]

No. 54.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 5.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 108. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Bagdad, August 26, 1939.*

JEDDA despatch No. 122.

Prime Minister expressed to me this morning uneasiness regarding the attitude of Saudi Arabia towards Iraq. He said that two days ago he received information that Ibn Saud was concentrating and arming troops at Riyadh. He would not regard such a development with serious apprehension unless foreign (*i.e.*, German and Italian) personnel were to be recruited to assist in the process (see in this connexion my despatch No. 458).

General Nuri said that for the past week the German broadcasts had been flattering and encouraging Ibn Saud. Nuri explained that he quite appreciated that Ibn Saud was friendly to Great Britain, but he feared that, nevertheless, Ibn Saud might attack one of the Hashimite family.

He alleged that two of Ibn Saud's "Syrian advisers"—Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin—were in indirect but close touch with German elements, including German Minister here, Dr. Grobba, through various Syrians in other places, such as Iraq, Germany and Italy.

Prime Minister also expressed fears of Iran's intentions towards Iraq, especially in regard to the still undelineated frontier.

(Repeated to Jedda and Tehran (in figures by air mail).)

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 480 E.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, August 25, 1939.

WITH reference to Sir Maurice Peterson's despatch No. 225 E. of the 20th May, 1938, I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the budget estimates of the Iraqi Government for the financial year 1939-40, as extracted from the Budget Law, No. 30 of 1939, which was recently passed by the Iraqi Parliament. A translation of the law will be forwarded when it is published in the English version of the *Official Gazette*.

2. The estimates were originally submitted to Parliament in February last, I.D. 5,712,000 being then allowed for revenue and I.D. 5,771,900 for expenditure. Parliament was, however, dissolved before they could be considered. Revised and higher estimates were submitted on the 17th June during the extraordinary sessions, but it was not until the 31st July that they were finally approved, after being further amended in an upward sense. Meanwhile, ordinances were issued each month to keep the 1938-39 budget in force.

3. The final estimates for the year 1939-40 are the highest recorded in Iraq, provision being made for revenue at I.D. 6,033,000, and expenditure at I.D. 5,994,632, with an estimated surplus of I.D. 38,368. Compared with the corresponding actual results (provisional) for the year 1938-39, the first two figures represent increases of I.D. 346,950 and I.D. 501,367 respectively. Although trade conditions continue to be unfavourable, it is not unlikely that the estimated surplus will be realised, as additional revenue has been created by new or increased taxation and the estimates of receipts are understood to have been conservatively prepared as in past years. In the latter connexion it is noteworthy that the net ordinary revenue, realised after deducting ordinary expenditure, has averaged I.D. 656,500 during the past four years, the figure for 1938-39 (a year of trade recession) being I.D. 193,000.

4. For convenience of reference, comparative figures of the budget estimates for the year 1938-39 and of the actual revenue and expenditure for that year have been added to the summary of the 1939-40 estimates mentioned above.

5. As regards revenue, the chief item is customs and excise, which is expected to yield I.D. 3,398,000, or I.D. 98,000 more than the 1938-39 estimate and I.D. 148,000 more than the amount actually obtained in 1938-39. The original estimate for customs receipts was nearly 5 per cent. lower than last year, as it was necessary to allow for the shrinkage in imports, but the final figure shows a slight increase over last year's estimate as a result of a revision of a section of the customs tariff and an additional duty on petrol. The revenue from a new excise tax on locally-made cigarettes is placed at I.D. 50,000, which is considered in the trade to be less than a quarter of the probable yield in a full year. The estimates for land and income taxes and stamp duties exceed by I.D. 114,000 those provided in the budget for the year 1938-39, mainly owing to an additional property tax and to an increase in income tax conservatively estimated to produce I.D. 80,000. A reduction of I.D. 47,000 is, on the other hand, anticipated in animal and produce taxes, as certain concessions have been made under this heading. The abolition of bridge tolls throughout the country is largely compensated for by a further tax on petrol. In 1938-39 posts and telegraphs showed an increase of I.D. 16,500 over their budgetary provision; an additional I.D. 30,000 is envisaged in the current year. Miscellaneous and Departmental receipts (chapters III and VI) are expected to rise respectively by I.D. 60,000 and I.D. 114,000, as compared with the 1938-39 estimates.

6. All the Ministries have contributed to the increase in the total authorised expenditure, the Ministry of Defence heading the list with I.D. 131,000, making the appropriation for that Ministry I.D. 1,685,000, or more than double that of any other Ministry. The Government's desire to improve educational facilities is revealed in the appreciably larger vote for the Ministry of Education—I.D. 821,950, as against I.D. 708,056. The pensions and gratuities appropriation is higher by I.D. 47,000, which includes the compensation of I.D. 20,000 to be paid to Mr. Monck-Mason's dependents (see my telegram No. 264 of the 4th August). The parliamentary vote has been increased by I.D. 40,000, owing to the fact that two sessions will be held during the year instead of one. Other increases of interest are I.D. 23,000 for the Health Services and I.D. 35,000 for the Public Works and Irrigation Departments.

7. A novel feature of the budget estimates is the provision made for the division of the Ministry of Economics and Communications into two separate Ministries—Economics, on the one hand, and Communications and Works on the other. A list of the departments coming under each of the new Ministries is enclosed. Saiyid Omar Nadhmi, who was Minister of Economics and Communications before the reconstruction, has been given the portfolio of Minister of Communications and Works, and is also acting as Minister of Economics pending the appointment of the new Minister. Mr. O. N. Loggin, the adviser to the old Ministry, has so far been made adviser to the Ministry of Communications and Works only. When referring to the reconstruction during the discussion of the budget in Parliament, the Minister of Finance stated that it would facilitate the work and help to improve the efficiency of departments primarily concerned with the development of the country. He also mentioned that the Government had under consideration further reorganisation, which included the establishment of an independent Ministry of Health.

8. The position of the Government accounts when they were closed on the 31st March last was as follows, according to published figures:—

	I.D.
Ordinary revenue	5,686,050
Less ordinary expenditure	5,493,265
Surplus	192,785
Add revenue on capital works account	2,037,458
	2,230,243
Less expenditure on capital works account	2,249,918
Deficit	— 19,675

The Minister of Finance pointed out, however, in his budget speech that there was a net deficit of about I.D. 150,000 for the year 1938-39, bringing the total net accumulated deficit up to some I.D. 850,000. The Director-General of the Ministry of Finance has since confirmed that the final figures for that year, those given above being provisional, will show a net deficit of approximately I.D. 150,000.

9. I am informed confidentially that at the beginning of August the Iraqi Government had a small overdraft at the Eastern Bank, through which their accounts are paid, the full amount due in respect of oil royalties accruing up to the 30th June and the first £500,000 instalment of the £8 million loan from the oil companies having been spent. Ordinary receipts during the current month are, however, expected more or less to cover ordinary expenditure. As regards capital works expenditure, the Iraqi Government have indicated their willingness to accept the credits offered by His Majesty's Government in respect of the railway commitments in the United Kingdom, while the payment of the second instalment of the oil loan on the 1st September should provide sufficient cash to enable the Government to liquidate the pending local obligations and to proceed with their four-years' capital works programme, on which I reported in my despatch No. 463 E. of the 21st August. The stringency, which has been a feature of Iraqi finances for some time past, should therefore tend to disappear after the end of the current month.

10. I am forwarding separate despatches regarding the budget estimates of the Railway Administration, the Directorate of the Port of Basra and the Fao Bar Dredging Service. These estimates, though included in the Budget Law, are kept separate from the main budget of the State.

11. The Budget Law also contains the estimates for the Iraqi Currency Board, the receipts being assessed at I.D. 130,000 and expenditure at I.D. 72,666. Of the latter sum I.D. 60,000 represents the Board's contribution to the Iraqi Government and will be credited to capital works account.

12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
BASIL NEWTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 55.

Summary of the Iraqi Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1939-40, together with Comparative Figures of the Estimates and Actuals (Provisional) for the Year 1938-39.

	Estimates 1939-40. I.D.	Estimates 1938-39. I.D.	Actuals April 1, 1938 to March 31, 1939 I.D.
I. Pensions and Gratuities ...	225,900	178,500	190,353
II. Civil List ...	54,280	58,000	58,058
III. Parliament ...	91,718	51,883	41,686
IV. Comptroller and Auditor-General ...	8,950	8,950	8,638
V. Council of Ministers ...	12,202	12,830	12,582
VI. Ministry for Foreign Affairs ...	98,490	90,810	76,738
VII. Ministry of Finance ...	331,411	317,530	323,479
VIIA. Customs and Excise ...	189,230	182,250	178,747
VIII. Ministry of Interior ...	464,155	446,765	482,699
VIIIA. Iraq Police ...	623,514	636,314	669,218
VIIIB. Health Services ...	374,990	351,520	338,044
IX. Ministry of Defence ...	1,685,600	1,554,300	1,591,469
X. Ministry of Justice ...	157,840	147,410	147,903
XA. Tapu Department and Land Registration ...	75,652	38,290 ⁽¹⁾	38,990
XI. Ministry of Education ...	821,930	708,056	686,493
XII. Ministry of Economics ...	44,980	25,350	70,063
XIIA. Agriculture and Veterinary Departments ...	111,750	93,410	94,672
XIII. Ministry of Communications and Works ...	71,890	50,370	...
XIIIA. Public Works Department ...	211,800	193,300	...
XIIIB. Irrigation Department ...	132,305	116,655	279,074
XIIIC. Posts and Telegraphs ...	206,045	207,320	204,360
Total ...	5,994,632	5,469,813	5,493,265

Receipts.

I. Taxation on Agricultural and Natural Produce, Animals, and Rents of Government Properties ...	889,500	936,800	923,409
II. Property Tax, Income Tax and Stamp Duty ...	665,000	551,000	593,559
III. Miscellaneous Revenues ...	276,500	216,950	255,466
IV. Customs and Excise ...	3,398,000	3,300,000	3,249,804
V. Posts and Telegraphs ...	295,000	265,300	281,819
VI. Other Government Services and Institutions ...	509,000	395,440	381,993
Total ...	6,033,000	5,665,490	5,686,050

⁽¹⁾ Tapu Department only.

⁽²⁾ Included under XII.

Enclosure 2 in No. 55.

Departments under the Ministry of Economics:—

1. Agricultural Department.
2. Veterinary Department.
3. Department of Commerce and Statistics.
4. Department of Industry and Minerals.
5. Oil Department.

Departments under the Ministry of Communications and Works:—

1. Iraq State Railways.
2. Port.
3. River Navigation Department.
4. Posts, Telegraphs, Telephones and Wireless Department.
5. Public Works Departments.
6. Irrigation Department.
7. Survey Department.

[E 6334/77/93]

No. 56.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 318.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Bagdad, September 6, 1939.

GERMAN Minister was informed, 5th September, that he and staff must leave Iraq within twenty-four hours, and arrangements have been made for their departure this afternoon for Beirut. It is hoped that an Italian or Greek or other ship will be available there for their further journey, but if delay would be excessive, French authorities may apply for permission for them to embark at Alexandria. Iraq Minister for Foreign Affairs has also instructed Iraq Minister in Berlin to ask for his passports.

Enemy nationals of military age or otherwise dangerous are to be interned, and the others allowed to depart by whatever route is convenient.

[E 6341/474/93]

No. 57.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 319.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, September 6, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Despite my constant efforts to keep the Iraqi Government up to the mark and the valuable help received from His Majesty's Ambassador and the secretary at Alexandria, there has been so much shilly-shallying about enemy nationals and declaration of war, that I waited to telegraph until decisions in my telegram No. 318 were confirmed to me on 6th September to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Although I believe that these two Ministers have been sincere in their intention to announce state of war, Government have now asked, before doing so, for assurances on certain points. I will telegraph further when their note has been translated, but doubt whether their declaration of war is now of much importance. Rupture of relations with Germany is being made public to-day.

British Military Mission and British advisers are satisfied that, despite hesitation in announcing state of war, Iraqi Government are, generally speaking, acting up to their obligations in the spirit as well as in the letter. Prime Minister seemed disappointed that no notice has been taken abroad of his broadcast reported in my telegram No. 301. I suggested that some more definite pronouncement, such as declaration of war, was probably being awaited.

(Repeated to Alexandria, No. 145.)

[E 6350/474/93]

No. 58.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 321.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 319, paragraph 2.

Assurances requested are:—

Bagdad, September 7, 1939.

1. That proclamation of state of war by Iraq will not involve the Iraqi Government in any additional obligations.
2. That His Majesty's Government will ensure the safety of Iraq if it is attacked by any other State.
3. That His Majesty's Government will, if necessary, assist the Iraqi Government financially if, owing to proclamation of state of war, Iraq has to take immediate steps to strengthen her army at a cost which might be too heavy for her and might cause an economic crisis here.
4. That Iraq shall have a voice in the final peace negotiations.
5. That Great Britain and France will duly consider "rights" of Arab States to whom the two Powers previously guaranteed liberty and independence, especially since they have both now in war espoused the cause of liberty and independence of the nation.

Comment follows.

(Repeated to Alexandria, No. 46 (please pass to M.E.I.C. with my telegrams Nos. 318 and 319 to Foreign Office).)

[E 6352/474/93]

No. 59.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 322.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY immediately preceding telegram and my telegram No. 319.

View of reliable source in touch with Iraqi Government is that the present emergency has not as yet done much to unite them. Government opponents would make political capital if it could be represented that Iraq had gone beyond her treaty of obligation. A further factor may be the attitude of younger army officers, to whom the word war conjures up vague and alarming possibilities.

As the Iraqi Government has shown so strong a desire to limit its commitments, we are the better entitled to limit ourselves and let them have a taste of their own medicine, e.g., if they wanted help to meet [group undecipherable] agency of oil royalties or help [? word omitted] than military credits already promised, we should be entitled to hesitate and bargain. At the same time we do not want to antagonise the country or weaken the case, so I suggest that whatever the substance of our reply may be, our professions should be as friendly as those of Iraqi Government have consistently been.

(Repeated to Alexandria, No. 47 (please pass to me, Ibrashi).)

[E 6353/474/93]

No. 60.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 324.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 323, last sentence.

Bagdad, September 7, 1939.

Regent is telegraphing direct to express the unshakable attachment of the Government and people of Iraq to the letter and spirit of the alliance "uniting our two countries," and to assure His Majesty of the firm determination of Iraq to do all in its power to co-operate accordingly with its great Ally until lofty principles for which Great Britain has entered into war shall prevail.

Immediately on receipt of reply it is proposed to publish exchange of telegrams in Bagdad.

I trust that due publicity and recognition will also be promptly accorded to this gesture at home in the press, but above all in the wireless, which is the only news received here at all quickly from abroad.

[E 6386/474/93]

No. 61.

His Royal Highness Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq, to His Majesty The King.—(Received September 8.)(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**September 7, 1939.*

IN the present grave international situation the duties of friendship, and the honourable discharge of our obligations, make it incumbent upon me to express to your Majesty our unshakable attachment Government and people alike to the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Alliance uniting us, and to assure you of our firm determination to do everything in our power in the same spirit to co-operate with our great ally until right and justice and the lofty principles to defend which you have entered the war shall prevail.

[E 6386/474/93]

No. 62.

His Majesty The King to His Royal Highness Amir Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq, Bagdad, Iraq.(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**September 8, 1939.*

I WAS deeply moved to receive your Royal Highness's telegram expressing the unshakable resolve of the Government and people of Iraq to co-operate with my Government in accordance with the treaty which unites us. The action of the Iraqi Government is a further proof, if proof were needed, of the sincere and lasting friendship between our two peoples. My Government much appreciate the encouragement which your message brings to them in their task of resisting the forces of aggression, and I assure your Royal Highness that if ever the horrors of war were to descend upon Iraq, my Government would carry out their obligations in the same spirit of loyalty and resolution.—GEORGE R.I.

[E 6353/474/93]

No. 63.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 322.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 9, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 321-324 [all of 7th September: Anglo-Iraqi Alliance].

Hesitation shown by Iraqi Government is disappointing, but I agree with you that His Majesty's Government must make allowances and respond to action which Iraq has, in fact, taken in as friendly a fashion as possible.

2. Furthermore, conduct such as toleration of British forces on Iraqi territory in time of war, to say nothing of further measures taken by Iraqi Government, such as internment and deporting German nationals, together with exchange of telegrams between The King and the Regent, is of so unneutral a character as to mean that for all practical purposes a state of war between Iraq and Germany must and does exist. An actual declaration by Iraqi Government to this effect has always been desired more for its moral than its practical results, and, so far as Iraq alone is concerned, there is now no need to insist on declaration, provided always that Iraqi Government can, as things are, take any further measures (such as prohibiting trading with Germany) which may be necessary for efficient prosecution of war.

[21053]

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3. It is, however, necessary to avoid doing anything in respect of Iraq which would be clearly at variance with corresponding action in respect of Egypt. Alexandria telegrams which have been repeated to you explain Egyptian position. Until this is cleared up, I should prefer you to say nothing which will make Sir M. Lampson's task more difficult, and what you say then will have to depend on whether Egyptian Government do or do not make a declaration.

4. If there is an Egyptian declaration, this may encourage Iraqi Government to act likewise. In that case, I propose that you should, unless you see strong objection, make to Iraqi Prime Minister in whatever manner you think best a communication on lines of my telegram No. 323 [of 9th September].

5. If there is no Egyptian declaration, you should, unless you see strong objection, act similarly on lines of my telegram No. 324 [of 9th September].

6. If Iraqi Government are unwilling to make a declaration, notwithstanding Egyptian example, you may take the line that His Majesty's Government will regret this decision, but that as it can make no practical difference, you have their authority to accept the position.

7. I should explain that in this case position will, in fact, be that His Majesty's Government will continue to act as if Iraq were a belligerent, *i.e.*, absence of declaration will make no difference to use which His Majesty's Government will make of Iraqi territory or to the measures which they will expect Iraqi Government to take over such matters as trading with enemy.

8. I leave it to your discretion whether to say this in so many words at present. You may think it better to take things for granted and act as if full Iraqi co-operation were a matter of course, as I have no doubt it will be.

9. As regards point (5), which presumably relates to Palestine, you will appreciate that His Majesty's Government cannot enter into any argument or give any further undertaking as the price of an Iraqi declaration. Neither can they make any admissions. The answer must inevitably therefore be terse and categorical.

10. Communications already referred to are non-committal about further assistance over military credits, &c. Attitude of His Majesty's Government towards such requests (which on financial grounds alone it will be exceedingly difficult to meet) must depend on conduct of Iraq in coming months.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 322. Repeated to Alexandria, No. 626.)

[E 6353/474/93]

No. 64.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 323.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 9, 1939.

COMMUNICATION referred to in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 322 [of 9th September] would be identical with that given in my telegram No. 324 [of 9th September], with the substitution of the following alternative texts for paragraphs 4 and 5:—

"4. Seeing, however, that Egyptian Government have now made a declaration, His Majesty's Government are most anxious that Iraqi Government shall do likewise in order that there may be no misunderstanding as to Iraq's position; and they earnestly hope that Iraqi Government will agree that this is desirable in Iraq's own interests.

"5. In this connexion His Majesty's Government have noted assurances for which Iraqi Government have asked. His Majesty's Government do not feel it appropriate that the implementation of the treaty should be made dependent by either side on the receipt of assurances. It so happens, however, that the answers to the Iraqi Government's questions are so clear that His Majesty's Government can give them without difficulty. They therefore gladly do so, on the understanding that they are only statements of the existing position." (Here follows answers (1) to (5) as in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 324 [of 9th September].)

[E 6353/474/93]

No. 65.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 324.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 9, 1939.

FOLLOWING is communication referred to in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 322 [of 9th September]:—

"His Majesty's Government have always been anxious that Iraqi Government shall declare war on Germany (or at any rate declare the existence of a state of war between Germany and Iraq), not because they have ever doubted the determination of Iraqi Government to fulfil all their obligations under the Treaty of Alliance, and so to contribute to defeat of Power whose victory would mean end of all true independence for Iraq and all other Middle Eastern States, but because such a declaration would make this determination clear to public opinion throughout the world, and so encourage all those others who sympathise with the efforts of those who are actively opposing German world domination.

"2. His Majesty's Government still think that the Iraqi Government would have been acting in the interest of their country had they issued a declaration as soon as war broke out between Great Britain and Germany, but they gladly recognise that by severing diplomatic relations with Germany, internment or deporting German nationals, placing their territory and communications at the disposal of His Majesty's Government, and by similar measures, Iraqi Government are fulfilling their obligations under alliance.

"3. Moreover, they realise that in the Regent's message to The King, Iraq has given a public and emphatic manifestation of her intentions to fulfil her obligations.

"4. This being so, His Majesty's Government do not wish to press further for a declaration, which cannot now, in their opinion, make any practical difference.

"5. The question of giving assurances does not in consequence arise. It so happens, however, that answers to questions which Iraqi Government have addressed to His Majesty's Government are so clear that His Majesty's Government can give them without difficulty. They therefore gladly give the following answers on the understanding that they are only statements of the existing position:—

"(1) No. The aid which His Majesty the King of Iraq is to give to His Britannic Majesty in the event of war is laid down in article 4 of the treaty.

"(2) Yes. This is laid down in article 4 of the treaty.

"(3) In view of the fact that the answer to (1) is in the negative and to (2) in the affirmative, His Majesty's Government do not consider that the proclamation of a state of war would necessitate any steps by Iraq to strengthen her army beyond the programme already in process of execution.

"(4) Yes.

"(5) His Majesty's Government mean in the future, as in the past, to carry out their undertakings to the Arab States. They have not had time to consult the French Government, but they have no doubt whatever that this would represent view of French Government, too.

"6. His Majesty's Government wish to repeat in conclusion that they appreciate the steps already taken by Iraqi Government and look forward to the most cordial co-operation in the days which lie ahead."

[E 6469/474/93]

No. 66

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 334.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

MY telegram No. 324.

Bagdad, September 13, 1939.

The exchange of telegrams was duly published here. Both the Regent and the Prime Minister informed me that terms of King's reply had been greatly appreciated in Iraq.

[E 6490/474/93]

No. 67.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 335.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegrams Nos. 322, 323 and 324.

Bagdad, September 13, 1939.

Since His Majesty's Government are prepared to give replies which may perhaps be held to amplify points raised by the Iraqi Government, I am inclined to suggest that we show that we expect them now in return to declare a state of war.

It is, of course, very unlikely that the Iraqi Government will go further or faster than the Egyptian Government, but I feel that we may as well attempt to obtain the *quid pro quo* which is suggested (although not already promised) in their note, the language of which is no doubt intentionally vague. (The text was sent to you by bag to-day.) The attempt could hardly do harm, and, if successful, it might help to give the lead to Egypt.

General Wavell, who has been here on a brief visit, tells me that all the military services feel considerable misgivings as to the eventual consequences if there is no declaration of war. For example, the Iraqi Government might hesitate on that ground to allow the French troops to pass through Iraq (see my telegram No. 328), while it obviously remains easier for them to reinsure with Germany in the event of Allied reversals in war or politics.

I would therefore suggest for your consideration a reply to the effect that, while the Iraqi Government's assurances and the exchange of telegrams between the King and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs make it clear that both our Governments are determined to fulfil the Treaty of Alliance in spirit as well as in letter, for technical and other reasons, such as [group undecypherable] at the end of paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 324. His Majesty's Government still consider it important that the position of Iraq as an ally should be made clear beyond possibility of doubt and mischievous propaganda or intrigue, by formal declaration of a state of war. They understand from the note of 6th September that the Iraqi Government will take this further step on the elucidation of the five points mentioned. This elucidation His Majesty's Government are happy to give as set forth in paragraphs 1 to 5 of section 5 of your telegram No. 324. At the same time I would propose to emphasise categorically that there is no foundation whatsoever for the allegation spread by German propaganda or other mischief-making sources that His Majesty's Government have ever contemplated asking for the aid of Iraqi troops outside Iraq. It has already thought it well to say this as from myself in the course of incidental conversation with the Regent and with General Taha, in case bazaar rumours should impute such designs to General Wavell.

(Repeated to Alexandria, No. 50. (Please pass to M.E.I.C.))

[E 6506/474/93]

No. 68.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 334.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Foreign Office, September 15, 1939.

FOLLOWING reply was given by Mr. Butler to parliamentary question by Mr. Mander on 14th September regarding position of Iraq in relation to the war:—

"The Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government lays down that, if either of the parties becomes engaged in war, the other party will immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally. The treaty further provides that the aid of the Iraqi Government will consist in furnishing to His Majesty's Government on Iraqi territory all facilities and assistance in their power, including the use of all means of communication. The Iraqi Government have made it clear that they are prepared to carry out their treaty obligations both in the letter and in the spirit. They have already severed relations with the German Government, and have taken various measures of a precautionary kind which are regarded by His Majesty's Government as most satisfactory. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation of His Majesty's Government for the loyal and friendly attitude of their ally."

2. Publicity has been given to this statement.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 334. Repeated to Alexandria, No. 665.)

[E 6490/474/93]

No. 69.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 336.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 16, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 235 [of 14th September: Anglo-Iraq Alliance].

In other circumstances, I would have welcomed your suggestion.

2. But in view of instructions in my telegram No. 651 [of 13th September] to Cairo, I doubt whether it is worth making question a major issue.

3. From point of view of His Majesty's Government, important consideration is that Iraqi Government should be able to fulfil all obligations under treaty, and His Majesty's Government would certainly not accept absence of a declaration of war as an excuse for any failure to do so.

4. This applies particularly to case quoted by Sir A. Wavell. It is "in the power" of the King of Iraq (see article 4) to furnish to His Britannic Majesty "facility" of transport for one of the latter's allies, and failure to do so would be breach of the treaty. In any case, the King of Iraq would incur no greater obligation towards France by declaring war than he has at present.

5. Similarly, in regard to reinsurance with Germany, I should have thought that, with or without a declaration, Iraqi Government could explain at need that every step against Germany had been taken under duress, and that German Government would pretend to believe them so long as it suited their purpose.

6. At the same time, it is important that Iraqi Government should not be able to plead later that His Majesty's Government had not made it clear that, even without a declaration, they would expect Iraq to take all measures normally taken against an enemy country. To guard against this danger, while avoiding any appearance of asking Iraqi Government to take any steps to which they were not already committed under the treaty, paragraph 4 of communication in my telegram No. 324 [of 9th September] might be amended to read as follows:—

"4. This being so, His Majesty's Government do not wish to press further for a declaration, if the Iraqi Government are, for their part, satisfied that they can, in fact, without such a declaration, fulfil all their obligations under the treaty."

[21053]

7. If asked for my views, you may say that it is purely a matter of their legal powers and that I am prepared to wait on events. If, however, they were to find later that they could not take certain necessary action without declaring war, His Majesty's Government would expect them to do so.

8. As regards Iraqi enquiries, I am prepared to answer them whether Iraqi Government make a declaration or not, partly because I dislike anything in the nature of bargaining for fulfilment of Iraqi obligations, but also because to leave these particular questions unanswered might make Iraqi action in addressing them to His Majesty's Government look even more justified than answering them would do.

9. As regards tactics, I feel it is important that, whatever you may say to General Nuri privately, Iraqi Government generally and *a fortiori* German Government should not derive impression that absence of declaration places His Majesty's Government in any difficulty. Attitude of His Majesty's Government should be that it is *Iraqi Government* who may find themselves in difficulty. It is for this reason that a good face was put on Iraqi action in answers to Regent's telegram and parliamentary question of 14th September (see my telegram No. 334 [of 15th September]).

10. Subject to above considerations, I am prepared to leave you wide discretion as to form in which you make communication suggested in my telegram No. 324 [of 9th September] and explanations by which you accompany it.

11. You may certainly deny, on my authority, that there is any foundation whatsoever for allegation that His Majesty's Government contemplate asking for the aid of Iraqi troops outside Iraq.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 336. Repeated to Alexandria, No. 672.)

[E 6666/6666/93]

No. 70.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 454.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, August 16, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Iraqi Government presented to Parliament, before its recent adjournment, a new draft Public Education Law, which has already received its second reading, and the text of which has been published in the press.

2. From the enclosed extract from the law it will be seen that it would severely restrict the activities of foreign and private schools in Iraq. Iraqis are, in fact, to be prohibited entry into foreign primary schools. Among the foreign schools in which primary classes exist the American institutions, such as the Jesuit School in Bagdad and Dr. Van Ess's school in Basra, are much concerned at the possible effect of the law upon them, and the United States Minister has spoken strongly to the Prime Minister on the subject. Nuri Pasha, I understand, promised in reply that the law should not go to Parliament (*i.e.*, presumably for its final reading) until next October, and in the meantime Mr. Knabenshue has reported the matter to Washington and asked for instructions. He has also expressed to me the hope that in his attitude of protest he will have the moral support of His Majesty's Embassy.

3. Mr. Knabenshue has also spoken of American treaty rights in the matter, but it is somewhat difficult to discover what these are. Article 4 of the convention between His Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq and the President of the United States of America regarding the Rights of the United States and of its Nationals in Iraq, of the 9th January, 1930 (Command No. 3833 of 1931) admittedly secures to United States nationals the right to maintain educational institutions in Iraq, but under article 7 the convention ceased to operate upon the termination of the special relations between the United Kingdom and Iraq in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of 1926, *i.e.*, in October 1932, and no instrument replacing it appears to be in force, the Commercial Treaty, signed between the two States on the 3rd December, 1938 (please see Sir M. Peterson's despatch No. 605 E. of the 14th December, 1938), not yet having been ratified.

4. The only basis, therefore, for an attack upon the new draft law on treaty grounds would appear to be article 15 of the Declaration of Guarantees by Iraq to the League of Nations of the 30th May, 1932, which reads as follows:—

"Subject to such measures as may be essential for the maintenance of public order and morality, Iraq undertakes to ensure and guarantee throughout its territory freedom of conscience and worship and the free exercise of the religious, educational and medical activities of religious missions of all denominations, whatever the nationality of those missions or of their members."

5. Such press comment as has appeared is favourable to the draft law, which is, of course, a typical piece of "popular nationalism." Whether, if passed, it will redound to the credit or advantage of the country must be highly doubtful. The Iraqi schools have not hitherto enjoyed a favourable reputation compared with their foreign competitors, and I believe that until recently even Cabinet Ministers preferred to send their children to a foreign rather than to an Iraqi school. The draft law shows the precarious nature of the basis upon which foreign educational institutions in this country have been established, and it must be regarded as a warning to, amongst others, the British Council of the care which would have to be exercised in considering the establishment of an institute of their own in Iraq.

I have, &c.
BASIL NEWTON.

Enclosure in No. 70.

Draft New Public Education Law.

(Submitted to Parliament.)

EXTRACTS.

Chapter VII.—*Private and Foreign Schools.*

Article 26.—No private or foreign school, of whatever kind or academic grade, may be established except by written permit from the Ministry of Education.

Article 27.—Private and foreign schools shall engage for the teaching of history, geography, civic knowledge and Arabic language instructors nominated or loaned by the Ministry of Education, to be paid by the schools themselves at the rates determined by the Ministry of Education on the scale of pay for similar teachers in the service of Government schools.

Article 28.—Private and foreign schools shall one month at least before the beginning of the scholastic year submit to the Ministry of Education their annual cadres of staff and their budgets showing the sources of their receipts and the objects on which receipts are to be expended.

Article 29.—Principals and teaching staff of private and foreign schools shall be appointed with the approval of the Ministry of Education.

Article 30.—In case of any principal or member of the teaching staff of a private or foreign school acting in contravention of article 5 (translation below) of this law, the Ministry of Education may call upon the school authorities to dismiss such principal or member of teaching staff immediately.

Article 31.—Any private or foreign school acting in contravention of article 5 of this law will be closed down for a period of one year in the first instance, and in the case of repeated contraventions will have its licence definitely cancelled.

(Article 5: Anything calculated to—

- (a) Spoil morals;
- (b) Affect national unity and honour;
- (c) Promote heresy or destructive ideas; or
- (d) Make for the dissemination of political or party propaganda of any kind

is absolutely forbidden in all schools of the various categories and grades.)

Article 32.—Private schools may not accept grants-in-aid from foreign sources except with the approval of the Ministry of Education.

Article 33.—Instruction in the Arabic language, history, geography and civic knowledge shall be in accordance with the programme of the Ministry of Education, and the teaching of the Arabic language shall be obligatory in all private and foreign schools.

Article 34.—Programmes of instruction of private and foreign schools and text-books for use in such schools shall receive the approval of the Ministry of Education, and may not be altered or changed except with the approval of the Ministry, who may prohibit the use of books inconsistent with the spirit of articles 1 and 5 of this law.

Article 35.—Private and foreign schools shall submit to the Ministry of Education's systems of examinations, and shall suspend work on official festivals and public holidays on which work is suspended in Government schools.

Article 36.—Iraqis are prohibited entry (for education) into foreign primary schools.

Article 37.—Conditions governing the establishment of private and foreign schools, the manner of inspection of such schools and the obligations of persons in charge of such schools, shall be determined by special regulation.

Article 38.—Any person desirous of opening classes for instruction, whether vocational or otherwise, must obtain a permit in writing from the Ministry of Education, who may close down such classes if it finds cause for such action.

Article 39.—Katatib (elementary schools usually attached to mosques—*Translator*) shall be regarded as unclassified private schools, and shall be subject to the provisions applicable to such latter schools.

Article 40.—The Ministry of Education may make grants-in-aid to private schools and private scientific and educational institutes.

(NOTE.—The above articles all come under Chapter VII in the draft as published in the local press. But articles following article 40 and beginning with article 41 are entitled Chapter IX, with no intervening Chapter VIII, which would show that there is a misprint and that the articles translated above as making Chapter VII actually represent two chapters, VII and VIII.—*Translator*.)

[E 6647/72/93]

No. 71.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 526. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, September 15, 1939.

UNDER articles 81, 82 and 83 of the Iraqi Constitution, it is provided *inter alia* that, if any question arises necessitating an interpretation of a Constitution, it shall be examined by a High Court specially convoked for the purpose.

2. Such a court has recently been sitting under the chairmanship of the President of the Senate, in order to decide whether, for the purpose of article 64 of the Constitution, which lays down that the number of Ministers of State shall not exceed nine or be less than six, the Prime Minister shall rank as one of the Council of Ministers. This development, which at first sight appears somewhat Gilbertian, has, in fact, a practical aspect, which arises from the present composition of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister now holds the additional portfolio of Minister of the Interior, and the other Ministers are those of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice, Communications and Education. The ministerial portfolios at present held are, therefore, seven in number, or eight if the Prime Minister were to be regarded as holding one apart from his portfolio of Minister of the Interior. If he were so regarded, there would be only one vacancy under article 64 of the Constitution, namely, the portfolio of the newly-created Ministry of Economics. The question which I have described as having been at issue, as also the question whether Ministers without portfolio may be created, is clearly of some importance in the event of the Prime Minister desiring to enlarge, or broaden the basis of, the Government.

3. The high court's investigations seem, in fact, to have been undertaken with a view to carrying a stage further negotiations which have been in progress for some time for the purpose of appointing Ministers of the Interior and Economics, and of creating, if the Constitution permits, a Ministry of Health. A further consideration is that, while there are at present two Shia members of the Cabinet (the Minister of Finance, Rustam Haidar—Personalities, No. 73—and the Minister of Education, Salih Jabr—Personalities, No. 79), there is only one Kurd (the Minister of Communications, Umar Nazmi—Personalities No. 87), and the question of bringing in a second Kurd to balance a possible third Shia may well have been under examination.

4. The court has now decided that the Prime Minister does not rank as one of the nine Ministers laid down in article 64 of the Constitution; that a ninth portfolio can therefore be created under the Constitution; but that Ministers "without portfolio" are not permitted. The Prime Minister, in confirming to me on the 11th September that he now had altogether three portfolios at his disposal, said that he had been discussing with the Cabinet whether they should be filled from the ranks of those who were more or less opposed to the Government or from the Government's supporters. In the former event, offers might be made to Jamil Madfai (Personalities, No. 41), Taufiq or Naji Suwaidi (Personalities, Nos. 85 and 64), and Naji Shaukat (Personalities, No. 63). The latter (who it will be remembered resigned from the Ministership of the Interior early this summer) had, however, General Nuri said, been trying to cause discontent by alleging that the army had been kept short of arms. If, General Nuri observed, new members of the Cabinet chosen from among the Opposition would not co-operate loyally with the rest, the Government would be weakened instead of strengthened, and in that case it would be better to select the new recruits from among their present supporters. The Prime Minister seemed at that moment to be inclined towards this latter course, but said that the question would be discussed further in the Cabinet.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India and to the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON

[E 6805/474/93]

No. 72.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 554.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Bagdad telegram No. 355, dated the 27th September, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of his note to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 25th September, respecting the question of the declaration of war by Iraq.

Bagdad, September 27, 1939.

Enclosure in No. 72.

Sir B. Newton to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Bagdad, September 25, 1939.

Your Excellency,

HAVING duly communicated to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the contents of your note of the 6th September regarding the effect of the present war between the United Kingdom and Germany upon the Treaty of Alliance between Iraq and Great Britain of the 30th June, 1930, I have been authorised to return to your Excellency the following reply:—

2. When war broke out as the result of the German invasion of Poland, His Majesty's Government never doubted the determination of the Iraqi Government to fulfil all their obligations under the Treaty of Alliance, and so contribute to

the defeat of the Power whose victory would mean the end of all true independence for Iraq and all other Middle Eastern States. At the same time they were anxious that the Iraqi Government should declare war on Germany, or at any rate declare the existence of a state of war between Germany and Iraq, because such a declaration would make this determination on the part of the Iraqi Government clear to public opinion throughout the world, and so encourage all the other peoples who sympathise with those who are actively opposing German world domination.

3. His Majesty's Government still think that the Iraqi Government would have been acting in the interest of their country had they issued a declaration of war as soon as war broke out between Great Britain and Germany. They gladly recognise, however, that, by severing diplomatic relations with Germany, internment or deporting German nationals, placing their territory and communications at the disposal of His Majesty's Government and by similar measures, the Iraqi Government are fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty of Alliance. Moreover, they appreciate that in the Regent's message to The King Iraq has given a public and emphatic manifestation of her intention to fulfil her obligations.

4. This being so, His Majesty's Government do not wish to press further for a declaration of war if the Iraqi Government, for their part, are satisfied that they can, in fact, without such a declaration, fulfil all their obligations under the Treaty of Alliance.

5. In your note, however, your Excellency raised certain questions which, in the view of the Iraqi Government, would arise in the event of the proclamation of a state of war, and you asked for the observations of His Majesty's Government upon them. His Majesty's Government have considered these questions, and have found the answers to them so clear that, despite their attitude towards the proclamation of a state of war by Iraq as described in the preceding paragraphs of the present note, they have no difficulty in replying as follows, on the understanding that their observations are only statements of the existing position:—

- (1) His Majesty's Government confirm that the proclamation of a state of war by Iraq would not involve the Iraqi Government in any obligations additional to those provided for in the Treaty of Alliance. The aid which His Majesty the King of Iraq is to give to His Britannic Majesty in the event of war is laid down in article 4 of that treaty.
- (2) In the event of aggression upon Iraq by any other State, His Majesty's Government will certainly not hesitate to ensure the safety of Iraq by coming as an ally to its immediate assistance as is already provided for in article 4 of the treaty.
- (3) In view of the fact that the answer to the Iraqi Government's first question is in the negative, and that the answer to their second question is in the affirmative, His Majesty's Government do not consider that the proclamation of a state of war would necessitate any steps being taken by Iraq to strengthen her army beyond the programme that is already in process of execution.
- (4) His Majesty's Government confirm that Iraq will have a voice in the peace negotiation which will take place on the conclusion of the war.
- (5) His Majesty's Government mean in the future, as in the past, to carry out their undertakings to the Arab States. They have not had the opportunity to consult the French Government on this subject, but they have no doubt whatever that the French Government's view of this matter would be the same as their own.

In conclusion His Majesty's Government wish to repeat that they appreciate the steps which have already been taken by Iraq in the present war, and that they look forward to the most cordial co-operation with the Iraqi Government in the days which lie ahead.

I avail, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

[E 6827/72/93]

No. 73.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 561.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, September 28, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 118, Saving, of the 22nd September, I have the honour to submit to your Lordship the following further information concerning the Cabinet changes which were announced on the 21st September.

2. The Prime Minister, whom I saw on the day the changes took place, was reticent and had little to say about his new colleagues except that one was a member of the Shaukat family, one was a Shia (Sadiq Bassam) and one a Kurd (Jalal Baban), and that the latter was an honest man. This last encomium surprised me, as from many others I had heard that in May 1938 Jalal Baban had been forced to resign from Jamil Madfai's Cabinet because of his more than dubious dealings with a Government contractor.

3. I asked about the fate of earlier plans for broadening the basis of the Government by including several ex-Prime Ministers. Nuri Pasha said that this had not been his idea but Jamil Madfai's. His own view was that such a Cabinet could not work harmoniously or be stable. Moreover, Jamil Madfai had made conditions which it had seemed to the Prime Minister to be unwise, or at least premature, to accept. On the other hand, he had arranged that either the Regent or he himself should consult Jamil Madfai on matters of importance, and he hoped, therefore, to obtain Jamil Madfai's general support.

4. Taufiq Suwaidi, who dined with me alone on the 27th September, told me a different story. He said that during the summer Nuri Pasha had sent an intermediary to the Lebanon to visit his brother Naji Suwaidi, Jamil Madfai and himself and to suggest that they and Rashid Ali Gailani and Naji Shaukat should all join the Cabinet. The Suwaidis and Jamil Madfai had accepted this proposal, and Taufiq Suwaidi had undertaken to bring the others into line. Their one condition was that the Prime Minister and his whole Cabinet should first resign, and that they should enter an entirely new Cabinet and not merely join Nuri Pasha's existing Administration. Their reason for this condition was that they did not wish it to appear that they approved of the policy which had been followed by the present Cabinet, many of whose actions were, in their opinion, wrong. When they returned to Bagdad early in September the matter had been reopened with the Prime Minister, but he had told them that he was unable to proceed with the plan as the Regent did not approve of it. He was satisfied, however, that this was only an excuse. I would here interpolate that from other sources I have heard that the plan would have involved the entry of Rashid Ali as one of the ex-Prime Ministers into the new Cabinet, in order that one of the Suwaidis brothers could take his place at the Palace, since there would not be room for both brothers in the Cabinet. As the post at the Palace gives special opportunities for exercising influence not only with the Regent but with his numerous important visitors, it is thought unlikely that Rashid Ali would care to vacate it except to become Prime Minister. He may therefore have inspired the Regent to discourage General Nuri from tendering his resignation, or himself have warned Nuri against the dangers of being double-crossed if he once resigned. Without any warning, however, these dangers may in any case have occurred to General Nuri and his friends.

5. Taufiq Suwaidi went on to say that the additions which had, in fact, been made to the Cabinet by the Prime Minister were all men of the third rank and would bring no strength to the Prime Minister, an opinion with which I am disposed to agree. He added that Nuri Pasha was becoming increasingly unpopular, because of his persecution of all those who had anything to do with Hikmat Sulaiman and Bekr Sidqi, and because he was filling important posts everywhere with incompetent personal adherents. It seemed to him that in these circumstances a change of Government would probably occur before long.

6. I observed that for Iraq's own sake and for the sake of her reputation abroad, I sincerely hoped that if a change occurred it would be effected constitutionally, for in these critical days any violent upheaval would be disastrous. What was wanted was a strong Government with a united country behind it, determined, in alliance with Great Britain, to see the war through to a successful conclusion. Taufiq Suwaidi said that he entirely agreed with me, and he

and the others were all avoiding any activity likely to embarrass the Government. On the other hand, it was difficult for them to give real support to Nuri Pasha so long as he persisted in his pursuit of personal vengeance. Here he mentioned Hikmat Sulaiman, and said that he was convinced that the charges brought against him were fabricated, and the evidence on which he had been convicted was false. I asked Taufiq Suwaidi what he thought of Taha-al-Hashimi, the Minister of Defence, and his position in the Cabinet. He said that Taha was an honest, well-intentioned man, but better suited to be Chief of the General Staff than a Minister. The idea that Taha was ambitious and aimed at becoming Prime Minister was dismissed summarily by Taufiq Suwaidi, who said that Taha-al-Hashimi knew well enough that he was not fit to hold such a position.

7. This conversation left me with the impression that the Suwaidis, Jamil Madfai and Naji Shaukat, though possibly they were doing nothing to undermine Nuri Pasha's position, would do nothing to support him, and, in fact, would be glad to see him forced to resign. Rashid's Ali's position is uncertain, but he is most probably playing for his own hand and he may not have forgiven Jamil Madfai and his colleagues for having banished him from Bagdad last December, although his quarrel with them is said to have been composed.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

[E 7283/6/31]

No. 74.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 623.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, October 24, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 386 of the 16th October reporting the arrival in Bagdad of Amin Hussaini, the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, I have the honour to report briefly on press and public reactions to this event. The *Istiqlal* was naturally dithyrambic. It declared itself quite unable adequately to express its joy at the presence in Bagdad of the great Arab national leader, for whom the deepest feelings of love were cherished in the heart of every faithful Arab who had not sold his conscience for gold. Other newspapers offered more sober welcomes, but all paid flattering tributes to the Mufti's personality and to his services to the Arab cause. Subsequently, daily accounts of his activities have been published in all the newspapers. According to these reports large numbers of distinguished visitors have visited him at his hotel (where he is the guest of the Government) and he has returned many of these calls in person in a luxurious automobile put at his disposition by the authorities.

2. On the evening of the 22nd October the Mufti was the guest of honour at an official banquet given at the Town Hall by the Prime Minister.

3. Jamal Hussaini and his companions returned to Bagdad on the 20th October and have since then been in close touch with the Mufti.

4. Public opinion has not yet, I think, crystallised. The extremist politicians and Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Iraq are understandably pleased at their leader's escape from increasing obscurity in Syria to the full light of a popular welcome in Bagdad, but among ordinary Iraqis, including those who sympathise with the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs against Zionism, some embarrassment is felt at the sudden arrival of the Mufti, and there is anxiety lest he should become the cause of activities disturbing to public tranquillity. The first flush of enthusiasm may therefore be succeeded by a sober realisation that he may become a political nuisance if allowed to engage in, or become an occasion for, political intrigue.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo and to the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

[E 7404/72/93]

No. 75.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 644.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, November 3, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 436 of the 8th August, I have the honour to report that the parliamentary session which began on the 13th June was prorogued on the 30th October. Meetings had been resumed on the 8th October after the adjournment on the 7th August, but the work was restricted in the main to the formal acceptance of the emergency ordinances which had been passed during the recess.

2. On the 1st November a new session was opened by the Regent with customary ceremony. The speech from the Throne (a translation of which is enclosed herein⁽¹⁾) opened with a reference to the declaration of war by Great Britain and France against Germany, and to Iraq's decision to fulfil her undertakings to Great Britain as an ally under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. The speech went on to refer to the pleasure given in Iraq by the tripartite treaty recently concluded between Great Britain, France and Turkey, and to the wisdom of the stand made by the Arab countries in support of the principles of the liberty and independence of nations. There was no direct mention of Palestine, but the hope was expressed that the attitude adopted by the Arab States would "constitute a strong factor in the realisation of their national ideals." The three main points of that part of the speech which dealt with home affairs were that the strengthening of the defence forces would be continued, that measures would be taken to deal with the financial difficulties caused by the war, and that one of the tasks of the new Ministry of Social Affairs would be to make provision for the better care of the children of the country.

3. At the first meeting of the Senate and Chamber which followed the opening of the session, the old Presidents were re-elected in both Houses, in the Senate Saiyid Muhammad-al-Sadr, and in the Chamber Saiyid Maulud Mukhlis.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the Governor-General of India, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the combined Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 7599/1884/93]

No. 76.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 666.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, November 14, 1939.

AS I am sure that your Lordship will agree that it is very desirable that I should take early opportunities after the hot weather season to visit places of importance in Iraq or in its immediate vicinity, I have the honour to inform you that I have recently concluded a short visit to Basra and Koweit.

2. I left Bagdad in the afternoon of the 3rd November by air and arrived at the Basra air port after a flight lasting a little over an hour and a half. I was thereby enabled to attend that same evening a reception at the Overseas Club, which had been organised by the president (Mr. Brickell, His Majesty's Consul at Basra) with a view to affording me an opportunity to meet the British community.

3. The following day I visited the Royal Air Force air base for flying-boats at Basra, and afterwards spent over two hours with Sir John Ward discussing many matters connected with the port. After luncheon with him I spent another two hours in seeing the port and some of the many services connected with it. I had heard much of the efficiency with which the port and air port are managed, and of the up-to-date buildings and equipment which have been provided for the convenience of the shipping and aircraft calling at Basra; what I saw fully equalled, and in fact surpassed, my expectations. The port and its ancillary organisations, power and light plants, water supply, soda water and ice factories,

and the air port, with its well-equipped control tower and wireless equipment, its large and well-drained landing ground, its well-built modern hotel, with every modern convenience and the waterways just opposite the hotel and aerodrome for the use of flying-boats, are, in their equipment, arrangement and maintenance, all in a class of their own compared with anything else in this country. Whereas the best achieved elsewhere is only reasonably good even when judged by oriental standards, the port and air port at Basra satisfy, I am informed, the criteria usually applied to similar enterprises even in Europe. They are self-supporting and ample provision is made, as I was informed by Sir John Ward, for their upkeep and development.

4. That evening Mr. and Mrs. Brickell gave a reception at the consulate, at which I made the acquaintance of the consular corps and of many Iraqi notables and senior officials. There were also present a number of compatriots with whom I was able to continue the acquaintanceship begun on the previous evening at the Overseas Club.

5. On the 6th November I flew to Koweit in the morning and back to Basra in the evening in an aircraft kindly put at my disposal by the Air Officer Commanding at Shaiba. On both the outward and return journey I was thus enabled to view from a low altitude the site of the proposed new port on the Khor Abdullah. It lies in a wide low-lying mud bank cut up by channels formed by a long arm of the sea, and the site, as seen from the air, suggested to me that Port Said, which I have also only seen from the air, may have originally looked rather similar. In Koweit, where I exchanged calls with His Highness the Ruler, I was the guest of Major Galloway, the Political Agent, and I was also fortunate to find Colonel Prior, the newly appointed Resident in the Persian Gulf, who was staying at the agency.

6. On the early morning of the 7th November I returned by air to Bagdad, arriving at 8.30 A.M. During my visit to Basra I was the guest of Mr. and Mrs. Brickell, and greatly appreciated their hospitality and their efficient and energetic arrangements which enabled me to meet so many of the prominent residents and see so much of Basra in so short a time.

7. If conditions permit, I propose next month to make a tour in the north of Iraq, lasting not more than ten days, and probably less, in order to gain an impression of places such as Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil and Sulamainiya.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

W. E. HOUSTON-BOSWALL.

[E 7600/72/93]

No. 77.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 667.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, November 14, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 644 of the 3rd November, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the debate on the Speech from the Throne, which took place on the 9th November, was mainly devoted to the situation in Palestine and Syria, and I enclose herein a report taken from the *Iraq Times*.

2. It will be seen that, as the result of speeches made by a number of Deputies, who raised the question of the position of Iraq in relation to the affairs of Palestine, the Prime Minister was obliged to define the attitude of his Government.

3. He based his statement on the white paper, and stressed the point that this document had the great merit of having finally banished the fear that there would ever be a dominant Zionist majority in Palestine. He then referred to the second gain for the Arabs contained in the white paper; the undertaking to set up a National Government in Palestine. He explained that there were certain points concerning this undertaking which required further elucidation, and suggested that it should not be difficult for His Majesty's Government to meet Arab wishes in this regard.

4. After the debate Parliament was adjourned for two months, with effect from the 15th November.

5. The same evening the Prime Minister told me that a similar debate had taken place in the Senate. There he had been heavily attacked by several members of the late Cabinet. They had generally criticised the policy of the Government including what they alleged to be the extravagance of the new Ministry of Social Affairs, but had reserved their heaviest artillery for the bombardment of the Government's policy regarding Palestine. The Prime Minister told me that he had answered his critics in the Senate with the same arguments that he had employed in the Chamber, and said that he was satisfied that he had convinced both Houses that there was more merit in the white paper than they had hitherto perceived. The difficulty, he explained to me, was that, although it had been widely published in Arabic, few had ever taken the trouble to read it, and of those few only one or two had understood its significance.

6. I asked his Excellency whether there was any particular reason why the question of Palestine should have come up for discussion at the present time when conditions there were so steadily improving. He said that the people of Iraq, as Arabs and Moslems, were naturally profoundly interested at all times in the political aspirations of their brother Arabs and Moslems in Palestine, and that in consequence the affairs of Palestine and, in recent years, the attitude of the Iraqi Government towards the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs against the menace of Jewish domination, had frequently become a subject for discussion when a general debate, such as that on the Speech from the Throne, took place in Parliament. He added that several speakers emphasised that they were not seeking to exploit the present situation, and your Lordship will observe that this point is brought out in the report on the debate which is enclosed herein.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

W. E. HOUSTON-BOSWALL.

Enclosure in No. 77.

Extract from the Iraq Times of November 11, 1939.

THURSDAY'S meeting of the Chamber of Deputies was noteworthy in several respects. At the close, the Minister of Justice announced that he had a message to deliver in the form of an Iradah. The Deputies then rose, and the Minister read an Iradah postponing the meetings of Parliament for two months from the 15th November.

The debate began when the President announced that the day's discussions would be concerned with the draft address in reply to the Speech from the Throne. A number of well-known Deputies, including Sayid Abdul Mahdi (an ex-Minister who represents the Muntafiq), spoke at length on Iraq's foreign relations, more particularly her position *vis-à-vis* the present war. Sayid Abdul Mahdi stressed that Iraq was co-operating sincerely with her ally, Great Britain, in the fulfilment of promises made to Britain. He went on to point out that the Allies had obligations of equal importance towards the Arabs of Syria and Palestine. Sayid Abdul Mahdi was followed by a number of Deputies, who spoke in more or less the same strain, suggesting that an end should be put to the difficulties besetting the Arabs of Palestine. Some of the speakers pointed out that the demand was not being made at the present time in an effort to take advantage of the present international situation: Iraq had always been seeking a just settlement of the Palestine question in the interests of the continuance of the strong friendly relations between Iraq and Britain.

His Excellency the Prime Minister (Sayid Nuri-as-Said) made an important statement in reply to the points raised by earlier speakers. His Excellency said that what Iraq wanted was the setting up of independent States in the Arab countries, on lines similar to the independence enjoyed by Iraq herself. "We have repeatedly put our point of view before the British and French Governments," he said, "and we are still doing our best for the fulfilment of our wishes." His Excellency then gave a résumé of the recent history of the Palestine

negotiations. He referred to the Round Table Conference in London, and said: "The results of our endeavours have not been wholly unsatisfactory, and we no longer fear that Palestine will become Zionist. We have now no doubt that the Arab majority in Palestine will continue to remain in control of their country." His Excellency went on to refer to the second point raised by the previous speakers, who had maintained that an Arab national State should be set up in Palestine. "This point," said Sayid Nuri, "has not been made clear in the white paper, and we are now endeavouring to have it clarified, and to have the period mentioned in the white paper shortened. It is probable that certain statements may be made which will elucidate this point and eliminate the doubts in the minds of some of us. It would not be difficult for our ally, Great Britain, after the settlement of the first problem—i.e., that of Jewish immigration—in a manner acceptable to the Arabs, to reassure them as to her intentions and then set up an independent State in Palestine."

The Prime Minister was followed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who made a statement on Iraq's position in the present war and the sincerity with which she was fulfilling her obligations towards Great Britain and the Powers who were signatories of the Sa'adabad Pact. His Excellency expressed the gratification with which he had heard of the signing of the pacts between Turkey and Britain and Turkey and France, which would, he said, be a stabilising factor in the Near and Middle East. In the later stages of the debate a statement was made by the Minister of Finance on economic questions. He requested the Majlis to pass a draft law for the payment of 6,000 dinars by the Government of Iraq for the relief of the Arabs in Palestine. This proposal was carried, and the address in reply to the Speech from the Throne was then approved by a unanimous vote.

[E 7693/72/93]

No. 78.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 431.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, November 23, 1939.

MY telegram No. 363 and my despatch No. 561.

There are renewed signs that an attempt may be made at any time to bring about a change of Government.

During the debate on the Speech from the Throne on 9th November, Nuri's Administration was vigorously attacked in the Senate by several members of the Cabinet which he displaced last December, and their feelings towards him have been embittered by Government orders, under discussion with the press, not to publish the debate.

Rashid Ali is said to be trying to enlist Taha against Nuri, and also members of the Madfai-Taufiq Suwaidi group. Although the latter may be reluctant to co-operate with Rashid Ali, they are very hostile to Nuri.

The Cabinet is not in a good position to resist an attack, if made. Apart from the doubtful loyalty of Taha, Jalal Baban is disgruntled, and Nuri himself is said by his own son to have lost his grip on affairs and to be in a nervous condition.

The sense of greater security resulting from the British-French-Turkish Pact will remove a restraining influence on internal political changes. The Mufti seems to have been behaving with foresight, and interest in his person to have diminished, but his arrival and the renewal of talk about Palestine are, of course, factors liable to enliven political movement and to encourage pan-Arabs, who, in the army and elsewhere, criticised Nuri for being too pro-British.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I tried to draw the other day, professed confidence in the stability of the Government.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 68 (for M.I. 2); Government of India, No. 8, Saving; Tehran, No. 18, Saving; and Jerusalem, No. 16, Saving.)

[E 7753/78/93]

No. 79.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 679 E.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, November 18, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a statement⁽¹⁾ showing the final figures of the receipts and expenditure of the Iraqi Government for the financial year 1938-39.

2. The final position of the Government accounts may be summarised as follows:—

	Receipts.	Expenditure.	Surplus + Deficit -
Ordinary budget...	5,795,370	5,642,131	+ 153,239
Capital works ...	2,037,458	2,446,609	- 409,151
Total operations ...	7,832,828	8,088,740	- 255,912

The accumulated deficit had thus increased from I.D. 695,631 on the 31st March, 1938, to I.D. 951,543 on the 31st March, 1939, chiefly owing to the continued rise in capital expenditure. It is to be noted that of the amounts allotted to the Ministry of Defence and to capital works loans under the 1938 five-year capital works programme (see Sir Maurice Peterson's despatch No. 238 E. of the 28th May, 1938), 27 per cent. and 58 per cent. respectively was spent in the first year of the period covered by that programme.

3. The deficit for 1938-39 is approximately I.D. 100,000 larger than was anticipated by the Ministry of Finance (see paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 480 E. of the 25th August). Presumably the Ministry had underestimated the amounts outstanding on the 31st March last in respect of capital expenditure.

4. A comparison between the final and the budget figures shows that the ordinary revenue exceeded the estimates by I.D. 129,880, all receipts having improved except those from customs duties and produce taxes. The actual expenditure was I.D. 172,328 higher than the budget estimates, largely as a result of increases under Ministry of Defence (I.D. 65,000), Ministry of Finance (I.D. 44,000), Ministry of Interior (I.D. 51,000) and Police (I.D. 38,000).

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 7842/374/93]

No. 80.

Anglo-Iraqi Credit Agreement.⁽¹⁾

WHEREAS the Government of the Kingdom of Iraq desire to purchase material necessary for the defence of Iraq and for the maintenance and development of the Iraqi transport system;

And whereas the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland desire to facilitate such purchases;

Now, therefore, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Iraq have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The Government of the United Kingdom undertake to advance by way of loan to the Government of the Kingdom of Iraq such sums, not exceeding in the aggregate £3,710,000 sterling, as may be payable by the Government of the Kingdom of Iraq under any contracts concluded or to be concluded by that Government with the approval of the Government of the United Kingdom for the purchase, in the United Kingdom, or in such other country or countries as

⁽¹⁾ The terms of this agreement and its existence are confidential for the time being.

may be agreed between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Kingdom of Iraq, of material necessary for the defence of Iraq and the maintenance and development of the Iraqi transport system.

ARTICLE 2.

The Government of the Kingdom of Iraq agree to pay to the Government of the United Kingdom, in pounds sterling, interest on the sums so advanced and outstanding from time to time at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum half-yearly, on the first day of January and the first day of July of each year.

ARTICLE 3.

The Government of the Kingdom of Iraq agree to repay to the Government of the United Kingdom the total principal amount of the advances made by them, in pounds sterling, by means of half-yearly instalments payable to them on the first day of January and the first day of July in each year commencing on the first day of July, 1941. These instalments shall be calculated so that the total amount payable by the Government of the Kingdom of Iraq, whether by way of interest or by way of repayment of principal, shall amount to £200,000 on the first day of July, 1941, and on each subsequent first day of January and first day of July, until the repayment of the total principal amount is completed. Provided that the amount of any such instalment shall not exceed the amount of the advances outstanding on the date on which that instalment is paid together with the interest payable on such advances in accordance with the terms of Article 2 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4.

Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding Article, the Government of the Kingdom of Iraq may at any time, should they so desire, repay to the Government of the United Kingdom in pounds sterling the whole or any part of the principal amount then outstanding.

ARTICLE 5.

The Government of the Kingdom of Iraq agree that, subject only to the priority charge contained in Clause 7 of a General Bond dated the 27th July, 1937, securing the payment of the principal of and interest on the Kingdom of Iraq £1 million 4½ per cent. secured Sterling Bonds issued in 1937 and of all other sums referred to therein, and to any charge which may be created in pursuance of the power contained in the said General Bond to secure any additional Bonds ranking *pari passu* with those issued in 1937, all sums payable by them to the Government of the United Kingdom under the terms of this Agreement shall be secured by way of a first charge on all revenues present or future of the Kingdom of Iraq derived from the exploitation of petroleum, naphtha, natural gases, ozokerite and derivatives thereof.

ARTICLE 6.

The detailed arrangements for the carrying into effect of this Agreement shall be agreed between the diplomatic representative of Iraq in London and the Export Credits Guarantee Department.

ARTICLE 7.

The present Agreement shall enter into force immediately.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Agreement and have fixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate, in London, in the English language, the 1st day of December, 1939.

(L.S.) HALIFAX.
(L.S.) M. RAOUF.

[E 7807/374/93] No. 81.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 686 E.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, November 23, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 428 of the 20th November, I have the honour to enclose copies of the note based on your telegram No. 434, which I handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the latter's reply, regarding the credits required by the Iraqi Government for the purchase of armaments and railway materials.

2. When handing to Saiyid Ali Jaudat my note of the 6th November I emphasised the necessity for secrecy, as explained in paragraph 8 of your telegram No. 434, and, of course, I did not fail to expatiate on this striking proof of the goodwill of His Majesty's Government and of the extent of their efforts to be helpful to Iraq. The commercial secretary subsequently spoke in the same sense to the Minister of Finance, who assured him that every precaution would be taken to ensure that there would be no leakage.

3. After examining the question thoroughly, the Ministry of Finance have decided that it will not be necessary to submit the agreement to the Iraqi Parliament, nor to seek legislative authority for pledging the oil royalties in the manner laid down in article 5 thereof. Parliamentary sanction would apparently have been necessary had His Majesty's Government insisted on letters of instruction to the Iraq Petroleum Company, as was at first proposed.

4. The Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance have all expressed their appreciation of the reduction of the rate of interest and also of the other special concessions made to the Iraqi Government. They are evidently pleased with the outcome of the negotiations.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 81.

Sir B. Newton to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Secret.)

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, November 6, 1939.

WITH reference to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' *note verbale* of the 12th September regarding the credits required by the Iraqi Government for the purchase of armaments and railway materials, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stating that it is now possible for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to grant these credits under a more simple and direct procedure than that hitherto under consideration.

2. I enclose herewith the text⁽¹⁾ of the revised credits agreement that it is proposed to conclude with the Iraqi Government in substitution of the agreement, the draft of which was communicated to your Excellency's Government through Mr. Hogg.

3. The reasons for the changes introduced are as follows:—

- (a) Under present conditions His Majesty's Government are prepared not to insist on the more elaborate procedure of a guaranteed bond issue.
- (b) The revised draft enables the Iraqi Government to effect payments for purchases in India or in any other countries to which His Majesty's Government may be prepared to agree.

The above two concessions could not have been granted under the former procedure.

- (c) His Majesty's Government have reduced the rate of interest in a similar agreement with one other country to 4 (four) per cent., and they are prepared to make the same reduction in favour of Iraq. The Iraqi Government will, of course, at once appreciate that so low a rate could not at present be justified on commercial grounds.

⁽¹⁾ For this text as signed, see Eastern (Iraq), December 1, Section 2 (E 7842).

4. The new procedure will have the advantage, from the point of view of the Iraqi Government, of eliminating stamp duty and the expenses which would be connected with a bond issue.

5. Your Excellency will see that the amount involved is £3,710,000. This sum is made up of £3,250,000 for defence requirements and £460,000 for railway supplies ordered through the Crown Agents. These totals do not include the £100,000 already accounted for by the deed arrangement with the Crown Agents.

6. Interest will be payable in January and July of each year on all the sums advanced as from the date upon which they were advanced. Since some goods have already been shipped, the first interest payment will be in January 1940.

7. The first repayment of principal is postponed to July 1941, because the Iraqi Government have to pay £100,000 under the Crown Agents' deed in January 1941.

8. His Majesty's Government have not felt able to waive the requirement that the loan shall be a charge on the oil royalties. They have, however, agreed not to insist on a general bond or on letters of instruction to the Iraq Petroleum Company, and they presume, therefore, that in the circumstances further legislation in Iraq will not be necessary. They have obtained some security, though of a rather different nature, from Roumania and Turkey for similar credits, and they hope that the Iraqi Government will recognise, especially in view of the reduction in the rate of interest spontaneously offered to them by His Majesty's Government, that there is no question of any discrimination on the part of His Majesty's Government against them. Further proof of their anxiety to help the Iraqi Government has already been afforded by the facilities given, in advance of the conclusion of a formal agreement, in respect of the supply of munitions from the War Office and from India.

9. It is very important that the agreement shall be kept secret, as His Majesty's Government do not wish the special concessions which are being made to the Iraqi Government to become known. This applies particularly to the rate of interest, and I most earnestly request that the Iraqi Government will take all necessary steps to ensure that the news of this concession does not leak out.

10. The conclusion of the agreement is a matter of great urgency, since the sum of £100,000 guaranteed to the Crown Agents for payment on behalf of the Iraqi Government is nearly exhausted and the Crown Agents have no further authority to undertake additional payments. Viscount Halifax trusts, therefore, that full authority to sign the agreement may be sent to the Iraqi Minister in London with the least possible delay.

I avail, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 81.

Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir B. Newton.

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, November 19, 1939.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 6th November, 1939, regarding the agreement proposed for conclusion between our two Governments concerning the credits to be granted to the Iraqi Government, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Ministry of Finance has authorised the Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary, London, by air mail, to sign the agreement on its behalf in accordance with the provisions of article 4 of the Law for the Purchase of Stores against the Issue of Bonds, No. 39 of 1939.

In offering to your Excellency my warm thanks for the efforts personally exerted by you for reaching such result, I avail, &c.

ALI JAUDAT.

[E 8010/72/93]

No. 82.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 717.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, December 8, 1939.

IN my telegram No. 431 of the 23rd November, I reported that there were renewed signs that the present Cabinet were in difficulties. So far as can be judged at the moment of writing, these difficulties appear to have subsided and the tension to have left the atmosphere. But a crisis, and even a *coup*, may at any time develop, for, as an Iraqi informant who may be more impartial than most remarked to me, a change of Government may be considered due after nine months or so, and the position of the Nuri Cabinet has deteriorated since he came into power, although it is impossible to say how far it has deteriorated. It may, therefore, be useful to your Lordship to be furnished with the following broad outline of the internal political situation.

2. Opposition to the Prime Minister is apparently being conducted by two main groups. The first and perhaps the more influential is what might be called the parliamentary Opposition. It is led by Jamil Madfai and embraces the other members of the last Cabinet, several ex-Ministers with hopes of office if there is a change, and the few remaining adherents of Hikmat Sulaiman. The motives of the parliamentary Opposition are a desire to hit back at Nuri Said for his *coup* against them last December, their natural wish to taste once more the sweets of office, and their dislike of the activities of the courts martial set up by Nuri's régime. They seem to have no serious difference in principle with the general policy of the Government, but indict them with the familiar charges of inefficiency and corruption which are customarily cited in this country against Governments in office. Among the public this group is supported by a considerable number of officials, whose interests have been harmed by what is alleged to have been Nuri Pasha's pursuit of personal vengeance against all who worked for his enemies and his unfair favouring of his own dependents and friends.

3. The second group is that of the Arab extremists who would like to exploit the war to obtain an amendment of the white paper policy in favour of the Arabs of Palestine and the Nationalists of Syria. This group has a number of supporters in the army and among the young *intelligentsia* and student classes. It works largely through the Nationalist clubs and is a profitable field for German propaganda.

4. It is difficult to say what measure of co-operation there may be between these two elements. The record of the leaders of the first group does not suggest that they really share the extreme views of the second, nor that, if they were to return to office, they would less readily fulfil the obligations of the alliance with Great Britain or be more intractable concerning Arab nationalism than Nuri Pasha and his colleagues. Nevertheless, the common opposition of these two groups to Nuri Said may possibly bring about an uneasy and ephemeral coalition to defeat the Government. There is also a danger that Jamil Madfai and his friends may be tempted to sue for the support of the extremists with pledges which it would embarrass them to have to fulfil in office.

5. The second group, the Arab extremists, lacks men of standing and seems to be looking for leaders. At one time it appeared that Sami Shaukat would fill this rôle, but latterly there has been an inclination for the rank and file to pin their hopes upon Taha-al-Hashimi, concerning whose differences with Nuri Said rumours have from time to time been in circulation. It will be recalled that before becoming Minister of Defence Taha-al-Hashimi was president of the Palestine Defence League. General Taha's own attitude is uncertain. Some say that he aims at the premiership, but others, including both the Prime Minister himself and Taufiq Suwaidi of the Opposition, are emphatic that he realises that he is unfitted to form and lead a Cabinet. Possibly his purpose is limited to securing a certain degree of support both in the army and among the political public in order to maintain his own position through the shifts and changes of political life.

6. Others who must be taken into account are Rashid Ali, Muhammad-al-Sadr and Maulud Mukhlis.

7. Of the first, it is said on all sides that he is ambitious to become Prime Minister. He apparently enjoys the Regent's confidence, but would find it

difficult to form a Cabinet, for few of the parliamentary Opposition would take office under him. Nevertheless, as principal political adviser in the Palace, he is in a favourable position to seize any opportunity which may occur to make a bid for power. Muhammad-al-Sadr, the President of the Senate, is believed to aspire one day to head a predominantly Shia Cabinet, but, though his name has been mentioned recently in political circles as a possible Prime Minister, the Suni effendi element is unlikely ever to accept a Shiah 'alim as Prime Minister. It is also doubtful whether Muhammad-al-Sadr could ever succeed in consolidating Shiah opinion behind him.

8. Maulud Mukhlis, the President of the Chamber, is a passionate Arab Nationalist, and though his political ineptitude and addiction to the bottle are well known, it is suggested in some quarters that the extremists are considering whether, with the support of abler and younger men, he could not be made the figure-head of a pan-Arab Government. Such a scheme is not, however, likely to appeal to many of the personalities normally counted as eligible for ministerial office.

9. Nuri Said's efforts to placate his critics have not met with much success. He has so far failed to persuade Jamil Madfai or any of his group to join the Cabinet and, in spite of his efforts on behalf of the Arabs in Palestine and the welcome given to the Mufti in Bagdad, the extremists continue to accuse him of having failed to do all that might have been done to further the Arab cause and of being too amenable to British influence. He is not, however, without supporters and, according to recent reports, his position with the army has lately improved.

10. His son Saba said recently, with some distress, that Nuri Said was showing signs of weariness. Although he was naturally tired when he dined with me on the day of his journey back from Egypt, and on other occasions he has seemed less cheerful and resilient than usual, I do not feel able from personal experience to confirm Saba's statement. It is possible that Nuri would willingly relinquish office for a rest if he were not afraid that he would be victimised by his enemies so soon as he ceased to be in authority. One ex-Minister who discussed the matter with a member of my staff even went so far as to say that, if Nuri Said resigned, he would be unable to stay in the country. If really faced with such a dilemma, he would, of course, be inclined to cling unduly to office, and his opponents, having no effective constitutional means of removing him owing to the proved inability of Parliament in Iraq to upset the Government, by which it has been packed, may attempt to organise yet another change of Government by force.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, to the Governor-General of India, and to the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

CHAPTER III.—SYRIA.

[E 4872/5/89]

No. 83.

Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Damascus, July 9, 1939.

FOLLOWING the direct intervention of the High Commissioner in administrative organisation of Syria, the Syrian political leaders have declined to co-operate, and the President of the Republic resigned 7th July.

In consequence of the situation thus created the High Commissioner yesterday evening issued four decrees:—

1. Suspending Syrian Constitution.
2. Dissolving Parliament.
3. Placing the administration of the country in the hands of a Directorate composed of permanent Syrian heads of Government Departments under Syrian Administrator-General.
4. Nominating Behij-al-Khatib (Personalities, No. 72) Administrator-General.

There have been no public demonstrations.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 57, and Beirut, No. 18, Saving.)

[E 4894/5/89]

No. 84.

Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord,

Damascus, July 3, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the text of a communiqué issued yesterday, Sunday, by the French High Commissioner, stating that, for "le maintien de l'ordre public" and in view of the failure of the Syrian Government to take the appropriate action dictated by circumstances, he had decided to increase the local autonomy of the regions of the Jebel Druze and the Alawites, and also to institute French control in the Jezirah. M. Puaux drew the attention of the Syrian Prime Minister to the need of delaying no longer the application of the "Arrêté" No. 5/LR of the 10th January, 1936, creating a system of local governments, called mohafazats.

2. The French authorities, having failed to induce any of the Syrian Governments that have been constituted since the resignation in February last of the Nationalist Cabinet of Jamil Bey Mardam to help them back into the administrative saddle, have been, I believe reluctantly, obliged to take the initiative themselves. In previous reports I have informed your Lordship that the immediate aim of French policy since the rejection by the Senate Committee of the 1936 treaty appeared to be the creation of a federal system. This is now in the main accomplished by the detachment of important districts, already ethnically and religiously distinct, from the Central Syrian Government. The finer division of the country is foreshadowed by the minatory reminder to the Prime Minister that the system of mohafazats must be brought in at once.

3. In a despatch to your Lordship's predecessor (No. 13 of the 13th January, 1936⁽¹⁾) I dealt in some detail with the implications of the system of mohafazats and, in paragraph 6, with the Syrian reactions in the matter. It may be recalled that it was the Nationalist opposition to the High Commissioner's decrees on this subject that started the general strike of 1936, which, in turn, led directly to the French promise of a treaty and to the signing in Paris of the 1936 treaty that was two years later recanted by the French Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.

4. The political cycle has made one complete revolution. French policy is back to the point where the Syrian Nationalists challenged it in February

⁽¹⁾ "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs," Part XXXVIII, No. 90.

1936. In the meantime, the local political atmosphere has, from the French point of view, improved considerably. The amount of rope that the French authorities allowed the Syrian Nationalists in power between December 1936 and December 1938 sufficed for the Kutleh-al-Wataniyah (Nationalist bloc) to hang itself in the eyes of most Syrians. The bloc has disintegrated into emulous political factions, whilst the bulk of the population has had a surfeit of political intrigue and place-hunting. The French political officers have skilfully played on all the cords. It may therefore be guessed that there will be little or no dangerous internal anti-French reaction.

5. The danger, if there is immediate danger, appears likely to come from Iraq, where disgruntled Syrians, no doubt encouraged by the immunity enjoyed by Palestinian revolutionaries in Syria in the past, are apparently making earnest efforts to stir up a revolt in Syria from a safe distance. It is doubtless to parry such attempts that the High Commissioner has provided for the continuance of French military control in the Jezirah region.

I understand that the French are in possession of information to the effect that Adil-al-Azmeh and Fawzi Kawokji are working directly with Sheikh Ajil-al-Yawir, the powerful tribal chief of the Shammar of northern Iraq, to create disorders in the district of Deir-ez-Zor. It has, I gather, been noticed that there has been corresponding activity among the Shammar in Syria. At the same time, Mahomet-al-Yassin, chief of the Iraqi desert police, is reported to have been questioning very closely all visitors from Syria who enter Iraq about the number of French troops in Syria and about their dispositions. Coupled with information of this nature are accounts of military training being imparted to Shammar tribesmen by Germans or German agents in Iraq.

Altogether, I am inclined to think that the three months that have elapsed since the despatch of my telegrams No. 18 of the 24th March and No. 20 of the 5th April have brought no material change in the situation. In my telegram No. 18 I suggested that Iraqi activity in connexion with Syria seemed likely to cause us some embarrassment, whilst in my telegram No. 20 I saw no likelihood of serious disturbances breaking out in Syria, provided the Iraqis under the influence of Syrian extremists did not meddle.

6. I see no reason to disagree with the French opinion that Syria is unripe for immediate independence. From past experience of French skill in handling tiresome and suspicious populations, I should feel little doubt in their ability to deal efficaciously with any political situation within Syria were the international situation less obscure. On the other hand, in the event of war the French administrators would be in a stronger position. It may be remembered in this connexion that, hated though the Turks were by the Syrians, and pressed though they were by the British forces, which employed every possible device to stir up revolt in Syria, the Turks had no difficulty in maintaining complete tranquillity in the country throughout the Great War.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's representatives in Aleppo, Bagdad, Beirut, Jerusalem and Paris.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MacKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 84.

Communiqué.

(Published July 2, 1939.)

Pour le Maintien de l'Ordre public.

M. GABRIEL PUAUX, Haut-Commissaire de France, s'est rendu à Damas, où il a reçu son Excellence Nassouh Bey Boukhari, Président du Conseil démissionnaire. Il lui a fait connaître qu'en présence de la carence gouvernementale et du refus du Parlement syrien de prendre en considération les conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement français subordonne la conclusion d'un accord définitif, il se trouvait dans l'obligation de prendre certaines mesures nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre public.

Le Gouvernement français estime, en effet, indispensable de donner satisfaction aux vœux des populations rattachées à la Syrie par un traité qui a été mis en application avant sa ratification et qui leur impose un régime dont les inconvénients et même les dangers ont été mis en lumière par une expérience de deux années. En conséquence, le Haut-Commissaire a pris des arrêtés apportant diverses modifications aux statuts du territoire alaouite et du Djebel-Druze pour renforcer leur autonomie, sans toutefois porter atteinte à l'unité politique, économique et législative de Syrie. Un régime judiciaire spécial est également prévu pour ces territoires. Des pouvoirs ont été conférés aux représentants du Haut-Commissaire afin d'assurer pendant une période probatoire le fonctionnement régulier des nouveaux statuts.

Dans le territoire de la Djézireh, où de récents incidents ont révélé une effervescence qu'il importe de calmer sans délai, le représentant de la France recevra une mission spéciale afin d'être à même de jouer le rôle d'un arbitre équitable entre les diverses confessions et les groupements ethniques.

Le Haut-Commissaire a, d'autre part, attiré l'attention de son Excellence Nassouh Bey Boukhari sur la nécessité de ne pas différer plus longtemps l'application à l'ensemble de la Syrie du régime de décentralisation prévu par le statut des mohafazats et de faire établir dès à présent par les administrateurs les listes des collèges électoraux afin que les élections des conseils de mohafazat puissent avoir lieu en septembre prochain.

Le Haut-Commissaire a également fait ressortir qu'il y aurait lieu de procéder à une révision des nominations de personnel dont la liste figure en annexe à l'arrêté 5/LR, qui aurait été faite contrairement aux dispositions de l'article 30 de cet arrêté.

(Communiqué par le Haut-Commissariat de la République française en Syrie et au Liban, le 2 juillet 1939.)

[E 5002/5/89]

No. 85.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, July 5, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 45 of the 10th June, 1939, regarding the situation in the Jezireh, I have the honour to report that on the 3rd July the High Commissioner of the French Republic published a decree ("Arrêté" 139/LR) providing that the powers and functions devolving by the laws and regulations in force upon the Administrator of the Muhafazat of the Jezireh shall be exercised until further order by the delegate of the High Commissioner at Hassetché. The delegate may be assisted in his functions by a Syrian Assistant Administrator.

2. This decree, which should satisfy the reiterated demand of the inhabitants of the Jezireh that they should be directly governed by a French official, not by a Syrian from Damascus, is calculated to put an end to the effervescence which has been so persistent in that region since the accession to power in 1936 of the Syrian Nationalist Government, and which has on several occasions led to grave civil disorders.

3. Colonel Marchand, who was delegate of the High Commissioner at Hassetché from October 1938 to June 1939, returned to Aleppo, ostensibly on sick leave, immediately after the events recorded in my despatch No. 45, referred to above, and has now left for France. It is understood that on the 7th June, although actually present in the Serai at Kamechlie while the demonstrators were forcing an entrance and pulling down the Syrian flag, he cautiously refrained from appearing and did nothing to control the situation. This conduct cost him the confidence of the High Commissioner, who lost no time in intimating to him that his continued presence in the Jezireh would be undesirable. He was replaced temporarily by Commandant Mossaze.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut, Damascus and Mosul.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 5213/5/89]

No. 86.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 56.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, July 12, 1939.

WITH reference to Damascus despatch No. 46 of the 3rd July, 1939, I have the honour to report that recent changes in the political status of Syria, beginning with the communiqué issued by the French High Commissioner on the 2nd July and ending with the resignation of the President of the Syrian Republic and the suspension of the Constitution, have been received with the most complete and extraordinary calm at Aleppo. Not a voice has been raised in protest, not one workman has gone on strike, not a single street demonstration has been organised. Neither the Nationalist *bloc* nor the Opposition parties have by any sign or token displayed an intention to resist a policy which but a short time ago would have been regarded as reactionary and totally unacceptable to all patriotic Syrians.

2. For this tame acquiescence three main reasons are responsible. The first is the discredit and virtual disruption which has overtaken the Nationalist *bloc* here since the end of the strike reported in my despatch No. 37 of the 29th April last. The second is the general feeling of disillusionment, not to say disgust, which has been engendered among the essentially unpolitically-minded population of Aleppo, who, having not without misgiving entered the political arena in 1936 to help the Nationalists into power, found that their only reward was maladministration, lack of stability and increasing subordination to Damascus. The third is a better perception of the bitter realities of the international situation, driven home by the object lesson of the loss of the sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey. This has brought the erstwhile masters of Aleppo within 30 miles of the city gates on the west as they were already on the north, and has given rise to a feeling that the only chance of averting the loss of Aleppo also to Turkey is by encouraging the French to stay in Syria and keeping them in as strong a position as possible.

3. The indefinite postponement of the doubtful boon of independence is also compensated to some extent by the consideration that the increased local independence to be enjoyed in future by the Mohafazat will give an impetus to the natural development of the town and district of Aleppo, which has in the past been too often sacrificed to Damascus.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 5264/5/89]

No. 87.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 385.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, July 18, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 244 of the 9th July, 1939, I have the honour to inform you that the decision of the mandatory authorities to suspend the Constitution in Syria was received with a chorus of angry protests in the Iraqi press.

2. The main theme of the articles which have been published is that by this act France has broken all her promises to the people of Syria and has shown her determination to maintain indefinitely colonial rule over the French mandated territories of the Levant.

3. In many articles it was alleged that French and British policies in the Middle East have been co-ordinated with the positive intention of weakening the Arabs and of encroaching upon their hard-won liberties. The cry of encirclement was borrowed from German propaganda and the shutting-in of the Arabs was declared to be clearly the aim of British and French policy.

4. Some papers pointed to the noble example of Palestine and urged the Syrians to show themselves as brave as their Palestinian brothers. Others remarked that the Syrians themselves were in part to blame for the disasters which had overcome them because they had allowed themselves to be divided and weakened by internal party dissensions.

5. One leader writer declared that for years the Arabs had clung to their trust in the British Government and in the war pledges of the Allies. This trust had now, once and for all, been dispelled, and replaced by feelings of hatred and the desire for revenge. The British and French policy of violence aiming at the extermination of a peaceful and proud people was responsible for this momentous change of feeling, the grave consequences of which God alone could foretell.

6. A happier note has been struck since the arrival in the Lebanon of the young King Faisal. Long accounts of the warm reception given to him by the Syrian and Lebanese people have taken the place of the earlier political diatribes and stories of how His Majesty was hailed as King of Syria have been gleefully published under large headlines.

7. On returning from his visit to Syria to arrange for the King's reception, the Prime Minister told me that he had been received by his Excellency the French High Commissioner and had discussed the political situation with him.

8. M. Puaux had stated that he wished to negotiate a new treaty with Syria and to bring it into force within a year. It would provide independence for Syria, but would retain the local autonomy which was now being established by decree for the Jabal Druze, the Alawite and the Jazirah. The Prime Minister said that this sounded well-meaning enough, but he feared that the French would find nobody to trust them now in Syria.

9. I took this opportunity to mention that I had heard that it was believed in certain quarters in Syria that if it were not for help and encouragement received from Iraq by malcontents in Syria the political difficulties in that territory would soon be solved. It would be unfortunate and embarrassing for all concerned if Iraq could be held to blame. The Prime Minister denied the truth of these stories and declared that many of them were circulated by Ibn Saud who received foolish reports from his legation in Bagdad. Recently, for example, it had been put about by the Saudi-Arabian Minister that a large supply of rifles and ammunition had been sent to Syria from Iraq. This was quite untrue, and the Iraqi Government were determined to maintain a correct attitude towards the French authorities in Syria. If, however, the French Government failed to solve their problems in Syria now, a day of reckoning was bound to come.

I have, &c.

BASIL NEWTON.

[E 5323/5/89]

No. 88.

Mr. R. I. Campbell to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 957. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 26, 1939.

IN his despatch No. 488, very confidential, of the 20th April last, His Majesty's Ambassador had the honour to report the representations which he made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of French policy in Syria, in accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 907, very confidential, of the 15th April. A subsequent conversation with M. Bonnet on the same subject was reported in Sir Eric Phipps's despatch No. 558, very confidential, of the 1st May.

2. I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a note⁽¹⁾ from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply to the above representations. It is stated that the French Government have come to the conclusion that the 1936 treaty, even as amended in 1937 and 1938, did not answer either the needs of Syria or the aspirations of native opinion. Opposition to the system defined in

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

these texts has been increasing, and both non-Moslem circles and the population of the outlying regions dreaded the advent of a régime which, under colour of centralisation, appeared to have as its essential objectives the suppression of the guarantees which had been traditionally recognised to members of other confessions, and the abolition of the provincial franchises. The experience of the last two years could only confirm the mandatory Power in the feeling that the wishes of the different clans in the country had not been sufficiently taken into consideration. For this reason, France, after ripe reflection, considered that it was her duty to call on the elements in question to participate more directly in the administration of their own interests. France did not, however, renounce her resolve of making, within a period which could not yet be fixed, her relations with Syria the object of a contractual settlement.

3. The note goes on to say that these explanations should be sufficient to dissipate any doubt there may be in regard to the motives by which French policy is inspired, and states that the French Government attaches importance to His Majesty's Government using the credit which the Treaty of Alliance gives them at Bagdad to ensure that opinion in Iraq is not mistaken on this subject.

4. The note concludes by stating that the recent evolution of affairs in the Levant shows that Syria is tending, inside her frontiers, to become more and more conscious of her own interests, and to orient herself accordingly. Without denying the force of the moral relations which unite the country to the surrounding peoples, the mandatory Power has none the less reached the conviction that these attachments, which are above all sentimental, are far from outweighing the results of twenty years of a narrowly national existence. There would be serious disadvantages in ignoring the effects of this state of affairs.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Bagdad, Cairo and Jedda, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

R. CAMPBELL.

[E 5323/5/89]

No. 89.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. R. I. Campbell (Paris)

(No. 1923. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 4, 1939.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 957 of the 26th July, in which was enclosed a copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the policy of the French Government in Syria.

2. I request that you will take a suitable opportunity of expressing to M. Bonnet my appreciation of this courteous communication.

3. I certainly realise the force of the objections to a centralised rule from Damascus, and I have noted with relief the calm with which recent measures in Syria have been received by the population. You may inform his Excellency accordingly, and add an assurance that His Majesty's Government will not fail to continue to use all their influence at Bagdad to ensure that the Iraqi Government view developments in Syria in their proper perspective.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Bagdad, Cairo and Jedda, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[E 5572/1291/89]

No. 90.

Records of Leading Personalities in Syria and the Lebanon.

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Chapter I.—Syrian Personalities.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1. Mehmet Ali Bey al Abed. | 55. Grégoire Hindié. |
| 2. Suleyman Sylvain Abouchar. | 56. Henri Hindié. |
| 3. Mahomet Bey Adali. | 57. Edmond Homay. |
| 4. Michel Akras. | 58. Youhanna Houbbi. |
| 5. Kemal Alpar. | 59. Rashid al Hussami. |
| 6. Naim Antaki. | 60. Hussein al Ibish. |
| 7. Mar Ignatius Aphram I. | 61. Nuri al Ibish. |
| 8. Dr. Yusuf Aractingi. | 62. Hassan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha. |
| 9. Najib Armanazi. | 63. Yusuf al 'Isa. |
| 10. Amir Adel Arslan. | 64. Said Bey Ishak. |
| 11. Amir Shekib Arslan. | 65. Ihsan Bey al Jabri. |
| 12. Fathalla Assioun. | 66. Sa'adallah al Jabri. |
| 13. Hashem al Atassy. | 67. Salim Jambart. |
| 14. Abdul Ghafar Pasha al Atrash. | 68. Amir Ja'far al Jezairi. |
| 15. Hassan al Atrash. | 69. Amir Said al Jezairi. |
| 16. Sultan bin Hamud Pasha al Atrash. | 70. Kaddour Bey. |
| 17. Ata Bey al Ayyoubi. | 71. Védi Munir Karabay. |
| 18. Raouf al Ayyoubi. | 72. Abdurrahman Kayali. |
| 19. Abd al Kader al Azm. | 73. Sheikh Najib Keis. |
| 20. Abd al Kader al Muayyad al Azm. | 74. Rushdi Kekhia. |
| 21. Haqqi al Azm. | 75. Sheikh Abdul Qader Keyhani. |
| 22. Khaled al Azm. | 76. Nessib Keyhani. |
| 23. Nazih al Muayyad al Azm. | 77. Behij al Khatib. |
| 24. Wasseq al Muayyad al Azm. | 78. Zeki al Khatib. |
| 25. Adil al Azmeb. | 79. Faiz al Khoury. |
| 26. Nabih al Azmeb. | 80. Farès al Khoury. |
| 27. Cemal Baki. | 81. Nazem Koudsi. |
| 28. Salah al Din Bey Baki. | 82. Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Kueishish. |
| 29. Fozi al Bakri. | 83. Mahomet Kurd Ali. |
| 30. Nassib al Bakri. | 84. Mustafa Bey Kusseiri. |
| 31. Subhi Barakat. | 85. Kyrillos IX. Mughabghab. |
| 32. Husni Barazi. | 86. Yusuf Liniado. |
| 33. Negib Agha Barazi. | 87. Said Mahasin. |
| 34. Moustapha Barmada. | 88. Sami Maidani. |
| 35. Fakhri Baroudi. | 89. Haj Fateh al Marachli. |
| 36. Dr. Albert Beylouni. | 90. Haidar Mardam Bey. |
| 37. Nassouhi al Bukhari. | 91. Jamil Mardam. |
| 38. Abud Combaz. | 92. Sami Pasha Mardam. |
| 39. Sheikh Dahham al Hadi. | 93. Nebih al Martini. |
| 40. Antoine Eddeh. | 94. Dr. Abdurrahman Melek. |
| 41. Haj Sami Sayem al Dahr. | 95. Ali Misirli. |
| 42. Hassan Bey Djebbara. | 96. Sheikh Meizar bin Abdul Muheisen. |
| 43. Michael Elian. | 97. Bedi al Muayyad. |
| 44. Mgr. Antoine Faraj. | 98. Mahomet Khalil Mudarres. |
| 45. Amir Fa'ur bin Mahmud al Fa'ur. | 99. Amir Mujhem bin Muheid. |
| 46. Said al Ghazzi. | 100. Habib Na'asaneh. |
| 47. Lutfi Haffar. | 101. Mahomet Nahas. |
| 48. Taufiq Haiyani. | 102. Rahmo Nahmad. |
| 49. Yusuf al Hakim. | 103. Damad Ahmed Namy. |
| 50. Hassan Bey al Hakim. | 104. Hamdi al Nasr. |
| 51. Shakir al Hanbali. | 105. Sheikh Nawwaf al Salih bin Sharkh. |
| 52. Abu al Huda al Hassibi. | 106. Raphael Nimr. |
| 53. Subhi al Hassibi. | 107. Sherif al Nuss. |
| 54. Yahya Hayati. | 108. Nuzhat al Mamlouk. |
| | 109. Mahomet Aref Quwatli. |
| | 110. Shukri Quwatli. |

111. Edmond Rabbath.
112. Sheikh Rakan bin Murshed.
113. Mazhar Reslan.
114. Khalil Rifaat.
115. Mahomet Ali Ridha al Rikabi.
116. Macarios Saba.
117. Rushdi al Safadi.
118. Georges Sahnouli.
119. Riza Said.
120. Sheikh Abdel Kader Sarmini.
121. Dr. Mahomet al Sarraj.
122. César Sayegh.
123. Hamdi Selçuk.
124. Amir Fawwaz Sha'alan.
125. Amir Nuri Sha'alan.
126. Dr. Abdurrahman Shahbandar.
127. Taufiq Shamieh.
128. Amir Bahjat al Shehabi.
129. Amir Moustapha al Shehabi.
130. Ihsan Sherif.
131. Sheikh Jamil al Din al Shugha'ar.
132. Mousallam Sioufi.
133. Teyfur Sökmen.
134. Mgr. Iyunis Stali.
135. Herant Sulahian.
136. Afif al Sulh.
137. Ardavazt Surmeyan.
138. Alexandros Tahhan.
139. Sheikh Taj ed Din al Hassani.
140. Abdughani Türkmen.
141. Ahmed Fsek Türkmen.
142. Abbas Ulku.
143. Jemil al Ulshi.
144. Cemil Yurtman.
145. Mahomet Said al Yusuf.
146. Sheikh Yahya Zamaita.
147. Farid Zein ed-Din.
148. Louis Ziade.

Chapter II.—*Lebanese Personalities (Beirut Consular District).*

1. Habib Abi-Chahla.
2. Maître Roukos Abou-Nader.
3. Sobhi Aboul Nasser.
4. Najib Aboussouan.
5. Mgr. Pierre Antoine Arida.
6. Amir Majid Arslan.
7. Amir Rafik Arslan.
8. Amir Khalil Bellama.
9. Amir Berjawi.
10. Abdullah Beyhum.
11. Assad Bustany.
12. Maître Camille Chamaoun.
13. Amir Fayek Chehab.
14. Amir Jemil Chehab.
15. Amir Khalid Chehab.
16. Omar Daouk.
17. Emile Eddé.
18. Hussein Bey el-Ahdab.
19. Kheireddin Ahdab.
20. Amir el Assad.
21. Sayyid Ahmed el Hussein.

Chapter I.—*SYRIAN PERSONALITIES.*

(Damascus and Aleppo Consular Districts.)

1. *Mehmet Ali Bey al Abed.*—Born 1874. A son of Ahmet Izzet Pasha al Abed, the power behind the throne of "Abdul the Damned." Of Kurdish extraction (which he is anxious to forget). A prudent pan-Arabist. At one time was employed in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, and for six glorious weeks was

22. Colonel Sheikh Khalil el Khazen.
23. Sheikh Bishara Bey el Khouri.
24. Sheikh Sami el Khouri.
25. Captain Nur ed Din Rifahi.
26. Habib Pasha es Saad.
27. Riad es Solh.
28. Dr. Nicolas Fayad.
29. Maître Hamid Frangieh.
30. Dr. Kamel Gargour.
31. Sheikh Mustafa Ghalaini.
32. Ibrahim Haider.
33. Sobhi Haider.
34. Georges Haimari.
35. Sheikh Hussein Hamadi.
36. Sabry Hamadi.
37. Sheikh Yusuf Istephan.
38. Hikmat Jumblat.
39. Gabriel Kabbaz.
40. Sheikh Tewfik Khaled.
41. Khalil Kaeib.
42. Musa Moubarak.
43. Musa Nammour.
44. Izz ed Din Omari.
45. Dr. Ayoub Tabet.
46. Georges Tabet.
47. Selim Tacla.
48. Gabriel Léon Tappouni.
49. Pierre Trad.
50. Gebran Tuani.
51. Maître Abdullah Yaffi.

Chapter III.—*French Officials in Syria and the Lebanon.*

1. Bailly, Pierre.
2. Bringuier, Colonel Henri.
3. Caillaud, General.
4. de Carpentier, Rear-Admiral.
5. Collet, Colonel Philibert.
6. Colombani, François.
7. David, Philippe.
8. Dubecq, Henry.
9. Fauquenot, Emile, M.B.E.
10. Forgeois, Gaston.
11. Gennardi, P.
12. Hauteclouque, Jean Marie François, Comte de.
13. Keller, Général de Brigade.
14. Lafond, Pierre.
15. Leusse, Pierre, Comte de.
16. Mentque, Jean, Vicomte de.
17. Meyer, Captain.
18. Meyrier, Jacques.
19. Monet, General.
20. Pouaux, Gabriel.
21. Purifié, Paul.
22. Reclus, O.
23. de Sandfort, Barthe.
24. Sarrade, Colonel Marie-Joseph.
25. Seyrig, Henri.
26. Tézé, Commandant.
27. Valluy, Claude.
28. Vasselet, Paul.

Turkish Minister in Washington. Spent the war in Switzerland and on the Côte d'Azur encouraging, at a safe distance, the Allied cause. Was elected President of the Syrian Republic in 1932 as a neutral. Has two good-for-nothing sons and an intelligent but indiscreet daughter who, by pan-Arab zeal and advanced nymphomania, worries her parents and by outspoken affection for the English (especially unmarried British liaison officers!) offends the French. Resigned from presidency bowing before the minatory attitude of the Nationalist bloc, which sought to make speedy way for Hashim al Atassy (*q.v.*) December 21, 1936. A wily old man who, like Mr. Jingle, "hides the grin of cunning beneath the mask of friendship." No longer of any political account. Now spends most of his time in the south of France. (June 1939.)

2. *Suleyman Sylvain Abouchar.*—Born about 1890. Greek Orthodox. Son of Naaman Bey Abouchar. Received his secondary education as a civil engineer in the United States. Chief engineer of the Public Works Department. Has had experience in Mexico. Speaks French and English. Intelligent, capable, straight. Very hot-tempered and dislikes being contradicted. (May 1936.)

3. *Mahomet Bey Adali.*—Born about 1857. One of the most prominent and influential Turkish notables of Antioch. A francophile, he was Deputy for Antioch in the Constituent Assembly, 1928, and Minister of Agriculture and Economics in Taj-ed-Din's Cabinet from 1934 to 1936. Again elected Deputy for Antioch in 1936 after the signature of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, he has been pilloried by the Turks in the sanjak for supposedly pandering to the Syrian Nationalists and his house at Antioch was attacked by them in 1937. In September 1938 he was elected a member of the Hatay Chamber of Deputies, and was in consequence suspended from the Syrian Chamber in December 1938. (June 1939.)

4. *Michel Akras.*—Maronite Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1877. Educated in the Maronite College at Beirut. Concealed certain British consular archives during the war. Francophil. (July 1936.)

5. *Kemal Alpar.*—Born in 1899 at Alexandretta. Studied at Salonica and Istanbul and later went to Germany, where he studied engineering. Later he returned to Istanbul and was in the Mercantile Marine for three years, after which he became assistant manager of the Haydar Paşa Electric Power Station under the Turkish Ministry of Public Works. In 1927 he again went to Germany to study railway engineering, and in 1929 returned to Turkey to take up an appointment as a railway engineer. In 1935 he became inspector-general in the Turkish Ministry of Public Works, and in 1937 he was transferred to the inspection branch of the Railway Engineering Service. In 1938 he returned to the Hatay and was for a time president of the "Halk Evi" at Alexandretta. In June 1938 he was appointed Chief of the Public Works Department of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, and on the 4th September, 1938, he became Minister of Public Works and Agriculture of the Hatay. (January 1939.)

6. *Naim Antaki.*—Born 1900. Educated in the American University, Beirut. Of the Greek Orthodox communion. A lawyer, he formerly worked with Maître Louis Ziadé and was at one time dean of the Order of Barristers at Aleppo. Has visited India. Secretary to the Syrian delegation in Paris for the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian Treaty. On his return he became in July 1937 Director of Foreign Affairs, but resigned in December 1937, being dissatisfied with the way in which he was ignored by his Moslem colleagues whenever important decisions were to be taken. Formerly an ardent Nationalist, his views are now considerably more moderate. (January 1938.)

7. *Mar Ignatius Aphram I.*—Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite) Patriarch of Antioch. Born 1884. Educated by the Dominicans at Mosul and received into the Roman Catholic communion. Subsequently reverted to his original church and was ordained in it. A travelled and cultured man who avoids partisanship. Now resides permanently at Homs. (January 1938.)

8. *Dr. Yusuf Aractingi.*—Born about 1885. Educated at Jesuit College in Beirut. Director of Public Health. In the Turkish Army Medical Corps during the war. A mine of inaccurate information on Bedouin and Syrian customs and folk-lore. A poor doctor but an ardent Francophil. (June 1939.)

9. *Najib Armanazi*.—Born about 1900. From Hama. Docteur en Droit ("à titre d'étranger") of Paris. Was private secretary to President Abed, and so anathema to Taj ed Dine, who persuaded de Martel to oblige Abed to get rid of him. Now 100 per cent. Nationalist. Appointed private secretary to President Atassy in 1937. (February 1938.)

10. *Amir Adel Arslan*.—Born about 1890. A Druse. Was pro-Turk in the war and enjoyed a kaïmakamship in the Lebanon. Member of the Party of Independence 1919-20. Took an active part in the rebellion of 1925-26, and was condemned to death by the French. Amnestied in 1937. Expelled from Egypt in 1931 after anti-Italian agitations. Lived for some years in Iraq. Accompanied Syrian Prime Minister to Paris in 1937 to discuss ratification of Franco-Syrian Treaty, and subsequently returned to Syria, where he received a warm welcome. Holds no Government post at present. Has for several times visited the United Kingdom, where he has business interests. Figures on the Palestine Black List. Is inclined to be pro-British. (February 1938.)

11. *Amir Shekib Arslan*.—Born about 1882. Druse. Brother of Adel (*q.v.*). Was a kaïmakam of the Shouf in the Lebanon during the war. Collected £700 for war fund of General Officer Commanding Damascus. Proposed the disarmament of the Maronites. Wrote violent anti-British articles in the *Sharq* newspaper of Damascus. Is credited with recommending to Jemal Pasha the hanging of the Syrian Nationalists. Was condemned to death by French court-martial for participation in 1925-26 rebellion. Fled to Palestine and then to Switzerland. Pardoned in April 1937 and returned to Syria a month later. At one time member of the Syrian Nationalist delegation at Geneva. With Ihsan Jabri (*q.v.*) published, when in Geneva, an incendiary and puerile journal called the *Nation Arabe*. During the Abyssinian war was bought lock, stock and barrel by Italian Intelligence Service. Figures on the Palestine Black List. Intelligent, self-seeking, treacherous. Appointed Dean of the Arabic Language Academy in Damascus in 1938. (June 1939.)

12. *Fathalla Assioun*.—Born 1899. A lawyer of the Armenian Catholic community at Aleppo. Moderate. Elected Deputy for Aleppo in December 1936.

13. *Hashem al Atassy*.—Born about 1865. Of Homs; good landed family. Prime Minister and president of the Constituent Assembly under Feisal, and president of the Constituent Assembly of 1928. Went to Mecca to be one of the three mediators in conflict between Imam Yahia and Ibn Saud. Succeeded Hanano as leader of the Syrian Nationalist bloc in January 1936. Led the Syrian delegation that went to Paris in March 1936 to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty after the disturbances of January-March 1936. A Nationalist who tempers courage with discretion. With the Syrian delegation in Paris his moderating and soothing influence was of great assistance to the successful conclusion of the treaty negotiations. Elected President of the Syrian Republic December 21, 1936. (March 1937.)

14. *Abdul Ghafar Pasha al Atrash*.—Born about 1880. A Druse from Jebel Druse (Suweida). Took part in rebellion of 1925 together with Nassib al Bakri (*q.v.*) and Sultan Atrash (*q.v.*). True to the Druse tradition of having a member of the family in each camp, Abdul Ghafar discovered French sympathies when the rebellion failed, and was one of the first to offer his submission. Beyond the three members of the Atrash family, it is doubtful whether any Druse took an interest in the broader questions of Syrian unity, or in anything except his own affairs. Co-operated with French Intelligence Service in Syria in encouraging the idea of Druse autonomy and non-inclusion in Syrian Republic. Since the advent to power of the Nationalists is rapidly changing his spots. Self-seeking and has little influence. (March 1937.)

15. *Hassan al Atrash*.—Born about 1880. A rising personality in the Jebel Druse, in the running for the appointment of Mohafiz. A cousin of Sultan al Atrash (*q.v.*). At present supporting the Syrian Nationalists, but he is notoriously a political opportunist. (February 1938.)

16. *Sultan bin Hamud Pasha al Atrash*.—Born about 1875. (Sultan is a name, not a title.) Family originally from Rashaya. Migrated to Jebel Druse in the 1860's and became the paramount Druse family in the Jebel Druse.

Sultan is generally regarded as the head of the family, though his cousin Hassan al Atrash (*q.v.*) appears to be ousting him. Under the Turks Sultan displayed craftiness and avoided open conflict with the Vali of Damascus. He adopted a less compromising attitude with the French, and in 1925-26, although not, perhaps, the soul and direction of the revolt against the mandatory, was certainly the centre around which the various insurgent leaders moved. When the revolt was crushed Sultan fled to Transjordan, where he found political sanctuary although condemned to death by French court-martial. He was amnestied in April 1937 and returned to Syria and threw in a half-hearted lot with the Syrian Nationalist party, leaving the field clear for his cousin Hassan to dominate the Druses of the Jebel. Has but a rudimentary education and of less than average intelligence; he is crafty, treacherous and inspires confidence as a leader of banditti. Lives in the hope of returning to the enjoyment of his past influence with the advent of his erstwhile rebel associate Dr. Shahbandar (*q.v.*). (February 1938.)

17. *Ata Bey al Ayyoubi*.—Born about 1877. Head of the old and well-to-do Damascus family of Ayyoubi; claims to be Ansari. Was Mutessarif of Lattakia and Kaïmakam of Rasheva in the time of the Turks. Director of the Ministry of the Interior under Haqqi al Azm (*q.v.*) 1921-24, and Minister of Justice under Subhi Bey Barakat (*q.v.*) 1924-25. Has gained the reputation of being honest. Affects pro-Turkish sentiments and is thought pro-French by the Nationalists. Entered abortive elections December 1931 on Sheikh Taj ed Dine's list, but did not stand in those of 1932. Made Minister of Justice under Taj ed Dine's Government, March 1934. Nominated by French to be Prime Minister to replace Taj ed Dine after the disturbances of the spring of 1936. Is on the board of directors of the National Cement Company. In Turkish times he was an Arabphobe—this has not been forgotten by the pan-Arabists. Resigned the office of Prime Minister in December 1936 to make way for a purely Nationalist Government. A pleasant person and an experienced administrator. Generally liked. (March 1937.)

18. *Raouf al Ayyoubi*.—Born about 1880. Cousin of Ata al Ayyoubi (*q.v.*). Mutessarif of Damascus and Administrative Inspector 1922-25. Minister of the Interior on reshuffling of Damad's Ministry 1927. Man of no consequence politically. (December 1935.)

19. *Abd al Kader al Azm*.—Born about 1885. Rector of the Syrian University. Mixed at one time in politics, and in 1927 was Minister of Finance, but soon returned to the university, where he enjoys universal consideration. (March 1937.)

20. *Abd al Kader al Muayyad al Azm*.—Born about 1865. Azm family of Damascus and Hama. Brother of Sheik Bey al Azm, who was hanged by the Turks as a traitor during the war. Rich landed proprietor. He is the father-in-law of Abdul Rahman Shahbandar (*q.v.*). Good manners and reputation. (March 1937.)

21. *Haqqi al Azm*.—Born about 1875. President of the Conseil d'Etat. First Governor of the State of Syria (1921-24). One of the French nominees for 1932 elections and accepted by the Nationalists. Made Prime Minister in the first Parliament (1932). Found his Cabinet too much for him and resigned in 1934, when he was replaced by Taj el Dine, the High Commissioner's appointee. He was one of the original members of the "Arab Club," but to-day manages to compress his Nationalist ideals within a French frame. Owns cotton lands in Egypt which, although heavily mortgaged, yield him a modest income. A wise old man but spineless. (May 1936.)

22. *Khaled al Azm*.—Born about 1895. Son of Mohammed Pasha al Azm. Does not take an active part in politics except an occasional intervention in agricultural matters. Member of the municipal council. Managing director of the National Cement Factory. A mild pan-Arabian. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice in the Bukhari Cabinet, April 1939. Has pronounced pro-German sympathies and an idea of his own importance commensurate with his girth. (June 1939.)

23. *Nazih al Muayyad al Azm*.—Born about 1896. Brother-in-law of Dr. Shahbandar. A rebel leader in 1925, but pro-French before that date. Prepared to work with Rikabi or Shahbandar or Haqqi al Azm against Nationalists in Syria, and has a cordial dislike for the Syrian Party of Independence in Egypt. Changes his mind every twenty-four hours. Was sentenced to death by court-martial in 1926 in his absence, but had already fled the country. He was pardoned in 1931. Condemned in absence to two years' imprisonment for participation in bomb outrage against Jamil Mardam (*q.v.*). Now in refuge in Transjordan. April 1939. (July 1939.)

24. *Wasseq al Muayyad al Azm*.—Born about 1885. Was in Turkish diplomatic service and occasionally Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid until 1919. From 1923 Director of Public Domains. Minister of Agriculture under Damad 1926, and Minister of the Interior after the split 1927. Appointed Director of Police 1928. Administrator of the liwa and president of the municipality 1929. Promoted Director of Cadastral Survey Department 1934. Now Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, 1936. Hopes to be first Syrian Minister in Paris. Married to an Englishwoman of lower middle classes who is a devoted mother to his children. Heavily in debt. Starves his family to maintain his mistresses. A prig; for ever boasting of his achievements. (June 1939.)

25. *Adil al Azmeh*.—Born about 1882. A *diplomé* of the Turkish School of Law. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Internal Affairs. Obtained his appointment under the Nationalist Government in recognition of his services to the Syrian cause whilst a political refugee in Transjordan, where he formed with his brother, Nabih al Azmeh (*q.v.*), the "Istiqlal party," whose first objective was the expulsion of the French from Syria. During the 1925-26 revolt in Syria he collected, as treasurer of his party, large sums of money from Palestine, Transjordan and other countries. After keeping more than half himself, he provided the rebels in Syria with money and arms on a considerable scale. His flagrant abuse of British political asylum earned him a contumacious condemnation by French court-martial. He was included in the general amnesty of 1937. On his return he was acclaimed as a great patriot and given high office. Back in Syria he used his influence to repay the consideration he had received from the British authorities in Transjordan and Palestine by facilitating the supply of arms and ammunition to the rebels in Palestine during the disturbances of 1936 and in 1937 of going a step farther in employing the Syrian Government machinery, from his key position in the Ministry of the Interior, to assist the recruitment of bandits in Syria for thuggery in Palestine. On the fall of the Nationalist Government in the early spring of 1939 he proceeded on leave to Iraq and has not since returned. Is reported to be building a cinema with his ill-gotten gains and to be carrying on intrigue on Iraqi soil against French in Syria. As unscrupulous with his friends as with his enemies. (May 1939.)

26. *Nabih al Azmeh*.—Born about 1876. Head of the "Palestine Defence Committee" in Damascus, prominent member of the Syrian Nationalist *bloc*, brother of Adil al Azmeh (*q.v.*). Graduated from Turkish Military Academy in 1900. His advance in Turkish army was slow as he was only a lieutenant when the war broke out in 1914. Was taken prisoner by British forces in 1916, but obtained his release to join the Amir Feisal's followers, where, like the Duke of Plaza Toro, he led from the rear. When Feisal was placed in charge of the "Occupied Enemy Territory East," he was made chief of police, but fled Syria on the French occupation in 1920. He was made welcome by the Amir Abdullah as a political refugee. He and his brother formed the "Istiqlal party" in Transjordan. This led to his banishment, and he went to the Hejaz, then to Egypt and so to Palestine, where he continued to foment trouble in Syria. He was one of the first of the Syrians amnestied in the general amnesty of 1937 to return to Damascus. In August and September under the direction of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al Hussein, and in concert with the Palestinian Muni al Madi, he organised the anti-British pan-Arab Congress of Bludan. He has, in an astonishingly short time, considerably enriched himself from the subscriptions obtained by the "Palestine Defence Committee." In December 1938 used the influence his interest in the Palestine disturbances had given him to try to create trouble for the French, who lost no time in banishing him to Palmyra. A thoroughly contemptible rascal who has betrayed his friends one after another. (June 1939.)

27. *Çemal Baki*.—Born in Antioch in 1902. Studied in the University of Adana and at Istanbul, where he specialised in politics and finance. In 1929 he was appointed assistant inspector of the Agricultural Bank in Turkey, and two and a half years later became inspector-general of the bank. In 1938 he returned to the Sanjak of Alexandretta, and on the 4th September, 1938, he was appointed Minister of Finance of the Hatay. (January 1939.)

28. *Salah al Din Bey Baki*.—Born at Alexandretta, leader of the Arab Nationalist party in the sanjak. Good social position. Anti-French. (January 1938.)

29. *Fozi al Bakri*.—Born about 1880. Was president of the Arab Club in Turkish times. Was condemned *in absentia* by Turkish court-martial in 1916. Eldest son of Ata Bey al Bakri, landed family claiming descent from the second Caliph. During the war the Emir Feisal stayed in his house. After fleeing before Turkish retribution he joined in the Arab revolt 1917. Took leading part in the 1925 rebellion, but was specially amnestied at Taj-ed-Dine's request in 1928. Failed in the 1932 parliamentary elections. Overshadowed in politics by his younger brother, Nassib al Bakri (*q.v.*). A xenophobe. (May 1936.)

30. *Nassib al Bakri*.—Born about 1885. Governor of the Jebel Druze. Younger brother of Fozi al Bakri (*q.v.*). Acted at one time as honorary Chancellor to the Shereef (afterwards King) Hussein. Joined in Arab revolt 1918. Chief secretary of Feisal after occupation. One of the leaders of the 1925 revolt. Amnestied with his brother. Elected in 1931 to Syrian Parliament as moderate Nationalist and as a full-blooded Nationalist in 1936 elections. An ardent supporter of pan-Arabism. The gross political blunder of the French authorities in banishing him to Hassatjeh in January 1936 raised him to the pedestal of a popular hero who had suffered for the cause. Because of this he has, at present, considerable political influence. Appointed Mohafiz of the Jebel Druze in January 1937 in recognition of his devotion to the Nationalist cause. Forced by violent Druze opposition to relinquish the post shortly afterwards. Minister of Justice in the short-lived Haffar Ministry 1939. Owns some property in Palestine. (June 1939.)

31. *Subhi Barakat*.—Born about 1886. Once an undistinguished officer in the Turkish army, which he hastily deserted in an Arab cloak on the approach of the British forces in 1918, now one of the foremost Syrian politicians. He has played, always unsuccessfully, many parts; rebel leader against the French in the Alawite territory (1920), Chief of the State of Aleppo as French nominee (1922), president of Syrian Federation (1923), and president of the Chamber—Speaker—(1932). In April 1932 a neurotic Syrian student attempted to assassinate him. A "whole-hogger" Nationalist, and rather truculent, but is not above truckling on his own behalf. At present he appears to be completely absorbed in political circles in the Hatay. (June 1939.)

32. *Husni Barazi*.—Born about 1882. Son of Suleiman Agha Barazi, a rich Kurdish landed family of Hama. Minister of the Interior under Damad 1926. Deported on suspicion of assisting rebels in July 1926. Member of Constituent Assembly 1928. Opposed by Nationalists in elections of 1932 and was not elected. He was, however, appointed Minister of Education in Taj-ed-Din's Government in March 1934, and resigned with Sheikh Taj in February 1936. Appointed Mohafiz of Alexandretta in January 1937, he sought to prove his attachment to his new Nationalist masters by intriguing with the Arab parties in the sanjak against the Turks and the mandatory, but was ejected in November 1937, when the new statute of the sanjak came into force. Now living on his estates in Hama. (May 1939.)

33. *Negib Agha Barazi*.—Born about 1862. A Kurd. A landlord of Hama. Moderate in politics, but elected in 1932 as Nationalist Deputy. The wealthiest inhabitant of Hama. A political nonentity. (March 1936.)

34. *Moustapha Barmada*.—Born about 1885. From Aleppo. Governor of that town in 1921-22 and senior member of the Bar. Nationalist. Does not appear in politics nowadays. Of no account, not even among his colleagues of the Bar. (March 1936.)

35. *Fakhri Baroudi*.—Born 1893. Rich Damascene family. Strong Nationalist. Narrowly escaped execution in 1925-26. Leader of local youth and *intelligentsia*. Deputy in 1932, and a man of sincere convictions. Possesses considerable rhetorical powers in low Arabic which the crowd understands. Was exiled by the French during the 1936 troubles; this only served to increase his political popularity. Unbalanced and rather a windbag. A heavy drinker and a man of coarse tastes whom the Nationalist party would be glad to drop. Was "Inspector-General" of the Iron Shirt organisation. Is now head of the violently xenophobe National Arab Bureau. (June 1939.)

36. *Dr. Albert Beylouni*.—Born about 1890 at Souedieh, doctor of medicine, has a good social position at Antioch and is leader of the Arab Orthodox Community. Formerly a supporter of Subhi Barakat (No. 24), after the signature of the Franco-Syrian Treaty he came to an understanding with the Alaouite leader, Zeki Arsouzi, and adopted the policy of union of all the Arab parties of the sanjak in opposition to the Turks. (January 1938.)

37. *Nassouhi al Bukhari*.—Born about 1884. Prosperous landlord. Ex-Turkish officer. Educated in Constantinople. During 1914-18 war was brigade commander in Turkish army. Captured by Russians on Caucasian front. Escaped from prisoners of war camp in Siberia through China. Returned to Turkey via United States of America and Greece and given command of Turkish Division on Palestine front. Lost no time in deserting when British occupied Damascus in October 1918. In 1925 appointed Minister of Agriculture in the Damad's Government. In 1927 took office as Minister of Education. Formed neutral Government with himself as Prime Minister in April 1939. A man of principle and well respected. (June 1939.)

38. *Abud Combaz*.—Born 1890. Native of Aleppo. Greek Catholic. Served with the Foreign Legion and took part in the Verdun fighting in 1916. Professional letter-writer. Said to be a police-spy. Organised a body of Christian young men known as the "White-Shirts" as a counter-movement to the Nationalist private militia known as the "Steel-Shirts." Suspected of having promoted the sanguinary incidents of October 1936, he was imprisoned for over forty days and subsequently released by order of the High Commission. Now living a retired life and believed to be a French secret agent. (January 1938.)

39. *Sheikh Dahham al Hadi*.—Born about 1896. Bedouin chief. Deputy head of Al Jarba-Shummar confederation. He is the first cousin of Sheikh Meizan (*q.v.*), paramount chief of the confederation. Elected Deputy for the Jezirah tribes December 1936. (March 1937.)

40. *Antoine Eddeh*.—Born about 1895. Greek Catholic by religion. Chief secretary of the Muncipe of Damascus. Specially appointed by the mandatory Power to exercise effective control of the whole administration. He draws a higher salary than his chief, Tewfik-el-Haiyani, the Mohafiz. The Nationalists were for ever seeking to have him displaced as his influence was feared and alleged to be pro-French and succeeded in 1938, when he was dismissed. He subsequently obtained a post in the Beirut Municipality. A man of considerable ability and an indefatigable worker. (June 1939.)

41. *Haj Sami Sayem al Dahr*.—Born 1896. Wealthy industrialist, and head of a weaving business. President of the Aleppo Chamber of Industry. Contributed largely to the Nationalist party funds and was treasurer of the funds collected for Palestine, but became discontented with the policy of the Syrian Nationalist Government and resigned from the Nationalist *bloc* in March 1939. (June 1939.)

42. *Hassan Bey Djebbara*.—Born about 1897 at Alexandretta, where he was educated in the French Collège des Frères. Worked in the Deutsche Palestina Bank and on the Bagdad Railway before the war. After the armistice he supported the French, and in 1924 was appointed Director of the Finance Department in the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Went to Geneva in 1937 to assist the League of Nations experts in drawing up the statute of the sanjak. An opportunist and self-seeker, he has supported the Alaouite element in the sanjak

which he has done much to organise. Expelled from Alexandretta in August 1938 and appointed Director of Finance at Aleppo later in that year. Acting Mohafiz of Aleppo, April 1939. (June 1939.)

43. *Michael Elian*.—Born 1900. Professes the most extreme form of nationalism. Spendthrift. Trimmer. Appointed "Garçon d'Honneur" of Nation's Home at Aleppo. (January 1938.)

44. *Mgr. Antoine Faraj*.—Born about 1884. Greek Catholic Vicair Patriarchal. Damascene. An intriguer and a windbag, without influence. (June 1939.)

45. *Amir Fa'ur bin Mahmud al Fa'ur*.—Born about 1900. Chief of the El Fadl Bedouin (sedentary), near Lake Hula. Friend of Amir Said Jezairi (*q.v.*). The lands of his tribe are astride the Syria-Palestine frontier. Elected Deputy for Kuneitra, December 1936. Strongly suspected of being engaged in smuggling arms and men to Palestine during the disturbances of 1937 to 1939. (June 1939.)

46. *Said al Ghazzi*.—Born about 1895. Lawyer. Lost his popularity with the Nationalists by supporting Taj ed Dine. Pressed for Nationalist participation in 1932 elections. When negotiations with High Commissioner's delegate came to a deadlock (Ihsan Sherif insisting on standing), Said al Ghazi withdrew his own candidature. Reputation enhanced by not being a party to the subsequent deals. Withdrew a second time in favour of Afif al Sulh in July by-election. Included in Ata Bey al Ayyoubi's Cabinet as Minister of Finance in March 1936. Refused the post of Mohafiz of Lattakia, January 1937. Appointed Director-General of Ministry of National Economy. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1938, but dismissed in 1939. Good-natured, intelligent, comfortably off. Too colourless to be either useful or dangerous. (June 1939.)

47. *Lutfi Haffar*.—Born about 1890. Textile merchant. Minister of Public Works under the Damad 1926, and deported for Nationalist sympathies some months later. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928. One of the present Nationalist leaders; has a reputation for a knowledge of economics. Accepted post as Administrator of Ain Fijeh waterworks. Deputy 1932. A moderate Nationalist of ability. Elected Deputy again in 1936. Elected Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Prime Minister for fifteen days in 1939. (June 1939.)

48. *Taufik Haiyani*.—Born about 1895. From Aleppo. Kaïmakam of Douma in 1925 and Mutessarif of Hauran since 1930. Secretary to the Syrian Government after the dismissal of Sheikh Taj ed Dine. Acting Governor of Damascus during the elections of April 1932. President of the Muncipe of Damascus 1936 and Mohafiz of Damascus. He is a keen official but has no friends at court. (February 1938.)

49. *Yusuf al Hakim*.—Born about 1875. Greek Orthodox from Lattakia. Brought up in the Ottoman magistrature. Was president of the Cour de Cassation but accepted interim portfolio as Minister of Justice under Damad 1926 at instance of the French High Commissioner, who promised to keep his original post for him, which was done. Still working for Damad's return as Prince of Syria. Not a bad fellow. Intelligent. Tries to hunt with the Nationalist hounds while running with the French hare. (March 1936.)

50. *Hassan Bey al Hakim*.—Born about 1886. Minister of Education in Bukhari Cabinet, April 1939. Director-General of Moslem Wakfs (August 1937). Was an Inspector of Finance and later Director of Posts and Telegraphs in Feisal's Syrian Government (1918-20). He was held responsible for delay in sending off Feisal's reply to General Gouraud's ultimatum in July 1920. (It was the absence of a reply that provided the excuse for General Gouraud to order the French troops to advance on Damascus.) He fled to Egypt and later went to Iraq. Then he obtained an appointment as manager of the Arab Bank's Jaffa branch. Amnestied in 1937, he returned to Damascus and received, as a loyal Nationalist, his present employment. Integrity good; politics, pan-Arab. (June 1939.)

51. *Shakir al Hanbali*.—Born about 1880. Lawyer. Mutessarif of Damascus 1924. Minister of Education under Damad 1926-27. Minister of Justice 1930. Acting Minister of the Interior 1932. Disliked by the Nationalists. Now out of office. Professor in the Syrian School of Law. Intelligent, moderate, of no moment. (March 1936.)

52. *Abu al Huda al Hassibi*.—Born about 1891. Landlord. Elected a Deputy in 1932 elections as French nominee. Re-elected as Deputy for Katana, December 1936. (March 1937.)

53. *Subhi al Hassibi*.—Born about 1895. Son of Ahmad al Hassibi. Agricultural engineer. Acting president of the Municipality 1925. Was at one time president of the Agricultural Bank. Now Director of the Locust Bureau. Was a member of the Constituent Assembly 1928. Strong Nationalist but not noisy. Keen on his job, intelligent and a good fellow. (April 1936.)

54. *Yahya Hayati*.—Born about 1885. Ex-Turkish officer. Studied at the Military School in Constantinople and rose during the Great War to the rank of colonel. After the occupation of Damascus he became a supporter of Feisal. Took a leading part in the 1925-26 revolt against the French, and afterwards escaped to Transjordan. Later joined Dr. Shahbandar in Egypt. Condemned to death by the French, but amnestied in 1936. Returned to Syria and in 1938 was appointed Director-General of the still-born Ministry of National Defence. (June 1939.)

55. *Grégoire Hindié*.—Armenian Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1895. Educated in the Armenian Seminary in Rome. Member of a wealthy Aleppo family with political connexions. A brother was at one time Minister of Finance. Formerly known as a Francophil, after his brother's resignation from the Finance Ministry he became a vehement critic of the French Administration in Syria and is now just as critical of the Syrian Nationalist Administration. (January 1938.)

56. *Henri Hindié*.—Born 1899. Partner in Hindié Frères, one of the more considerable Aleppo business houses. Formerly Syrian Minister of Finance. At one time Francophil, after his resignation he became a critic of the French Administration in Syria and is now very hostile to the Syrian Nationalist Administration. (January 1938.)

57. *Edmond Homsy*.—Born 1897. Son of Albert Homsy, a private banker with interests in Egypt, and reputed to be a very rich man as wealth goes in Aleppo. The father is Roumanian consul here, and during the war was, it is said, exceedingly intimate with Jemal Pasha, Commander-in-chief of the Vth Army Corps, with whom he did lucrative business; successively he has shown warm pro-Turkish, pro-German, pro-British, pro-Arab and pro-French sentiments.

The son as a young man spent a few months in Switzerland and a few months as an undergraduate at Oxford. He is of pleasant address but reputed indolent. Syrian Minister of Finance, March to October 1936. Member of the Syrian Delegation for the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian treaty. Elected as Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo, December 1936. (March 1937.)

58. *Youhanna Houbbi*.—Born about 1889. Syrian Catholic Archbishop of the Jezireh. A confirmed opponent of the Syrian Nationalists and leader of the separatist movement in the Jezireh. Went to Paris in September 1937 with the Syrian Catholic Patriarch, Cardinal Tappouni, and is believed to have succeeded in securing from the French Government certain additional safeguards for the Christian minorities in the Jezireh. Owing to the hostility of the Syrian Nationalists he was not allowed to return to his see in the Jezireh, but was obliged to remain in Beirut for a time in 1938. Later, however, he succeeded in obtaining permission to return.

59. *Rashid al Hussami*.—Born about 1881. A lawyer. Ex-procureur général of the Court of Cassation. Nationalist in feeling, but does not appear in politics. Has returned to the bar. Well respected and popular. (April 1936.)

60. *Hussein al Ibish*.—Born about 1890. A Kurd. Son of Ahmad Aga al Ibish. Well known in Cairo as dealer in race-horses. Married sister of Abdulrahman Yussef and inherited large properties near Hijane, which he farms. Hunted big game with Yussef Kemal. Takes no part in politics, but in close touch with Bedouin. Sportsman. Has had a succession of bad years with his farm, is rather short of money, has grown disheartened and seems to be going steadily downhill. (April 1936.)

61. *Nuri al Ibish*.—Born about 1895. Younger brother of Hussein. Was at Cirencester Agricultural College. Very like his brother, in whose continued misfortunes he shares. (April 1936.)

62. *Hassan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha*.—Born 1866. Medical practitioner and expert in forensic medicine. Head of the Nationalist bloc at Aleppo. He has a big influence over the populace, to whom he is known as "Abouna." An ardent Pan-Arab, fanatically anti-French. Elected Deputy for Aleppo, December 1936, he resigned in March 1939, but his resignation has not yet been accepted by the Chamber. (June 1939.)

63. *Yusuf al 'Isa*.—Born about 1880. Greek Orthodox from Jaffa. Deported by the Turks. Editor of *Alif Ba*. Leader of anti-Zionist demonstrations 1929. Syrian Monarchist. Though to have been the author of a forged manifesto, said to be by Hanano, in elections of 1931. Failed in 1932 elections. Able journalist. Probably, like his kind in Syria, for sale. Has lately shown a disposition to see the wisdom of controlling his Anglophobia, which seems now to be less pronounced. His newspaper has the largest daily circulation of any Syrian paper (3,000 to 4,000). (June 1939.)

64. *Said Bey Ishak*.—Born 1897. Elected Christian Deputy for the Jezireh in 1937, despite the opposition of the Syrian Nationalists. One of the leaders of the separatist movement in the Jezireh. (January 1938.)

65. *Ihsan Bey al Jabri*.—Brother of Sa'adullah al Jabri ("Aleppo Personalities," No. 13). Deputy for Aleppo in the Parliament at Constantinople during the Turkish régime and for a time A.D.C. to the Sultan. Returned to Aleppo after the war and proceeded to Damascus, where he was Chamberlain to King Feisal during the latter's short reign. Fled with King Feisal at the time of the French occupation of Damascus, first to Palestine and then to Iraq. In 1924 he was delegated by the Syrian Arabs to go to Geneva to uphold the cause of Syrian independence at the League of Nations in company with the Druse leader, the Emir Shakib Arslan. Sentenced to permanent banishment from Syria and remained in Europe working for this cause from 1924 to 1937. Amnestied in April 1937, and appointed Mohafiz of Lattakia in November 1937, in succession to Mazhar Reslan. Dismissed April 1939. (June 1939.)

66. *Sa'adullah al Jabri*.—Born 1890. An extreme Nationalist who helped to organise armed opposition to the French in 1920 and has worked against them ever since. He was a member of the Syrian delegation for the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian treaty and was elected a Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo in December 1936. After his return from Paris he became much more moderate. He was Minister of the Interior in the former Nationalist Government and also first Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A pleasant personality combined with a certain ability. (June 1939.)

67. *Salim Jambart*.—Born 1873. Merchant. President of the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce. Formerly Syrian Minister of Public Works, but resigned in 1933 since he was not prepared to endorse M. de Martel's draft treaty. A moderate Nationalist, he was defeated in the last Syrian elections. Minister of National Economy in the Haffar Ministry, February-March 1939, and in the Ministry of Nassouhi al Bukhari, April 1939. Agreeable and generally respected, but hardly a live wire. (June 1939.)

68. *Amir Ja'far al Jezairi*.—Born about 1895. Conservateur du Musée Arabe. Son of Amir Taher. Nationalist sentiments, but does not appear in politics. Cultivated, honest, but of no account. (April 1936.)

69. *Amir Said al Jezairi*.—Born about 1872. Head of the family. Proud of descent from Abd-al-Qader. Takes himself very seriously and likes to be called "Altesse." Pretends to aspire to the presidency or Kingship of Syria. Headed electricity boycott, Italian boycott and Hedjaz railway agitation during the summer of 1931. Has properties in Palestine and so likes to keep in with the British authorities. Up to the neck in debt. Narrowly escaped being sold up in 1931. His son tried to murder him in 1934, because of his supposed stinginess. Not very clever, nor entirely sane. Rather a joke with everyone. (April 1936.)

70. *Kaddour Bey*. Born 1887. Elected Moslem Deputy for the Jezireh in the Syrian Parliament, 1937, although he is not a Nationalist. (January 1939.)

71. *Vedi Munir Karabay*.—A Turk of Antioch, born about 1894, a lawyer by profession. Elected Deputy for Antioch in the Sanjak Chamber of Deputies in September 1938. Vice-President of the Chamber. (January 1939.)

72. *Abdurrahman Kayali*.—Born 1890. Educated in the American University at Beirut. Married into the Mudarres family. King Feisal's chamberlain at Damascus. Prominent Nationalist and inclined to preach moderation. His influence is probably less than might be expected. Intelligent, but not masterful. Elected Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo in December 1936. Minister of Education and of Justice in the former Nationalist Government. Went to Geneva in December 1936, to put forward the Arab claim for Alexandretta. Sent from Damascus to Aleppo in February 1937 to apologise to the French for the Steel-Shirts clash with the French gendarmerie. Known for his peaceful feelings. (June 1939.)

73. *Sheikh Najib Keis*.—Chief spiritual judge of the supreme Druze Mejliss of Bayada. (June 1939.)

74. *Rushdi Kekkia*.—Born 1905. Belongs to a well-known Aleppo Moslem family. Elected Deputy for Aleppo December 1936, he became known for his vehement speeches in the Syrian Assembly. Resigned from the Nationalist bloc March 1939. (June 1939.)

75. *Sheikh Abdul Qader Keylani*.—Born about 1875. Of Hama. Descendant of 14th century namesake. Rich and respected family. Had a legal training in Constantinople. Deputy under Turkish régime. Minister of Agriculture under Taj ed Dine 1928-29. Nationalist. (April 1936.)

76. *Nessib Keylani*.—Born about 1896. Of Hama. Deputy for Douma in 1932. French nominee. Non-party. Not re-elected in 1936. Has almost succeeded in dissipating the sufficiency his father left him. (March 1937.)

77. *Behij al Khatib*.—Born about 1893 in the Lebanon and educated at the American Protestant College. Appointed a Government clerk in Feisal's Administration (1919-20) and went to Palestine on the occupation of Syria by the French. He returned in 1923 and obtained a minor Government post. During the revolt of 1925-26 Behij Bey served in the Ministry of the Interior and earned the reputation of being a pro-French official. He afterwards served under Sheikh Taj ed Dine in 1928 and as private secretary to Hakki Bey al Azm in 1932, thus incurring the displeasure of the Nationalist party. He was then sent as Mutessarif to Deir-ez-Zor until 1934, when Sheikh Taj ed Dine, once more Prime Minister, appointed him Administrative Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior. He also filled the posts of head of the municipality and Director-General of Police. In 1937 the Nationalist party, who had come into power, dislodged him on account of his alleged pro-French sympathies. He was, however, retained in Government service on French insistence and did much to quieten down the situation in the Jebel Druze, where he went as Administrator in November 1937. Did equally good work in the Jezireh in 1939. He has earned the unusual reputation of being a painstaking and incorruptible public servant. He speaks both English and French fluently. (May 1939.)

78. *Zeki al Khatib*.—Born about 1890. Not known before the elections for the Constituent Assembly 1928. Lawyer. Nationalist Deputy in 1928 and 1932. Inflammatory speech on the 20th December, 1931, contributed largely to the troubles of that day. Is an extremist. Quarrelled with the Nationalists over the terms of the Franco-Syrian treaty. Not re-elected in 1936 elections. Rapidly becoming a windy nonentity. (March 1937.)

79. *Faiz al Khoury*.—Born about 1891. Greek Orthodox. Professor of Roman law. Educated by Irish Presbyterian Mission and at Beirut and in France. Originally Protestant, but converted to Orthodoxy in 1935 as latter community has representative in Chamber and Protestants have not. Elected to the Constituent Assembly 1928 as mouthpiece for his brother Farès. Nationalist, probably Xenophobe. Nationalist Deputy in 1932. Great following among university students. Played a leading part in the first session of Parliament and again during the general strike of 1936. Tempers his ambition with prudence. Re-elected Deputy, December 1936. Head of the Damascus Bar since 1936. Minister of Finance and acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the fifteen-day Ministry of Lutfi Haffar 1939. (June 1939.)

80. *Farès al Khoury*.—Born about 1870. Protestant. Educated American College at Beirut. Was a dragoman at the British consulate, Damascus, from 1899 to 1909. Lawyer; Minister of Finance under Feisal, when he discreetly

lined his pockets. Minister of Public Instruction under Damad 1926. Deported some months later on suspicion of assisting rebels, thus winning martyr's crown of glory and confidence of Moslems. Well off. Chairman of board of directors of National Cement Company; professor of the School of Law; legal adviser to the municipality. Took leading part in the general strike of 1936. Went to Paris in March 1936 as member of the Nationalist delegation to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty. Deputy, December 1936. Elected president of the Chamber of Deputies (Speaker) the 21st December, 1936, in recognition of his services to the Nationalist bloc in the treaty negotiations. Has since tried to justify the paradox of his inclusion in an otherwise all-Moslem Administration by being "plus royaliste que le Roi." Brother of Faiz. A prudent, skilful and unscrupulous politician. Entirely venal. (May 1939.)

81. *Nazem Koudsi*.—Born 1906 Aleppo. Lawyer. Hot-head. Extremist. Active during troubles of February 1936. Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo, December 1936. Resigned from Nationalist bloc, March 1939. (June 1939.)

82. *Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Kueishish*.—Born about 1890. Bedouin chief. Head of the Feda'an tribe in the Upper Jezira (Amir Mujhem, *q.v.*, is the paramount chief). More pugnacious than the paramount chief, whose successor he will probably become. (March 1937.)

83. *Mahomet Kurd Ali*.—Born 1875. Formerly editor of Muqtabas, but handed over to brother on accepting office under the French. Minister of Public Instruction under Haqqi-al-Azm 1921 and Taj-ed-Dine 1928-30. During war wrote ferocious leaders against British and French, and in 1921 was foolish enough to visit Jemal Pasha in Berlin and was dismissed by the French. Was made president of the Syrian Académie arabe, but was removed from the office in 1934 on the ground of the insufficiency of his knowledge of the Arabic language. Was Minister of Public Instruction till 1932. Now in Egypt seeking admission to the Arab Academy of Egypt. Pompous turncoat. (April 1936.)

84. *Mustafa Bey Kusseiri*.—Born 1876. A prominent Turkish notable of Antioch. Minister of Agriculture and Economics in Ata Bey Ayoubi's Provisional Cabinet during the negotiation of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, he lost popularity with the Turks of the sanjak for his supposed pro-Nationalist policy and his house in Antioch was attacked by them in 1937. In September 1938 he was offered a seat in the Hatay Chamber of Deputies, which he declined, but at the same time he resigned his seat in the Syrian Chamber. (June 1939.)

85. *Kyrillos IX, Mughabghab*.—Born about 1858. Greek Catholic Patriarch. Lebanese, formerly Bishop of Zahlé. Generally considered anti-French. Tried to remove Greek Catholic priests from seminary of St. Anne at Jerusalem (Pères blancs), without success. Unpopular with his flock and the French High Commission, who pointedly gave Légion d'Honneur to his vicar-general. Spends half his time in Egypt and half in Syria and Lebanon. Has recently earned hostility of Moslems on account of his efforts, which were unsuccessful, to get the Christian churches to combine to send a delegation to France in March 1936 to protect the interests of the "minorities" in connexion with the Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations. A Vicar of Bray. (May 1936.)

86. *Yusuf Liniado*.—Born about 1872. Jew. Formerly a banker, but now penniless. Deputy in 1928 and 1932. No party, but Zionist in feeling. Never opposes the Nationalists. Re-elected Deputy, December 1936. Chameleon. (March 1937.)

87. *Said Mahasin*.—Born about 1885. Poor Damascus family. Educated Constantinople. Lawyer. Minister of the Interior under Taj ed Dine. Rigged elections to the Constituent Assembly 1928; was attacked by Nationalists and jettisoned by Taj ed Dine. Now become a Royalist. Member of the Damascus bar. His Royalist activities were the consequence of his personal objection to Taj ed Dine. Professor of Civil Law in the Syrian University. One of the best lawyers in Damascus (a partner of Sami Maidani, *q.v.*). Keeps as free of politics as his ambitions, which are tawdry, permit. (April 1936.)

88. *Sami Maidani*.—Born about 1895. Son of Sadiq Maidani, wheat merchant in the Maidan. Studied law in Germany and has a German wife. A

professor in the School of Law. Is a member of the Municipal Council. Entered 1932 elections as Independent and received only twenty votes. A sound lawyer who now keeps out of politics. Has pronounced German sympathies. (June 1939.)

89. *Haj Fateh al Marachli*.—Member of a wealthy Aleppo Moslem family. Notorious pro-Turk during the war, but joined Ibrahim Hanano in the rebellion which he organised against the French and fought with him till 1921, when he escaped to Turkey, where he owns villages near the Syrian frontier, and settled in Gazi Aintap. Opted for Turkish nationality and is still *persona grata* to the Turks, in whose interest he is still reputed to be working, despite the gratitude lavished on him by the Syrian Nationalists. Returned to Aleppo in April 1937 on the proclamation of the amnesty and was accorded a triumphal reception. (May 1939.)

90. *Haidar Mardam Bey*.—Born about 1900. Wealthy landlord. Son of Sami. Was secretary to Feisal. Formerly chief secretary to the municipality. Appointed Administrative Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and "chef du protocole," January 1938. Married to a Christian woman. Pleasant and open-minded. (February 1938.)

91. *Jamil Mardam*.—Born about 1890. Cousin of Sami Pasha. Nationalist. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928, and member of various deputations sent by the Constituent Assembly to the French High Commissioner. Deputy in 1932 and Minister of Finance. Formed and led a party of Syrian Arabs to try to effect a settlement between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahia in 1934. His counsel carries great weight in the Nationalist party. Was member of the Nationalist delegation that went to Paris in March 1936 to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty. Formed Nationalist Government December 1936 and became Prime Minister (Président du Conseil) and Minister of National Economy the 21st December, 1936. Popular and ambitious. A skilful politician of agreeable personality. (March 1937.)

92. *Sami Pasha Mardam*.—Born about 1860. Formerly a rich landlord, but now heavily in debt. Enjoys general respect, but is of little account politically. Uncle and father-in-law of Jamil Mardam. (March 1937.)

93. *Nebih al Martini*.—Born 1884. Began his career as a clerk in a Turkish police office. Held various administrative positions and was Mutessarif at Deir-az-Zor during the British occupation. Mohafiz of Aleppo from 1925 to February 1937, when he was put on the retired list. Moderate, well-meaning, but weak and unreliable. (June 1939.)

94. *Dr. Abdurrahman Melek*.—Born in Antioch in 1893, son of Hadj Faik Bey Melek Zadé. Studied in the Rushdieh School, Antioch, and the Imperial Lyceum, Aleppo, and in 1910 entered the Medical School in Damascus. Went to Istanbul in 1911 to continue his studies. Served in the war as Assistant Director in the 41st Division. After the war he opposed the French in Antioch and was deported by General Gouraud to the Island of Rouad. Released after the Ankara Agreement, he returned to Antioch and in 1931 was elected a Deputy in the Alexandretta Council of Representatives. Co-operated with Teyfur Sokmen in working for the Turkish interests in the Sanjak, and was co-founder with him of the "Halk Evi" in Antioch. In 1935 he went into exile and lived in Istanbul. Went to Geneva in 1937 to assist the Turkish delegation in settling the Sanjak question. Returned to Antioch in 1938 and was appointed Vali of the Sanjak. Appointed first Prime Minister of the Hatay, the 4th September, 1938. Cultivated, intelligent and pleasant mannered. Elected Member for Aintab in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, March 1939. (May 1939.)

95. *Ali Misirli*.—Turkish merchant of Antioch, born about 1903, enjoying a certain influence. Elected member of the Sanjak Chamber of Deputies for Antioch, the 4th September, 1938. (January 1939.)

96. *Sheikh Meizar bin Abdul Muheisen*.—Born about 1899. Bedouin chief. Head of the Al-Jarba-Shummar Confederation, mainly settled in the Jezira. (May 1936.)

97. *Bedi al Muayyad*.—Born about 1870. Rich landlord. Educated at Constantinople. Deputy for Damascus under Turkish rule. President of the Representative Council 1921-22. Minister of Justice to Haqqi-al-Azm 1921-24. Minister of Agriculture and Acting Minister of Public Works under Sheikh Taj ed Dine, and Minister of the Interior when Taj ed Dine was dismissed. Took a holiday in Paris and was made a great fuss of by the Quai d'Orsay. Held office in Taj ed Dine's Ministry in 1935 and retired with it after the general strike of 1936. (April 1936.)

98. *Mahomet Khalil Mudarres*.—Born 1894. Member of a family of wealthy Aleppo landowners. President of the Aleppo Cotton Spinning Company. Moderate in politics. Appointed Minister of Finance in the Ministry of Nassouhi al Bukhari, April 1939. (June 1939.)

99. *Amir Mujhem bin Muheid*.—Born about 1886. Bedouin chief. Head of the Feda'an tribe in the Upper Jezira. Elected Deputy for the Jezira, December 1936. Generally respected. (March 1937.)

100. *Habib Na'asaneh*.—Syrian Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1894. Educated in the Jesuit College at Beirut, and a man of some culture. Francophil; on good terms with his Patriarch. (July 1936.)

101. *Mahomet Nahas*.—Born about 1890. Ex-Turkish officer. Ex-Director of Finance at Damascus. Director of Finance of Ibn Saud for about two years. Again Director of Ministry of Finance. Reported to be thoroughly inefficient. (February 1938.)

102. *Rahmo Nahmad*.—Born 1876. Well-to-do Aleppo business man. Head of the Israelite community in Aleppo and member of the Administrative Council of the Vilayet since the Turkish régime. A critic of British policy in Palestine. (June 1939.)

103. *Damad Ahmed Namy*.—Born about 1885. Circassian origin. Grandfather was Emir Mahmoud, and Governor of Tripoli. Father was Fakhro Bey and had large estates in Beirut. Ahmed Namy was son-in-law to Abdul Hamid, and retains, rather questionably, the title of Damad, although divorced. Became Chief of State of Syria 1925-26 at a critical moment and worked conscientiously at a policy of conciliation. The French High Commissioner dropped him without ceremony and replaced him by Taj ed Dine. Supported Nationalists in the Advisory Council 1931. Formerly sedulously cultivated de Martel. Still clings to the hope of being made King of Syria. Has far less political influence than he thinks. Well meaning, perhaps a little fatuous. (June 1939.)

104. *Hamdi al Nasr*.—Born about 1885. Damascene. Started as a clerk in the Finance Department and has risen to the post of Directeur général. Was Minister of Finance under Damad 1925, and left with him in 1928 and returned to his Government office. Dismissed from his post by the Nationalist Government January 1937. An intelligent and conscientious civil servant. (March 1937.)

105. *Sheikh Nawwaf al Salih bin Sharkh*.—Born about 1880. Bedouin chief. Head of the Hadidi tribe, one of the largest and wealthiest of the Syrian desert. Sheikh Nawwaf was educated in the tribal school at Constantinople. An astute and benevolent ruler. (May 1936.)

106. *Raphael Nimr*.—Born 1877. Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Aleppo. Educated in the Balamand Monastery, near Tripoli. On bad terms with his Patriarch. An intriguer. Visited South America at the end of 1938. (June 1939.)

107. *Sherif al Nuss*.—Born about 1880. One of the leading merchants in Damascus. Avoids politics. Acting president of the chamber of commerce and member of the board of the National Cement Company. Like most Syrians, he is Nationalist in sentiment. Influential, good Moslem. (March 1937.)

108. *Nuzhat al Mamlouk*.—Born about 1882. Of Damascus. Commandant of Police in Aleppo. Was educated in Damascus and later in Constantinople, where he obtained a military proficiency certificate, and in 1909 was commissioned into the Turkish cavalry. In 1910 he was engaged in a punitive expedition against the Druses. Went in 1912 on Turkish military mission to Afghanistan. Joined

Turkish Flying Corps in 1916 and served with it in Persia and Iraq during the rest of the war, after which he left the Turkish army and in 1922 joined the Syrian gendarmerie. In 1926 he was acting Commandant of Police in Aleppo, but was later retired on political grounds.

In May 1936 he was called upon by the Nationalist party to organise and command the Hadeedi (Iron Shirts). In January 1937 was appointed Commandant of Police in Aleppo.

109. *Mahomet Aref Quwatli*.—Born about 1875. Landlord. President of the Chamber of Agriculture. Old-fashioned country squire, fond of shooting. Keeps out of politics, and has suffered losses through his family's connexion with the rebellion. Has one son, Saadi, aged 26, a pleasant but spineless lad. (April 1936.)

110. *Shukri Quwatli*.—Born about 1886. Landlord. Nationalist during the Feisal régime and anti-French. Removed himself to Palestine on the French occupation, but returned later. During the rebellion of 1925 afforded every assistance to the rebels (except, of course, personal participation in fighting), for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment by court-martial. He fled to Palestine and was amnestied in 1931, and again returned to Syria. Interested in his farm and a "National" fruit-preserving project. Vice-President of the Nationalist bloc. Made Finance Minister and Defence Minister (combined) in Jamil Mardam's Cabinet, the 21st December, 1936. Sincere extremist so long as his personal safety is not involved. Has decided German sympathies. During Palestine disturbances of 1937 pretended officially to oppose terrorism in that country, but secretly facilitated financing of the terrorists in Palestine both directly and in respect of arms purchases made in Syria. A shifty chauvinist. (February 1938.)

111. *Edmond Rabbath*.—Born 1903. Aleppo lawyer. Renounced his Greek nationality on attaining his majority, became a Syrian subject and joined the Nationalist bloc. Elected a Deputy for Aleppo in 1936. Formerly an extremist, his views have lately become moderate. Now resides in Beirut. (June 1939.)

112. *Sheikh Rakan bin Murshed*.—Born about 1905. Bedouin chief. Head of the small but predatory El Kmasah-Saba'a tribe, which is usually encamped in the Salimiyeh district. Elected Deputy for the Damascus tribes December 1936. A sheikh after the novelist's heart. (March 1937.)

113. *Mazhar Reslan*.—Born about 1883. Native of Homs. During war was Kaïmakam of Mosul. After war was made Director of Education under the Feisal Government. Subsequently, was appointed Mutessarif of Deir-az-Zor and, later, of the Belqa district. In April 1921, after the establishment of the Amirate of Trans-Jordan, he was appointed Mustashar al Haqqania (Chancellor) by the Amir, and was later made Mustashar Mali (Treasurer). In July Reslan formed a new Government, taking himself the office of chief Minister. He was replaced by Rikabi in March 1922, yet returned to power in February 1923, but resigned in September of the same year. He subsequently held office as Minister of Finance, but in May 1924 he again threw his hand in and came back to Syria. In 1926, however, he fled the country after having been implicated in the 1925 revolt. He returned in 1928, was Deputy for Homs in the Constituent Assembly 1928, again in 1932, and then made Minister of Justice and Education, but was not employed by subsequent Governments until 1937, when the "Nationalist" Government appointed him the first Mohafiz of Latakia in January 1937 attached temporarily to the headquarters of the Nationalist bloc, December 1937. Minister of Interior in the fifteen-day ministry of Lutfi Haffar, 1939. He is a typical specimen of Turkish-trained Arab official. He is courageous but slow-witted, holds ultra-nationalistic political views, but moderates his passions in matters affecting the administration of his district or department. (June 1939.)

114. *Khalil Rifaat*.—Born about 1880. Educated at Constantinople. Lawyer. President of the Criminal Court of the First Instance, under Feisal and Haqqi al Azm. Director of police under Damad. Superseded by Wasseq al Muayyad, his enemy. Procureur général to the Courts of Cassation and Appeal. Now Inspector-General to the Ministry of Justice. Good reputation. (February 1938.)

115. *Mahomet Ali Ridha al Rikabi*.—Born about 1860. Educated at Constantinople. Good Damascus family. Under Turkish régime was Vali of Basra. General in Turkish army. Commandant at Bagdad and, at outbreak of war, Vali of Medina. Transferred to Jerusalem to command of troops. Is said to have been reduced to President of Municipality at Damascus. In 1918, after fall of Nazareth, deserted to British forces, entered Damascus with them, and was made a Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. Appointed Military Governor of Syria by Feisal and Prime Minister on departure of British troops. Disputes with French led to their dismissing him in 1921. Removed to Transjordan and became Prime Minister to Abdullah 1922-23. Quarrelled with Mr. Philby (then British representative at Amman) 1923 and went to Palestine. Put up for Representative Council without success. After a period of apparent inactivity, intrigued unsuccessfully to become Prime Minister of Syria under Damad. Anti-French and anti-British, too. Cordially hated in Damascus. Never forgets an offence or misses an opportunity to pay off old scores. Put up as candidate in 1931 elections, but was not returned. Avaricious, unscrupulous and past-master of Turkish methods of intrigue. Rapidly becoming senile. (February 1938.)

116. *Macarios Saba*.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1873. Educated at Ain Traz, in the Lebanon. Was a patriarchal vicar in Egypt, where he is said to have accumulated a competence. One brother, Costaki Saba, is a Nationalist Deputy. Another, Amin, is employed in the Banco di Roma at Aleppo. The Greek Catholics were at one time the largest Christian community in Aleppo, and their archbishop is regarded as dean of the archiepiscopal body in that town. (July 1936.)

117. *Rushdi al Safadi*.—Born about 1875. Educated at Constantinople. Hussein's commander in the Taif fighting, smartly defeated by Ibn Saud. President of the Municipality, Damascus, 1925-26. Kaïmakam of Idlib in 1932. Promoted to be Mutessarif of Euphrates district in 1935. Dismissed by Nationalist Government in January 1937 for refusing to "co-operate" with the Nationalists during the elections. Has property in Amman and poses as a lover of England. No particular politics. If pro-anything, pro-Rushdi. (March 1937.)

118. *Georges Sahnaoui*.—Born about 1885. Greek Catholic of humble extraction. Successful merchant (building materials). Was a Nationalist. Member of Constituent Assembly. Elected Deputy December 1936. Member of the firm Michel Sahnaoui et Fils, who are agents of the Shell Oil Company. His brother Jean was appointed Spanish honorary vice-consul in 1936. Clever and pushing. (March 1937.)

119. *Riza Said*.—Born about 1875. Educated in Constantinople and Germany. Specialist in eye diseases. Minister of Public Instruction under Haqqi al Azm 1921. Rector of Syrian University until he was removed in 1936 from the office by the French on account of his Nationalist sympathies. A pedant with political ambitions which are not likely to be realised.

120. *Sheikh Abdel Kader Sarmini*.—Born 1865. Lawyer practising in the Shari' Court at Aleppo. Prominent Nationalist, but not extremist. Son, Zafar, condemned to term of imprisonment for incitement in February 1936. Elected Nationalist Deputy for Aleppo, December 1936. (June 1939.)

121. *Dr. Mahomet al Sarraj*.—Born about 1905. Owns property in Hama. Took a diploma in political science in France. Returned to Syria and supported the Nationalist cause. Elected a member of the Committee of the Ironshirts. Appointed in January 1938 as Director of the Political Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a position he still holds. (June 1939.)

122. *César Sayegh*.—Born about 1877 at Alexandretta, a leading member of the Arab Nationalist party there. Formerly president of the Municipality of Alexandretta, but compelled to resign owing to continuous disagreement with the French authorities. (January 1938.)

123. *Hamdi Selçuk*.—Born at Alexandretta about 1903. Studied law for three years at Istanbul and became Assistant Attorney-General at the Supreme Court in Angora. Returned to Alexandretta in the summer of 1938 and was

elected president of the "Halk Evi" and, subsequently, member of the Sanjak Chamber of Deputies for Alexandretta. (January 1939.)

124. *Amir Fawwaz Sha'alan*.—Born about 1907. Grandson of Nuri and prospective successor. Spends much of his time in the Damascus cabarets. Tendency to consumption. Not without qualities. Has a strong following in the Rualla, whom he commands during their Razzias. Treacherously slew his rival and cousin, Farhan bin Mashur, near Palmyra in April 1935. Has married both his sisters into Ibn Saud's family, one to Ibn Saud himself, and the other to the Amir Saud. These matches are looked upon by the Bedouin as having a political significance in connexion with the Wadi Sirhan grazing lands and the Jauf Oasis. Elected Deputy December 1936 under the Nationalist banner. His political allegiance depends on his pocket or his vanity—sometimes both. May yet become the force in the desert that his grandfather was; he, too, is for sale. (March 1937.)

125. *Amir Nuri Sha'alan*.—Born about 1860. A treacherous blackguard who has committed enough crimes to merit being hanged many times over. Murdered his brother in order to take his place as sheikh of the tribe. Chief of the Rualla Bedouin, and nominated in 1932 Deputy for the Bedouin in the Syrian Parliament. Assisted Feisal 1918. Superlative ruffian, completely and frankly venal; boasts of having sold himself in turn to Turks, Arabs, British and French. Still for sale, but to-day not worth his price. To please Ibn Saud he pretends to have become a Wahabi. Commander of the Legion of Honour. Grows of less and less account as his grandson Fawwaz increases his influence among the tribesmen. Still rather a "bogey-man" in Damascus. (April 1936.)

126. *Dr. Abdurrahman Shahbandar*.—Born about 1885. Extremist. "Star" student at Beirut American Protestant College (1905-10). Connected by marriage with the Azm family. One of the principal figures in the rebellion of 1925 and sentenced to death by court-martial. Fled to Egypt, where he now practises medicine, with success, in the Syrian and Lebanese colonies of Cairo. He is the spiritual head of the Syrian Nationalists and very popular (except, of course, with the Nationalist leaders). His exile has made him seem greater than he was when in Syria. For many who have never seen him he is superhuman. His inflexibility and undoubted sincerity, coupled with his rhetorical talents, combine to make him a formidable political personage. Employed the skill he acquired at a foreign educational missionary institution to modernise the practices of desert law by amputating under anaesthetic, with due regard for asepsis, hands of Syrians condemned by the rebels' tribunal for assisting the French in 1925. He introduced the novel method of first dislocating the wrist before severing the hand from the arm in the single stroke required by tradition. He stated in 1932 that he would never take advantage of an amnesty from the French, but in 1936 he tried to get it in order to join, if not lead, the Nationalist deputation in Paris and gladly accepted it in April 1937. Through his partisans, staged a triumphant return in May, stayed about a month, then, with promises to his followers to re-settle in Syria and become their political leader, went back to his lucrative medical practice in Cairo. Again returned to Syria in May 1939 after the Nationalist *bloc's* fall from grace. He still loves to meddle in Syrian and Arabian politics. Intelligent, but obsessed by his own opinion. (June 1939.)

127. *Tawfiq Shamieh*.—Born about 1880. Greek Orthodox. Head of Feisal's political bureau. One of the leaders of the People's party 1924, but for having supported Taj-ed-Dine in 1928 Nationalists have now dropped him. Minister of Public Works under the Damad 1926, and Minister of Public Works under Taj ed Dine 1928-29. Minister of Finance 1931, but unemployed after the elections until June 1936, when he was appointed Mohafiz of the Euphrates. Also acting Mohafiz of the Jezirah during 1937. Well educated, speaks English and French. (February 1938.)

128. *Amir Bahjat al Shehabi*.—Born about 1885. Studied law in Constantinople. Given an appointment in the Damascus police during the Feisal régime, but dismissed by the French. Elected head of the Damascus Bar in 1932; replaced in 1936 by Faiz al Khoury (*q.v.*). Mohafiz of the Jezirah 1937. Now President of the Damascus Court of Appeal. A Moslem. Able and of good character. (June 1939.)

129. *Amir Moustapha al Shehabi*.—Born at Damascus in 1893. Studied at one of the French schools in Damascus, at Istanbul and in France. Since 1919 he has occupied many important posts. He was Minister of Public Instruction, and accompanied the Syrian delegation to Paris during the negotiations of the Franco-Syrian treaty. Appointed Mohafiz of the Vilayet of Aleppo February 1937. Considered a man of high character and moderate political feelings. Left Aleppo in March 1939 following the resignation of the Mardam Ministry. (May 1939.)

130. *Ihsan Sherif*.—Born about 1892. Lawyer. French degree ("à titre d'étranger"). Secretary of the People's party 1924. Member of the Constituent Assembly 1928. One of the most uncompromising Nationalists. Insisted on standing for elections in 1932, thus nearly spoiling the agreement with the High Commissioner's delegate. Nationalist Deputy 1932. A man of sincere convictions, with a violent temper. (April 1936.)

131. *Sheikh Jamal al din al Shugha'ar*.—Principal of the Venerable Druze Sheikhs of Bayada.

132. *Moussallam Sioufi*.—Born about 1885. One of the leading merchants in Damascus. Member of the chamber of commerce and director of the National Cement Company. Nationalist sentiments, but steers clear of active politics. (April 1936.)

133. *Teyfur Sökmen*.—Born about 1888, son of Mustafa Pasha Mursal, an influential Turk of the Amouk. In 1919 he resisted the French occupation of the country and led bands that fought against the French in Kosseir, Kirik-Han, Marash and Aintab until 1921. After the Franklin-Bouillon Treaty was signed he went to Adana and later resided in Aintab and Istanbul, from which places he continued his activities against the French mandatory authorities in Syria, and more especially in Alexandretta. In 1933 he formed in Turkey the "Committee for Co-operation in the Sanjak," the name of which was changed in 1936 to "Committee for the Independence of the Hatay." In 1935 he was elected Deputy for Adalia in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In August 1938 he returned to Alexandretta, and on the 4th September, 1938, was elected President of the Hatay State. Re-elected Deputy for Adalia in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, March 1939. (May 1939.)

134. *Mgr. Iyunis Stati*.—Born about 1884. Of Homs. Syriac Catholic Bishop of Damascus. Unlike his predecessor he is not a fanatical Christian, that is to say, he can bear the sight of Christians not members of his Church. Is an ardent defender of the "minorities" cause. Generally esteemed. (April 1936.)

135. *Herant Sulahian*.—Born 1872. Originally from Aintap in Turkey, he rendered valuable service to his people during the massacres at Aintap in 1895. Now a merchant at Aleppo. Is of the Armenian Gregorian faith and belongs to the Armenian "Hintchak" political party. A good speaker. Elected Deputy for Aleppo in December 1936. (January 1939.)

136. *Afif al Sulh*.—Born about 1890. Originally from Beirut. Lawyer, but does not practise. Active Nationalist. Interested in politics and opposed the Turks before the war. Sent on a mission by M. de Jouvenel to Jebel Druze in 1926 to negotiate with leaders of the revolt. One of the leading Nationalists willing to co-operate with the French for the independence of Syria. Organiser of the Nationalist party in 1927. Hated by Dr. Shahbandar and his party. Accused of giving the names of the Arabs hanged by Jemal Pasha, but no proof forthcoming. Deputy of Damascus. Took an active part in organising the general strike in January 1936, was exiled by the French, but was released with the others in March of the same year. (April 1936.)

137. *Ardavazt Surmeyan*.—Armenian Gregorian Archbishop of Aleppo. Born 1892. Educated in the Gregorian College at Constantinople. A travelled man of the world and an energetic shepherd of his flock. A Turkish national and said to have some relations with Soviet Armenia. (January 1938.)

138. *Alexandros Tahhan*.—Born about 1867. Damascene. Greek Orthodox Patriarch, elected by the Damascene vote. Bishop of Tripoli before his election. Has been criticised for his weak handling of the Epiphanius revolt in the

Orthodox Church in 1935, which led to the formation of an independent Greek Orthodox Church of Latakia in 1936. Does not interfere in politics. Not popular outside Damascus. Pleasant and cultivated. (April 1936.)

139. *Sheikh Taj ed Din al Hassani*.—Born about 1885. Algerian origin (Telemsen family). Son of Badr ed Dine. Haqqi al Azm appointed him Qadi of Damascus on account of his father's popularity; had no other qualifications. Became ally of Jemil Elchi and Wasseq al Muayyad when the Damad's Ministry split in 1927. Persuaded by the High Commissioner that he could secure a subservient majority in the Constituent Assembly and distributed much of the secret funds to rig the elections, but without success. Formed the Government in 1929, entirely subservient to the French. Frankly stated in 1928 that he was prepared to take office on any terms and as representative of any party that would support him. Always busy feathering his nest. Apt to be oriental towards women when drunk, and has caused embarrassment at official dinners and receptions. Succeeded in maintaining himself until his illicit interference caused election riots in December 1931, when M. Ponsot served him up as a sacrifice to public resentment. Insisted on standing as a candidate against French wishes and spent a good deal of money, but failed hopelessly. Dropped out of favour in 1932. Received a gratuity of 400,000 fr. when he lost his post, but won his way back with M. de Martel, for whom possibly the sheikh's tub-thumping had a special attraction. Was appointed Prime Minister by the High Commissioner in 1934, and his partial and corrupt administration led directly to the general strike in 1936. Was forced to resign in March 1936 and fled to France in a complete funk, his life having been threatened by the Nationalists. Now living in Paris. Uneducated, completely venal, prepared to truckle to anybody. (June 1939.)

140. *Abdulghani Türkmen*.—Born in Antioch in 1883, son of Izzet Bey Türkmen, notable of Antioch. Was member of the Administrative Council and director of the Agricultural Bank in Antioch. Elected Deputy to the Alexandretta Council of Representatives in 1931, he worked assiduously for the Turkish interest in the Sanjak, and in 1936 became president of the "Halk Evi" (People's House). In September 1938 he was elected President of the Hatay Chamber of Deputies. (January 1939.)

141. *Ahmed Faek Türkmen*.—Born in 1908 at Antioch. Studied in Istanbul where he obtained a diploma in dentistry as well as a degree in philosophy from the university. Subsequently he became a teacher of philosophy and social subjects in various Istanbul schools, and was made Secretary-General of the Philosophy Committee in Turkey. In 1934-36 he studied philosophy at the Sorbonne in Paris. Author of works on Turkish history and language and of the "History and Geography of the Hatay." He returned to Antioch in 1938 to become Minister of Public Instruction in the Hatay. (January 1939.)

142. *Abbas Ulku*.—Born at Alexandretta about 1893. A druggist by profession, he is a prominent member of the Alexandretta "Halk Evi," and in September 1938 was elected member of the Sanjak Chamber of Deputies for Alexandretta. (January 1939.)

143. *Jemil al Ulshi* (Elchee = Ambassador).—Born about 1880. Damascene of modest extraction. Major in the Turkish army. Was Feisal's liaison officer in Beirut, and is credited, quite wrongly, with playing into the hands of the French. On the French occupation of Damascus succeeded Ala ed Din as Prime Minister, but was dismissed after a few months. Attached himself to Taj ed Dine, who appointed him Minister of Finance 1928 and Minister of Interior 1930. Lined his pockets well. Was included in the Taj ed Dine Government 1934. No longer of any account. (March 1936.)

144. *Çemil Yurtman*.—Born in 1891 at Antioch, studied law in the University of Istanbul. Returned to Antioch in 1923 and practised as a lawyer there till 1927. He then went to Turkey and was appointed judge in the Caza of Denizli Çibrikler and subsequently judge in the Vilayet of Adana. In 1932 he resigned and returned to his profession. In 1938 he returned to Antioch and was appointed first Attorney-General, later Minister of Justice of the Hatay. (January 1939.)

145. *Mahomet Said al Yusuf*.—Born about 1899. A Kurd and landowner. Son of Abdurrahman Pasha and hereditary chief of Kurds in Syria and Palestine. He received his education in Austria and Germany during the war in company with many young Syrians who, for political reasons, were made much of by the German authorities. Speaks German and some French and English, and affects the pose of the perfect man about town. Had great influence among Kurds owing to his position, but has now lost it. Not a bad fellow. Has a German wife. (April 1936.)

146. *Sheikh Yahya Zamaita*.—Born about 1875. Damascene. Sheikh Imam in Turkish army during war and was chief disciple to Badr ed Din. Exerts a certain influence among simpler sections of the people and political agent to Taj ed Dine. Since death of Badr ed Din had been trying, not yet with success, to establish himself as leader of the ulema. Shrewd and intelligent. (April 1936.)

147. *Farid Zein ed Din*.—Born about 1910. A Druze of Lebanese origin. Studied at American University, Beirut, specialising in economics, and later continued his studies in England and France. Acquired Syrian nationality and joined the Nationalist bloc. In July 1938 was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Is xenophobe in general and anglophobe in particular. Is also a prominent member of the Arab Club in Damascus, which is the centre of pro-Nazi intrigue. (June 1939.)

148. *Louis Ziade*.—Born 1886. Prominent member of the Aleppo bar. Ambitious, insinuating manners, prefers to settle cases out of court. (July 1936.)

Obituary.

Ahmad Hassib al Hassibi.

Ata al Kassem.

Bedros Milletbashian.

Chapter II.—LEBANESE PERSONALITIES.

(Beirut Consular District.)

1. *Habib Abi Chahla*.—Born about 1903. A Greek Orthodox of Beirut practising as a lawyer. Studied law in Paris and is a "docteur en droit." In the El Ahdab Cabinet of January 1937 was appointed Minister of Defence, Public Health and Education. A successful lawyer and an eloquent speaker. Has great influence in the Greek Orthodox Community. Said to be "fast" and somewhat of a gambler. Appointed Minister of Interior in the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinets of July and November 1937. Resigned with rest of Cabinet January 1938. Minister of Interior in second Yaffi Cabinet the 22nd January, 1939. (July 1939.)

2. *Maitre Roukos Abou Nader*.—Born about 1881. A Maronite lawyer from the hill village of Baskinta. Practises in Beirut where he has been Bâtonnier of the Bar. Deputy in the present as well as in several previous Chambers. Appointed Minister of Education, Health and Posts and Telegraphs in the Yaffi Cabinet formed on the 1st November, 1938. Intelligent but corrupt. Resigned with Yaffi Cabinet on the 21st January, 1939, and appointed Minister of Education and Public Health in second Yaffi Cabinet on the 22nd January, 1939. (July 1939.)

3. *Sobhi Aboul Nasser*.—A Moslem of Beirut. Born about 1880. Is Director of Interior. In pre-war days was an official in the Turkish Administration. Member of a well-known Beirut family. (July 1939.)

4. *Nejib Aboussouan*.—A Palestinian Christian by origin. Born about 1875. Practised as a lawyer in Jerusalem before the war. From 1923-33 was first president of the Lebanese Supreme Court of Appeal. In 1929 was Minister of Justice. Was, and still is, a candidate for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. Honest and capable. (July 1939.)

5. *Mgr. Pierre Antoine Arida*.—Maronite Patriarch. Born about 1865. Owing to the number of Maronites in the Lebanon is the most influential ecclesiastic in the country. The ancient traditional friendship between the Patriarch and the French has been somewhat impaired of late owing to the attitude adopted by Mgr. Arida towards certain economic measures taken by the mandatory authorities, notably in the case of the tobacco monopoly 1935. Visited Rome in May 1937 to express his gratitude to the Pope for the Pallium. Subsequently visited Paris before returning to the Lebanon. (July 1939.)

6. *Amir Majid Arslan*.—A young Druse landowner. Born about 1907. Is a cousin of the notorious Amir Shekib Arslan. Appointed Minister of Agriculture in the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinet of November 1937. No great ability and little personal influence. Resigned with rest of Cabinet January 1938. (July 1939.)

7. *Amir Rafik Arslan*.—A Druse. Born about 1900. Director of Agriculture. Was a Deputy in all previous Parliaments. (July 1939.)

8. *Amir Khalil Bellama*.—A Maronite. Born about 1878. Of the Lebanese family the Emirs Bellama. Son of Emir Yousseff Ismail and grandson of the Emir Haidar (*cf.* Churchill's book on the Lebanon). Practised as a lawyer in Cairo for twenty years, now retired. Well off. Is a candidate for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. (December 1935.) Appointed to a vacancy in the Lebanese Chamber in 1936. Appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Finance and Customs in the El Ahdab Ministry, January 1937. Omitted from the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinet of March 1937, but appointed Minister of Health and of National Defence in that of July 1937. Nominated a Deputy to the Chamber in October 1937, but was again omitted from the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinet of November 1937. (July 1939.)

9. *Ahmed Berjawi*.—A Shia Moslem. Born about 1888. Is administrator of Mount Lebanon. Is an ex-judge and was once chief of police in Beirut. (July 1939.)

10. *Abdullah Beyhum*.—A Beirut Moslem. Born about 1871. A well-to-do merchant before the war, but his business suffered badly during the war period and he was obliged to make a composition with his creditors. When the Senate was created, he was appointed a Senator and after the amalgamation of both Houses, became a Deputy. Appointed Secretary of State in 1933, which post he still holds. Is not a dominant character, but generally liked. Superseded as Secretary of State by Dr. Ayoub Tabet (*q.v.*) in January 1936. (July 1939.)

11. *Assad Bustany*.—A Maronite. Born about 1890. Chief of the secret police. Honest and hardworking. (July 1939.)

12. *Maitre Camille Chamaoun*.—Born about 1903. A Maronite by religion and a lawyer by profession. Member of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. Made Minister of Finance in Chehab Cabinet formed on the 21st March, 1938. Resigned with rest of Cabinet in October 1938. Intelligent. (July 1939.)

13. *Amir Fayek Chehab*.—A Maronite. Born about 1875. A direct descendant of the Amir Beshir Chehab. Chief of the Lebanese State Secretariat. Retired on a pension January 1937. (July 1939.)

14. *Amir Jemil Chehab*.—A Maronite. Born about 1895. Is Director of Finance. Full of zeal and tenacity and consequently unpopular. (July 1939.)

15. *Amir Khaled Chehab*.—A Moslem. Born about 1893. Minister of Finance in 1927. Deputy in former Parliaments and president of the present Parliament. (December 1935.) Again elected a Deputy in October 1937, but superseded in the presidency of the Chamber by Pierre Trad. Appointed Prime Minister and formed his Cabinet on the 21st March, 1938. Resigned October 1938. (July 1939.)

16. *Omar Daouk*.—A Moslem of Beirut. Born about 1874. Is president of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce. Is the largest and richest landowner in Beirut. (July 1939.)

17. *Emile Eddé*.—A Maronite. Born about 1883. A Beirut lawyer with a good practice. Was a member of the Lebanese deputation to Paris in 1919 to beg for a French mandate. Was president of the Representative Council of the Grand Liban. Became president of the Council of Ministers in 1929 and held, in addition, the portfolios of Interior and of Public Health. He tried to realise economies, lost popularity, and resigned. Is now one of the more favoured candidates for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. Is clever and energetic, but too impulsive. His relations with the mandatory Power are very cordial. (December 1935.) Elected President of the Lebanese Republic in January 1936. By a decree of the 6th October, 1937, article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution which fixes at six years the term of office of the President of the Republic was reaffirmed. (July 1939.)

18. *Hussein Bey el Ahdab*.—A Moslem of Beirut. Born about 1870. Was Governor of Beirut under the pre-war Ottoman Administration. In 1921 appointed Administrator of Beirut and president of the municipality. In 1928 was Minister of Finance and Minister of Public Works and Agriculture from 1928-31. During his tenure of office at the Ministry of Public Works showed energy and capacity—especially as regards road-making. Was afterwards accused of irregularities in the Ministry. Has held no office since. (July 1939.)

19. *Khair ed Din El Ahdab*.—Born about 1893. A Sunni Moslem of Beirut. Studied law in Paris for three years before the War. After the War was employed in the French High Commission and later given a Vice-Governorship in the Lebanon, which appointment he held for two years. Later he founded a newspaper, the *Ahd el Jedid*, in company with Riad es Solh (*q.v.*). Elected to the Chamber in 1934 as a Deputy of Beirut. In January 1937 after the re-institution of the Lebanese Constitution he was appointed Premier with the additional portfolios of the Interior and of Justice. Is a nephew of Hussein Bey El Ahdab (*q.v.*). Married to a Christian wife. Intelligent and tactful. (January 1937.) Reformed his Cabinet successively in March, July and November 1937. Reconstructed his Cabinet in January 1938, but resigned premiership in March 1938. (July 1939.)

20. *Ahmed el Assad*.—Born about 1903. A Shia Moslem and Deputy for South Lebanon. Comes of an old Moslem family. Educated at the American University of Beirut. Has a certain influence in South Lebanon. Appointed Minister of Public Health and Posts and Telegraphs in Chehab Cabinet the 21st March, 1938. Cabinet resigned in October 1938. (July 1939.)

21. *Sayyed Ahmed El Hussein*.—Born about 1882. A Shiah Moslem of the Eekan. Appointed a Senator in 1926. Was a Deputy in 1929. Has been at different times Minister of Agriculture, of Finance and of Public Works. Appointed Minister of Public Works and Agriculture in the reformed Cabinet of Ahdab in March 1937, but was omitted from the two later Cabinets. Elected a Deputy in October 1937. Uneducated but honest. (July 1939.)

22. *Colonel Sheikh Khalil El Khazen*.—A Maronite. Born about 1878. Belongs to a leading family in the Lebanon. Is senior native officer commanding the Lebanese gendarmerie. Happy-go-lucky and full of humour. (December 1935.) Retired from active service in 1937. (July 1939.)

23. *Sheikh Beshara Bey El Khouri*.—A maronite. Born about 1890. A lawyer by profession. In 1925 was appointed president of the civil section of the Court of Appeal. Minister of Interior in first Lebanese Cabinet 1926. Prime Minister and Minister of Education in 1927, and Prime Minister and Minister of Justice and Education in 1928. After a short interval, again became Prime Minister in May 1929, as well as holding the portfolios of Interior and Public Health. He resigned before the end of the year. Was a strong candidate for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic in 1931, but was beaten in the final ballot. Became a Deputy in 1933 in the present Parliament. Is a rival of Emil Eddé for the next vacancy in the presidency of the Republic. This rivalry has degenerated into a bitter hostility which, fanned by their partisans, has vented itself in much mutual recrimination in the local press and has not enhanced the personal prestige of either principal. Beshara-el-Khoury is a capable lawyer, and has sound views, but is not a dominant character. He is somewhat effusive. Nominated a Deputy in October 1937. (July 1939.)

24. *Sheikh Sami El Khouri*.—A Maronite. Born about 1895. Is Director of Justice in the present Lebanese Administration. A brother of Beshara Bey-el-Khoury. (July 1939.)

25. *Captain Nur Ed Din Rifahi*.—Born about 1898 at Beirut. Served in the Turkish army during the war. Entered the Lebanese gendarmerie in 1919 and promoted chief of the mobile unit in 1932. Appointed Inspector-General of Lebanese police in 1937. Returned to gendarmerie with rank of major in February 1939. (July 1939.)

26. *Habib Pasha El Saad*.—A Maronite. Born about 1860. Was president of the Lebanese Council under the Ottoman régime. Exiled to Adana during the war. In 1920 was president of the Administrative Council when he denounced some of his colleagues to the French as being partisans of Feisal, for which they were exiled. Was again President at a later period and then Secretary-General of the Government of the Great Lebanon. In 1928 he was made President of the Council and Minister of Justice. Has been a Deputy, either elected or nominated, in nearly every Parliament. Appointed President of the Lebanese Republic for one year in December 1933 and his tenure was prolonged for a further year in December 1934. He is typical of the old school of officials brought up under the Ottoman régime. His present post is a sinecure, and he was evidently put there by the mandatory authorities as a reward for past services, since it is clear that he is too aged to work. (December 1935.) Was superseded in the presidency of the Republic by Emile Eddé (*q.v.*) in January 1936 and retired into private life.

27. *Riad El Solh*.—A Moslem of an old and influential family of Sidon. Born about 1892. His father, Ridha Bey el Solh, had held various administrative posts under the pre-war Turkish régime, and it was doubtless for this reason that the son, although known to be an adherent of the Arab movement, was not molested during the war. Riad Bey is very intelligent, a born politician and is looked upon generally as one of the most influential leaders of the Arab National movement. He has visited Geneva several times with Ishan Jabri and Shekib Arslan and is in touch with the Arab leaders in Iraq and Palestine and with Saudi Arabia. Clever and persuasive and ready to use his own private means in the Arab cause. He has considerable influence in Moslem circles. Was exiled to Kameslieh in the spring of 1935 on the accusation of having encouraged the taxi-drivers' strike in Beirut. After a couple of months of exile he was permitted to return. He is by profession a lawyer, and is in practice at Beirut. (July 1939.)

28. *Dr. Nicholas Fayad*.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1885. Director of Posts and Telegraphs. Is a doctor of medicine and practised in Alexandria until 1931 when he returned to Beirut and was appointed a Greek Orthodox Deputy in the Chamber. Speaks well. (July 1939.)

29. *Maitre Hamid Frangieh*.—Born about 1906. A Maronite lawyer belonging to a prominent family of Zgorba (North Lebanon). Is a Deputy in the present Chamber. Appointed Minister of Finance and of National Economy in the Yaffi Cabinet formed on the 1st November, 1938. Intelligent. Resigned with Cabinet the 21st January, 1939. (July 1939.)

30. *Dr. Kamel Gargour*.—A Greek Catholic. Born about 1890. Director of Public Health since 1929. Capable surgeon and doctor. Appointed Minister of Public Works in re-formed Ahdab Cabinet January-March 1938. In March resumed his duties as Director of Public Health. (July 1939.)

31. *Sheikh Mustafa Ghalaini*.—A Moslem. Born about 1895. Cadi of the Lebanese Republic. Studied under various well-known Moslem divines as well as at Al-Azhar. Well versed in the Arabic and Turkish languages and in theology. Before his appointment as Cadi was well-known as a poet and orator. In 1910 when one of the ulema, he taught in various schools of Beirut and was also part-editor of the newspapers the *Ittihad-el-Osmani* and the *Mufid*. Later on he published an Arabic review entitled the *Nibras*. Was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress. Jemal Pasha appointed him military chaplain on the Palestine front during the war when his special task was to fan the religious fanaticism of the Turkish troops. In 1919 he entered the service of the late King Feisal and was tutor to the children of Feisal and Abdullah.

He also contributed anti-French articles to the press. With the departure of Feisal, Mustafa Ghalaini went to Egypt and Transjordan finding employment at police headquarters in the latter country. Is said to have been a close friend of Moureiwed, who organised the attack on General Gouraud on the Kuneitra Road. During 1922 he occasionally visited Beirut where his presence usually coincided with local troubles and he was eventually expelled on the suspicion that he was implicated in the murder of Assad Bey, Director of the Interior. He returned secretly to Beirut in 1924, but was arrested and deported. General Sarraïl cancelled the deportation order in 1926. Elected president of Beirut Moslem Council in 1928. In 1929 he was active in organising anti-Zionist propaganda and demonstrations and was in close touch with Amin-el-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. When the Cadi Kasti died in 1933, he was appointed Cadi of the Lebanese Republic and has since refrained from politics. He is now on good terms with the mandatory authorities. (July 1939.)

32. *Ibrahim Haider*.—Born about 1892. A Shia Moslem, member of a leading family of the Bekaa. Studied agriculture in France before the War and returned there later, subsequently joining the Syrian delegation which went to Paris in 1919 to ask for a French Mandate over Syria. Has been a Deputy in every Lebanese Chamber and is a former Minister for Agriculture. In the El Ahdab Cabinet of January 1937 was appointed Minister for Agriculture, for National Economy and for Public Works. Intelligent and cunning. (January 1937.) Again a Deputy in the Chamber in October 1937, and in November appointed Minister of Public Health and of Posts and Telegraphs. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in January 1938. Appointed Minister of Agriculture in 2nd Yaffi Cabinet 22nd January, 1939. (July 1939.)

33. *Sobhi Haider*.—A Shia Moslem. Born about 1885. Is Director of Public Instruction. Has formerly been Director of Finance and Agriculture. (July 1939.)

34. *Georges Haimari*.—A Maronite. Born about 1899. Was formerly chief of the Cabinet to the Governor of the Grand Lebanon and later to the President of the Lebanese Republic, a post he still holds (1939). Has a reputation for honesty and for eschewing political intrigue. Is generally liked. (July 1939.)

35. *Sheikh Hussein Hamadi*.—A Druse of Baakline (Lebanon). Born about 1875. Is grand Sheikh-ul-Akl of the Druses. (July 1939.)

36. *Sabry Hamadi*.—Born about 1896. A Shia Moslem from a prominent family of Hermel in the Bekaa. Deputy in the present and in the previous Chamber. Appointed Minister of Public Works and of Agriculture in the Yaffi Cabinet of the 1st November, 1938. Reputed to be honest and active. Resigned with Cabinet on 21st January, 1939. (July 1939.)

37. *Sheikh Yusuf Istefhan*.—Born about 1883. A Moslem by religion, he is a Deputy for North Lebanon in the present Chamber. Was a Senator before the abolition of the Senate in 1928 and has been several times a Deputy. Appointed Minister of the Interior and of Defence in the Chehab Cabinet, March-October 1938. A man of some importance in his own district. (July 1939.)

38. *Hikmat Jumblat*.—Born about 1906. Member of a well-known Druse family. A Deputy in the present Chamber. Appointed Minister of Agriculture in the re-formed Ahdab Cabinet, January-March 1938. Held the same appointment in the Chehab Cabinet, March-October 1938. Educated at the American University, Beirut. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in 2nd Yaffi Cabinet the 22nd January, 1939. (July 1939.)

39. *Gabriel Kabbaz*.—A Greek Catholic. Born about 1898. Editor and proprietor of the French paper the *Orient*, published in Beirut. Is a Deputy in the present Chamber (1935). His newspaper is pro-French, and he is generally believed to receive a subvention from the mandatory Power. Is the usual type of oriental journalist and inclined to confuse licence with liberty. Nominated a Deputy in the Chamber, October 1937. Appointed Minister of Public Works and National Economy in 2nd Yaffi Cabinet, the 22nd January, 1939. (July 1939.)

40. *Sheikh Tewfik Khaled*.—A Moslem. Born about 1880. Appointed in 1931. Mufti of the Lebanese Republic. (July 1939.)

41. *Khalil Kseib*.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1880. President of the Press Association of Beirut and editor of the Arabic daily paper *Saut-al-Ahrar*. A somewhat stupid individual who carries no weight with the staff of his paper, which is run by the sub-editors. The paper is widely read, but, unfortunately, it lacks supervision, with the result that its news is often unreliable. Its general tone is pro-French. Nominated a Deputy in the Chamber of October 1937. Appointed Minister of Public Instruction in re-formed Ahdab Cabinet, January-March 1938. Held the same appointment and in addition that of National Economy in the Chehab Cabinet March-October 1938. In the Yaffi Cabinet of November 1938, he was appointed Minister of Interior, War and Foreign Affairs. Resigned with Cabinet on the 21st January, 1939. (July 1939.)

42. *Musa Moubarak*.—A Maronite. Born about 1903. Is chief of the Secretariat of the French High Commissioner's delegate to the Lebanese Government, and is thus the channel of communication between the High Commission and the Lebanese Government. Is an intelligent and active young man. (July 1939.)

43. *Musa Nammour*.—A Maronite. Born about 1882. A lawyer with a certain following. Was a Deputy from 1926 to 1929, being once President. Was also at times Minister of the Interior, of Justice, and of Finance. Since 1929 has held no Government post. Now runs the Arabic newspaper *Al-Bilad*. Is said to be unpopular with the mandatory authorities. His honesty is doubtful. Elected a Deputy in the Chamber of October 1937 and in November appointed Minister of Finance and of National Defence. Again appointed Minister of Finance in the re-formed Ahdab Cabinet January-March 1938. Minister of Finance in 2nd Yaffi Cabinet, the 22nd January, 1939. (July 1939.)

44. *Izzed Din Omari*.—A Moslem of Iraqi origin. Born about 1880. Was for several years president of the Criminal Court of First Instance. Afterwards he was administrator of Mount Lebanon and is now Chief of Police. Intelligent and cunning. Retired on a pension 1937, and replaced by Captain Nur ed Din Rifahi (*q.v.*), who was himself replaced in February 1939.

45. *Dr. Ayoub Tabet*.—A Protestant. Born about 1882. Deputy in the present and in the last two Chambers. Minister of Interior and of Public Health in 1928, when he tried to make improvements. Although a Doctor of Medicine by profession, he does not practise. An energetic and honest man. Lived in United States before and during the war, and during the period 1914-18 was an active French propagandist. Whenever the question arises of giving the presidency of the Chamber or the Secretaryship of State to a representative of the religious minorities, Dr. Tabet's name is generally mentioned. (December 1935.) Was appointed Secretary of State in January 1936, but post was abolished on the formation of the El Ahdab Ministry in January 1937. Elected a Deputy to the Chamber 1937. (July 1939.)

46. *Georges Tabet*.—Born about 1886. Member of a leading Beirut family. Has been previously a Deputy and was once previously Minister of the Interior. Appointed Minister of Finance in the Ahdab Cabinet of July and in the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinet of November 1937, Minister of National Economy and Education. A likeable and popular man of average ability. Appointed Minister of Interior in the reconstructed Ahdab Cabinet January-March 1938. (July 1939.)

47. *Selim Tacla*.—A Greek Catholic. Born about 1893. Administrator of Beirut and president of the municipality. Began his career as a judge and has been a provincial administrator and Director of the Interior. Clever and active. (December 1935.) Appointed Administrator of North Lebanon 1936. Elected a Deputy to the Chamber in October 1937 and in November appointed Minister of Public Works. Resigned from Ahdab Cabinet January 1938. Appointed Minister of Public Works and Foreign Affairs in Chehab Cabinet March-October 1938. (July 1939.)

48. *Gabriel Léon Tappouni*.—Syrian Catholic Cardinal Patriarch of Antioch. Born the 3rd November, 1879, at Mosul, Iraq. Ordained November 1902. Secretary to the Apostolic Delegate in Iraq 1908. Elected Bishop in 1912

and appointed "Vicaire Patriarcal" at Mardin. Imprisoned by the Turks June-October 1918. Transferred to Aleppo 1919 and appointed Bishop there in 1921. Elected Patriarch in June 1929 and made Cardinal in December 1935. Visited Rome and Paris October 1937. (July 1939.)

49. *Pierre Trad*.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1873. A lawyer and ex-leader of the Bar. Succeeded the late M. Debbas as President of the Chamber for the first year of the present Parliament, but was not a candidate for the second term. Clever and bright talker. Cherishes the hope that he may become President of the Republic some day. (December 1935.) Elected President of the Chamber in October 1937. (July 1939.)

50. *Gebran Tuani*.—A Greek Orthodox. Born about 1892. Formerly Minister of Public Education. Editor and proprietor of the Arabic daily paper *An-Nahar*. He is a clever journalist, and his paper, which is often critical of the mandatory Power, has a wide circulation. An intelligent but somewhat unscrupulous man. (December 1935.) Nominated a Deputy in the Chamber of October 1937. (July 1939.)

51. *Maitre Abdullah Yaffi*.—Born about 1900. A Sunni Moslem lawyer of Beirut. Deputy in the present Chamber and little known before that. Moderately intelligent with strong nationalist sentiments. Appointed Prime Minister and formed his Cabinet on the 1st November, 1938. Cabinet resigned on the 21st January, 1939, and was reformed on the 22nd January, 1939. (July 1939.)

Chapter III.—FRENCH OFFICIALS IN SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

1. *Bailly, Pierre*.—Born 1897. Principal inspector, second class, in French Customs Administration. Inspector of Customs at Aleppo. Socially agreeable and always helpful. Married. (July 1939.)

2. *Bringuier, Colonel Henri*.—Born 1880. French officer commanding the Syrian gendarmerie. An artillery officer, who, after serving in Morocco and later during the war with distinction, transferred to the gendarmerie, where, before coming to Syria, he held the command of the Pyrénées Brigade. Notwithstanding the delicacy of his position as Commandant of Gendarmerie under the orders of the Syrian Government, he has been outstandingly helpful to the British consulate in Damascus in connexion with endeavours to restrict the number of Syrian participants in the Palestine disturbances, 1937-38. Is a Knight of the Légion d'Honneur. (July 1939.)

3. *Caillaud, General*.—Born the 21st October, 1880. Is Général de Corps d'Armée. Appointed to command the French army in the Levant in May 1938 and took over that command from General Huntziger in July 1938.

General Caillaud passed out from St. Cyr in 1902 and was posted to the 3rd Algerian Infantry. Remained in North Africa until 1911 when he entered the Ecole de Guerre. Staff Officer with 1st Army Corps in 1914. Later commanded 9th Algerian Infantry and then went to a Staff appointment at Salonika. Captain in 1914, major in 1918 when he served with 6th Army. Mentioned four times in despatches. Officer of Legion of Honour, he took part in Riff operations 1925, when he was promoted lieutenant-colonel. Commanded 13th Algerian Infantry 1926-29, during which time he was again mentioned three times in despatches. Colonel in 1928. Chief of Organisation Bureau, Army General Headquarters, Paris, 1929. Commander of Legion of Honour 1931. Brigadier-General 1933 when he returned to Morocco. Divisional General in 1936, he commanded the Division at Meknes.

An able, competent, and energetic soldier with long colonial experience. Married. (July 1939.)

4. *de Carpentier, Rear-Admiral*.—Born about 1883. Took over command of the French Naval Division in the Levant from Rear-Admiral Fernet on the 15th July, 1938. Entered the French Naval School in 1899. During the Great War commanded the *Engageante* in the Channel and Atlantic Division and

sank an enemy submarine for which he was made Chevalier of the Legion of Honour. After the war he was appointed to command the destroyer *Delage* and later the training ship *Jeanne d'Arc*. Promoted captain in 1930, he entered the school of Higher Naval Studies. Later he commanded the cruiser *Tourville* and the battleship *Paris*. In 1937 he was appointed Major-General of the Port of Toulon and promoted Rear-Admiral. (July 1939.)

5. *Collet, Colonel Philibert*.—Born about 1898. Served in the ranks in the Great War. Assigned for service in Syria in 1919, where he raised the 1st Squadron of Circassian Gendarmerie, a force since increased to ten squadrons, under his command. Served in Jebel Druse at time of rebellion. In 1938 transferred to the Sanjak of Alexandretta to secure order during elections, and on the proclamation of martial law there was appointed delegate of High Commissioner. When Turkish troops entered the sanjak he was appointed colonel. Earned some opprobrium by his seemingly Turcophil behaviour, but it transpired subsequently that he was acting under orders. Considered a good soldier, and one who is ready to obey orders implicitly, but he is disinclined to act on his own responsibility. (July 1939.)

6. *Colombani, François*.—Born about 1892. Appointed Director of the Sûreté Générale in June 1937 in succession to Paul Bouchède. Was chief of the French secret police in Constantinople during the post-war occupation. Lately head of the Sûreté at Montparnasse (Paris). Active and appears to be friendly disposed. Married. Unpopular and disliked by his compatriots. (July 1939.)

7. *David, Philippe*.—Born 1894. Doctor of law. Administrator in Chief of Colonies, French Colonial Service. French delegate and consul at Aleppo from 1934. Has also held posts at Damascus and Beirut. Chevalier of the Legion of Honour, Croix de Guerre. Energetic, tactful, socially charming. Speaks English only if absolutely obliged to do so. Not always convinced of Britain's *bona fides* in Near Eastern matters. Married. (July 1939.)

8. *Dubecq, Henry*.—Born 1896. Principal Inspector of Special Police, first class, in French Administration. Chief of the Sûreté Générale for Northern Syria. Very obliging. Good company. Married. (July 1939.)

9. *Fauquenot, Emile, M.B.E.*—Born 1893. Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior. Is a member of the French Colonial Service, in which he holds the rank of "chef de bureau." Is liked by Syrian officials, but looked askance at by his compatriots on account of his, it is said, too hearty espousal of the Syrian cause. Both he and his wife were in the French espionage service during the war. For their assistance to British prisoners of war they were each made members of the Order of the British Empire. Untrustworthy. (July 1939.)

10. *Forgeois, Gaston*.—Born 1890. Procureur, second class, in French Ministry of Justice. Procureur général and Inspector-General of Justice at Aleppo. Pleasant personality, but quiet and retiring. Married. (July 1939.)

11. *Gennardi, P.*—Born about 1886. Inspector-General of the control of Moslem pious foundations and of the land registry. A Corsican married to a Lebanese Moslem. Served in the French secret service in North Africa before 1914. Lost an arm, a leg and an eye in the war of 1914-18. Came to Syria in 1919 and was attached to the military tribunal. Appointed to his present post in 1921. Intelligent, shrewd and well-informed though hard and vindictive. Is a Moslem and is influential in Moslem circles. (July 1939.)

12. *Hauteclouque, Jean-Marie-François, Comte de*.—Born 1893. Has served in diplomatic posts in Rio de Janeiro, Berne, Constantinople and Bucharest. Promoted counsellor 1934.

Appointed French delegate in Damascus in 1938 and assumed office in January 1939. Rather bewildered by the complexity of Syrian politics. Agreeable socially; rather a Gascon. Appears to be willing to be helpful over our peculiar difficulties in connexion with Palestine. Concrete results, however, leave something to be desired. (July 1939.)

13. *Keller, General of Brigade*.—Born May 26, 1884. General Officer Commanding French Troops in Syria. Has a good military reputation amongst his *entourage*. Has shown praiseworthy combination of humanity and firmness when

charged with the re-establishment of order. Pleasant and decidedly Anglophil, and when the occasion has arisen has been helpful in co-operation on the Syro-Palestinian frontier. (July 1939.)

14. *Lafond, Pierre*.—Born in 1897. Belongs to the French consular service. Has been in the country since 1926; was previously in Tunis. Was first employed in the High Commission, then was French consul in Beirut before being transferred to Tripoli as delegate of the High Commissioner. Transferred to Beirut at the end of 1934 and appointed High Commissioner's delegate to the Lebanese Government. Is perhaps not a strong personality, but is socially very agreeable and generally liked. Married. (July 1939.)

15. *de Leusse, Comte Pierre*.—Born the 24th December, 1905. Assistant to Director of the Political Department of the French High Commission January 1939. Entered the French consular service from the Ecole des Sciences Politiques. Appointed an attaché to the French Legation at Berne 1931, at the embassy at Washington 1933, Vienna 1935, and thence Bucharest. Is Consul de France, 3rd class. (July 1939.)

16. *Mentque, Jean, Vicomte de*.—Born about 1897. Assistant to the delegate of the High Commissioner at Alexandretta since 1931 and has been acting delegate on several occasions, the last in June-October 1937. Formerly the head of a financial firm in France which had to close down owing to the crisis. Well educated, intelligent, speaks good English, and a good administrator in normal circumstances but apt to be an alarmist in times of crisis. Served in the Jebel Druse for a short time in 1933. (July 1939.)

17. *Meyer, Captain*.—Born the 9th September, 1901. Head of the Intelligence Section of the delegation at Damascus. Made a reputation for himself when political officer in the Jezireh during the troubles in 1936-37. A well-balanced intelligence officer, a pleasant personality and helpful. (July 1939.)

18. *Meyrier, Jacques*.—Born in 1892. Entered the French consular service in 1919 and appointed vice-consul at Constantinople. Transferred to Shanghai in 1923 and later to Tientsin. Returned to Shanghai and remained there as consul-general until 1936 when he was appointed Secretary-General to the French High Commission at Beirut. Married to the daughter of a former French official on the board of the Ottoman Debt. A capable official, has much personal charm and is well liked. (July 1939.)

Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in March 1939.

19. *Monet, General*.—Appointed General Officer Commanding Troops in Northern Syria in October 1937 with the rank of colonel. Promoted general on the 1st January, 1938. Has served at Timbuktu and Dakar and in Indo-China, and came to Aleppo from Sarralbe on the Lorraine frontier. Speaks German and Russian. An agreeable personality, and likes to stress the advantages of Anglo-French co-operation in the Near East. (July 1939.)

20. *Puauze, Gabriel*.—Appointed High Commissioner for the Levant States under French mandate in November 1938, and arrived at Beirut the 7th January, 1939. Born the 19th May, 1883. Appointed attaché 1906. Served at Berne 1906, Tunis 1907. Made third secretary 1908. Quai d'Orsay 1914. War service 1914-18. Tunis 1919. First secretary 1920. Consul-general Cologne 1922. Counsellor of embassy at Berne 1924. Minister-Resident Kovno 1926. Minister at Bucharest 1928. Vienna 1933. (July 1939.)

21. *Purifié, Paul*.—Born 1879. President, second class, in French Ministry of Justice. President of the Court of Appeal at Aleppo. Slippery. Married. (July 1939.)

22. *Reclus, O.*—Born about 1882. Counsellor at the High Commission for Economic Affairs. Belongs to the Tunis Administration and holds the rank of assistant secretary-general in that service. Is a hard worker and appears to be capable, but he has a difficult situation to deal with, and thus has acquired the reputation of being stiff and difficult. Socially is most agreeable. Married. (July 1939.)

23. *De Sandfort, Barthe*.—Born about 1885. Succeeded M. Périer as director of the diplomatic bureau of the French High Commission in September 1937. Was previously French consul at Naples. Pleasant and courteous. (July 1939.)

24. *Sarrade, Colonel Marie-Joseph*.—Born in 1882. Entered St. Cyr 1901. Commanding the troops in the Euphrates area and the 2nd Demi-Brigade (Autochthonous). (July 1939.)

25. *Seyrig, Henri*.—Born about 1897. An archaeologist. Came to Beirut in 1929 from the French school in Athens. Was also at New College, Oxford. Is Inspector-General of Archaeology. A pleasant and cultured man. Married. (July 1939.)

26. *Tézé, Commandant*.—Born about 1892. Chief of the Military Cabinet of the French High Commissioner. Has served for many years in the French Intelligence Service, and was employed in Syria from 1920-26. Lately in garrison at Fontainebleau. (July 1939.)

27. *Valluy, Claude*.—Born about 1892. Adviser to the Ministry of Finance. Has a great reputation among both French and Syrians as an administrator. Has made Syria his career. Has a Syrian Christian wife. His first wife was from the Lebanon. A keen official who should, but may not, go far. (July 1939.)

28. *Vasselet, Paul*.—Born about 1890. Is an official of the French Ministry of Public Works. Since 1921 has been employed in the High Commission and has risen to be Inspector-General of Public Works and Controller of Concessionary Societies (railways, transport, port, &c.), and thus wields great influence. Is unpopular with the native element, who accuse him of strangling local enterprise for the profit of the concessionary companies. Married. (July 1939.)

French Officials who left Syria and Lebanon in 1938-39.

Bonnot, Commandant.	Huntziger, General.
Dewatre, Lieutenant.	Kieffer, Louis.
Fernet, Rear-Admiral.	de Martel, Damien J. A. C.
Fougère, General.	Noiret, General.
Garreau, Roger.	

Chapter IV.—ALPHABETICAL LIST OF DEPUTIES IN THE SYRIAN PARLIAMENT, 1936.

Member.	Party.	Constituency.	Religion.
Shayesh ben Abdelkarim	Nationalist	Tribes of Aleppo	Sunni.
Mohamed Yahya Adali	Nationalist	Antioch	Sunni.
Haj Mohamed al Aisha	Nationalist	Deir-Ez-Zor	Sunni.
Mahavash Vehbeh al Ajili	Nationalist	Rakka	Sunni.
Munir al Ajlani	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Mohamed Kheir Akil	Nationalist	Kalamoun	Sunni.
Hussein Awni	Nationalist	Jebel Akrad	Sunni.
Nuri al Asfari	Nationalist	Idlib	Sunni.
Sabri al Assali	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Fatallah Assioun	Nationalist	Aleppo	Armenian Catholic.
Makram al Atassy	Nationalist	Homs	Sunni.
Nassib Bakri	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Najib Barazi	Nationalist	Hama	Sunni.
Fakhri Baroudi	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Mohamed Hadi Beikar	Nationalist	Azaz	Sunni.
Ibrahim Dahieh	Nationalist	Homs	Alawiyyin.
Omar Dallal	Nationalist	Hama	Sunni.
Wahid Duwaidri	Nationalist	Idlib	Sunni.
Mohamed al Farah	Nationalist	Rakka	Sunni.
Abdallah Parkouh	Nationalist	Homs	Greek Orthodox.
Amir Fa'ur al Fa'ur	Nationalist	Kuneitra	Sunni.
Mohamed Nuri Fetaya	Nationalist	Deir-Ez-Zor	Sunni.
Dahham al Hadi	?	Jazirah Tribes	Sunni.

Member.	Party.	Constituency.	Religion.
Lutfi Haffar	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Abdul Aziz Hallaj	Nationalist	Jebel Samaan	Sunni.
Hikmet Haraki	Nationalist	Maara	Sunni.
Ismail al Hariri	Nationalist	Ezra	Sunni.
Abul Huda al Hassibi	Nationalist	Katana	Sunni.
Hikmet Hakim	Nationalist	Idlib	Sunni.
Hussein Hilmi	Nationalist	Munbej	Sunni.
Edmond Homsy	Nationalist	Aleppo	Greek Catholic.
Mujhem al Bashir al Huweidi	Nationalist	Rakka	Sunni.
Refik Hussein	Nationalist	Homs	Sunni.
Hassan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha	Nationalist	Aleppo	Sunni.
Jamil Ibrahim Pasha	Nationalist	Jebel Samaan	Sunni.
Khalil Ibrahim Pasha	?	Jezirah	Sunni.
Said Ishaq	?	Jezirah	Syrian Orthodox.
Saadallah Jabri	Nationalist	Aleppo	Sunni.
Saad ed Din al Jabri	Nationalist	Jebel Samaan	Sunni.
Movsis Der Kaloustian	Nationalist	Antioch	Armenian Orthodox.
Rushdi Katkhuda	Nationalist	Aleppo	Sunni.
Dr. Abdurrahman Kayali	Nationalist	Aleppo	Sunni.
Said al Kayali	Nationalist	Harem	Sunni.
Ghanem al Khaiti	Nationalist	Douma	Sunni.
Yunis al Khanshur	Nationalist	Douma	Sunni.
Faiz al Khoury	Nationalist	Damascus	Greek Orthodox.
Farès al Khoury	Nationalist	Damascus (Minorities)	Protestant.
Nazem Koudsi	Nationalist	Aleppo	Sunni.
Mustapha Kousseiri	Nationalist	Antioch	Sunni.
Ahmed al Lahham	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Yussef Liniado	Nationalist	Damascus	Jewish.
Suleiman Maasarani	Nationalist	Homs	Sunni.
Sadek Maarouf	Nationalist	Antioch	Alawiyyin.
Assem Mahmoud	Nationalist	Kuneitra	Sunni.
Mohamed Mahmoud	Nationalist	Kalamoun	Sunni.
Jamil Mardam Bey	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Mustapha al Mekdad	Nationalist	Deraa	Sunni.
Trad Milhem	Nationalist	Damascus Tribes	Sunni.
Mohamed al Mufleh	Nationalist	Deraa	Sunni.
Amir Mujhem ben Muheid	?	Jazirah Tribes	Sunni.
Rakkan bin Murshed	Nationalist	Damascus Tribes	Sunni.
Turki al Najrass	Nationalist	Deir-Ez-Zor	Sunni.
Said Orfi	Nationalist	Deir-Ez-Zor	Sunni.
Al Haj Ali Bey Qaddur	?	Jezirah	Sunni.
Shukri al Quwatli	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Mazhar Rezman	Nationalist	Homs	Sunni.
Edmond Rabbat	Nationalist	Aleppo	Roman Catholic.
Abdelkader Rahmo	Nationalist	Bab	Sunni.
Daoud Rihani	Nationalist	Alexandretta	Alawiyyin.
George Sahnawi	Nationalist	Damascus	Greek Catholic.
Nawwaf al Saleh	Nationalist	Aleppo Tribes	Sunni.
Abdelkader Sarmini	Nationalist	Aleppo	Sunni.
Fawwaz Sha'alan	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Buzan Shahin	Nationalist	Jerablus	Sunni.
Mustapha Shahin	Nationalist	Jerablus	Sunni.
Jamil Shammat	Nationalist	Zibdani	Sunni.
Ihsan Sherif	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Dr. Toufiq Shishakli	Nationalist	Hama	Sunni.
Aff al Solh	Nationalist	Damascus	Sunni.
Hrante Sulahian	Nationalist	Aleppo	Armenian Orthodox.
Amir Suleiman	Nationalist	Selimieh	Ismaili.
Mahmoud Pasha Bey Zadeh	Nationalist	Kirik Khan	Sunni.
Abdul Hadi Zarzur	Nationalist	Abou Kamal	Sunni.
Farès Zobhi			

Chapter V.—ALPHABETICAL LIST OF DEPUTIES IN THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT, NOVEMBER 1937.

Name.	Party.	District.	Religion.
*Aad, Elie	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Abi Chahla, Habib	Unionist	Beirut	Greek Orthodox.
*Abdallah, Aly	Unionist	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
Abdul-Kader, Khaled	Unionist	North Lebanon	Moslem Sunnite.
Abou Jaoudeh, Khalil	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.

* Denotes Deputies appointed.

Name.	Party.	District.	Religion.
Abou Nader, Roucos	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
*Ammoun, Charles	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Aralan, Emir Majid	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Druse.
*Awad, Tewfik	Unionist	North Lebanon	Maronite.
*Azar, Ibrahim	Constitutional	South Lebanon	Maronite.
*Bellama, Emir Khalil	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Beydoun, Raashid	Constitutional	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
Bittar, Wakim	Unionist	North Lebanon	Maronite.
*Boulos, Jawad	Unionist	North Lebanon	Maronite.
Boustani, Alexandre	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Chamaoun, Camille	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Daher, Negib Hanna	Unionist	North Lebanon	Maronite.
Daoud, Nassib	Unionist	Bekaa	Druse.
El-Abbud, Mohamed	Constitutional	Akkar	Moslem Sunnite.
*El-Ahdab, Khairuddin	Unionist	Beirut	Moslem Sunnite.
El-Assad, Ahmad	Unionist	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
*El-Fadel, Bahige	Unionist	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
*El-Fadel, Nassouh Agha	Unionist	North Lebanon	Moslem Sunnite.
El-Khazen, Sheikh Farid	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
El-Khalil, Kazem	Unionist	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
*El-Khoury, Sheikh Bishara	Constitutional	Beirut	Maronite.
(Leader)			
El-Zein, Yussef	Constitutional	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
Frangie, Hamid	Constitutional	North Lebanon	Maronite.
Ghoss, Nicolas	Unionist	North Lebanon	Greek Orthodox.
Haidar, Ibrahim	Unionist	Bekaa	Moslem Shi'a.
Hamadi, Sabri	Constitutional	Bekaa	Moslem Shi'a.
*Harfouche, Emir Rashid	Unionist	Bekaa	Moslem Shi'a.
Husseini, Sayed Ahmed	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
Istephan, Sheikh Yussef	Unionist	North Lebanon	Maronite.
*Jabr, Kamal	Unionist	Beirut	Moslem Sunnite.
Jounblat, Hikmat	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Druse.
*Jounblat, Raashid	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Druse.
*Kabbaz, Gabriel	Unionist	Beirut	Greek Catholic.
Kanaan, Maroun	Unionist	South Lebanon	Maronite.
Karamah, Shafik	Unionist	Tripoli	Moslem Sunnite.
Kazhoun, Mohamed A.	Constitutional	Bekaa	Moslem Sunnite.
Khatib, Ahmed Yunis	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Moslem Sunnite.
*Kseib, Khalil Khoury	Unionist	Beirut	Greek Orthodox.
Lababidi, Dr. Selim	Unionist	Beirut	Moslem Sunnite.
*Lailakian, Wahram	Constitutional	Beirut	Armenian Orthodox.
Moukaddem, Rached	Unionist	Tripoli	Moslem Sunnite.
Mounzer, Sheikh Ibrahim	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Greek Orthodox.
Nakad, Negib	Constitutional	Bekaa	Greek Orthodox.
Nammur, Moussa	Constitutional	Bekaa	Maronite.
Nassif, Shafik	Unionist	Beirut	Protestant.
*Nassouly, Mubieddin	Unionist	Beirut	Moslem Sunnite.
Osseyran, Negib	Unionist	South Lebanon	Moslem Shi'a.
Salem, Youssef	Constitutional	South Lebanon	Greek Catholic.
Shehab, Emir Khaled	Constitutional	South Lebanon	Moslem Sunnite.
Skaf, Elias	Constitutional	Bekaa	Greek Catholic.
*Tabet, Eyoub	Unionist	Minorities	Protestant.
Tabet, Georges	Unionist	Beirut	Maronite.
Tacla, Salim	Constitutional	Mount Lebanon	Greek Catholic.
Tobia, Zakia	Unionist	Mount Lebanon	Maronite.
Toutounjian, Khosroff	Unionist	Beirut	Armenian Orthodox.
*Trad, Pierre	Unionist	Beirut	Greek Orthodox.
(President)			
*Tuoni, Gabriel	Constitutional	Beirut	Greek Orthodox.
Yafi, Abdallah	Unionist	Beirut	Moslem Sunnite.

* Denotes Deputies appointed.

[E 5789/5/89]

No. 91.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

(C. 230.M.157.1939.)

Genève, le 11 août 1939.

Déclaration du Gouvernement français concernant la Syrie et le Liban.—(Received in Foreign Office, August 17.)

Lettre au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations.

J'AI l'honneur de vous faire savoir que, le 23 juin dernier, le Gouvernement de la République a souscrit une déclaration dont une copie est ci-jointe et qui porte confirmation de la mission de la France en Syrie et au Liban.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir porter le texte de cette déclaration à la connaissance des États membres de la Société des Nations.

GEORGES BONNET.

Paris, le 25 juillet 1939.

Déclaration.

Le Gouvernement de la République déclare qu'il n'entre aucunement dans les intentions de la France de renoncer en faveur d'un tiers à la mission qu'elle assume en Syrie et au Liban.

GEORGES BONNET.

Paris, le 23 juin 1939.

[E 7014/5/89]

No. 92.

Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 98.)

My Lord,

Beirut, October 2, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 47 of the 22nd September, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the text⁽¹⁾ of Decree No. 246/LR of the 21st September, by which the French High Commissioner suspended certain articles of the Lebanese Constitution relating to the exercise of legislative and executive powers.

2. A further decree, No. 247/LR of the 22nd September, defined the powers of appointment reserved to the Lebanese President by article 4 of Decree No. 246/LR as comprising the appointment of:—

- (i) The heads of the administrative services.
- (ii) Regional administrators.
- (iii) Inspectors-general of the administrative services.
- (iv) Gendarmerie officers of the rank of major and upwards.
- (v) The five highest ranks of judges in the judicial hierarchy.

3. The High Commissioner accompanied the publication of the former decree by a message to the Lebanese people, which was broadcast from the Beirut station on the 21st September and appeared in the local press the following day. In it he stated that Lebanese of all parties and creeds had declared their solidarity with France in the war imposed upon her, and France was determined to maintain normal and ordered life in the Lebanon. The people must carry on their normal occupations, but must spare no effort to increase the country's production. For this purpose far-reaching modifications must be made in the political régime, so that party rivalries and place-hunting could give place to quiet industry, great economies be made in an Administration which had proved too cumbrous and

(¹) Not printed.

expensive for so small a country, and Government decisions be carried out with the greatest despatch. The régime now laid down was to be considered as only a wartime measure, but its practice would furnish useful experience for after the war. The High Commissioner concluded by declaring his intention to keep in close touch with Lebanese political and religious leaders, and his hope that the Lebanon would remain closely bound to France.

4. The new régime would appear in practice to approximate to that instituted in July last in Syria (Damascus telegram No. 51 of the 9th July to your Lordship), but with rather stricter control by the French.

5. With the exception of the displaced Ministers and Deputies and other directly interested parties, the Lebanese people as a whole seem to have warmly welcomed the change of régime, as freeing the country from the cost of an unproductive Administration and putting an end to the futile party squabbles and intrigues which have been so prominent a feature of the last few years. There is a natural tendency to grumble at some of the measures taken as a result of the war, but it is generally hopeful that increased flexibility and rapidity in the implementing of Government decisions, and the liberation of provincial authorities from the fear of ejection at every change of ministry, will create a marked improvement in the country's administration.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, the Middle East Intelligence Centre at Cairo, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine, and His Majesty's Consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
G. T. HAVARD.

[E 7570/2143/89]

No. 93.

Consul MacKereth to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 77.)

My Lord,

Damascus, November 9, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Colonel Chrystall, commanding the Transjordan Frontier Force, accompanied by three British officers of his regiment, flew to Dera'a yesterday to confer with Général Keller and French frontier officers on matters pertaining to security on the confines of Syria and Transjordan.

2. Recently there has been a recrudescence of minor misunderstandings on frontier matters concerning the Jebel Druse and Transjordan. They have arisen mainly out of the cloud of suspicion in the minds of some French military officials administering Druse territories, which the Druses and some Transjordanians do nothing to dissipate.

3. As your Lordship is aware, I have spared no effort to extinguish once and for all the doubts about British intentions that have long lingered in the midst of the French Administration in the Jebel Druse. If these doubts had some foundation fifteen years ago, they have none to-day. Mr. Kirkbride, Colonel Chrystall and Major Glubb have whole-heartedly co-operated with me in this very desirable mission. I have, too, had the strong support here of Général Keller. I venture to draw your Lordship's attention to the persistence with which Colonel Chrystall has attacked the Druse citadel of *méfiance* in order to establish cordial relations and mutual confidence between French and British officers on the frontier. He has never missed an occasion, often at considerable inconvenience to himself, to further good relations, either by co-operation or by personal contact. A month ago he visited Colonel Bouvier, the military commander of the Jebel Druse, whose antipathy for the Transjordanian Administration was notorious, accompanied by two officers of the Transjordan Frontier Force, Wing Commander Porter, Senior Air Staff Officer of the Palestine Air Command, and the French liaison officer from Jerusalem. The visit was a great success, and Colonel Bouvier, on his part, made it an occasion to demonstrate publicly to the sceptical Druses the cordiality of Anglo-French relations. At the meeting, which I had arranged, yesterday at Dera'a, and to which I have already referred, Général Keller, by making a public and ceremonial reception of Colonel Chrystall, which was witnessed by a large

crowd, followed by a conference in the Government House at Dera'a, provided an admirable exhibition of Franco-British solidarity for the education of the frontier elements of the Syrian and Transjordanian populations.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
GILBERT MacKERETH.

[E 8076/347/89]

No. 94.

Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 126 E.)

My Lord,

Beirut, December 8, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 73 of the 5th December, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the texts⁽¹⁾ of the French High Commissioner's decrees Nos. 336/LR to 348/LR of the 3rd December, imposing control over imports and exports and over currency in this country.

2. A précis of the main provisions of these decrees is also enclosed, in case it may be of use as a guide to their contents.

3. Further examination of the position created by these decrees suggest that the advantage they give to French subjects and goods may be in the event more apparent than real. This cannot, however, be judged until experience has been gained of their practical working.

4. A leading banker who has not been appointed as "accredited broker" under decree No. 342/LR has been consulted as to the effect of the currency regulations imposed by these decrees and has given his opinion that they are unlikely to give rise to any serious interference with the course of trade. The only criticism so far widely expressed of the import and export control imposed is that the Economic Section of the High Commission, through whom this control is effected, is already overworked and understaffed, so that unless appropriate measures to remedy this are taken, serious delays are likely to be experienced in the issue of the necessary permits. Time will show if these criticisms are justified.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, and with the second enclosure only to His Majesty's Consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
G. T. HAVARD.

Enclosure in No. 94.

Précis of Decrees of December 3, 1939.

336/LR.

IMPORT of all foreign goods prohibited, except by authorisation of secretary-general. For working of this decree, see following decrees.

337/LR.

Notwithstanding 336/LR, the import is allowed of foreign goods which were (a) not subject to previous bans on imports; are proved to have been despatched directly to the French mandated territories before the 3rd December, 1939; and are for local consumption; or (b) were subject to previous bans on imports but were being imported under licences issued before the 3rd December, if imported before the licences expire. Applications for import permits to be made to Economic Section of High Commission, permits being valid for four months.

French and French colonial goods are exempted from prohibition of imports.

338/LR.

Export of all forms of capital prohibited except under permit. Following decrees define "export of capital."

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Exchange operations must be effected through Banque de Syrie or other bank authorised by secretary-general. Transactions in foreign transferable securities or other foreign property titles or proofs of debt may also be regulated similarly. Following decrees will lay down working of this decree. Penalties specified in detail. Control over administrations of public, concessionary, and private concerns, to assure observance of this decree, is instituted.

339/LR.

I.—Regulation of Imports.

1. The importation of foreign goods is made dependent on the production of a certificate establishing (a) that the importer is authorised to obtain the necessary foreign exchange, or (b) that no foreign exchange is needed. The Economic Section of the High Commission is to make out this certificate when issuing import licences as specified under 337/LR.

2. Foreign exchange, when needed to pay for imports, is only to be issued to the importer by the exchange bureau on production of certificate mentioned in (1). Importer must also give all necessary proofs and refund exchange obtained if not justified.

3. Temporarily, certificates will not be required for imports temporarily allowed under 337/LR. Foreign exchange needed for such imports will be issued by the Exchange Control on production of proof. The importer must subsequently prove the importation for which he has obtained foreign exchange by a customs certificate, and must refund any unjustified foreign exchange.

4. Foreign exchange needed for imports completed *before* the 3rd December will be issued on production of proofs of debt.

II.—Regulation of Exports.

5. The export of goods abroad is made dependent on signature by exporter of undertaking (a) if the export is to be paid for in foreign exchange, to hand over such foreign exchange to the Exchange Control, or (b) if export is to be paid for in £ Syrian, only to accept foreign holdings of £ Syrian already allowed by Exchange Control to be used for the purchase of Lebanese or Syrian goods.

6. Exporters must furnish all necessary details to the Exchange Control.

7. Commercial transactions with France and French colonies are not subject to this decree.

340/LR.

I.—Export of Capital.

This is first defined as:—

- (i) Acquisition of real or personal property outside the French mandated territories, France and the French colonies.
- (ii) Retaining abroad, or in foreign currency, any moneys acquired abroad by trade, services or otherwise.
- (iii) The export of money and securities.
- (iv) Exchange operations, except under II below.

Foreigners, also Syrians and French, not residing or having establishments in the French mandated territories, France or French colonies may remove their money or property or its value therefrom on production of proof that they possessed it on the 3rd December, 1939; also any money or property subsequently acquired from proved foreign sources.

The Exchange Control may acquire all foreign currency or foreign debts; moneys acquired abroad (see (ii) above) must be paid to it. It may issue foreign exchange for payment of importations and of debts contracted before the 3rd December and for financing travel abroad.

Persons leaving the French mandated territories must prove that they are not taking out money or securities; but may take cheques or letters of credit (i) if not resident in the French mandated territories, up to the amount which they brought in; (ii) if resident, up to £ Syr. 250, with subsequent permission to receive up to £ Syr. 500 per month while abroad. Application must be made to the secretary-general for permission to receive more than this.

All persons must declare foreign currency, &c., on entering or leaving French mandated territories.

Remittances and postal orders can only be issued if authorised by the Exchange Control.

Registered packets must be given *open* to the post office, to be closed after the contents have been verified.

II.—Exchange Control.

The Banque de Syrie is to act in this capacity, on behalf of the mandatory Power, but may call in other banking establishments authorised by secretary-general.

Bankers must declare all exchange operations to Exchange Control.

341/LR.

Article 1 (see 340/LR). All persons, of whatever nationality, leaving the French mandated territories must declare their money, securities or titles of property or proofs of debt. The customs will control their declarations.

No one, whatever his nationality, residing in the French mandated territories may take money, securities, &c., out of the French mandated territories except by authorisation from the Exchange Control, unless they have less than £ Syr. 25. Possessors of frontier passes are not affected by this article.

Persons *not* residing in the French mandated territories can only take out as much as they declared on entry. They cannot take out securities, titles to property, or proofs of debt, except by authorisation of the Exchange Control.

All persons entering the French mandated territories must declare their money, &c. The declaration is controlled and returned stamped to owner (for production on exit).

Temporarily, persons not residing habitually in the French mandated territories, but there on the 3rd December, can take out up to £ Syr. 250 without a permit. If they can prove that on the 3rd December they held more than this, the Exchange Control may authorise them to take out up to the sum they can justify, within six months from their date of arrival.

Sums in excess of the authorised amounts found on persons leaving the country, if declared, may be deposited in customs and restored to the owner on his return.

All exports of money, securities, &c., made in other ways depend on special authorisation from the Exchange Control.

342/LR.

Regulates accredited brokers and their transactions (see 340/LR. II).

343/LR.

Prohibited and Permitted Exchange and Capital Export Operations.

I.—For French (including French Colonial, Syrian and Lebanese subjects).

Prohibited (without exception).

Transactions in foreign currencies, whether inside France, French colonies and French mandated territories, or not, except through Exchange Control.

Exchange, transfer, or remittance between French mandated territories and the rest of France except through the proper channels.

Prohibited (except by authorisation of the Exchange Control).

Export of money, securities, &c., from the French mandated territories.

Purchase of foreign exchange except to pay for foreign imports, settle foreign debts, or finance travel abroad.

Acquisition of property abroad, if effected abroad; or if effected in France from a foreigner.

Retaining, either in or out of France, beyond the authorised period, foreign exchange acquired by sale of exports, services, &c.

Accepting £ Syrian for such exports, services, &c., if such £ Syrian are not foreign transferable holdings.

Permitted (if justified).

Purchase of foreign exchange from the Exchange Control to pay for foreign imports, settle foreign debts, or finance travel abroad.

Export of currency by persons leaving the French mandated territories, in accordance with 341/LR.

Acquisition of property abroad if from a Frenchman or if realised abroad for reinvestment.

Sale of foreign securities in France.

Acquisition of £ Syrian in payment of exports or services, when they are foreign transferable holdings.

Permitted (without justification).

Acquisition of foreign exchange from exports or services abroad, if handed over to the Exchange Control.

Transactions in foreign property, in or out of France (except sale of foreign securities mentioned above).

Import into French mandated territories of means of payment, securities, &c.

II.—For Foreigners.

Prohibited (without exception) (as for French).

Prohibited (except by authorisation of the Exchange Control).

Export of money, securities, &c., from the French mandated territories.

Purchase of foreign exchange at Exchange Control except for transfer of foreign property.

Sale of property abroad realised in France for a person considered French.

Permitted (if justified).

Transfer of certain types of foreign property.

Re-export of means of payment previously imported.

Permitted (without justification).

Import of money, securities, &c.

Purchase, in France, of property abroad.

344/LR.

For purposes of the prohibition or regulation of export of capital and currency control laid down in 338/LR professional secrecy cannot be pleaded by public administrations and concessionary undertakings against High Commission agents engaged in controlling the carrying out of these regulations.

Private firms must keep their books, &c., until a year after the suppression of exchange control, and must produce them when required to do so to the High Commission agents.

345/LR.

Amends "Code des Douanes" to bring it into line with decrees Nos. 336, 337, 339, &c.

346/LR.

Lays down the jurisdiction for breaches of 338/LR.

347/LR.

Concerns accredited brokers (see 342/LR).

348/LR.

Cheques in £ Syrian or francs on France (or French colonies) can be exported from French mandated territories if sent direct to persons resident in France (or French colonies) by post and accompanied by authorisation by accredited bank, letter being presented open at post office for inspection.

Decision No. 397.

The banks authorised as accredited brokers are the Cie Algérienne and Crédit foncier.

Import and Export Regulations.

CHAPTER IV.—PALESTINE.

[E 5079/6/31]

No. 95.

Mr. Trott to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, July 15, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 100.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, after making it clear that the suggestions in your paragraphs 2 and 3 had not at first been fully understood, now says that the King sees no objection to appealing to the people of Palestine in the terms suggested; but he is making preliminary enquiries to see whether public opinion in Palestine is such that the appeal would be worth making.

The King also asks whether His Majesty's Government consider he should make this appeal alone or in co-operation with Iraqi and Egyptian Governments. Have His Majesty's Government made similar proposals to those two Governments or not? Finally, the King would like to hear in confidence what actual steps are to be taken to initiate return to normal conditions.

(Repeated to Alexandria, No. 21; Bagdad, No. 13; and Jerusalem, No. 5.)

[E 5245/6/31]

No. 96.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 91. Saving.)

[By Bag.]

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Bagdad, July 18, 1939.

MY telegram No. 26 to Jerusalem (No. 243 to you).

1. Prime Minister, who returned from Lebanon on Saturday, 15th July, called on me on following Monday. He said that he had seen Mufti and Arab Higher Committee, and suggested to them that time had come to publish a declaration urging restoration of peace in Palestine, so that white paper policy could be brought into effect.

2. Without agreeing, Mufti had given Prime Minister impression that he was not altogether opposed to idea, as he had said that restoration of peace would be much facilitated if (1) political prisoners, said to number about 2,000, could be released from internment camps; and (2) orders given for punitive operations of British troops to be less severe. (Prime Minister said that Jamal Husain had spoken on this point to Secretary of State for Colonies during last P.M.C. meeting at Geneva.)

3. Prime Minister explained that, as he had not had opportunity to convey foregoing to the High Commissioner in Jerusalem, he wished to give this information to me. In promising to pass it on I observed that, while I had no information to enable me to express an opinion, my personal assumption would be that it would be putting the cart before the horse to release prisoners until peace and good order had, in fact, been restored.

4. Prime Minister went on to say that news of decision to cancel Jewish immigration quota for October-March had not been received before his interview with Mufti. He was sure that it would have an excellent effect on Arab opinion.

5. At my weekly interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs on 18th July his Excellency said that Arab leaders who visited Iraq had conveyed the impression that it would be easier for them to co-operate in the restoration of peace if means could be found to facilitate their contact with the authorities in Palestine. It transpired that the leader whom the Minister for Foreign Affairs had in mind was Amin Tamimi, who is now in Bagdad. He realised that the Mufti would be out of the question.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 13, Saving; Cairo, No. 21, Saving; and Jedda, No. 10, Saving.)

[E 5079/6/30]

No. 97.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Trott (Jedda).

(No. 107.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 99 [of the 15th July: Proposed appeal by Ibn Saud to the people of Palestine].

You may reply to Minister for Foreign Affairs that, since the initiative in this matter came from King Abdul Aziz, and His Majesty's Government were merely replying to His Majesty's enquiry, no similar communication was made at the time to the Egyptian or Iraqi Governments, though His Majesty's Government have on a number of occasions expressed the general hope that the neighbouring Arab States would feel able to use their influence for the restoration of law and order in Palestine.

2. His Majesty's Government would have a friendly regard for a joint effort by the three Governments, or separate action by any one of them, to persuade the Palestinian Arabs to co-operate in restoring normal conditions, and consider that such a move might be a decisive factor in hastening the date when an end is put to useless bloodshed and the people of Palestine can start peacefully on their road towards greater self-government. I feel, however, that it must be left to Ibn Saud to decide whether his appeal should be made in co-operation with Egypt and Iraq or whether he could secure acceptance of his advice by the Arabs of Palestine more rapidly and effectively by acting alone.

3. You should explain that while His Majesty's Government are anxious to accelerate a return to normal conditions, there is little more that they can do to this end whilst disorder continues. His Majesty's Government have already taken very substantial measures to meet Arab grievances, and these measures have produced a marked effect upon opinion in Palestine. It is now for the Palestine Arabs to take the next steps. From their point of view, it should be evident that they cannot hope to derive political advantages from the continuance of disorders. As soon as disorders cease, it will be possible for His Majesty's Government to take steps to initiate the constitutional changes laid down in the white paper.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 247; Cairo, No. 501; and Jerusalem, No. 574.)

[E 5677/6/31]

No. 98.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 263A.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, August 4, 1939.

MY telegrams No. 259 and No. 91, Saving.

I have explained to the Prime Minister, whom I met at dinner last night, that, owing to absence of High Commissioner on tour and his subsequent early departure on leave, I understand that a visit to Jerusalem next week is unlikely to be opportune. A discursive conversation ensued, of which following is gist:—

Prime Minister referred to good effect which the amnesties might have, and I told him that I believed that certain number of releases had, in fact, recently been allowed. I emphasised that, so far as production of a good effect was concerned, nothing could presumably be more helpful than cancellation of Jewish immigration quota.

Prime Minister went on to say that, without committing themselves to acceptance of the white paper, majority of the Arab Higher Committee wanted to restore peace and order. He gave me to understand that they would be ready to co-operate for that purpose if an approach to local authorities in Palestine could be facilitated. I replied that, while I could not speak for the High Commissioner, my impression was that he might consider that such approaches should be made direct. I referred to mention by Minister for Foreign Affairs of Amin Tamini, and said that I understood that he was quite free to return to Palestine. Prime Minister's comment was that Amin Tamini was not of sufficient importance, and that, generally speaking, it would be humiliating and look like

surrender for the members of Arab Higher Committee to apply to be received. Some assistance by intermediaries was therefore desirable.

Prime Minister feared that Jews would have unfair advantage over Arabs, because they were well represented and had the ear of the authorities, whereas all Arab leaders who really counted were out of the country. I suggested that High Commissioner would not wish to act to the detriment of those left in the country who did co-operate, and Prime Minister observed that means could no doubt be found of enabling all those who wished for the restoration of peace and order to work together.

In conclusion, Prime Minister said that he had wished to put in person to the High Commissioner the points which he had explained to me as above.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 31. Figures by post to Damascus and Beirut.)

[E 6141/6/31]

No. 99.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Havard (Beirut).

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 28, 1939.

JERUSALEM telegram No. 1042 [of the 26th August: Suggesting that in the event of war the French should be asked to arrest and detain the Mufti and his associates].

The position with regard to the Mufti differs from that with regard to the other individuals mentioned, firstly, because drastic measures against him would almost certainly have undesirable repercussions in Egypt and Iraq, and secondly, because the French authorities already have him under surveillance. In his case, however, little difficulty should arise. All that the French need do is to tighten up the present measures of surveillance so as to render them effective, and prevent any possibility of his organising disturbances in Palestine.

2. The further suggestion that twenty of the Mufti's associates and eleven gang-leaders should at once be arrested and detained by the French authorities on the outbreak of war would evidently have much to recommend it if it could be relied upon to prevent Arab disturbances in Palestine without causing trouble elsewhere. This may not, however, be the case, and it may conceivably be possible to check Arab disturbances by other methods, e.g., through influence of Egypt and Iraq as allies of the United Kingdom. In these circumstances I think that the most you should do at present is to communicate the thirty-one names immediately to the French authorities as the names of the people who are considered by the High Commissioner most likely to engage in attempts to organise disturbances in Palestine. You should then consult the French authorities regarding measures which they would consider best calculated to prevent these people, in the event of a world war, from engaging in such undesirable activities. Whether the mass arrest of thirty-one Palestine Arab nationalists is likely to have serious adverse effect in the Arab world is a matter for serious consideration by both the French and ourselves, and it would perhaps be well if some less drastic measure which would be equally effective could be devised. I am consulting His Majesty's representatives in Egypt and Iraq regarding probable effect in those countries of measures urged by High Commissioner.

Please repeat to Damascus.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 658; Bagdad, No. 281; Alexandria, No. 557; and Paris, No. 473, Saving.)

[E 6142/6/31]

No. 100.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 293.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, August 30, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 282.

If Mufti and his associates were arrested and detained, the fact could not be kept secret, and would give Iraqi opinion, if ill-intentioned, a pretext for criticising United Kingdom and France.

[21053]

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If the present surveillance of Mufti, &c., were merely intensified, adverse effect here would be much less.

It is, of course, possible that to take with Mufti strong action proposed might impress Iraqi Government, but this involves risk which I think is undesirable. In the present circumstances, therefore, we should not do anything [group undecypherable] to affront or challenge pan-Arab opinion in Iraq or give handle to German intrigues and propaganda, which is less easy to control here than in Palestine. Nuri Pasha aspires to be pan-Arab leader, but is anti-German and pro-British. If he were displaced, I doubt whether any new Government in which Rashid Ali and General Taha might well have increased influence would be as helpful to us as Nuri Pasha's.

(Repeated to Alexandria, No. 50.)

[E 6186/6/31] No. 101.

Mr. Bateman to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 486.)

(Telegraphic.)

Alexandria, August 31, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 558.

Egyptian Government and people are at present far too engrossed with us in facing problems of mutual defence to pay much attention to Palestine. Prime Minister has, however, found time strongly to deprecate d'Iraqui Chargé d'Affaires policy of Nuri and others in openly manifesting refusal to accept white paper. He argues that such action must cause needless trouble to Great Britain at a time of great stress, and will effect nothing beyond annoying us to no practical purpose.

Arrest of Mufti and his associates would, I am sure, throw a spanner in a machine that is now working very smoothly. It would invite attention to a problem that is losing interest and would provide a much-needed excuse for the anti-British propagandist to split the Cabinet and stimulate opposition to Government in the country. I agree with Sir B. Newton that stricter surveillance of the Mufti is the better remedy as seen from here.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 6186/6/31] No. 102.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Consul-General (Beirut).

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 1, 1939.

MY telegram No. 32 [of 28th August: Proposed arrest of Mufti and his associates in the event of war].

Replies received from His Majesty's representatives in Egypt and Iraq show that they are seriously apprehensive of the possible results of arresting and detaining the Mufti and his associates. They fear that such drastic action would inevitably arouse among Egyptians and Iraqis much criticism of the United Kingdom and France. Sir B. Newton recommends that we should not do anything in present circumstances to affront or challenge pan-Arab opinion in Iraq, or give handle to intrigues and propaganda of our ill-wishers. This might strengthen opposition to present Government, and he believes that if present Iraqi Prime Minister were displaced, no future Iraqi Government would be likely to be as helpful to us. His Majesty's representative in Egypt feels that the Palestine question is now overshadowed in that country by graver issues. He believes that arrest of Mufti and his associates would invite attention to a problem that is losing interest and would provide a pretext for increasing anti-allied propaganda and for stimulating opposition to the present Egyptian Government.

2. You should inform French High Commissioner accordingly and point out that, while we remain anxious that Palestinian agitators in Syria should be prevented from organising disturbances in Palestine, we feel that, owing to position in Egypt and Iraq, it will be best to refrain from drastic action against the Mufti's associates immediately on the outbreak of war. His Majesty's Government hope, however, that very strict surveillance of the Mufti himself, which should reduce his communications with outside world to minimum, together

with arrangements whereby his associates may be closely watched and controlled, may be arranged, and that these measures may prove adequate. You should consult with French authorities as to possibility, for instance, of reverting to proposal to remove Mufti out of harm's way to Lattakia or some similar spot, and report their news.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 522, Saving, and Jerusalem, No. 675.)

[E 6552/6/31]

No. 103.

Viscount Halifax to Consul-General Havard (Beirut).

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 20, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 39 [of 7th September: Surveillance of the Mufti].

I am very grateful to the French High Commissioner for the prompt action which he has taken with regard to control of Mufti and his associates.

2. There are, however, a number of points on which I should like to be more fully assured, and you should take an early opportunity of raising them with him:—

- I feel that great care will have to be exercised as regards the grant of special permission for visits, and hope that in any case where doubt exists as to applicants' credentials, the French High Commissioner will consult the High Commissioner for Palestine before permission is given.
- I think that every precaution should be taken to ensure that messages are not smuggled to and from the Mufti, either by members of his family or by other means.
- I hope that the French authorities will be prepared immediately to arrest Mufti or any of his associates if they should be found to be engaged in any subversive activities designed to create disorder in Palestine, or if any evidence should be forthcoming that they are in touch with German agents. In this connexion I am not clear about the twenty-one associates of the Mufti referred to in paragraph 2 of your telegram. Are the remainder of the thirty-one mentioned in the High Commissioner's telegram No. 1042 already under arrest?

3. You should, in any event, keep a close watch on the operation of the measures of surveillance imposed on these persons and report regularly whether you are satisfied that they are proving effective.

(Addressed to Beirut, No. 42. Repeated to Alexandria, No. 688; Bagdad, No. 344; Jerusalem, No. 741; and Paris, No. 659, Saving. Beirut should repeat to Damascus.)

[E 6642/6/31]

No. 104.

Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, September 23, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 42.

I have discussed the matter with French High Commissioner, who replies as follows:—

- Every request to visit Mufti will be examined by Political Bureau of High Commission, which is in constant communication with me in this connexion, and I will refer any doubtful cases to High Commissioner, Jerusalem. The number of visits will be considerably reduced by the fact that those formerly frequenting Mufti will be in forced residence.
- Every effort will be made to stop oral communications of a subversive character from passing between Mufti and his associates, but personal servants in Mufti's house go out to shop, &c., and it is in practice impossible to control everything they may say.

[21053]

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(3) If any absolute proof of continuation of Mufti's subversive activities comes to hand, or if any evidence is forthcoming of contact with German agents, the matter will be immediately referred to Paris and I shall be told for your information. Decision will then be taken by London and Paris in consultation.

2. As regards Mufti's adherents, of whom twenty-one were political and eleven gang leaders of it, all of whom are to be found in mandated territories and not already under arrest, they are being marked down and will all be put into forced residence within the next few days. Those who are relations of Mufti and those who are of a better class will be placed in some village in the north of Lebanon, whilst lower orders and gangsters will be placed at Palmyra. As soon as operation is completed I will send by despatch a full list of names.

3. An army officer in uniform has already been detached to guard Mufti's house.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Bagdad, Alexandria, Paris, and to Damascus, Saving.)

[E 6730/6/31]

No. 105.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 2, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 125 [of 25th September: Enquiry from Ibn Saud regarding an appeal to the Mufti to end Palestine disorders].

Information reaching His Majesty's Government is that Mufti's importance is rapidly on the wane, although it may have been somewhat revived by the initiative of French High Commissioner in inviting him to make a declaration of loyalty to France (see Beirut telegram No. 51 [of 27th September] which is being repeated separately), and they wish to avoid any action which would bring him back into the limelight.

2. Please therefore make following communication to Ibn Saud when you see him at Riyadh:—

3. "His Majesty's Government are most grateful for opportunity of expressing their views with regard to an appeal to the Mufti. Their attitude to the Mufti is clear and definite. They are not prepared to admit him into Palestine or to recognise him in any way. This being so, they would much prefer the Arab States to make no appeal to him for a proclamation or declaration of any sort."

4. If you are asked about attitude of His Majesty's Government towards an appeal by Arab States to people of Palestine, you may say that His Majesty's Government would not wish to raise objection and may refer to message based on my telegram No. 107 [of 30th July]. It would have to be understood, however, that in saying this His Majesty's Government, whilst they would, of course, welcome any step which Arab States took in their own initiative in direction of improving a situation in Palestine which causes difficulties for us all, were not asking Arab States to make such an appeal, which should be made, if at all, on initiative of those States alone.

5. For your own information. His Majesty's Government have had under consideration at various times since war began possibility of impressing upon Iraqi and Egyptian Governments that it was their duty as Allies, as well as in their own obvious interest, to use all their influence, in whatever manner they thought best for the purpose, to end disturbances in Palestine. In opinion of His Majesty's Government, this duty is self-evident, even though His Majesty's Government are for various reasons neither able nor willing to modify the white paper policy, either by putting glosses upon its terms or otherwise. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government do not expect Governments concerned to do otherwise than reserve their attitude towards white paper, just as Zionists, while offering whole-hearted and unconditional support to Allies, are reserving theirs.

6. No such approach has yet been made, partly because situation in Palestine is in any case improving. But although position of Ibn Saud is somewhat different, it may help you to know that this is line which His Majesty's Government would, in fact, probably take with Egyptian and Iraqi Governments if necessity arose.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 133. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 376; Cairo, No. 737; and Beirut, No. 52 (who should inform Damascus).)

[E 6784/6/31]

No. 106.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 369.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 3, 1939.

MY telegram No. 351.

Prime Minister used the opportunity of the visit from the oriental secretary yesterday to press for reconsideration of the plan that Arab rulers should issue a pronouncement [group undecipherable]ing suspension of all opposition to the policy of His Majesty's Government for the duration of the war, and that the Mufti should then publish an appeal for co-operation with the Allies in the present struggle against Germany. Prime Minister said that he was well aware that His Majesty's Government and the High Commissioner may dislike the plan, because they thought it would revive moribund influence of the Mufti. He admitted that this might be so, but claimed that such an appeal would, in fact, weaken the Mufti's influence amongst extremists, where it was still considerable. On the other hand, the proposed appeal by the Mufti would put an end to German propaganda based on Arab struggle in Palestine, and greatly strengthen the hands of Iraqi Government by removing Palestinian questions from internal politics for the duration of the war. He urged that, in the present circumstances, the situation in the whole Arabic world should be considered and not the circumstances of Palestine alone. He said that these were minor conditions and no bargaining; all that he wanted was an intimation from His Majesty's Government to the Governments concerned that there was no objection to the proposed action.

He then reverted to the proposal that the Mufti and his family should come to live in Iraq. He promised the most binding guarantee would be taken that the Mufti would not indulge in any political activities, and argued that his coming would add to the prestige of the Government and silence its extremist opponents. While I think you should know that the Prime Minister still has this latter idea in mind, I consider he is being moved by sentiment rather than by reason, and that the presence of the Mufti in Iraq would be most objectionable. It would be a focus of propaganda and intrigue and greatly encourage mischief-mongers and all those already inclined to the view that the Arabs should now demand future concessions in Palestine in return for their present support in the war.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 38; Damascus, No. 13; Jedda, No. 40; Beirut, No. 15; and Saving to Cairo and Mice (by bag).)

[E 6938/6/31]

No. 107.

Consul-General, Beirut, to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, October 15, 1939.

MUFTI escaped during the night. All frontier posts warned.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 43; Paris, No. 7; Cairo, No. 18; Bagdad, No. 20; Jedda; Damascus; and M.I.C.E., unnumbered.)

[E 6961/6/31]

No. 108.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 386.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 16, 1939.

BEIRUT telegram No. 59.

Mufti and family [group undecypherable] palace in Bagdad about 11 A.M. this morning.

He is visiting the Prime Minister at 12.30 P.M.

Prime Minister has informed Adviser to the Interior that he will insist on the Mufti—

- (1) Declaring himself whole-heartedly on the side of Britain;
- (2) Giving undertakings to live in Iraq, in complete seclusion, and to refrain from all political activities; or
- (3) Leaving the country at once.

Adviser reports that the Prime Minister, who seemed to be disconcerted by the Mufti's arrival, declared his determination to prevent the Mufti from causing the revival of Palestinian agitation in Iraq.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 44; Alexandria, No. 56 (please repeat to M.I.C.E. and Jedda); Beirut, No. 17 (please repeat to Damascus); Tehran, No. 30; and Governor of India, No. 7.)

[E 6784/6/31]

No. 109.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 395.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 17, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 369 [of 4th October: Desire of General Nuri to arrange for proclamations by the Arab States and Mufti calling off the rebellion in Palestine].

Following reply was drafted before news of Mufti's escape was received and is now sent only for general guidance as to attitude of His Majesty's Government:—

"In general, His Majesty's Government adhere to views expressed in my telegram No. 133 [of 2nd October] to Jedda, and so far as possible you should be guided by those views in any reply you make to General Nuri.

"2. But if you think that it will make General Nuri's internal position any easier if he is allowed to approach the Mufti (see last sentence of paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference) with a view to encouraging latter to make a declaration, His Majesty's Government do not wish to stand out too strongly on this particular point. You may therefore, if you think it necessary, take the line that what the Mufti does is no concern of His Majesty's Government, and that Iraqi Government must decide how best to carry out their clear duty of doing what they can to help His Majesty's Government in bringing Palestine troubles to an end; it must, however, be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government can accept no responsibility for any advice given by Arab States to the Mufti, and are not asking the Arab States to give him any advice at all.

"3. If my telegram under reference and the present telegram do not cover all the points which you think General Nuri may raise, please let me know.

"4. I entirely support your view with regard to removal of Mufti from Syria."

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 395. Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 821; Jedda, No. 144; Beirut, No. 54 (for Damascus); and Cairo, No. 764 (for M.E.I.C.).)

[E 6961/6/31]

No. 110.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 404.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 18, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 386 [of 16th October: Arrival of the Mufti in Bagdad].

You may inform Prime Minister that His Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction of the attitude which he intends to adopt towards the Mufti.

2. You will have seen from my telegram No. 395 [of 17th October] that, even if the Mufti had remained in Syria, His Majesty's Government would have seen no insuperable objection to an invitation by Arab States on lines of (1). In the present circumstances, they consider that insistence on (1) by Iraqi Government is even necessary and desirable. They assume that (1) and (2) are complementary and not alternative.

3. Should Mufti decline to give undertakings under (1) and (2), His Majesty's Government would welcome his departure under (3), since he is, on the whole, likely to be more dangerous in Iraq than in any other country. In fact, you might even suggest to General Nuri that, whatever undertakings the Mufti may give, his mere presence in Iraq is likely to be a source of continual trouble to His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government alike, and that it might be best from all points of view to tell Mufti that Iraqi Government would prefer him to move on as soon as possible.

4. But the solution which would suit His Majesty's Government best of all would be for Iraqi Government to hand him over to them. In that event, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to give guarantees that he would be well treated, though kept under close surveillance, and allowed to have his immediate family with him. We would propose to remove him to some place where the climate involved no risk to his health. It would not be the Seychelles. For your own information, we would have it in mind to remove him for at least the duration of the war to some spot relatively remote from Palestine, such as Ceylon.

5. I realise, however, that, whatever General Nuri's personal inclinations might be, he might be unable to agree to this course without seriously compromising his own political position, especially as it might be difficult to find a plausible legal excuse on which to base it. I can only, therefore, leave it to you to work for this solution if you see any means of doing so.

6. Should the Mufti eventually settle in Iraq, I can again only leave it to you to do your utmost to ensure that surveillance, which I assume will be exercised by Iraqi Government (although not yet mentioned by General Nuri), is more real than that of French authorities in Syria has proved to be. In particular, it must be made clear that once Mufti has settled in Iraq under surveillance, he must not be allowed to change his mind and leave country without reference to His Majesty's Government.

7. It has been suggested that His Majesty's Government might offer to assist Iraqi Government in providing guards, but I realise that this could only be done by bringing airmen from Habbaniya to Mufti's place of residence, which would in itself be conspicuous, and that proposal might not be welcome to Iraqi Government on other grounds. If, however, an opening presents itself for putting forward this idea, please use it (provided that air officer commanding has no objection).

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 404. Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 732; Alexandria (for Mice), No. 766; Jedda, No. 145; and Beirut (for Damascus), No. 56.)

[E 7156/6/31]

No. 111.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 403.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 23, 1939.

(R.) MY telegram No. 398; my telegram No. 402, and your telegram No. 404.

My telegram No. 351 reported that Nuri Pasha approached [? me] on 21st September on the subject [end of R] of the Mufti and companions coming to

Iraq. Shortly afterwards Jamal Hussaini and party of Palestinian Arab leaders arrived in Bagdad, and the Prime Minister spoke at length on 2nd October to the oriental secretary on the same subject (my telegram No. 369). A fortnight later the Mufti arrived here. This sequence of events suggests that in spite of my clear warnings of serious difficulties to which the presence of the Mufti in Iraq would give rise, Prime Minister may have committed himself to receiving the Mufti in Iraq, even though concurrence of His Majesty's Government could not be obtained.

The Mufti is now the honoured guest of the Government. He is receiving calls from all people of importance and returning them, and unofficial delegations are coming from the provinces to welcome him. Whatever the Mufti's position may be in Palestine, to Prime Minister and everybody here he is the hero of the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs against Zionism.

In such circumstances I see no hope whatever of persuading Prime Minister to hand over the Mufti or to expel him from the country or to keep him under rigorous surveillance indicated in the second part of paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 402. The most that can be expected is that undertakings should be taken from the Mufti to abstain from political activity, and that he should be persuaded to make a declaration of his support of Allied cause. If he or the Prime Minister suspect that we want such a declaration, they may, however, begin to bargain.

I will, of course, do my utmost to keep Iraqi Government up to the maintenance of the assurances given to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and confirmed by the Prime Minister, but it will not be easy. These assurances were not spontaneous, but given when I referred myself to the arrival of the Mufti. Iraqi Government have no doubt been anxious as to how His Majesty's Government would receive the news and may (see paragraph [? 1]) have had a guilty conscience. Insistence on surrender or expulsion of the Mufti would be repugnant to their own true feelings, compromise their position if they gave way and tend to make His Majesty's Government very unpopular.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 47; Jedda, No. 43; and Alexandria, No. 61.)

[E 7214/6/31]

No. 112.

Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 108.)

My Lord,

Beirut, October 16, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 59 of the 15th October announcing that the Mufti had escaped from his house at Zouk, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the enquiries made by the French authorities seem to show that the escape more probably took place on the morning of the 14th October than during the night of the 14th-15th.

2. During the morning of the 14th October two or three heavily veiled women left the Mufti's house and drove away in his car, which was waiting at the gate. The guard on duty paid no attention to this departure, being under the impression that they were the Mufti's womenfolk going for a drive. In the evening the car did not return, but this again, whilst it struck the guard as being unusual, did not make them suspicious of any plot to abscond, since in the month of Ramadhan, which had just begun, it is not unusual for people to remain away to break their fast with friends.

3. It was the Mufti's habit to go for a walk every afternoon, accompanied by one of his guards, but he did not appear at the usual hour on the afternoon of the 14th. The guard sent up to ask whether he intended to go out, and received the reply that, as it was Ramadhan, the Mufti would not go and wished to remain at home. This again seemed natural and did not arouse any suspicion.

4. On the morning of the 15th the guards noticed an unusual going and coming in the house, and asked the reason. They were told that the Mufti could not be found.

5. The chief of the Security Police was immediately informed, and instructions to keep watch were telegraphed to all frontier posts, but without result.

6. The authorities now presume that the Mufti escaped disguised as a woman in the party that left the house on the morning of the 14th October, and that he thus repeated the method of escape which, almost exactly two years before, he had adopted when he fled from Jerusalem.

7. There had been for some time previously rumours to the effect that the Mufti wished to go either to Iraq or to Saudi Arabia, and these rumours were so persistent that the High Commissioner sent to the Mufti to ask what truth there was in them. The Mufti had replied that it had been suggested that he should go to Iraq, but he himself thought that he was better off where he was, and intended to stay.

8. It is impossible to say whether he was merely trying to hoodwink the authorities at the time or whether his departure was a sudden inspiration. A search of his house revealed the fact that his departure was precipitate. He had left all his clothes behind, and even his seal. He had, however, taken all his papers. In addition, stocks of rice and charcoal sufficient for the whole winter were found in his house. The four members of the Arab Committee at present in the Lebanon, Dr. Hussein Khaldi, Hilmi Pasha, Fouad Sabah and Alfred Rock, apparently know nothing of the plan, and are consequently bitter at having been left in the lurch.

9. On the other hand, there has been for some time a steady exodus of Palestinian extremists to Iraq. When I received news on the 9th October from the Middle East Intelligence Centre that Amin Tamini and Wassif Kemal—two of the extremists on the list of those who were to be put into forced residence—had arrived in Iraq from Beirut, I immediately drew the attention of the Political Bureau of the High Commission, as well as that of the Director of the Sûreté, to the matter, and asked when the persons whose names were on the list were going to be dealt with. I was told that some nine Palestinian gangsters were already confined in Palmyra, and that the political offenders, including those in the Mufti's immediate entourage, would be housed in Beit Mery—a village in the mountains—as soon as Jemal Hussein and his mission returned from Bagdad. I pointed out that there might not be many left by that time, but it was explained that the authorities had had difficulty in finding housing accommodation for them owing to the requisitioning of houses by the French military authorities.

10. Again, on the morning of the 13th October, I gave a copy of a report to both the Director of the Political Bureau of the French High Commission and to the chief of the Sûreté, regarding a plot to assassinate certain Palestinian moderate elements in Beirut and elsewhere. In that report the exodus of Palestinian extremists was emphasised, and the writer of the report stated that he understood that the Mufti himself was secretly preparing to run away from the Lebanon. The chief of the Sûreté promised that he would go carefully into the matter, but within twenty-four hours of his receiving the report the Mufti had already fled.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Cairo and Bagdad, to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, to His Majesty's Consul at Damascus and to the Middle East Intelligence Centre.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

[E 7234/6/31]

No. 113.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 406.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 28, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 845 to Jerusalem.

The Prime Minister informed the oriental secretary on 27th October that both Ibn Saud and the Egyptian Prime Minister had telegraphed to him suggesting that the Government of Iraq and Egypt and Saudi Arabia should approach His Majesty's Government with a view to the release of Arabs interned in Palestine for political reasons.

2. The Prime Minister had replied by [?radio] suggesting it would be preferable to grant a general amnesty for all except those who had committed crimes of violence, but recommends that no action should be taken until he had had an opportunity to enquire through me what response His Majesty's Government were likely to make. The oriental secretary [?group omitted] that he did not wish an appeal to be made unless His Majesty's Government were bound to respond favourably, but in that event the appeal would be made in whatever manner His Majesty's Government thought suitable. Nuri explained that so far as he was concerned this proposal had no connexion either with the plan for an appeal by the Arab Government for peace in Palestine, about which views were still being exchanged or with the proposal for a declaration of M.V.

3. I cannot, of course, judge of the position in other countries, but from my experience here I would suggest, while continuing to welcome normal consultations through diplomatic channels, His Majesty's Government should tactfully discourage further joint intervention by the Arab Government in the affairs of Palestine. Political leaders in this country have plenty to do in managing its affairs and the less they, and public opinion generally, are taken up with those of Palestine the better. For, in contemplating our alleged maltreatment of Arabs in Palestine, public opinion here is only too ready to forget all that we have done for the Arabs in Iraq. Moreover, even if Iraq Arab leaders were practical statesmen of moral courage and high calibre, able to resist temptation to bargain, and personally disinterested, there would still remain the objection that too many cooks spoil the broth. The fact of Mufti's arrival in an added reason for discouraging an intermediary with whom he might and would be however wrongly, associated.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 64; Jerusalem, No. 49; and Jedda, No. 45.)

[E 7276/6/31]

No. 114.

Consul-General Havard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 111.)

HIS Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Beirut telegram No. 67 to Foreign Office, dated the 22nd October, 1939, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of French translation of letter from Mufti to French High Commissioner, dated the 14th October, 1939, respecting Mufti's expression of gratitude, &c.

Beirut, October 24, 1939.

Enclosure.

Mohammed Amin El-Husseini to M. Puaux, Ambassadeur de France, Haut-Commissaire de la République en Syrie et au Liban, Beyrouth.

(Traduction.)

Excellence,

J'ESTIME de mon devoir, au moment de quitter le Liban, de réitérer à votre Excellence et à l'Etat français ma profonde gratitude pour la bienveillance et le bon traitement dont j'ai été entouré durant mon séjour au Liban, et de déclarer que j'apprécie hautement les difficultés que vous avez dû rencontrer, vous et votre Gouvernement, de la part du Gouvernement anglais du fait de sa pression, ses démarches incessantes et sa grande insistance à mon sujet et à celui de certains autres réfugiés palestiniens en Syrie et au Liban.

Durant les deux années de mon séjour ici, je me suis efforcé d'être fidèle à l'engagement que j'avais, à mon arrivée au Liban comme réfugié politique, donné à l'autorité française de ne lui causer aucun ennui. Pour ce motif, j'ai refusé d'accepter les invitations qui m'étaient envoyées et d'assister aux réunions publiques, voire même aux réunions religieuses dans les mosquées. Je n'ai pas, depuis deux ans, assisté à la prière du vendredi ni à une cérémonie religieuse. Nul doute que votre Excellence estime à leur juste valeur les difficultés et embarras d'un homme comme moi, qui s'empêche de remplir ses obligations religieuses.

J'ai dû suivre cette ligne de conduite pour tenir mon engagement et pour payer votre bonne action de réciprocité comme l'exigent la convenance et la courtoisie sociales. Mais j'ai senti durant ces derniers mois et semaines que ma liberté individuelle était rendue très restreinte, malgré ma complète observation des engagements ci-haut mentionnés. Je sens et suis complètement persuadé que ma liberté avait été enchaînée à la suite d'une pression exercée sur vous à mon endroit par les autorités britanniques. Si la chose dépendait de vous seul, vous n'auriez pas pris ces mesures si sévères parce que votre haute moralité ne vous le permet pas, et parce que les Français apprécient hautement le sens et la valeur de la liberté individuelle et la considèrent comme faisant partie de leurs traditions essentielles.

Bien que le Comité suprême arabe ait décidé de déployer tous ses efforts pour le règne de l'ordre en Palestine, le Gouvernement anglais ne cesse d'exercer sa pression et d'insister auprès de vous, ce qui a abouti à cet état de choses si intolérable où je me trouve empêché de me transporter dans une ville où je puisse accomplir mes devoirs religieux en Syrie et au Liban.

Comme votre Excellence a précédemment déclaré qu'elle ne trouvait pas d'inconvénient à mon départ pour un autre pays, ni à mon retour, si je veux, au Liban, à moins que le Gouvernement anglais ne s'y oppose et ne s'y refuse, je me suis vu contraint de quitter ce pays pour deux motifs: (1) Pour retrouver ma liberté personnelle; (2) pour vous éviter le tracass permanent que mon séjour vous a causé et causera de la part des autorités anglaises.

J'ai décidé, Excellence, de me rendre dans un des pays arabes musulmans où je trouverai le repos et la tranquillité.

En cours de route, je juge de mon devoir de remercier de nouveau par votre entremise les autorités françaises pour leur hospitalité et bienveillance, de confirmer à votre Excellence la teneur de ma précédente lettre en date du 9 Chaaban 1358, et de vous exprimer ma gratitude et mon respect, ainsi qu'à tous vos collaborateurs que j'ai connus durant mon séjour ici.

J'espère fermement que nous pourrons à l'avenir avoir ensemble une réunion amicale dans des circonstances meilleures que les circonstances actuelles et raffermir les relations d'affection et d'amitié entre la nation arabe et le noble peuple français.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

MOHAMMED AMIN EL-HUSSEINI.

1^{er} Ramadan 1358 (14 octobre 1939).

[E 7180/6/31]

No. 115.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 430.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 2, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 404 [of 25th October: Mufti].

It seems that His Majesty's Government must choose between:—

- (1) Exercising strong pressure to have Mufti handed over or at least expelled, and
- (2) Making best of prospect of his residing in Bagdad under no more than nominal surveillance.

2. Difficulty of (1) is that, if ordinary diplomatic pressure failed, His Majesty's Government might only be able to insist on compliance by measures which would seriously impair alliance, and might even create very situation (general disorder in Iraq, with consequent necessity for reinforcements in aircraft and troops) which it would be their object to avoid in securing Mufti's expulsion.

3. It is therefore a matter of balancing risks. Adulation which Mufti is receiving suggests that, in spite of all assurances, he may become a centre of intrigue in Iraq, and it cannot in any case be good for British prestige. If serious trouble were certain to follow his intrigues, difficulties of (1) would have to be faced. But I feel that there is at least a good prospect of contrary happening.

i.e., of interest in him waning and his losing influence when, as you say, first enthusiasm has died down.

4. Unless, therefore, you feel that either (a) pressure under (1) could be successfully applied without apprehended dangers arising, or (b) Mufti is so dangerous that these dangers must anyhow be faced, it will be necessary to fall back on (2).

5. As regards surveillance, it does not seem worth while troubling over details, since experience in Lebanon shows that nothing short of solitary confinement will prevent his communicating with his followers somehow. Nevertheless, you should endeavour to have him placed under such surveillance as shall ensure:—

- (i) That, having once elected to stay, he cannot depart without His Majesty's Government being consulted, and
- (ii) That some sort of watch is kept upon his visitors.

6. Would it be possible for some of British police inspectors to take part in this surveillance? I realise they are few in numbers, but if this could be arranged and given some publicity, it might at least suggest that Iraqi Government recognised their responsibilities to His Majesty's Government. (Palestine Administration might be asked if it could lend Iraqi Government some British constables for this purpose, but this would no doubt be most unpalatable to Iraqi sentiment.)

7. As regards declaration by Mufti, High Commissioner is not in favour of this so far as Palestine is concerned, and I agree that further insistence on your part may merely dispose those concerned to bargain. You need therefore take no further steps to this end.

8. Unless you see serious objection, you should, however, inform Iraqi Government that His Majesty's Government have taken formal note of assurances given to you by Minister for Foreign Affairs and repeated by Prime Minister; add that Iraqi Government should be under no misapprehension as to serious view which His Majesty's Government take of Mufti's arrival, and of responsibility which this has placed on them; and give solemn warning that, should it appear in future that Mufti has taken any part in organising or encouraging lawless activities in Palestine or Transjordan, His Majesty's Government would regard such action as equivalent to assisting the enemy, and would be compelled to demand that Iraqi Government should hand him over to them.

9. I leave it to your discretion to hint that unless assurances of Iraqi Government are faithfully carried out, His Majesty's Government may not see fit to proceed with credits. There are reasons, including unfortunate history of supply question, which render any use of this weapon somewhat unsatisfactory. But if Iraqi conduct is unsatisfactory, its use may, nevertheless, have to be considered.

10. I may add that question has been raised of securing extradition under treaty of 2nd May, 1932. Difficulty is that in spite of strenuous efforts during two years, no evidence whatever has been obtained which would convict Mufti of complicity in any crime such as those listed in article 3.

11. This telegram was drafted before receipt of your telegrams Nos. 406 and 407 [of 28th October], which do not, however, seem to call for its revision. In particular, they strengthen conclusion of paragraph 8 above.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 430. Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 884.)

[E 7596/6/31]

No. 116.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 663.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, November 13, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 420 of the 11th November, I have the honour to submit herewith some further observations on your Lordship's telegram No. 430 of the 2nd November.

2. I agree generally with your appreciation of the situation created by the Mufti's arrival in Bagdad. Very strong pressure would, I am sure, have to be applied to bring about his surrender to His Majesty's Government, and I am satisfied that more harm would be done to British interests by taking such a course than it is at all likely that the Mufti will be able to do himself.

3. I agree, too, that it is of little use to attach much importance to details concerning surveillance. To be really effective, surveillance would have to be organised and carried out entirely by British personnel, and this, I fear, would be quite impossible to arrange. Nevertheless, I shall do my best to persuade the Iraqi Government to ensure that the Mufti shall not quit Iraq without His Majesty's Government being consulted and that a watch is kept on his visitors.

4. At present, the Mufti is so well treated that I doubt whether he has any wish to leave Iraq, and from the Prime Minister's observations to me on more than one occasion I gather that he has the Mufti under close if unobtrusive observation. It is obviously in Nuri Pasha's own interests to be well informed of all that the Mufti says and does, but there is no certainty that he will tell me of the reports that are made to him on this subject unless it is convenient for him to do so.

5. As regards the use of British police from Palestine to take part in the surveillance of the Mufti, I fear that the Iraqi Government could never be persuaded to accept a plan which would be a reflection on their own sovereignty and humiliating to the Mufti, who is, after all, the honoured guest of a country which prides itself on having achieved independence. In Iraq there are no longer any British police inspectors, and the two officers who remain in the police force in Bagdad occupy senior advisory positions, in which, I fear, they have no opportunity to exercise any considerable control over the arrangements made to watch the Mufti.

6. I may conveniently explain here that the Mufti and his entourage have now been moved from the hotel in the middle of the town in which they were at first accommodated and have been installed in a pleasant house in a suburb situated at the northern end of the city.

7. As I have already reported, I have spoken with considerable emphasis to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of the eighth paragraph of your Lordship's telegram No. 430 of the 2nd November, and I repeated this statement to the Prime Minister when he called for a general conversation prior to his departure to Egypt for the Id holidays which follow the month of Ramadan. It may accordingly be hoped that the Iraqi Government have now no doubt as to the gravity of the view which His Majesty's Government take of the Mufti's arrival in Iraq and of the responsibility which they consider lies with the Iraqi Government to ensure that he does not abuse the asylum which he at present enjoys by organising or encouraging lawless activities in Palestine and Transjordan.

8. I should remark here that no reports have yet been received to indicate that the Mufti has shown any inclination to depart from the letter or the spirit of his undertakings to the Iraqi Government not to indulge in political activities. For this reason I considered it inexpedient at this stage to hint at any doubt of the good faith of the Iraqi Government or to link the credit proposals with the affairs of the Mufti.

9. As regards the large number of Palestinian politicians and political exiles who now surround him and undoubtedly add to the risks inherent in his presence in Bagdad, it is possible that, as progress is made with the arrangements described in your telegram No. 877 of the 31st October to Jerusalem, these men will gradually return to Palestine, leaving the Mufti to continue a less animated life in Bagdad.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador).

W. E. HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL.

[E 7768/6/31]

No. 117.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 163.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, November 30, 1939.

IBN SAUD says he has been invited by Iraq Government to approve and get Yemen to approve draft declaration already accepted by Egypt, Iraq and Palestinians whereby His Majesty's Government would state that peace in Palestine will be rewarded by complete independence of Arab States at the end of the war. Ibn Saud is awaiting the views of His Majesty's Government before replying.

[E 7793/6/31]

No. 118.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Trott (Jedda).

(No. 176.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 9, 1939.

SIR R. BULLARD'S telegrams Nos. 163 and 164 [of 30th November and 3rd December: Palestine].

You may inform Ibn Saud that it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to agree to a declaration in the terms suggested. They cannot go beyond the policy laid down in the white paper, which offers Palestine a road to independence, and it now rests with the Palestinians themselves to take the steps which will make possible the implementation of that policy. If the neighbouring Arab States wish to give advice to the Palestinians, they would best serve their interests by urging them to take advantage of the opportunity with which His Majesty's Government have presented them.

(For your own information.)

2. The words "Arab States" presumably include Syria and the Lebanon, as well as Transjordan. All three territories are administered under mandates which contemplate their ultimate independence. But His Majesty's Government would be unwilling to make any promises at this present time concerning the future date by which Transjordan may be expected to be able to stand alone. Moreover, His Majesty's Government obviously cannot make any promises on behalf of the French Government, and they do not wish to link the question of Palestine with that of territories for which they have no responsibility. You should therefore avoid any references to countries other than Palestine in your reply. If Ibn Saud later mentions them specifically, you may be guided generally by this paragraph in any immediate interim reply you feel called upon to make, and should for the rest say you will refer his enquiries to His Majesty's Government. I do not suppose any of the framers of the proposed declaration were thinking of Aden and the Persian Gulf States, but His Majesty's Government could not, in any circumstances, make pronouncements about *their* ultimate independence.

3. It is possible that the brief summary of the draft declaration contained in Ibn Saud's message may not accurately reproduce its terms, and that it may contain nothing quite so categorical as a statement that a promise has been made by His Majesty's Government to grant "complete independence of the Arab States at the end of the war." In order, therefore, that there may be no misunderstanding, it might be well to reproduce this phrase in your reply.

4. As regards Ibn Saud's views, it is not clear why a refusal by His Majesty's Government to reply to the declaration should be taken as a tacit admission of their intention to grant independence, or why such a refusal should redound to the ultimate advantage of Iraq.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 176. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 471; Cairo, No. 881; and Jerusalem, No. 996.)

[E 8124/2637/31]

No. 119.

Memorandum respecting Russian State and Ecclesiastical Property in Palestine.

ON the 18th May, 1923, the Soviet Russian trade delegation in this country communicated to the Foreign Office a memorandum stating that, according to information received by the Soviet Government, a body claiming to represent the Russian Palestine Society was about to sell a part of the society's real estate in Palestine. The memorandum proceeded to point out that, in virtue of a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the 23rd January-5th February, 1918, the society had been wound up and its movable and immovable property recognised as the property of the Soviet Russian State. The property of the former Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, which was subordinate to the former Holy Synod, had likewise become the property of the Soviet Russian State in virtue of the same decree. The note finally asserted the claim of the Soviet Government to property of the former Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Palestine, such as consular buildings, &c., and declared that the Soviet Government would hold His Majesty's Government responsible for the security of all this property until such time as the Soviet Government should be in a position to dispose of it again.

2. In consultation with the Colonial Office, it was agreed that article 10 of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of the 16th March, 1921, which might have been considered to have bearing on the question (since by its provisions the Soviet Government undertook to make no claim to the funds or other property of the late Imperial Russian Government in the United Kingdom), was not applicable to Palestine; and it was therefore proposed to reply to the Soviet note to the effect that the validity in Palestine of the claim to the property in question, in virtue of the legislation under which various categories of property in Soviet Russia had been transferred to the Soviet Russian State, could only be determined in the Palestinian courts.

3. The Colonial Office, however, felt that, in view of article 13 of the mandate for Palestine, a special responsibility rested upon His Majesty's Government as the mandatory Power "for ensuring that nothing should be done in Palestine which might be regarded by any religious community as indicating an imperfect appreciation of the intense religious interest in that country which is felt throughout the world." The Colonial Office further felt that it was important to ensure that, "pending the formation of the Holy Places Commission referred to in article 14 (of the Palestine mandate), and the approval of its functions by the Council of the League of Nations, no executive or judicial decision should be taken in Palestine except in accordance with some approved procedure in such matters as might, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, come within the competence of, or necessitate a prior reference to, the said commission if and when it is appointed." It was therefore decided that no reply should be returned to the Soviet note pending the receipt of a full report from the High Commissioner in Palestine.

4. On the 13th February, 1924, the Colonial Office communicated a report which had been received from Sir Herbert Samuel, and also the draft of the reply which it was proposed to return to this report. In two letters, dated the 5th and 17th March, the Foreign Office concurred (subject to certain observations) in the proposed draft reply, and agreed that, until the position was fully elucidated, no reply should be returned to the note from the Russian trade delegation.

5. A memorandum containing a summary of the situation as it appeared to the Foreign Office at that time was sent to the Colonial Office on the 1st May, 1924, in a letter which pointed out the chief difference between the policy previously pursued and that now advocated; namely, that instead of legal measures being instituted to *prevent* the delivery of ecclesiastical property in Palestine to the Soviet Government (in order that it should not be secularised), the property should be delivered to the Soviet Government *if its title could be proved satisfactorily in the Palestinian courts*, and the necessary steps should then be taken in accordance with the local legislation to prevent secularisation—should the Soviet Government contemplate such a course. It was proposed that, if the Colonial Office concurred, the principles and policy embodied in the memorandum would be adopted in discussing the question at the conference

between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Trade Delegation. The matter was not, however, raised at the conference nor was any mention of it made in the subsequent (unratified) Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

6. The whole question was fully discussed at an inter-departmental meeting (Colonial Office and Foreign Office) on the 23rd May, 1924, and it was then agreed that the adoption of the course indicated in the preceding paragraph would entail a certain risk; for, if the claims of the Soviet Government came up for judgment in present circumstances, the Palestine Courts might be forced to take a final decision in a cause or matter in connexion with the Holy Places or religious buildings or sites in Palestine, or the rights or claims relating to the different religious communities in that country; and His Majesty's Government could in no circumstances contemplate such a decision being taken except by some procedure which had been definitely approved by the Council of the League of Nations. It was therefore proposed that immediate steps should be taken to remove from the jurisdiction of the Palestine Courts any cause or matter of this nature; and that if it were doubtful whether the matter in dispute fell within the definition given above, the question should be referred to the High Commissioner, who should decide it in accordance with such instructions as he might receive from the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Provisions to this effect were accordingly embodied in the Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, which was promulgated on the 25th July, 1924.

7. This action removed the immediate risk of any decision being taken in contravention of articles 13 and 14 of the mandate (*i.e.*, as regards property falling within the category of Holy Places, &c., as defined in the mandate). There remained, however, the danger that if certain *other* property not coming within the scope of these articles, but, nevertheless, impressed with an implied trust for religious or charitable purposes, were transferred unconditionally to the Soviet Government, that property might be made liable to treatment such as would lay the mandatory open to the charge of disregarding the intense religious interest in Palestine entertained throughout the world. It was accordingly agreed that local legislation should be framed in Palestine, as soon as the Order in Council had been promulgated, to ensure that the Palestine courts would, in effect, safeguard the purposes for which property in that country was originally acquired by such bodies as the Russian Palestine Society and the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission. Action of this kind was all the more necessary in view of the fact that some of the property of those two bodies had been registered in the name of the late Imperial Russian Government, and it was thus difficult to resist the contention that the Soviet Government was the successor of that Government in respect of property so registered. It was evident, however, that such registration had been effected solely because the Ottoman Government did not permit foreign institutions to own property; the position was now reversed, and the clear duty of the mandatory was to protect the properties against a Government which had no claim to be regarded as a protector of Christian interests. The "Charitable Trusts Ordinance," embodying the necessary safeguards was therefore framed, and was promulgated in September 1924.

8. As regards the steps to be taken as soon as a concrete case arose in which the matter at issue was ruled to be out of the jurisdiction of the Palestine courts in accordance with the Order in Council, it was agreed that the matter should be referred to the Council of the League of Nations and that proposals to the following effect should be laid before that body for approval:—

Pending the formation of the Holy Places Commission for which provision was made in article 14 of the mandate, matters decided by the High Commissioner to fall within that commission's competence should be laid before a special *ad hoc* commission, composed of the Chief Justice of Palestine and not less than two British judges of the Palestine courts, and charged with the duty of enabling the mandatory to carry out the provisions of article 13 of the mandate.

9. The Foreign Office, in agreeing to the composition of the *ad hoc* commission as indicated above, insisted that no questions should be referred to it *except* those concerning Russian ecclesiastical property. No concrete case of this kind has yet arisen.

10. Meanwhile, M. Bitner, a secretary of the Soviet Mission in London, had on the 30th May, 1924, enquired informally whether there would be any

objection to his Government sending a representative to Palestine to examine the position with regard to Russian Government property there; and on the 17th July M. Rakovsky had enquired in an official note whether the High Commissioner could be instructed to take all requisite steps to protect the property of the Russian Government and of the "former" Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, the alienation of which, according to information received by his Government, was contemplated. He further requested facilities for a representative of the Soviet Government to proceed to Palestine and take measures to safeguard that Government's property (*i.e.*, the property claimed by them). These enquiries entailed considerable correspondence with the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner for Palestine, and the Colonial Office held that the subject could not be satisfactorily dealt with until the Order in Council had been promulgated and the Charitable Trusts Ordinance had been prepared. On the 24th October M. Rakovsky was informed as follows:—

- (a) No transactions were taking place in Palestine in regard to property registered in the name of the Russian Government, Ecclesiastical Mission, or Lay Orthodox Society, and the local authorities had been directed not to pass any such transactions without reference to the Palestine Government.
- (b) As regards the question of sending a representative of the Soviet Government to Palestine, M. Rakovsky was asked to state precisely what steps it was proposed that this representative should take in the matter and whether he would have any official status during his visit.
- (c) It was explained that, in the event of the Soviet Government desiring to establish its title to any property in Palestine, the ownership of which was a matter of dispute, the proper course for it to take was to prove its title thereto in the Palestine courts. It appeared, however, that some, at any rate, of the property might belong to the category mentioned in articles 13 and 14 of the mandate; and, in view of the obligations assumed by His Majesty's Government under those articles, an Order in Council had recently been promulgated removing from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts all causes or matters relating to the Holy Places, &c.

A copy of the Order in Council was enclosed.

11. After a silence of eighteen months, M. Maisky, Chargé d'Affaires, *ad interim*, in his reply of the 9th March, 1926, regarding the functions to be assigned to the representative whom the Soviet Government wished to send to Palestine, stated that those functions would be to investigate the nature, situation and "misuse" of the property registered in the name of the Russian Government, to protect it against "further plunder," and to take steps in connexion with "past unlawful transactions." M. Maisky did not state whether the Soviet representative would have any official status during the proposed visit.

12. As stated above it had been decided, in agreement with the Colonial Office, firstly, that in the event of the Soviet Government desiring to establish its title to any property in Palestine, the ownership of which was a matter of dispute, the proper course for it to take would be to prove its title thereto in the Palestine courts, and, secondly, that if and when the Soviet claims were ruled to be out of the jurisdiction of these courts, to refer the matter to the Council of the League with the suggestion that an *ad hoc* commission should be appointed to adjudicate on this question. The first stage of the procedure had been explained to the Soviet representative, but the second had been withheld, and the question to be settled was whether the Soviet Government should or should not now be afforded the facilities they requested with the object of obtaining the necessary information prior to bringing their claim before the Palestine courts.

13. The matter was referred by the Colonial Office to the Government of Palestine, who were, however, entirely opposed to the suggestion that a representative of the Soviet Government be appointed to visit Palestine, but offered, through the proper channels, to furnish the Soviet Government with any particulars regarding the registration and leases of the properties for which the Soviet Government might formally apply.

E 5521/1004/65
(1926).

14. As a result, a note was addressed to M. Krassin, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, in which it was stated that His Majesty's Government, after careful consideration, were "unable to agree to the despatch of a representative of the Soviet Government to Palestine," but repeated the offer made by the Government of Palestine regarding the communication of any information which the Soviet Government might require.

E 6426/1004/65
(1926).

15. M. Krassin, in an offensive note in reply, pointed out that this refusal on the part of His Majesty's Government to allow a Soviet representative to enter Palestine, "by preventing the Government of the U.S.S.R. to take steps for the protection of their properties against plunder," forced the Soviet Government to place upon the British Government the responsibility for the maintenance of the integrity of such property of the U.S.S.R. in Palestine, and to reserve to itself the right to demand from the British Government compensation for any losses the U.S.S.R. may suffer as a result of the refusal.

E 6426/1004/65
(1926).

16. Since it was precisely because His Majesty's Government did not recognise any Soviet right over this property, or admit that it had been "plundered," and since, in any case, the Soviet claim for compensation would be as high as possible (apart from the question whether a representative had previously viewed it), the threat contained in the note was not considered formidable, and it was decided to leave the note unanswered.

E 41/41/65
(1927).

17. In the meantime the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Palestine was finding itself in a precarious financial position, owing debts to contractors, tradesmen and private individuals to the amount of some £12,000. As a result of the various cases brought against the mission, their revenues had been attached by the district court, but after assurance had been given that every effort would be made to provide the mission with funds to meet their obligations by the sale of some of their properties, and the better disposition of other properties, as had no religious significance or character, the Executive Office consented to suspend execution, and, in the circumstances, it became urgent that the Government of Palestine should take action to enable the administrator of the Russian properties to carry out one of three schemes:—

- (1) To grant a moratorium in favour of the mission.
- (2) To permit a building-lease project to be carried into effect.
- (3) To authorise the sale of properties registered in the name of the mission.

E 41/41/65
(1927).

18. It was eventually decided that the practical advantages of allowing the building lease to be carried into effect outweighed the political disadvantages attaching thereto, subject to the establishment of a proper measure of financial control over the mission.

E 3434/41/65
(1927).

19. Subsequently, however, it transpired that, even if the proposed building lease were carried through, the mission would still not get out of its financial difficulties, and the Colonial Office therefore proposed to approve the High Commissioner's suggestion that certain of the outlying properties should be sold. In their reply to this suggestion the Foreign Office considered that such sale should only take place when the creditors of the mission have obtained an order of the court for the sale in question, and that, in the event of the claim of the Soviet Government to these properties being submitted to arbitration, His Majesty's Government would be in a stronger position to defend a sale of a portion of the property, if the sale had been effected in pursuance of an order of court than if it had been carried out by an administrative order of the Government. If a court had gone into the question, it was argued, His Majesty's Government could rely, in the course of any arbitral proceedings on the familiar argument that the matter had been decided by a tribunal which was independent of the Executive, and that it was impossible, or would be improper, to interfere with the judgment which was no doubt in accordance with the laws of Palestine.

E 2364/1172/65
(1928).

20. This point of view was put before the Government of Palestine, who argued, however, that the Soviet Government in any arbitral proceedings against His Majesty's Government would be likely to contend that the relations between the Palestine Executive and the Palestine Judiciary were not relevant to claims between sovereign States, and that, from that aspect, nothing would be gained by denying the administrator the right to dispose of the mission's properties by private treaty.

E 2364/1172/65
(1928).

21. In view of these considerations, the Foreign Office withdrew their objections and agreed that the administrator should be allowed to dispose of properties at his discretion. In order, however, to minimise so far as possible the

possibility of difficulties arising with the Soviet Government over this question, it was asked that property should only be sold to such extent as might be necessary to meet the claims of creditors who either had obtained a judgment which they would be entitled to have enforced by execution and sale, or were in a position to obtain such a judgment by reason of the fact that their claims are undisputed. It was further suggested in the Foreign Office letter that, in selecting properties to sell, preference should be given to properties which were not registered in the name of the former Russian Government.

22. Although it had been apprehended at the time that the disposal of some of these properties by sale would be necessary in order to pay outstanding debts, it was, however, eventually found possible, by careful management, by composition with creditors and by loans from banks, to clear the institutions of debt without disposing of any property, with the exception of one plot of land which was mortgaged in 1935. The amount of the mortgage will, however, be paid off in fifteen years, and it is expected that the properties will thereafter be free from any financial embarrassment.

23. The question of the ownership of these properties was not raised by the Soviet Government at any time between 1926 and 1939.

24. On the 29th March, 1939, however, the Soviet Ambassador called at the Foreign Office and left a memorandum, in which the Soviet Government expressed a desire to send a representative to Palestine to investigate the situation of the various properties. M. Maisky added that it was now the intention of his Government to dispose of these properties. E 2637/2637/31
(1939).

25. In sending a copy of the memorandum to the Colonial Office, it was pointed out that, in the circumstances, it might be difficult to continue to refuse permission for a Soviet representative to visit Palestine in order to examine these properties, but that it would require to be made clear to the Soviet Government that, if permission were given, it did not constitute any recognition of the Soviet claim to the possession of these properties.

26. It was finally agreed, after consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine, that, should M. Maisky revert to the matter, he could be informed that there would be no objection to despatch of a representative to Palestine on the conditions laid down in the preceding paragraph. But, unless the Soviet Ambassador himself made some further move, further consideration of the question was to be deferred, and it was hoped that the Soviet Government would, in fact, not raise this matter with His Majesty's Government until the international situation became clearer. E 7823/2637/31
(1939).

27. A despatch from the High Commissioner for Palestine of the 10th November, 1939, of which a copy was received in the Foreign Office in the course of correspondence with the Colonial Office, contains some details of the Russian religious bodies in Palestine and their properties. E 7823/2637/31
(1939).

Eastern Department, December 15, 1939.

[E 8075/6/31]

No. 120.

Dr. Weizmann to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 22.)

*Jewish Agency for Palestine,
London, November 30, 1939.*

Dear Lord Halifax,

ON the outbreak of war the Jewish Agency declared, on behalf of the Jewish people, their desire to render their utmost assistance to Great Britain in every sphere of war activity. I wrote to the Prime Minister in this sense, and a similar statement was issued by our executive in Jerusalem. With regard to the differences which had arisen over the white paper, I said that "we would like these differences to give way before the greater and more pressing necessities of the time." We understood that our offer of co-operation was welcome, and it seemed reasonable to assume that, while the war lasted, nothing would be done by His Majesty's Government which would make our co-operation more difficult.

A truce over the white paper seemed to us to be indicated also because the validity of the white paper had been very seriously questioned by the Permanent Mandates Commission. We thought that Great Britain, standing for the rule of law and for international justice, would not ignore the views expressed by the

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spokesmen of impartial public opinion on the Permanent Mandates Commission, or proceed to take further steps to implement the white paper in disregard of the fact that the admittedly new policy had not been approved by the League Council.

I was greatly encouraged by the understanding and sympathy shown by you in our previous conversations. But the practice of His Majesty's Government, as represented by the Colonial Office, continues to be based on a resolve to implement the white paper as fully as possible, without the slightest regard for the effect which this will have upon Jewish co-operation in the present emergency. Sometimes we even have the impression that a war effort on the part of the Jewish people is opposed for fear that the credit which we would gain thereby might interfere with the policy of applying the white paper with full rigour in the future.

Here are some of the main difficulties with which we have to contend on this score:—

- (i) The suspension of Jewish immigration into Palestine for the current half-year, with a prospect of indefinite prolongation, has been made to apply even to refugees, with the result that, for the first time since the establishment of the British mandatory régime in Palestine, only non-Jews can qualify for immigration under the new quota. We contend that this ban on refugee immigration is contrary even to the white paper, which promised certificates for 25,000 refugees subject only to the condition that they should be admitted "as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is assured." We greatly appreciate the facilities afforded to us for taking out of Germany some 3,000 immigrants to whom certificates had been given before the war, but this appreciation in no way diminishes our sense of injury that, just at a time when almost 2 million Polish Jews are completely crushed under the Nazi occupation régime, Great Britain should impose an absolute bar on the entry into Palestine even of those of them who have managed to escape—and impose it by an arbitrary, and in our opinion untenable, interpretation of the white paper itself.
- (ii) We are now threatened with the implementation of the land provisions of the white paper, which would close by far the larger part of Palestine against us, and introduce discrimination on grounds of race and religion—provisions which the Permanent Mandates Commission unanimously declared to be incompatible with the interpretation of the mandate hitherto in force, and which a majority of its members judged to be contrary to any other construction which might properly be placed upon the mandate.
The adoption of such a measure at such a time would be bound to produce deep resentment among our people both in Palestine and outside, and would take the heart out of their enthusiasm for the British cause.
- (iii) When our people offered their services to the military, and after the formation of units consisting of Jews had been under discussion for some time, we were suddenly informed that those units must be "mixed"—Arab-Jewish—units. It must have been clear to the authorities that Jewish enthusiasm could be enlisted only for forms of service compatible with their national self-respect, and that no *esprit de corps* could in present circumstances be expected in a mixed Palestinian unit. Political considerations were allowed to take precedence over military interests.
- (iv) Jews trained for self-defence are the basic material for our offer of man-power. But the authorities in Palestine are apparently preparing severely to reduce our legally organised defence formations, while informal military training, which has been going on for years past with the tacit acquiescence of the authorities, has been turned into a crime, and declared to be a preparation for rebellion. Men who have done distinguished service with the British forces in Palestine are now lying in prison on rags, half-starved and treated as criminals.
- (v) Concrete proposals have been put forward on the Jewish side for utilising our industrial resources in Palestine as a supply-base for the armed forces in the East. We have reason to believe that the impor-

tance of this offer is fully realised in the highest naval and military quarters. But, here again, apprehensions, on political grounds, lest His Majesty's Government should incur some obligations to the Jews, seem to militate against projects of undoubted value. The Jews are made to feel that the very fact that an offer of help comes from them is enough to condemn it.

You will understand how deeply worried I am to think that, in going to America, I shall be leaving all these pending issues in such an unclear and—as far as prevalent practice is concerned—negative condition. Is the land law to be promulgated, or is it for the time being to remain in abeyance? Are the Jews in Palestine to be treated as suspects, or as people whose loyalty and readiness to serve deserve to be encouraged? Are political considerations rooted in the white paper policy to be allowed to defeat schemes of practical assistance in the conduct of the war, or are British war interests to prevail? I feel that I owe it to my colleagues whom I am leaving here in charge, as well as to my friends in America, to whom I shall have to report on the situation, to do my utmost now to achieve clarity on these fundamental points.

Yours very sincerely,
CH. WEIZMANN.

[E 8075/6/31]

No. 121.

Viscount Halifax to Dr. Weizmann.

Dear Dr. Weizmann,

Foreign Office, December 19, 1939.

SINCE we had our talk at the Foreign Office on the 30th November I have given further thought to the letter which you left with me, and I have taken the opportunity of discussing with others the matters at issue.

As I have already told you, I have no authority to discuss with you the affairs of Palestine, which are outside my province, nor is my acquaintance with such questions sufficiently close and continuous to enable me to reply in detail to the various points raised in your letter. Writing, however, as a member of the Cabinet which was collectively responsible for the recent white paper on Palestine policy, I may perhaps venture to give you my opinion on the broader aspect of the question as I see it.

In the first place, may I remind you that the policy embodied in the white paper was adopted by the Cabinet, after long and anxious deliberation, as the most equitable solution of a bitter controversy and as the only course which would enable us to fulfil in equal measure our mandatory obligations to Jews and Arabs. In the circumstances, it seems clear to me that it is not possible to modify or postpone the application of the white paper policy in favour of one community without doing an injustice to the other. This strikes me as a governing consideration.

The policy of the white paper became effective as soon as it had been approved by Parliament, and, as you know, our attitude is that, as that policy does not involve any amendment of the mandate, it does not require the prior approval of the League Council. Neither before the war nor since has the Government said or done anything to justify the assumption that implementation of the policy would be deferred either because it has not yet been approved by the League Council or on account of the war situation.

In conclusion, let me assure you that I am the last to underrate the value of Jewish sympathy and co-operation with the Allied war effort. But, highly as His Majesty's Government appreciated Jewish offers of assistance on the outbreak of war, it must not be overlooked that those offers were made unconditionally and were welcomed on that footing. So far as this country is concerned, we are putting our whole energy into a life-and-death struggle with Nazi Germany, the persecutor of Jewry in Central Europe, and by ridding Europe of the present German régime we hope to render a supreme service to the Jewish people.

Yours sincerely,
HALIFAX.

[E 8412/8412/34]

No. 122.

*Mr. Johnson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 24.)**United States Embassy, London,
December 21, 1939.*

My Lord,

UNDER instructions from my Government, based on information received from the American Consul-General at Jerusalem, I have the honour to invite your Lordship's attention to the establishment by the Palestine Government of an import licence system, effective the 11th December, 1939, applicable to some 422 items of the total of 760 items of merchandise in the Palestine Customs classification list, including almost all articles imported from the United States.

The Department of State is also informed that in an interview on the 12th December, 1939, between a representative of the American Consulate-General and the economic adviser of the Palestine Government, the latter stated that he was unable to give assurances that American trade will not be subject to restrictions placing it on a less favourable footing than British trade with Palestine.

The economic adviser is stated to have explained that the policy of the Palestine Government, in accordance with instructions from the British Government, is to accord preference to imports from British Empire sources, such a policy having been justified by the economic adviser on the ground that the British Government cannot cut Palestine adrift during the war, but must afford its currency and economic interests the protection of emergency measures applied throughout the British Empire.

Any effort on the part of the Palestine authorities to discriminate against American imports into Palestine with a view to reducing the demand for foreign exchange or for exchange from countries outside the sterling exchange control area would, of course, be viewed by my Government as violation of American treaty rights in Palestine and particularly those embodied in article 2 of the American-British Mandate Convention of the 3rd December, 1924, and the related article 18 of the mandate assuring American trade with Palestine equality of treatment with that of the mandatory Power or of any foreign State.

While the United States Government is not disposed to raise any question regarding the adoption of measures in Palestine which may be reasonably necessary and consistent with the status of Palestine and the obligations of the British Government as mandatory for that territory, it cannot overlook illegal and unwarranted interferences with American treaty rights, and it does not find itself able to recognise either the necessity or justification for the administration of the exchange control and import licence system in Palestine in a manner to give preference to imports from British Empire sources, with a resultant discrimination against imports from the United States.

The foregoing observations are deemed equally applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to British mandated territories in Africa, where a control import licence system is understood to have been introduced similar to that in Palestine.

I have the honour to add that the United States Government feels confident that, in accordance with the obligations under its mandate conventions with the United States, the British Government will continue to recognise that American products must be admitted to Palestine and British mandated territories in Africa on a basis of full equality in all respects with British and all other products.

I have, &c.

HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

[E 8033/6/31]

No. 123.

MEMORANDA RESPECTING THE "McMAHON-HUSSEIN CORRESPONDENCE" OF 1915 AND 1916 AND CERTAIN SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS MADE ON BEHALF OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINE.

(Printed December 1939.)

1. "Summary of Historical Documents from the Outbreak of War between Great Britain and Turkey, 1914, to the Outbreak of the Revolt of the Sherif of Mecca in June 1916." (Arab Bureau: November 29, 1916: printed January 1921 as Secret 10812.)⁽¹⁾
2. "Memorandum on the Exclusion of Palestine from the Area assigned to Arab Independence by the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915-16." (Mr. W. J. Childs: October 24, 1930. Confidential 13778.)⁽¹⁾
3. Correspondence relating to the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, comprising the Kitchener-Abdullah and the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, September 1914 to March 1916, with an introduction. (January 23, 1939.)
4. "The Juridical Basis of the Arab Claim to Palestine." (Foreign Office: January 1939.)
5. "The texts of the 'Kitchener-Abdullah' and 'McMahon-Hussein' correspondence: 1914-16: and their Sources." (Foreign Office: January 23, 1939.)
6. "The Juridical Basis of the Arab Claim to Palestine: Views of the Lord Chancellor." (Mr. H. L. Baggallay: January 30, 1939.)
7. "The McMahon-Hussein correspondence: Results of the examination of the Arabic texts of certain obscure passages." (Mr. A. C. Trott: January 31, 1939.)
8. Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, as circulated to the Arab Conference on Palestine: February 14, 1939.⁽²⁾
9. "The Legal Basis of the Arab Claim to Palestine: some additional considerations," with four appendices. (Foreign Office: February 21, 1939.)
10. "The Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916: provisions regarding the special administration for Palestine." (Mr. H. K. Grey: February 21, 1939.)
11. "The 'McMahon Pledge' of October 24, 1915: instructions by His Majesty's Government with regard to this pledge." (Foreign Office: February 22, 1939.)
12. "Extract from a statement by M. Chekri Ganem, chief representative of the Central Syrian Committee, before the Supreme Council at Paris on February 13, 1919" (circulated to the United Kingdom representatives to the Conferences on Palestine, February 22, 1939.)
13. "The 'Sykes-Picot' Agreement of May 16, 1916: Explanations given to the Sherif of Mecca." (Foreign Office: February 22, 1939.)
14. "Subsequent declarations by British officials as to the meaning and fulfilment of the McMahon pledge of October 24, 1916," with Sir Henry McMahon's letter to Sir John Shuckburgh of March 12, 1922. (Foreign Office: February 23, 1939.)
15. "The Arab Claim to Palestine: Reservation of Palestine by His Majesty's Government." (Foreign Office: February 23, 1939.)
16. "General Sir Edmund Allenby's assurances to the Arabs regarding the future of conquered Ottoman territory, October 1918." (Foreign Office: February 23, 1939.)
17. "Literal Translations of the Arabic Letter dated October 26, 1915." (Mr. J. Heyworth-Dunne, School of Oriental Studies: February 23, 1939.)
18. Mr. J. Heyworth-Dunne to Mr. Baggallay, concerning certain necessary changes in the English text of the "McMahon-Hussein Correspondence" suggested by Mr. Antonius and agreed to by himself. (February 25, 1939.)

⁽¹⁾ Not reprinted in this collection.⁽²⁾ Not reprinted in this collection: see Note 1 to No. 8 in the body of the collection.

19. Mr. J. Heyworth-Dunne to Mr. Baggallay, concerning the meaning of certain Arabic words in the "McMahon-Hussein Correspondence." (February 25, 1939.)
20. Mr. J. Heyworth-Dunne to Mr. Baggallay, giving a final list of the changes suggested by Mr. Antonius and agreed to by himself for incorporation in the published edition of the correspondence. (March 2, 1939.)
21. "Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca: July 1915-March 1916," as published. (Miscellaneous No. 3 (1939): Cmd. 5957: issued March 3, 1939.)^(2a)
22. "Statements made on behalf of His Majesty's Government during the year 1918 in regard to the future status of certain parts of the Ottoman Empire." (Miscellaneous No. 4 (1939): Cmd. 5964: issued March 20, 1939.)^(2a)
23. "Report of a committee set up to consider certain correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon [His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt] and the Sherif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916." (March 16, 1939: Cmd. 5974: issued March 21, 1939.)⁽²⁾
24. Records of the Meetings of the "McMahon-Hussein Committee" (see No. 23):—
 - (a) First meeting: February 23, 1939.
 - (b) Second meeting: February 24, 1939.
 - (c) Third meeting: February 28, 1939.
 - (d) Fourth meeting: March 16, 1939.
25. Dr. Chaim Weizmann to *The Times*: March 22—published on March 23, 1939, commenting on Cmd. 5974 (No. 23) (E 2230/6/31).
26. "Future of Palestine: Emir Feisal's attitude before the Peace Conference," with two annexes. (Mr. H. K. Grey: March 31, 1939, prepared as a result of No. 25.)
27. "Palestine: Statement of Policy [by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom]" (Cmd. 6019: May 1939.)⁽⁴⁾
28. Summary of references to the "McMahon-Hussein" Correspondence, &c., made during the debates in the House of Commons on May 22 and May 23 and in the House of Lords on May 23, 1939.
29. Mr. C. W. Baxter to Sir Reader Bullard, discussing the explanations given to King Hussein about the Sykes-Picot Agreement (June 1, 1939).
30. "Proceedings of the Permanent Mandates Commission: June 1939": Statements by the Secretary of State for the Colonies respecting the Hogarth message, &c.

Additional Memoranda not included in the Original Print of the Collection, but added when the Collection was included in the Eastern (Arabic) Volume.

Appendix 1.—Foreign Office Departmental Minute commenting on No. 23 above. (Mr. Baggallay, March 18, 1939.)

Appendix 2.—Note upon certain documents issued by the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs. (Eastern Department, December 31, 1939.)

(NOTE.—In the present collection the following footnotes appeared when the document to which they are appended was first produced:—

Nos. ⁽²⁾ to ^(2a), ^(2b), ^(2c) and ^(2d) to ^(2e). All others were added when the collection was put together to be printed. In the case of the footnote to No. 3 in the collection, this means it was added when the introduction was written.)

^(2a) Not reprinted in this collection.

^(2b) Not reprinted in this collection, except for the first three paragraphs.

⁽⁴⁾ Not reprinted in this collection, except for paragraphs 1, 7 and 18.

1.

"Summary of Historical Documents from the Outbreak of War between Turkey and Great Britain, 1914, to the Outbreak of the Revolt of the Sherif of Mecca in June 1916." (Arab Bureau: November 29, 1916: printed for the Foreign Office in January 1921: Secret 10812.)*

[Not reprinted.]

2.

"Memorandum on the Exclusion of Palestine from the Area assigned to Arab Independence by the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915-16." (Mr. W. J. Childs: October 24, 1930: printed for the Foreign Office: Confidential 13778.)

[Not reprinted.]

3.

[E 577/6/31]

Correspondence relating to the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, comprising the "Kitchener-Abdullah" Correspondence and the "McMahon-Hussein" Correspondence: September 1914 to March 1916.

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Introduction.

Documents.

- (1) A telegram sent by Lord Kitchener, with the concurrence of Sir Edward Grey, to Mr. Cheetham, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo, with a message for the Sherif Abdullah.
September 24, 1914.
- (2) A translation of a letter from the Sherif Abdullah for Lord Kitchener.
(Received at the Residency, Cairo, October 30, 1914.)
- (3) A translation of a letter from Mr. Cheetham to the Sherif Abdullah, with a message from Lord Kitchener.
November 1, 1914.
- (4) A translation of a letter from the Sherif Abdullah for Lord Kitchener.
(Received at the Residency, Cairo, about December 9, 1914.)
- (5) A translation of a letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo.
(July 14, 1915.)
- (6) A translation of a letter from Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca.
August 30, 1915.
- (7) A translation of a letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon.
September 9, 1915.
- (8) A translation of a letter from Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca.
October 24, 1915.
- (9) A translation of a letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon.
November 5, 1915.
- (10) A translation of a letter from Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca.
December 14, 1915.
- (11) A translation of a letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon.
January 1, 1916.
- (12) A translation of a letter from Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca.
January 25, 1916.
- (13) A translation of a letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon.
February 18, 1916.
- (14) A translation of a letter from Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca.
March 10, 1916.

INTRODUCTION.

THE correspondence which led to the entry of the Arabs into the World War of 1914-18 on the side of the Allies, was initiated in September 1914 by Earl Kitchener of Khartum, then Secretary of State for War. On the 24th September, 1914, he sent to Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the draft of a telegram (Document No. 1) to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo containing a message to be conveyed to the Sherif Abdullah (afterwards the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan), son of the Sherif of Mecca (afterwards King Hussein of the Hejaz). This message asked what the attitude of the Arabs of the Hejaz would be in the event of the entry of Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers.

Lord Kitchener's message was approved by Sir Edward Grey and duly conveyed to the Sherif Abdullah by Mr. Cheetham. The Sherif Abdullah replied (Document No. 2) in terms generally favourable to Great Britain, but demanded certain guarantees. In reply a further letter (Document No. 3) was sent to the Sherif Abdullah to the effect that if the Arabs assisted Great Britain in the war Great Britain would guarantee the independence of the Sherifate. The Sherif, in acknowledging this letter, stated (Document No. 4) that the Arabs of the Hejaz would do nothing to harm British interests pending the arrival of a favourable moment for action against Turkey.

In July 1915 a further communication (Document No. 5) was received, this time direct from the Sherif of Mecca, who addressed himself to Sir Henry McMahon, at that time His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo. The Sherif's letter elaborated the Arab demands, particularly in the territorial sphere. The ensuing correspondence (Documents Nos. 6-14) between the Sherif and Sir Henry McMahon, is largely concerned with the latter subject.

The texts of the fourteen letters which follow this introduction have never before been assembled as a complete collection. These texts are the original drafts in English or the contemporary translations, *i.e.*, the texts in departmental use since the period of the correspondence, the texts given to the Amir Feisal in 1919 and 1921 and the texts supplied to, and quoted by, the Royal Commission on Palestine in 1937.

Foreign Office, January 23, 1939.

(1)

A Telegram sent by Lord Kitchener, with Sir Edward Grey's concurrence, to Mr. Cheetham, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo, September 24, 1914.

Tell Storrs^(*) to send secret and carefully chosen messenger from me to Sherif Abdullah^(*) to ascertain whether, should present armed German influence at Constantinople coerce Sultan against his will and Sublime Porte to acts of aggression and war against Great Britain, he and his father and Arabs of Hejaz would be with us or against us.^(†)

(2)

A Translation of a Letter from the Sherif Abdullah for Lord Kitchener, received at the Residency, Cairo, on October 30, 1914^() [undated].*

I beg most respectfully to state that I have received your messenger and private letter, and thank God for the excellence of your opinion of my steadfastness to my word. You are aware that if we do not continue to hold fast to the Moslem Khalifate it could not be imagined that we would fulfil obligations to any other authority. This is based on two things, equally important: first,

^(*) Mr. (now Sir Ronald) Storrs, oriental secretary at the Residency at Cairo.

^(*) The Sherif Abdullah, son of the Sherif (Hussein) of Mecca. The Sherif Hussein afterwards became King Hussein of the Hejaz. The Sherif Abdullah is now the Emir of Transjordan.

^(†) Lord Kitchener's message was embodied in a letter drafted at Cairo to the Sherif Abdullah, in the exact terms of the message.

^(*) This letter was brought to the Residency by Ali Effendi, the messenger chosen by Mr. Storrs to convey to the Sherif Abdullah the message contained in Lord Kitchener's telegram to Mr. Cheetham (Document No. 1).

religion; and, secondly, the Khalifate's restraint from interference with the interests of our country, and that it avoids touching our long-standing privileges. The possibility of anything occurring which will interfere with these two fundamental principles has forced us to adopt this critical position for fear of being accused of making dissensions in Islam and causing a revolution in it. This position and none other will we continue to maintain until some change comes from God. The indication sent by you is one in which we and the Hejaz high nobility feel united with you, and for that reason it is necessary to give it due respect and importance. Moreover, as the Government of Great Britain is in the eyes of the Moslem world the second greatest Moslem Power, and as the Hejaz is not to be compared with any other country in the world for its religious importance, therefore the protection of its sanctity and of our nationality and all our rights and customs, including even petty ones, is a matter of life and death to us, and one in which we should not be sparing of our lives to protect and defend. Consequently, the people of the Hejaz will accept and be well satisfied with more close union with Great Britain and its Government, owing to the notorious neglect by Constantinople of religion and its rights; and the failure of the Turks' administration and their complete neglect of furthering it, either materially or morally, externally or internally; and Great Britain will take the first place in their eyes so long as she protects the rights of our country and the rights of the person of his Highness our present Emir and Lord, and the rights of his Emirate and its independence in all respects without any exceptions or restrictions, and so long as it supports us against any foreign aggression, and in particular against the Ottomans, especially if they wish to set up any one else as Emir with the intention of causing internal dissension—their principle of government—and provided that the Government of Great Britain would guarantee these fundamental principles clearly and in writing. This guarantee we expect to receive at first opportunity. In conclusion, we present you our best regards, &c.

(3)

A Translation of a Letter from Mr. Cheetham, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo, to the Sherif Abdullah, November 1, 1914.^()*

Lord Kitchener's salaams to Sherif Abdullah.

Germany has bought the Turkish Government with gold, notwithstanding that England, France and Russia guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire if the Turks remained neutral in this war. The Turkish Government have, against the will of the Sultan, through German pressure, committed acts of aggression by invading the frontiers of Egypt with armed bands of Turkish soldiers.

If the Emir of Mecca is willing to assist Great Britain in this conflict, Great Britain is willing, recognising and respecting the sacred and unique office of the Emir Hussein, to guarantee the independence rights and privileges of the Sherifate against all external foreign aggression, in particular that of the Ottomans. Till now we have defended Islam in the person of the Turks; henceforward it shall be in that of the noble Arab.

If the Arab nation assist England in this war that has been forced upon us by Turkey, England will guarantee that no internal intervention takes place in Arabia, and will give Arabs every assistance against external foreign aggression.

It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina, and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring.

(4)

A Translation of a Letter from the Sherif Abdullah for Lord Kitchener; received at the Residency, Cairo, on about December 9, 1914 [Undated].

After paying due respects, yours of the 12th Zil Hijja has been received with due honour and reverence, and we have taken it as a basis for action and a

^(*) This letter was carried to the Sherif Abdullah by the messenger Ali Effendi, who left Cairo with it on or about November 1, 1914.

reference for the present and future. In accordance with it, and in view of its fidelity and accord, our country has come to hold most conscientiously to your suggestions, and has undertaken to carry out faithfully what we said in our previous letter and what we confirm in the present one; and has avoided since our foregoing letter all that affects unfavourably your material and moral interests. Yea more, we are endeavouring to discourage any man who seeks to harm these interests—any one of those who are outside the pale of the Hejaz colony.

If you could perceive our critical position in undertaking the matter, you would know that we are doing that which is more important than the performance of that which is naturally imposed upon us, regardless of whether or not these negotiations take place and whether or not an agreement is arrived at. It is so because religion which justified it, and which is the sole foundation of action, prevents us from working at once. But when the time shall come, and it is not far distant, we cannot but accomplish it, even though the Ottoman Empire be not occupied, and even though it should muster against us all its army.

In closing, I would remind you that we act upon the words of him who said: "Perform ye the promise ye make to God when ye pledge yourselves." We then pay to His Highness and yourself our best regards, requesting you to keep this correspondence secret until the right time should come.

(5)

A Translation of a Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, (19) July 14, 1915.

To his Honour:

Whereas the whole of the Arab nation, without any exception, have decided in these last years to live, and to accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their administration both in theory and practice; and whereas they have found and felt that it is to the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and aid them to the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions (which are based upon the maintenance of the honour and dignity of their life) without any ulterior motives whatsoever unconnected with this object;

And whereas it is to their (the Arabs') interest also to prefer the assistance of the Government of Great Britain, in consideration of their geographical position and economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned Government, which is known to both nations and therefore need not be emphasised;

For these reasons the Arab nation see fit to limit themselves, as time is short, to asking the Government of Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval, through her deputy or representative, of the following fundamental propositions, leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it may prepare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, until such time as it finds occasion for making the actual negotiations:—

Firstly.—England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat, Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. England to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.

Secondly.—The Arab Government of the Sherif to acknowledge that England shall have the preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries whenever conditions of enterprises are otherwise equal.

Thirdly.—For the security of this Arab independence and the certainty of such preference of economic enterprises, both high contracting parties to offer mutual assistance, to the best ability of their military and naval forces, to face any foreign Power which may attack either party. Peace not to be decided without agreement of both parties.

(19) Undated and unsigned, but enclosed in an unsigned personal letter, dated Ramadan 2, 1333 (July 14, 1915), from the Sherif to Mr. Storrs.

Fourthly.—If one of the parties enters upon an aggressive conflict, the other party to assume a neutral attitude, and in case of such party wishing the other to join forces, both to meet and discuss the conditions.

Fifthly.—England to acknowledge the abolition of foreign privileges in the Arab countries, and to assist the Government of the Sherif in an international convention for confirming such abolition.

Sixthly.—Articles 3 and 4 of this treaty to remain in vigour for fifteen years, and, if either wishes it to be renewed, one year's notice before lapse of treaty to be given.

Consequently, and as the whole of the Arab nation have (praise be to God) agreed and united for the attainment, at all costs and finally, of this noble object, they beg the Government of Great Britain to answer them positively or negatively in a period of thirty days after receiving this intimation; and if this period should lapse before they receive an answer they reserve to themselves complete freedom of action. Moreover, we (the Sherif's family) will consider ourselves free in word and deed from the bonds of our previous declaration which we made through Ali Effendi.

(6)

A Translation of a Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, to the Sherif of Mecca, August 30, 1915.

To his Highness the Sherif Hussein,

(After compliments and salutations.)

We have the honour to thank you for your frank expressions of the sincerity of your feeling towards England. We rejoice, moreover, that your Highness and your people are of one opinion—that Arab interests are English interests and English Arab. To this intent we confirm to you the terms of Lord Kitchener's message,⁽¹¹⁾ which reached you by the hand of Ali Effendi, and in which was stated clearly our desire for the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants, together with our approval of the Arab Khalifate when it should be proclaimed. We declare once more that His Majesty's Government would welcome the resumption of the Khalifate by an Arab of true race. With regard to the questions of limits, frontiers and boundaries, it would appear to be premature to consume our time in discussing such details in the heat of war, and while, in many portions of them, the Turk is up to now in effective occupation; especially as we have learnt, with surprise and regret, that some of the Arabs in those very parts, far from assisting us, are neglecting this their supreme opportunity, and are lending their arms to the German and the Turk, to the new despoiler and the old oppressor.

Nevertheless we are ready to send your Highness for the Holy Cities and the noble Arabs the charitable offerings of Egypt, so soon as your Highness shall inform us how and where they should be delivered. We are, moreover, arranging for this your messenger to be admitted and helped on any journey he may make to ourselves.

Friendly reassurances. Salutations.

A. H. McMAHON.

(7)

A Translation of a Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, September 9, 1915.

To his Excellency the Most Exalted, the Most Eminent—the British High Commissioner in Egypt; may God grant him Success.

With great cheerfulness and delight I received your letter dated the 19th Shawal 1333 (the 30th August, 1915), and have given it great consideration and regard, in spite of the impression I received from it of ambiguity and its tone of coldness and hesitation with regard to our essential point.

(11) See Document No. 3.

It is necessary to make clear to your Excellency our sincerity towards the illustrious British Empire and our confession of preference for it in all cases and matters and under all forms and circumstances. The real interests of the followers of our religion necessitate this.

Nevertheless, your Excellency will pardon me and permit me to say clearly that the coldness and hesitation which you have displayed in the question of the limits and boundaries by saying that the discussion of these at present is of no use and is a loss of time, and that they are still in the hands of the Government which is ruling them, &c., might be taken to infer an estrangement or something of the sort.

As the limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom we should satisfy and with whom we should discuss them after the war is over but our peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by these limits and their word is united on this.

Therefore they have found it necessary first to discuss this point with the Power in whom they now have their confidence and trust as a final appeal, viz., the illustrious British Empire.

(Literal translation of above passage:—

"And therefore they saw the discussion in it first the place of their confidence and trust the axis of final appeal now and that is the illustrious British Empire.")

Their reason for this union and confidence is mutual interest, the necessity of regulating territorial divisions and the feelings of their inhabitants, so that they may know how to base their future and life, so not to meet her (England?) or any of her Allies in opposition to their resolution which would produce a contrary issue, which God forbid.

(Literal translation of above passage as follows:—

"The feelings of its inhabitants to know how to base their future and life for not to meet her or one of its Allies in front of their resolution when the thing comes to a contrary result, which God forbid.")

For the object is, honourable Minister, the truth which is established on a basis which guarantees the essential sources of life in future.

Yet within these limits they have not included places inhabited by a foreign race. It is a vain show of words and titles.

May God have mercy on the Khalifate and comfort Moslems in it.

I am confident that your Excellency will not doubt that it is not I personally who am demanding of these limits which include only our race, but that they are all proposals of the people, who, in short, believe that they are necessary for economic life.

Is this not right, your Excellency the Minister?

In a word, your high Excellency, we are firm in our sincerity and declaring our preference for loyalty towards you, whether you are satisfied with us, as has been said, or angry.

With reference to your remark in your letter above mentioned that some of our people are still doing their utmost in promoting the interests of Turkey, your goodness (lit. "perfectness") would not permit you to make this an excuse for the tone of coldness and hesitation with regard to our demands, demands which I cannot admit that you, as a man of sound opinion, will deny to be necessary for our existence; nay, they are the essential essence of our life, material and moral.

Up to the present moment I am myself with all my might carrying out in my country all things in conformity with the Islamic Law, all things which tend to benefit the rest of the kingdom, and I shall continue to do so until it pleases God to order otherwise.

In order to reassure your Excellency, I can declare that the whole country, together with those who you say are submitting themselves to Turco-German orders, are all waiting the result of these negotiations, which are dependent only on your refusal or acceptance of the question of the limits and on your declaration of safeguarding their religion first and then the rest of rights from any harm or danger.

Whatever the illustrious Government of Great Britain finds conformable to its policy on this subject, communicate it to us and specify to us the course we should follow.

In all cases, it is only God's will which shall be executed, and it is God who is the real factor in everything.

With regard to our demand for grain for the natives, and the moneys ("surras") known to the Wakfs Ministry and all other articles sent here with pilgrims' caravans, high Excellency, my intention in this matter is to confirm your proclamations to the whole world, and especially to the Moslem world, that your antagonism is confined only to the party which has usurped the rights of the Khalifate, in which are included the rights of all Moslems.

Moreover, the said grain is from the special Wakfs and has nothing to do with politics.

If you think it should be, let the grain of the two years be transported in a special steamer to Jedda in an official manner, in the name of all the natives as usual, and the captain of the steamer or the special "Mamur" detailed as usual every year to hand it over on his arrival at the port will send to the Governor of Jedda asking for the Mamur of the grain at Jedda or a responsible official to take over the grain and give the necessary receipt signed by the said Mamur, that is, the Mamur of the grain himself. He should make it a condition that he would (? not) accept any receipt but that signed by this Mamur.

Let the captain of the steamer or the Mamur (detailed with the grain) be instructed that, if he finds anything contrary to this arrangement, he should warn them that he will return home with the cargo. Thereupon the Mamur and the special committee detailed with him, which is known as the committee of the grain for the natives, will take over the grain in the proper form.

Please accept my best regards and salutations.

If you choose to send a reply to this, please send it with the bearer.

Shawal 29, 1333.

(8)

A Translation of a Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, to the Sherif of Mecca, October 24, 1915.

I have received your letter of the 29th Shawal, 1333, with much pleasure and your expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction.

I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the moment had not yet arrived when they could be most profitably discussed.

I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction:—

The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits and boundaries and, in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:

- (1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.
- (2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.
- (3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice, and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

- (4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.
- (5) With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her traditional friends the Arabs, and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.

I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions, and if there are any other matters dealt with in your letters which I have omitted to mention, we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.

It was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings which, thanks to the clearness of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without trouble or mishap, in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present sad war. May God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom to all peoples!

I am sending this letter by the hand of your trusted and excellent messenger, Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Arayfan, and he will inform you of the various matters of interest, but of less vital importance, which I have not mentioned in this letter.

(Compliments.)

A. HENRY McMAHON.

(9)

A Translation of a Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, November 5, 1915.

(In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!)

To his Excellency the most exalted and eminent Minister who is endowed with the highest authority and soundness of opinion. May God guide him to do His Will!

I received with great pleasure your honoured letter, dated the 15th Zil Hijja (24th October, 1915), to which I beg to answer as follows:—

1. In order to facilitate an agreement and to render a service to Islam, and at the same time to avoid all that may cause Islam troubles and hardships—seeing, moreover, that we have great consideration for the distinguished qualities and dispositions of the Government of Great Britain—we renounce our insistence on the inclusion of the Vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab kingdom. But the two Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab; they are both descendants of one forefather.

We Moslems will follow the footsteps of the Commander of the Faithful Omar-ibn-Khattab, and other khalifs succeeding him, who ordained in the laws of the Moslem faith that Moslems should treat the Christians as they treat themselves. He, Omar, declared with reference to Christians: "They will have the same privileges and submit to the same duties as ourselves." They will thus enjoy their civic rights inasmuch as it accords with the general interests of the whole nation.

2. As the Iraqi vilayets are parts of the pure Arab kingdom, and were, in fact, the seat of its Government in the time of Ali-ibn-Abu Talib, and in the time of all the khalifs who succeeded him; and as in them began the civilisation of the Arabs, and as their towns were the first towns built in Islam where the Arab power became so great; therefore, these provinces are greatly valued by all Arabs

far and near, and their traditions cannot be forgotten by them. Consequently, we cannot satisfy the Arab nations or make them submit to give up such a title to nobility. But in order to render an accord easy, and taking into consideration the assurances mentioned in the fifth article of your letter, to keep and guard our mutual interests in that country as they are one and the same, for all these reasons we might agree to leave under the British administration for a short time those districts now occupied by the British troops without the rights of either party being prejudiced thereby (especially those of the Arab nation; which interests are to it economic and vital), and against a suitable sum paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of occupation, in order to meet the expenses which every new kingdom is bound to support; at the same time respecting your agreements with the sheikhs of those districts, and especially those which are essential.

3. In your desire to hasten the movement we see not only advantages, but grounds of apprehension. The first of these grounds is the fear of the blame of the Moslems of the opposite party (as has already happened in the past), who would declare that we have revolted against Islam and ruined its forces. The second is that standing in the face of Turkey, which is supported by all the forces of Germany, we do not know what Great Britain and her Allies would do if one of the *Entente* Powers were weakened and obliged to make peace. We fear that the Arab nation will then be left alone in the face of Turkey together with her allies, but we would not at all mind if we were to face the Turks alone. Therefore, it is necessary to take these points into consideration in order to avoid a peace being concluded in which the parties concerned may decide the fate of our people as if we had taken part in the war without making good our claims to official consideration.

4. The Arab nation has a strong belief that after this war is over, the Turks, under German influence, will direct their efforts to provoke the Arabs and violate their rights, both material and moral, to wipe out their nobility and honour and reduce them to utter submission, as they are determined to ruin them entirely. The reasons for the slowness shown in our action have already been stated.

5. When the Arabs know the Government of Great Britain is their ally who will not leave them to themselves at the conclusion of peace in the face of Turkey and Germany, and that she will support and will effectively defend them, then to enter the war at once will, no doubt, be in conformity with the general interest of the Arabs.

6. Our letter, dated 29th Shauâl, 1333 (9th September, 1915), saves us the trouble of repeating our opinions as to articles 3 and 4 of your honoured last letter regarding administration, Government advisers and officials, especially as you have declared, exalted Minister, that you will not interfere with internal affairs.

7. The arrival of a clear and definite answer as soon as possible to the above proposals is expected. We have done our utmost in making concessions in order to come to an agreement satisfying both parties. We know that our lot in this war will be either a success, which will guarantee to the Arabs a life becoming their past history, or destruction in the attempt to attain their objects. Had it not been for the determination which I see in the Arabs for the attainment of their objects, I would have preferred to seclude myself on one of the heights of a mountain, but they, the Arabs, have insisted that I should guide the movement to this end.

May God keep you safe and victorious, as we devoutly hope and desire.

Zil Hijja 27, 1333.

(10)

A Translation of a Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, to the Sherif of Mecca, December 14, 1915.

To Sherif Hussein:

(After customary greetings and acknowledgment of previous letter.)

I am gratified to observe that you agree to the exclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana from boundaries of the Arab territories

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I also note with great pleasure and satisfaction your assurances that the Arabs are determined to act in conformity with the precepts laid down by Omar Ibn Khattab and the early Khalifs, which secure the rights and privileges of all religions alike.

In stating that the Arabs are ready to recognise and respect all our treaties with Arab chiefs, it is, of course, understood that this will apply to all territories included in the Arab kingdom, as the Government of Great Britain cannot repudiate engagements which already exist.

With regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut, the Government of Great Britain have taken careful note of your observations, but, as the interests of our ally France are involved, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.

The Government of Great Britain, as I have already informed you, are ready to give all guarantees of assistance and support within their power to the Arab kingdom, but their interests demand, as you yourself have recognised, a friendly and stable Administration in the vilayet of Bagdad, and the adequate safeguarding of these interests calls for a much fuller and more detailed consideration than the present situation and the urgency of these negotiations permit.

We fully appreciate your desire for caution, and have no wish to urge you to hasty action, which might jeopardise the eventual success of your projects, but, in the meantime, it is most essential that you should spare no effort to attach all the Arab peoples to our united cause and urge them to afford no assistance to our enemies.

It is on the success of these efforts and on the more active measures which the Arabs may hereafter take in support of our cause, when the time for action comes, that the permanence and strength of our agreement must depend.

Under these circumstances I am further directed by the Government of Great Britain to inform you that you may rest assured that Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace in terms of which the freedom of the Arab peoples from German and Turkish domination does not form an essential condition.

As an earnest of our intentions, and in order to aid you in your efforts in our joint cause, I am sending you by your trustworthy messenger a sum of £20,000.

(Customary ending.)

H. McMAHON.

(11)

A Translation of a Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, January 1, 1916.

(In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!)

To his Excellency the eminent, energetic and magnanimous Minister:

We received from the bearer your two letters⁽¹⁾ dated the 9th Safar (the 14th December, 1915), with great respect and honour, and I have understood their contents, which caused me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction as they removed that which had made me uneasy.

Your honour will have realised after the arrival of Mohammed (Faroki) Sherif and his interview with you, that all our procedure up to the present was of no personal inclination or the like, which would have been wholly unintelligible, but that everything was the result of the decisions and desires of our peoples, and that we are but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the position they (our people) have pressed upon us.

These truths are, in my opinion, very important and deserve your honour's special attention and consideration.

With regard to what had been stated in your honoured communication concerning El Iraq as to the matter of compensation for the period of occupation,

⁽¹⁾ "Two letters." One of these was Sir H. McMahon's letter of December 14 (Document No. 10); the other was presumably a note under cover of which we sent the Sherif the £20,000 (see Document No. 10).

we, in order to strengthen the confidence of Great Britain in our attitude and in our words and actions, really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of our certainty and assurance in trusting her glorious Government, leave the determination of the amount to the perception of her wisdom and justice.

As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications; and all this was only done so, to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present wars and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts.

I do not find it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is of greater security to the interests and presumption of the rights of Great Britain than it is to us; and will necessarily be so whatever may happen, so that Great Britain may finally see all her own peoples in that contentment and advancement which she is endeavouring to establish for them now especially as her Allies being neighbours to us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which there will be no peace of mind. In addition to which the people of Beirut will decidedly never accept such isolations, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity of our interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with any other Power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.

I declare this and I have a strong belief, which the living will inherit from the dead, in the declarations which you gave in the conclusion of your honoured letter. Therefore, the honourable and eminent Minister should believe and be sure, together with Great Britain, that we still remain firm to our resolution which Storrs learnt from us two years ago, for which we await the opportunity suitable to our situation, especially in view of that action the time of which has now come near and which destiny drives towards us with great haste and clearness, so that we and those who are of our opinion may have reasons for such action against any criticisms or responsibilities imposed upon us in future.

Your expression "we do not want to push you to any hasty action which might jeopardise the success of your aim" does not need any more explanation except what we may ask for, when necessary, such as arms, ammunition, &c.

I deem this sufficient, as I have occupied much of your Honour's time. I beg to offer you my great veneration and respect.

Safar 25, 1334.

(12)

A Translation of a Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, to the Sherif of Mecca, January 25, 1916.

(After customary greetings.)

We have received with great pleasure and satisfaction your letter of the 25th Safar (1st January) at the hands of your trusty messenger, who has also transmitted to us your verbal messages.

We fully realise and entirely appreciate the motives which guide you in this important question, and we know well that you are acting entirely in the interests of the Arab peoples and with no thought beyond their welfare.

We take note of your remarks concerning the Vilayet of Bagdad, and will take the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the time for peaceful settlement arrives.

As regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France.

[21053]

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It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting for the cause of right and liberty.

In this great cause Arabia is now associated, and God grant that the result of our mutual efforts and co-operation will bind us in a lasting friendship to the mutual welfare and happiness of us all.

We are greatly pleased to hear of the action you are taking to win all the Arabs over to our joint cause and to dissuade them from giving any assistance to our enemies, and we leave it to your discretion to seize the most favourable moment for further and more decided measures.

You will doubtless inform us by the bearer of this letter of any manner in which we can assist you, and your requests will always receive our immediate consideration.

You will have heard how El Sayed Ahmed-el-Sherif-el-Senussi has been beguiled by evil advice into hostile action, and it will be a great grief to you to know that he has been so far forgetful of the interests of the Arabs as to throw in his lot with our enemies. Misfortune has now overtaken him, and we trust that this will show him his error and lead him to peace for the sake of his poor misguided followers.

We are sending this letter by the hand of your good messenger, who will also bring to you all our news.

With salaams.

H. McMAHON.

(13)

A Translation of a Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, February 18, 1916.

(In the name of the Merciful, the Compassionate!)

To the most noble his Excellency the High Commissioner. May God protect him.

(After compliments and respects.)

We received your Excellency's letter dated the 25th Rabi El Awal, and its contents filled us with the utmost pleasure and satisfaction at the attainment of the required understanding and the intimacy desired. I ask God to make easy our purposes and prosper our endeavours. Your Excellency will understand the work that is being done, and the reasons for it, from the following:—

Firstly.—We had informed your Excellency that we had sent one of our sons to Syria to command the operations deemed necessary there. We have received a detailed report from him stating that the tyrannies of the Government there have not left of the persons upon whom they could depend, whether of the different ranks of soldiers or of others, save only a few, and those of secondary importance; and that he is awaiting the arrival of the forces announced from different places, especially from the people of the country and the surrounding Arab regions as Aleppo and the south of Mosul, whose total is calculated at not less than 100,000 by their estimate; and he intends, if the majority of the forces mentioned are Arab, to begin the movement by them; and if otherwise, that is, of the Turks or others, he will observe their advance to the Canal, and when they begin to fight, his movements upon them will be different to what they expect.

Secondly.—We purposed sending our eldest son to Medina with sufficient forces to strengthen his brother (who is) in Syria, and with every possibility of occupying the railway line, or carrying out such operations as circumstances may admit. This is the beginning of the principal movement, and we are satisfied in its beginning with what we had levied as guards to keep the interior of the country quiet; they are of the people of Hejaz only, for many reasons, which it would take too long to set forth; chiefly, the difficulties in the way of providing their necessities with secrecy and speed (although this precaution was not necessary) and to make it easy to bring reinforcements when needed; this is the

summary of what you wished to understand. In my opinion, it is sufficient, and it is to be taken as a foundation and a standard as to our actions in the face of all changes and unforeseen events which the sequence of events may show. It remains for us to state what we need at present:—

Firstly.—The amount of £50,000 in gold for the monthly pay of the troops levied, and other things the necessity of which needs no explanation. We beg you to send it with all possible haste.

Secondly.—Twenty thousand sacks of rice, 15,000 sacks of flour, 3,000 sacks of barley, 150 sacks of coffee, 150 sacks of sugar, 5,000 rifles of the modern pattern and the necessary ammunition, and 100 boxes of the two sample cartridges (enclosed) and of Martini-Henry cartridges and "Aza," that is, those of the rifles of the factory of St. Etienne in France, for the use of those two kinds of rifles of our tribes; it would not be amiss to send 500 boxes of both kinds.

Thirdly.—We think it better that the place of deposit of all these things should be Port Sudan.

Fourthly.—As the above provisions and munitions are not needed until the beginning of the movement (of which we will inform you officially), they should remain at the above place, and when we need them we will inform the Governor there of the place to which they may be conveyed, and of the intermediaries who will carry orders for receiving them.

Fifthly.—The money required should be sent at once to the Governor of Port Sudan, and a confidential agent will be sent by us to receive it, either all at once, or in two instalments, according as he is able, and this (5) is the (secret) sign to be recognised for accepting the man.

Sixthly.—Our envoy who will receive the money will be sent to Port Sudan in three weeks' time; that is to say, he will be there on the 5th Jamad Awal (the 9th March) with a letter from us addressed to Al Khawaga Elias Effendi, saying that he (Elias) will pay him, in accordance with the letter, the rent of our properties, and the signature will be clear in our name, but we will instruct him to ask for the Governor of the place, whom you will apprise of this person's arrival. After perusal of the letter, the money should be given to him on condition that no discussion whatever is to be made with him of any question concerning us. We beg you most emphatically not to tell him anything, keeping this affair secret, and he should be treated apparently as if he were nothing out of the way.

Let it not be thought that our appointment of another man results from lack of confidence in the bearer; it is only to avoid waste of time, for we are appointing him to a task elsewhere. At the same time, we beg you not to embark or send him in a steamer, or officially, the means already arranged being sufficient.

Seventhly.—Our representative, bearer of the present letter, has been definitely instructed to ensure the arrival of this, and I think that his mission this time is finished, since the condition of things is known both in general and in detail, and there is no need for sending anyone else. In case of need for sending information, it will come from us; yet, as our next representative will reach you after three weeks, you may prepare instructions for him to take back. Yet let him be treated simply in appearance.

Eighthly.—Let the British Government consider this military expenditure in accordance with the books which will be furnished it, explaining how the money has been spent.

To conclude, my best and numberless salutations beyond all increase.

Rabi-al-Akhar 14, 1334.

(14)

A Translation of a Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, to the Sherif of Mecca, March 10, 1916.

(After customary greetings.)

We have received your letter of the 14th Rabi-el-Akhar (18th February), duly delivered by your trusted messenger.

We are grateful to note the active measures which you propose to take. We consider them the most suitable in the existing circumstances, and they have the

approval of His Majesty's Government. I am pleased to be able to inform you that His Majesty's Government have approved of meeting your requests, and that which you asked to be sent with all haste is being despatched with your messenger, who is also the bearer of this letter.

The remainder will be collected as quickly as possible and will be deposited at Port Sudan, where it will remain until we hear from you officially of the beginning of the movement and of the places to which they may be conveyed and the intermediaries who will carry out the orders for receiving them.

The necessary instructions, as set forth in your letter, have been issued to the Governor at Port Sudan and he will arrange everything in accordance with your wishes.

Your representative who brought your last letter has been duly facilitated in his journey to Jeizan, and every assistance has been given him in his mission, which we trust will be crowned with good results.

We have arranged that, on completion, he will be brought to Port Sudan, whence he will proceed by the safest means to join you and report the results of his work.

We take the opportunity, in sending this letter, to explain to you a matter which might otherwise not have been clear to you, and which might have given rise to misunderstanding. There are various Turkish posts and small garrisons along the coasts of Arabia who are hostile to us, and who are said to be planning injury to our naval interests in the Red Sea. We may, therefore, find it necessary to take hostile measures against these posts and garrisons, but we have issued strict instructions that every care must be taken by our ships to differentiate between the hostile Turkish garrisons and the innocent Arab inhabitants, towards whom we entertain such friendly feelings.

We give you notice of this matter in case distorted and false reports may reach you of the reasons for any action which we may be obliged to take.

We have heard rumours that our mutual enemies are endeavouring to construct boats for the purpose of laying mines in the Red Sea, and of otherwise injuring our interests there, and we beg of you that you will give us early information should you receive any confirmation of such reports.

We have heard that Ibn Rashid has been selling large quantities of camels to the Turks, which are being sent up to Damascus.

We hope that you will be able to use your influence with him in order that he may cease from this practice and, if he still persists, that you will be able to arrange for the Arabs who lie between him and Syria to seize the camels as they pass, a procedure which will be to our mutual advantage.

I am glad to be able to inform you that those misguided Arabs under Sayed Ahmed-el-Senussi, who have fallen victims to the wiles of Turkish and German intriguers, are now beginning to see the error of their ways and are coming in to us in large numbers, asking for forgiveness and friendship.

We have severely defeated the forces which these intriguers had collected against us, and the eyes of the Arabs are now becoming open to the deceit which has been practised upon them.

The capture of Erzerum, and the defeats sustained by the Turks in the Caucasus, are having a great effect in our favour, and are greatly helping the cause for which we are both working.

We ask God to prosper your endeavours and to further the work which you have taken in hand.

In conclusion we beg you to accept our warmest salutations and expressions of friendship.

Jamad Awwal 6, 1334.

A. H. McMAHON.

[E 6/6/31]
[E 764/6/31]

4.

The Juridical Basis of the Arab Claim to Palestine.—(Circulated to the Cabinet on January 23, 1939, as C.P. 19 (39).)

I.—General.

It is probable that, when the Arab Delegations arrive in London for the forthcoming Palestine discussions, they will, in addition to expounding the broader principles on which they base their claim to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of the whole of Palestine, maintain that this claim is unassailable on legal grounds also.

2. It has been suggested that, if this should prove to be the case, the Arab Delegates should be urged to remember that the object of the discussions is the formulation of a plan for the future, and that insistence upon purely juridical considerations, often of a highly contestable nature, is not calculated to assist in the attainment of this object; but that, if they wish to ensure that their legal case does not remain unrecorded, they should prepare a memorandum setting forth their views upon this aspect of the question, to which His Majesty's Government will in due course furnish a written reply.

3. Whether this procedure is acceptable or not to the Arab Delegates, it is desirable to consider beforehand the principal legal arguments upon which the Arab case is founded and the counter-arguments on each point.

4. The Arab arguments group themselves around two of the most important of His Majesty's Government's declarations of policy concerning Palestine—the "McMahon-Hussein" correspondence of 1915 and the "Balfour" Declaration of 1917, regarded in the light of the declared war aims of the Allies and certain provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

II.—The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence.

5. On the 24th October, 1915, Sir Henry McMahon, at that time British High Commissioner in Egypt, gave to the Sherif of Mecca, later King Hussein of the Hejaz, the following pledge concerning the boundaries of Arab independent countries:—

"The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modification and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept these limits and boundaries, and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurance and make the following reply to your letter:

"Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca."

6. The Arabs maintain that the territory now called Palestine (at that time commonly regarded by them as part of Syria and, at any rate, not generally known or thought of as "Palestine") did not lie "west" of the district of Damascus and was thus included, by the terms of the pledge, in the area in which Arab independence was to be recognised; and they hold that the existence of this pledge, anterior to the Balfour Declaration, justifies their repudiation of that Declaration and the Mandate in which it is enshrined.

7. The validity of this argument depends to a large extent on the precise meaning of the phrase "district of Damascus," in using which Sir H. McMahon made what may be termed a specific reservation respecting the territory to which his pledge was to apply. This phrase has been the subject of endless debate, the counter-argument upon which His Majesty's Government have consistently based their case being the result of an examination of the Arabic version of the correspondence made in 1920 by Major (now Sir Hubert) Young, who had served on

the Arab Bureau in Cairo during part of the war. Major Young saw that the Arabic of the words "district of Damascus" had the meaning "Vilayet of Damascus" (a vilayet being the largest class of administrative area into which the Ottoman Empire was divided). Now the vilayet of which Damascus was the capital⁽¹⁾ included Homs and Hama, but not Aleppo, which was the capital of a separate vilayet of that name. But the important point about its configuration was that, although it extended southward to the Gulf of Akaba, it excluded all of what is now called Palestine west of the Lake of Tiberias, the River Jordan and the Dead Sea and all of what is now the Lebanon or Syria west of the Lebanon or anti-Lebanon ranges. In other words, most of what is now called Palestine lay "west" of the vilayet of which Damascus was the capital.

8. The counter-argument of His Majesty's Government, therefore, depends upon an interpretation of the phrase "district of Damascus," whereby the western boundary of this "district" was the medial line of the Lake of Tiberias, the River Jordan and the Dead Sea, the area to the west of that boundary (divided before the war between the Independent Sanjak of Jerusalem and the southern part of the Vilayet of Beirut) being accordingly excluded, by the words of the pledge, from the area promised to the Arabs.

9. When the meaning of the pledge was discussed in London with the Emir Feisal (a son of the Sherif of Mecca and later King Feisal of Iraq) on the 20th January, 1921, the above counter-argument was used, and the Emir pointed out that:—

"... if His Majesty's Government relied upon the strict interpretation of the word (vilayet) as applied to Damascus and Aleppo they must also interpret the word to mean the same with regard to Homs and Hama. There was not, and never had been, a Vilayet of Homs or Hama."

10. It is true that there are no Vilayets of Homs or Hama, but it is also true that both Damascus and Aleppo are the capitals of vilayets, and as such should have sufficed in themselves to establish Sir H. McMahon's meaning. The additional mention of Homs and Hama was evidently made to ensure that the intervening territory of which they were the most important town should also be excluded from the area consigned to Arab rule, and obviously no reference was intended to non-existent vilayets. In corroboration of this interpretation it may be remarked that there is no apparent consistency of usage with regard to the application of the term "vilayet." In one of his letters King Hussein himself referred to the "Vilayets of Mersina and Adana" although there is no Vilayet of Mersina, and in another letter he referred to the Vilayets of Adana and Alexandretta, while no vilayet of the latter name has ever existed. It could, therefore, be represented as exaggerated pedantry that Arabs should demand from non-Arabic-speaking foreigners a strictness of expression and usage which they themselves do not observe even in correspondence with such foreigners.

11. The counter-argument of His Majesty's Government was also used in the Memorandum on British Policy sent by Mr. Winston Churchill to the Arab Delegation, which was then in London, on the 3rd June, 1922. In their reply, which had evidently been prepared with expert English legal assistance, the delegation maintained that the word "district" and not "vilayet" was used, and, moreover, that the word "district" and not "vilayet" was meant, firstly, because of the reference to Homs and Hama (see paragraph 9) and, secondly, because the true name of the "Vilayet of Damascus" was "Vilayet of Syria."

12. It is true that the official Turkish name for the vilayet of which Damascus was the capital was "Vilayet of Syria," but there should have been no misunderstanding of the phrase, since Turkish usage frequently employed "Sham" (Damascus) as a general appellation for Syria. Moreover, the writer of the letter had already found it necessary to use "Syria" (even though there was a vilayet of that name) in order to describe comprehensively a vague geographical area evidently including the Vilayets of Syria and Beirut, the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem, the Province of the Lebanon, and part of the Vilayet of Aleppo.

13. Neither the Emir nor the Delegation seem to have pointed out that as the Vilayet of Aleppo extended to the Mediterranean, and so had no area to

⁽¹⁾ See the map at p. 19 of the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine, 1937 (Cmd. 5479).

the west of it, Sir H. McMahon could not have meant this vilayet when he spoke of the "district of Aleppo," and was therefore probably not thinking of the actual Turkish administrative areas at all.

14. The foregoing paragraphs represent the attitude which has hitherto been consistently held by His Majesty's Government on the subject of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, and which has been given public expression. Nevertheless it is important to emphasise the weak points in His Majesty's Government's case, *e.g.*:—

- (i) The fact that the word "district" is applied not only to Damascus, &c., where the reading of vilayet is at least arguable, but also immediately previously to Mersina and Alexandretta. No vilayets of these names exist, and in spite of what has been said in paragraph 10 it would be difficult to argue that the word "districts" can have two completely different meanings in the space of a few lines.
- (ii) The fact that Homs and Hama were not the capitals of vilayets, but were both within the Vilayet of Syria.
- (iii) The fact that the real title of the "Vilayet of Damascus" was "Vilayet of Syria."
- (iv) The fact that there is no land lying west of the Vilayet of Aleppo.

15. It may be possible to produce arguments designed to explain away some of these difficulties individually (although even this does not apply in the case of (iv)), but it is hardly possible to explain them away collectively. His Majesty's Government need not on this account abjure altogether the counter-argument based on the meaning of the word "district," which has been used publicly for many years, and the more obvious defects in which do not seem to have been noticed as yet by Arab critics.⁽²⁾ But it will certainly be unwise to place any reliance in this counter-argument. The best explanation which His Majesty's Government can give of the meaning which Sir H. McMahon meant his pledge to bear is probably by a reference to the use of the phrase "districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo" in certain discussions which took place in 1915 between the late Sir Gilbert Clayton, Chief Political Officer at Army Headquarters in Egypt, and Mahomed Ibn-Sherif-el-Faroki, an Arab Nationalist and former officer in the Ottoman army.

16. In the course of these discussions El Faroki stated that the Arabs were "at the parting of the ways," and that they would fight France for the "districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo." Although the Arabs are unlikely to admit that anything which El Faroki may have said in the course of these conversations (of which the only record is, anyhow, derived from British sources) has any binding effect upon the Arabs generally, no Arab could argue convincingly that, assuming the phrase to have been used at all, El Faroki meant by it no more than the "immediate surroundings" of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo (which certain Arabs have maintained to be the meaning of the word "districts" in the pledge). On the contrary, he clearly intended it to convey a broad definition of the Syrian hinterland, as distinct from the Mediterranean coast, this hinterland being an area vital to the schemes of an Arab Empire or Confederation, and in this sense the "districts" he named were intended to extend from Aleppo to the Gulf of Akaba. Moreover, El Faroki did not include Palestine or a "district" of Jerusalem among the districts for which he declared the Arabs would fight. It is thus evident that when Sir H. McMahon gave his pledge of the 24th October, 1915, to the Sherif he adopted El Faroki's own phrase in order to assure the Sherif and the Syrian Arabs that the area for which they were prepared to fight was assigned to them, and further that, in using this phrase, he used it in the same comprehensive sense as El Faroki, *i.e.*, as one which covered the Syrian hinterland southwards to the Gulf of Akaba.

17. Apart from the specific geographical reservation attached to Sir H. McMahon's pledge of the 24th October, 1915, there is also what may be termed a general reservation, since he stated that Great Britain was only prepared to recognise Arab independence—

"... in regard to those portions of territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France."

⁽²⁾ See, however, *The Arab Awakening* by Mr. George Antonius (Hamish Hamilton, 1938), pp. 164-183, where the Arab case is argued with much ability.

18. If the "specific" reservation already expounded covers Palestine (as His Majesty's Government have consistently maintained), then Great Britain and France have sufficient legal justification for the policy they have pursued in Palestine—the policy of assigning it to the Jewish National Home. If, however, it be held (as is done by the Arabs) that the specific reservation does not cover Palestine, then it is clear that Sir H. McMahon's general reservation becomes of special importance. The background to this "general" reservation is as follows:—

19. In 1915, after the beginning of the British naval attack on the Dardanelles forts, a Russian claim to the eventual possession of Constantinople and the Straits was sent to Great Britain and France, and in the middle of March the French Government informed His Majesty's Government that, for their part, they claimed Cilicia and Syria ("Syria" at that time including the whole of Palestine and Transjordan). This claim was recognised and recorded in the report which Sir M. de Bunsen's Committee on Asiatic Turkey presented in June 1915. It is thus evident that already at that date, and equally in October of the same year, His Majesty's Government were in fact precluded from assigning Palestine unreservedly to the Arabs.

20. The Arabs may argue that the Sherif of Mecca was not aware of these inter-Allied understandings or of the extent of the French claim to Syria and Palestine, especially as the Sykes-Picot Agreement was not concluded until 1916 or made public property (by the Bolsheviks) until the end of 1917. Sir H. McMahon's letter of the 24th October, 1915, does not, it must be admitted, contain any description of the exact limits and boundaries of the French claim, but this was mainly owing to the fact that the French claim, though recognised by His Majesty's Government, had not in fact been territorially defined. The form of words chosen was therefore such as to cover the general claim made by the French Government, however wide it might prove to be, and the pledge was only to apply to those parts of Syria in which His Majesty's Government might eventually obtain a free hand as a result of the peace settlement.

21. It is, moreover, clear that the Sherif of Mecca had some knowledge of the nature of the French claim, since in a letter of the 1st January, 1916, he reserved the right to press at a later date a claim to "what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts." It is possible to argue that by this phrase the Sherif must have intended to refer to the coasts of the vilayet of Beirut, i.e., he left to France for the time being, subject to a subsequent claim, the whole of Northern Palestine practically as far south as Jaffa.

22. It can, furthermore, be argued that this aspect of the question is no concern of His Majesty's Government. Sir H. McMahon gave unequivocal expression to a general reservation in favour of the prior claim by an Allied Power; and it might be said that had the Sherif been anxious to know the precise nature and extent of the French claim, it was for him to make enquiries either of His Majesty's Government or the French Government.

23. Finally, the assumption that the Sherif well understood the import of the French claim is corroborated by the fact that the delegation of Palestinian Arabs which came to London in 1922 argued that, as a result of the continued British occupation of the Holy Land, any obligations which Great Britain might previously have had to France with regard to Palestine had expired.

24. But, although the fact that this argument was used is a useful factor in building up the case of His Majesty's Government, the argument itself cannot be reconciled with the theoretical position. In May 1916 Great Britain and France effected in the Sykes-Picot Agreement a compromise whereby both were excluded from Palestine, and this compromise held good until, in 1918, France agreed in effect to vary this compromise by accepting, for her own expected material advantage, the policy of the Balfour Declaration. The policy of the Balfour Declaration implied the indefinite British occupation of Palestine, but the essential French interest remained that, in return for French concurrence in the occupation, Great Britain should execute and maintain this policy.

25. It is evident, therefore, that any failure on Great Britain's part to realise this policy would constitute a violation of the separate pledge concerning the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine given by the French Government to the Zionists on the 14th February, 1918, and a departure from French policy in Palestine as envisaged at that time. A French interest and concern

in Palestine (and in the maintenance of the Balfour Declaration), though temporarily vested in the trusteeship of Great Britain, is, in strict theory, as much in existence as in 1915. In practice it might not be expedient to use an argument which has little relation to the realities of to-day, but the Arab contention that Sir H. McMahon's general reservation was not effective at any of the material time is at any rate untenable.

26. But although the counter-arguments may be stronger in regard to the "general" reservation than in regard to the "specific" reservation, there are points of weakness connected with the "general" reservation also. While it is true that the French claim to Palestine, or the French claim for an international administration of Palestine, was only withdrawn after the acceptance of the Balfour Declaration by the Allies, this does not alter the fact that it was His Majesty's Government who initiated that Declaration, and thus assumed an obligation which bears no relation to the French claims and which, unless Sir H. McMahon's "specific" reservation can be held to be entirely valid, was incompatible, and quite unjustifiably so, with their pledge to the Sherif of Mecca. The policy of the Balfour Declaration was not essential to the satisfaction of French claims in this region. On the other hand, these claims were not necessarily incompatible with Palestine remaining an Arab State, and they were therefore in no way contrary *per se* to Sir H. McMahon's pledge to the Arabs. In short, the "general" reservation has little, if any, validity apart from the "specific" reservation.

27. Finally, the "general" reservation is seriously prejudiced by a mistake in translation. Sir H. McMahon no doubt meant to say that Great Britain could only promise Arab independence in areas where she was free to act without detriment to her Ally, France, even if these areas were found in some cases to impinge upon the area otherwise left open to Arab independence by the "specific" reservation. But Major Young discovered, in the course of his examination of the correspondence which has already been mentioned, that what was actually said in the text sent to the Sherif was:—

"We accept those limits and boundaries, and in regard to the areas (or provinces) which those boundaries enclose, where (or whereas) Great Britain is free to act without affecting the interests (or policy) of her ally, France, I am empowered," &c.

28. This careless translation completely changes the meaning of the reservation, or at any rate makes the meaning exceedingly ambiguous, and it entitled the Sherif to think that within the area restricted by the "specific" reservation, His Majesty's Government were free to act without reference to the French Government.⁽¹⁾ It also helps to explain the difficulty which the Sherif and his son Feisal had later on in comprehending the attitude of His Majesty's Government in 1919 and 1920 towards French designs on Damascus.

29. It will therefore be seen that there are points of serious weakness in His Majesty's Government's case. In fact, in many respects, the best that can be done is to maintain that, in considering an agreement contained in so loosely-worded inconclusive and incomplete a series of letters as the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, His Majesty's Government are entitled to take their own interpretation and their own avowed intentions into account, wherever the meaning of the text is ambiguous, at least as much as the interpretation and the avowed intentions of the other side.

30. It may be mentioned (although it is not evidence) that Sir H. McMahon has on two subsequent occasions explained his intentions when he made his pledge on behalf of His Majesty's Government to the Sherif of Mecca, (a) once in a private letter to Sir J. Shuckburgh of the 12th March, 1922, and (b) again in a letter to *The Times* of the 23rd July, 1937. He has stated that:—

"It was not intended by me in giving this pledge to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised.

"I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well known to King Hussein."

⁽¹⁾ Mr. Antonius (see footnote ⁽¹⁴⁾) quotes a version of the pledge based on the Arabic text sent to the Sherif, but does not, nevertheless, seem to draw the full conclusions as to the limits which it placed upon the area in which French claims had to be consulted.

III.—The "Balfour" Declaration.

31. The Arab juridical claim to Palestine is founded not only, positively, upon their interpretation of the McMahon pledge of 1915, but, also, negatively, on the repudiation of the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Attempts have continually been made to prove that the policy of the Jewish National Home is at variance with various Allied declarations made both during the course of the war and subsequently in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The following constitute the most important arguments urged by Arab advocates against the Balfour Declaration:—

32. The Arab Parliamentary Congress which held meetings in Cairo during October 1938, in its resolutions regarding Palestine, gave as its first reason for the alleged invalidity of the Balfour Declaration:—

"That it is a transgression on the rights of the Arabs who won their independence as a result of their alliance with Great Britain and their joint victory in the war, and because of the fact that the said declaration was made by one who had no right to make it. Further, if Great Britain had not pledged itself to support and guarantee Arab independence, the Arabs would have never waged war against their Sultan and Khalifa, nor would they have shed their blood in overthrowing the Ottoman Empire to be ultimately placed under the domination of the Jews."

33. This can scarcely be termed a legal argument, but it has considerable emotional force, and in view of its origin merits consideration. The contention falls into three parts:—

- (i) Regarding the "joint victory," the Arabs forget that this victory was won very largely as a result of British subsidies, food-stuffs, rifles, ammunition and other armaments, and of British leadership, and that the present position of the Arab world as a whole is mainly due to the sacrifices of the Allied and Associated Powers in the war.
- (ii) The phrase denying Lord Balfour's "right to make the Declaration" is incorrect, so far as legal obstacles are concerned, in view of the reservations expressed in the McMahon letter of the 24th October, 1915 (*vide* paragraphs 5 to 30).
- (iii) Had the Arabs not waged war against their Sultan and Khalifa, and had the Central Powers been victorious, it is not likely that the Arab lands would now be enjoying a greater measure of freedom than before the war, and extremely improbable that most of them would now have become, or be about to become, independent States. There is even some reason to think that, if the Balfour Declaration had not been made when it was, the German Government might have persuaded the Turkish Government to make a similar announcement themselves.

34. The Arabs also claim that the Balfour Declaration is incompatible with that one of the "fourteen points" laid down by President Wilson in January 1918 which includes the words:—

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

35. It must be the object of His Majesty's Government to show that there is nothing here which could reasonably be construed as incompatible with some line of development similar to that intended by the policy of the Jewish National Home. If the Arabs maintain that the phrase in question does not cover such a policy, it must be remembered that the Balfour Declaration was anterior to the much vaguer and more general "fourteen points," and not only was its text submitted to the author of the "fourteen points," but on its publication it received the endorsement of the Governments of Great Britain, France and the United States.

36. The Arabs also claim that the Balfour Declaration is nullified by the Anglo-French Declaration of the 7th November, 1918, in which it was stated that:

"The object aimed at by France and Great Britain . . . is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks.

and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations. In order to carry out these intentions France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia."

37. This again is a general pronouncement and, even assuming that Syria would necessarily have to be taken to include Palestine, must clearly be read with the qualification necessitated by the anterior existence of the Balfour Declaration. There is also, moreover, every reason to assume that, after the lapse of more than a year from the publication of the Balfour Declaration, the destiny envisaged by the Allies for Palestine was known to the Arab World. Finally, as a result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, the term "Syria" was clearly no longer intended by the Allied Powers to include Palestine. The Sherif of Mecca's attention was, in fact, drawn to the import of the Agreement early in 1918, and he at least must have well understood that in this connexion Syria no longer bore the same geographical signification as prior to 1916.

38. It is also part of the Arab claim that the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations are inconsistent with the Balfour Declaration.

39. The Arab argument on this point relates to paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant, in which it is stated:—

"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."

40. The Arabs claim that this paragraph is violated by the terms of the Balfour Declaration, in that the institution in the territory of one of these communities of a National Home for another alien race, which will ultimately become numerically and politically preponderant in the territory in question, is incompatible with a recognition of independence for that community, since they will no longer be the governing majority when independence comes to be granted.

41. The Arabs claim, furthermore, that by reason of its inconsistency with the terms of paragraph 4 of Article 22, the Balfour Declaration is null and void under the first part of paragraph 1 of Article 20, which abrogates all existing obligations or undertakings between members of the League which are inconsistent with the Covenant, while the Mandate for Palestine, in so far as it incorporates the Balfour Declaration, is null and void under the second part of the same Article 20, which obliges States Members never to enter into any other obligations inconsistent with the Covenant.

42. This seems to be the line of the Arab argument. The answer^(*) is, in part, that it does not follow that the Mandate is inconsistent with paragraph 4 of Article 22 merely because it does not altogether correspond with the only other Mandate framed thereunder, *i.e.*, the Mandate for Syria; and that the question whether any Mandate is consistent with the Covenant can, in any case, be conclusively and definitively answered by reference to the fact that the Council of the League approved it.

43. But the main answer is summed up by the Royal Commission, who pointed out that—

- (a) The provisional recognition of "certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" as independent nations is permissive; the words are "can be provisionally recognised," not "will," or "shall";
- (b) The penultimate paragraph of Article 22 prescribes that the degree of authority to be exercised by the Mandatory shall be defined, at need, by the Council of the League, and

(*) It might also be said (a) that para. 1 of Article 20 only refers to obligations between the Members of the League *inter se*; and (b) that the Balfour Declaration is not (or at any rate not exclusively) an obligation or understanding between Members of the League; since amongst the parties to the understanding which it created are (i) the Jewish organisations and (ii) the U.S.A. which is not a Member of the League.

- (c) The acceptance by the Allied Powers and the United States of the policy of the Balfour Declaration made it clear from the beginning that Palestine would have to be treated differently from Syria and Iraq, and this difference of treatment was confirmed by the Supreme Council in the Treaty of Sèvres and by the Council of the League in sanctioning the Mandate.

44. In brief, it cannot be denied that it is inconsistent with the independence of the Arabs of Palestine to make their country a National Home for the Jews. But the provision of paragraph 4 of article 22 with regard to independence is permissive only, and it seems clear that the reason why this permissive provision was inserted was to make it clear that a mandate of limited duration and scope as suggested in paragraph 4 would be valid and could not be challenged on the ground that it conflicted with paragraph 2 of the same article, which contemplates generally a more extensive tutelage. Paragraph 4 provided that this less extensive tutelage was permissible in certain cases, but left it to the Council to decide, when drawing up the mandate for each community, whether, and if so to what extent, independence should be recognised. In support of this interpretation His Majesty's Government can rely upon what actually happened, and upon the fact that the Allied Powers and the United States of America, as well as the League of Nations, agreed to the Mandate for Palestine with the existing provisions for the Jewish National Home.

IV.—Conclusion.

45. It is necessarily well-nigh impossible to anticipate with complete accuracy the arguments on which the Arab delegates will base their juridical claim to Palestine. The points discussed in the foregoing paragraphs represent, however, so far as can be traced, the main arguments hitherto advanced, including the resolutions passed at the recent meeting in Cairo of the Arab Parliamentary Congress, and it is hoped that the observations and counter-arguments herein suggested may, when the preparation of a counter-memorandum becomes necessary, prove both relevant and useful.

46. At the same time, it is sufficiently apparent from the foregoing paragraphs that, so far at any rate as the McMahon-Hussein correspondence is concerned, the counter-memorandum is likely to be dependent on a forced line of reasoning, and that the case of His Majesty's Government in regard to this correspondence lacks that self-evident and decisive clarity which ought to form the basis of important international acts. Nothing, in fact, that can be brought forward by way of explanation of Sir H. McMahon's pledge is likely to enable His Majesty's Government to convince the world at large that the Royal Commission were wrong when they said:—

"It was in the highest degree unfortunate that, in the exigencies of war, the British Government was unable to make their intention clear to the Sherif."

47. The position with regard to the declared war aims of the Allies is possibly stronger, if the wording of their declaration is taken into account in relation to the situation already existing in regard to Palestine when they were made. But the Arabs are not likely to be mainly or even primarily interested in the juridical aspects of this question, and the general tenor of their case is likely to be that the Balfour Declaration is inconsistent with the whole spirit in which the Allies declared that the war was being waged.

Foreign Office,
January 1939.

[E 634/6/31]

5.

The Texts of the "Kitchener-Abdullah" and "McMahon-Hussein" Correspondence, 1914-16, and their Sources.

Foreign Office = The archives of the Foreign Office.

Cairo = The archives of the Residency (now His Majesty's Embassy) at Cairo.

Arab Bureau = The archives of the Arab Bureau established at Cairo in 1916.

Arab Bureau Summary = "Summary of Historical Documents from the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey, 1914, to the outbreak of the Revolt of the Sherif of Mecca in June 1916." Cairo, November 29, 1916 (compiled from the archives of the Arab Bureau): Printed for the Foreign Office in January 1921, as Secret 10812 (E 155/4/91 of January 4, 1921).

India Office Print = "Correspondence with the Grand Sherif of Mecca" (September 24, 1914, to March 10, 1916): Printed by the India Office: B 222 (69301 of 1916).

Collection of January 1939 = "Correspondence relating to the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, comprising the 'Kitchener-Abdullah' and 'McMahon-Hussein' correspondence: September 1914 to March 1916"; Foreign Office: January 1939 (E 577/6/31). This collection follows as far as possible the texts communicated to the Emir Feisal in the past (see paragraph 5 below), and is therefore in a form suitable for communication to Arab representatives should this ever be necessary. It would similarly be suitable, with a few emendations, for publication.

Childs = A memorandum entitled "Memorandum on the Exclusion of Palestine from the Area assigned for Arab Independence by the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915-16" (by Mr. W. J. Childs: October 24, 1930: Printed by the Foreign Office: confidential 13778). This contains extracts from the correspondence and a considerable amount of information about the circumstances in which it took place, but little or no information about the sources where original or contemporary texts are to be found.

Antonius = "The Arab Awakening" by Mr. George Antonius (Hamish Hamilton: 1938), which gives the texts of most of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence (documents (5) to (12)). These texts are stated to be translations made by Mr. Antonius from Arabic texts obtained in part at least from the Sherif of Mecca (when King Hussein).

The correspondence between the Residency, on the one hand, and the Sherif Abdullah and the Sherif of Mecca, on the other was carried on in Arabic on both sides.

2. Unfortunately, the Arabic texts of the letters sent from the Residency were not always entirely accurate renderings of the English drafts on which they were based. To make matters worse, copies of these letters as sent in Arabic were not always retained in the Residency, or, if they were retained, were transferred at a later date, along with other documents relating to Arabian affairs, to the custody of the Arab Bureau, which was established in Cairo in 1916. The Archives of the Arab Bureau were transferred to the Foreign Office in 1921, but before this was done many files thought to be of lesser importance were destroyed, no entirely satisfactory list being kept of what was destroyed and what retained.

3. The position is much the same in regard to the letters received in Arabic from the Sherif Abdullah and the Sherif of Mecca.

4. The consequence is that in some cases there are no Arabic texts extant which can definitely be said to be originals of letters received or contemporary copies of letters sent, and, in a few cases, there are no Arabic texts at all.

5. It is not definitely known whether the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan or other members of the family of the late King Hussein still have in their possession any originals or copies of the Arab texts. Copies of the English translations of documents (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12) were, however, communicated to the Sherif Feisal (afterwards the Emir Feisal and King Feisal of Iraq), a son of King Hussein, on the 9th October, 1919 (132930 of 1919), and copies of documents (1), (2) and (3) were communicated to him on the

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10th January, 1921 (E 155/4/91). There are some grounds for thinking that so far as the "Kitchener-Abdullah" correspondence is concerned King Hussein's family are in much the same situation as His Majesty's Government, but may have better contemporary evidence for the "McMahon-Hussein" correspondence.

6. In the case of the English drafts or translations also, some of these drafts and translations are only available from printed collections made at later dates.

7. Arabic texts have been freely published in the Middle East in the past, while partial English versions, obtained from Arab sources, have been published in the *Daily Mail* in 1923. The Royal Commission on Palestine (Cmd. 5479) published in 1937 the more important passages, on the basis of the English translations in the possession of His Majesty's Government. But the correspondence has not been officially published by His Majesty's Government.

8. Details regarding each of the documents in the correspondence are given in the following notes, of which a summary forms Annex I hereto. In these notes no reference is given to a printed collection ("Arab Bureau Summary" or "India Office Print") if a reference can be given to an earlier source ("Foreign Office," "Cairo" or "Arab Bureau"), or to "Arab Bureau" if a reference can be given to "Foreign Office."

9. It should be noted that, apart from the two cases in which a document is undated, there are several cases in which it is difficult for one reason or another to determine within a day or two what date the original document really bore. It should also be noted that the documents received at the Residency were always unsigned, probably from motives of prudence in the senders.

(1)

Lord Kitchener to the Sherif Abdullah, September 24, 1914.

The original text of the telegram sent to Mr. Cheetham is in Foreign Office 52598 of the 24th September, 1914. Sir Ronald Storrs has stated that no copy was kept of the letter which he sent to the Sherif Abdullah in Arabic as a result of this telegram, but that no alterations or additions were made in the message. The letter was presumably sent as from Lord Kitchener. No draft in English is in Cairo or Arab Bureau. The word "Khalif" appears instead of "Sultan" in the original telegram, but the word "Sultan" was used in the version given to the Emir Feisal in 1921, and has been retained in the collection of January 1939.

(2)

The Sherif Abdullah to Lord Kitchener: received at Cairo, October 30, 1914.

Neither an Arabic text (original or copy) nor an English translation is available in Foreign Office, Cairo or Arab Bureau. The present translation is from Arab Bureau Summary, which gives it as an extract only. Not in India Office print. A telegram from Cairo reporting the receipt of the letter is in Foreign Office 65589 of the 31st October, 1914. The letter was presumably addressed to Lord Kitchener, but this is not definitely known. It certainly contained a message for him.

(3)

Mr. Cheetham to the Sherif Abdullah, with a Message from Lord Kitchener, November 1, 1914.

Neither an Arabic nor an English translation is available in Foreign Office, Cairo or Arab Bureau. There are two extant versions, the fuller in India Office print, the shorter in Arabic Bureau Summary. It seems probable that the fuller version, which is given as Annex 2 hereto, is a translation of the letter as actually

sent, both from internal evidence and from references later in the correspondence. On the other hand, the shorter version, which may be a first draft of the letter eventually sent, was communicated to the Emir Feisal in 1921 (E 155/4/91 of 1921), and has not apparently been challenged since then, although it omits an important passage to the effect that "Great Britain will promise not to intervene (in the area of Arab Independence) in any manner whatsoever, whether in things religious or otherwise." It is, in consequence, the shorter version which has been included in the collection of January 1939.

(4)

The Sherif Abdullah to Lord Kitchener: received at Cairo, December 9, 1914.

Neither an Arabic text (original or copy) nor an English translation is available in Foreign Office, Cairo or Arab Bureau, nor is an English translation printed in Arab Bureau Summary. The present translation is from India Office print. The letter is presumably meant to be addressed to Lord Kitchener rather than to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo.

(5)

The Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, July 14, 1915.

English translation in Foreign Office 125293 of the 4th September, 1915 (Ramleh Secret despatch No. 94 of the 26th August, 1915). No Arabic text (original or copy) available in Foreign Office, Cairo or Arab Bureau. The letter, itself undated and unsigned, was received under cover of a shorter letter to Mr. Storrs, dated the 14th July, 1915. English translation of this covering letter is given in India Office print. File 72 contains some notes on the places mentioned in the main letter, especially "Amadia Island," which is presumably Jezireh-ibn-Omar, a large island town on the Tigris between Midiat and Amadia, and the meaning of which is not dealt with in Childs. Jezirat has been used in the collection of January 1939.

(6)

Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, August 30, 1915.

English translation as for (5). Arabic copies in Cairo (copy sent to Foreign Office in Cairo despatch No. 781 of the 19th June, 1937: E 3529/22/31) and Arab Bureau file 73, document No. 1.

(7)

The Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, September 9, 1915.

English translation in Foreign Office 163827 of the 3rd November, 1915 (Cairo despatch No. 126 of the 19th October, 1915). No Arabic text (original or copy) available in Arab Bureau.

(8)

Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, October 24, 1915.

English translation in Foreign Office 163832 of the 3rd November, 1915 (Cairo Secret despatch No. 131 of the 26th October, 1915). Arabic copy in Cairo (copy sent to Foreign Office in 1937—see (6)) and (an extract) in Arab Bureau

file 73, document No. 3. For comments on the Arabic text by Major (later Sir Hubert) Young, see F. 16103/9/44 of the 25th December, 1920. Major Young found that the passage regarding French interests was misrendered in the Arabic text and sent to the Sherif as follows:—

"... We accept these limits and boundaries and in regard to the areas (or provinces) which those boundaries enclose, where (or whereas) Great Britain is free to act without affecting the interest (or policy) of her ally France, I am empowered" &c.

The Arabic copies show that the main points in Sir H. McMahon's pledge were numbered 1 to 5, and this numbering is referred to in the Sherif's reply (document (9)) and reproduced in Antonius. It has accordingly been reproduced in the collection of January 1939, although it does not appear in any of the earlier English versions.

(9)

The Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, November 5, 1915.

English translation in Foreign Office 179240 of the 26th November, 1915 (Cairo despatch No. 148 of the 17th November, 1915). Arabic texts in Foreign Office 183206 of the 2nd December, 1915, and (probably the original) in Arab Bureau file 72, document No. 8 D.

(10)

Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, December 14, 1915.

English translation in Foreign Office 198266 of the 24th December, 1915 (Cairo Secret despatch No. 172 of the 14th December, 1915). Arabic copy in Cairo (copy sent to Foreign Office in 1937—see (6)), but not in Arab Bureau. The letter promises a further communication on the subject of the interests of France, but it does not seem ever to have been sent (for reasons for this given to the Sherif Feisal, see 132930 of 1919).

(11)

The Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, January 1, 1916.

English translation in Foreign Office 20954 of the 2nd February, 1916 (Cairo despatch No. 16 of the 24th January, 1916). Arabic text (probably the original) in Arab Bureau file 72, document No. 12.

(12)

Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, January 25, 1916.

English translation as for (11). No Arabic text in Foreign Office, Cairo or Arab Bureau.

(13)

The Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, February 18, 1916.

English translation in Foreign Office 45855 of the 9th March, 1916 (Cairo despatch No. 42 of the 29th February, 1916). Arabic text (probably the original) in Arab Bureau file 72, document No. 16.

(14)

Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, March 10, 1916.

English translation in Foreign Office 58230 of the 27th March, 1916 (Cairo despatch No. 54 of the 13th March, 1916). Arabic copy in Cairo (sent to Foreign Office in 1937—see (6)) and Arab Bureau file 73, document No. 7.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
January 23, 1939.*

Annex 1 to 5.

A Summary of the Sources of the Texts.

Documents.	English translation.	Arabic text or copy.
(1) From Kitchener, September 24, 1914	F.O. 52589 of 1914	None.
(2) From Abdullah (Received October 30, 1914)	A.B. Summary ...	None.
(3) From Kitchener, November 1, 1914	A.B. Summary, I.O. print (different versions)	None.
(4) From Abdullah (Received December 9, 1914)	I.O. print ...	None.
(5) From Hussein, July 14, 1915	F.O. 125293 of 1915	None.
(6) From McMahon, August 30, 1915	F.O. 125293 of 1915	A.B. 73/1. Cairo (E 3529/22/31 of 1937).
(7) From Hussein, September 9, 1915	F.O. 163827 of 1915	None.
(8) From McMahon, October 24, 1915	F.O. 163832 of 1915	A.B. 73/3. Cairo (E 3529/22/31 of 1937).
(9) From Hussein, November 5, 1915	F.O. 179240 of 1915	A.B. 72/8D.
(10) From McMahon, December 14, 1915	F.O. 198266 of 1915	Cairo (E 3529/22/31 of 1937).
(11) From Hussein, January 1, 1916	F.O. 20954 of 1916	A.B. 72/12.
(12) From McMahon, January 25, 1916	F.O. 20954 of 1916	None.
(13) From Hussein, February 18, 1916	F.O. 45855 of 1916	A.B. 72/16.
(14) From McMahon, March 10, 1916	F.O. 58230 of 1916	A.B. 73/7. Cairo (E 3529/22/31 of 1937).

Annex 2 to 5.

Alternative Text of Document (3).

A Translation of a Letter from Mr. Cheetham, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo, to the Sherif Abdullah, (17) November 1, 1914.

(After compliments and thanks.)

We have understood your reasons and acknowledge the justice of your request. So we have reported to Lord Kitchener, who has replied as follows:—

Salaams to the Sherif Abdullah.

That which we foresaw has come to pass. Germany has bought the Turkish Government with gold, notwithstanding that Great Britain, France and Russia guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire if Turkey remained neutral in this war. The Turkish Government have, against the wish of the Sultan and through German pressure, committed acts of war by invading without provocation the frontiers of Egypt with armed bands followed by Turkish soldiers who are now massed at Akaba to invade Egypt, so that the cause of the Arabs, which is the cause of freedom, has become the cause also of Great Britain.

If the Amir and Arabs in general assist Great Britain in this conflict that has been forced upon us by Turkey, Great Britain will promise not to intervene

(17) This letter was carried to the Sherif Abdullah by the messenger Ali Effendi, who left Cairo with it on or about November 1, 1914.

in any manner whatsoever, whether in things religious or otherwise. Moreover, recognising and respecting the sacred and unique office of the Amir Hussein, Great Britain will guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the Sherifate against all external foreign aggression, in particular that of the Ottomans. Till now we have defended and befriended Islam in the person of the Turks; henceforward it shall be in that of the noble Arab.

It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina, and so good may come, by the help of God, out of all the evil which is now occurring.

It would be well if your Highness could convey to your followers and devotees, who are found throughout the world, in every country, the good tidings of the freedom of the Arabs, and the rising of the sun over Arabia.

Zil-Hijja 12 (1332).

[E 891/6/31]

6.

The Juridical Basis of the Arab Claim to Palestine.

Views of the Lord Chancellor.

Mr. Beckett and I went to-day to see the Lord Chancellor at his request in order to discuss the memorandum entitled "The Juridical Basis of the Arab Claim to Palestine," which was recently circulated to the Cabinet (C.P. 19 (39)).

2. The Lord Chancellor said that, after reading this memorandum and re-reading some parts of the report of the Royal Commission on Palestine, he felt that he could agree with a great deal of the memorandum, but nevertheless thought that in the matter of Sir Henry McMahon's pledge the memorandum did not state the case for His Majesty's Government as well as it could be stated, even allowing for the fact that the wording of the pledge was exceedingly vague and unsatisfactory.

3. As regards the "specific" reservation in Sir Henry McMahon's letter of the 24th October, 1915 (*i.e.*, the one limiting geographically the extent of the area of Arab independence), Lord Maugham said that what Sir Henry McMahon might have been thinking or might have meant to say when writing his letter was not strictly relevant to the construction of that letter. But it was permissible to take into account the whole of the surrounding circumstances when attempting to get at the true meaning of the words used; and there were two important circumstances which were to his mind most relevant and of which no mention was made in the memorandum. These were:—

(a) The importance which both Great Britain and France attached at the time when the letter was written to the ports on the Mediterranean coast. It was unthinkable that Sir Henry McMahon should have made a promise to any Arab leader which involved placing under Arab sovereignty the coast on which were situated such strategically important ports as Acre, Haifa and Jaffa.

(b) The existence in Palestine of sites holy not only to the Arabs, but also to the Christians and Jews. It was, again, unthinkable that Sir Henry McMahon should have made a promise to any Arab leader which meant that the Allies would, after conquering these sites from one Moslem Power, hand them over without safeguards to the undisputed sovereignty of another Moslem Power.

4. On this basis, the argument of His Majesty's Government could be that the Sherif of Mecca, when he received the letter of the 24th October, 1915, must have realised that the pledge could not possibly be read (at any rate without further enquiry) as covering territory which included not only these important ports, but also the Holy Places of three religions. In other words, the fact that the pledge was silent on the subject of these points should have been taken by the Sherif, not as evidence that the territory now known as Palestine was left to the area of Arab independence, but, in view of all the surrounding circumstances, as evidence that it was excluded from that area.

5. Moreover, this view of the proper construction of the pledge was borne out by the references in the letter containing the pledge to the "Holy Places." If this phrase meant, and was understood to mean, as the Lord Chancellor thought, Jerusalem and other places in Palestine sacred to Christians, to Arabs and to Jews, the fact that Great Britain undertook to protect these places should have made it clear to the Sherif that Palestine was not within the area within which the Arabs were to be independent rulers. If, on the other hand, the phrase meant, and was understood to mean, Mecca and Medina, the fact that so holy a Moslem city as Jerusalem was not included in the guarantee of protection, and that the rights of Christians and Jews were in no way protected, should have made it clear that His Majesty's Government had excluded Palestine from the area to which the pledge applied.⁽¹⁾ It is inconceivable that Sir Henry McMahon was offering to guarantee Mecca and Medina and was obtaining no safeguards as regards Jerusalem, an equally holy city from the Christian point of view.

6. Secondly, Lord Maugham considered that, so far as the "general" reservation was concerned (*i.e.*, the one excluding from the area of Arab independence those areas in which Great Britain was not free to act without France), this part of the pledge could only be read as referring to the facts as they existed on the 24th October, 1915, all subsequent arrangements as between His Majesty's Government and the French Government, or between His Majesty's Government and the Allied and Associated Powers generally, being irrelevant from the strictly legal point of view. In other words, this part of pledge meant—

"Great Britain promises the Arabs that, except for the portion of Syria lying west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, they shall be independent in such parts of the area claimed by the Sherif as Great Britain is to-day free to dispose of without her ally France,"

and not—

"Great Britain promises the Arabs that, except for the portions of Syria lying west of the district of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, they shall be independent in such parts of the area claimed by the Sherif as Great Britain may hereafter become free, as the result of a Franco-British settlement of their respective claims, to dispose of without her ally France."

The pledge was in no way dependent on what France might do in the future. It related to an area in which Britain was, in October 1915, *free to act*.

7. On this basis, the argument of His Majesty's Government should be that, as the claims of France in October 1915 extended to the whole of what is now known as Palestine, as well as to Syria, Palestine was entirely excluded, so far as the pledge was concerned, from the area of Arab independence. If France subsequently relinquished her claim to Palestine the matter might, of course, be reconsidered, but the area of the pledge itself would not be altered. If France gave up her claims, it would be necessary for Great Britain, and perhaps other countries, to consider their own interests. It was premature to deal with these interests until that happened, since the reservation excluded Palestine from the pledge. The subsequent recognition by France of the Balfour Declaration could in no way affect this general reservation, even assuming (which was not necessarily the case) that, by recognising the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent mandate, France relinquished her right to be consulted (otherwise than as a member of the League of Nations) in the disposal of Palestine. If, moreover, the Sherif of Mecca was unaware of the fact that the claims of France extended to Palestine at that time, the onus lay on him to make sure of the extent of these claims.

8. Thirdly, Lord Maugham expressed the views that the McMahon Pledge and the Balfour Declaration were not incompatible. The McMahon Pledge on his construction excluded Palestine from the area of Arab independence. In other words, the Arabs were not promised that they should ever possess the sovereignty of Palestine. The Balfour Declaration, on the other hand, did not mean that there was to be a State under Jewish sovereignty in Palestine. The use of the words "National Home" and the subsequent reservation regarding the interests of other peoples were to his mind conclusive on this point. It might

⁽¹⁾ From an examination of the Arabic texts there is a strong probability, although not an absolute certainty, that both Sir H. McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca were thinking of Mecca and Medina only.

be that all the troubles of His Majesty's Government had come from the fact that they had allowed more to be read into the Balfour Declaration at subsequent times than the words of the declaration themselves contained. But in any case there was no reason to hold the view that the Balfour Declaration was inconsistent with a pledge which excluded Palestine from the area of Arab independence.

9. The Lord Chancellor asked that his suggestions might be brought to the notice of any of those who might have to argue the legal case for His Majesty's Government with representatives of the Arabs.

L. BAGGALLAY.

Foreign Office, January 30, 1939.

[E 870/6/31]

7.

The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence: Results of the Examination of the Arabic Texts of certain Obscure Passages.

I have read through the correspondence and documents alluded to in Mr. Baggallay's "Notes for Mr. Trott" (1) of the 23rd January and have come to the following conclusions: The references to numbers (e.g., (1), (5), &c.) are to the documents in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence as reproduced in the memorandum entitled: "Correspondence relating to the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire" of January 1939.

2. To begin with I will reply to the four points of paragraph 5.

3. The first point is: "What word is actually used in the Arabic of (8) for 'Districts of Damascus'?" There are two Arabic texts of this passage, and they are not textually identical. I shall add, later on, some remarks about their differences, but for the purposes of replying to this question it is unnecessary to treat them as different texts; the actual translations of the word "districts" are the same. The word is "vilāyat" in each case; in translating "districts of Mersina and Alexandretta" the word is in the dual number, whereas in translating "districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo" the plural is used; the dual of the word "vilāyat" being "vilāyatin" and its plural being "vilāyāt." This is merely in accordance with the usual grammatical rules.

4. The second point is: "What is the real meaning of this word 'vilāyat' when used in Arabic?" The Arabic word "vilāyat" is, from the point of view of strict grammar, the verbal noun (what the great Arabist Wright calls the *nomen verbi*) from the root "valia." The root "valia" means "he held command or authority over, he had charge over, he superintended or presided over." The present participle of this root is "vālin," which is the same as the familiar word "vālī," meaning "one who supervises, or presides," and the verbal noun "vilāyat" means, in the first place, "holding authority," "superintending," and so by the usual process of philological evolution it became applied to "the office of being a superintendent or vālī," and thence to the area which the vālī controls. A vilāyat, in fact, is the area ruled over by a vālī. This is the natural and ordinary meaning of the word to an Arab, and I do not think it would have any different meaning to a Turk.

5. It is true that the word is frequently used in a loose sense for any governmental area, and there seems no doubt that there never was a vālī for Homs or Hama, so that the word vilāyat was inappropriate for those two places: presumably the governor of Homs or Hama was called not a "vālī," but a "hākīm" in which case the area over which he presided should be termed a "hukūmat" or possibly an "amīr" in which case his area or office would be termed an "imārat."

6. There are two points about the Arabic text which have not, as far as I know, been noticed hitherto and which may throw some light on what was in the mind of the drafter or the translator.

7.—(a) The word "Syria" in the phrase "portions of Syria lying to the west . . ." in (8) is translated by "bilād-ush-Shām" and not by the one word "Shām." In classical times "Shām" meant just "Syria," but modern usage

(1) See Annex.

sometimes confuses it with the City of Damascus, so that "Shām" might mean either the Province of Syria or the City of Damascus. By using the phrase "bilād-ush-Shām" the writer evidently meant the province, and not the city—in fact, the word "bilād" means usually "regions," so he may have meant to use a very wide term stretching even beyond the limits of what Mr. Antonius (2) recognises as the true "vilāyat" of Syria. (See below, under paragraph 21, for further remark on the word "bilād" and also paragraphs 20 and 22). This point is not in itself of much importance, but it has to be considered in relation to the other point, which is as follows:—

8.—(b) The translator of the phrase "districts of Damascus, Hama . . ." uses for "Damascus" neither "Shām" nor "Dimishq," but calls "Damascus" "Dimishq-ush-Shām," which literally means "Damascus of Syria." Now, at first sight, it seems that this fact indicates that "vilāyat" does not mean here the Turkish administrative district, but the governorate of Damascus City. But whether this view is correct or not depends on what the current practice was at the time, and I have no knowledge on that point. It may be that, whenever the town of Damascus is named, it is, or was, usual to add "of Syria" after it merely in order to avoid confusion with some other town named Damascus. In that case we need take no real notice of the words "of Syria" and we are back to the old problem as to the precise meaning of the phrase "Vilāyat of Damascus." On the other hand, it is permissible to think that the proper designation of the Turkish administrative district of Syria was "vilāyat-ush-Shām" simply, without any mention of Damascus.

9. I fear that there is no way of clearing up the various ambiguities of the Arabic text of the pledge in (8). It is simply a loosely worded collection of phrases. The fact that the translator did not take very much care over what he said is also shown by the fact that he altered the order of the words Hama and Homs, putting the latter before the former.

10. The third point in "Notes for Mr. Trott" is: "Can any support for the view that 'vilāyat' could or should have been taken to mean the Turkish administrative area known as the Vilāyat of Syria be derived from the use of this word, or other words, in the Arabic of (8) and of other letters for the words translated 'district' and 'vilāyat' in those letters?"

11. I will first deal with the text of the documents received from the Sherif, i.e., with (9), (11) and (13).

12. To start with document No. (9), paragraph 1. The word "vilāyets" in line 6 is quite correct, the Arabic word being "vilāyat," the plural of "vilāyāt." (Strictly speaking, the scribe ought to have used the dual number, as he was dealing with only two "vilāyats.") In the next line, the word translated "provinces" is "vilāyatin" (this time the correct form—the dual—is used); so that the English text ought to have been: "But the two vilāyats of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts." The word "their" is also in the dual. But this fine distinction between the dual and the plural number is immediately forgotten, for the next words are in the plural number, the word translated "provinces" being "vilāyāt"—a literal rendering would be "verily they are purely Arab vilāyats."

13. As for the word translated "sea coasts," it is "sawāhil," the plural of the word "sāhil," which properly means just "the shore," i.e., the place where the water of the sea or of a river washes the land. So "sea coasts" is quite an adequate translation. The word does not mean "environs" in a general way; on the other hand, there is absolutely nothing to show where the coasts begin or end.

14. Document No. (9), paragraph 2. In the first line of paragraph 2 the word translated "provinces" is again the plural of "vilāyat"; and the following word "Irāqīh" is an adjective, so that a literal translation would be: "As the Iraqi vilāyats are part of the pure Arab kingdom . . ." As for the word "provinces" in the seventh line of this paragraph, I cannot find this word at all in the Arabic: the fact is that Arabic sentences in this part of the letter are so involved that it is very difficult to translate them at all. I think the translator was quite justified in repeating the word "provinces" so as to make the meaning as clear as possible.

15. Document (9), paragraph 2, line 8: "Those districts now occupied by the British troops." The word translated by "districts" is not "vilāyāt," but

(2) See George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Hamish Hamilton, 1938).

the vaguer term "jihát." This is the plural of the word "jihát" which really means a "side" or "direction," so its plural might well be translated "parts" in quite a vague and undefined sense.

16. Similarly, in the last two lines of paragraph 2 of (9), the words "sheikhs of those districts" might just be rendered "sheikhs of those parts"—the word for "districts" being "jihát."

17. Document No. (11), paragraph 7, first line. The word "parts" in the phrase "the northern parts and their coasts" is a translation of the vague term "jihát." The word for "coasts" is the same as that used previously and rendered by "sea coasts," i.e., the word "sawáhil."

18. At the end of that paragraph, the words "in Beirut and its coasts" occur. Here again the word used for "coasts" is "sawáhil," so it is to be presumed that the meaning was Beirut and an undefined coastal strip around Beirut.

19. At the end of paragraph 8 of (11), occurs the phrase "a span of land in those regions." Here again the word translated "regions" is "jihát." The word translated "span" is "shibr," which just means "a hand's-span."

20. Document (13), paragraph 4, line 2. The word used for Syria is simply "ash-Shám," which, as mentioned above, might equally well mean "Damascus."

21. Document (13), paragraph 4, line 9: "The people of the country." The word translated "country" is "bilád," already met with in the phrase used in document (8) for Syria. "Bilád" is really the plural of "baldah" which means a town or a city; but the plural word "bilád" has come to mean "region" or "parts" in much the same sense as "jihát." As for the next words "the surrounding Arab regions," the word for "regions" is "aqtár" (the plural of "qutr"), another general and vague word, a literal translation of the whole phrase being "and that which surrounds it (the country) of Arab regions."

22. Document (13), paragraph 5 (beginning "secondly"), lines 2 and 3. "In Syria." "Syria" is written simply "Ash-Shám."

23. Document (13), paragraph beginning "fifthly." The word for "Governor" in the phrase "Governor of Port Sudan" is "Amir" and not "váli." This is, of course, correct: it would be wrong to say "váli" in this case as the Governor of Port Sudan would not be so exalted a personage as a váli. Unfortunately there is no mention of the "district" or "region" or "governorate" of Port Sudan in the letter: so we cannot tell whether the writer would have used the word "viláyat" or some other word.

24. To turn now to the letters sent to the Sherif: Document (6). The only mention of anything resembling "districts" in this letter is in the words "the Arabs in those very parts," where the word "parts" is represented by "jihát."

25. Document (8). The translation of the words "districts" in the fourth paragraph, and of "vilayets" in paragraph (5) further on in the same letter, has already been dealt with. It remains to notice the following points:—

26. Paragraph (1), line 3. The word used for "territories" is "bilád" in the text in the Arab Bureau archives. But the word representing "territories" in paragraph (3) is, in the Arab Bureau text, a different word, "aqálm," which is the plural of "iqilm," which means a "region": in fact, both "bilád" and "aqálm" are vague words meaning the same thing. In the text received from His Majesty's Embassy at Cairo in 1937 the word "aqálm" is used in both places.

27. (b), Fifth line of the paragraph following paragraph (5). The word used for "countries" in the phrase "from the Arab countries" is "bilád."

28. It is thus clear that the Sherif used the word "viláyat" or its dual or plural in some places: in letter (9) he spoke of the Viláyats of Mersina, Adana, Aleppo and Beirut. Antonius at p. 419 points out that the Port of Mersin lay in the Viláyat of Adana. So the Sherif was speaking loosely when he spoke of the Viláyat of Mersina; on the other hand, he was just repeating what Sir H. McMahon had said in that respect: moreover, Sir H. McMahon was just as incorrect when he spoke of the Viláyat of Homs, &c.

29. All the other instances in which the Sherif referred to "districts" or similar things deal with only vague and undefined areas. He used different words to mean those vague regions, but that is not surprising in such loosely-worded communications, particularly as the Arabic language is extremely rich in words.

30. It cannot therefore be said that the Sherif used a different word in Arabic when speaking of districts which were not viláyats, from when speaking of districts which were real viláyats.

31. It remains to consider documents (12) and (14).

32. For document (12) we have no Arabic text, so it is impossible to say how the word "vilayet" was translated in paragraph 3 of that document: I imagine it must certainly have been by the Arabic word "viláyat."

33. As for document (14), it may be worth noting that (a) the word used in this text for "Governor" of Port Sudan is "muháfiz," i.e., a different word from that used by the Sherif, viz., "amír." "Coasts of Arabia" (middle of page 33) is translated by "sawáhil bilád-ul-Arab," i.e., "the shores of the Arab regions," or "the Arab cities": though the second equivalent is inappropriate here, which shows that the word "bilád" must here be a general word meaning "regions." The words "Arab inhabitants" near the end of the same paragraph are translated by a periphrasis "those who dwell in those parts" (the word for parts being "jihát").

34. The fourth point in "Notes for Mr. Trott" is: "Is the same Arabic word used in (8) for the word 'districts' in the phrase 'districts of Mersina and Alexandretta' as in the phrase 'districts of Damascus'?" The answer is 'yes.' The word used is 'viláyat.'

35. As for paragraph 8 of the "Notes for Mr. Trott" (dealing with the reservation for French interests), my opinion is as follows:—

36. The first point is that in each of the two Arabic texts of (8) there is a very clear full stop after the words translated "we accept those boundaries." (Those words are represented by different Arabic words in the two texts, but the differences are not important.) We cannot, of course, be sure that there was a full stop in the text sent to the Sherif. Writers of Arabic are very careless of punctuation marks: in fact, in 1915 the usual practice was, I think, to omit them altogether. However, the stop is very prominent in both of our texts, and Antonius (p. 419) begins a new paragraph after those words.

37. The second point is that the following word, "fa amma," show that at any rate a new clause is being started. No other punctuation mark is used until the word for "France": after that word the text in the Arab Bureau file has a comma, while the Residency text has no comma there.

38. The two texts differ slightly, but in essentials they are the same. I should translate them both as follows, keeping as close to the text as the English idiom permits:—

(Beginning of new sentence): "But with regard to the regions which those limits embrace where Great Britain (is) at liberty to act as she wishes without touching the interests of her ally France, I am authorised . . . &c." I have put in the comma after France, but it does not make much difference.

39. It is in my view important to realise that there is no comma in either of the Arabic texts before the word representing "where." Antonius (p. 419 of his book *The Arab Awakening*) uses a comma, but if that comma be omitted the sentence becomes even more ambiguous: i.e., it might mean that we were free to act without reference to the French Government within the area restricted by the specific reservation: or it might mean that, within those limits, there were certain areas in which Great Britain was not at liberty to act without consulting France, and that, therefore, Great Britain could only give guarantees about the remaining areas in which the French were not interested.

40. The meaning of the Arabic texts turns on the exact meaning of the word "haithu," which is translated "where." In classical times there is no doubt that the word "haithu" meant "where": the examples given in Lane's dictionary are such phrases as "I will stand *where* Zayd shall stand," or "*where* the star Canopus is rising." Belot's dictionary, a much more modern work, gives the equivalent as "où, là où, à l'endroit où." On the other hand, in modern usage the word is often to be translated "as" or "whereas" or "seeing that," though this meaning is not given by Belot at all.

41. I therefore think that, although the translation is certainly a bad one, it is not quite so bad as Major Young believed: I think that the Arabic text does not necessarily imply that, within the area restricted by the specific reservation, His Majesty's Government were free to act without reference to the French Government. And the fact that Antonius does not really develop that point at all seems to confirm my view.

42. It should, I think, be remembered that we do not know for certain what Arabic texts are in the hands of the Arab delegation. It is possible that even their texts of the Sherif's letters do not agree with the original letters which we hold; I have received the impression from the translation of some passages in Antonius that he was really translating a different text from that which we possess, *e.g.*, his translation of the second paragraph of (9) is difficult to reconcile with our text, excessively involved though the Arabic is.

43. Antonius's translation of document (7) from the Sherif (Antonius, p. 417) is also very much at variance with our translation: he says "As for the Caliphate, God have mercy on its soul and comfort the Moslems for their loss"; but our translation merely says "May God have mercy on the Khalifate and comfort Moslems in it." Antonius makes great play about the Sherif's statement that the Khalifate was dead, so that there was no point in Sir H. McMahon making a fuss about it; but evidently the Cairo translator did not see that that was the Sherif's meaning. I can imagine what the Sherif's words may have been—they were quite possible, ambiguous: but we do not possess an Arabic text of this document.

44. If we are to enter into a detailed discussion with the Arabs as to the exact meaning of the whole correspondence, I think it will be well for us to start off by the sort of procedure which lawyers call "discovery of documents": we can put our English texts on the table, and possibly the Arabic texts of the Sherif's letters: but we could make it a condition that the Arabs should do the same; so that we should know what *their* Arabic texts say. Of course, the Sherif's letters themselves are not signed, but the delegation could hardly go back on our texts of *those* letters.

45. In addition to the points to which my attention is drawn in "Notes for Mr. Trott," I have been asked to examine two further points: the meaning of the words "Holy Places," &c., and the precise shade of meaning, as between the present and the future, of the reservation regarding French interests.

46. In Document (6), line 21, occur the words "for the Holy Cities." In each of the two Arabic texts which we have, the Arabic is "al-bilād al-'arabiyyah al-muqaddassah." Literally this means "the sacred Arab cities." The word "bilād," however, is usually used in the sense of "regions," as mentioned above.

47. In Document (8) in the paragraph marked (2), there is the phrase "will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression. . . ." The Arab Bureau text for "Holy Places" is "al-bilād al-muqaddaseh": in other words, exactly the same as in Document (6) (see paragraph 46 above), except that the word for "Arab" was missed out. The words in the Residency text, however, are "al-amākin al-muqaddaseh." The word "amākin" is the plural of "makām," which means a "place."

48. If the Arabic text which went to the Sherif was the "Arab Bureau" text, there is a strong presumption that the expression used in Document (8) meant the same as that in Document (6), and, therefore, must have referred to the holy places under the Sherif's control at that time, *i.e.*, Mecca and Medina. If the text was the Residency text, the question is more open, though I myself think that even then the Sherif would understand the words as being limited to Mecca and Medina. It is the plural which is used throughout, and not the dual: had it been the dual there would have been no question but that only Mecca and Medina were intended. But as I have noted above, we can point out an instance from the Sherif's own letters in which he omitted to use the dual when he should have done so in strict grammar.

49. As regards the general reservation about French interests made in Document (8), the question is whether that reservation was, so to speak, actual or contingent; *i.e.*, whether it meant that His Majesty's Government guaranteed all the area except the part to which the French had a claim on the 24th October, 1915 (the date of Document (8)), or whether they guaranteed all the area except what would eventually be established to be the French zone of interest when the war was over and a settlement with France was reached.

50. I think that the natural meaning of the Arabic text is the former one. It would, of course, have been possible to put a verb in the future and to say, for instance, "the regions where Great Britain will be at liberty to act without touching the interests of France."

51. Nevertheless, Arabic tenses are much vaguer than ours; it is possible to say in English: "I am coming to see you to-morrow" when one means

"I will come"; and this sort of thing is still more pronounced in Arabic. If you say "God blessed the Amir," that usually means "May God bless the Amir"—a sort of optative. The so-called present tense has a past meaning when used with certain prepositions. And in this particular passage the present tense might well have a future, or continuing, meaning.

52. I fear that it is quite impossible to tie down the Arabic words about "French interests" to anything in particular as far as a distinction between an actual and a contingent liability is concerned. The translator was evidently a careless, and perhaps an uneducated, person. I do not say that the Arabic language is incapable of conveying a distinction of this sort; but I am sure that the actual text, which was really almost a word-for-word translation of the English text, could be read either way.

53. The Arabs cannot well complain of the vagueness of the Arabic versions of Sir H. McMahon's letters, considering that they themselves (or rather the Sherif) produced Arabic which is so vague as to be almost incomprehensible and almost impossible to translate.

54. I mentioned above that there are differences between the two Arabic texts which we possess of the vital parts of Sir H. McMahon's letter of the 26th October, 1915 (Document (8)). I should explain that the Arabic text in the Arab Bureau archives (A.B. 73/3) is a translation of part of the letter only; it is, in fact, an Arabic version of the document which lies next before it in the file, beginning "Statement of the Policy of the British Government towards the Arabs." At the end of the Arabic text occur the words "Representative of His Britannic Majesty in Egypt"; it looks as if the original plan had been for Sir H. McMahon to sign just this Arabic text, but that it was later decided to embody this first statement of policy in a fuller statement, *i.e.*, in what we know as document (8).

55. The differences between the two texts are not important. I notice that Antonius (footnote on page 420 of *The Arab Awakening*) draws attention to what he regards as a mistranslation of the words "tadābir idāreh khāsseh"; the explanation of this confusion lies in the fact that the Palestine Commission's version (no doubt the same as (8)) corresponds with the Arabic text of the Arab Bureau file, which gives the words "tadābir ahkām idārich makhsūseh," which might well be translated as "special measures of administrative control." The words in the Residency text are nearer to, but still not the same as, that quoted by Antonius—they are "tadābir idārich makhsūseh," the last word having exactly the same meaning as Antonius' "khāsseh." This indicates that Antonius was working on an Arabic text which differed from both the texts which we possess.

A. C. TROTT.

Foreign Office, January 31, 1939.

Annex to 7.

McMahon-Hussein Correspondence.

Notes for Mr. Trott.

1. The word "district" is constantly, and the word "vilayet" occasionally, used in the English translations of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence,⁽¹⁾ particularly in documents (8), (9), (10) and (12), and with reference to Adana, Aleppo, Alexandretta, Bagdad, Basra, Beirut, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Mersina. In (11) the words "Beirut and its coasts" are used.

2. It is important to establish the real meaning (in Arabic) of the phrase "Districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo" in (8), and particularly whether "District of Damascus" could reasonably be held to mean "the Vilayet of (*i.e.*, the Turkish administrative district of) Syria."

3. It is said that the word used in the Arabic texts really was "vilayet," but that in Arabic "vilayet," which is a Turkish word, does not necessarily mean an administrative area (as it does in Turkish) but any large area.

⁽¹⁾ No. 5 in this collection of papers.

4. Some account of the arguments used with regard to this phrase will be found in—

(a) "The Juridical Basis of the Arab Palestine" (Foreign Office, January 1939).

(b) *The Arab Awakening*, Chapter IX (George Antonius).

5. It would be useful if you could establish—

(1) What word actually is used in the Arabic of (8) for "Districts of Damascus, &c."

(2) What the real meaning of this word is when used in Arabic.

(3) Whether any support for the view that it could or should have been taken to mean the "Turkish administrative area known as the Vilayet of Syria" can be derived from the use of this word, or other words in the Arabic of (8) and other letters for the words translated "district" and "vilayet" in those letters.

((4) Whether the same Arabic word is used for "Districts of Mersina and Alexandretta" as for "districts of Damascus," &c.

6. As an example of 5 (3): if the Sherif ever uses a different word in Arabic when speaking of real "vilayets" from when speaking of districts which were not vilayets, the British case, such as it is, would have to be supported by different arguments from those which would be employed if the Sherif used the same word throughout.

7. It would also be useful to know precisely what meaning can be attached to "Beirut and its coasts" in (11).

8. There is also a misrendering, to which Sir H. Young drew attention in 1920, in the Arabic text of (8) where it refers to French interests. Could you compare the usual (intended) English version, Major Young's literal version, and Mr. Antonius' version with the Arabic text and say—

(1) Which is the best rendering in English.

(2) Whether, if Sir H. Young and Mr. Antonius are right, the Arabic is, nevertheless, sufficiently ambiguous to be capable of bearing the intended meaning.

9. It is, in fact, desirable that the whole of the vital passage in (8), as quoted in "The Juridical Basis of the Arab claim" should be checked.

10. Any other suggestions you can make after studying the correspondence will be very welcome.

L. BAGGALLAY.

January 23, 1939.

[E 1217/6/31]

(Confidential.)

(P.C. (A.) (P.) 2.)

8.

CONFERENCES ON PALESTINE, 1939.

UNITED KINGDOM-ARAB MEETINGS.

Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca.

A copy of the English translation of correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein, as set out in the attached schedule,⁽¹⁾ is circulated for the confidential information of delegates.

(Signed) H. F. DOWNIE, *Secretary.*

St. James's Palace, February 14, 1939.

SCHEDULE.

1. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, July 14, 1915.
2. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, August 30, 1915.
3. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, September 9, 1915.
4. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, October 24, 1915.
5. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, November 5, 1915.
6. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, December 14, 1915.
7. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, January 1, 1916.
8. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, January 25, 1916.
9. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, February 18, 1916.
10. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, March 10, 1916.

⁽¹⁾ NOTE 1.—These translations are not printed in the present collection as they are identical with the texts under No. 3, except for the omission of the Kitchener-Abdullah Correspondence and for the following changes, which were introduced just before their circulation to the Conference:—

(a) Letter of October 24, 1915, paragraph 4, was made to read:—

"The two *vilayets* of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the *vilayets* of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo . . . and not—

"The districts of Mersina . . . west of the districts of Damascus . . ."

(b) Letter of November 5, 1915, paragraph 1, second sentence, was made to read:—

"But the two *vilayets* of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts are purely Arab *vilayets* . . . and not—

"But the provinces of Aleppo and Beirut . . . are purely Arab provinces."

(c) Letter of November 5, paragraph 2, first sentence, was made to read:—

"As the Iraqi *vilayets* are parts of the pure Arab Kingdom . . . and as their towns were the first towns built in Islam . . . and not—

"As the provinces of Iraq are parts of the pure Arab Kingdom . . . and as their towns in those provinces were the first towns built in Islam . . ."

NOTE 2.—The Arabic texts of letters Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 in the above schedule were circulated to the Arab Delegations on February 15 under document P.C. (A.) (P.) 3 of that date (E 1217/6/31) (see No. 5).

NOTE 3.—For further changes made in the English text, see under No. 21.

[E 1357/6/31]

9.

The Legal Basis of the Arab Claim to Palestine: some Additional Considerations.

The legal basis of the Arab claim to Palestine was recently discussed in a memorandum which was circulated to the Cabinet as C.P. 19 (39).

2. The Lord Chancellor subsequently made some observations upon this memorandum, which were embodied in a further memorandum dated the 30th January, 1939.

3. Since these two memoranda were written Mr. George Antonius's book *The Arab Awakening*, which is referred to in the foot-notes to the earlier memorandum, has been more closely studied. Mr. Antonius makes two assertions which, if accurate, may be regarded as promises made to the Arabs with regard to Palestine, which ought to be taken into account while the future of Palestine is now under consideration.

4. The first of Mr. Antonius's assertions relates (p. 268) to the fact that when Commander Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in Cairo went to Jedda early in 1918 in order to explain to the Sherif of Mecca what His Majesty's Government meant by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 (which had recently been published by the Bolsheviks) and the Balfour Declaration of the previous November, he gave the Sherif an assurance that—

"Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population."

5. Mr. Antonius adds that the message was delivered orally, but that the Sherif took it down and that the quotation is Mr. Antonius's own rendering of a note made by the Sherif in Arabic at the time. Mr. Antonius goes on to say that this represents a fundamental departure from the text of the Balfour Declaration, which purports to guarantee only "the civil and religious rights of the Arab population."

6. It is a fact that Commander Hogarth was sent to Jedda early in 1918 in order to offer explanations to the Sherif with regard to the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration. His instructions with regard to the Balfour Declaration were to the following effect:—

"That since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realisation of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal."

The full text of the telegram to Sir Reginald Wingate in which these instructions were embodied forms appendix A to this memorandum. This telegram was drafted by Sir Mark Sykes and approved with certain amendments by Lord Hardinge of Penshurst and Lord Robert Cecil.

7. Commander Hogarth did not subsequently report the precise terms in which he communicated this message to the Sherif.^(*) But in view of what the Sherif recorded and subsequently communicated to Mr. Antonius there can be no doubt that the message was delivered as sent to Sir Reginald Wingate from the Foreign Office. Commander Hogarth did, however, record the following observations:—

"I passed to formula No. 3 (Jewish settlement in Palestine) prefacing it by a statement of the growth of Zionism during the war and the great value of a Jewish alliance. The King seemed quite pleased with the formula and agreed, saying that he welcomed Jews to all Arab lands. I explained that His Majesty's Government resolve safeguarded the existing local population."

(*) His report, such as it was, was subsequently published in Cmd. 5064 (see No. 22).

And later on—

"The King would not accept an independent Jew State in Palestine nor was I instructed to warn him that such a State was contemplated by Great Britain. He probably knows little or nothing of the actual or possible economy of Palestine and his ready assent to a Jewish settlement there is not worth very much."

8. The second of Mr. Antonius's assertions relates (p. 270) to a so-called "Declaration to the Seven."

9. He asserts that on the 16th January, 1918, Mr. Walrond, a member of the Intelligence Service in Cairo, delivered a reply from the Foreign Office to seven prominent Arab Nationalists who had sent a memorial (Appendix B) to His Majesty's Government expressing their misgivings with regard to the intentions of the Allies respecting territories claimed by the Arabs in the event of an Allied victory.

10. Mr. Antonius prints the declaration in full as Appendix D to his book, explaining that it is made from notes taken in Arabic by one of those who was present. According to his version the message included a statement to the effect that the future government of the territories already occupied by the Allied armies (which included Palestine) would be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed.

11. In all essentials Mr. Antonius's assertion is perfectly correct. The memorial was received in the Foreign Office in June 1918. A reply was drafted in the Foreign Office by Sir Mark Sykes, approved by Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, and telegraphed to Sir Reginald Wingate on the 11th June, 1918. This telegram is attached as Appendix C to the present memorandum.

12. A message based upon this telegram was read out to two of the memorialists by Commander Hogarth (not Mr. Walrond, although Mr. Walrond was present) on about the 25th June.

13. It will be seen that the message, which Mr. Antonius says was made known all over the Arab world at the time, did, indeed, include the following passage:—

"In regard to the areas occupied by the Allied forces His Majesty's Government draw the attention of the memorialists to the texts of the proclamations issued respectively by the Chief Officers Commanding at the taking at Bagdad () and Jerusalem (). These proclamations embodied the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the inhabitants of these regions. It is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the future government of these regions should be based by the principle of the consent of the Government and this policy has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's Government."

14. It should be explained that there is a mystery about the proclamation made by General Allenby at the taking of Jerusalem (the date of which was the 9th December). No proclamation of the kind which the writer of this telegram must have had in mind has ever been traced in the archives of the Foreign Office or in any book written about the Palestine campaign. The official history of the war (*Mesopotamia Campaign 1914-18*, Volume III) prints as Appendix XXXVIII the proclamation on the capture of Bagdad. This proclamation is printed as Appendix D to the present memorandum. There is also on record a proclamation which Lord Allenby made on the 11th December on his entry into Jerusalem, but this relates only to the Holy places of all religions in Palestine and says nothing about the political position. It must have been something corresponding to the Bagdad proclamation which was meant.^(*)

Foreign Office,
February 21, 1939.

(*) Subsequent investigations at the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence have failed to reveal any trace of such a Proclamation.

Appendix A to 9.

The following are the terms of the message which Commander Hogarth was instructed to deliver to King Hussein when he visited Jedda in January 1918:—

(1) The *Entente* Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view.

(2) So far as Palestine is concerned we are determined that no people shall be subject to another, but—

(a) In view of the fact that there are in Palestine shrines, Wakfs and Holy places, sacred in some cases to Moslems alone, to Jews alone, to Christians alone, and in others to two or all three, and inasmuch as these places are of interest to vast masses of people outside Palestine and Arabia, there must be a special régime to deal with these places approved of by the world.

(b) As regards the Mosque of Omar it shall be considered as a Moslem concern alone, and shall not be subjected directly or indirectly to any non-Moslem authority.

(3) Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine, and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realisation of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal.

In this connexion the friendship of world Jewry to the Arab cause is equivalent to support in all States where Jews have a political influence. The leaders of the movement are determined to bring about the success of Zionism by friendship and co-operation with the Arabs, and such an offer is not one to be lightly thrown aside.

Appendix B to 9.

Translation of a Memorial addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo by seven prominent Syrian nationalists on May 7, 1918.

We, the undersigned representatives of various Arab political societies and of the supporters of the Arab movement, have been given full power to voice the expression of their tongues.

The purpose of this letter is to ask respectfully his Excellency the High Commissioner to forward these our views to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the information of His Majesty's Government.

Should it be deemed possible to trust us and to give a confidential reply, the undersigned will undertake to treat it as such, stating merely to those who elected us that we are satisfied with the information, and will give our word not to communicate it to a soul, with the exception of King Hussein Ibn Ali the Great, and his sons the Princes.

We are constantly being asked questions as to a doubt exists as to the real meaning of Mr. Lloyd George's and Mr. Wilson's recent pronouncements, but cannot reply. Persons are withholding their whole-hearted assistance, being suspicious of the intentions of Great Britain and afraid of being left behind at the end of the war, and are not putting forward their best efforts to further the aims which we believe Great Britain has in view.

This class of people is one over which we could exercise an important influence and they would, we feel sure, be willing to take our word on trust.

They believe it impossible, as the majority of us who are Moslems feel, to sever their connexion with Turkey as their spiritual leader, if their future is to be a matter of uncertainty.

Feelings such as these have prompted us to unite our people and submit these questions and points of view, and this is a result of the activity shown by the so-called committees in Paris and other cities of Europe representing the French and various views opposed to our own. We may here mention that many of them appear to us to consist of names which we have never heard of in Syria nor in our different societies.

Accordingly we have felt it our duty to our fellow-countrymen behind the enemy lines to raise our voice as well, and the more so as we represent four-fifths, and more, of the total inhabitants of Syria, and as we feel certain that this address will receive the approval of His Majesty King Hussein and of his sons the Princes, should we, on account of a previous agreement between them and the Arab societies, send a delegate to show it to them.

One of the reasons which obliged us to keep the address confidential is because Syria is still in the grip of the Turks and thousands and tens of thousands of our sons are on the Turanian far distant battlefields without any protector to protect them from the vengeance of these assassins should we address this openly to His Majesty's Government.

As our different committees represent all classes of the nation, especially the enlightened class with the religious leaders of note and well known aristocrats, and as they are diffused throughout Arabia and have intimate relations with the Bedouin chiefs, we believe the British Government will commit a grave error if they neglect (overlook) these ready-made and organised committees which have only been established to defend Arabia against the oppression of the Turk and to safeguard the rights of the people. Especially after Russia has submitted to the German Peace Terms and consented to restore the Turkish territories it has occupied in this war, and even to restore part of the Caucasus: a fact which will strengthen Turkey and increase the Turkish danger to Arabia.

It is worth mentioning that our situation in Egypt has become a difficult one as some Egyptians reproach us with sarcasm saying:—

"That the Germans, the enemies of Islam, have made conditions in their Peace Terms with the Russians that the people of the Caucasus, who are Moslems, can plan their future themselves and that their relations with their neighbours—especially the Turks—should be free. They have also arranged that Persia and Afghanistan, both Mahomedan kingdoms, should be completely independent. While your Allies, who are the friends of Islam, have concluded amongst themselves an agreement to divide your territory into two zones, the North of which is to be under French influence and the South to be under British."

Inquiries.

1. Can we assure our people that it is the aim of the British Government that the Arabs should enjoy complete independence in Arabia?

We, as representatives of the Arab societies, promise as soon as we get a positive answer to our question, to offer the necessary services which our Allies request us to perform, the advantages of which are for us all.

It is recognised that the Arabs all over Arabia have been longing for a long while to shake off the Turkish yoke and get complete independence and the proof that this has been the goal of our purpose appears from the societies and committees that have been working until very lately in Constantinople, Syria, Irak and Egypt and elsewhere. The Arabs have been encouraged to pursue this policy by the sympathy shown by the British Government with their aims at the beginning of the war and the assistance offered to His Majesty King Hussein the Great in starting the Arab Movement.

We consider the formation of a national army in the Arab territories occupied by the British of prime importance as it would result in strengthening the Arab Frontier and weakening the Turkish. For this reason we ask to be allowed to form committees which would work for this end in those territories and as soon as they form a sufficient force to send it to the Northern Arab Troops under the leadership of the Princes the sons of His Hashimite Majesty.

2. The supporters of the Arab Movement whenever they mention Arabia mean by it to include Geziret el Arab, Syria, Mesopotamia, Mosul and a large part of the province of Diarbekr.

3. Is the policy of His Majesty's Government to assist the inhabitants of these countries to attain their complete independence and the composing of an Arab Government decentralised like the United States of America, or other Federal Governments, which suits their social condition; or does it not consider them all equal?

4. The Syrians, though only too glad to form part of the Arab Federal Government, have, however, for a long time previous to the war, been working to apply the principle of decentralisation to Syria, dividing it into provinces, which would have the right to administer their own internal affairs but it would be possible, if Arabia became independent, to apply the same principle to its provinces, including principalities such as Nejd, Yemen and Asir.

5. The Arabs have always relied on Great Britain and believed in her traditional inherited policy that demanded the security and respected the inviolability of the Arab countries as a political necessity. For that reason our people stretch forth the hand of friendship and sincerity to Great Britain and its mighty people and hope that they will be a defender of this Arab race, of well known past history, a race, which if kept standing at the doors of the East, will be a trusty sentinel and sincere friend to the supporters of their independence.

6. The official declarations that have been announced by the statesmen of Great Britain, specifying the security of the Turkish provinces, which are inhabited by people of Turkish origin only, and not challenging their maintenance, has left the Arab nation in great despair for the security of their political life. They think it unjust that Turkey, the ally of the Germans should be unambiguously assured of their country's security, while the Arabs are neglected in that respect, who are an ally of Great Britain and have sacrificed the most worthy of their manhood for their independence.

The Arab leaders maintain that their race has more right to the security and independence of their country than the Turks who have ruined Arab civilisation and thrown it into a sea of ignorance and oppression and committed a succession of crimes against humanity and will never be pardoned by history; and how can leaders of civilisation to-day pardon them or admit the sacrifice of Arabia for the maintenance and security of Turkey?

6.—(b) Here there is room to refer to the differences in the Arab country and to the divergence of opinion existing among some of the Emirs in Geziret el Arab. We maintain that agreement on the part of Arab Emirs is not impracticable as the fundamental principles to be imposed on them by the Government of Federal Arabia, provided His Majesty's Government gives us assistance and allows us a free hand with confidence and sincerity in Geziret el Arab and enlists the assistance of His Majesty King Hussein Ibn Ali the Great in uniting the hearts and purposes of the Emirs.

Then we and the enlightened Arabs generally, and particularly the Syrians, whether here in Egypt, or in the countries still under the Turkish yoke or in parts where the British army is operating, would be ready to give every assistance and to do anything that the interests of our country sets before us showing loyalty to our allies that undertook to help us.

7. Though the source of the Arab revolution appeared in the Hejaz, its corner-stone was Syria, and it had the greater share in the intellectual movement. The Hejaz was all along in close touch with it, and His Majesty the Great King and his sons the Princes have been in perfect agreement with the Arab societies there and in Egypt.

If it had not been for the confidence of the Syrians in Great Britain's loyalty to the Arabs generally, and to Syria in particular, they would not have offered from the beginning of the war until to-day so many of their most distinguished men as a sacrifice for the independence of Arabia, and especially Syria.

We have no doubt but that the great men of England, who are well known for their sense of justice, will never allow whatever be the state of political affairs in Europe, those noble lives and blood to pass away in vain.

Among important proofs, a reference to which is disclosed in this *exposé*, is the fact that the Syrian societies have not sent their delegate to Egypt after the declaration of war except to reassure themselves of the support of Great Britain and the realisation of the hopes which the Arab nation reposed in Great Britain.

It may suffice to turn your attention to the political revelations which Ahmed Djemal Pasha published in a book (*La Vérité sur la Question syrienne*) which

was printed in Constantinople during the war, in which he perverted the truth. You will be able to realise the history of some of these committees from the true story which we are enclosing with this address.

(Signed by Seven.)

Appendix C to 9.

The "Declaration to the Seven."

HIS Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of the seven with the greatest care. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the reasons why the memorialists desire to retain their anonymity, and the fact that the memorial is anonymous has not in any way detracted from the importance which His Majesty's Government attribute to the document.

The areas mentioned in the memorandum fall into four categories:—

1. Areas in Arabia which were free and independent before the outbreak of war.
2. Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the action of the Arabs themselves during the present war.
3. Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion, occupied by the Allied forces during the present war.
4. Areas still under Turkish control.

In regard to the first two categories, His Majesty's Government recognise the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting these areas and support them in their struggle for freedom.

In regard to the areas occupied by Allied forces, His Majesty's Government draw the attention of the memorialists to the texts of the proclamations issued respectively by the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief on the taking of Bagdad and Jerusalem. These proclamations embody the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the inhabitants of those regions. It is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the future government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed, and this policy has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's Government.

In regard to the areas mentioned in the fourth category, it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the oppressed peoples of these areas should obtain their freedom and independence, and towards the achievement of this object His Majesty's Government continue to labour.

His Majesty's Government are fully aware of, and take into consideration, the difficulties and dangers which beset those who work for the regeneration of the populations of the areas specified.

In spite, however, of these obstacles, His Majesty's Government trust and believe that they can and will be overcome, and wish to give all support to those who desire to overcome them. They are prepared to consider any scheme of co-operation which is compatible with existing military operations and consistent with the political principles of His Majesty's Government and the Allies.

June 1918.

Appendix D to 9.

British Proclamation on capturing Bagdad.

To the People of Bagdad Vilayet,

IN the name of my King, and in the name of the peoples over whom he rules, I address you as follows:—

Our military operations have as their object the defeat of the enemy, and the driving of him from these territories. In order to complete this task, I am charged with absolute and supreme control of all regions in which British troops operate; but our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.

[21053]

x 4

Since the days of Hulagu your city and your lands have been subject to the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have fallen into ruins, your gardens have sunk in desolation, and your forefathers and yourselves have groaned in bondage. Your sons have been carried off to wars not of your seeking, your wealth has been stripped from you by unjust men and squandered in distant places.

Since the days of Midhat the Turks have talked of reforms, yet do not the ruins and wastes of to-day testify the vanity of those promises?

It is the wish not only of my King and his peoples, but it is also the wish of the great nations with whom he is in alliance, that you should prosper even as in the past, when your lands were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science and art, and when Bagdad city was one of the wonders of the world.

Between your people and the dominions of my King there has been a close bond of interest. For 200 years have the merchants of Bagdad and Great Britain traded together in mutual profit and friendship. On the other hand, the Germans and Turks, who have despoiled you and yours, have for twenty years made Bagdad a centre of power from which to assail the power of the British and the Allies of the British in Persia and Arabia. Therefore, the British Government cannot remain indifferent as to what takes place in your country now or in the future, for in duty to the interests of the British people and their Allies the British Government cannot risk that being done in Bagdad again which has been done by the Turks and Germans during the war.

But you, people of Bagdad, whose commercial prosperity and whose safety from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter of the closest concern to the British Government, are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspiration of your philosophers and writers shall be realised, and that once again the people of Bagdad shall flourish, enjoying their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. In Hejaz the Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans who oppressed them, and proclaimed the Sherif Hussein as their King, and His Lordship rules in independence and freedom and is the ally of the nations who are fighting against the power of Turkey and Germany; so, indeed, are the noble Arabs, the Lords of Koweit, Nejd and Asir.

Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause of Arab freedom at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the Great Powers allied to Great Britain that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the hope and desire of the British people and the nations in alliance with them that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown among the peoples of the earth, and that it shall bind itself together to this end in unity and concord.

O people of Bagdad, remember that for twenty-six generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another in order that they might profit by your dissensions. This policy is abhorrent to Great Britain and her Allies, for there can be neither peace nor prosperity where there is enmity and misgovernment. Therefore, I am commanded to invite you, through your nobles and elders and representatives, to participate in the management of your own civil affairs in collaboration with the political representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British army, so that you may be united with your kinsmen in north, east, south and west in realising the aspirations of your race.

[E 1367/6/31]

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10.

Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916: provision regarding the special administration for Palestine.

The report of the Palestine Royal Commission presented to Parliament in Cmd. 5479, July 1937 contains the following passage (page 21):—

"Finally, in May 1916, an agreement was concluded, commonly known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the Arab area north of the Arabian peninsula in the following manner:—

(1)

(2)

(3) With a view to securing the religious interests of the *Entente* Powers, Palestine, with the Holy Places, is to be separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special régime to be determined by agreement between Russia, France and Great Britain.

(4)

2. The object of the present memorandum is to show in what circumstances the provision regarding the special régime for Palestine came to be included in the agreement, with special reference to the extent to which Sir M. Sykes was personally responsible for its inclusion. Before proceeding with the examination of those circumstances, it is desirable, however, to quote the exact terms of the agreement in this respect; they are as follows:—

"3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and, subsequently, in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca." 87247/938/
W 44/191C

(The "brown area" referred to in this clause is that so marked on the map attached to the agreement.)

It will be seen that the summary of this provision quoted from the Royal Commission's report makes no mention of the stipulated subsequent consultations with the other Allies and with the representatives of the Shereef.

3. It is not proposed in this memorandum to enter into details of the correspondence with the Shereef in regard to the limits of the territories to be assigned to the Arabs, this having been done in Mr. Childs' memorandum of the 24th October, 1930, regarding the exclusion of Palestine from those territories. Conf. 13778.

4. The first views of Sir M. Sykes on the question of Palestine and the independent Arab areas appear to have reached the Foreign Office in a telegram from Sir H. McMahon, dated the 19th November, 1915, i.e., a few days before discussions were instituted with M. Picot in London. In this telegram Sir M. Sykes said that he had been shown the correspondence relating to the Arab movement, and mentioned as one of the difficulties to be overcome that of making arrangements with the Arabs which would be inoffensive to French susceptibility based on financial and historical sentiment. To meet this difficulty, he suggested that the *Entente* Powers should agree with the Arabs to recognise, respect and protect the Arab Provisional Government or Governments in the Vilayets of Beirut, Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem and the Hejaz and the Sanjak of "Derzor Urfa" during the war, and should guarantee the areas mentioned as the minimum of independent Arab territory after the war; in order to secure the assent of France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy should engage not to obtain concessions in the Vilayets of Aleppo, Beirut and Damascus and the Sanjak of Urfa without the approval of the French Government, and also to recognise the spirit of previous agreements between the French and Ottoman Governments with regard to educational establishments in the same area in the suggested Arab independent territories. Two days later Sir M. Sykes sent a further message from Cairo, from which the following is an extract:— 174633/
34982/W 44/
191C

"With regard to France and Arabs, our task is to get Arabs to concede as much as possible to French and to get our Haifa outlet and Palestine included in our sphere of enterprise in the form of French concession to us. Thus we smooth the way for France with Syrians, and in the matter where France has a (traditional) (trading) interest, deal directly with her. 175461/
34982/W 44/
191C

"NOTE.—Arabs will always welcome any extension of our sphere of enterprise."

5. On the 23rd November the first discussions were held with M. Picot in London. At a meeting held at the Foreign Office on that date, M. Picot claimed for France possession (nominally a protectorate) of the whole coast from where the Taurus Mountains approach the sea in Cilicia down as far as the Egyptian frontier, and made it clear that there was little prospect of his Government receding from this attitude. Sir A. Nicolson, referring to the inclusion of Palestine in the area claimed by France, pointed out that the question of Jerusalem, Nazareth and other places was a question apart which affected other nations, including Russia, and stated that it could not be discussed at that time. M. Picot replied that Jerusalem and Bethlehem might be formed into an enclave, but certainly of no greater area than would suffice to include those two places. At this stage a deadlock was reached and it was agreed to suspend further discussions while M. Picot laid the matter before his Government.

6. Early in December a despatch, addressed to the War Office and dated the 15th November, was received from Sir M. Sykes, in which was enclosed a memorandum resuming the impressions he had received on various points as a result of his tour of the Eastern theatre. In this memorandum he recommended, *inter alia*, that we should back the Arabic-speaking peoples against the Turkish Government on one consistent and logical plan. To achieve this object, he said it would be necessary to obtain the sanction of France and Italy to an agreement as to the future treatment of the Arab peoples in the Ottoman Empire, to obtain from France guarantees compatible with Arab national aspirations, and to settle with France, Italy and Russia the status of Jerusalem; and in a list of recommendations constituting our ultimate goal he included the following:—

"Declaration of a British internal and external protectorate over an area in Southern Syria and Mesopotamia to be agreed upon with France and Russia.

"Declaration of a French internal and external protectorate in an area north of the British area."

7. His Majesty's Government were now awaiting the return of M. Picot from Paris. In the meantime it was decided that Sir M. Sykes could give valuable information to the War Committee of the Cabinet, which he did at a meeting of that body held on the 16th December. On this occasion he urged, *inter alia*, that we should settle with the French as soon as possible and reach a definite understanding regarding Syria; questioned as to the nature of the arrangement which he suggested, Sir M. Sykes recommended the retention for ourselves of such country south of Haifa as was not in the Jerusalem enclave, and expressed the view that it was most important that we should have a belt of British-controlled country between the Shereef of Mecca and the French, adding that it could be argued that the French were not giving up very much, assuming that the enclave were large enough to contain the head of the Dead Sea and enough of the Jordan for the pilgrims to go to. Apart from this aspect, the question of the Palestine enclave does not appear from the record of Sir M. Sykes' evidence to have been discussed, and it may be assumed that it had already been accepted in principle by the Prime Minister and his colleagues on the committee.

8. The discussions with M. Picot in London were resumed at the Foreign Office on the 21st December, when Sir M. Sykes was present as a member of Sir A. Nicolson's Committee. At this meeting conclusions were reached which M. Picot agreed to submit to his Government. These conclusions described the Arab State (which was to be divided between Great Britain and France into spheres of commercial and administrative interest) subject to certain conditions, which included the following:—

"Jerusalem to form an enclave, its boundaries yet to be defined."

Subsequently it was decided that, in order to obviate the prolongation of the discussions, Sir M. Sykes and M. Picot should examine the whole question and collaborate in drawing up a memorandum which would co-relate the various factors of the general problem of Arab, French and British requirements in the Near East. After an examination of the question by Sir M. Sykes and M. Picot, a memorandum was submitted by them early in January 1916; it commenced with

a summary of the various claims, and, as regards the Palestine Holy Places, said:—

"Lastly, such a settlement has to be worked in with an arrangement satisfactory to the conscientious desires of Christianity, Judaism and Mahommedanism in regard to the status of Jerusalem and the neighbouring shrines."

Discussing this aspect in greater detail later in the memorandum under the heading: "International Religious Interests," Sir M. Sykes and M. Picot said:—

"As regards Jerusalem and the Holy Places, the following must be borne in mind:—

- "(a) The Latin and Orthodox religions require equal consideration in Palestine.
- "(b) The members of the Jewish community throughout the world have a conscientious and sentimental interest in the future of the country.
- "(c) The Mosque of Omar represents, next to Mecca, the most holy and venerable shrine in Islam, and it must be a *sine qua non* that the Mosque of Omar itself should be under the sole control of Moslems, and that the chief of the Arabian confederation should have an equal voice in the administration of Palestine."

The memorandum concluded with a summary of the lines of the settlement proposed; this included the following:—

"3. That in the brown area there should be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with Russia, Italy and the representatives of Islam."

9. The Sykes-Picot memorandum was circulated to the departments represented on Sir A. Nicolson's committee, and, their comments having been received, a meeting of the committee was held at which the draft agreement was drawn up on the basis of the Sykes-Picot recommendations. As regards Palestine, the wording of the eventual agreement, quoted in paragraph 2 above, was adopted; it will be noticed that the principal amendment was the substitution of the phrase "representatives of the Sherif of Mecca" for the phrase "representatives of Islam." It is therefore unnecessary for present purposes to trace the history of the subsequent discussions leading to the exchange of notes between Sir E. Grey and the French Ambassador in May 1916 which formally placed on record the arrangement generally known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

10. From the preceding narrative it will be seen that Sir M. Sykes originally contemplated the establishment of an Arab Government in Palestine, which would be a British "sphere of enterprise," and that later he suggested discussions with France, Italy and Russia regarding the status of Jerusalem. But at the first discussions in London with M. Picot (*i.e.*, before Sir M. Sykes' participation therein) it had been accepted that the question of the Palestine Holy Places was one for separate consideration affecting countries other than France and Great Britain. It does not appear that Sir M. Sykes was given any written instructions prior to his discussions with M. Picot, but he was obviously informed of the previous discussions in the Nicolson committee. The general nature of the recommendation submitted by Sir M. Sykes and M. Picot in regard to Palestine was not in the nature of a new departure; all that was new was the marking of the actual enclave on the map.

HUGH K. GREY.

Foreign Office, February 21, 1939.

[E 1549/6/31]

11.

The "McMahon Pledge" of October 24, 1915: Instructions by His Majesty's Government with regard to this Pledge.

The instructions given to Sir Henry McMahon by His Majesty's Government with regard to the pledge eventually embodied in his letter to the Sherif of Mecca of the 24th October, 1915, can be traced in the following three documents:—

- (1) Sir Henry McMahon's personal and unnumbered telegram of the 18th October, in which he suggests the general lines of what he might say to the Sherif on the subject of the boundaries of the area of Arab independence (153045) (Appendix 1).⁽²³⁾
- (2) Sir Edward Grey's telegram No. 796 of the 20th October, concurring generally in Sir Henry McMahon's suggestions (155203) (Appendix 2).⁽²⁴⁾
- (3) Sir Henry McMahon's despatch No. 131, Secret, of the 26th October, 1915, enclosing a copy of his letter of the 24th October to the Sherif and commenting upon its terms (163832) (Appendix 3).

2. From an examination of these documents it appears that—

- (a) Neither Palestine nor Jerusalem was mentioned at any point.
- (b) There is nothing in the documents which is actually inconsistent with Sir H. McMahon's statement that in giving the pledge he intended to exclude Palestine from the area of Arab independence.
- (c) There is, on the other hand, nothing which positively supports this statement.
- (d) The most definite indication which Sir H. McMahon gives of his intentions is in paragraph 4 of his despatch of the 26th October, in which he says that he has been "definite in excluding Mersina, Alexandretta and those districts on the northern coast of Syria which cannot be said to be Arab and where I understand that French interests have been recognised."

Foreign Office, February 22, 1939.

Appendix 1.

EGYPT.

Sir H. McMahon to Foreign Office.—(Received October 19.)

(Unnumbered.) *Cairo, October 18, 1915.*
(Personal.)

Your personal telegram of the 14th October, latter portion.

Please see my despatch No. 121, Confidential, of the 12th October forwarding statements of Sherif-el-Faroki, and also my telegram No. 623, conveying the purpose of letter from Sherif of Mecca. From further conversation with Faroki it appears evident that Arab party are at parting of the ways, and unless we can give them immediate assurance of nature to satisfy them they will throw themselves into the hands of Germany, who, he says, has furnished them fulfilment of all their demands. In the one case they seem ready to work actively with us, which will greatly influence the course of Mesopotamia and Syrian campaigns, while in the other Arabs will throw in their lot against us and we may have all Islam in the East united against the Allies.

Arab party say they cannot longer hesitate, because they must act before Turkey receives further assistance from Germany. Matter, therefore, is urgent.

Decision presents great difficulties, because unless care is taken it is quite

⁽²³⁾ At the first meeting of the "McMahon-Hussein Committee" (see No. 23) the Arab representatives asked to see Sir Henry McMahon's instructions, and the question of showing them (but not giving them) Appendices 1 and 2 was considered. In the end, however, it was decided not to do so, and they did not repeat their request.

possible that young Arab party may eventually prove as troublesome as young Turks. Unless, however, information in possession of His Majesty's Government removes anxiety regarding threatened Turco-German designs against Bagdad and Egypt we must take this risk in endeavour to get and keep Arabs on our side.

I understand Faroki, in course of further conversations, expresses opinion that Arab party would accept an assurance on the following lines:—

England accepts principle of independent Arabia under British guidance and control within limits propounded by Sherif of Mecca, in so far as England is free to act without detriment to the interests of her present Allies (this refers to French, in regard to whom see remarks on modification of north-west limits of Arabia). England, when situation admits, will advise and help Arabs regarding establishment of such form of government in territories concerned as may seem most suitable. In respect to above territory, Arabs will recognise Britain and no other influence, will recognise British interests as paramount, and will work under British guidance and control. Arabs for this purpose will accept such British residencies, advisers and officials as may be necessary to ensure sound administration, but Arabian peninsula itself will remain under its own chiefs. England will recognise inviolability of Holy Places and guarantee them against unlikely [*sic*] aggression.

In regard to north-western boundaries proposed by Sherif of Mecca, Faroki thinks Arabs would accept modification leaving in Arabia purely Arab districts of Aleppo, Damascus, Hama and Homs, whose occupation by the French they would oppose by force of arms.

He also accepts the fact that British interests necessitate special measures of British control in Basrah vilayet.

If we consider letter of Sherif of Mecca in the light of Faroki's views, I do not think either Sherif or Arab party are likely to regard any less wide assurance as acceptable.

Faroki is anxious himself to visit Sherif and I propose to facilitate his doing so in due course.

In the meantime I would be glad of instructions how to reply to Sherif and what assurances to give Arab party through Faroki.

Appendix 2.

Foreign Office to Sir H. McMahon (Cairo).

(No. 796.) Cypher telegram. *October 20, 1915, 5.50 P.M.*

Your Personal telegram of the 18th.

You can give cordial assurances on the lines, and with the reserve about our Allies, proposed by you. Stipulation that Arabs will recognise British interests as paramount and work under British guidance, &c., should not be included unless it is necessary to secure Arab consent, as this might give rise to impression in France that we were not only endeavouring to secure Arab interests, but to establish our own in Syria at expense of French.

There is no difficulty in speaking without reserve about Arab peninsula and Holy Places. The general reserve you propose is, however, necessary, more especially for north-western boundaries.

As regards Mesopotamia, proposed sphere of British control, namely, Basrah vilayet, will need extension in view of special interests in Bagdad Province and area actually in our occupation. Our treaties with Arab chiefs will, of course, stand.

But the important thing is to give our assurances that will prevent Arabs from being alienated, and I must leave you discretion in the matter, as it is urgent and there is not time to discuss an exact formula.

The simplest plan would be to give an assurance of Arab independence, saying that he will proceed at once to discuss boundaries if they will send representatives for that purpose, but if something more precise than this is required you can give it.

You should keep Wingate informed.

Appendix 3.

Sir H. McMahon to Sir E. Grey.

(No. 131. Secret.)
Sir,

Cairo, October 26, 1915.

With reference to my secret telegram No. 644 of to-day's date, I have the honour to enclose herewith the English text of the reply which I have despatched in Arabic to the Sherif of Mecca.

2. The matter appeared to me to admit of no delay, and I have therefore lost no time in answering the Sherif's letter, and have availed myself of the authority to act without further reference, accorded to me in your telegram No. 796 of the 20th instant.

3. The composition of a reply which would be acceptable to the Arab party and which would at the same time leave as free a hand as possible to His Majesty's Government in the future has been a difficult task.

4. I have been definite in stating that Great Britain will recognise the principle of Arab independence in purely Arab territory, this being the main point on which agreement depends, but have been equally definite in excluding Mersina, Alexandretta and those districts on the northern coast of Syria, which cannot be said to be Arab, and where I understand that French interests have been recognised. I am not aware of the extent of French claims in Syria, nor of how far His Majesty's Government have agreed to recognise them. Hence, while recognising the towns of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo as being within the circle of Arab countries, I have endeavoured to provide for possible French pretensions to those places by a general modification to the effect that His Majesty's Government can only give assurances in regard to those territories "in which she can act without detriment to the interests of her ally France."

5. It will be observed that I have definitely specified France as the only Ally concerned. The use of the term "Allies" would, I understand, inevitably have aroused the suspicion of the Arabs, who would have conjured up visions of all our Allies putting forward claims in various part of the Arab territories.

6. I believe I am right in the supposition that no territorial interests have ever been even tentatively claimed, either by Russia in Northern Mesopotamia or by Italy on the Arabian coasts of the Red Sea, and that it is therefore unnecessary, and, indeed, inadvisable, to provide for any such interests.

7. I venture to emphasise the fact that the eventual arrangement would be very greatly facilitated if France would consent to forgo any territorial claims she may have to purely Arab territories, such as Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo. The inclusion of such districts in Arabia will be insisted on by the Arabs, and although they might possibly agree in regard to them to accept from France a similar arrangement to that which we are proposing elsewhere, it is obvious that this will give rise to trouble, and that much more satisfactory and lasting results will be possible in the future if the Arab questions can be dealt with as a whole by Great Britain.

8. In face of the the vital importance to the Allied cause of the present issues involved, France could hardly be unreasonable on this point, and the question of compensation elsewhere, if necessary, is well worthy of serious consideration.

9. It is, I consider, not going too far to say that the only hope of preventing this question becoming eventually one of trouble and anxiety to all concerned is to leave it in the direction of one Power alone.

10. I would also once more lay stress on the religious importance attached to Damascus by Arabs, not only as one of the three points of departure of the Sacred Carpet, but as, in their eyes, one of the principal Holy Places.

11. In conclusion, I am of opinion that while the terms I have proposed are the minimum that could be offered with any promise of success, there is reasonable hope of their being accepted by the Sherif individually and the leaders of the Arab party.

12. The letter was despatched yesterday in the hands of the Sherif's messenger, Mahmoud Arif Arayfar, who is in the complete confidence of the Sherif, and appears to be a man of considerable intelligence and of some influence.

13. The opportunity was taken of verbally explaining the terms of the letter to facilitate its comprehension by the Sherif. Further verbal assurances

of sympathy and support were also given, and, in particular, care was taken to allay any apprehension which the Sherif might entertain regarding the possibly sinister motives towards himself of our assistance to the Idrisi and Asir, in whom he is said not to place complete confidence.

A copy of this despatch is being sent by this mail to India.

I have, &c.

A. HENRY McMAHON.

[E 1305/6/31]

12.

(For the use of United Kingdom Representatives only. Not circulated to the Arab and Jewish Delegations.)

CONFERENCES ON PALESTINE, 1939.

(P.C. (U.K.) 11.)

Extract from a Statement by M. Chekri Ganem, Chief Representative of the Central Syrian Committee, before the Supreme Council at Paris on February 13, 1919.

"May we say one word as regards Palestine—although the subject is said to be a thorny one?

"Palestine is incontestably the southern portion of our country. The Zionists claim it. We have suffered too much from suffering resembling theirs not to throw open wide to them the doors of Palestine. All those among them oppressed in certain retrograde countries are welcome. Let them settle in Palestine, but in an autonomous Palestine, connected with Syria by the sole bond of federation. Will not a Palestine enjoying wide internal autonomy be for them a sufficient guarantee?

"If they form a majority there, they will be the rulers. If they are in the minority, they will be represented in the Government in proportion to their numbers.

"Is it necessary, in order to establish them, to dismember Syria . . . and to constitute a State in the midst of a country which, as a consequence, would be hostile to them?"

[David Hunter Miller: "My Diary at the Conference of Paris": Vol. XIV, page 414.]

St. James's Palace, S.W. 1,
February 22, 1939.

[E 1548/6/31]

13.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916; Explanations given to the Sherif of Mecca.

Mr. Antonius states in his book, *The Arab Awakening* (page 251), that when Sir Mark Sykes went to Jedda in May 1917 nothing was said by him to the Sherif of Mecca about the existence of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, whereby portions of the territories which the Sherif had claimed for the area of Arab independence, and which had been promised, as he thought, in the "McMahon pledge" of the 24th October, 1915, had been divided up into British and French spheres of influence.

2. As a matter of fact, this is not quite correct. It is true that the text of the agreement was kept from the Sherif, both then and later, but Sir Mark Sykes was nevertheless authorised to inform him in strict confidence and "in general terms," as had already been done in the case of the Sultan of Egypt, of an agreement between Great Britain, France and Russia regarding the future of Syria, Palestine and Arabia.

3. According to a telegram from Sir Reginald Wingate at Cairo of the 7th May, 1917, Sir Mark Sykes explained to the Sherif Feisal at Wejh on the 2nd May the principle of Anglo-French agreement regarding an Arab confederation, which principle he accepted after much argument, and on the 2nd May he explained fully to the Sherif of Mecca himself the agreement regarding an Arab confederation or State; the Sherif seemed relieved by this explanation, as the stipulation that the agreement of the Arabs themselves would be necessary to whatever was done disposed of his worst apprehensions; he also agreed, after much argument, that a Franco-Arab settlement was essential to the Arab development in Syria.

4. Sir Mark Sykes returned again to Jedda a little later, accompanied this time by M. Picot, and what then took place is described as follows in Mr. Childs' memorandum of the 24th October, 1930:—

5. "A year after the Sykes-Picot Arrangement was concluded His Majesty's Government and the French Government sent Sir Mark Sykes and M. Picot on a mission to King Hussein. M. Picot was charged to deliver a friendly message from his Government to the King; Sir Mark Sykes's part was to establish, if possible, cordial relations between the King and the representative of France.

6. "In an interview M. Picot and Sir Mark Sykes had with King Hussein on the 20th May, 1917, a declaration by the King in answer to the message from the French Government (which had been delivered the previous day) was read aloud as follows:—

"That His Majesty the King of Hejaz learned with satisfaction that the French Government approved of Arab national aspirations; and that, as he had confidence in Great Britain, he would be content if the French Government pursued the same policy towards Arab aspirations on the Moslem Syrian Littoral as the British did in Bagdad."

7. "To Sir Mark Sykes the King sent the following message:—

"We are ready to co-operate with France in Syria to the fullest extent and with England in Mesopotamia. . . ."

8. "In an interview with Captain T. E. Lawrence on the 29th July, 1917, the King explained his own views of the conversations with M. Picot and Sir Mark Sykes in the previous May.

9. "These views do not bear directly on the question of Palestine, but they refer to Syria and doubtless represent the ideas the King would have held in respect of Palestine had he been uncertain as to its future:—

"The King," Captain Lawrence reported, "is extremely pleased to have trapped M. Picot into the admission that France will be satisfied in Syria with the position Great Britain desires in Iraq. That, he says, means a temporary occupation of the country for strategical and political reasons (with probably an annual grant to the Sherif in compensation and recognition) and concessions in the way of public works. "I was ready, without being asked, to guard their interests in the existing railways and assist their schools; but the Hejaz and Syria are like the palm and fingers of one hand, and I could not have consented to the amputation of any finger or part of a finger without leaving myself a cripple."

"In conclusion, the King remarked on the shortness and informality of the conversations, the absence of written documents, and the fact that the only change in the situation caused by the meeting was the French renunciation of the ideas of annexation, permanent occupation or suzerainty of any part of Syria—"but this we did not embody in a formal treaty, as the war is not yet finished. I merely read out my acceptance of the formula as the British in Iraq, proposed to me by M. Picot, since Sir Mark Sykes assured me that it would put a satisfactory conclusion to the discussion."

10. It will be seen that there is no certainty that Palestine was specifically mentioned by either side, and from subsequent reports by the British agent at Jedda it seems clear that whatever Sir Mark Sykes may have said there was still considerable misunderstanding between His Majesty's Government and the Sherif as to the areas which were to be reserved for Arab independence.

11. The most illuminating illustration of the position which obtained even after a further visit paid to Jedda by Commander Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in January 1918 to explain the true intent of the Balfour Declaration is probably that contained in a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Bassett, the British agent at Jedda, to Sir Reginald Wingate at Cairo. The following is an extract from this letter, which is dated the 11th February, 1918:—

"The telegram⁽²⁶⁾ from the Foreign Office for the King, setting out the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Arab cause, should have an excellent effect with His Highness, and copies will no doubt be sent from Mecca to the Emirs in the field. It is a question, though, how far its still rather general terms will go to reassure Emir Abdullah. King Hussein himself will be well satisfied by the reaffirmation by His Majesty's Government of their former 'pledge,' but, as your Excellency knows, he has read into the terms of that 'pledge' very wide territorial boundaries, and professes the most implicit trust in the intention and ability of Great Britain to redeem the 'pledge' as he reads it. Wilson has written so often of the danger underlying this question that I need only say it is always uppermost in one's mind here in one's daily intercourse with the King. Since his talk with Hogarth on the Palestine question—if not before—I have little doubt that His Highness has realised that he must be prepared to meet certain slight modifications of what he describes as the 'agreement,' and that he will meet them in a reasonable and proper spirit I fully believe, provided they are not too drastic, and full opportunity is given for their discussion with him in detail. He said as much to Hogarth in my presence. On the other hand, anything that would mean for him a rude awakening, I dread."

12. There is nothing to show that, even after the receipt of such letters as these, any attempt was made to make unmistakably clear to the Sherif (or the King as he was by then) the full extent of the reservations made by His Majesty's Government.

Foreign Office, February 22, 1939.

[E 1420/6/31]

14.

Subsequent Declarations by British Officials as to the meaning and fulfilment of the "McMahon Pledge" of October 24, 1915.

1. *Sir Henry McMahon.*

(Extract from a letter to *The Times* of the 23rd July, 1937.)

After referring to the recent publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine, Sir Henry McMahon says:—

"I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically, that it was not intended by me in giving the pledge to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised.

"I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well known to King Hussein."

(This statement is identical in substance with a statement⁽²⁷⁾ made by Sir Henry McMahon to an official of the Colonial Office, who had asked him for information on this point, in 1922.)

2. *Sir Gilbert Clayton* (a member of Sir Henry McMahon's staff).

(A minute addressed to Sir Herbert (now Lord) Samuel when High Commissioner for Palestine.)

"High Commissioner,

April 12, 1923.

"I was in daily touch with Sir Henry McMahon throughout the negotiations with King Hussein, and made the preliminary drafts of all the letters. I can bear out the statement that it was never the intention that Palestine should be

⁽²⁶⁾ See Appendix C of *The Arab Awakening*.

⁽²⁷⁾ See Appendix.

included in the general pledge given to the Sherif; the introductory words of Sir Henry's letter were thought at the time—perhaps erroneously—clearly to cover that point. It was, I think, obvious that the peculiar interests involved in Palestine precluded any definite pledges in regard to its future at so early a stage.

"2. If my memory serves me I think that the Sykes-Picot Agreement envisaged *International* control of Palestine, but I may be wrong.

"3. Not only are the people of Palestine quite unable to maintain a government with any pretence to efficiency, but its size and resources are not sufficient to enable it to stand alone, without external support such as Zionist interests are bound to enlist. Alone it must inevitably fall under the control of some more powerful neighbour.

(Initialled) G. F. C.
(GILBERT F. CLAYTON)."

3. Colonel T. E. Lawrence.

(a) (Extract from a draft preface to the *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, dated the 18th November, 1922.)

"He (Mr. Winston Churchill) executed the whole McMahon undertaking (called a treaty by some who have not seen it) for Palestine, for Transjordan and for Arabia. In Mesopotamia he went far beyond its provisions

"I do not wish . . . to make long explanations; but must put on record my conviction that England is out of the Arab affair with clean hands. Some Arab advocates (the most vociferous joined our ranks after the Armistice) have rejected my judgment on this point They found me out of date; and I was happy to withdraw from a political milieu which had never been congenial."

(b) (Extract from a letter to Professor Yale, dated the 22nd October, 1929.)

"It is my deliberate opinion that the Winston Churchill settlement of 1921-22 (in which I shared) honourably fulfils the whole of the promises we made to the Arabs, in so far as the so-called British spheres are concerned Winston's settlement so pleased me that I withdrew wholly from politics, with clean hands, I think, and enlisted in the Air Force"

Foreign Office, February 23, 1939.

Appendix to 14.

[E 2821/2821/65]

Sir H. McMahon to Colonial Office.

5 Wilton Place, S.W. 1,
March 12, 1922.

My dear Shuckburgh,

With reference to our conversation on Friday (the 10th), I write you these few lines to place on record the fact that in my letter of the 24th October, 1915, to the Sherif of Mecca it was my intention to exclude Palestine from independent Arabia, and I hoped that I had so worded the letter as to make this sufficiently clear for all practical purposes.

My reasons for restricting myself to specific mention of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo in that connexion in my letter were (1) that these were places to which the Arabs attached vital importance, and (2) that there was no place I could think of at the time of sufficient importance for purposes of definition further south of the above.

It was as fully my intention to exclude Palestine as it was to exclude the more northern coastal tracts of Syria.

I did not make use of the Jordan to define the limits of the southern area, because I thought it might possibly be considered desirable at some later stage of negotiations to endeavour to find some more suitable frontier line east of the Jordan and between that river and the Hejaz Railway. At that moment, moreover, very detailed definitions did not seem called for.

I may mention that I have no recollection of ever having anything from the Sherif of Mecca, by letter or message, to make me suppose that he did not also understand Palestine to be excluded from independent Arabia.

I trust that I have made my intention clear.

Yours sincerely,

A. HENRY McMAHON.

[E 1419/6/31]

15.

The Arab Claim to Palestine: Resurrection of Palestine by His Majesty's Government.

The fact that His Majesty's Government had realised at an early stage of the war—and several months prior to the "McMahon pledge" of the 24th October, 1915, that, in the event of an Allied victory over Turkey, the disposal of Palestine would present a problem in which both France and Russia would have an interest, is borne out by the proceedings of a report of a committee appointed by the Government to consider the nature of British desiderata in Turkey-in-Asia in the event of a successful conclusion of the war.

2. The report of this committee, which was under the chairmanship of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, was presented the 30th June, 1915.

3. Mr. Childs, in his memorandum of the 24th October, 1930, quoted from various parts of this report, and sums up the attitude of the committee towards Palestine in the following words:—

"The committee had recognised and recorded:—

(a) That France had already and definitely claimed Syria and Palestine, and that her claim to Syria would have to be respected; though they thought it likely her claim to Palestine might be successfully withstood.

(b) That Russia, owing to the deep interest of the Orthodox Church in the Holy Places, would insist on making her voice heard regarding the future of Palestine.

(c) That Great Britain, like France, would be unable to assert an exclusive claim to Palestine."

4. Later the conclusions of this committee concerning Palestine (see appendix) were communicated to the Arab members of the "McMahon-Hussein" Committee at the second meeting on the 24th February, 1939.

Foreign Office, February 23, 1939.

Appendix.

Extract from a Report^() on the Proceedings of a Committee appointed by the Prime Minister in 1915, and presided over by Sir Maurice de Bunsen.*

Palestine.

96. Still less do the committee desire to offer suggestions about the future destiny of Palestine, but since that territory has been included within the geographical limits assigned to the British sphere in the two schemes, of partition, and of zones of interest, they desire to repeat that they see no reason why the sacred places of Palestine should not be dealt with as a separate question. They have felt free to deliberate on the assumption that the French claim will be rejected, since they are convinced that the forces opposed are too great for France ever to make that claim good, but for the same reason they consider that it will

(*) Entitled: "British Desiderata in Turkey-in-Asia: Report, Proceedings and Appendices of a Committee appointed by the Prime Minister, 1915," dated June 30, 1915.

be idle for His Majesty's Government to claim the retention of Palestine in their sphere. Palestine must be recognised as a country whose destiny must be the subject of special negotiations, in which both belligerents and neutrals are alike interested.

[E 1827/6/31]

16.

General Sir Edmund Allenby's Assurances to the Arabs regarding the future status of conquered Ottoman Territory, October 1918.

At the first meeting of the "McMahon-Hussein Committee" (**) General Nuri-al-Said referred to certain assurances which he said Sir Edmund Allenby had given to the Amir Faisal in October 1918, as the result of which the Sherifian forces had evacuated Beirut and allowed the town to be placed under French administration. He added that a copy of a letter containing these assurances had later been communicated by the Amir Faisal to the Peace Conference at Paris.

2. A search was accordingly made in the archives of the Foreign Office, but the only reference to any such assurances which could be found was the telegram from Sir Edmund Allenby of the 17th October, 1918, of which a copy forms an appendix to this memorandum.

3. Moreover, the records of the Peace Conference show that on the 6th February, 1919, the Amir Faisal appeared before the Supreme Council and referred to this question without mentioning any letter.

4. On the 23rd September, 1919, however, the Amir Faisal wrote to Mr. Lloyd George (Confidential 11562, No. 109):—

"... when the British General in Command at Beirut obliged the Arab troops to evacuate the sea-coast, he wrote to Shukri Pasha, the Arab General, that this change was simply of a military and temporary character... the statement of his Excellency, the Commander-in-chief, in a telegram he sent to me in which he assured me of the nature of this arrangement... induced me to agree."

5. The letter to Shukri Pasha and the telegram to the Amir Faisal cannot be traced in the Foreign Office, but may be in the archives of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

6. A summary of the telegram in the appendix, which was communicated to the Arab representatives on the "McMahon-Hussein Committee" forms Annex H of the report of the committee. (**)

*Foreign Office,
February 23, 1939.*

(Additional Note.—Subsequent investigations made among the files of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force at the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence failed to add any useful information to that contained in the foregoing memorandum (see E 4254/6/31).)

Appendix.

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Egypt, to War Office.—(Received October 18, 1918.)

(I 6906/P.)

(October 17, 1918.)

Have communicated the policy decided upon as approved by High Commissioner for communication to King of Hejaz to my French military administrator at Beirut, and to Feisal, with whom yesterday I had an interview. Feisal is very distrustful of French intentions, fearing that French military governors will take advantage of their official positions to carry on propaganda,

(**) See No. 23.

(**) See No. 23.

and thereby (?) entail prejudice to an eventual settlement on a basis of real self-determination, I gave him official assurance that whatever measures might be taken during period of military administration, they were purely provisional and could not be allowed to prejudice final settlement by the (?) peace conference, at which no doubt Arabs would have a representative, I added that instructions to military governors would preclude their mixing in political affairs, and that I should remove them if I found any of them (?) contravening these orders. I reminded Feisal that the Allies were in honour bound to endeavour to reach settlement in accordance with wishes of the peoples concerned, and urged him to place his trust whole-heartedly in their good faith. Feisal appeared reassured, but doubtless he is being pressed by his followers and by his father probably. The general feeling of uneasiness on the part of Arabs can only be dispelled by public declaration of policy by the French and British Governments, and any injudicious pushing by French of their own interests at the present moment will confirm suspicions of the Arabs and forfeit their confidence in the French and also ourselves.

[E 1441/6/31]

17.

Literal Translations of the Arabic Letter dated October 26, 1915.

Verily the two *vilayets* of Mersin and Alexandretta and parts of territories of Sham lying to the west of the *vilayets* of Damascus [of Sham] and Homs and Hamah and Aleppo—it is not possible that it should be said that they are purely Arab and therefore it is incumbent that they should be excepted from the limits demanded.

With this modification and without transgressing on treaties contracted between us and certain Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

Now with respect to these regions which those limits include where Great Britain is free to act without touching the interests of her ally France, then verily I am authorised on behalf of the Government of Great Britain to present the following pledges and to answer your letter as follows.

Verily with due consideration of the modifications mentioned above, Great Britain is prepared to recognise the independence of the Arabs and to support that independence in all the regions which are inside the limits which His Highness the Sharif of Makkah demands.

Remarks.

1. The term *vilayet* (Arabic, *wilayah*) is often wrongly used. None of the so-called *vilayets* in (1) is a *vilayet* except Aleppo.

2. The word *ajza'*—plural of *juz'*—is undefined and untechnical. It can be translated as "parts" or "portions."

3. The *ajza'* lying to the west of the *vilayets* of Damascus and Homs and Hamah (and Aleppo) can only refer to the Province of Lebanon, the Sanjak of Tripoli and the Sanjak of Latakia. There are no "parts" to the west of Aleppo.

4. There is another word here for "region" or "district," i.e., *aqalim*, plural of *iqlim*. It is a geographical term (not political). *Vilayet* and *sanjak* are political terms.

5. The word *tadummuha* is most likely a mistake. It means "to draw together, to collect the parts of a thing, to add to"; the verb *damina* should have been used, it means to "include in."

6. *Tasarafa* = to dispose of.

7. *An uqaddima al-mawathiq al-atiyah* means "that I put forward the following compacts (or bonds or promises)"; there is no pronoun used regarding the person to be affected by these promises.

8. *Aqalim* is used again. The *hudud* refer to those demanded by the Sharif.

Remarks on Foreign Office Drafts.

1. The words "limits," "frontiers" and "boundaries" are usually translated in the Arabic letters as *hudud* and *tukhum*.

[21053]

2. "Proposed limits and boundaries" has been rendered "the limits demanded," literally—"the asked-for limits."

3. "And, in regard . . . territories." In Arabic there is a full stop after "the limits." A new sentence is started, "*wa amma min khusus al-
aqalim*"—"and as for those regions."

4. Paragraph (1).—Note the different order of words in my translation and the repetition of *istiglal*—independence. The Arabic version contains emphasis which does not exist in the English.

5. "Territories" has been rendered *aqalim*.

6. Limits and boundaries—*hudud*.

7. "Propose" is rendered *talaba*—this word is better rendered *iqtaraha*.

Antonius ("The Arab Awakening"), p. 419.

1. Districts—*vilayets*.
2. Proposed delimitation, in Arabic we have "limits demanded."
3. That delimitation in Arabic is "those limits."
4. Regions—*aqalim*.
5. Proposed frontiers—not in Arabic.
6. (1) does not read exactly as in Arabic.

[E 1571/6/31]

18.

From Mr. J. Heyworth-Dunne to Mr. H. L. Baggallay.

75 Antrim Mansions, N.W. 3,

February 25, 1939.

Dear Mr. Baggallay,

The following are the more obvious cases of mistranslation which Mr. Antonius and I consider advisable to correct in your proofs. I have discussed these points fully with Mr. Antonius and we are in complete agreement as to what they should be. As for the other letters which Mr. Antonius has criticised, he understands that another translation would not make any fundamental differences. It would also be impossible to translate letters 1 and 3 as the originals are not available:—

Page 4, line 1: instead of "limits, frontiers and boundaries" read "limits and boundaries."

Page 7, lines 8–15: omit altogether and substitute, "For our aim, O respected Minister, is to ensure that the conditions which are essential to our future shall be secured on a foundation of reality, and not on highly-decorated phrases and titles. As for the caliphate, God have mercy on its soul and comfort the Moslems for their loss."

Page 10, line 10: read "with hesitation and coldness."

Page 10, lines 11–12: read "but it appeared to me that the time had not yet come when that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner."

Page 10, line 19: districts instead of *vilayets*.

Page 10, line 20: districts instead of *vilayets*.

Page 10, line 21: Homs before Hama.

Page 10, line 22: "limits demanded" instead of "proposed limits and boundaries."

Page 10, lines 24–25: "limits" omit "boundaries."

Page 10, line 26: full stop after "limits" and new paragraph beginning with "As for the . . ."

Page 10, line 26: read "As for those regions lying within" and not "In regard to those portions of territories."

Page 11, line 5: read "uphold" for "support."

Page 11, lines 6–7: "in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca."

Page 11, lines 21–22: "special administrative arrangements" instead of "special measures of administrative control."

Page 11, line 27: omit "traditional."

Page 12, line 15: read Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Ibn Uraifan.

Page 14, line 9–10: why underline "British troops"?

Page 16, line 13: *vilayets* should be substituted by "districts."

Page 16, line 26: read "Great Britain have fully understood and."

Page 17, line 1: after "involved" add "in them both."

Page 18, line 7: "Your two letters" appears to be an error. The Arabic is not clear as the word has been badly copied by an illiterate copyist. I am of the opinion, with Mr. George Antonius, that this should read "your letter," in which case the footnote can be omitted.

Page 19, line 20: "protection" for "presumption."

Page 19, line 22: omit "all her own peoples" and read "friends."

Page 20, line 1: instead of "no peace of mind" read "no peaceful conditions."

Page 20, line 3: instead of "isolations" read "dismemberment."

Page 20, line 6: read "reciprocity and, indeed, the identity of her interests."

I am sending you two other copies of this letter in case you would like them. I shall be at the school from 11 A.M. until lunch-time should you need me.

Yours sincerely,

JAMES HEYWORTH-DUNNE,
Senior Lecturer in Arabic.

[E 1571/6/31]

19.

Mr. J. Heyworth-Dunne to Mr. H. L. Baggallay.

School of Oriental and African Studies,

Vandon House,

Vandon Street, London.

February 25, 1939.

Dear Mr. Baggallay,

As an afterthought, the word "Vilayet" with a "v" at the beginning and an "et" at the end is Turkish and means "an administrative province."

The word "Wilayah" with a "w" at the beginning and "ah" at the end is Arabic and has a much wider meaning. It can mean "district" or "area" or "the seat of a Governor."

As the documents are in Arabic, it can be argued that it has the Arabic meaning. Taking into consideration the "surrounding circumstances," I think it has been used without discrimination. Turkish words and expressions were so commonly used at this time.

Yours sincerely,

J. HEYWORTH-DUNNE.

[E 1691/6/31]

20.

Mr. J. Heyworth-Dunne to Mr. H. L. Baggallay.

Dear Mr. Baggallay,

March 2, 1939.

With further reference to your letter of the 25th February and in accordance with your telephone request of this morning, I have had another interview with Mr. George Antonius, and we have gone through the proposed corrections of the translations of the McMahon-Sharif Husain letters, and I have to point out the further following remarks:—

Page 4, line 12: Mr. A. has no objection to the three words "limits, frontiers and boundaries" remaining as they are, although "limits and boundaries" is more correct.

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Page 7, lines 8-15: Mr. A. insists on this paragraph being used as it is in my letter.

Page 10, line 10: The words "with hesitation and coldness" can remain as they are in the original document.

Page 10, lines 11-12: Must be read according to my translation.

Page 10, lines 19 and 20: The word "districts" must be used instead of "vilayets."

Page 10, line 21: Homs before Hama.

Page 10, line 22: Mr. A. does not object to the translation "limits demanded," and thinks that it is the best and more exact translation.

Page 10, lines 24-25: The same remark applies here as to page 4, line 12.

Page 10, line 26: My suggestion to be adopted, but after "within" add "those frontiers."

Page 11, line 5: Mr. A. is indifferent as to whether the word "uphold" or "support" is being used.

Page 11, lines 6-7: Mr. A. insists on "in all," and does not object to the translation "limits demanded." The words "frontiers proposed" could also be used.

Page 11, lines 21-22: The correction must be used.

Page 11, line 27: The word "traditional" must be omitted.

Page 12, line 15: Mr. A. suggests that it does not matter whether the name is altered or not, but he thinks it would be better if it were correct.

Page 14, lines 9-10: He still insists that "British troops" should not be underlined. I agree.

Page 16, line 13: "Vilayets" must be deleted and "districts" substituted.

Page 16, line 26: The expression "Great Britain have fully understood and" must be used.

Page 17, line 1: After the word "involved," "in them both" must be inserted.

Page 18, line 7: My original remarks must hold good.

Page 19, line 20: "Protection" instead of "presumption."

Page 19, line 22: "Friends" instead of "all her own peoples."

Page 20, line 1: "No peaceful conditions" instead of "no peace of mind."

Page 20, line 2: Mr. A. insists on "citizens" being used instead of "people." This is the correct translation of "bayroutiyin." Mr. A. is very insistent on this point.

Page 20, line 3: "Isolations" is wrong, and the word "dismemberment" must be used instead.

Page 20, line 6: The wording as in my previous letter must be used.

We have the further following remarks to make:—

Page 2, line 8: Mr. A. puts forward the following suggestion, with which I agree, namely, in the eighth line, the word "jezirat" is used, and, in the Palestinian Royal Commission Report, it was erroneously stated that this referred to the Amedia Island. It is recommended most strongly that, in order to avoid criticism, it should be made quite clear that "jezirat" refers to the Island of Ibn Umar.

Pages 6 and 7: For the purposes of correction here, we have called the paragraph beginning "as the limits, &c.," paragraph A. We have called the paragraph beginning "therefore they have found" paragraph C. We have called the paragraph beginning "and therefore they saw" paragraph B, and the paragraph beginning "the feelings of its inhabitants" paragraph D. We strongly recommend that paragraphs B and D be omitted altogether, and that paragraphs A and C should be rewritten as follows:—

(A) As the limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one individual whose claim might well await the conclusion of the war, but are those of our people who have decided that those frontiers are as a minimum vitally necessary to their new life, and whose resolution is final on this point. Therefore, they have decided to discuss this point in the first resort with the Power in which they now have their confidence and trust and whom they regard as their ultimate appeal, namely, the Illustrious British Empire.

(C) Their reason for this aim and confidence is the reciprocity of interests, the necessity of regulating territorial divisions and the wishes of the populations concerned, so that they may know how to base their future life and avoid finding Great Britain or any of her allies in opposition to or conflict with their wishes, which God forbid!

We further recommend also that, throughout the correspondence and translations, the names Sharif should be written "Sharif," and that the name "Husain" should be read "Husain" (and that the country "Yemen" should be written "Yaman") which is the correct way of spelling it.

I should be very glad if you would send a copy of this letter to Mr. George Antonius for his approval.

Yours sincerely,

J. HEYWORTH-DUNNE.

[E 1747/6/31]

(21)

Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915-March 1916.

[With a Map.]

Miscellaneous No. 3 (1939): Cmd 5957.

CONTENTS.^(*)

No.

1. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, July 14, 1915.
2. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, August 30, 1915.
3. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, September 9, 1915.
4. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, October 24, 1915.
5. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, November 5, 1915.
6. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, December 14, 1915.
7. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, January 1, 1916.
8. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, January 25, 1916.
9. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, February 18, 1916.
10. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, March 10, 1916.

APPENDIX.—Map of Pre-war Turkish Administrative Districts comprised in Syria and Palestine.^(**)

N.B.—The Command Paper is preceded by the following explanatory note:—

"The correspondence of which an English text follows was exchanged in Arabic.

"This English text is based upon the original drafts in English of the letters sent by Sir Henry McMahon and the contemporary translations into English of the letters received by Sir Henry McMahon.

"The language of some of the original drafts or contemporary translations has, however, been modified in certain places where the language has been criticised on the ground that it does not reproduce accurately the Arabic of the actual correspondence and the criticism has been found on examination to be justified.

^(*) The texts of the letters are not reprinted in this collection.

^(**) This is the same map as in the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine (Cmd. 5479, at page 19).

"The text printed in the following pages is the revised text which results from these modifications. Except where otherwise stated, the footnotes indicate the text as it stood before the modifications were introduced."

"His Majesty's Government have been advised in this matter by Mr. J. Heyworth-Dunne, Senior Lecturer in Arabic at the School of Oriental Studies, University of London."

The changes referred to in this explanatory note are those agreed upon by the "McMahon-Husain Committee" (see No. 23).

As stated in the explanatory note, the footnotes to the Command Paper show how the changed passages used to read in the former, unrevised English text—except where otherwise stated. The exceptions are all in letter No. 3, the reason being that for this letter (as for certain others, in which, however, no changes were necessary) His Majesty's Government have no Arabic text in their archives, although Arabic texts are available in works published in the Middle East. In the case of this letter, therefore, it was necessary to retain the former text in the body of the letter and mention in the footnotes the changes proposed by Mr. George Antonius, on behalf of the Arab members of the committee.

It should be noted that the footnotes to the Command Paper do not show the more important of the changes which were introduced into the original English texts, as given under No. 3, before those texts were communicated to the Arab representatives (see note 1 to No. 8). In other words, if the text as given in the body of the Command Paper is modified so as to follow the former readings indicated in the footnotes to the Command Paper, the result will be the text given under No. 3 so far as Sir Henry McMahon's letter of the 24th October, 1915, is concerned, and the text to which a reference is made under No. 8 for the Sherif's letter of the 5th November, 1915.

22.

Statements made on behalf of His Majesty's Government during the year 1918 in regard to the Future Status of certain parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Miscellaneous No. 4 (1939): Cmd. 5964.

CONTENTS.⁽²³⁾

No.

1. The Hogarth Message—

- (a) A message which Commander D. G. Hogarth, C.M.G., R.N.V.R., was instructed in January 1918 to deliver to King Hussein of the Hejaz.
- (b) A record of the conversation which Commander Hogarth had with King Hussein about the message.
- (c) Some notes by Commander Hogarth about this conversation.

2. The Declaration to the Seven—

A message which His Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo was instructed in June 1918 to convey to seven Arab leaders who had presented a memorial to His Majesty's Government.

3. Certain assurances given by Sir Edmund Allenby to the Emir Faisal in October 1918.

⁽²³⁾ Not printed in this collection, but see Nos. 9 and 16.

[E 2166/6/31]

23.

Report of a Committee set up to consider certain Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, and the Sherif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916.

March 16, 1939.

(Cmd. 5974.)

CONTENTS.⁽²⁴⁾

The Report, dated March 16, 1939.

Annex A: "Memorandum on British Pledges to the Arabs" (handed in by the Arab representatives at the first meeting on February 23).

Annex B: "The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence" (handed in by the United Kingdom representatives at the second meeting on February 24).

Annex C: "Statement by Sir Michael McDonnell on certain legal points arising out of the Lord Chancellor's statement at the Second Meeting of the Committee on February 24" (handed in by the Arab representatives at the third meeting on February 28).

Annex D: "Observations arising out of the Lord Chancellor's statement on February 24, 1939" (handed in by the Arab representatives at the third meeting on February 28).

Annex E: "Statement by the Lord Chancellor" (handed in by the United Kingdom representatives at the fourth meeting on March 16).

Annex F: The Hogarth Message of January 1918.

Annex G: The Declaration to the Seven of June 1918.

Annex H: Sir Edmund Allenby's assurance to the Amir Faisal of October 1918.

Annex I: The Anglo-French Declaration of November 7, 1918.

Annex J: Extract from the Report of a Committee presided over by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, June 1915.

Note by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

This report was adopted at the Fourteenth Meeting of the Arab and United Kingdom Delegations to the Conferences on Palestine, which was held on Friday, the 17th March, 1939.

REPORT.

At the Sixth Meeting of the Arab and United Kingdom Delegations to the Conferences on Palestine, which was held at St. James's Palace on the 15th February, 1939, it was agreed that a committee should be set up to consider certain correspondence, commonly called the "McMahon-Hussein Correspondence," which took place in 1915 and 1916 between Sir Henry McMahon, at that time His Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo, and the Sherif of Mecca, afterwards King Hussein of the Hejaz, and to furnish a report to the conference upon this correspondence.

⁽²⁴⁾ Not printed in this collection, except for paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Report.

2. A committee was accordingly formed, consisting of the following persons:—

Representatives of the Arab Delegations attending the Conference.

His Excellency General Nuri al-Sa'id, Prime Minister of Iraq (replaced after the first two meetings by:

His Excellency Sayyid Taufiq al-Suwaidy, leader of the Iraqi Delegation after the departure from London of General Nuri al-Sa'id),

His Excellency Abdul-Rahman Bey Azzam, Egyptian Minister in Bagdad and Jedda,

Auni Bey Abdul-Hadi, Palestine delegate,

Musa Bey al-Alami, Palestine delegate,

Mr. George Antonius, Palestine delegate and Secretary-General, Arab Delegations,

with the following as adviser:

Sir Michael McDonnell, formerly Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Palestine.

Representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

The Right Honourable The Lord Maugham, P.C., Lord High Chancellor of England,

Sir Grattan Bushe, K.C.M.G., C.B., Legal Adviser, Colonial Office,

Mr. H. L. Baggallay, First Secretary, Foreign Office,

with the following as adviser:

Mr. J. Heyworth-Dunne, Senior Lecturer in Arabic at the School of Oriental Studies, University of London,

and as secretary:

Mr. J. R. Colville, Third Secretary, Foreign Office.

3. The committee met at the House of Lords on four occasions, on Thursday, the 23rd February, Friday, the 24th February, Tuesday, the 28th February, and Thursday, the 16th March, and considered the "McMahon-Hussein Correspondence," as well as certain subsequent events and documents which either the Arab representatives or the United Kingdom representatives thought might shed light upon the meaning and intention of the correspondence.

24.

Records of the Meetings of the "McMahon-Hussein Committee."⁽²³⁾

(a)

Record of the First Meeting held in the House of Lords at 2 P.M. on February 23.

The Lord Chancellor began by welcoming the Arab members of the committee and saying that he wished to define the object of the discussions. He did not expect that an agreement would necessarily be reached between the two points of view, but he hoped that both sides would be enabled to obtain a clearer idea of the other's case. He wished to say that he himself was not present in his capacity as a judge but as the representative on the committee of His Majesty's Government.

Mr. George Antonius said that General Nuri wished him to thank the Lord Chancellor on behalf of the delegation for being present, and for the explanation which he had given. Mr. Antonius then proceeded to read a statement giving the Arab view of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. A copy of this statement is attached.⁽²⁴⁾ When Mr. Antonius had finished, it was agreed that the errors of translation in the English text of the correspondence, which Mr. Antonius claimed to have found, should be examined by Mr. Heyworth Dunne, and that he and Mr. Antonius should subsequently meet privately to discuss the matter.

⁽²³⁾ See No. 23 for those present at the meetings.

⁽²⁴⁾ See Cmd. 5974 (No. 23).

General Nuri al-Said said that during the Arab revolt he and his fellow officers had never entertained the slightest doubt with regard to the future of Palestine. When the Balfour Declaration was announced, General Nuri and his friends had decided to withdraw from the revolt, until they heard that King Hussein had received further assurances from His Majesty's Government through Commander Hogarth as to the effect of the declaration. General Nuri described how he, in common with all the Arabs, had been suspicious of the contents of the McMahon correspondence, and how Arabs in Egypt, India, Mesopotamia, and five Arab army corps in the Turkish army, had waited to be satisfied about the contents of the correspondence before joining in the Arab revolt. He, General Nuri, had gone to Mecca on the invitation of Sherif Hussein to see the letters which the Sherif had received from Sir H. McMahon, and had arranged a code by means of which he could send a signal to the waiting Arabs, if he was satisfied with the pledges contained in the letters. When the Sherif showed him the texts Nuri felt very depressed about the reservations in respect of the Lebanon and Mesopotamia, but it never occurred to him, nor to Hussein, that there was any question of Palestine being included in the reserve area. He agreed with the Sherif that as regards these reserve areas the only thing to do was to wait until the end of the war and then discuss the matter further with Great Britain. Thereupon General Nuri sent the appropriate message in code to the Arabs of Egypt, India and Turkey, and there followed a general desertion of Arabs from the Turkish army.

The news of the Balfour Declaration came like a bombshell: the Arabs were already entertaining grave doubts about the Lebanon and Mesopotamia; the addition of Palestine to the area excluded from Arab independence made them decide to abandon the revolt. From Akaba Arab officers sent formal protests to the Sherif, and an urgent reply came to say that the Sherif had received new assurances from His Majesty's Government that Palestine should not be a national home for the Jews.

General Nuri went on to describe how at the end of the war the Arabs, knowing from the McMahon correspondence that the French claimed the Lebanon, sent a force from Damascus to occupy Beirut before the English or French could reach the city. This force only agreed to allow the French to enter at the personal request of Lord Allenby. Three days later Lord Allenby had an interview with the Amir Feisal, and told him that, as Commander-in-chief of the Allied Forces, he must organise purely temporary administrations in the occupied territory, but he agreed to do so on a basis which would in no way affect the final settlement. This declaration by Lord Allenby was confirmed by an Anglo-French declaration of the 7th November, 1918, according to which the administration of the territories concerned should be drawn up with the consent of the people. The original of the letter from Lord Allenby to the Amir Feisal, in which the former declared that the administrations he had set up were merely provisional, and declared that the future of the countries concerned should be decided according to the will of their inhabitants, was now at Bagdad; and Lord Allenby later repeated this statement before the Peace Conference.

Auni Bey said he would like to say a few words about the intentions of the Sherif Hussein. He himself had been connected with the matter in 1921, when Great Britain was negotiating a treaty with Hussein at Amman. He wished to explain that the reason why the negotiations for this treaty had failed was that the terms included a clause by which King Hussein was to recognise the special position of His Majesty's Government in Palestine. King Hussein flatly refused to consider such a proposal.

The Lord Chancellor said that there were two matters to be considered in these discussions:—

- (1) The texts of the correspondence themselves. He would be ready to go into these texts and to show that in the view of His Majesty's Government Palestine was not excluded from the area in respect of which Sir H. McMahon made a reservation to the Sherif Hussein.
- (2) The "surrounding circumstances" connected with the general political situation in 1915 and subsequently. Whatever conclusions they might reach about the text, he hoped that he would at any rate be able to prove to the satisfaction of the Arab delegates that the attitude of

His Majesty's Government had throughout been honourable and that they had never wavered in the view of the interpretation of the correspondence which they held.

Azzam Bey said that if Sir H. McMahon had wanted to make a specific mention of the Vilayet of Syria, he would have done so. He was, in fact, only referring to quite a small region around each of the four cities. West of the Vilayet of Aleppo would be the sea. Therefore Sir H. McMahon could not have meant the whole Vilayet of Aleppo. He was convinced that Sir H. McMahon had been thinking of four small districts, of which the southerly limit was Damascus. Had he wished to make reservations south of Damascus, he would have mentioned other towns or regions, similar to Homs and Hama, further south, e.g., Hauran and Maan. Moreover, the population *not purely Arab* in that part of the world was restricted to the territory due west of the line Damascus-Aleppo, and scarcely existed further south.

Musa Bey Al Alami said that much depended on the place names. Aleppo was the centre of a vilayet, which included the Sanjaks of Alexandretta and Mersina. Damascus was the capital of the Vilayet of Syria, which included the Sanjak of Hama, which, in its turn, included the region (Kaimakamlet) of Homs. It might be possible to expand the interpretation of the term "Syria," but it was impossible to give any meaning but one to "Homs" and "Hama." The mention of these two places proved that only the four towns mentioned and their surrounding districts were meant. *Musa Bey* went on to say that, in his first letter to Sir H. McMahon, *Sherif Hussein* mentioned the Mediterranean as a boundary of the area in which there was to be Arab independence. In his reply of the 24th October Sir H. McMahon made his reservation, but did not mention the Mediterranean. If he had meant that the whole length of the Mediterranean seaboard was to be included in the reserved area, he could and would have said this in so many words in his reply.

It was agreed that the next meeting should take place at 2 P.M. on Friday, the 24th February, when the Lord Chancellor would make his statement on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

(b)

Record of the Second Meeting held in the House of Lords at 2 P.M. on February 24.

The Lord Chancellor made a statement on the lines of the attached memorandum^(*) in reply to the remarks made and the memorandum handed over on behalf of the Arab representatives at the first meeting.

In the course of this statement his Lordship enlarged upon certain aspects of the case to which he attached particular importance, and most especially upon the unique importance of Palestine for the whole Christian world, which made it unthinkable that Great Britain possessed the power, or that Sir Henry McMahon should have intended, to include in the area of Arab independence a country which Great Britain had no conceivable right to dispose of by herself, even if she were to become its conqueror.

The Lord Chancellor also said that, at their first meeting, a reference had been made to a committee (mentioned in the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine) set up in 1915 to consider British interests in the Middle East. His Lordship read an extract^(**) from the report (dated the 30th June, 1915) of this committee, of which Sir Maurice de Bunsen had been the chairman. This extract was, he stated, the only part of the report directly relevant to the matter in hand. He pointed out that, on the showing of this extract, even assuming it had been true that Great Britain did not at the time of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence consider Palestine to be within the French sphere of influence, Great Britain would, even so, not have considered herself to be in a position to dispose of the sovereignty of Palestine.

(*) Annex A (for this Annex, see Cmd. 5974, No. 23).

(**) Annex B: printed as Annex J to Cmd. 5974 (see No. 23) (see also No. 15).

The Lord Chancellor also emphasised two points which he wished to make clear:—

- (1) That, from a legal point of view, it was immaterial whether or not France had been persuaded to give up her claims to Palestine subsequent to the time when the correspondence took place; but
- (2) That His Majesty's Government never did, in fact, persuade France to give up these claims. In the "Sykes-Picot" Agreement, France, Russia and Great Britain agreed that they would decide between them later what was to become of Palestine; and, as a party to the mandate, France still maintained her interest in the country.

The Lord Chancellor mentioned at one point the speech made by Viscount Grey of Fallodon in the House of Lords on the 27th March, 1923 (to which attention had been drawn in Mr. Antonius's memorandum), in which Lord Grey suggested that in the "McMahon Pledge" and in the "Balfour Declaration" His Majesty's Government had undertaken two inconsistent engagements. Lord Grey was in opposition at the time and he made this statement in the middle of a controversial debate on party lines, covering a great variety of subjects besides Palestine. But in any case, in the Lord Chancellor's view, Lord Grey's speech was based on a complete misunderstanding of the "Balfour Declaration." His Lordship did not agree at all with the view that the Balfour Declaration implied that there was to be a Zionist Government in Palestine.

The Lord Chancellor then dealt with the assurance given to King Hussein by Commander Hogarth, which had also been mentioned at the first meeting. He did not dispute that this assurance had been to the effect that Jewish settlement in Palestine should only be in accordance with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population. He admitted the force of this assurance, and said that on account of it he believed that the promise in the Balfour Declaration to respect the civil and religious rights of the Arab population in Palestine should receive a wide and liberal interpretation.

He was clear in his own mind (he was expressing his own opinion and in no way binding the Government) that, as a result of this assurance also, the Jews were not entitled to a Zionist State in Palestine.

The Lord Chancellor drew attention to the importance which should be attached to statements by Sir Henry McMahon, Sir Mark Sykes, Sir Gilbert Clayton^(*) and Colonel T. E. Lawrence, showing that, in their view, the Arabs had received full satisfaction of their claims and that Palestine was not excluded from the "reserved area" in the McMahon correspondence. He also drew attention to Lord Balfour's great reputation for honesty and stated that in drawing up the "Balfour Declaration" he was convinced that Lord Balfour did not think he was doing anything contrary to the pledges given to the Arabs, or anything that would involve a Jewish claim to an independent State in Palestine.

To sum up, the Lord Chancellor stated that, in his opinion, three things were clear:—

- (1) Whatever may have been the Arab interpretation of the McMahon correspondence, Sir H. McMahon did not *intend* Palestine to be included in the area promised to the Arabs. He agreed, however, that this was not a point of legal significance.
- (2) As a matter of strict legal interpretation, it had been established that the reservation of French interests was sufficient to exclude Palestine from the area of the pledge.
- (3) Great Britain has never regarded herself as free (whatever statements might have been made in—to his mind—unguarded moments by statesmen out of office) to act in Palestine without reference to the rights and interests of the Arabs in that land. In confirmation of this, he cited the proclamations of Lord Allenby, the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration, and finally, and perhaps most important, the message delivered to King Hussein by Commander Hogarth.

Arising out of (3), and again speaking for himself, and without binding the Government, the Lord Chancellor thought that the Arabs would be justified in

(*) Annex C (see No. 14).

urging that there was no very great difference between "civil and religious rights" in the Balfour Declaration, and "political and economic freedom" in the Hogarth message; and entitled to rely on the Hogarth message as explaining the Balfour Declaration and giving it a very wide meaning.

The Lord Chancellor ended his speech by expressing the hope that he had convinced the committee that His Majesty's Government and their predecessors were guiltless of any breach of faith, adding that he must, in any case, repudiate strongly any charge of bad faith on the part of His Majesty's Government or their predecessors; and by an appeal to the committee to remember that, whatever might have happened in the past, it was now necessary to take account of the realities of the situation.

General Nuri-al-Said, said that as he would be returning to Iraq before the next meeting of the committee, he would like forthwith to make a brief reply to what the Lord Chancellor had said.

General Nuri Pasha opened his statement by saying that when the proposal to appoint this committee had first been mooted, he had asked Mr. MacDonald whether this was intended to be an independent committee, or one representing on the British side the views of His Majesty's Government. When told that it was intended to be the latter, he had felt that it was not worth his while to accept service upon it. Later on he changed his mind, merely because he had heard that the Government representative on the committee was going to be the Lord Chancellor, and because he felt that in that choice lay a real prospect of the Arabs obtaining at least some of the justice they asked for. He was glad to see that that expectation had to a certain extent been fulfilled in the latter portions of the Lord Chancellor's statement.

General Nuri went on to say that he had prepared a brief statement, which he proceeded to read out. The statement was as follows:—

"The British Government has insisted—and I gather that your Lordship also maintains—that it was not the intention of the British Government to include Palestine in the area promised to King Hussein in the McMahon correspondence.

"I ask your Lordship to point out where that intention is to be found in the McMahon correspondence.

"Is there any trace of such an intention in the whole of the letters written under the authority of the British Government to King Hussein?

"I appeal to you as an English judge accustomed to giving decisions on the interpretation of documents.

"Would any English court hold that the British Government had made clear this intention to exclude Palestine from the area promised to the Arabs in the letters sent to King Hussein by Sir Henry McMahon?

"Thirteen hundred and sixty years ago our Prophet said that God alone could know the heart of man. A celebrated English judge, three centuries ago, said that the devil alone knew the heart of man. A man's intentions must be judged from his actions and writings. The writings of the British Government to King Hussein give no indication of this intention of the British Government to exclude Palestine from the area which she would acknowledge to be part of a future Arab State. In the case of Beirut, Bagdad and Basra, the British Government made it clear in their letters to King Hussein that Great Britain was not free to acknowledge them as part of the future Arab State. Had she intended to exclude Palestine also, why did she not make it equally clear in this correspondence?"

It was agreed that the next meeting should take place at 2 P.M. on Monday, the 27th February.^(*)

(C)

Record of the Third Meeting held in the House of Lords at 2 P.M. on February 28.

Mr. Antonius said that the Arab representatives had listened with great interest to the statement made by the Lord Chancellor at the Second Meeting on

^(*) This meeting was subsequently postponed.

the 24th February, and had subsequently read carefully the memorandum presented to them. They wished to pay a sincere tribute to the painstaking care shown in the composition of the memorandum, and also to express their gratification at finding that, whatever differences there might be regarding the legal interpretation of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, there were certain later pledges the importance of which the Lord Chancellor admitted, notably the message communicated to the Sherif of Mecca by Commander Hogarth in January 1918, and of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918. At the same time, the Arab representatives found it regrettable that the Lord Chancellor should still adhere to the view that Palestine was contained in the area excluded from Arab independence. He thought it possible that this view was based on a misapprehension as to the exact meaning of a correspondence exchanged entirely in Arabic. The Arab representatives had certain supplementary observations to make on the Lord Chancellor's statement and memorandum; Sir Michael McDonnell would deal with the actual meaning of the words used in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence; and he himself would comment later on the Lord Chancellor's remarks about the "surrounding circumstances."

Sir Michael McDonnell then read a statement, of which a copy is attached,^(*) about certain legal points arising out of the Lord Chancellor's statement and memorandum.

Mr. Antonius read a memorandum, of which a copy is also attached,^(*) regarding the "surrounding circumstances" which might have affected the meaning of the pledge given by Sir Henry McMahon, and the interpretation placed upon it by the Sherif of Mecca. In speaking of the Lord Chancellor's belief that Sir Henry McMahon could never have given the Sherif an unconditional promise that Palestine should be included in the area of Arab independence, without first obtaining a guarantee for the Holy Places and for the security of the Suez Canal, he stressed the point that the whole McMahon-Hussein correspondence was inspired by the desire of both sides that the Arabs and the British be linked closely together, not only by a political and military alliance, but also by co-operation in the administration.

Abdul-Rahman Bey Azzam said that he wished to speak of that part of the Lord Chancellor's statement which dealt with Christian interests in Palestine. The Holy Places of Palestine were as sacred to the Moslems as they were to the Christians, since the founder of Christianity was himself sacred to the Moslems. When Lord Allenby marched on Jerusalem, it was made clear to the Moslems throughout the world that the advance of the English in Palestine was not a crusade on behalf of Christianity. The Holy Places were only to be transferred from one Moslem hand to another, and a specific assurance on this point was given to the Moslems in India. Abdul-Rahman Bey Azzam had recently been told by the Bishop of Jerusalem that Lord Allenby had admitted to him that there were more Moslems in his army than Jews or Christians. It could not, therefore, be claimed that Great Britain had any sacred trust to uphold in Palestine on behalf of Christians throughout the world. It was made quite clear to the Arabs by General Allenby and others that the religious *status quo* in Palestine was to be maintained; and, in view of the fact that Christians had for centuries exploited Palestine in the name of their religion, any other statement would have alienated Moslem opinion throughout the British Empire.

In support of this thesis, Abdul-Rahman Bey Azzam quoted an official proclamation, issued by the Viceroy of India on the 2nd November, 1914, a copy of which had been supplied to him by the Indian Moslem Delegation now in London, in which the expression used to denote Mecca and Medina was "the Holy Places of Arabia." From that it was clear, he said, that the term "Holy Places" in the McMahon correspondence included not only those in Arabia, but those in Mesopotamia and Palestine as well. He also quoted a speech made by Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister in 1914, in which the latter said that nothing was further from the thoughts of His Majesty's Government than to launch a crusade against the Moslem Holy Places. Thus, when the Arabs helped Lord Allenby to take Jerusalem, they did so in the belief that they were conquering Palestine from the Turks, and no more.

^(*) Annex A: printed as Annex C to Cmd. 5974 (No. 23).

^(*) Annex B: printed as Annex D to Cmd. 5974 (No. 23).

The Lord Chancellor had said that Palestine was not inhabited by people of purely Arab stock, and that there had been for centuries a constant infiltration of foreign immigrants. It was, however, necessary to consider the people of Palestine as they were at the time of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, and not according to the racial characteristics of their remote ancestors. Palestine was inhabited by a 95 per cent. Arab population when war broke out.

Auni Bey Abdul-Hadi referred to the Lord Chancellor's remarks about the massacres of 1860 and other incidents. He objected to the prevalent European belief that the Moslems are a religiously fanatical people, and stated that students of history would find that the Moslems were tolerant, hospitable and by no means fanatical. Reputable historians had found that, in every case, the origins of the outbreak lay in some hidden foreign intrigue. In the particular case of Palestine, Christians and Jews had lived under Moslem rule without suffering any form of persecution and massacre; and this was true even in the case of the Jews during recent years. There was perhaps no country in the world where strangers and foreigners were so well received and treated as in the Arab countries. He therefore wished strongly to repudiate any allegations against the tolerance and sense of responsibility of Moslems.

The Lord Chancellor proposed that the committee should now adjourn, and said that, if His Majesty's Government considered it desirable to make a further statement in answer to the points which had been raised at this meeting, they would give full notice to the committee.

Mr. Antonius asked what arrangements were to be made for drawing the report of their conclusions, which he understood was to be presented by the committee to the conference.

The Lord Chancellor replied that, in his view, the best plan would be that, when he had had time to decide whether any further statement by His Majesty's Government was asked for, Mr. Baggallay and Mr. Antonius might meet privately and attempt to discover whether there was common ground upon which an agreed report could be drawn up.

(D)

Record of the Fourth Meeting held in the House of Lords at 2.15 P.M. on March 16.

The Lord Chancellor began by saying that he would have been content to leave matters as they stood after the third meeting of the committee, but he understood that the Arab representatives would prefer him to make a reply to some of the points raised in the statements made by Mr. Antonius and Sir M. McDonnell at that meeting.

The Lord Chancellor then read a statement, of which a copy is attached.^(*)

Having concluded his statement, the Lord Chancellor said that he only wished to add that, although it seemed that there was no prospect of agreement being reached upon an interpretation of the correspondence, he hoped he was expressing the views of the committee when he said that their discussions had been exceedingly useful in making clear the views of both sides and throwing light on many subjects which had hitherto been obscure. He would like to express his personal appreciation of the patience with which the Arab representatives had listened to his views and of the moderation and courtesy with which, as he gladly recognised now that he had heard the whole of their statements, the Arab representatives had approached even the most controversial topics. It had been a very great pleasure to him to be associated with the Arab representatives in the examination of a question which, however complicated and difficult, was nevertheless of undoubted importance, and, to a lawyer, of the highest interest.

Mr. Antonius said that he wished, on behalf of the Arab representatives, to express their appreciation of the kind remarks made by the Lord Chancellor about the attitude of the Arab representatives and the way they had presented their case. In the days which had elapsed since the last meeting of the

^(*) Printed as Annex E to Cmd. 5974 (see No. 23).

committee, the Arab representatives had had meetings with Sir Grattan Bushe and Mr. Baggallay, to discuss the drafting of a report on the work of the committee, and they wished to place on record their gratitude for the pains taken, and the open-mindedness shown, by Sir Grattan Bushe and Mr. Baggallay in discussing the amendments to the draft report suggested by the Arab representatives.

The committee then proceeded to discuss the draft report, and subject to certain alterations, particularly to paragraphs 14 (e) and 22, it was agreed that the report should be accepted and should be submitted to the conference.

The committee agreed that Mr. Antonius and Mr. Baggallay should be asked to forward the report to the secretary of the conference, and in doing so to say that so far as the committee was concerned there would be no objection to the publication of the report.

In conclusion, *Abdul Rahman Bey Azzam* expressed the thanks of himself and his colleagues to the Lord Chancellor and the other United Kingdom representatives for the patience with which they had listened to the statement of the Arab case.

[E 2230/6/31]

25.

Dr. Chaim Weizmann to The Times.

(Cutting dated March 23, 1939.)

The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence.

Sir,

The United Kingdom representatives on the committee set up to consider the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, state in the report published yesterday (Cmd. 5974), "that on a proper construction of the correspondence, Palestine was, in fact, excluded" from the scope of the McMahon pledges, though "the language in which this exclusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time." In other words, the British delegation, having given full weight to all the considerations advanced in support of the Arab case, declined to accept the construction of the McMahon undertaking so long and so assiduously contended for on the Arab side.

Certain documents other than the McMahon correspondence were considered by the committee, and certain conclusions were drawn from them closely affecting Jewish interests. None the less, the Arabs alone were heard. The Jewish delegation were not consulted, and had no opportunity of offering their comments on these documents, or of producing others, of which the existence and relevance are acknowledged in the report.

In commenting on the statements selected by them, the highly relevant fact was never mentioned or considered by the committee that no demand was made at the Peace Conference by the Arab delegation, headed by the Emir Feisal, son of King Hussein, for the fulfilment of the promise now alleged to have been contained in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence; but that, on the contrary, the Arab delegation, in their statement before the Council of Five, expressly excluded Palestine from their demand for the independence of the Arab territories. Two members of the committee, General Nuri-al-Said of Iraq and Auni Bey Abdul Hadi of Palestine were themselves members of the Arab delegation at the Peace Conference, and were present when this statement was made.

Yours, &c.

CH. WEIZMANN.

*The Jewish Agency for Palestine,
77 Great Russell Street, W.C. 1.
March 22, 1939.*

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[E 2230/6/31]

26.

Future of Palestine: Emir Feisal's Attitude before the Peace Conference.

On the 29th January, 1919, the Emir Feisal, as head of the Hejazi Delegation at Paris, addressed a memorandum to the Peace Conference regarding Arab territorial claims. This memorandum was worded as follows:—

"As representing my father, who, by request of Britain and France, led the Arab rebellion against the Turks, I have come to ask that the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia, from the line Alexandretta-Diarrbekir southward to the Indian Ocean, be recognised as independent sovereign peoples, under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The Hejaz, which is already a sovereign State, and Aden, which is a British dependency, are excluded from the Arab demand.

"The confirmation of the States already existing in the area, the adjustment of their boundaries with one another, with the Hejaz and with the British at Aden, and the formation of such new States as are required, and their boundaries, are matters for arrangement between us, after the wishes of their respective inhabitants have been ascertained.

"Detailed suggestions on these smaller points will be put forward by my Government when the time comes.

"I base my request on the principles enunciated by President Wilson (attached), and am confident that the Powers will attach more importance to the bodies and souls of the Arabic-speaking peoples than to their own material interests.—FEISAL."

Supreme
Council
I.C. 134
(General:
192).

Annex.

Second Point of President Wilson's Address at Mount Vernon of July 4, 1918.

"The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantages of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery."

2. The Hejazi Delegation, represented by the Emir Feisal, Colonel Lawrence, Rustem Haidar, Amir Abdul Hadi and Nuri Said, was received by the Supreme Council on the 6th February, 1919. At this meeting the Emir Feisal (who spoke in Arabic) referred to his memorandum of the 29th January, and proceeded to justify the claim for the independence of all the Arabic-speaking peoples south of the Alexandretta-Diarrbekir line. The "Secretary's notes" of the proceedings contain the following statement of the Emir Feisal's views on Palestine:—

"Palestine, in consequence of its universal character, he left on one side for the consideration of all parties interested. With this exception, he asked for the independence of the Arab areas enumerated in his memorandum."

It may be noted that in his address to the Supreme Council, as in his written memorandum, the Emir Feisal made no reference to the promises made to King Hussein, but based the Arab claims on Wilson principles and Allied promises at the end of the war. (It would, of course, have been bad policy on his part to have referred to secret agreements before President Wilson personally in view of the latter's publicly announced attitude in regard to such agreements.)

3. Little was said to the Emir Feisal at this meeting, apart from questions addressed to him with the object of eliciting additional information on the Arab claims, and the question was not discussed by the Supreme Council on the withdrawal of the Hejazi Delegation.

Supreme
Council,
I.C. 134
(General:
192).

4. The Emir Feisal had recognised that the Palestine question stood in a special position, and had agreed to its being shelved for the time being, but there was nevertheless a definite movement in favour of the inclusion of that country in an independent Arab State of Syria. This claim was put before the Supreme Council by the Syrian Committee, headed by Chekri Ganem, on the 13th February, 1919. The wording of that part of Chekri Ganem's statement which related to Palestine was as follows:—

Supreme
Council,
I.C. 141 (4)
(General:
192).

"Palestine is incontestably the southern portion of our country. The Zionists claim it. We have endured too many sufferings like theirs not to throw open wide to them the doors of Palestine. All those among them who are oppressed in certain retrograde countries are welcome. Let them settle in Palestine, but in an autonomous Palestine connected with Syria by the sole bond of federation. Will not a Palestine enjoying wide internal autonomy be for them a sufficient guarantee?"

"If they form the majority there, they will be the rulers. If they are in the minority, they will be represented in the Government in proportion to their numbers.

"Is it necessary, in order to establish them, to dismember Syria, to take from it its means of access and its historic safeguard against any invasion (which always took that route), and to constitute a State in the midst of a country which, for that very reason, would be hostile to them?"

"Agreements have also been mentioned which were concluded even before our deliverance, some cutting us in pieces and taking away our ports Haifa and Acre, others giving our capital to the Hejaz. Whatever we may have said, we have truly the greatest and most respectful sympathy for that new kingdom and its new King, as well as for the princes, his sons. We admire their courage, and we love them for what they have been led to do for us. But as they speak our language, they doubtless know the proverb: 'If I love thee, O my bracelet, I love my arm still more.'"

The reference to agreements concluded before the Arabs' deliverance was supplemented later by one to "the agreements of 1916, which made our hearts bleed." After the Syrian claims had been heard, the Supreme Council decided to adjourn the question to a later date.

5. No attempt is made in this memorandum to follow in detail the subsequent discussions regarding the future of Palestine. It may be recorded, however, that the movement for the inclusion of the country in Syria increased as the details of the Zionist programme became generally known. In the middle of May 1919 Colonel Cornwallis, who enjoyed to an exceptional degree the confidence of the Emir Feisal, reported that the latter was beginning to realise the difficulties which he would encounter in reconciling the Palestine Arabs and the Zionists, was "no longer treating the question as a minor one," and proposed to try to induce the Zionists to moderate their demands; late in the month the Emir Feisal, during discussion with Colonel Cornwallis and Colonel Joyce, while maintaining that he was only presenting the views of the people of the country, showed himself as very distrustful of the Zionist policy. On the 30th August, Colonel French (Acting Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force) reported that he believed the Emir Feisal to have made honest attempts to hold the balance between the moderate and extreme sections of the Arabs, and to be desirous of fulfilling his promises both to His Majesty's Government and to the Zionists.

Confidential
11562, No. 54.

Confidential
11562, No. 63.

Confidential
11562, No. 98.

6. On the 13th September, 1919, a British aide-mémoire was drawn up on the subject of the military occupation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, of which copies were communicated to M. Clemenceau, the Emir Feisal and to the United States and Italian representatives at the Peace Conference. This aide-mémoire gave notice to the French Government and to the Emir Feisal of the intention of His Majesty's Government to withdraw British troops from Syria and Cilicia, and stated that, in deciding to whom to hand over the responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area, regard would be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs; this entailed handing over to the French in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line

Confidential
11562,
No. 104.

and also in Cilicia, and to the Arabs in Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. As regards Palestine, the aide-mémoire stated:—

"The territories occupied by British troops will then be Palestine, defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba, and Mesopotamia, including Mosul, the occupation thus being in harmony with the arrangements concluded in December 1918 between M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George."

The full text of the aide-mémoire is annexed (Annex I).

7. The announcement of this decision to the Emir Feisal led to his protesting in strong terms to His Majesty's Government, and subsequently to his presenting his case to the Peace Conference. The discussions which the Emir Feisal held with His Majesty's Government in London raised the whole question of the various promises made to the Arabs, but his main preoccupation was that the future of Syria would be prejudiced by French occupations in that country. Palestine does not appear to have been mentioned in the correspondence between the Emir Feisal and Mr. Lloyd George in London or between the former and M. Clemenceau in Paris; a note by the Emir Feisal submitted by the Hejazi Delegation to the Peace Conference on the 6th November, 1919, also made no mention of the Palestine question, so it is unnecessary to enter into details of the discussions in this memorandum.

8. The development of a new stage in the question followed the announcement to the Emir Feisal at the end of April 1920 of the decisions of the Supreme Council regarding the allocation of the mandates for territories detached from Turkey. In a communication addressed to the Emir Feisal Lord Allenby announced that Syria and Mesopotamia had been recognised as independent States, the mandates being entrusted to France and Great Britain respectively, and that Great Britain had also been nominated the mandatory Power for Palestine; the communication stated, *inter alia*:—

"As regards Palestine, you have always been aware that His Majesty's Government were pledged to creating a national home for the Jews in Palestine, an intention in which administration acquiesced. His Majesty's Government will regard themselves as under an obligation which will be confirmed by terms of mandate to safeguard in fullest manner the interests of indigenous inhabitants of the country."

The text of the Emir Feisal's reply to Lord Allenby will be found in Annex II. It will be seen that he claimed that Sir H. McMahon had recognised Palestine to be within the Arab Empire, and, as regards his own acquiescence in the creation of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, maintained that all that he had admitted was that the rights of Jews should be safeguarded to the same extent as those of the indigenous Arabs. The official protest of the Hejazi delegation to the Supreme Council, dated the 30th April, 1920, against the allocation of the mandates made no reference to the McMahon promises, but stated that King Hussein, in declaring war against Turkey, and in rallying the Arabs to the cause of the Allies, aimed at nothing less than their liberation from a foreign yoke and the creation of a free and independent Government which would allow them to take their place in the concert of civilised nations. As regards Palestine in particular, the Hejazi delegation claimed that it was part of Syria and that its detachment therefrom was contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants.

9. Subsequent developments fall outside the scope of the present memorandum.

HUGH K. GREY.

Foreign Office, March 31, 1939.

Annex No. I.

1. Steps will be taken immediately to prepare for the evacuation by the British army of Syria and Cilicia, including the Taurus tunnel.

2. Notice is given, both to the French Government and to the Emir Feisal, of our intentions to commence the evacuation of Syria and Cilicia on the 1st November, 1919.

Confidential
11562,
No. 159.

Confidential
11675,
No. 229
(Enclosure 1).

Confidential
11675,
No. 229
(Enclosure 2).

Confidential
11675,
No. 219.

3. In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area, regard will be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs.

4. In pursuance of this policy, the garrison in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia will be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo will be replaced by an Arab force.

5. After the withdrawal of their forces, neither the British Government nor the British commander-in-chief shall have any responsibility within the zones from which the army has retired.

6. The territories occupied by British troops will then be Palestine, defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba, and Mesopotamia, including Mosul, the occupation thus being in harmony with the arrangements concluded in December 1918 between M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George.

7. The British Government are prepared at any time to discuss the boundaries between Palestine and Syria, and between Mesopotamia and Syria. In the event of disagreement in regard to the above boundaries, the British Government are prepared to submit the question to the arbitration of a referee appointed by President Wilson.

8. In accordance with the principles of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the French Government shall not object to the Arab State granting to the British Government the right to construct, administer and be the sole proprietor of a railway line connecting Haifa with Mesopotamia on a trace to be decided on after survey anywhere as far north as the latitude of Deir-az-Zor. The British Government shall have the right to construct oil-pipe lines as well as the railway line. The British Government shall, in addition, have a perpetual right at all times to improve the facilities of these railway and oil-pipe lines, and to transport troops along the railway, and these rights shall be exercisable even in time of war, without infringement of the neutrality of the French Government or of the Arab State. In the event of disagreement as to the trace of the railway line and oil-pipe lines, the British Government are prepared to submit this question to the arbitration of a referee appointed by President Wilson.

9. The British Government notify the French Government and the Emir Feisal of their intention immediately to carry out a survey with the object of finding, if practicable, a trace for the railway line and pipe lines entirely within the British mandate, in order to enable them to avoid the necessity of exercising the rights of construction referred to above.

10. Until the boundaries of Palestine and Mesopotamia are determined, the British commander-in-chief shall have the right to occupy outposts, in accordance with the boundary claimed by the British Government.

11. The French Government having accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate despatch of French troops via Alexandretta and Mersina for this purpose.

Paris, September 13, 1919.

Annex II.

Emir Feisal to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.

Your Lordship,

It is with great appreciation that I put on record recognition of conference at San Remo that Syria and Mesopotamia are both independent States. This decision of conference has been arrived at, as all the Arabs believe, in accord with desire of independent Syrian nation and in spirit of justice and humanity.

Also I put on record with great justness the preparedness of our great Ally, Great Britain, to recognise me as head of independent Syrian State.

As regards mandate which your Lordship has mentioned, I feel I have no right to discuss it, the people, being aware of danger which it may entail upon their future safety and independence, have bitterly protested against it and refuse to accept it.

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Yet that does not mean that we are self-contented, and are not ready to get necessary help we are in need of by making contracts with our Allies in which our national sovereignty is absolutely safeguarded. In former letters both I and my Government have stated that we do not refuse such help.

As regards question of Palestine, I have not noticed in your Lordship's letter enough clearness to suggest recognition that this country is an inseparable part of Syria, though Palestine geographically, ethnographically, traditionally, economically, and from point of view of language and national desire can in no way be separated from Syria. Moreover, there is to be found amongst correspondence between His Majesty Hussein and his Excellency Sir H. McMahon a letter in name of Great Britain, dated the 25th October, 1915, which recognised Palestine to be within Arab Empire, whose limits as therein defined are accepted by British Government.

Moreover, these letters, as notes of meeting at 10 Downing Street show, are considered to be of equal value as engagement with President of French Republic. Even Sykes-Picot Agreement, on considering question of Palestine, has clearly stated in third article that in yellow zone an international administration would be established, and form of such an administration should be decided on after an agreement of representatives of Sherif at Mecca.

There is nothing to be found in this document concerning Zionists or Jews. Being in need of calming people who are in a most agitated state of mind and spirit, I hope I can get from Great Britain some satisfactory declaration which I can also use in keeping in hearts of Arabs confidence which they have in great Ally, and to prove them that any agreement between British and Zionists is in no way to be considered of more value than agreement with King Hussein or President of French Republic.

As regards question of my acquiescence to creation of a national home for Jews in Palestine, I believe there is some misunderstanding; all that I have admitted is to safeguard rights of Jews in that country as much as rights of indigenous Arab inhabitants are safeguarded and to allow same rights and privileges.

Arabs of Palestine, both Christian and Mahomedan, have repeatedly availed themselves of every opportunity against any agreement or pledge that they would make their motherland the national home of Israelites. I am ready to come to Europe quickly to state case of my country, if only I receive a positive declaration to my agitated people stating that conference does in no way allow Palestine to be separated from Syria. By such means alone I believe we can come to a solution which would safeguard interests of all concerned. In the meantime I am urgently in need of an answer.

I again wish to assure your Lordship of my high consideration and esteem

27.

Palestine Statement of Policy (Cmd. 6019): May 1939.

In the Statement on Palestine, issued on the 9th November, 1938,^(*) His Majesty's Government announced their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain neighbouring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regarding future policy. It was their sincere hope that, as a result of full, free and frank discussion, some understanding might be reached. Conferences recently took place with Arab and Jewish delegations, lasting for a period of several weeks, and served the purpose of a complete exchange of views between British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish representatives. In the light of the discussions, as well as of the situation in Palestine and of the Reports of the Royal Commission^(*) and the Partition Commission,^(*) certain proposals were formulated by His Majesty's Government and were laid before the Arab and Jewish delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the Jewish delegations felt able to accept these proposals, and the conferences therefore did not result in an agreement. Accordingly, His Majesty's Government are free to formulate their own policy,

^(*) Cmd. 5893.

^(*) Cmd. 5479.

^(*) Cmd. 5854.

and after careful consideration they have decided to adhere generally to the proposals which were finally submitted to, and discussed with, the Arab and Jewish delegations.

7. In the recent discussions the Arab delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British Government, in October 1915, undertook to recognise and support Arab independence. The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the correspondence which passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab representatives during the recent conferences in London. Their report, which has been published,^(*) states that both the Arab and the British representatives endeavoured to understand the point of view of the other party, but that they were unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence. There is no need to summarise here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the phrases used. For their part they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their representatives in the report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.

18. In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavoured to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the mandate to both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these obligations has led to controversy and has made the task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the mandate has aroused. Their purpose is to be just as between the two peoples in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and who, since they live side by side, must learn to practise mutual tolerance, goodwill and co-operation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task of creating these relations difficult; but they are encouraged by the knowledge that at many times and in many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants have lived in friendship together. Each community has much to contribute to the welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to co-operate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.

^(*) Cmd. 5974.

Summary of References to the "McMahon-Hussein" Correspondence made during the Parliamentary Debates upon Palestine, May 22-23, 1939.

A.—House of Commons, May 22, 1939.

<i>Column.</i>	<i>Speaker.</i>	<i>Reference.</i>
1950-1952	Mr. Malcolm MacDonald	"There are some people who urge . . . something less than a national State."
1980-1982	Mr. Crossley	"My right hon. friend will not expect . . . but as an advocate of the policy of the Cabinet." ⁽⁴⁸⁾
2015-2016	Mr. Amery	"In any event that demand . . . must mark the limit of their claims."
2026-2027	Mr. MacLaren	"I will not worry the House . . . promises to the Jews by the Balfour Declaration."
2027-2028	Mr. MacLaren	"I will quote the actual words of the documents . . . the land of the Arabs under Turkish rule."
2039	Mr. Beaumont	"As regards the McMahon pledge . . . a sense of grievance over this matter."
2047-2048	Mr. Noel Baker	"I was utterly mystified by what he said . . . the Arabs are to be in the majority for ever."

B.—House of Commons, May 23, 1939.

2193	Sir Thomas Inskip and Mr. Amery	"My right hon. friend the Member for Sparkbrook . . . to spend much time on it."
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C.—House of Lords, May 23, 1939.

97-99	Lord Samuel	"The White Paper, it was true . . . in a satisfactory fashion." ⁽⁴⁹⁾
134	Lord Reading	"There is another strange tendency abroad . . . ammunition in support of it."
141-142 ...	Lord Zetland	"Before I say a word with regard . . . embraced the country of Palestine."

⁽⁴⁸⁾ This shows a misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Crossley. This came as no surprise to the Arabs, who had in fact asked that the Chancellor should say so.

⁽⁴⁹⁾ Lord Samuel states that the word of Sir Henry McMahon and Sir Gilbert Clayton that Palestine was not included in the pledges to the Arabs "and that it was so understood by the Arab leaders" was not to be doubted. But Sir Henry and his colleague never quite said that; they said they meant to exclude Palestine, and that they had never been given any cause to suspect that this exclusion was not understood by the Arab leaders.

[E 2982/177/25]

Letter from Mr. Baxter to Sir Reader Bullard discussing the Explanations given to King Hussein about the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

My dear Bullard,

Foreign Office, June 1, 1939.

I have received your letter No. 651/925/3 of the 23rd March, 1939, enclosing a copy of a letter sent to King Hussein on the 8th February, 1918, by Colonel Bassett. Your translation of the Arabic has been compared with the original message in the Foreign Office archives and is substantially the same. It is also substantially the same as the translation published by George Antonius at p. 431 of *The Arab Awakening*.

2. It is not at all clear what Sheikh Yusuf Yasin expects us to do about this message, and, if he does not raise the question again, I think it would be best to let the matter drop. There is nothing to be gained by going again into these matters of past history, especially now that the question of our war-time pledges has been discussed by the "McMahon-Hussein" Committee (see *inter alia* pp. 28, 43 and 47 of Command Paper 5974).

3. At the same time, the conduct of His Majesty's Government in keeping the text of the "Sykes-Picot Agreement" of May 1916 from King Hussein is likely, in spite of the "McMahon-Hussein" Committee, to remain a matter on which diverse opinions will inevitably be held.

4. In this connexion it is important to note that His Majesty's Government did not conceal the fact of the existence of the agreement from King Hussein, and the story of Sir Mark Sykes's visits to Jedda in May 1917 to tell him about it "in general terms" is summarised in the attached memorandum,⁽⁵⁰⁾ which was prepared while the conferences were in being. This memorandum shows, unfortunately, that, in spite of all explanations, King Hussein did not really comprehend the point in the agreement which has now become the most important (although at the time it was probably quite secondary), *i.e.*, that Palestine was to be international; on the other hand, he evidently did understand that the agreement contained an express stipulation that the "agreement of representatives of the Sherif of Mecca" was required to whatever was done in Palestine (or at least in the Brown area).

5. None of this, however, affords a really satisfactory explanation of why, after the Bolsheviks had in the autumn of 1917 published the "Sykes-Picot Agreement," and King Hussein, who had received an account of the agreement from Jemel Pasha, had asked what it all meant, His Majesty's Government should have fobbed him off in February 1918 with the message which Sheikh Yusuf Yasin has produced to you; and still less why in June 1918, when a fuller account of the "Sykes-Picot Agreement" had reached King Hussein and he had addressed further expostulations to His Majesty's Government, they should have sent him the message quoted by George Antonius (who has misunderstood the chronology of the two messages) at page 257 of his book (I enclose for comparison a copy of Sir Reginald Wingate's telegram⁽⁵¹⁾ No. 948 of the 16th June, 1918, asking for approval, which was given, of this message). One reason for the failure of His Majesty's Government to give him a full account of the agreement is that they felt they would have to have French consent, but it does not seem that any effort was made to secure that consent.

6. The best explanation of the attitude of His Majesty's Government which could at need be given is, I think, somewhat as follows:—

- (1) King Hussein had already in May 1917 been told in general terms by Sir Mark Sykes of the arrangement made by Great Britain, France and Russia about Ottoman territory.
- (2) It had been impressed upon King Hussein by Sir Mark Sykes at that time that these arrangements, in so far as they affected Palestine at least, would require his agreement.
- (3) Subsequently, the Balfour Declaration about Palestine had been issued in November 1917, and the explanations of His Majesty's Govern-

⁽⁵⁰⁾ See No. 13.

⁽⁵¹⁾ Not printed.

ment as to what the declaration meant had been conveyed to King Hussein in the Hogarth message of January 1918.

- (4) The Balfour Declaration and the Hogarth message had superseded the provisions of the "Sykes-Picot Agreement" relating to Palestine, so that when His Majesty's Government sent King Hussein their message of the 8th February, 1918, their intentions in regard to Palestine were already known to him.
- (5) In these circumstances the fact that the message of the 8th February, 1918, omitted any reference to the provisions of the "Sykes-Picot Agreement" relating to Palestine was perfectly natural and legitimate.
- (6) Similarly, the message sent in January 1918, about the "Sykes-Picot Agreement" was an accurate and adequate description of that agreement, taking into account the changes which had come over the situation since the agreement was concluded.

7. Some additional points are those contained in the attached extract from Childs's memorandum of 1930,⁽²²⁾ but although they are true as far as they go, I do not pretend that they really answer the questions posed in paragraph 4.

8. It must, furthermore, be remembered that it is possible to argue that apart from the controversial question of Palestine (and even here the view of His Majesty's Government is that there is no real ground for controversy) there was nothing in the "Sykes-Picot Agreement" inconsistent with the pledges already given by His Majesty's Government to King Hussein. Leaving aside Palestine, the agreement divided the northern Arab countries into a French and a British sphere of influence. In the British sphere, His Majesty's Government were clearly at liberty to refrain from taking full advantage of the position which the agreement allowed them if to do so would be inconsistent with undertakings which they had given to third parties. The acquiescence of His Majesty's Government to the provisions relating to the French sphere is therefore all that matters. This sphere was divided into a prospective independent Arab State, which was, however, to have French advisers, and an area in which the French Government, in agreement with the Arab State, might (but need not) set up a direct administration. The area of potential French direct administration lay along the Syrian littoral and corresponded almost exactly with the area which had in the "McMahon-Hussein correspondence" been unquestionably and undeniably—and apart from the reservation for French interests—excluded by geographical description (subject to the Sherif's right to reopen the question after the war) from the area in which His Majesty's Government were to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs. It is true that the area assigned to the "French" independent Arab State (including Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo) was not in the end formed into an independent State, but that was because of post-war developments long subsequent to the giving of our pledges to the Arabs. It is also true that there were, apart from the territorial provisions, many other provisions in the agreement, some of which entrenched considerably on the nominal independence of the "French" and "British" Arab States, but even in the "McMahon-Hussein correspondence" it had been made clear that Great Britain was to have a special position in that area in which her promises held good (*i.e.*, the area in which she was free to act without detriment to France).

9. It is therefore possible to make out a respectable case in support of the view that His Majesty's Government committed no breach of loyalty to King Hussein in withholding from him the exact terms of the "Sykes-Picot Agreement." But to anyone looking back at the question with the knowledge of to-day, it must inevitably seem a great pity that it was not communicated to King Hussein in full. If that had been done, an infinite amount of unnecessary mystery and suspicion would have been avoided.

10. Should Sheikh Yusuf Yasin return to the charge of his own accord, I suggest that you should take the line that it is useless to discuss further these questions of ancient history, and that the British pledges to the Arabs were dealt with by the McMahon-Hussein Committee once and for all. In case of need,

⁽²²⁾ Page 33, "Sir Mark Sykes . . . he deemed expedient."

however, you might make use in informal conversation of any of the points in the foregoing paragraphs which you think might make an impression on him. You should, however, put nothing in writing without further reference to the Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,
(for C. W. Baxter),
LACY BAGGALLAY.

30.

Proceedings of the Permanent Mandates Commission, June 1939.

References to the Hogarth Message, the Weizmann-Feisal Agreement, the proper interpretation of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, &c., will be found on the following pages of the Minutes of the 36th Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, at which the Palestine White Paper (Cmd. 6019: May 1939) was considered:—

97-98, 102-107, 110, 113, 114, 116-120, 173, 185, 200 and 274.

The following important references to the Hogarth Message were made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies:—

Mr. Malcolm MacDonald (June 15):—

"If the extent of the effort which the Jews would make in re-establishing a National Home was one of the main factors which would determine ultimate developments in Palestine, the attitude of the existing Arab population was the other. When the mandate was framed, there were only some 80,000 Jews settled in the country; but there were already more than 600,000 Arabs, whose forefathers had been in occupation of the land for many centuries. From the beginning, the Balfour Declaration recognised certain duties to the non-Jewish population. While promising the Jewish people a National Home, it declared that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." This principle is reflected in the operative clauses of the mandate where—for example, in Article 2—it is laid down that "the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants" are to be safeguarded, and in article 6 that "the rights and position" of the non-Jewish sections of the population are not to be prejudiced.

There has sometimes been controversy as to what these phrases were intended to mean. Some exponents have sought to minimise the significance of the words and to suggest, for instance, that "civil rights" meant little more than civic rights. That is an untenable position. The provisions in the mandate must be regarded as giving effect, not only to the Balfour Declaration, but also to the spirit of article 22 of the Covenant. The Arabs were a people whose well-being and development was to form a sacred trust of civilisation. They were a people who had been settled in a country for many centuries, but in whose land there was to be created a home for another people.

There can be no doubt that the rights of the Arabs which were to be safeguarded included all those political and social rights which a free people in such circumstances were entitled to retain. Should any doubt still remain upon the point there exists contemporary evidence contained in the message communicated to King Hussein early in 1918, which indicates authoritatively what the British Government had in mind when it spoke of protecting the civil rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. This message was delivered only a few weeks after the publication of the Balfour Declaration itself. That pronouncement, with its promise to the Jewish people, came as something of a shock to the Arab world. British advisers in the Near East were even fearful lest it should cripple the great Arab revolt itself. And so the British Government sent a representative, one Commander Hogarth, to explain to King Hussein the significance of the Balfour Declaration. It was a frank explanation. It did not seek to minimise the extent of British sympathy with Jewish aspirations in Palestine, nor Britain's

determination to do whatever she properly could to help in the achievement of those aspirations. It was an honest and balanced description of what was intended regarding both the Jews and the Arabs. Commander Hogarth stated that Jewish opinion in the world favoured a return of Jews to Palestine, that the British Government viewed with favour the realisation of this aspiration, and that the Government was determined that no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal. But he stated categorically that this was only to be done "in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political," and he added that the British Government was determined that, so far as Palestine was concerned, "no people shall be subject to another."

I would point out that it was not a new Government which gave this explanation of the Balfour Declaration. It was the same Government, with Mr. Lloyd George in 10, Downing Street, and Mr. Balfour at the Foreign Office. There can have been no misunderstanding; there can have been no confusion of thought. The Hogarth message does not add anything to the substance of the Balfour Declaration; it is an authoritative explanation of its content. It does not purport to be additional to anything which was afterwards put into the mandate. It is merely evidence that the words "civil and religious rights" and "rights and position" in the Balfour Declaration and the mandate were intended by those primarily responsible to include the normal political rights of a people.

That assurance to the Arabs must surely mean that Palestine could not one day become a Jewish State against the will of the Arabs in the country.

So if the Jews did not respond sufficiently to the opportunity afforded to them, or if the Arabs objected to their country becoming a Jewish State, the conception of a Jewish National Home in Palestine was to be interpreted as something less than a Jewish National State.

And though the Jews may be a numerical minority in Palestine, they are not an ordinary minority. They are an extraordinary minority. One of the purposes of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate was to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish community in one country in the world where it would not suffer the insecurity and disabilities of a minority. Whatever the number of its citizens, the Jewish National Home has a special status in Palestine. As long ago as January 1918, Commander Hogarth, in his message to King Hussein, delivered on behalf of the British Government, laid down the principle that "so far as Palestine is concerned . . . no people shall be subject to another." That principle seemed to be acceptable to the Arab leader then. It is a principle which must be carefully maintained in any constitutional arrangements in Palestine.

Mr. Malcolm MacDonald (June 16).

In reply to the second point raised by Mlle. Dannevig, it was true that the Hogarth message had not been published until comparatively recently. He had not claimed that the Hogarth message in any way added to or detracted from the Balfour Declaration or the terms of the mandate, both of which were published. The message was merely additional evidence of the fact that the phrases used in the declaration and in the mandate meant the rights of the Arabs in Palestine in the full political sense of the word. He thought it was because the British authors, who joined with others in framing the mandate, never questioned that the word "rights" meant political rights, that they did not produce this evidence to that effect.

The chairman asked whether the Secretary of State for the Colonies took the view that the promise made by Commander Hogarth and that enshrined in the mandate, which was an international instrument, carried equal weight.

Mr. MacDonald said he did not take that view at all. He would describe the Hogarth message as important evidence of what the British authors of the Balfour Declaration and the British Government, who had had a great share in the framing of the mandate, had had in mind when they used certain words in the declaration and in the mandate. It corroborated the case which he had made,

but he would not claim that the Hogarth message had anything like the same international status as the mandate. If any conflict arose as between the Hogarth message and the mandate, the mandate, of course, must be accorded greater importance. But his point was that there was no conflict.

The chairman asked whether the Hogarth message was prior in date to Sir Henry McMahon's letter.

Mr. MacDonald replied that the McMahon correspondence took place in 1915, the Balfour Declaration was issued in November 1917, and the Hogarth message was sent in January 1918.

[E 2166/6/31]

Appendix 1.

(Confidential.)

Copy of a Departmental Minute upon the Report of the "McMahon-Hussein" Committee (Cmd. 5974).^()*

THE origin of the committee and of the report which the committee has prepared is explained in the opening paragraph of the report itself.

2. The report in its present form is the same in all essentials as the draft which was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Palestine on the 6th March, but a number of changes of form have been necessary in order to secure its acceptance by the Arab representatives on the committee.

3. It was at one time hoped to secure the insertion of a paragraph in which the Arab representatives would say that they accepted the assurance of the British representatives that it had been the intention of His Majesty's Government and Sir Henry McMahon to exclude Palestine from the area of Arab independence, and that they thought they had done so, and in which the British representatives would say that they accepted the assurance of the Arab representatives that the Shereef of Mecca had intended to include Palestine and thought he had done so. But the Arab representatives were adamant on this point, and it was agreed that the point was not one of sufficient practical importance to break upon. Instead, the statements by Sir H. McMahon and Sir G. Clayton about the intentions behind the correspondence were put into the statement of the British case in paragraph 13.

4. Although the report does not say so in so many words, it is fairly clear to those who read between the lines that the British representatives abandoned the argument that the words "district of Damascus" mean "the administrative area known as the Vilayet of Syria," upon which His Majesty's Government relied in the white paper of 1922 and which had been the main plank of the British case until now. The Lord Chancellor has called the British case on this point "straw," and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald has called it "tricky." Both adjectives are thoroughly deserved.

5. On the other hand, mainly on the Lord Chancellor's advice, His Majesty's Government have, through their representatives, laid great stress in this report upon the "French reservation" argument.^(*) The Lord Chancellor has called this argument "cast-iron," although he has qualified this by saying that it holds good "on a strictly legal interpretation." In my own mind, I am fairly satisfied that although this may be the proper legal construction of the language used in regard to French interests (and I rather think that the Attorney-General and some others do not entirely share the Lord Chancellor's interpretation), both Sir H. McMahon and the shereef must respectively have meant and thought it meant that His Majesty's Government would carry out their promises to the Arabs in any territory in which French claims were found not to have prevailed when a final territorial settlement had been reached.

6. The report also lays stress, from the British point of view, upon the "surrounding circumstances," which is an argument introduced on the advice of the Lord Chancellor.

^(*) See No. 23.

^(**) See Nos. 4 and 6 in the present collection, and the relevant passages in the British Statement in Cmd. 5974.

7. The most important paragraph in the report is probably the last one of all, which definitely puts on the map, so to speak, the Hogarth message and various other declarations made by His Majesty's Government during the war, which had been forgotten until Mr. Antonius resurrected them in his book *The Arab Awakening*.

8. In the course of the negotiations with the Arab representatives about the draft report, the British representatives gave way to them on nearly every point of detail which they raised. The only point on which they stood adamant was that they would not go so far as the Arab representatives wished in admitting that the whole correspondence was so hopelessly confused and muddled that no one could legitimately say that Palestine was either excluded or included in the area of Arab independence as a result of it. Since, as the Lord Chancellor admitted to the Arab representatives, the onus of proving exclusion lay with His Majesty's Government, to have done this would have meant admitting that the Arab contentions were right. If nothing but my own personal feelings were concerned, I should probably be willing to go even as far as this.

9. So far as the general effect of the report is concerned, I do not think it can be summed up better than in another phrase of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's: "We have let the ball touch one stump without removing the nails."

L. BAGGALLAY.

March 18, 1939.

Appendix 2.

SINCE this collection of memoranda was printed, attention has been drawn to two sets of documents which ought to be consulted by anyone who studies this question in future. These are:—

- (a) *Documents relating to the McMahon Letters* (the Jewish Agency for Palestine, March 1939; Foreign Office Library No.).
- (b) *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-39* (the Royal Institute of International Affairs: Information Department No. 20a; Foreign Office Printed Library, No. 8vo. 12468).

The Jewish Agency documents do not add anything very new, but they include some correspondence not included in the present collection, such as the *Feisal-Frankfurter* correspondence of 1919. They also give some useful quotations from statements made at different times in the House of Commons. They also give, rather more fully than this collection, statements made later by persons concerned with the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, including a letter from Colonel C. E. Vickery to *The Times* of 21st February, 1939 (most of which is, however, beside the point).

Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-39, is an exceedingly useful compilation, giving a bird's-eye view of the Palestine story and the texts of most of the essential documents.

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office, December 31, 1939.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 6357/6/31]

No. 124.

Memorandum respecting Arab Federation.

THE independent States which are commonly called the "Arab States" are Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, the first and second of these four being allies of the United Kingdom. To these must be added Syria, the Lebanon and Transjordan, which are administered by their own Governments under the guidance of a mandatory Power (France in the first two cases and the United Kingdom in the third). Palestine, which is directly governed by a mandatory Power (the United Kingdom), the British Colony and British Protectorate of Aden, the British-protected States of Koweit, Bahrein, Qatar, Kalba and the six Trucial Sheikdoms, and Muscat, which is juridically entirely independent, but in practice subject to a considerable degree of British influence. To make the picture absolutely complete, mention must be made of the Kuria Muria Islands, which are British territory, and certain islands in the Red Sea of which the sovereignty is at present indeterminate. The inhabitants of Tripolitana, which is part of the Italian Empire, and other territories of North Africa are sometimes referred to as Arabs, but the fate of these countries lies outside the scope of the present memorandum. So does the Sudan, which is under the condominium of Great Britain and Egypt, for, although Arabic is spoken there, it cannot be called an Arab country.

2. It is doubtful whether even the most enthusiastic pan-Arabs regard the union of all the Arab countries in Asia, together with Egypt, in a single empire or federation as anything but a distant dream, although now that wireless and the motor car have solved many problems of distance and communication, and the discovery of oil has gone a long way towards solving the problem of finance, there is no intrinsic reason why the whole of the Arabian Peninsula as far north as the Anatolian and Iranian plateaux should not amalgamate into a single political unit. Egypt would always be likely to remain apart, although in the past it has on more than one occasion formed a part of great empires which embraced Syria, Mesopotamia and parts at any rate of the Arabian Peninsula.

3. Pan-Arabs usually begin with more modest schemes, and these schemes usually contemplate—

- (a) The federation of Syria and Iraq (this was the form of federation most discussed in earlier years, a common idea being that there should be a dual monarchy under the King of Iraq);
- (b) The federation of Syria (and possibly the Lebanon), Palestine and Transjordan; or
- (c) The federation of Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq (this has been advocated by General Nuri-al-Said, the present Prime Minister of Iraq).

4. The idea of closer union of one kind or another among the Arab States on the lines of one of these three schemes, or even on more ambitious lines, has at first sight much to recommend it, and must seem especially natural to those older men who remember the days when they all belonged to one country, even though that country was under alien rule. For instance, Palestine and Transjordan are geographically, economically and strategically somewhat unnatural entities, which only exist as the result of external support. The same is true of Syria and the Lebanon. The four territories are geographically a single area and some kind of union between them ought to increase the prosperity of each of the four. Some kind of union between Iraq and Syria (especially if Syria were enlarged by the addition of the Lebanon), Palestine and Transjordan would also be natural. On the other hand, any kind of union between Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine, without Syria, would not be very natural. In short, there is nothing inherently permanent about most of the present boundaries of the Arab countries. Apart from Egypt, and to a lesser extent Iraq, few of them correspond to natural geographical or economic divisions. A tendency to rearrange their political divisions and groupings in future years is only, therefore, to be expected.

5. Small States find it increasingly difficult, moreover, in the world of to-day, to maintain their independence. Directly or indirectly they must rely upon the aid and support of some more powerful neighbour. A single large State could aspire with greater prospects of success to independence in the fullest sense of the word.

6. Finally, there is throughout the Arab countries, including even Egypt, a common language (despite local forms and dialects), for the great majority, except in the Lebanon, a common religion (which upon the whole transcends sectional differences) and a common culture (all allowance made for vast differences in development, education and sophistication). It would be tempting to add that there was a common racial origin, but there is probably nothing of the kind. On the other hand, Sunni Arabs regard themselves as forming one large community, and, whether this sentiment is scientifically justifiable or not, they are in consequence the main standard-bearers of pan-Arab ideals.

7. As a result of these factors, of more extensive education and of easier communications, there is unquestionably a growing sense of solidarity among the Arab peoples. This sense of solidarity has been intensified in the case of Iraq, Syria and Palestine by the struggles of each country to gain its independence. It may also have been exploited by political leaders for reasons of their own, and it has unquestionably been stimulated enormously in all Arab countries by the troubles in Palestine. But many national movements have been similarly exploited and stimulated and are none the less real on that account. In the case of the Arabs this sense of solidarity may ultimately overcome, at any rate temporarily, the personal jealousies of their rulers and politicians, as well as narrower local patriotisms, just as German nationalism eventually led to the German Empire and the Third Reich, despite the opposition of the German princes and Austrian politicians.

8. But meanwhile all such ideas are beset by formidable obstacles, which may be classified as the divergent interests of—

- (a) The rulers of the various States,
- (b) France,
- (c) Turkey, and
- (d) Great Britain.

9. The jealousies among the rulers are intense. The strongest and most influential man among them is Ibn Saud, although his territory is one of the most backward and, until its oil and gold resources can be developed, certainly also the poorest. He is determined that, if there is to be any outstanding leader among the Arabs, it shall be himself and no one else. He is particularly jealous of the Hashimite family, which formerly ruled in the Hejaz and is now represented in Iraq and Transjordan, and the prospect of either the young King Feisal II or the Emir Abdullah extending his rule over Syria or Palestine appears to Ibn Saud as a direct threat to his interests. The Royal families in Iraq and Transjordan no doubt repay his dislike with interest. Moreover, the Emir Abdullah and his relations in Iraq are rivals in various matters, especially that of the nebulous throne of Syria. Another aspirant to leadership in the Arab and indeed the Moslem world is King Farouk of Egypt, whose ambitions in the direction of the Caliphate have already made him suspect to Ibn Saud at least. The Imam Yahya of the Yemen is an old man to whom suspicion is second nature and the mere suggestion of dependence or subordination an outrage. Even the little sheikhs of the Aden Protectorate and the Persian Gulf, although they may not like British control for its own sake, prefer it to absorption by stronger neighbours.

10. The jealousies of the Arab rulers are reflected, though less strongly, in their Governments. The Ministers and officials composing the Administration of such a country as Iraq are like Ministers and officials elsewhere, in that they try to make the best political and economic bargains they can for the community which they represent, without letting sentimental ideas about Arab brotherhood interfere over much with their aims or reflecting too closely upon the precise composition of that community. For instance, the Sunni element, to which allusion has already been made, is actually outnumbered in Iraq by the Shiah Arabs and the Kurds, although it is politically predominant. Moreover, Arab brotherhood is soon forgotten whenever the Iraqi Government, for example, employ a Syrian or a Palestinian or an Egyptian for a post which an Iraqi thinks

he himself could fill. Again, there is a genuine national sentiment at least in Egypt and, of recent years, in Iraq. In the other Arab countries national feeling in the wider sense can hardly exist. An Arab from Damascus, or the Hejaz, or the Hadramaut may and probably does have a fellow-feeling for those of the same local origin as himself, and a feeling of loyalty—if he is a tribesman—for his tribal chief. But it is unlikely that his emotions are profoundly stirred by the Republic of Syria, or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or the Sultanate of Shihr and Mukalla.

11. Finally, whatever the wishes of the Arabs may be (and notwithstanding the fact that a single large State or federation might, as already suggested, be better able to stand on its own feet than a number of small ones), the difficulties inherent in administering such a large, sparsely populated and backward country, in which Iraqis, for instance, will still look on Syrians as effete and Syrians still look on Iraqis as boors, make it most unlikely that even a single Arab State or union of Arab States could, at any rate for a long time to come, dispense with friendly help and support from outside. In fact, the best advice which sympathisers with pan-Arabism can give to its supporters is that each Arab State should first learn how to become strong and prosperous, so that it can bring strength and prosperity to the eventual federation, instead of weakness and poverty.

12. The French attitude towards Arab federation and *a fortiori* towards any closer form of union has been expressed emphatically and categorically on many occasions.⁽¹⁾ The French Government are definitely and implacably opposed to it as something which may weaken their position in Syria and even in the Lebanon. They maintain that it is in the interest of both Great Britain and France to stabilise as soon as possible the existing situation in the Arab world. Why the French Government attach so much importance to their position in the Middle East is not always easy to understand. The retention of Syria and the Lebanon under mandate cannot be of any particular advantage economically, except in so far as it provides employment for a number of French officials. Although use is often made of the argument that it is cheaper to maintain troops in the mandated territories than in France, the defence of territories so remote from other French territories must on the whole be an anxiety and a commitment rather than a source of strength. The reason is, no doubt, partly to be found in the historic cultural connexion of France with the Levant and in memories of the French rôle of protector of the Christians in the East: in fact, a matter of pride and prestige, rather than of solid benefit.

13. Jealousy of Great Britain also plays its part in deciding the French attitude. Since the area in the Middle East where British influence is predominant is much larger than the area under French control, and since, moreover, His Majesty's Government have always been regarded as more sympathetic than the French Government to Arab aspirations, it is assumed in France that French influence in a united Arab State or federation would be much less powerful than British influence. Any sympathy shown by His Majesty's Government for pan-Arab aspirations is consequently not regarded as being wholly disinterested, and, in so far as it is considered to be a subtle attempt on the part of His Majesty's Government to rob France of her share in the spoils of the last war, it causes considerable resentment.

14. In any case, the France of to-day is determined to maintain an effective hold upon Syria and the Lebanon, whatever their precise status may be, and, if there is one part of the world more than another where French Governments and officials have in the past been suspicious and resentful of British rivalry and where even to-day His Majesty's Government must pay more than ordinary regard to French susceptibilities, it is here.

15. There is not much that can be said about the position of Turkey. The Turkish Government have repeatedly declared that they harbour no territorial ambitions. But there are many people who refuse to believe this, especially since the absorption of the Hatay (the Sanjak of Alexandretta), and these people maintain that sooner or later Turkey will take steps to obtain control of Aleppo and Mosul, if not of areas further south. Although it is unlikely that Turkey will take these steps so long as her political interests tie her to Great Britain and France, the existence of latent ambitions of this kind is probable enough. If

⁽¹⁾ See annex for some examples.

these latent ambitions do exist, an Arab federation might, indeed, appear to Turkish eyes as a prospective obstacle to Turkish interests, although it would be difficult for the Turkish Government to say this openly.

16. There remains to be considered the position of Great Britain. His Majesty's Government are sometimes exhorted to have a "comprehensive policy" for the Middle East^(*) and to formulate and pursue this policy on a "long view." This is admirable advice, but of a kind which it is seldom possible to follow effectively in practice. There may be an "ideal" Middle East, a grouping of States or political systems which would suit British interests better than any other. But it would be difficult to find any two persons to agree on what form this ideal should take and even if the ideal were self-evident it would probably be most difficult, if not impossible, to bring it into being. For the purposes of day-to-day diplomacy it is necessary to be less ambitious, to take the Middle East as it is and to endeavour to adopt the existing scheme of things to the more obvious needs of British Imperial policy.

17. The fundamental British interests in the Middle East are, as it happens, well defined. They are communications and oil. Great Britain has two main lines of communication from the Mediterranean to India, Australia and the Far East. The first, which is primarily a sea route, runs through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean; the second, which is primarily an air route, runs from the Mediterranean coast, through Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, to the Persian Gulf and thence down its western shore to the Indian Ocean. The principal sources of oil are Persia (Iran) and Iraq, with Bahrein and Saudi Arabia making rapid progress. The Persian oil is shipped by way of the Persian Gulf. The Iraqi oil is shipped from Tripoli and Haifa, on the Mediterranean coast. In years to come increases in the range of aircraft, the discovery of oil in large or larger quantities in the United Kingdom or Canada or other developments may alter the strategic basis of the British Empire and make it possible for British policy to be less concerned with developments in the Middle East. But, until that day comes, Great Britain must in some form or other—not necessarily the precise form of to-day—conduct her relations with the Middle Eastern countries, through varying degrees of protection, influence, alliance and friendship, so as to ensure that her essential interests shall continue. In particular she must maintain effective control, whether direct or indirect, of certain vital points like Haifa, the Suez Canal, Aden, the Persian Gulf and the Basra-Haifa air route, and she would not care to see any European Power less friendly than France established in Syria and the Lebanon.

18. Judging their needs by this standard, His Majesty's Government do know fairly well what they want from each of the Arab countries; and, in spite of German and Italian rivalry and an unpopular policy in Palestine, they have contrived until now to maintain their position as the predominant Power in the Middle East. It is impossible in pursuing any policy, "consistent" or otherwise, to please all the Middle Eastern countries and peoples equally. When one can only be pleased at the cost of displeasing another, all that can be done is to balance the major against the minor interest.

19. How then, in the light of all this, ought His Majesty's Government to regard the question of closer Arab union?

20. It is sometimes supposed by advocates of pan-Arab ideas that Great Britain must necessarily be opposed to these ideas for much the same reasons as France opposes them, and particularly because a single State embracing all the Arab countries would not be amenable to British influence in the same way as a number of small and weaker States. The invitations extended to the Arab States to be represented at the conferences on Palestine may have shaken this belief to some extent, but there is some truth in it, and it is unlikely that His Majesty's Government would of their own accord ever wish actively to promote and encourage pan-Arab ideas, even if the attitude of the French Government left them free to do so, and even if their relations with the various Arab rulers were of such a kind that they could support a policy which seemed to favour one among them without causing offence to the others.

(*) This term is used here to cover the Arab countries mentioned in paragraph 1, with the addition of Persia (Iran). It is usually held to embrace Turkey too, but Turkey lies outside the problem here under discussion. It might also be held to include Afghanistan, whose main importance is her position as a buffer between India and the Soviet Union.

21. At the same time, as has been said in earlier paragraphs, there is nothing inherently permanent about most of the existing boundaries of the various Arab countries, while pan-Arabism is a phenomenon in the politics of the Middle East which has probably come to stay. This being so, any attempt to oppose the idea which it embodies, as opposed to any particular manifestation of that idea, or to treat it with open lack of sympathy, would be not only ineffective, but extremely unwise. His Majesty's Government have therefore taken the line, when the question has been discussed in the past, that, while they would be unwilling to take any initiative and think that this initiative should, and must, come from the Arabs themselves, they would, if the point were to arise, endeavour to avoid displaying active opposition or open lack of sympathy, and would instead endeavour to guide the movement along lines which should ensure that the ensuing federation or union was friendly to Great Britain. These views have been expressed to the French Government on more than one occasion and they probably represent the least, and also the most, that His Majesty's Government can decide or do for the moment.

22. This memorandum is not intended to be an exhaustive examination of the different forms which Arab union might take and somewhat vague terms have therefore purposely been used. But union can naturally take many forms, from alliances to complete amalgamations under a single administration. Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen are already parties to a Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, which is not, in point of fact, an alliance in the true sense of the word, but a consultation pact. So far, this treaty represents almost the only step taken by the Arabs towards the realisation of pan-Arab ideas. So far as is known, no attempt has yet been made to give effect even to the limited obligations assumed under this treaty. It is not, therefore, a very long step, but it may prove the beginning of a long march.

23. In conclusion, some reference must be made to the interest which the Zionist leaders take in the question of Arab federation. It has often been suggested to His Majesty's Government by these leaders and their sympathisers, as well as by other persons of no marked Zionist sympathies who, nevertheless, wish to find a solution of the Palestine problem, that an effort should be made to promote the union of Palestine and Transjordan with Iraq, or Syria, or both, because the Arabs of this larger State would have less objection to the immigration of Jews than the Arabs of Palestine alone; and the inducement held out to His Majesty's Government to make this effort is that they would be laying up for themselves treasure in Heaven by earning the lasting friendship and gratitude of the Arabs.

24. It is conceivable that His Majesty's Government might be able to win the friendship and gratitude of the Arabs in this way. But it is unlikely that any assistance given by His Majesty's Government and the French Government to the union of the Arab States would lead the Arabs generally to agree to any really substantial increase of Jewish immigration either into Palestine or into the Arab area as a whole.

25. It is also possible that continued German or other propaganda in favour of pan-Arabism may lead to pressure being put on His Majesty's Government to declare themselves in the same sense.

26. It is hoped, however, that enough has been said in this memorandum to show that a spontaneous attempt by His Majesty's Government to promote Arab federation, from whatever motives, would be a very risky experiment, from the point of their relations with the existing Arab countries, as well as their relations with France and possibly Turkey; and that a positive declaration on the subject should be avoided as long as possible. Changes in the Arab world are doubtless bound to come, possibly changes in the direction of closer union. The present Middle Eastern edifice is slightly ramshackle and His Majesty's Government may sooner or later have to help in repairing it. But it will be better for them to wait until the play of natural forces has shown how their assistance and support can most usefully be applied. To add to the present edifice a further storey, with nothing but theory for use as mortar, might merely bring it tumbling to the ground.

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office, September 28, 1939.

Annex.

The French Government have always been opposed to any idea of a federation of Arab States, and have on many occasions made their views known to His Majesty's Government. In a memorandum referring to the Peel Commission report of July 1937 the French Ambassador drew attention to certain points in it which seemed to indicate that federation was a possible solution. He pointed out that such suggestions tended to encourage pan-Arab aspirations and had a disturbing effect on the situation in Syria. He urged that it would be to the interest both of Great Britain and France to stabilise as soon as possible the existing situation in the Arab world. The French Government themselves were doing their best to stabilise Syria.

In October 1938, before the issue of the Woodhead report, the French Ambassador again spoke about allusions in the press to the idea that some form of Arab confederation might receive the blessing of His Majesty's Government. This had greatly disconcerted the French Government, who were always desirous of being of help to His Majesty's Government in those areas. In this instance they hoped most earnestly that nothing of this nature would materialise. Their own position *vis-à-vis* Syria was always difficult, and any idea of a confederation could not but add to their difficulties. Even were the inclusion of Syria not contemplated—and to this the French Government attached the utmost importance—nevertheless, such a confederation would act as a magnet and augment disquiet and agitation in Syria.

Officials of the Quai d'Orsay spoke in the same sense at the same time. They explained that the French Government wish Syria and the other States to remain as individual entities within their existing frontiers; they would not favour any idea of a large conglomerate Arab State under a sort of joint Franco-British mandatory régime such as had been mooted in the British press.

[E 6868/628/91]

No. 125.

Exchange of Telegrams between His Majesty The King of the Yemen and His Majesty King George VI.

(1)

Translation from Arabic of Telegram from the Imam Yahya of al-Yemen to His Majesty King George VI, Emperor of England.

IN view of the fact that I am one of the Kings and the most aged of them, and a King who represents one of the oldest ruling houses of the world and one of the Elders (sheikhs) and heads of the faiths, I hasten to put forward my exposition to you with my fullest respects, my sincerest appreciations and considerations for you.

The greatness, the civilisation and the prosperity of your kingdom, which were not achieved except after mighty efforts, great application and the overcoming of great and difficult obstacles by the forefathers of your honourable nation, and which did not achieve consolidation except upon honour and humanity, and sublime knowledge and by the sacrifice of human souls and precious possessions.

It is incumbent upon you, since you are the successors of those who built those glories, to preserve and guard that which you have received from your mighty predecessors, and to keep at a distance from everything which might cause what they have built to shake.

The assiduous application for the amelioration of your people will open up the gates of wealth and lead to the enjoyment of possessions and the expenditure thereof in public welfare and for high and noble ideals, for the improvement of the human race and its protection from the errors of speech; it will lead to true worship and to the foundation of the brotherhood of the human race between all the nations of the world, it will lead to happiness between men instead of hate and bitterness.

In this way the world will achieve the highest degree of tranquillity and well-being, and will be saved from that which has overwhelmed the human race during the present time by way of conflict and destruction, which brings sorrow and disaster, and to which there is no end and which can only mean the annihilation and destruction of mankind and their homelands. This overwhelming calamity is like unto a volcano which pours over everything, whether green or dry.

Reason and nature disapprove of all this and all those who uphold it. In view of the above, I hasten with my hopes to you from the very depths of my heart to beg of you to use your clear mind and your never failing judgment, and to look into this matter which has brought us to the fire of conflict, and it is hoped that the outcome of this will lead you to the round table of negotiations and council in order to safeguard the well-being of your kingdom and the life of your nation and also the life and happiness of the whole world and the human race, which, at present, is in the most dangerous and terrible straits.

If you will be good enough to consider my efforts in suggesting this method, it will be the only way of saving the happiness and peace of mankind for the future. If you look into this with the eye of justice, humanity and compassion, it will be seen that there is no difference between an Englishman, a German, an Italian, a Frenchman or a Russian, and all efforts made to save every soul and to avoid all danger from them and to spread happiness and high ideas among them, these efforts can be called blessed by God and are beloved by all men of the human race. There is no disgrace upon anyone who holds the key which will lock the gate of evil—on the contrary, his is the glory and praise of every tongue.

I implore the Almighty God to lead you to the road which will conduct you to the well-being of man, and may your praiseworthy efforts to keep mankind from hard and evil be successful.

I ask you to consider my plea to use your endeavours for the well-being of the world, and I assure you of my greatest respects.

(2)

Telegram (en clair) from His Majesty The King to His Majesty The King of the Yemen (Sanaa), October 30, 1939.

I wish to thank your Majesty for your telegram of the 2nd October and for the interest you have shown in the well-being of the peoples under my rule. I fully share your desire for the return of peaceful conditions in the world and for the promotion of the prosperity and happiness of all sections of the human race.

The constant preoccupation of my Government has been to maintain peace between the nations of the world on conditions of honour and mutual self-respect. Before the German invasion of Poland at the end of August, my Government did everything in their power to secure a peaceful solution of the differences between the German and Polish Governments, and I have no doubt that negotiations could have been opened if passions had not been excited and tension deliberately increased by the action of the German Government.

Not content with their own earnest endeavours to preserve peace, my Government also associated themselves with the noble efforts of the heads of friendly States and Governments, including the President of the United States of America, the King of the Belgians, the Queen of the Netherlands, and the head of the Italian Government, as well as those of the Pope, to persuade the German Government to settle their differences with Poland by pacific means. Unfortunately, all these efforts were in vain owing to the determination of the German Government to take away by force the independence of Poland. German policy was carried out through the wholesale destruction of Polish towns and villages, often far removed from the scene of hostilities, and through the ruthless slaughter of civilians, including women and children.

In such circumstances my peoples were compelled to take up arms in support of their plighted word to the Polish Government, and in defence of the principle of liberty, not only for Poland, but for all independent nations, which might, in

their turn, become the victims of aggression and naked force. The freedom of all nations, both great and small, is at stake, and our purpose in thus taking up arms has been to redeem the world from the perpetually recurring fear of aggression, and to enable the peoples of the world to preserve their independence and their liberties. I could wish that it were possible to achieve this object without any further bloodshed, but the only conditions for peace which have yet been suggested by the German Government fail to offer any reparation for the wrongs inflicted upon the Polish and other peoples, who have been deprived of liberty, or to give any guarantee that further acts of German aggression will not be committed, as soon as a favourable opportunity presents itself.

The peoples of my Empire can, therefore, only continue the struggle until victory enables them to redeem their pledges and to conclude an honourable peace. I desire no material advantages for myself or for my peoples, and nothing from the German people which need offend their self-respect. It is our hope and our intention to create an international system in which peace will be possible for all nations, and in which all the peoples of the world can devote themselves to the development of their culture, the pursuit of their ideals and the improvement of their material prosperity. Such a settlement cannot be ensured by an uneasy and temporary truce. It can only be based on the conviction that aggression will cease and that pledges will be kept. The confidence of the world must be restored before solutions can be found to all the problems which confront us and which prevent an improvement in the well-being of the peoples. If the German Government can give convincing proof of the sincerity of their desire for peace by definite acts and by the provision of effective guarantees of their intention to fulfil their undertakings, my peoples will then be ready to devote themselves, in close collaboration with all other peace-loving nations, to the pursuit of the ideals so eloquently described in your Majesty's telegram. Meanwhile, I trust that the present war in Europe will not affect the prosperity of your Majesty's kingdom or disturb the well-being of your subjects.

I take this opportunity of renewing to your Majesty the expression of my esteem, together with my best wishes for your Majesty's long life and prosperity.—GEORGE R.I.

[E 7267/2768/65]

No. 126.

Sir H. Seymour to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 168.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 31, 1939.

IT is announced here that meeting of Saadabad Powers will not be held.

I understand from the Turkish Ambassador that the Iranian Government do not desire a meeting, and that there is no question at present which cannot be dealt with through diplomatic channels.

(Repeated to New Delhi, No. 68; Angora, No. 12; and His Majesty's Representative, Kabul, No. 12. Copy by bag to Bagdad, No. 2, Saving; and His Majesty's Representative, Angora, No. 650.)

[E 7313/2768/65]

No. 127.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 411.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, November 1, 1939.

THE Prime Minister fears that at forthcoming meeting of Saadabad Powers proposal may be made to convert existing pact into one of mutual assistance. From remarks made to him by M. Aras in 1935, he has the impression that there already exists a secret agreement between Turkey and Iran for mutual diplomatic if not military support.

I suggested that it was very unlikely that any of the Saadabad Powers would care to take any avoidable step which might antagonise Russia, but the Prime Minister would, nevertheless, be glad to know the views of His Majesty's Government in case the above proposal should be made.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 8; Kabul, unnumbered; Tehran, No. 17, Saving; Cairo, No. 31, Saving (pass to M.E.I.C.))

[E 7313/2768/65]

No. 128.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 443.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 11, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 411 [of 1st November: Strengthening of Saadabad Pact].

You should inform Prime Minister that I understand that the Persian Government do not desire a special meeting of Saadabad Powers, and are most unlikely to agree to strengthening of existing pact on lines he indicates.

2. You may add that, while I myself view with sympathy any efforts on the part of countries concerned to pursue a policy of co-operation, I consider that, if any suggestion for strengthening pact were made, it would be essential for all concerned to consider most carefully what reactions it might cause elsewhere, what liabilities they would each assume, and what assistance they could hope to receive. Since His Majesty's Government are bound to come to the assistance of Iraq in the event of the latter becoming engaged in war, they would obviously be closely concerned, but I find it difficult to give in advance any indication of what their attitude might be. So much would depend on details of suggestion and on world conditions.

3. You may also add at your discretion, as a general reflection, that, if trouble were to come, in whatever form, each of the Saadabad Powers might have to act quickly and decisively according to its own interests; that if their respective interests proved to follow the same path, these Powers would be likely to find that the existing pact already afforded an adequate basis of co-operation; that if, on the contrary, their interests proved divergent, no more paper strengthening of the pact would be likely to be found sufficient to overcome the divergence; that it is, as a rule, only a source of future difficulty to undertake obligations which one is not quite sure of being both willing and able to carry out when the time comes; and that, all in all, the disadvantages of provoking speculation and disquiet by any alteration in the pact would probably outweigh the somewhat nominal advantages of closer obligatory co-operation.

4. The following are to be regarded as my own preliminary observations only, and not in any way as considered views of His Majesty's Government.

5. In view of the alliance, Iraq probably stands to gain little by a conversion of Saadabad Pact into one of mutual assistance. She might merely undertake thereby commitments to fight outside her own territory, which are not imposed upon her by alliance, and which she is known to dread. It is, however, conceivable that in event of a forward policy by Soviet Union in Persia during the continuance of the present war, His Majesty's Government might find it essential, somehow or other, to make available sufficient forces to defend the roads from the Iranian plateau into Iraq and Khuzistan, either with or without the approval of the Persian Government, according to the complexion and attitude of that Government at the time. In that event, British forces would have in part at least to act through and from Iraq, and if His Majesty's Government and Soviet Government were to become involved in hostilities against each other (which would not, however, inevitably be the case), Iraq would be exposed to Soviet resentment (even though, the alliance being already in operation as the result of this country being engaged in war with Germany, the addition of a second enemy could not bring it further into operation). His Majesty's Government would, in any case, have to try to convince the Iraqi Government that acquiescence in such action on their part was action in the interest of Iraq in the sense of paragraph 3 above.

6. These possibilities should be borne in mind if any question of co-operation between the Saadabad Powers is discussed with Iraqi Government. His

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Majesty's Government have nothing to lose, especially in view of their commitments to Turkey, from a predisposition on the part of Iraqi Government to assist other Saadabad Powers. But it is more than doubtful whether desirable object of co-operation between these Powers would be brought nearer by any show of enthusiasm on the part of His Majesty's Government, who, in any case, need to keep their hands as free as possible; or by too much insistence by these Powers themselves, at any rate in public, on the existence of common interests.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 443. Repeated to Angora, No. 612; Tehran, No. 126; Kabul, No. 158; Government of India, No. 2858; and Cairo, No. 91, Saving.)

[E 7583/2768/65]

No. 129.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 20.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 134. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Bagdad, November 11, 1939.

TEHRAN telegram No. 168 to Foreign Office.

Prime Minister has informed me that, in response to request from Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs has approached Iranian Government, through their legation here, with a view to persuading them to agree to meeting of Saadabad Powers. Minister for Foreign Affairs had stressed point that pact was entirely pacific and not directed against any other State. He had added that, if Iranian Government felt that the present was unsuitable time to hold meeting, it was desirable that they should indicate date which in their view would be more opportune.

2. Prime Minister said that he had no idea why Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had asked Iraqi Government to take this step, but as he and his colleagues desired early meeting, they had accepted his request.

3. Prime Minister added that, if the Iranian Government remained obstinate, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan might hold meeting without them. He explained that on reflection he has decided that Iraq should favour mutual assistance pact between Saadabad Powers if it were proposed by Turkey and kept within framework of Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 7; Tehran, No. 36; and Kabul.)

[E 7583/2768/65]

No. 130.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 461.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 134, Saving, [of 11th November: Saadabad Pact].

Having asked for my views, General Nuri might have waited to receive them before approaching Persian Government.

2. I trust that if the Persian reply is negative, he will not press his idea of a meeting with the Turkish and Afghan Governments alone. The idea of any arrangement for active mutual support between Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan, without the participation of Persia, would seem hardly practicable, and, if General Nuri puts forward anything of the kind, he may only succeed in smashing Saadabad Pact altogether.

3. As you will have seen from my telegram No. 443 [of 11th November], the mutual obligations, even in their present restricted form, assumed by parties to this pact provide, in my opinion, a useful basis upon which it might, in certain circumstances, be possible to build a structure of some value. I very much hope, therefore, that General Nuri will, when he has had time to consider the matter more fully, agree that there is nothing to be gained by showing impatience.

4. For your own information, His Majesty's Government attach importance to strengthening morale of Afghan and Persian Governments in their resistance to threat of Soviet penetration, and would therefore welcome any practicable proposals for increased co-operation between Saadabad Powers as a whole, especially where initiative came from Turkey. For reasons given in paragraphs 2 and 3, however, any attempt to force the pace, despite Iranian objections, would not seem likely to achieve object which we have in view. Moreover, it might be exceedingly difficult to fit a fortified Saadabad Pact into framework of Anglo-Iraqi Alliance without involving His Majesty's Government indirectly in obligations to assist Persia in circumstances over which they might have no control.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 461. Repeated to Angora, No. 647; Tehran, No. 139; Kabul, No. 169; and Government of India, No. 3140.)

[E 7813/7697/65]

No. 131.

Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 160. Secret.)

Jedda, November 13, 1939.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit a translation of a statement about Russia and the Arab world which Ibn Saud has sent to me through Mr. Wall, who is still at Riyadh. Copies of Mr. Wall's letter and memorandum on this subject were sent to Mr. Baggallay on the 3rd November.⁽¹⁾

2. It is a little difficult to see exactly what Ibn Saud is driving at. Is he asking for arms or hoping for a subsidy? Or has he really been driven by what he thinks to be the Russian menace to contemplate an Arab union which he has hitherto regarded as chimerical owing to the different aims of the various parts? He expressly asks His Majesty's Government to believe that he is not grinding his own axe, but against this there is the exclamation by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, quoted by Mr. Wall: "His Majesty's Government grant Turkey a loan of £60 million, but do not give the Arabs 60 piastres." This recalls a remark that Ibn Saud made when he first read the scheme for the partition of Palestine, which provided for the payment of a large lump sum in order to put Transjordan on its feet. "By all means give Abdullah 2 million," said the King, "but don't let me go bankrupt." It may, however, be envy rather than a real need that makes the King compare the situation of Turkey with his own or with that of the Arabs in general. Captain de Gaury, who leaves for Riyadh in a few days, may be able to form a more precise notion of the King's views.

3. Ibn Saud's scheme for an Arab union fostered and subsidised by His Majesty's Government does not sound a very practical policy for war time, but on that His Majesty's Government will give their reply in due course. Meanwhile, Captain de Gaury, to whom I am giving a copy of this despatch, is being instructed to put the following considerations before Ibn Saud as from me and not as representing the views of His Majesty's Government in so important a matter:—

- (a) While we cannot exclude the possibility that Soviet Russia may profit by the preoccupations of the other Powers to expand southwards, it seems improbable that she will do so, for she cannot be certain of the friendship either of Germany or of Japan, and may therefore be chary of making two fresh enemies on the south—Turkey and Persia.
- (b) The attitude of His Majesty towards Turkey is understandable, but His Majesty's Government have better hopes on that point. It seems certain that Turkey would be resolutely opposed to the advance of Russia southwards either through Turkey or through Iran.
- (c) The Iranian Government have always striven to avoid being brought under even the economic domination of Russia, and they would certainly resist any attempt by Russia to invade their country.

⁽¹⁾ Printed as Enclosures 2 and 3 to this despatch.

- (d) His Majesty's Government are prepared to believe that the tendency will be for the Arab countries, under the influence of a common language and a common religion, to draw closer together as time goes on. At the same time they have never considered that it would be wise for them to try to promote this aim, on which the Arabs themselves are by no means united at present and the French may have views of their own; and to embark upon so difficult a task when engaged in a major war would be extremely difficult.
- (e) His Majesty has already been doing his best, as His Majesty's Government gratefully acknowledge, to remove the one grievance (the Palestine question) which prevents the Arabs from co-operating whole-heartedly with the Allies.
- (f) While subsidiary lines of defence are necessary, His Majesty's Government are devoting their main energies to the principal task of defeating Germany. To this end they are concentrating on the war in the west, at sea, on the air and on land, and on strengthening Turkey and taking other measures in order to preserve peace in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. At the same time, however, they are doing all they can, in accordance with their obligations, to see that Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt are in a proper state of defence against any possible enemy. France, too, is taking every precaution in Syria.
- (g) Sir R. Bullard is very glad that the King's statement was received before his departure for Tehran. After so many years' service in Arab countries he would naturally give full weight to the point of view of the Arab world in any matter affecting the Near and Middle East, but, after reading His Majesty's statement, he will have it in mind when he reaches Tehran and is examining the problems raised by the war from a fresh standpoint.

4. This despatch had just been drafted when the Foreign Office memorandum respecting Arab federation, dated the 28th September, was received. I trust that I am right in thinking that my remarks do not go beyond the terms of that memorandum.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 131.

Translation of an undated Document.

(In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate!)

DECLARATION.

(Secret.)

IT has been our custom to forward to the British Government some of our views, which we think it is worth while to communicate for the information of that Government, in any circumstances which we consider important; and although there may be no practical utility in all these declarations, yet the only reason we have for forwarding them is because we know that the British Government possesses, in the matters which we are discussing, information more complete than the information which we possess; and it is careful to observe its own interests as far as possible; so on that basis we now set forth that which we know in the present state of affairs.

Now we hear from broadcasts, from the mouths of most of the Arabs, and from correspondence which certain advisers send to us, that everyone thinks that we should refer to the British Government that which we know, in order to ask its opinion in the light of the general interest; and if it considers our declarations to be apposite, then we are ready to assist it in any way we can; but if it considers that the general interest is to the contrary of that, then, of course, the general interest transcends everything else.

There are no terrors for the British Government in the developments of the past few days, which have been full of change: the greatest and most vital of those developments have been two things: (1) The desertion of Berlin by Rome; and (2) the entry of Russia with Germany. As for the first, we had expected it, because we were of the opinion that Italy would not enter in a war in which she stood to gain nothing; but as for the second, that was strange and we had not expected it, nor had anyone else. So we see that things are rapidly changing day by day, and that our own interests prompt us to consult with the British Government on three matters. The first is its connexion with our interests. The second is its connexion with the interests of the Arabs. And the third, and the most important, is its connexion with British interests in Arab countries and the combination of the Arabs with it, on account of their traditional friendship, derived from the past and the present, and on account of the connecting links which are necessary for Britain and the advantage to be gained from that. And in addition to that the good name which may result from that is the best effect on that interest, and will be a blow for the enemy. For all these reasons we set forth our views as follows:—

First: We do not doubt that the British Government is fully convinced that all the Arabs do not consider that the German or the Soviet Governments have any intention to make war on the Arabs; there would be no interest for them in that.

Second: The whole of the Arabs, whether those who agree with the British Government or those Muslims who are estranged from it, including those whose views are contrary to those of the British Government, in fact we believe every one of them, would be very sorry to see any enemy defeat the British Government, because they are convinced that their interests impel them and oblige them to combine with them and to have friendship for them; and that should any enemy prevail over the British they would suffer as much as Britain. Now if this is plain to the British Government, then in our view the Arabs, who are in great numbers, do not possess at the present moment sufficient strength to enable them to oppose any disasters, if any sudden change in the present state of affairs should take place which might threaten the Arab world with danger. They do not possess sufficient force to combat such events, in the first place because the equipment which would enable them to do their duty is small, and, in the second place, because of the want of union among them, whether between Governments or between races; and in the third place there exists no famous man who could do what was necessary when the time came, and make the Arabs combine; for the present time is not such as would call forth a common programme and a united policy. Fourthly, we see that danger threatens the Arabs and their friends. And treaties of alliance, made without a binding link between persons who will do what is their duty and will oblige the people to strengthen those treaties—without that such treaties are worth little. For instance, the Treaty of Sa'dabad—when the time came all of them followed their own interests and abandoned the principle. In view of all this, if the British Government attaches great importance to the Arab lands, and if it considers that a common voice and united strength for the Arabs would be to the advantage of the British, from the point of view of defence, and, on the other hand, would be threatening and injurious to the enemy, then our opinion is, that if it (the British Government) agrees, then to prolong the present state of affairs will be of no use after the entry of the Russians and the Germans, and the developments of the war; and we fear that the Russians might make a sudden move in order to damage Britain and to strengthen Germany, and confuse the Allies and the colonies of Britain. And we fear that it (Russia) might therefore adopt a policy towards the Arab countries, on one of two sides: either on the side of the Turks, or of the Iranians; and that would either be in enmity with the Turks and the Iranians, or by agreement with them; and if they do that, their fundamental object will be to damage Britain and her Allies. If the British Government shares our view, but if the matter is out of the question, then the present state of affairs cannot go on as it is; and if it considers that this critical situation overshadows the Arabs and their friendship, then we think that the British Government should act as in the Arabic proverb: "Resolution is the father of need, the father of success: while inaction is the father of regret, the father of sorrow." The essential thing is that the British Government should examine this matter and should seek the views of its friends, and should, indeed, act with resolution and vigour, and should prepare

the assistance which is necessary for the events which may happen to the Arabs; and if a calamity should befall as mentioned above, then Britain and her friends would be prepared. And there is no might and no power, save in God! He it is who humbles the enemy, and we look to Him to prevent the occurrence of that which we fear; and verily a man sorrows not for his efforts to prepare to withstand events, when God frees him from danger. In this matter there is great benefit: a check to the enemy and an assurance to the friend. If the British Government agrees with that view, then let it consult its friends and ascertain their views in the matter and do what is necessary; but if this is a matter which the British Government considers to be impossible, then no impossible thing has been created in this way. And we hope that God will make it an impossible thing, and will be a sufficient guard against the wickedness of our enemies; and that He will make victory our ally and the ally of our friends.

Enclosure 2 in No. 131.

Copy of Letter addressed to Sir R. Bullard by Mr. J. W. Wall.

Dear Sir Reader,

Riyadh, November 3, 1939.

IBN SAUD talked a good deal about Russia during your visit, and in general, I think, gave the impression that he considered Russia a false friend to Germany and no danger, directly, to the Allies. This view was also expressed, as far as I can remember, in the Ministry of Information's telegram sent to us shortly after the Russians entered Poland. Ibn Saud has now changed his mind and has decided that the Russians are a menace to the Arab world. As far as I can gather, this change of mind is due to Russia's determined and rapid advances in the Baltic area and to Turkey's apparent failure (in Ibn Saud's view) to declare herself prepared to stand in the way of any Russian aggression.

2. In any case, after some days of brooding, he has hatched the enclosed statement, containing views which he considers of great importance and which he wishes me to transmit to you for consideration by His Majesty's Government as quickly as possible. As he offered to send my letter by special car, and as the labour of cyphering and decyphering so long a statement might well make the communication of it by telegraph less speedy than by car, I have sent the statement in original, together with my memorandum of his conversation—which, I hope, amplifies and explains certain points of the statement.

3. I have made no comment on the matter, confining myself, in a later discussion with Yusuf Yasin alone, to clearing up some of the Arabic expressions used and making sure I had got the King's meaning. Ibn Saud wishes me to say that he is prepared to give all explanations and amplifications that His Majesty's Government may ask for. He hopes, too, as Yusuf Yasin repeated to me, that His Majesty's Government will not think he is grinding his own axe and discount his estimate of the seriousness of the danger he apprehends on that account.

4. My personal impression is that he really believes in the danger he describes. He is quite sincere; the force and clarity of his expressions left me in no doubt about that. He toned down his badawy accent and took pains to make me understand every sentence. He used strong language about the Russians ("dogs," "accursed ones," "this vile Government").

5. Though my memorandum does not lay much stress on the "material assistance" which Ibn Saud would like His Majesty's Government to give the Arabs, this is undoubtedly of great importance to their minds. Yusuf Yasin said to me last night: "You grant Turkey a loan of £60 million (or whatever it is) in return for fair words, while we, the Arabs, who could and would do far more for you than Turkey promises, you don't give us 60 gurush!"

Enclosure 3 in No. 131.

Memorandum by Mr. J. W. Wall.

1. In a private interview at 9 A.M. on the 3rd November (His Majesty, Yusuf Yasin and J. W. Wall only present) the King developed a point of view he had outlined to me in the public interview the day before, and handed me a statement^(*) which he had dictated the night before.

2. As general preface, he said that his opinions were naturally based on the information available to him. His Majesty's Government had, of course, wider sources of information, and they would judge his opinions by the light of what they knew about the present situation and its probable developments.

3. The Arabs' concern with European affairs arises from the fact that the necessities of modern mechanical civilisation have made the Arabs dependent on European skill and resources.

4. Of the three European Powers with interests in the Arab world Britain is recognised by all the Arabs as being the most important. French influence is geographically more restricted and is confined to the region where France actually exercises political power; France is not thought by the Arabs to wish to extend her influence in the Near East. Moreover, French interests correspond pretty well with those of Britain. Italy—whatever Ahmed Bin Yehia's^(*) flirtations with her may amount to—has no foothold in the Near Eastern Arab countries; she is heartily hated by the vast majority of the Arabs, including Yehia, and would be even if nothing stood against her other than her action in Libya. But the destinies of the Arab world are inevitably linked with Britain's, and all the Arabs prefer to be associated with Britain rather than with any other European Power.

5. This being so, the Arabs could not, at the beginning of the war, regard Britain's situation with indifference. But the situation is no longer what it was on the 3rd September. Then the struggle appeared to be a straight fight between the Allies and Germany: the latter having no interests in the Arab world, and the former being, in the King's view, assured of ultimate victory, the war was not immediately alarming to the Arab countries. The only Near Eastern State likely to take material part—however slight—in the war was Turkey, whom the Arabs thought to be on the point of concluding an alliance with the Allies. Now, however, two things have happened that change the situation and create a potential danger to the Arab countries:

6. Russia has taken a hand in the war, showing herself to be, if not an entirely docile tool of the Nazi's, then, at least, no friend of the Allies; and Turkey has taken up an attitude that amounts to neutrality, and has especially insisted that she will take no action directed against Russia.

7. The danger to the Arabs from this new situation lies in this: Germany will seek to damage British interests wherever she can; that she is already seeking to attack Britain in the Arab world is shown by her broadcasts to the Arabs (the King mentioned particularly that German radio had issued invitations to Arabs to go to Germany, and had recommended various "safe" routes through neutral countries). But the Arabs are a sceptical folk, and the Germans must be aware on what stony ground their gospel falls. Hence it follows they will attempt a more direct, material attack on Britain's position in the Near East. Their only route to the Arab countries is through Russia.

8. At first sight Russia's contact with the Arabs seems far from direct. But in reality only two States separate them: Turkey and Iran. The Arabs have no faith either in the strength of these two "barriers" or in their abiding friendship for the Arabs. Where is the Pact of Saadabad? Turkey has already declared that she will not fight Russia. It is not impossible that differences between Iraq and Iran may occur.

9. The present war situation thus involves a threat to the security of the Arab States themselves as well as a threat to British interests in them. In defending themselves against this threat the Arabs would be defending British interests. (Here the King asked Sheikh Yusuf to read the "statement" to me.)

10. But, as shown in the "statement," the Arab line of defence is at present weak for three reasons: (1) The natural poverty of the Arab countries and their lack of military equipment; (2) the internal weakness of the régimes:

^(*) Enclosure 1.

^(*) The King of the Yemen.

Egypt and Iraq, the two strongest Arab States, were to some extent disabled by party strife—especially Iraq, where the Shi'a sect is an important cause of instability; (3) the lack of union between the various States.

11. If, then, the King argued, the danger he apprehends does not seem entirely imaginary to His Majesty's Government, it is clearly in their interests to strengthen the Arab States as much as they can. This can be done in two ways: (1) By giving material assistance; (2) by helping the various Arab States to compose their differences and thus promoting the unity of the Arab world.

12. The King laid great emphasis on the important part His Majesty's Government could play in bringing about Arab unity. He appeared to conceive of Great Britain as the mediator and adviser of a federation of Arab States. There is no one man or one State in the Arab world strong enough and disinterested enough to command the respect of all the rest. But Great Britain has the respect of all the Arabs. True she is not, strictly speaking, "disinterested," but her interests are not those of dynastic and family prestige and fortune, but economic and strategic interests, the service of which need not clash with the furtherance of purely Arab interests—indeed, the service of Britain's interests is likely to lead to an increase in the material welfare of the Arabs. He believed that, having such a position, Britain would be able to bring about a large measure of unity among the Arabs by "guaranteeing the protection of the interests of each State in relation to the others." (When, discussing this later with Yusuf Yasin, I said I couldn't see the precise, practical application of the phrase, Yusuf Yasin said that the King was indicating a general principle and it was premature to try and discuss what practical forms a policy based on such a principle would take.)

13. The King was confident that the Arabs would gladly concede the rôle of "referee" to Britain, and, if Britain would accept it, he for his part would endeavour his utmost to carry out the principle and induce the other Arabs to carry it out, because he was convinced, and believed that the majority of the Arabs were convinced, that only through Britain's aid could be achieved those ambitions which are shared by all the Arabs: Unity, security and independence.

14. In conclusion, the King repeated his conviction of the community of British and Arab interests in the Near East. He had put forward these views because he was convinced that to follow them was the best way of attaining ends which could neither be viewed nor pursued in isolation. He wished it to be understood that, in expressing the views contained in his statement, he was following his custom of using complete frankness of expression to the British Government; his language concealed no personal ambition. He said plainly: "Consult your friends," meaning not only the other Arabs, but the French.

[E 7952/554/93]

No. 132.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax:—(Received December 12.)

(No. 449. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, December 12, 1939.

FROM information given to me by my Turkish colleague, it looks as though Nuri Pasha is fishing for an invitation to Angora.

According to the same source, real initiative for a special meeting of Saadabad Powers came from Iraqi Government, but Nuri Pasha threw out suggestion that, in addition to that pact, a separate military alliance or other very close agreement might be concluded between Turkey and Iraq, such as he understood was already in existence between Turkey and Iran (compare my telegram No. 411).

After obtaining confirmation from his Government, Turkish Minister has informed Nuri Pasha that no such Turco-Iranian agreement exists. Turkish Government see no need for a separate agreement of such a nature with Iraq in view of excellent relations between their two countries, of Turkish alliance with Great Britain, and of British alliance with Iraq.

In these circumstances, if Nuri Pasha does go to Angora, I should not be surprised if he reverts to the idea of an alliance between Turkey, Egypt and Iraq (Cairo telegram No. 743 and your telegram No. 846 to Cairo), partly for reasons of vanity, but partly as a means of meeting Russian menace and danger that Iran may yield to Russian pressure.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 9; Cairo, No. 69; and Tehran, No. 22, Saving.)

[E 7989/2768/65]

No. 133.

Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax:—(Received December 18.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 143. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Bagdad, December 7, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 461.

In fairness to Prime Minister, I should explain that he asked for your views on possible proposal to convert existing Saadabad Pact into one of mutual assistance (my telegram No. 411), and, so far as I know, he has made no communication to Iranian Government on that subject. In absence of Prime Minister with Regent in Basra, I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs observations contained in first three paragraphs of your telegram No. 443, and I have since repeated them to Prime Minister. Both agree, generally, with your views, and no further action concerning this proposal seems to be contemplated.

Idea of Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs has from the beginning been that meeting of Saadabad Powers, as a sequel to conclusion of British-French-Turkish Pact, would have been a gesture of solidarity with the Allies. Suggestion of meeting being held by Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan if Iran declined to attend was, I suspect, merely one of Nuri's bright ideas. I have explained to him advice given in paragraphs 2 and 3 of your telegram No. 461, force of which he admitted.

He appreciates that nothing should be done to jeopardise Saadabad Pact or give unnecessary provocation to Russia. He fears that ultimately it may prove impossible for His Majesty's Government to avoid conflict with Russia.

(Repeated, recypher (figures by post), to Angora, No. 6, Saving; Tehran, No. 21, Saving; Kabul, unnumbered, Saving; and Government of India, No. 9, Saving.)

[E 7952/554/93]

No. 134.

Viscount Halifax to Sir B. Newton (Bagdad).

(No. 477. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 19, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 449 [of 12th December: Turco-Iraqi relations].

Reply of Turkish Government to General Nuri seems very sensible.

2. I share Iraqi Prime Minister's anxiety regarding Soviet policy, but his various suggestions (strengthening of Saadabad Pact and alliance between Turkey and Iraq or Turkey, Iraq and Egypt) all suffer from the same faults:—

- (a) Over-estimate of Iraqi strength.
- (b) Reluctance to recognise that resistance to any Soviet expansion in the Middle East must be based on His Majesty's Government and the French Government.
- (c) Lack of appreciation of the terribly difficult position in which Persia finds herself.

3. Only way in which Persia could hope ultimately to secure her position against Soviet Union would be by an alliance with Great Britain and France, such as Iraq and Turkey already have, and Afghanistan knows she could have without

difficulty, even though she may not think it expedient to accept it for the moment. But any suggestion for such an alliance, even if the Shah's pride and prudence allowed him to make or accept it, would be most embarrassing to His Majesty's Government and probably to French Government, seeing that they would have great difficulty in making available the forces which would have to be held ready to proceed to Persia, if negotiations for an alliance were to be successfully concluded and alliance itself implemented at need.

4. Yet such an alliance, rather than the various suggestions hitherto made by General Nuri, is logical solution of difficulties for which General Nuri quite legitimately wishes to make provision; and if he pursues his schemes long enough, this elemental fact will sooner or later force itself upon his or some other Government's notice. As already stated, it might be most embarrassing to His Majesty's Government (who, pending further consideration, must inevitably pursue a policy of opportunism where possible Soviet aggression or intrigue against Persia is concerned) if this suggestion were to be made in any quarter.

5. The more, therefore, that General Nuri can be discouraged from pursuing these schemes the better, and if such arguments as it is open to you to use upon the subject fail to convince him, I see no harm in his learning a lesson from the Turkish Government.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 477. Repeated to Angora, No. 691; Cairo, No. 895; and Tehran, No. 147.)

[E 8095/554/93]

No. 135.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 845.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, December 20, 1939.

I ASKED Minister for Foreign Affairs a few days ago whether there was any question of Nuri Pasha coming here. He said he had no reason to think there was. He had received information from Bagdad that Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs is anxious to come, but the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs intends to take no initiative and no invitation will be extended.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Tehran and Cairo.)

[E 8096/554/93]

No. 136.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 846.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, December 22, 1939.

MY telegram No. 845.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me last night that he has now received from General Nuri a lengthy communication containing suggestions for an alliance between Iraq, Turkey and Egypt, and, as I could gather, further proposals. His Excellency could only speak in very general outline and somewhat vaguely, but has promised to give me details as soon as possible. In the meantime, I do not guarantee strict accuracy of the above. Nuri also proposed either that he should come to the country, or that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should visit Bagdad. The Minister for Foreign Affairs did not seem at all enthusiastic, and I said that you had been aware that suggestion had been under consideration by Nuri, and that you saw grave objections to it, largely from the point of view of Iran.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Tehran and Cairo.)

[E 8416/544/93]

No. 137.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 859.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, December 23, 1939.

MY telegram No. 846.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has now given me details.

2. According to the report of a conversation between General Nuri and the Turkish Minister at Bagdad, General Nuri said that, if a meeting of Saadabad Powers was ruled out, there should be conversations between the Turkish and Iraqi Governments. He would be prepared to come to Angora for the purpose.

3. General Nuri's arguments in support of this suggestion were not very clear. They appear to have been based on the danger to Iran, Iraq and Turkey from Russia. He suggested a closer understanding, to include Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, he dropped the last, and advocated an agreement between Turkey, Egypt and Iraq.

4. Turkish Minister, speaking personally, argued that this would do great damage to the Saadabad Pact. General Nuri disagreed. He said that he did not contemplate immediate result, but he [? group omitted] combination of States might be achieved in ten or fifteen years; economic matters could be dealt with first, as a beginning.

5. Finally, General Nuri dropped Egypt out also, and concentrated on an agreement between Turkey and Iraq. The Turkish Minister, speaking officially, said that this would be displeasing to Iran.

6. I gave the Minister for Foreign Affairs your views as indicated in your telegram No. 846 to Cairo and No. 461 to Bagdad. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is in agreement with these, and I do not think that his answer to General Nuri will be encouraging.

7. Full report by bag.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Tehran, and Cairo.)